Introduction

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The context

Politically motivated violence is an apex national security threat. Political violence, especially terrorism, does not emerge suddenly. In an environment of grievance and aspirations, it is nurtured and developed through indoctrination and support. The prelude to violence and terrorism is ideological extremism and exclusivism supported with sustained resources. If governments can effectively manage the threat of exclusivism, the threat of extremism, terrorism and violence will diminish. The strategy to manage political violence and its most vicious form, terrorism, is upstream intervention.

As terrorism has taken a more ferocious and destructive turn in the early 21st century, governments should invest in prevention. The key is to manage extremism and exclusivism, the precursors of violence and terrorism. Otherwise, nations will suffer from brutal attacks on innocent civilians that will eventually disrupt social harmony. Most of the attacks create fear and panic, resulting in ethnic and religious polarization.

With the rise of the Islamic State and its predecessor, Al-Qaeda, the world is facing the scourge of global terrorism. In parallel, there is communal mistrust and distrust, which damage social cohesion and national unity. Beneath the iceberg is the extremism and exclusivism challenge that many governments has chosen not to understand or address.

If not the tier-one national security challenge, terrorism today is a major security issue for most countries around the world. This is because violent ideologies have penetrated every country and vulnerable populations. The driver of radicalization is ideology. The terrorists exploit extremist and

exclusivist ideologies to legitimize and justify attacks. Ideology, a strong force which could indoctrinate rational people to act out of norms, needs to be countered. Countering ideology and promoting moderation, seeking to engage hearts and minds, is always an uphill battle. Due to the difficulties of engaging the public, government cannot do it alone. The governments should work in partnership with a range of actors – community and other – to touch the public. To reach out to the community, governments need a strategic framework for preventing and countering terrorism. Counter-radicalization and deradicalization will only work if governments can seed and sustain community partnerships. The government–public interface is through religious, educational, and media organizations. With recent changes in the socioeconomic and political landscape around the world, the government has no option but to build community partnerships. The epicentre of preventing and countering violent extremism (PCVE) has shifted to society. Who can deliver PCVE programmes to touch the vulnerable communities?

To influence the human terrain, the government–civil society partnership is paramount. With the rise of the Islamic State in June 2014 and its mastery of the digital space, youth from all over the world travelled to Iraq, Syria and other conflict zones to fight. To reach out to the public, governments had to build partnerships with a range of actors. To identify the key players, initiatives and strengths and weaknesses of the past and ongoing initiatives, this book focuses on the role of civil society organizations (CSOs) engaged in prevention and response. Such divisive ideologies are detrimental to social harmony and threaten all communities. If governments around the world fail to address the problem of violence and extremism, societies will suffer polarization. There will be hatred, prejudice and suspicion. Partnership between state and society should be carefully nurtured and supported to ensure social cohesion and resilience.

The challenge

Both religion- and ethnicity-based exclusivism and extremism is difficult to detect and hard to control. Often online and offline ideology infects segments of communities. If there no counter- or alternative narrative, the vicious and virulent ideology crystallizes, resulting in cells and networks

that precipitates in attacks. As ideological penetration is subtle and difficult to identify, it requires community vigilance and collaboration with government. The government, working in partnership with community and civil society organizations, can prevent, pre-empt and respond. As opposed to a kinetic response, a calibrated response can neutralize such threats seeking to polarize society. With a society segregating into pockets of ethnicities and religions, a country will never reach the desired development. Working with CSOs, government should exercise administrative control and ensure communal harmony and societal integration.

With the fragmentation of communities along ethnic and religious lines, the extremist and exclusivist ideologies needs to be countered. In addition to countering, government and partners should promote moderation. Building bridges across the ethnic and religious divide is imperative for every country to maintain communal harmony and social stability. Major steps need to be taken by every entity – government, intergovernmental organizations (United Nations and other bodies), regional organizations (European, Middle Eastern, African as well as Asian) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to foster ethnic and religious understanding and amity.

