

IBN HALDUN UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION

MASTER THESIS

**A MIXED METHOD ANALYSIS OF THE
KPOIFICATION IN ANIES BASWEDAN'S CAMPAIGN
FOR 2024 INDONESIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION**

HAURA QONITA AZZAHRA KEMORA

THESIS SUPERVISOR
ASSOC. PROF. MEHMET KARANFILOGLU

ISTANBUL, 2024

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FOR 2024 INDONESIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION**

by

HAURA QONITA AZZAHRA KEMORA

**A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in
Communication**

**THESIS SUPERVISOR
ASSOC. PROF. MEHMET KARANFILOGLU**

ISTANBUL, 2024

APPROVAL PAGE

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in New Media and Communication.

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This is to confirm that this thesis complies with all the standards set by the School of Graduate Studies of Ibn Haldun University.

Date of Submission

Seal/Signature

ACADEMIC HONESTY ATTESTATION

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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ÖZ

ANIES BASWEDAN'IN 2024 ENDONEZYA CUMHURBAŞKANLIĞI SEÇİM KAMPANYASININ KPOPİFİKLEŞTİRİLMESİNİN ANALİZİNDE KARMA YÖNTEMİ

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Bu çalışma, Anies Baswedan'ın 2024 Endonezya başkanlık kampanyasına K-pop hayran kültürünün entegrasyonunu ve bunun siyasal katılım üzerindeki etkisini incelemektedir. Araştırma, bu fenomenin çevrimiçi ve çevrimdışı siyasi faaliyetler üzerindeki etkilerini anlamayı amaçlamaktadır ve yaratıcılık, bilgi yayma, iletişim ve sivil güçlendirme konularına odaklanmaktadır. Çalışma iki ana soruyu ele almaktadır: @aniesbubble Twitter hesabının ortaya çıkmasından önce ve sonra Anies Baswedan'a yönelik kamuoyu duyarlılığındaki fark ve K-popifikasyonun siyasal katılım üzerindeki etkisi, Twitter'ın Siyasal Kullanımı (PUT), Siyasal Öz Yeterlilik (PSE), Çevrimiçi Siyasal Faaliyetler (OnP) ve Çevrimdışı Siyasal Faaliyetler (OfP) bağlamında değerlendirilmektedir. Araştırmada karma yöntem kullanılmıştır; SmartPLS ile nicel çıkarımsal analiz ve NodeXL ile nitel ağ ve duygu analizi gerçekleştirilmiştir. Nitel yöntem sonuçları, @aniesbubble hesabından önce daha fazla düğüm ve kenarla daha yüksek bir etkileşim olduğunu, @aniesbubble sonrası ise ağ yoğunluğunun arttığını ve daha fazla bağlantılı bileşen olduğunu göstermiştir, bu da artan etkileşimleri ve daha odaklı bir ağı işaret etmektedir. Duygu analizi, her iki dönemde de ağırlıklı olarak olumsuz duyguların hakim olduğunu, ancak @aniesbubble sonrası #forevery1 ve #aniesfinalstage gibi destekçi odaklı etiketlerle hafif bir iyileşme olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Nicel yöntem sonuçları, Siyasal Öz Yeterlilik (PSE) ve Twitter'ın Siyasal

Kullanımı (PUT) deęişkenlerinin Çevrimdışı Siyasal Kampanyaları (OfP) Çevrimiçi Siyasal Faaliyetler (OnP) aracılığıyla etkilediğini göstermiştir, bu da etkileşimin sadece faaliyetten daha önemli olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Ayrıca, aktif iletişim ve anlamlı etkileşimlerin (OnP) çevrimdışı siyasal faaliyetleri (OfP) artırmada kritik olduğu belirlenmiştir. Bu çalışma, popüler kültürün siyasal kampanyalara entegre edilmesinin gençleri mobilize etme ve siyasal katılımı artırma potansiyelini ortaya koymaktadır. Gelecekteki araştırmalar, sosyal medyanın ve popüler kültürün siyasetteki gelişen rolüne dair daha fazla içgörü sağlamak amacıyla bu tür stratejilerin uzun vadeli etkilerini ve etkinliğini farklı kültürel ve siyasal bağlamlarda incelemelidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ağ Analizi, Çevrimiçi Siyasal Aktivizm, Kpopifikasyon, Siyasal Kampanya, Siyasal Katılım.

ABSTRACT

A MIXED METHOD ANALYSIS OF THE KPOPIFICATION IN ANIES BASWEDAN'S CAMPAIGN FOR 2024 INDONESIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

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This study explores the integration of K-pop fan culture into Anies Baswedan's 2024 Indonesian presidential campaign, termed "Kpopification," and its influence on political engagement. The research aims to understand how this phenomenon affects online and offline political activities, focusing on creativity, knowledge dissemination, communication, and civic empowerment. The study addresses two main questions: the difference in public sentiment on Anies Baswedan before and after the @aniesbubble Twitter account's emergence and the impact of K-popification on political engagement, considering the Political Use of Twitter (PUT), Political Self-efficacy (PSE), Online Political Activities (OnP), and Offline Political Activities (OfP). A mixed-method approach was utilized, combining quantitative inferential analysis using SmartPLS with qualitative network and sentiment analysis via NodeXL. Qualitative method results indicated an initial higher engagement with more vertices and edges before @aniesbubble, while post-@aniesbubble, the network showed higher graph density and more connected components, suggesting increased interactions and a more focused network. Sentiment analysis revealed predominantly negative sentiment in both periods, with a slight improvement post-@aniesbubble, driven by supporter-driven hashtags like #aforevery1 and #aniesfinalstage. Quantitative method results indicated Political Self-Efficacy (PSE) and Political Use of Twitter (PUT) influence Offline Political Campaigns (OfP) through Online Political Activities (OnP),

highlighting the importance of engagement over mere activity. Furthermore, active communication and meaningful engagement (OnP) are crucial for enhancing offline political activities (OfP). This study underscores the potential of integrating popular culture into political campaigns to mobilize youth and enhance political participation. Future research should examine the long-term impacts and effectiveness of such strategies in various cultural and political contexts to provide further insights into the evolving role of social media and popular culture in politics.

Keywords: Kpopification, Network Analysis, Online Political Activism, Political Campaigning, Political Participation.



DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my beloved mother, whose unwavering support and encouragement have been the cornerstone of my academic journey. Her sacrifices and constant belief in my potential have propelled me forward through every challenge. To my grandfather, my greatest advocate and source of inspiration, your faith in my abilities and your unwavering support have been invaluable in my pursuit of higher education.

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Finally, to myself, for the perseverance and determination that have brought me to this point. This thesis is a testament to my hard work and dedication. I am proud of what I have accomplished and grateful for the journey that has led me here.

With heartfelt gratitude to each of you for your profound impact on my life, this work is dedicated to you.

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Haura Kemora

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LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AVE	Average Variance Extracted
Betw	Betweenness Centrality
Capres	<i>Calon Presiden</i> ; Means Presidential Candidate in Indonesian
CBSEM	Covariance Based Structural Equation Modeling
CR	Composite Reliability
DPL	Digital Political Labor
EWOM	Electronic Word of Mouth
Golput	<i>Golongan Putih</i> ; Literally Means White Group, Referring to Group of People Who are Abstaining From Voting
HTMT	Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio
K-beauty	Korean Beauty; Refers to Korean Beauty Standard, Cosmetic, Style, etc.
K-drama	Korean Drama; Refers to Korean Television Series
K-fashion	Korean Fashion; Refers to Korean Fashion Style
K-food	Korean Food
K-pop	Korean Pop; Refers to a Music Genre of Korean Pop
K-poper	Fans of Korean Pop
K-pop	A Quantitative Variable, Referring to the K-popification of the Campaign (Kpop) Refers to the Adoption of Elements From K-pop Culture, such as Fan Engagement Strategies and Multimedia Content, to Enhance Political Campaigning.
K-pop1	Communication; One of the K-popification Quantitative Indicator
K-pop2	Creativity; One of the K-Popification Quantitative Indicator
K-pop3	Knowledge; One of the K-Popification Quantitative Indicator
K-pop4	Organization and Civic Power; One of the K-popification Quantitative Indicator
N	The Set of All Nodes in the Network
OfP	A Quantitative Variable, Referring to Offline Political Activities
OnP	A Quantitative Variable, Referring to Online Political Activities
	Pilpres Pemilihan Umum Presiden; Means Presidential Election in Indonesian
PLS	Partial Least Square
PLS-SEM	Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling

PSE	A Quantitative Variable, Referring to Political Self-efficacy
PUT	A Quantitative Variable, Referring to Political Use of Twitter
Sab	The Size of the Standard Error of the Indirect Effect
SEM	Structural Equation Modeling
SRMR	Standardized Root Mean Square Residual
UGC	User-Generated Content
VIF	Variance Inflation Factor
X	A Social Media Platform Formerly Known as Twitter
R ²	The R Square Value Test, or Coefficient of Determination
Q ²	The Total Coefficient of Determination in Path Analysis



CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The advent of the internet has significantly transformed a world once dominated by television, reflected in the significant decline in viewership of television and other traditional mass media channels (Gurevitch et al., 2009). The advancement of internet technology has significantly transformed various aspects of life, with internet usage and access to digital devices continually expanding (Ismawani et al., 2021). The Internet has connected most of humanity, and our "network society" has emerged from the digital revolution and major sociocultural changes. This new freedom, characterized by the interactive flow of messages among many people and the reduction of centralized control, has transformed sociopolitical practices, enabling a new landscape of social and political change (Castells, 2013). The transition from television-centric to digitally mediated publicity has reshaped various aspect in the society, including the dynamics of political communication (Chen, 2015).

Previous research have explore how social media plays in the political landscape (Chen, 2015; Spierings & Jacobs, 2014). Social media, particularly Facebook, played a major role for the first time in the US presidential election in 2012 (Carlisle & Patton, 2013; Ceron et al., 2014). Social media has become a crucial component of electoral campaign (Tang & Lee, 2018), serving as a vital communication channels for candidate (Stier et al., 2018). It acts as a "transmission belts" between citizens and political figures (Schroeder, 2018). Furthermore, social media platforms allow candidates to reach out to voters, mobilize supporters, and influence the public agenda (Stier et al., 2018). Nonetheless, Soon and Samsudin (2016) found that people prefer to seek information and news from television, print media and their online versions over social media, particularly for election and political-related news, due to their perceived trust-worthiness. Therefore, it can be concluded that the media landscape is evolving into an ecological reconfiguration that incorporates social media alongside traditional mass media, rather than completely displacing it (Gurevitch et al., 2009).

