Method before ontology: Reconstructing the core of eliminative materialism

Abstract

William Ramsey’s recent account of eliminative materialism (EM) treats EM as an ontological thesis about what mental kinds do not exist. I argue, by contrast, that the core of EM in Quine, Feyerabend, Rorty, and Stich is methodological: it concerns how to revise, replace, or retire psychological posits under scientific pressure, with any ontological eliminations derivative of method. A close reading of the founding texts shows that inventory‐style realism and a fixed priority of metaphysics over method misclassify EM’s commitments. Restoring a method‐first order clarifies confusions that have shaped the debate and aligns “scientific eliminativism” with the founders’ method‐first orientation. The result is a historically grounded reorientation: EM primarily counsels conceptual re‐engineering in light of successful science, rather than a priori ontological austerity.