The challenge is for government to reach the grassroots. To keep the communities together, those CSOs with expertise and experience in PCVE space can make a difference. The CSO can develop approaches and strategies to engage, interlock and influence communities to enhance people-to-people linkages. Local intelligence can empower CSOs to develop and deliver targeted responses. Based as they are in the community, CSOs can take preventive and corrective steps in the communities. The CSOs are well positioned to influence and support community efforts from cohesion to resilience. CSO have the contacts to create an environment that fosters harmony and prevents and counters violent extremism, but they need the resources to reach and effect change.

Building social cohesion is a long-term effort by various entities – government, the private sector and CSOs. Without private sector or government funding and government security, CSO cannot operate in conflict zones. The PCVE initiatives – community engagement to prevent and counter extremism and terrorist rehabilitation to deradicalize – are vital to control threats. If ordinary civilians are radicalized, they will endorse,

advocate, support, conduct and participate in violence. If terrorists are not rehabilitated, they will continue to pose a threat. To nurture an environment hostile to violent extremism and related ideas, the PCVE programmes can build social harmony and resilience. Similarly, after rehabilitation, the peaceful reintegration of terrorists and extremists to the community, is vital to deactivate the threat. With government in the background, the CSOs are best placed to interact with the population to prevent violent extremism in the community. Although the criminal justice and prisons system should spearhead the rehabilitation efforts, to engage and deradicalize the terrorists, the CSOs can play the most vital role.

Rehabilitation

While community engagement remains the highest priority, without a capacity for rehabilitation, the threat will persist. As crucial instruments for protecting the population from ideological contamination, the terrorists should be isolated. While in custody, the terrorists should be engaged from their extremist ideas. The strategy is also to engage the immediate family of terrorist and impart universal values to prevent manipulation by terrorist organizations. To disengage terrorists from violent action and families from supporting them, the first step is to map their radical ideologies and identify the misunderstood concepts. The findings will be useful in developing the counter-ideology to replace their negative thoughts with positive thoughts. The findings and the counter-narrative will help to build an appropriate defence mechanism in the society.

The concept of rehabilitation is highly contested among scholars. The term itself lacks clear definition and there is no consensus on what constitutes successful rehabilitation as mentioned by Schmid (2013). Academics and practitioners tend to use terms like “deradicalization”, “counter-radicalization”, and “rehabilitation” interchangeably. One distinction is that rehabilitation efforts occur after groups or individuals commit criminal acts, whereas counter-radicalization policies and programmes are pre-emptive, seeking to dissuade individuals at risk of radicalization (Schmid, 2005). Hence, Schmid also clearly explained that the rehabilitation also differs from disengagement. The former includes a cognitive component and change in ideology, whereas individuals who

disengage from violent groups and behaviours may not be considered deradicalized (Schmid 2013). Here, the terms “deradicalization” and “rehabilitation” are used to encompass the process of reintegrating individuals who have let violent extremist groups back into their societies (Schmid 2013).

Omar Ashour (2015) published an interesting article in the *Washington Post* entitled “Deradicalization: Revisited”. He discussed the effectiveness and challenges of rehabilitation programmes in the United States. Ashour refers to rehabilitation as a process of relative change, one in which a radical group reverses its ideology and delegitimizes the use of violent methods to achieve political goals, while also moving towards an acceptance of gradual social, political and economic changes within a pluralist context. However, scholars have never agreed on one precise definition and they have been the subject of debate within the security community. Rehabilitation is also defined as “the social and psychological process whereby an individual’s commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity” (Lazreg, 2017). It can be achieved through specific procedures that involves moving people from violent extremism to moderate and tolerant person. In general, the term "rehabilitation" should be applied only in the context of individuals who have not only become radicalized but have also made, or are in the process of making, a transition from the realm of rhetoric and ideas to the reality of terrorism or violent extremism (Clutterbuck, 2015). Finding ways to deal with such individuals in order to curtail their activities is vital, with the primary aim being to persuade them to disengage from the use of violence and also the desire to use it (Clutterbuck, 2015).