1.1. Research Background

The use of internet increases overtime, as reported by Kemp (2024) that Indonesia had 139 million active social media users, which represents 49.9% of the population. Indonesian users primarily use social media for leisure (58.9%), staying in touch with friends and family (57.1%), and following trending topics (48.8%) (Howe, 2024). In politics, social media first played a major role in the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial elections, aiding the campaigns of Joko Widodo and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Tapsell, 2021). This period marked the rise of social media in Indonesian elections, incorporating strategies such as twitter hashtags and YouTube Videos to their campaigns, to boost political participation and civic engagement (Hui, 2020) Social media interaction significantly boosts individuals' interest in political information and participation by enhancing their knowledge and motivating engagement in elections through two-way communication and content sharing (Astuti & Hangsing, 2018).

Social media played a pivotal role in the election campaigns of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) in the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election, transforming Indonesian politics by enabling real-time interaction with voters and broad dissemination of campaign messages (Astuti & Hangsing, 2018; Tapsell, 2021). Platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube were extensively used to share information about the candidates, mobilize supporters, and engage with constituents (Santoso & Wardani, 2021). The success of these campaigns highlighted the effectiveness of social media in reaching a wide audience at a lower cost compared to traditional media (Tapsell, 2021). Social media monitoring services provided valuable insights into voter behavior, which helped refine campaign strategies and contributed to their victories (Saraswati, 2018). However, the rise of social media also made political mudslinging more visible, as evidenced by the smear campaigns against Jokowi and Ahok (Hui, 2020).

Utilizing social media in political activities undoubtedly expands candidates' reach, including reaching fans of Korean pop music (Korean Pop or K-Pop) (Yurcel et al., 2024). Indonesia is reported to be the largest K-pop fanbase globally in Twitter (CNN Indonesia, 2022). According to research found by M. Y. Ahmad et al. (2024) the Korean wave disseminate via social media and exerts influence, particularly on

teenagers worldwide. Korean wave penetrates into Indonesia through various products such as K-pop, K-drama, K-movies, K-fashion, K-food, and K-beauty (H. Wulandari, 2022) K-pop fans, known as K-poppers, extend their community culture beyond K-pop itself, a phenomenon termed K-popification (Sabandar, 2024). This trend has entered politics. In 2021, K-pop fandom in Chile initiated campaign for candidate Gabriel Boric by applying digital campaigns and community events inspired by K-pop fandom mobilization tactics (Muthmainnah, 2024). With less than a month, “K-poppers for Boric” succeeded in gaining awareness, and Boric won the 2021 presidential election with the biggest voters turnover (Soo, 2023). Similarly, “K-pop Stans 4 Leni” campaign was organized to support Leni Robredo in the 2022 Philippine presidential election (Plug, 2023). This demonstrates the effectiveness of K-popification in engaging and mobilizing youth for political participation (Romero, 2021).

Twitter account @aniesbubble initiated campaign supporting Anies Baswedan in 2024 Presidential election, by incorporating K-pop characteristics and cultures. K-popification of Baswedan’s campaign by @aniesbubble and other volunteer groups involve creating merchandise, organizing events akin to K-pop fandom gatherings, and fundraising efforts mirroring those of K-pop fanbases (Shula, 2024). This strategy aims to appeal to young voters, fostering a sense of closeness to politics and encouraging their engagement in political discourse (Briefer, 2024). However, research by Yurcel et al. (2024) suggests that a large following and interactions do not necessarily translate to high voter turnout or support.

1.2. Research Aim and Question

This study seeks to examine the phenomenon of K-popification within Anies Baswedan's 2024 presidential campaign in Indonesia and its influence on both online and offline political engagement. Additionally, it delves into the aspects of creativity, knowledge dissemination, communication, and civic empowerment associated with the K-popification trend. Through this investigation, the research aims to shed light on the intersection of K-pop culture and politics, the dynamics of online and offline political involvement, and the role of social media in facilitating voter mobilization. Therefore, the research investigates the following research questions:

Research Question 1 How do the sentiment and discourse of Anies Baswedan differ before and after the emergence of the Anies Bubble X account, by measuring the positive or negative sentiment metrics, and network analysis?

Research Question 2 How do the precedents and antecedents of the K-popification phenomenon influence Anies Baswedan's 2024 Indonesian Presidential Campaign, focusing on the interactions between the Political Use of Twitter (PUT), Political Self-efficacy (PSE), Online Political Activities (OnP), and Offline Political Activities (OfP)?



CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

The emergence of social media as a prominent tool in election campaigns has led to a reevaluation of traditional communication strategies (Stier et al., 2018). Political actors now utilize social media platforms to disseminate their messages, mobilize supporters, and shape public opinion (Falasca et al., 2019; Fernández Gómez et al., n.d.) This shift reflects a broader trend towards the digitization of political communication, where online platforms play an increasingly central role in shaping electoral outcomes (Brandao, 2022; Spierings & Jacobs, 2014). This section explores the development of political communication, social media usage by political figures and parties, and the impact of social media in politics, by drawing from existing studies and theories. Furthermore, this section goes in-depth on the development of communication during elections in Indonesia, and how election candidates have utilized social media as their campaign tools. Lastly, this section delves into K-popification phenomenon in general and in politics – how it emerges, how it is used, and its impact.

2.1. The Development of Political Communication

Media systems translate the agendas of political elites and citizens into the media agenda, serving as a key mechanism for political responsiveness and change (Schudson, 2011). This responsiveness is essential for the legitimacy of ruling elites, and counter-publics challenge the status quo through media (Fraser, 1990). Schroeder (2018) underscores the importance of politically relevant communication and information, emphasizing that democratic societies should ensure these inputs are representative and not skewed towards powerful elites. The role of media in politics is not limited to traditional formats; digital media has expanded the scope of what is considered 'political,' though traditional media still dominate political responsiveness and inputs (Chadwick, 2013). Media systems have become autonomous from market and political forces, serving various functions in the political, cultural, and economic

systems (Schroeder, 2018). Historically, television played a central role in public life, providing a shared platform for political debates and national events. However, the emergence of digital technologies has led to a dramatic expansion of media choices, challenging the primacy of traditional television channels (Gurevitch et al., 2009). One of the most significant indicators of this change is the decline in television viewership, especially for political news. Research conducted by the Pew Internet & American Life Project revealed that the internet has become a significant source of campaign news for many Americans, with its popularity steadily increasing since 2004, particularly among younger demographics, while television and newspaper usage for election news has remained relatively stagnant (Pew Research Center, 2008).

2.1.1. The “Old” Political Communication

From its inception, television has been viewed as a medium with the potential to transform political communication and contribute to the functioning of democratic societies (Gurevitch et al., 2009). Early commentators like John Scupham emphasized its role in fostering informed and inclusive democracy through rational argumentation and increased civic engagement (Scupham, 1967). Television is seen as a tool for the enrichment of democracy, enabling broader participation in public life. These optimistic assessments were supported by early studies demonstrating that exposure to televised political content enhanced voter knowledge and engagement (Blumler & McQuail, 1968). However, as television became entrenched as a dominant medium, its relationship with politics evolved into one of mutual dependence (Gurevitch et al., 2009).

Politics provided the raw material, while television packaged and disseminated it to audiences, initially with minimal alteration. Over time, spurred by historical events like the Vietnam War and Watergate, television adopted a more critical and interventionist role, challenging political narratives and assuming a co-producer role in shaping political reality. This shift gradually eroded the traditional boundary between observer and participant, empowering television to influence the events it covered (Blumler & McQuail, 1968; Gurevitch et al., 2009). Andriantsoa et al. (2005) observed the private media proliferation of Madagascar since 1990s, which has been dominated by state-controlled media. They explained that the combination of

economic and political liberalization, along with advancements in communication technologies, has led to a notable increase in private media outlets. The proliferation of private media in Madagascar has significantly impacted the political landscape, particularly in terms of democratic reform. Contrary to some theories suggesting that media privatization could consolidate power among entrenched interests and undermine democratic pluralism, the Malagasy experience has shown otherwise. The diverse and competitive private media landscape has facilitated political transitions and improved governance by providing platforms for airing competing views and fostering political debate. During the presidential elections of 1991 and 2001, private media played a crucial role in enabling political change and enhancing government accountability.

In comparison to politician in the 21st century, the cult of Saint Swithun's strategic communication and political efforts in late 10th century England, involving brand creation, fund-raising, message dissemination, and stakeholder engagement, are similar. Through the lens of modern public relations theory, Watson (2008) examined the political communication strategies of the creation of the cult of Saint Swithun by Aethelwold. As the powerful Bishop of Winchester, supported by the King, Aethelwold recognized the importance of gaining the support of those displaced from the churches. He offered them a saintly symbol in Saint Swithun, who represented secular clerical miracle-working. Over time, Aethelwold established the cult of St Swithun as a brand, used internal communications to promote the shrine in Winchester among clergy and monastic orders, produced publications documenting the saint's miracles, and integrated benedictions into the church's daily worship language. This helped spread the messages and reinforced them through frequent repetition. Organizations must communicate effectively with individuals, political actors, and other organizations to ensure survival, minimize risks, maximize opportunities, manage uncertainties, control internal conflicts, and divert outside scrutiny, with many practices being symbolic but essential for providing explanations and legitimization (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Chermak & Weiss (2005) found that police public information officers (PIOs) recognize the media's power and use it to promote their organization, while news personnel appreciate the ease with which police-provided data allows them to produce crime stories. The study highlighted that police perceptions of their relationship with the media are influenced by their ability to use

media power to support their organizational goals. Effective communication and media exploitation are crucial for maintaining a positive relationship.

