Rational force of analogy/qiyas in law: Logic of law in Islamic and contemporary legal reasoning

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University of Windsor

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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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Analogy is an inherently fragile form of argument, as the conclusion is derived from similarity, while overlooking dissimilarities. Yet law necessarily depends upon analogical reasoning to ensure consistency and predictability in its rulings. This entanglement of fragility and necessity compels the legal traditions, like Islamic and common laws, to formulate a justification of analogy when applied in law. The most successful justification, I argue, is the one that is anchored in logic. This logical grounding is a shared feature among contemporary legal theorist Scott Brewer, the informal logician Douglas Walton, and the 12th-century Muslim jurist-logician al-Ghazzali, as all three insist that the justification of legal analogy is logical. This paper aims to trace the thematic contours of their explanation in order to demonstrate, drawing primarily on al-Ghazzali's two works: al-Mustasfa fi Usul al-Fiqh and al-Muntahal fi al-Jadal, that al-Ghazali's model of analogical reasoning effectively integrates key elements of Brewer's abduction model and Walton's model of defeasible argument.

L'argumentation par analogie est intrinsèquement fragile, car elle tire ses conclusions de la similitude, tout en négligeant les différences. Pourtant, le droit repose nécessairement sur le raisonnement analogique pour garantir la cohérence et la prévisibilité de ses décisions. Ce paradoxe entre fragilité et nécessité oblige les systèmes juridiques, comme le droit islamique et le common law, à justifier l'utilisation de l'analogie. Je soutiens que la justification la plus pertinente est celle qui repose sur la logique. Ce fondement logique est un point commun aux théories contemporaines de Scott Brewer, au modèle de logique non formelle de Douglas Walton et à la pensée du juriste et logicien musulman du XIIe siècle, al-Ghazālī, qui insistent tous sur le caractère logique de la justification de l'analogie juridique. Cet article vise à analyser les fondements conceptuels de ces théories, en s'appuyant principalement sur les deux ouvrages d'alGhazālī : al-Mustaṣfā fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh et al-Muntaḥal fī al-Jadal, afin de démontrer que le modèle de raisonnement analogique d'al-Ghazālī intègre efficacement les éléments clés du modèle d'abduction de Brewer et du modèle d'argumentation réfutable de Walton.

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Anahtar Kelimeler

Abduction, Analogy, Comparative Legal Reasoning, Defeasibility, Qiyas

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Informal Logic

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45

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3

Künye

Komath, M. (2025). Rational force of analogy/qiyas in law: Logic of law in Islamic and contemporary legal reasoning. Informal Logic, 45(3), 423-448. https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v45i3.10212

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