Clutterbuck also discusses the way to find a suitable definition of rehabilitation, it has proven to not only become the only challenge for practitioners of counter-terrorism but also to be taken into cognisance is the fact that they must take a wider perspective on radicalization that considers more than the process or measures to be put in place (Clutterbuck, 2015). Measures are dependent upon a variety of factors, including profiling database, geographical location, and the type of behaviour and contingencies that they are designed to address (Clutterbuck, 2015).

Understanding the strategic nature of the real problem is a more realistic and sure way to finding a precise way to remedy the problem. One of the

major problems for practitioners in this field is that they don’t understand the real problem, so they give the wrong medicine for the disease.

In this realm, there is the need to critically analyze the practical and theoretical aspects of rehabilitation programmes and the methods being employed to bring extremists and terrorist back to a non-violent life (Kohler, 2017). Adopting the method of using a coherent theory of radicalization and deradicalization which integrates existing programmes into a typology and methodology regarding the effects and concepts behind rehabilitation. Kohler (2017) suggested practitioners have to be in tune about a current state of the art assessment of deradicalization programmes. It thereby functions as a unique guide for practitioners and policy-makers in need of evaluation or construction of such programs (Kohler, 2017).

The major aim of people involved in rehabilitation is to consolidate the existing scholarship on deradicalization and to move the field forward by proposing a coherent theory of deradicalization, including ways to measure effectiveness, standard methods and procedures, different actors of such programmes and cooperation at a national and international level (Kohler, 2017). Furthermore, Koehler said, “every single person has to identify how, when and why rehabilitation programs work, how they can be built and structured, and to identify their limitations”.

Community engagement

The scale, magnitude and intensity of threat in the early 21st century has prompted governments to invest in developing capabilities to mitigate the threat of politically motivated violence, especially terrorism. The threat is based in conflict zones and in radicalized segments of the communities. With the growing severity of the evolving terrorist threat, more governments are realizing the need to address the ideological and operational threat proactively. The large-scale politicization, radicalization and mobilization of communities is a challenge for all governments.

The mastery of exploring social media by the Islamic State has enabled worldwide radicalization and recruitment. Starting in 2013, some 50,000 foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and their families travelled to Iraq and Syria. Although tens of thousands of FTFs were killed in the battlefields of the Levant in the Middle East, thousands of Islamic State fighters still

remain in theatre. They are in captivity or in hiding. In parallel, Hayʹat Taḥrīr al-Shām, also known as Al-Qaeda in Syria, operate in Iraq and Syria. Both these movements present a formidable threat. Like the Islamic State, the HTS also host several thousand FTFs and their families.

The returnees are hailed as heroes and they in return radicalize their family and friends. The returnees form a part of the iconography. Due to the lack of legislation, rehabilitation is not mandatory. There is a lack of evidence of the atrocities committed overseas by the returning FTFs. Due to the legal limitations, not all can be prosecuted. To protect the communities from the returnees, governments have no option but to work with community partners to address these threats. It is both to deradicalize the returnees and also to engage those vulnerable to radicalization in the community.

Both Islamic State and Al-Qaeda and their affiliates worldwide continues to radicalize their followers online. While a few hundred have staged “lone wolf” and “wolf pack” attacks both in the Muslim migrant/diaspora and in territorial communities, others have formed their own threat groups or joined others. Due to the large influx of returning foreign fighters, the threat has expanded. The greatest challenge is the consequent radicalization of local communities. As radicalization challenges governments and societies, governments need to develop counter-radicalization programmes to engage communities both in the physical and cyber space. Community engagement programmes is the key to preventing and countering the offline and online threat. Governments and CSOs need to work with three sectors: the formal and informal education sector to integrate communities; religious institutions to regulate the mosques and madrasahs; and digital space to promote the message of moderation, toleration and co-existence.