2.1.2. Political Communication with the Development of New Media

In his book, Schroeder (2018) discusses the relationship between media, digital media, and politics, highlighting their role as an autonomous subsystem that acts as a transmission belt between citizens (or publics) and elites in the political process. Rather than viewing the transition as a displacement of traditional media by digital platforms, it can be seen as an ecological reconfiguration, redefining roles and relationships within the media landscape. With the proliferation of affordable communication technologies, audiences are no longer passive recipients of information but active participants in public discourse (Gurevitch et al., 2009). The transition from traditional to digital media is characterized as a hybrid system where older logics of transmission coexist with newer logics of circulation and negotiation, though traditional media still hold significant sway (Chadwick, 2013). Schroeder (2018) critiques this view, noting that new media allow both political and media elites, as well as political outsiders, to more effectively monitor, respond, and shift political agendas.

The shift towards channel multiplication has profound implications for political communication. With audiences dispersing across various platforms and time-shifting their viewing habits, the once-unified mass audience is now fragmented into distinct issue publics. Individuals can opt out of exposure to topics or perspectives that do not align with their interests or preferences, leading to a diminished role for television as a public sphere (Gurevitch et al., 2009). Adapting the new media, politicians and political parties integrated multi-channelling, which ‘maximizes the benefits of individual sub-media through combining their strengths and mitigating weaknesses’ (Chen, 2015).

The transition from television-centric to digitally mediated publicity has reshaped the dynamics of political communication. Traditional barriers between public and private realms have eroded, leading to a 24/7 presence of mediated publicity. From reality TV to political interviews, the boundaries of the public sphere are constantly being

renegotiated, requiring political actors to adapt to new modes of engagement (Meyrowitz, 1985). The internet has expanded the range of political sources, challenging the traditional gatekeepers of information. And unlike traditional broadcasting, digital platforms enable interactive engagement, allowing audiences to shape and remix content. In the realm of politics, this shift has upended traditional models of message dissemination, as politicians must now contend with the active participation of audiences who can question, challenge, and modify the messages they receive (Gurevitch et al., 2009).

Agenda-setting theory is introduced as a way to understand how media foreground topics, though it is limited in explaining how political agendas are translated between elites and citizens (McCombs, 2013). The competition for political attention is increasing, yet the overall attention space remains limited, affecting the potential for political change (Bimber, 2003). Thompson's concept of a 'struggle for visibility' aligns with this idea but does not fully address the impact of new media on political visibility and change (Thompson, 1995). The rise of what has been termed the "fifth estate" represents a shift towards decentralized reporting and scrutiny, disrupting the traditional power dynamics between broadcast journalists and political elites (Dutton, 2009). The gatekeeping monopoly once held by editors and broadcasters is diminishing as individuals generate their own content and engage in alternative networks of information dissemination. (Gurevitch et al., 2009) Digital technologies have not only transformed the modes of communication but also reshaped the balance of power in political discourse. Access to a diverse array of media platforms and content has empowered marginalized groups, including the young, housebound, and diasporic minorities, by facilitating greater social connections and political engagement (Dutton et al., 2004).

2.1.3. Political Marketing and Public Relations Development

Political marketing scholars have viewed ICT development and internet adaptation through diverse lenses (N. Ahmad & Popa, 2014). Butler and Collins (1994) emphasized media's role in political party positioning strategies, while Wring (1997) highlighted its importance in both selling and market orientations. Newman (1994) underscored media's influence on political messaging and campaigning, with

Strömbäck (2007) seeing media as part of the political market, and Ormrod (2011) considering it an external stakeholder. Political public relations (PR) emphasizes the importance between political entities and their public, as defined by Strömbäck and Kiouisis (2011):

The management process by which an organization or individual actor for political purposes, through purposeful communication and action, seeks to influence and to establish, build, and maintain beneficial relationships and reputations with its key publics to help support its mission and achieve its goals, stresses a focus on relationships between political actors and their publics.

Political public relations (PR) aims not only to bring attention to issues (Curtin, 1999) but also to communicate particular political views and interpretations, aiming to garner public support for policies or campaigns (Froehlich & Rüdiger, 2006). Political public relations employs thematic and persuasion strategies to ensure statements appear correct, explanations plausible, evaluation legitimate, and actions necessary and advantageous (Froehlich & Rüdiger, 2006). Carlisle and Patton (2013) highlights the significant role of an individual's social connections in facilitating political involvement, as they refer to Putnam (2000) analogy of how social networks such as bowling leagues cultivate interpersonal trust and cooperation, which extend throughout interpersonal networks, fostering the potential for civic and political engagement. Political communication researchers argues that digital media features boost political engagement and participation (Carlisle & Patton, 2013), by offering convenience, accessibility to information, online avenues for political expression, and connections with like-minded peers, which potentially appeals those who are dissatisfied with traditional political involvement (Boulianne, 2009). Social media platforms, such as Twitter, allows dialogue and interaction for political public relations to flourish (Fisher, 2016). Falasca et al. (2019) argues that social media enables a novel approach to generating content in the context of political public relations. They refer to the concept of digital political labor and its implications for audience agency. Digital political labor extends the analysis of audience labor to include user-generated content as part of political campaigning. This perspective considers both advertising and user-generated content (UGC) as pivotal dimensions of digital political labor (Caraway, 2011).

2.1.4. Emergence of Social Media as a Political Communication Tool

Political communication has evolved significantly with the advent of social media, ushering in a new era of digital campaigning (Boatwright et al., 2019; Tang & Lee, 2018). Traditional political communication methods such as television, newspapers, and rallies, have been supplemented by social media and other digital platforms (Suiter, 2015). This shift has transformed the landscape of election campaigns, enabling candidates and political parties to reach wider audiences and engage in real-time interactions with voters. (Boatwright et al., 2019)

The integration of social media into election campaigns has significant implications for political theory and practice. Researchers have explored the impact of social media on voter behavior, campaign strategies, and democratic processes (Kovic et al., 2017; Russmann, 2022; Spierings & Jacobs, 2014). They have also examined the role of social media in fostering political polarization, facilitation grassroots mobilization, and shaping the dynamics of public discourse (Ziegler, 2023). Some studies suggest social media impact on political participation leads to limited engagement due to selective exposure and reinforcement effects (Graber, 1996), with user typically interacting with like-minded individuals (Baumgartner & Morris, 2009). Skoric & Zhu (2016) discovered that individuals engaged in social media were more inclined to take part in offline endeavors, such as participating in political dialogues and volunteering to assist political parties.

Studies have highlight the growing significance of social media platforms in providing news alongside traditional sources (Holocomb et al., 2013). Despite increasing criticism towards social media and technology firms for their perceived failure in curbing the spread of misinformation, a significant proportion of Americans still rely on these platforms for news. According to a survey by the Pew Research Center conducted in 2021, just under half (48%) of U.S. adults report obtaining news from social media either “often” or “sometimes” (Walker & Matsa, 2021). Studies over the last decade depict Twitter growing significance during political campaigns (Boatwright et al., 2019; Ceron et al., 2014). Twitter serves as a significant intermediary for news dissemination, production, and consumption (Hermida, 2010). Twitter is frequently utilized for political discourse with opinion leaders, and reflects

voter preferences through keyword frequency (Tumasjan et al., 2010). Furthermore, Twitter serves as crucial platform for gathering political information due to its hyperlinking capabilities such as re-tweet and hashtag (Boatwright et al., 2019).

2.2. Political Figures' Social Media Presence

Researches on social media use of political figures is crucial for understanding the contemporary political communication dynamics and their implications for democratic processes. (Falasca et al., 2019; Fernández Gómez et al., n.d.) Social media enables interactive communication between politicians and the public, emphasizing the creation of meaning through user activities, such as shares and likes (Fisher, 2016). Falasca et al. (2019) argues that social media not only facilitates communication but also serves as a platform for production, such as user-generated content as contribution of digital political labor (DPL). In election campaigns, social media serve multiple purposes beyond merely addressing political topics for a broad audience. These functions include promoting issue positions, showcasing positive personality traits, enhancing name recognition, organizational uses, active campaigning in information spaces, resource collection and allocation, and symbolic purpose (Jungherr, 2016; Kobayashi & Ichifuji, 2015). Unlike static websites or electronic brochure campaigns must harness social media features to demonstrate their modernity and relevance (Stier et al., 2018). That is to say, a significant portion of online campaigning efforts should focus on mobilizing supporters, organizing campaigns, and fulfilling representational goals (Lilleker et al., 2011).

Social media allows politicians to target specific demographic and political characteristics (Diaz et al., 2016), requiring them to tailor their communication strategies to fit their audience and the socio-technical environments of the platforms (Jungherr, 2016). Bode et al. (2016) founds that political figures customize their message content to the topic preference of their immediate communication network, because social media has an interactive environment. Stier et al. (2018) explains that it stems from strategic decision-making aimed at optimizing message effectiveness, or the outcome of the politicians' unintentional uses and gratification. The presence of political figures on social media platforms has reshaped the landscape of political discourse and engagement (Fernández Gómez et al., n.d.; Jungherr, 2016). Politicians

and electoral candidates utilize platforms like Twitter and Facebook to directly communicate with voters, bypassing traditional media intermediaries (Rao, 2020). This phenomenon raises questions about the implications of political figures' social media use for democratic processes, public opinion formation, and political accountability (Brandao, 2022). Pre-modern election campaign methods has been associated with labor-intensive interpersonal communication and amateur involvement. The development of social media platforms allows political parties to strategically blend various campaign approaches (Ziegler, 2023). Political parties in the UK have integrated a modified version of citizen-initiated campaigning, engaging supporters primarily in disseminating content, rather than in its creation or significant involvement in event organizing. This approach allows central party offices to maintain control without fully harnessing the potential of citizen-led campaigning initiatives (Gibson, 2015). That is to say, investigating political figures' social media presence provides insights into the evolving nature of political communication and its impact on governance and society (Baltezarević & Baltezarević, 2022; Bossetta & Schmökel, 2023).