Capacity Building

Today, rehabilitation and community engagement is a global imperative. For rehabilitation and community engagement to succeed, it should be an enterprise. Multiple agencies must come together to deliver effective services to affected and influenced populations. The Asian experience in community engagement and terrorist rehabilitation is a State–CSO partnership. In Asia, the approaches to community engagement and

rehabilitation is varied based on experiences of countries to fight the current and emerging threat.

The efforts at community engagement and rehabilitation programmes are still lacking and inadequate. Although there is greater community awareness and government interest to build both community engagement and rehabilitation programmes, the progress varies. Compared to the threat, the efforts to seed new programmes and upgrade existing programmes is limited. To build community engagement programmes is relatively easy, but to build rehabilitation programmes is a challenge.

Most countries have visions for rehabilitation but no real rehabilitation programmes. Among the only countries to have developed an ad hoc and unstructured rehabilitation programmes. Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Singapore, China, and Pakistan offer comprehensive rehabilitation programmes. Although IS has recruited from more than 120 countries, less than a fifth of these countries have developed at least ad hoc programmes for rehabilitation of terrorist and extremists. Countries like Thailand, Bangladesh and Maldives have visions, but they do not have structured deradicalization programmes in place. At the heart of building such programmes are creative and innovative leadership, dedicated organizations, and government–community partnership.

The sustained rise of a contemporary wave of terrorism has caused scholars and practitioners to begin referring to rehabilitation as a crucial aspect of countering terrorism. However, the number of books on the subject covering approaches or modes of rehabilitation is a handful. While previous studies are useful, this work updates the readers on the current and emerging developments in community engagement and rehabilitation, especially the state–society partnership. The focus is on the role of CSO working in PCVE.

In this context, the rehabilitation of terrorists is carried out through seven modes. They are: (1) social rehabilitation, where family and community play a role in the detainee’s journey to reintegrate into the community; (2) psychological rehabilitation, where detainees work with psychologist to re-establish their capacity to function in society, achieve self-efficacy that lead to positive behaviour transformation; (3) religious rehabilitation: as a result of the detainees who have used religion to justify violence as well as the how terrorist groups used ideologies that are religious in nature – religious clerics extricate these misunderstood concepts and impart correct teachings

of these ideologies; (4) educational rehabilitation, which provides the detainees the opportunities to gain academic qualifications or gain entrepreneurship knowledge to be economically independent; (5) vocational rehabilitation, which allows detainees to acquire new skills or upgrade current skills to gain employment upon release; (6) creative arts therapy, which uses art themes for therapeutic interventions and transformative journeys to reintegration into the community; and (7) sports & recreational rehabilitation which is employed to channel detainees' energy to perform physical sports activities in order to improve their self-esteem.

The rehabilitation approaches are employed by government agencies working with CSOs depending on the recommendations, the availability of resources and acceptance by the implementing bodies. Opportunities for utilizing rehabilitation should be made available at different times. A rehabilitation programme can be prescribed as part of a prison sentence or an alternative to incarceration; this restrictive condition can be determined through a risk assessment approach.

Building rehabilitation capabilities requires leadership, a legal framework, a dedicated organization, and infrastructure and expert resources. Increasingly, the world has started to understand that no single agency can develop and implement a comprehensive rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is an enterprise where the government, the private sector, community organizations and academia, work together in collaboration. There is recognition that the prison responsible for institutionalizing incarceration is the body responsible for holding the offender. Although prisons are identified as the custodial setting, they often lack the knowledge and skills to transform those they hold.

Under the different modes of rehabilitation, diverse partners come together to develop different approaches to intervention. To develop and sustain these multiple interventions, visionary leadership is central. At all levels, a goal-oriented rather than a rule-oriented leadership is essential to success. Creative and innovative leadership, and not classical and bureaucratic leadership, is at the heart of collaboration. If the three streams are to work together, the key is to understand and manage the risks and yet invest and persist. Rehabilitation is a risk, but it is a risk worth taking as it provides the common good for the individual, family, workplace and community.

About the chapters

The state–society partnership to build security and stability is a work in progress. Compared to government, CSOs' capacity to reach the hearts and minds of the human terrain is huge. The CSOs play a pivotal role in preventing and countering exclusivism, extremism and terrorism. With threat entities – groups, networks, cells and personalities – harming societies, governments need to enhance its partnerships with CSOs. To support government efforts, progressive CSOs, academic think tanks, and private security companies have come forward to play their role. They have inherent capabilities in 'soft' power that can be applied appropriately to unite communities. Government strategies of using 'hard' power alone will be of limited and enduring value.

By integrating the CSOs into the counter-terrorism enterprise, governments can engage communities and reintegrate radicalized individuals back into society. To deradicalize terrorists, the CSOs can build a support systems to include spouses, families, and extended families. To enhance and expand its influence to counter the ideology, CSOs can also enlist friends, communities and the society. The CSO capacity to reach out and shape societal thinking can expand with resources and leadership. In order to ensure the success of PCVE initiatives, their policies, plans, approaches and strategies will have to be developed carefully. The choice of a framework for a PCVE programme is by no means straightforward. It is intricate and requires a deep study of each context.

In chapter 1, Professor Rohan Gunaratna discusses CSO programmes conducted in Asia, namely Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Professor Gunaratna discusses the origin and background of active CSO in PCVE programmes in these countries. He focused his discussion on both state and civil society initiatives.

Professor Mizan Aslam, in chapter 2, examined the role of CSO in PCVE programmes. This chapter discussed the problem of PCVE is no longer an issue which becomes exclusive to certain government entities such as the Police, Army or Anti-Terrorism Elite Units, but it has also become the responsibility of every small unit of the community, which is the individual. Each and every member of the community has a role to play in helping government in handling terrorism threats and PCVE. An increasing awareness amongst the community has made this a subject of more

interesting discussion. In fact, the world administration towards PCVE today has changed; no longer using the ‘top-down’ policy in nature, it will be driven by the ‘bottom-millions’ policy generated by most countries in approaches concerning deradicalization and anti-terrorism.

In chapter 3, Dr. Hettiarachi introduced criticism of the CSO initiatives in Sri Lanka. The government initiated a multi-phase programme that included a humanitarian phase, then a socioeconomic phase, and finally a political engagement phase. The State pursued this in partnership with community engagement programmes to build resilience in the community. The author also includes criticism from international and the non-governmental organizations abroad have made about Sri Lankan responses, including political lobbying and advocacy activities conducted by LTTE, front, cover and sympathetic organizations. Dr. Hettiarachi also brilliantly discussed about the people who demanded a secure nation with economic stability, which led to a change in government on 16 November 2019. Against this backdrop, a major objective of this chapter is to analyse the challenges posed by the LTTE remnants, causative factors, apathy in responding to the rise in violent extremism, counter-productive measures initiated to address these factors, the current strategy of the government to manage and mitigate the threat and recommendations to ensure the safety and well-being of the community.

In Chapter 4, Dr. Ummu Atiyah and Seniwati highlighted the strategy of counter-terrorism using a study of Islamic policy in Malaysia and Indonesia. This chapter also discussed moderate approaches by gender-based CSOs. The addition of this chapter aims not only at eradication, but also on recovery, mitigation, institutional prevention, and supervision. As the threats of terrorism continues, countries, Malaysia and Indonesia without exception, have ventured into new ways of dealing with it. It is a state–society partnership in dealing with terrorism, which could be treated as a prevention. This chapter also discussed women’s involvement in PCVE, not only to possess economic resilience, but also to be able to educate their family and societal members about the danger of terrorism. Finally, both authors give an extensive explanation of the government’s ventures into non-state partnership to prevent extremism and terrorism.