2.2.1. Role of Political Figures' Social Media Use

2.2.1.1. Shaping Public Perception

Political figures' social media presence plays a significant role in shaping public perception and influencing voter attitudes. Through platforms like Twitter and Facebook, politicians can directly communicate their policies, visions, and personal narratives to the electorate (Joa & Yun, 2022). This direct engagement can enhance transparency and accessibility, while also enabling politicians to bypass traditional media gatekeepers (Fernández Gómez et al., n.d.). Twitter is highly utilized by influential figures such as politicians and journalists, who often view it as a valuable tool for news reporting (Stier et al., 2018). Journalists consider Twitter as the “index of public opinion”, indicating that targeted campaign messages on this platform could potentially influence other media outlets (Kreiss, 2014). In their study on Dutch election 2010, Spierings and Jacobs (2014) found that Dutch politicians frequently use social media during election campaigns, and a substantial number of them have significant numbers of followers on platform like Twitter. However, the study

indicates that while social media presence correlates with preference votes, the effect size is relatively modest. Active engagement on social media platforms is crucial for politicians to maximize the impact of their presence.

The potential influence of social media on elections has sparked interest, with studies exploring the concept of “brute force effects” – the idea that increased exposure to candidates through media presence can sway voter behavior (Jungherr, 2016). Kovic et al. (2017) study found that while brute force effects were initially expected to have a minor impact on electoral outcomes, they were more substantial than anticipated. Presence in newspaper and resonance in Facebook were particularly influential. Their study highlights the significance of resonance on social media in influencing electoral outcomes. Engagement with the audience on social media platforms emerges as critical factor in translating online presence into electoral success.

2.2.1.2. Mobilizing Supporters

Brandao (2022) investigated the ability Jair Bolsonaro, president of Brazil from 2019 to 2022, to utilize digital networks to mobilized voters, employing a low-budget communication approach in his presidential campaign. According to Mudde (2004), in the backdrop of a crisis within the party system, Bolsonaro seized upon the opportunity to frame himself as an underdog populist, capitalizing on the ideology of “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”. The polarized political climate escalated dramatically when Bolssonaro was attacked at a campaign rally, which, while limiting his street campaigning, heightened public attention to his homemade Facebook videos and exclusive TV interviews. Bolsonaro ran a highly confrontational campaign, targeting not only the Worker’s Party, but also the broader party system and mainstream media. Bolsonaro utilized social media to directly interact with voters and rally his supporters, deviating from traditional communication methods previously observed (Brandao, 2022). The 2008 Obama campaign in the US not only spurred the use of social media in electioneering, but also promoted citizen-driven campaigning, leading to a shift in control from central party offices to supporter networks (Gibson, 2015). Social media plays a significant role in political communication by enabling politicians to directly engage with voters and mobilize their supporters, as observed in the case of Dutch Politicians by Spierings & Jacobs (2014). The impact of social media

on preference votes is influenced by factors such as the frequency of communication and the number of followers. While having a social media account alone does not guarantee electoral success, active engagement can significantly boost preference votes, with each tweet during campaign period contributing to additional votes per follower.

The outcome of social media campaigns not only online mobilization, but it translates into tangible real-world activities, known as the “onion effect”. The onion effect refers to where each interaction serves not only as a request to votes, but also an encouragement to engage in actions such as organizing, fundraising, canvassing, or hosting events (Cogburn & Espinoza-Vasquez, 2011).

2.2.1.3. Amplifying Messages

Ziegler (2023) states that grassroots activists effectively became unofficial representatives of the SPD party within their personal networks, in an event where a specific content was distributed to registered supporters through Telegram channel in 2021, allowing them to share it on their personal social media account. This strategy is efficient in amplifying message and support through everyday interaction, thereby boosting the party support. Social media network media paradigm facilitates prompt content dissemination within networks of like-minded peers with similar interest (Klinger & Svensson, 2014). Social media features can significantly amplify the messages and content of electoral candidates, as evidenced by research analyzing the impact of social media variables on preference votes. The multiplicative effect of social media engagement suggests that each tweet or post during the campaign period contributes to additional votes per follower, potentially due to followers acting as opinion leaders who share candidate messages with their networks, thus expanding candidate visibility and support (Bond et al., 2012). A study conducted by Spierings & Jacobs (2014) in the context of Dutch politics suggests that social media engagement plays a crucial role in electoral outcomes, with potential implications for political campaigns in other democracies with similar electoral systems. By sharing information from social media, followers becomes “ambassadors” who influences their peers, thereby expanding the support network (Suiter, 2015).

Falasca et al. (2019) found that politicians can leverage digital political labor (DPL) of their social media followers in several ways:

- A. Followers as “political emissaries”, spreading political content through likes, shares, and comments, thereby reinforcing the messages posted by political parties.
- B. Followers engaged as “demand-on-demand”, essentially becoming tools manager by political parties to generate likes, positive comments, and others supportive responses, which are valuable assets in political campaigns.
- C. User-generated content (UGC) represents a significant aspect of digital political labor, as followers invest their time and resources in creating content that aligns with political messages. This labor, whether acknowledge or not by political parties, serves to direct political communication towards the party.

2.3. Social Media Campaigning during Elections

For nearly a decade, election coverage has focused on the influence and use of new media technologies such as the internet, social media, and mobile communication. New media has evolved from being a novelty for parties, candidates, civil society organizations, and conventional media to an essential, albeit secondary, facet of political communication during elections. Political actors' professionalization of channel management, political organizations' heightened risk management, and their greater use of global knowledge transfer and learning are indications of this new significance. These shifts demonstrate the integration of whole new communication technologies into the political environment, as well as the interaction between technological possibilities and structural context (Chen, 2015; Tang & Lee, 2018). Social media has become a powerful mechanism for motivating voters, discouraging the opponent's followers, and raising campaign funds (H. Yang et al., 2020).

2.3.1. Theoretical Framework of Social Media Campaigning

Social media campaigning involves the strategic use of digital platforms to promote political messages, mobilize supporters, and influence voter behavior (Boatwright et al., 2019). Theoretical frameworks such as the electoral momentum theory (Tang &

Lee, 2018), connective action logic (Lance Bennett & Segerberg, 2012), social identity theories (Boatwright et al., 2019), digital political labor (Falasca et al., 2019), etc. inform our understanding of the mechanisms through which social media campaign in the political context operate. By conceptualizing social media campaigning, researchers can analyze the strategies and objectives behind candidates' online engagement efforts, and the outcome or impact.

Electoral momentum significantly impacts a candidate's success, particularly in the U.S. primary elections, where early victories can signal a candidate's viability and influence voter preferences in subsequent states (Tang & Lee, 2018). This momentum can be generated by major campaign events, such as national conventions and debates, and can be observed in shifts in polling data. Candidates with early leads often receive increased media coverage, campaign contributions, and endorsements, which further bolster their chances (Steger, 2007). This effect is amplified by the spiral of silence, where perceived electoral strength encourages supporters to be more vocal, while those backing a lagging candidate tend to become silent, thus influencing voter persuasion through both interpersonal and impersonal communication (Noelle-Neumann, 1985). Social media's role in this context is crucial, as it provides real-time indicators of a candidate's popularity through metrics such as followers, likes, comments, and shares, which can significantly shape perceptions of a candidate's momentum. Brandao (2022) study on the case of Jair Bolsonaro win the presidential election shows the importance of electoral momentum. Bolsonaro's rise to power in Brazil was fueled by a crisis in the party system, with changes in electoral regulation providing him with a political opportunity as an underdog challenger. His populist campaign, framed by protests against corruption in the PT government, capitalized on digitally networked politics during pro-impeachment protests, leveraging social media to substitute for the party organization he lacked. Despite facing challenges such as a stabbing that forced him to campaign through home videos and exclusive interviews, Bolsonaro's radical positions propelled him to the center of the public sphere, with his Twitter network experiencing a surge in positive sentiment. Tang & Lee (2018) analysis on the 2016 Legislative Council election in Hong Kong revealed a significant relationship between candidates' Facebook performance, electoral momentum, and final vote shares. Electoral momentum was proposed as a crucial intermediary factor linking social media campaigning and vote shares, with candidates' social media performance

positively correlating with their electoral momentum, ultimately influencing vote shares. However, variations in the relationship between social media campaigning and electoral momentum were observed across candidates, particularly favoring candidates belonging to the opposition camp, incumbents, and candidates affiliated with political groups with more candidates in the election. Their study underscores the importance of identifying mediators like electoral momentum in understanding the impact of social media on election outcomes, offering theoretical insights and practical implications for campaigners, as evidenced by the dynamics observed in the 2016 LegCo election in Hong Kong.

Connective action logic, as proposed by Bennett and Segerberg (2012), emphasizes the role of digital media in organizing collective action. Unlike traditional collective action, which relies on hierarchical organization and collective identity, connective action is facilitated by digital networks that enable individuals to share personalized content and loosely coordinate actions without centralized control (Bimber et al., 2012). This decentralized approach is particularly relevant in political campaigns, where supporters can engage in activities such as sharing campaign messages, creating and spreading memes, and organizing grassroots events independently (Lance Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). Social media platforms provide the infrastructure for these decentralized and participatory campaign activities, allowing candidates to harness the collective power of their supporters and amplify their messages (Doroshenko, 2022). Social media users produce and disseminate content, contributing to political campaigns through unpaid labour (Falasca et al., 2019). This unpaid labour generates significant value for political actors, as users' activities such as commenting, liking, and sharing political content enhance campaign reach and engagement. Digital Political Labour (DPL) extends the analysis of social media campaigns by highlighting the often-overlooked dimension of audience labor in political communication, underscoring the dual role of social media users as both content producers and targets of advertising, reflecting the complexities of value creation and audience commodification processes (Fuchs, 2012; Fuchs & Mosco, 2015). This labor is integral to building and maintaining political relationships, illustrating how social media interactions shape political content and meaning in election campaigns (Falasca et al., 2019). Furthermore, voters' supports towards a candidate in social media could be explained by social identity theory, which describes the psychological mechanisms

behind voter behavior on social media. Concepts such as Basking in Reflected Glory (BIRGing) and Cutting Off Reflected Failure (CORFing) illustrate how individuals align their self-image with successful entities or distance themselves from unsuccessful ones to maintain self-esteem (Cialdini et al., 1976; Snyder et al., 1986). In political campaigns, supporters of winning candidates become more vocal and visible online, whereas those backing losing candidates might withdraw or change affiliations. This dynamic is amplified on social media platforms, where users engage in BIRGing and CORFing through their interactions with political content, reinforcing group identities and influencing public perceptions (Boatwright et al., 2019).