In chapter 5, Dr. Stanis and his co-authors outlined the continuous effort done by Indonesian state–society entities, considering their success story and also the roles played by various departments and organizations in

rehabilitation initiatives for countering radicalism. This chapter also focuses on rehabilitation initiatives to terrorist inmates in four separate stages: identification, rehabilitation, re-education, and reintegration. The implementation of terrorist rehabilitation programmes requires collaboration between Indonesian government institutions such as the National Counterterrorism Agency, the Indonesian National Police, correctional institutions, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Social Affairs, non-governmental organizations, and the communities. Finally, Dr. Stanis et al. discussed the way forward from collaborative state–society governance, it is expected that, first, the terrorist rehabilitation programme is carried out collaboratively; second, there will no longer be any acts of terror by recurrent perpetrators, and, last, the terrorists who have been rehabilitated shall be agents of change in de-radicalization programmes.

Dina, in chapter 6, focussed on post-general election PCVE issues and programmes in Malaysia. Despite the continued support from various government agencies, Malaysia faces the sustained threat of terrorism. It can be seen through the rise of terrorist-related detainees in nine primary prisons throughout Malaysia. According to Dina in this chapter, she recommended that the Malaysian government should develop strong entrepreneurial programmes with relevant CSO as a tool for countering radicalism. A critical component for ex-detainees to succeed in their reintegration programmes will be in building their economic capabilities. Dina unfolded a social enterprise key success factors in developing social intervention mechanisms that successfully disengage terrorists and help them pursue a post-release career. Dina also focused this initiative on Malaysian youths and women who are always preyed on by terrorist networks, both locally and globally.

Fajar et al. precisely examined the Indonesia’s long journey in religious rehabilitation in chapter 7. Fajar et al. explained that Indonesia have been dealing with terrorists since the idea of Darul Islam Indonesia (DII), which escalated after the independence, and continued until Islamic State (ISIS) and the Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), with numerous bombings and attacks. According to Fajar et al., more than 60 percent of the detained terrorists were youths, either schoolchildren or university students. Fajar et al. in this chapter also considered major initiatives in dealing with terrorism in Indonesia, with the main objectives being to deradicalize, disengage and

reintegrate, have been used. These have focused, in particular, on using the psychological approach with university students. Success in the efforts to manage terrorism threats in the future depends highly on the unity and cooperation amongst the authorities and general public. Fajar et al. believed that students can also assist in PCVE if they were nurtured accordingly, and understand every action taken and activities surrounding them.

In the final chapter, Iftekharul Bashar canvassed the strategy of counter-terrorism using the state–society approach in Bangladesh. This chapter also discussed on moderate or *wasatiyyah* approaches by CSO. The addition of this chapter aims not only at eradication but also at recovery, mitigation, institutional, prevention, and supervision. As the threats of terrorism continues especially during the current time of the pandemic, pressures to which Bangladesh is no exception, have ventured into new ways of dealing with it. It is a state–society partnership in dealing with terrorism which could be treated as an effective form of prevention.

Conclusion

This book is a collection of case studies on non-state counter-terrorism. The focus is on PCVE programmes by CSOs in the Asia region. The multitude of successes can be seen through the examples on the chapters of this book. Based on empirical research, various case studies by the contributors highlight experiences and best practices aligning with strengths and weaknesses in CSO initiatives. An understanding of the issues and challenges facing CSO in PCVE are debated.