2.3.2. Impact of Election Campaign in Social Media

2.3.2.1. Mere Presence vs Engagement

Kovic et al. (2017) investigate the role of candidates' exposure in traditional media and their activity on social media on their electoral success, labeling these effects as "brute force effects" (Hansen & Wänke, 2009; Harmon-Jones & Allen, 2001), analysing the 2015 Swiss federal election. They discuss the "mere exposure effect," where repeated exposure to candidates fosters positive attitudes, extending this concept to electoral contexts as brute force effects. They found that brute force effects are present but not decisive. Mass media presence notably affects electoral outcomes, while social media activity's impact is less significant. Incumbency emerges as a potent predictor of success, with a two-step Matthew effect, where incumbents' media prominence reinforces their electoral advantage. Social media resonance, particularly on Facebook, emerges as influential, indicating that audience engagement matters more than mere activity. Similarly, Spierings and Jacobs (2014) found that two main effects: direct and interaction effects. Direct effects suggest that even minimal use of social media can influence the number of preference votes a candidate receives by showcasing their personality and signalling modernity. Direct effect is concluded to be 'conditional and cannot be simply expected'. The presence of a social media account, along with a large number of followers, can amplify this effect. Interaction effects, however, highlight the importance of active engagement on social media platforms. Merely having a large number of followers is not sufficient; candidates must actively communicate with their audience to garner electoral dividends. Volodymyr Zelensky's digital campaign during

the Ukrainian presidential election in 2019, characterized by open communication and citizen engagement, resembled the logic of connective action, traditionally associated with social movements (Doroshenko, 2022). His social media campaign bought him his win, as he effectively mobilized a diverse populace, bridged societal divisions post-Euromaidan revolution, and achieved a landslide victory despite a smaller campaign budget than his rivals. Zelensky's campaign utilized customizable hashtags and technological tools to foster engagement, particularly among younger citizens, garnering widespread coverage and support (Doroshenko, 2022). Furthermore, findings of longitudinal study of Austrian political parties shows that parties recognized the potential of social media for building supporter relationships, leading to a greater focus on interactivity and professional community management. Target group-centred campaigns dominated, evolving from a lack of clear target groups in 2013 to more specific targeting options, including dark ads, by 2019 (Russmann, 2022).

2.3.2.2. Understanding the Impact of Social Media on Voter Behavior

Yang et al. (2020) investigated how both general and political use of Facebook among U.S. college students influenced their online and offline political participation and civic engagement. They found that while general Facebook use had a small negative effect on political participation and civic engagement, political use had a more positive impact, particularly on online and offline political participation. Additionally, the study revealed the bidirectional relationships between online and offline participations and civic engagement, suggesting that offline activities often extend to online platforms and vice versa. Similarly, Bode et al. (2014) argues that social media users are active in politics and can be transformed into supporters, contributors, and in-person voters through online campaigning strategies. There is positive correlations between social media use and both bridging and bonding social capitals (D. Liu et al., 2016). Studies indicates that social media use leads to significant amplification in both online and offline capital for the users, encompassing bonding social capital rooted in close relationships like family and friends, and bridging social capital derived from broader social networks (Valenzuela et al., 2012). Among U.S. university students, Facebook use enhances their online social capital, subsequently facilitating their political use of the platform (D. Liu et al., 2016). However, while online social capital

positively correlates with civic engagement, it does not directly translate into active online or offline political participation (Valenzuela et al., 2012).

Engaging frequently in political discussion online have several benefits, including increasing political knowledge, which can in turn boost participation in campaigns, and honing the ability to critically analyze online content (Nisbet & Scheufele, 2004). Miller et al. (2015) explains that the frequency of political discussions may vary depending on users' direct connections and their roles within social networks, with gatekeepers typically engaging more than the others. There are several impacts of social media in political efficacy, including allowing users to interact with public officials and hold them accountable. Additionally, it may bolster political efficacy as individuals may feel less self-conscious about their political competence due to the anonymity provided by the internet (Kenski & Stroud, 2006).

2.4. Social Media Campaign in Indonesian Election

In January 2024, Datareportal reported that Indonesia had 139.0 million active social media user identities, equivalent to 49.9% of the total population (Kemp, 2024). The primary platforms included YouTube with 139.0 million users, Facebook with 117.6 million users, Instagram with 100.9 million users, and TikTok with 126.8 million users aged 18 and above, indicating significant engagement across various demographics. These figures reflect the high integration of social media into daily life, with 75.0% of internet users engaging with at least one social media platform (Kemp, 2024). However, despite the overall high engagement, there has been a subtle shift in usage patterns; daily engagement time has decreased by 7 minutes, and the use of social media for brand discovery has declined by 1.8% compared to the previous year, as reported by Meltwater (Howe, 2024). This suggests a growing selectivity among Indonesian users in how they engage with brands and content on social media. The predominant reasons for social media use include leisure (58.9%), maintaining contact with friends and family (57.1%), and keeping up with trending topics (48.8%), highlighting the multifaceted role of these platforms in users' lives (Howe, 2024). While traditional media like television and radio had previously dominated political campaigns, and political usage of the Internet dates back to the late New Order Government (Saraswati, 2018); social media first played a significant role in the 2012

Jakarta gubernatorial elections, supporting the campaigns of emerging politicians such as Joko Widodo ("Jokowi") and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama ("Ahok") (Astuti & Hangsing, 2018; Hui, 2020; Tapsell, 2021). This era marked the advent of social media in Indonesian elections, leveraging new social media strategies such as Twitter hashtags and YouTube music videos to garner support, bringing a surge of optimism about its potential to boost political participation and civic engagement, and (Astuti & Hangsing, 2018; Hui, 2020). Furthermore, despite most opinion polls favoring Fauzi Bowo (Foke) and Nachrowi Ramli (Nara), the victory of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) in the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election highlighted the accuracy of social media predictions over traditional polls, as evidenced by consultancies like Provetic and Politicawave (Hui, 2020). The rapid expansion of social media in Indonesia has significantly impacted both the political landscape and the general public. In order to understand its use in electoral campaigns requires considering the mediation by economic forces, particularly the political campaign industry, which has led to the commodification of social media through practices like buzzing, user mobilization, and monitoring (Saraswati, 2018).

Table 2.1. Indonesian Elections 2012–2024

Year	Election	Candidates	Winner
2012	Jakarta gubernatorial election	Fauzi Bowo – Nachrowi Ramli Joko Widodo – Basuki Cahaya Purnama (Ahok)	Joko Widodo – Basuki Cahaya Purnama (Ahok)
2014	Indonesian presidential election	Prabowo Subianto – Hatta Rajasa Joko Widodo – Jusuf Kalla	Joko Widodo – Jusuf Kalla

Table 2.1. (cont.)

Year	Election	Candidates	Winner
2017	Jakarta gubernatorial election	Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono – Sylviana Murni Basuki Cahaya Purnama (Ahok) – Djarot Saiful Hidayat Anies Rasyid Baswedan – Sandiaga Uno	Anies Rasyid Baswedan – Sandiaga Uno
2019	Indonesian presidential election	Joko Widodo – Ma’ruf Amin Prabowo Subianto – Sandiaga Uno	Joko Widodo – Ma’ruf Amin
2024	Indonesian presidential election	Anies Baswedan – Muhaimin Iskandar Prabowo Subianto – Gibran Rakabuming Ganjar Pranawo – Mahfud MD	Prabowo Subianto – Gibran Rakabuming

2.4.1.1. Social Media Use in Indonesian Election Campaign

2.4.1.2. The Rise of Social Media Use in Indonesia Election Campaign

Social media has rapidly transformed Indonesian politics, significantly impacting election campaigns. Social media was crucial in the 2012 Jakarta election campaigns of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) (Tapsell, 2021). Astuti and Hangsing (2018) analysis of platforms like Facebook and Twitter during the 2012 Jakarta Governor Election revealed that candidates extensively used social media channels to share various types of information, including profiles, philosophies, supporters, and campaign activities. Facebook emerged as the most utilized platform, enabling real-time interaction with constituents through status updates, messages, and media sharing. Twitter and YouTube were also pivotal, with frequent updates on supporters and issue positions. In the 2012 Jakarta elections, campaign professionals

initiated and managed the use of social media for all contestants. The involvement of political campaign industry practitioners wasn't automatic but was prompted by the development of social media campaigning services. These services, which include managing content, audiences, and labour, underscored the importance of social media in the electoral process (Saraswati, 2018). In the 2019 presidential election campaign, both Jokowi and Prabowo leverage social media, particularly Twitter, to engage voters, with Prabowo focusing on interacting with followers and Jokowi emphasizing visual content in tweets (Santoso & Wardani, 2021).

Social media campaigning aims to make campaign issues widely known and discussed, a phenomenon termed "virality," shaped by network characteristics and human attention (Nahon & Hemsley, 2013). As President, Jokowi supported Ahok's rise to Governor of Jakarta, aided by young, digitally savvy groups called "Teman Ahok" (Friends of Ahok), which were partly volunteer-driven. Hasan Nasbi of Cyrus Network, a key figure in Ahok's campaign, emphasized the importance of social media in Ahok's re-election strategy, highlighting its cost-effectiveness and broad reach compared to traditional media (Tapsell, 2021). Campaigners focus on managing and curating issues to ensure a consistent flow of content throughout the campaign period. The content aims to mobilize users to engage with campaign messages, especially those supporting candidates or denouncing their rivals (Saraswati, 2018). The rise of social media during this period made traditional political mudslinging more visible, leading to the term "black campaigns" to describe efforts to undermine candidates with rumors and false information (Hui, 2020). Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) were targeted by smear campaigns labelling them as communists, foreigners, and proselytizers (Hui, 2020), while incumbent Governor Fauzi Bowo (Foke) was criticized for his administration's failures (Saraswati, 2018).

Furthermore, social media enables campaigners to monitor voters behaviour, which allows candidates to gain an edge in the cyber campaign war. Social media monitoring services, enabled by search engines using relevant keywords, analyse vast amounts of social media content to inform campaign strategies. Jokowi's campaign team utilized services from companies like Katapedia and PoliticaWave, which provided regular updates on social media trends to strategists, during 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election. These companies, pioneers in Indonesian political campaign monitoring,

gained attention by accurately predicting Jokowi's victory, countering conventional pollsters' forecasts (Saraswati, 2018). PoliticaWave, utilizing software called Media Wave, claimed predictive results not far off from quick counts and could even be obtained before the gubernatorial election began (DetikNews, 2012). Based on analyzing over 200,000 conversations across various social media platforms, including Twitter, Facebook, Kaskus, blogs, forums, and news sites, PoliticaWave forecasted Joko Widodo and Basuki "Ahok" Purnama to win the Jakarta gubernatorial runoff election against Fauzi Bowo and Nachrowi Ramli (Celesta, 2012; Y. M. P. Putra, 2012). They observed that discussions overwhelmingly favored Jokowi and Ahok over Foke and Nara, with the former dominating both in terms of frequency of mentions and unique users engaged in the conversation. Despite a brief surge in positive sentiment when PKS decided to support Foke and Nara, PoliticaWave's analysis indicated an overall negative sentiment towards them, contrasting with the consistent positive sentiment for Jokowi and Ahok (Celesta, 2012). Similarly, Katapedia's observation prior to the 2014 presidential election indicated Jokowi's lead over Prabowo in social media conversations, forecasting a 52.06% to 47.93% advantage. Deddy Rahman, the Director of the social media monitoring agency Katapedia, emphasized that the subsequent official results from the General Election Commission (KPU) confirmed this trend, demonstrating the correlation between social media sentiments and public opinion. This success underscored the predictive capability of social media monitoring technology, as previously demonstrated in correctly forecasting Jokowi's gubernatorial victory in Jakarta and other regional elections. Deddy emphasized the importance of monitoring social media conversations nationwide to understand public sentiments comprehensively, suggesting that such insights could inform policymaking and governance decisions (Antara, 2014).

2.4.1.3. The Emergence of Black Campaign, Buzzers and Cyber War

Jokowi's 2014 presidential victory was largely driven by a grassroots campaign fueled by social media activism (Hui, 2020; Saraswati, 2018; Tapsell, 2021). Buzzing, or the distribution of campaign issues through social media by influential users, became prominent during the Jakarta election, with both unpaid and paid buzzers participating (Hui, 2020; Paramaditha, 2013). Unpaid buzzers were typically popular celebrities and social activists, while paid buzzers were hired by campaign teams, such as those of

Foke and Alex. Notable accounts like @triomacan2000, run by Raden Nuh and Abdul Rasyid, engaged in smear campaigns against candidates like Jokowi (BeritaSatu, 2012), allegedly for financial gain (Patria et al., 2013; Saraswati, 2018). Conversely, @kurawa, managed by Rudi Sutanto, supported Jokowi voluntarily through the Jokowi Advanced Social Media Volunteers (JASMEV) group (Sadasri, 2016; Saraswati, 2018). JASMEV group is a group of volunteers who had initially supported Jokowi and Ahok in the 2012 elections (Hui, 2020). In the 2014 presidential elections, social media's role intensified, with Jokowi and Prabowo Subianto both leveraging it for campaigning. Despite Jokowi's grassroots support, he faced intense black campaigns that questioned his identity and affiliations, contributing to a highly divisive election (Sadasri, 2016; Saraswati, 2018). Jokowi faced accusations that he was a political party puppet, a communist, Chinese, and non-Muslim. Meanwhile, accusations were raised about Prabowo's citizenship, personality, and the condition of his company (Hui, 2020). Traditional campaign methods focused on swaying undecided voters and reinforcing candidate supporters, but social media campaigns have shifted this strategy. Instead of merely converting opponents' supporters, social media campaigns engage them in online "cyber wars," spreading content to reinforce opinions, mobilize supporters, and boost activism (Saraswati, 2018). JASMEV, for instance, was trained to engage in social media battles to energize Jokowi's supporters and challenge his opponents' supporters. Techniques included using hashtags like #ReplaceTitleSongWithJOKOWI to draw users into the campaign, highlighting the strategic use of social media to mobilize voter participation (Saraswati, 2018).

In late 2016, Ahok joined President Jokowi's PDI-P party, distancing himself from the Teman Ahok group, which depicted him as a martyr. Concurrently, anti-Ahok groups like the "Muslim Cyber Army" used social media to incite racist and sectarian sentiments against him as governor candidate, and Jokowi as president (Tapsell, 2021). Muslim Cyber Army (MCA) is a group that target individuals deemed insulting to Islam through doxing and cyber-vigilantism (Hui, 2020). The Jakarta election campaign dominated by online "black campaigns" against Ahok, targeting his Chinese heritage and alleged insults to the Koran. Anies Baswedan's campaign also faced attacks, including claims he was a Shia Muslim or wanted to impose Sharia law. Both Ahok and Anies' campaigns produced online material to counter these attacks and spread their narratives. Interviews and ethnographic research revealed that identity

politics, centered on Ahok's religion and ethnicity, overshadowed public policy issues. Anies' campaign subtly promoted him as the candidate for devout Muslims, a tactic that Indonesian commentators noted as a precursor to the strategies used in the 2019 presidential election (Tapsell, 2021). A fictional presidential and vice-presidential candidate duo, Nurhadi-Aldo, emerges as a campaign promoting *golput* (not voting) during the highly polarized 2019 presidential election in Indonesia, reaching hundreds of thousands on social media platforms. It suggests that the Nurhadi-Aldo campaign represents a challenge to the dominant political discourse, which favors religious and nationalist rhetoric, by offering a new style of *golput* campaign that addresses marginalized groups' aspirations in terms of economic identity (Duile, 2021).

Social media platforms played crucial roles in disseminating campaign messages and updates in 2019 presidential election (Hui, 2020; Maella et al., 2019; Yulfa et al., 2023). Social media saw fierce competition between candidates, exemplified by the 'Hashtag War'. The pro-opposition hashtag #2019GantiPresiden (translation: change president in 2019) and the pro-Jokowi hashtag #01JokowiLagi (translation: 01 Jokowi again) became prominent, with both sides striving to stay within the bounds of "positive" and "negative" campaigning (Hui, 2020). In March 2018, the anti-Jokowi hashtag "2019GantiPresiden" emerged on Twitter in response to the pro-Jokowi hashtag "#Jokowi2Periode," quickly gaining popularity. PKS chairman Mardani Ali Sera leveraged this momentum to create a new social movement, which appeared organic but actually relied on established WhatsApp networks for mobilization. Despite Mardani's claims of non-partisanship, the movement involved significant participation from PKS and other local legislative candidates, and was bolstered by leaders like Neno Warisman, who used her networks and strategies from previous campaigns to build support (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2019). This "change president" campaign swiftly became viral on social media, and the opposition gained momentum thanks to the hashtag (Irawanto, 2019a)

Social media analyses of the 2019 general elections revealed the polarization driven by interactions among these buzzers on platforms like Twitter, leading them into strong political divides and echo chambers (Sugiono, 2020). The terms "buzzers" and "cyber troops/armies" became widespread, referring to actors manipulating public opinion online (Hui, 2020; Tapsell, 2021). In political sense, buzzers are recruited to

promote issues that benefit certain candidates. These buzzers are micro-celebrities boasting numerous followers on social media. They were utilized as cyber troops/armies for the candidates' political campaigns. Buzzers are recruited to promote candidates' interests on social media, acting as cyber troops for political campaigns. Meanwhile, cyber troops as actors representing political parties or candidates, responsible for shaping public opinion online (Syahputra et al., 2024). Jokowi's campaign reportedly employed around 8,000 social media soldiers, while Prabowo's team also utilized cyber troops (Hui, 2020). According to Irawanto (2019a), both presidential candidates have established clandestine social media teams to monitor and strategize online actions. Jokowi's "Awan" team analyzes social media content and devises strategies executed by the "Cakra" team, while Prabowo's camp formed the "Pride" team, led by digital marketing expert Anthony Leong, responsible for producing campaign content and mapping accounts, potentially for attacks against Prabowo-Sandiaga. In one instance, during an incident involving the burning of the tawhid flag by members of Nahdlatul Ulama's paramilitary, the Awan team created the hashtag #KompakdamaiIndonesiaku and instructed Cakra team members to promote it across 20 provinces. Mafrur et al. (2014) investigated supporters and detractors of *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (Prosperous Justice Party) activity in twitter during 2014 legislative elections in Indonesia, particularly, the authenticity of these voices and whether they represent genuine public sentiment or are merely campaign-driven tweets. Through empirical analysis, the study distinguishes between real and campaign accounts, highlighting differences in tweeting behaviour and account characteristics, while cautioning that Twitter data may not always reflect truth as tweets could originate from bots, cyborgs, or campaign accounts.

2.4.1.4. Celebrity Politicians and Candidate Personal Branding in Social Media

The digital era has enabled celebrity politicians to leverage their fame and performative skills to navigate the political landscape effectively (Beta & Neyazi, 2022; Maella et al., 2019). Instagram serves as a powerful tool for them to build personal branding, connect with voters, and establish political legitimacy (Beta & Neyazi, 2022). This platform allows celebrity politicians to create personal branding and engage with potential voters through feeds, stories, hashtags, and multimedia content (Maella et al., 2019). This transformation underscores the evolving nature of

political campaigns in the age of social media, where visual and emotional appeals play a pivotal role in influencing public perception and voter behaviour (Beta & Neyazi, 2022), even more than the candidate's policies (Irawanto, 2019a). Jokowi's post about his personal life gained significantly higher engagement than his posts about government policies (Irawanto, 2019a). Meanwhile, Islamic personalization is a significant element in social media campaigns, particularly among women candidates in local parliamentary elections in Indonesia. Female candidates utilize Islamic personalization to connect with voters and cultivate a religious image, resulting in higher levels of positive responses and increased political participation, not solely to meet quota requirements but to actively engage in electoral campaigns (Darwin & Haryanto, 2021).

In their research, Beta and Neyazi (2022) investigated how celebrity politician leverage social media, particularly Instagram, for personal branding, and found the following points:

- Present themselves as relatable and accessible to ordinary citizens, to avoid revealing personal flaws and maintain an idealized image.
- Use visual narratives to project their political alignment and legitimacy, by extending performance to gestures, self-presentation, and attire to appeal voters.
- Engage in actions like hugging fans, taking selfies, and interacting with crowds to create a sense of closeness and authenticity. Use emotional appeal to connect with votes and mobilize support
- Demonstrate awareness of public issue and commitment to service the public, by portraying their political journey as a sacrifice or the greater good.