The Western-led counter-terrorism response has been largely lethal and kinetic. It has failed to produce the desired effects and outcome, both in the battlefield and off the battlefield. The problem of radicalization is not solved by locking up radicalized individuals,. After several years behind bars, unless deradicalized, they might end up again in a new battlefield. Extremists are smart and dynamic in manipulating legal gaps and societal loopholes. With CSOs coming into the picture, a bridge between the government and community has been built. The community, specifically the family, plays a pertinent role in establishing co-operation between the inmate and the rehabilitation effort. Family bonding has been a main pillar for inmates who want to denounce violent extremism. The effort to re-

establish human capacity and function in society can be achieved when the inmate transforms. Reforming an inmate to a peaceful state of mind and developing favourable attitudes towards life requires both time and effort. Rehabilitation has to be focused on personality and the welfare of the beneficiary, especially in rehabilitating his or her ideology. Most beneficiaries can be transformed only through a comprehensive approach to rehabilitation.

As the surrounding environment is key, PCVE always faces challenges, even when deradicalization achieves their objectives. Deradicalization efforts in custody will endure only if the surrounding environment is sterile. Counter-radicalization of population is a must for deradicalized beneficiaries to maintain course. There is also a risk of recidivism, whereby the beneficiaries who appear to be disengaged or even deradicalized become re-engaged or re-radicalized by terrorist groups (Altier, et al., 2015). Continuous engagement by CSOs is essential in curbing the terrorism menace. With changes in policy and law in the foreseeable future, CSOs role in PCVE will be on the global counter-terrorism or peace-building agenda. Although states have the ultimate responsibility to maintain security and stability, CSOs will increasingly play a vital role in counter-terrorism and peace-building. In partnership with government, CSOs needs to develop clear policies in the implementation of related programmes and activities. From school to university, followed by working life, government and CSOs should raise public awareness by engaging students and employers to be alert and vigilant. A more prudent and thoughtful approach should be taken by CSOs to engage the vulnerable segments of society such as the women, children, teenagers. The CSOs can co-opt education leaders, religious scholars, entrepreneurs and other community influencers to make a difference.

With violent extremism and terrorism evolving, the threat mutates. In God-driven movements, the threat has not diminished with the death of the founders of the terrorist movements. Although CSOs are not equipped to operate on the ground in conflict zones, they can offer limited assistance. They can raise awareness by operating in cyberspace both to raise awareness and to enhance public understanding. This is even more important for children and youth living in conflict areas where they are radicalized and recruited. Similarly, radical communities in conflict zones can be disengaged and deradicalized by CSOs with PCVE expertise.

With its global expansion, the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda movements will continue to challenge both governments and societies in the foreseeable future. The approaches and strategies preventing, countering and rehabilitating terrorists and extremists should remain dynamic. Unlike Al-Qaeda and IS-centric groups that operate openly in the battlefields, they operate discretely away from the battlefields. As large movements with a mastery of social media, their scale, magnitude and intensity of radicalization is appreciable and growing. Terrorism continues to exploit both the physical and digital domains. Terrorist operatives who are free and inmates who are in custody (as well as their supporters) continue the fight. As long as the grievances persist and ideology remains intact, they will continue to participate and support the fight to different degrees. State–CSO partnerships working together has proven effective to mitigate terrorist recruitment and radicalization. The cooperation, collaboration and partnerships have saved numerous individuals who were vulnerable to indoctrination and terrorist messaging. Radicalized individuals need a wider spectrum of interventions for effective custodial and community rehabilitation. Prison is not sufficient to deradicalize them. Community institutions should offer counseling to prevent relapse. The government needs extensive and collaborative approaches with CSOs to make a difference. Both counter-radicalization and deradicalization are major weapons of counter-terrorism. To produce lasting results, the approaches and strategies should be holistic and comprehensive.

After a review of the battlefield successes and failures, it is apparent that the insurgents and terrorists have endured. Today, there is a shift in the thinking that the formula for defeating extremism and terrorism is 90 percent ‘soft’ power and 10 percent ‘hard’ power. Although in the battlefields, it is necessary to use force, off the battlefields, the partnerships with CSOs are working to contain the threat. The US-centric approach of using overwhelming firepower failed to win the battles and wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and in other theatres. Government partnership with Civil Society Organizations enables numerous preventive and curative mechanisms instead of focusing on military and security approaches.

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