Fadiyah and Simorangkir (2021) found that Jokowi has been proactive in using his personal Instagram for the election campaign in 2019. They found that his posts are consistent in building a positive image of Jokowi, and it's effective in achieving his objective to win the 2019 presidential election. Irawanto (2019) wrote in his article that Jokowi's team use his personal life by posting his wife and grandson, to contrast him with Prabowo, who is single. In response, Prabowo's campaign posted old family photographs to highlight his elite lineage, though this strategy could backfire as

Indonesians prefer leaders who relate to ordinary people. Ma'ruf's campaign emphasized his religious activities and agility at 75, often showing him in traditional attire and interacting with supporters. Conversely, Sandiaga's posts highlighted his athleticism and rapport with young people and housewives.

After choosing Ma'ruf Amin, a 75 year old cleric, as his running partner, Jokowi's team effort to reach the millennial's support appears to be more aggressive. Millennial is a demographic that would make up a large voting bloc in 2019 (Heriyanto, 2019). According to an article by the Head of Legal and Information Section of KPKNL Palembang on the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia website, a gimmick involves using packaging, appearance, or staged scenes to deceive, surprise, create an atmosphere, or convince others. In marketing, gimmicks are strategies to quickly gain recognition and popularity, while in politics, they are used during emotional events to garner sympathy from constituents, often through pre-arranged situations (Wahidin, 2022). Jokowi aims to attract young voters through physical signaling and appearances at events, and posting them on social media (Irawanto, 2019b). He made a notable entrance at the Asian Games by riding a motorbike and later posted images of a motorbike tour on Twitter, which received positive responses from youth. Additionally, Jokowi frequents music festivals and heavy metal concerts, while surrounding himself with young, high-profile figures like Erick Thohir to appeal to millennials. Meanwhile, Ma'ruf Amin connects with young voters by emphasizing his legacy for future generations and claims support from millennial-led organizations (Irawanto, 2019b). A big part of both candidates campaign strategies lie on efforts to engage with millennials, a significant portion of the digital audience, using savvy digital strategies (Hui, 2020). The chairman of the Prosperous Justice Party, Muhamad Sohibul Iman, described Sandiaga Uno as a "*millennial santri*," highlighting his blend of modern lifestyle and pious Muslim values despite his secular appearance and Western education. To appeal to millennials, Sandiaga introduced the idea of "The New Prabowo," portraying Prabowo as a fun, relaxed individual who values unity and democratic processes. Prabowo has actively engaged with young influencers and millennial mothers, aiming to resonate with younger voters through social media and direct interactions, supported by a team of young spokespersons (Irawanto, 2019b). The term "emak-emak" (mothers) was trending on Twitter, reflecting attempts to appeal to everyday mother figures among voters (Hui, 2020).

2.4.2. The Impact of Social Media Election Campaign on Indonesian Voters

The 2012 Jakarta Governor Election marked a significant political shift in Indonesia, being the first to utilize social media for campaigning, effectively increasing young people's interest and participation in politics by raising awareness of political issues (Astuti & Hangsing, 2018). Data shows that the use of candidates' websites and social media by respondents is relatively good, with websites being the most frequently viewed campaign media, followed by Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, and these platforms are considered useful tools for influencing voting decisions (Satria et al., 2014). Interaction on social media significantly influences individuals' interest in political information and participation, as seeking political information on social media enhances users' knowledge and motivates them to engage in elections through two-way communication and content sharing (Astuti & Hangsing, 2018). Furthermore, electronic word of mouth (eWOM) significantly mediates the relationship between social media marketing and voting intention, with candidates and political parties boosting voting intentions by leveraging social media to encourage positive eWOM among voters, focusing on building a positive image and aligning with voters' religious sentiments (Moslehpour et al., 2024). The continuous delivery of information via social media helps voters form clear perceptions of candidates, fostering trust and confidence in their chosen representatives. Additionally, social media's transparency and multimedia capabilities contribute to users' confidence in the candidates they support, making it a vital tool for modern political communication (Astuti & Hangsing, 2018).

2.4.2.1. The Case of Ahok: Digital Political Labour (DPL) and Mobilization

In the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, social media played a pivotal role in shaping the campaign dynamics between supporters of Basuki Tjahja Purnama (Ahok) and his main opponent, Anies Baswedan (Hui, 2020; Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2019; Tapsell, 2021). The rivalry was characterized by intense emotional appeals and disinformation from both sides (Hui, 2020), facilitated by social media algorithms that helped form polarized communities known as algorithmic enclaves (Lim, 2017). These enclaves were not isolated but interconnected, where users engaged in extreme affective interactions, reinforcing their love or hate for Ahok. The

enclaves were driven more by emotional bonds rather than ideological alignment, and this binary discourse marginalized moderate voices, creating a highly charged and antagonistic online environment. The theory of algorithmic enclave by Lim (2017) refers to dynamic, affectively driven networks on social media, shaped by the interplay between human users and algorithms. Unlike static filter bubbles or echo chambers, these enclaves evolve based on affective interactions and can include groups that do not necessarily position themselves against the dominant public sphere. This theory represents the dynamic of social media. The 2017 gubernatorial election campaign of Ahok suffered a major setback when his comment on a verse in the Koran was edited and spread on social media, igniting widespread outrage (Tapsell, 2021). Ahok was accused of blasphemy during a speech on September 27, 2016, where he referenced Surat Al-Maidah verse 51 (Columbia Global Freedom of Expression, 2017). A heavily edited 30-second clip of his one-hour and 38-minute speech went viral two weeks after it was posted (Columbia Global Freedom of Expression, 2017), leading to mass protests and demands for his arrest (Tapsell, 2021). Thousands of protestors, organized by several Islamic organizations, gathered not only from Jakarta but from various regions across Indonesia, such as Aceh, Palembang, and Makassar, demanding Ahok's imprisonment. Prominent figures, including Rizieq Shihab, Ustadz Arifin Ilham, and Police General Tito Karnavian, participated in the protest. President Joko Widodo and Vice President Jusuf Kalla also joined the demonstrators for Friday prayers (Arbi & Asril, 2020). Ahok ultimately lost the election and was imprisoned for blasphemy (Hui, 2020). In May 2017, he was sentenced to two years in prison, a harsher penalty than the prosecutors' request of one year with a two-year probation (Columbia Global Freedom of Expression, 2017). The verdict, based on Article 156a of the Indonesian Criminal Code, faced sharp criticism from international human rights organizations like Amnesty International, which argued that Ahok's imprisonment tarnished Indonesia's reputation for tolerance. Despite this, hundreds of protestors continued to rally at each of Ahok's court hearings, demanding his incarceration (Arbi & Asril, 2020).

2.4.3. Anies Baswedan's Social Media Campaign during Elections

In Indonesia, the pervasive influence of the internet has transformed how individuals express themselves on online platforms like Instagram. Public figures, including Anies

Baswedan, Ridwan Kamil, and Ganjar Pranowo during their time as regional heads, heavily utilize Instagram as a strategic tool for communication and self-presentation. Through qualitative analysis, it's evident that while these figures share some optimistic traits, variations exist in their responsiveness and engagement with the public (Kurniawati et al., 2022). Since he was elected as governor of Jakarta in 2017, Anies Baswedan's personal branding strategy on Instagram has been a subject of examination, revealing his adeptness in building and managing a strong personal brand characterized by uniqueness, relevance, and consistency (Kurniasih & Setianti, 2024). His Instagram account showcases unique content, a relaxed communication style, and a focus on pertinent societal issues, fostering a close connection with followers. Anies's branding emphasizes authenticity and relatability, deviating from traditional formal political communication approaches (Kurniasih & Setianti, 2024). Additionally, as 2024 Presidential Candidates, Ganjar Pranowo emphasizes simplicity and public relations skills, Anies Baswedan focuses on authority and a careful speaking style, showcasing his achievements as the former Governor of Jakarta as their branding in Twitter (Fatikha & Suranto, 2024). Baswedan's branding in Twitter aligns with his Instagram strategy, emphasizing consistency and relevance in communicating with voters (Kurniasih & Setianti, 2024). Anies Baswedan's personal branding on social media platforms like Instagram and Twitter underscores his commitment to engaging with constituents and conveying a distinct political identity. By leveraging these platforms effectively, Anies forges intimate connections with followers, shapes public opinion, and reinforces his image as a potential leader in Indonesian politics (Suryawati, 2021)

Anies Baswedan's multifaceted political communication strategies across various social media platforms are examined in recent studies, highlighting their significance in contemporary Indonesian politics. His utilization of Instagram as a primary means of connecting with constituents is analyzed, emphasizing the impact of his content, including hashtags and visual style, on voters and Indonesian politics (Sitompul & Anom, 2024). Baswedan's strategy emphasizing more interaction with followers and campaign-related images, in comparison to Ganjar Pranowo's political marketing communication content and digital storytelling on Instagram (Susilowati et al., 2024). Additionally, Anies Baswedan's innovative campaign on TikTok, marked by live sessions and engaging content, showcases his effort to resonate with younger voters,

underscoring the importance of adapting to social media trends (Nazma & KN, 2024). The hosting of the 2022 Formula E World Championship in Jakarta is also examined in the context of Anies Baswedan's political marketing, demonstrating his ability to leverage events for enhancing his political image and positioning (Satrio et al., 2023). Furthermore, Anies Baswedan's visual representation on Instagram is analyzed, emphasizing his portrayal as a serious yet warm and humanist presidential candidate, with recommendations for diversifying campaign strategies to bolster his image as a relatable leader (Reviyanti, 2023).

Anies Baswedan's social media campaign for the 2024 Indonesian presidential election has been subject to extensive analysis, shedding light on various aspects of his online presence and its impact on public perception and trust. One crucial aspect examined is the level of political trust in online social networks, particularly Twitter, concerning Baswedan's candidacy. Research findings suggest a relatively stable level of online political trust in Anies Baswedan, influenced by factors such as his response to the COVID-19 pandemic, regional development initiatives during his tenure as Governor of Jakarta, government awards and achievements, and his personal characteristics perceived as intelligent and thoughtful leadership (Luth et al., 2023). The effectiveness of Baswedan's social media strategy in influencing voters' political attitudes and public trust is highlighted, with emphasis on factors such as content quality, consistency, transparency, and leadership qualities (Yahya et al., 2024). Additionally, hashtag campaigns like #AniesPresidentRI2024 on Twitter have been instrumental in shaping positive perceptions of Baswedan as a potential presidential candidate, underscoring the agenda-setting effect of social media discussions (Puspitasari & Anggoro, 2024). Baswedan's campaign has also leveraged the support of online influencers, known as buzzers, who actively shape public opinion on platforms like Twitter. Despite facing some negative responses, the support network for Baswedan exhibits active engagement, highlighting successful digital opinion movements in favor of his candidacy (Maulana et al., 2022). Furthermore, Baswedan's innovative use of TikTok, particularly in engaging with K-pop enthusiasts, has garnered significant attention and support, demonstrating the effectiveness of creative storytelling and multimedia content in political campaigns (Nazma & KN, 2024). However, Baswedan's social media campaign has not been without challenges. Controversies surrounding his tenure as Governor of DKI Jakarta, such as issues related to the Adikarya Wisata 2019

award and the handling of Jakarta's flood problems, have sparked negative discussions on platforms like Twitter. Despite efforts to counter negative campaigning through strategic messaging and engagement with first-time voters, Baswedan's social media presence has been subject to scrutiny and polarization (Asri, 2018; Fitriyani & Hartanto, 2020).

2.4.3.1. Reaching the Youth in 2024 Indonesian Presidential Election

The 2024 Indonesian presidential election witnessed a notable convergence of political campaigning and K-pop fandom, particularly evident in the rise of "Anies Bubble," a Twitter account dedicated to supporting Anies Baswedan's candidacy (Fairuz, 2024; Nazma & KN, 2024; H. R. Putra, 2024). The emergence of Anies Bubble, alongside similar supporter accounts like Olppaemi Project and Humanies Project, marked a significant innovation in political engagement, drawing inspiration from K-pop fan culture (Nazma & KN, 2024). The phenomenon of Anies Bubble and similar supporter accounts underscores the growing influence of fan cultures, particularly K-pop fandoms, on political discourse in Indonesia (D. R. Wulandari et al., 2023). Anies Baswedan's supporters, often referred to as "Humanies," played a pivotal role in fostering youth participation in politics through creative and interactive online campaigns, including live sessions and community-driven initiatives (H. R. Putra, 2024).

With millennials and Generation Z expected to constitute a significant portion of the electorate in 2024, Anies Baswedan and Prabowo Subianto adapted their campaign strategies to resonate with younger demographics, leveraging social media platforms to shape their political image (Wahyono, 2024). Anies Baswedan's engagement with K-pop fandom through Anies Bubble exemplifies this trend, demonstrating a departure from traditional outreach methods to embrace innovative storytelling and multimedia content (D. R. Wulandari et al., 2023). The utilization of fan accounts like Anies Bubble represents a novel approach to political messaging, aiming to foster relatability with younger voters and counter rival personas, such as Prabowo's "gemoy" identity (Wahyono, 2024). However, while such approaches enhance candidates' visibility and appeal, questions persist about their substantive impact on policy discussions and democratic discourse (D. R. Wulandari et al., 2023). The creative use of symbolism

and language from K-pop fandom by Anies Bubble reflects a broader strategy to appeal to younger audiences in a culturally resonant manner (Nabilla, 2024). Despite the dynamism injected into the campaign by accounts like Anies Bubble, the overall impact on the election remains a subject of debate, with scholars acknowledging the conscious engagement of young voters but questioning the broader electoral significance (Setiawan & Kurniati, 2024)

2.5. K-popification and Korea Wave Phenomena in Indonesia


According to social media platform X (formerly known as Twitter), Indonesia is reported as a country with the largest K-pop fandom in the world in 2021 (CNN Indonesia, 2022). Korean wave penetrates Indonesia through its entertainment products, this is marked by various Korean cultural products such as K-pop, K-drama, K-movies, K-fashion, K-food and K-beauty, entering Indonesia (H. Wulandari, 2022). Korean wave, or *Hallyu*, refers to the phenomenon where South Korean culture spread around the world (A. F. I. Putra, 2023). Korean wave reflects South Korean culture ability to influence people around the world (Valenciana & Pudjibudojo, 2022). Korean wave expands through K-pop songs and idol groups, and K-drama series and movies, to fashion, beauty, and lifestyle (Erlande & Sari, 2023). Through constant exposure of South Korean content, viewers adapt and integrate the elements to their daily life (A. F. I. Putra, 2023). Research by M. Y. Ahmad et al. (2024) shows that Korean Wave spreads through social media, and influence people, particularly teenagers, around the world. Erlande & Sari (2023) found that Korean wave had a significant influence on students. Teenagers fanaticism towards Korean wave, and the excessive attraction and loyalty towards K-pop and K-drama culture, reflects the increasing popularity and adaptation of South Korean trends in Indonesia (A. F. I. Putra, 2023).

Not only K-pop is its own genre, it successfully create its own community, group identity and culture (Pamugari, 2024). K-pop bands, sometimes known as "idols," compete with other bands for media attention in South Korea by making weekly debuts on network television shows. Online, fans launch campaigns for their favourite songs and find out how many album sales, Spotify streams, YouTube views, or social media mentions their idols need to receive for a song to be on the top charts or receive an

award. K-pop fans also known to donate to charities to commemorate their idol's significant events (Soo, 2023). K-pop fans, or K-poppers, often apply their community culture towards other things outside K-pop, a phenomenon called *K-popification* (Sabandar, 2024). *K-popification* refers to the phenomenon where K-pop fans apply K-pop culture on non-K-pop issues (Pamugari, 2024). For instance, treating and providing support to someone or a group who is not an idol to be like a K-pop idol (Sabandar, 2024)

2.5.1. Anies Bubble: K-popification in Indonesian Political Election

The recent discourse of K-popification in politics is regarding the K-popification of Anies Baswedan, one of the candidates in Indonesian Presidential election in 2024. Anies Bubble consistently post clips of Anies Baswedan TikTok Live, with Korean caption as if they are a K-pop fan account. K-popification of Anies Baswedan spreads with the increasing popularity and followers of @aniesbubble account. Its popularity attracts K-pop community on a large scale, while simultaneously increased its electability in this year's elections (Pamugari, 2024). Anies Bubble posted a voting pole to collectively determine Anies Baswedan fandom name in X. "Humanies" won, with 75.3% ahead over "Manies" which only got 24.7% out of 99,533 votes (Shula, 2024). Anies Bubble also created an owl emoji as a representation of the figure of Anies Baswedan, and made it its profile picture.



Picture 2.1. @aniesbubble X Account Profile

Source: @aniesbubble in X, 9 June 2024

The K-popification movement also extends to creation of merchandise common in K-pop such as photo card of Anies Baswedan and the owl light sticks (Sabandar, 2024). The volunteers also created “Humanies Cup Sleeve Event x Nobar Debat Capres”, a watch party event of the presidential debate, in a coffee shop in Jakarta, similar to K-pop fandom event that celebrates their idols important events (Shula, 2024).



Picture 2.2. Aminbong Lightsticks with an Owl Logo

Source: (Photo: X, @kadergocar) (Shula, 2024)

K-pop fans who took part in Anies Baswedan's K-popfication also raised funds to help with the campaign period with themes and things related to K-pop, starting from photocards and banners distributed by fans at every campaign event in various cities, to plans to bring food trucks like K-pop fans who bring food trucks when their idols are promoting albums (Pamugari, 2024). The @olpproject account appeared which heads the fan project for Anies Baswedan. They did fundraising to broadcast *videotrons* supporting Anies Baswedan at several locations. Videotron projects are usually done by fans for their idols who have birthdays or are making comebacks (Muthmainnah, 2024).



Picture 2.3. Food Truck at the Jakarta “Desak Anies” Event Sent by Supporters

Source: Briefer (2024)

This phenomenon ultimately becomes a strategy for the candidates to attract Generation Z, including influencing them to vote for them during election. This tactic makes politics feel closer, and Generation Z will become more open and willing to participate in political discussion (Briefer, 2024). Nonetheless, research by Yurcel et al. (2024) investigating @aniesbubble posts in X and the influence on voters perception and behaviours, found that the number of followers and high interactions on @aniesbubble which is active in spreading campaign-related content does not guarantee a high number of votes (Yurcel et al., 2024). Furthermore, Anies Baswedan has another program called “Desak Anies” to reach and educate the younger generation, according to the campaign team of Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar (Amin). This discussion program, involving presidential candidate Anies Baswedan and young people, addresses societal issues and encourages youth engagement in the political landscape, especially for the 2024 elections (Prasetyo, 2024).

Indonesian K-Pop fans on X have voiced their opinions on social and political issues, such as when challenging the Omnibus Law which was legalized in 2020 (Leonaldy, 2020). President Joko Widodo proposed the law on October 20, 2019, aiming to simplify regulations impeding job creation and the growth of small and medium enterprises. However, it has faced widespread opposition for undermining workers' rights previously protected under the 2003 Labour Law (Rokhim, 2023). It led to

nationwide protests and significant social media backlash, especially on X (Rahman, 2020). Many K-pop fan accounts used hashtags like #MosiTidakPercaya and #DPRRIPengkhianatRakyat to express their discontent (Leonaldy, 2020). Influential accounts, often with K-Pop profile picture, dominated the conversation, choosing to educate each other about the law rather than promoting their idols (Rahman, 2020). Their efforts led to the Omnibus Law becoming a global trending topic for several days (Leonaldy, 2020; Rokhim, 2023). This instance highlighted the ability of K-pop fans to coordinate efforts and bring significant attention to an issue. It demonstrates K-poppers ability to influence public discourse and raise awareness among young people without political manipulation (Rokhim, 2023).

2.5.2. K-popification in Politics Around the World

Constanza Jorquera, a K-pop fan in Chile, initiated “K-popers for Boric”. They started digital campaigns, community--building events, and ran voter information drives during Chile presidential election 2021 (Muthmainnah, 2024). Less than a month before Chile’s presidential election, Jorquera organized the campaign after Jose Antonio Kast had won the first of two rounds of voting (Soo, 2023). She believed that she could attain the success of digital campaigning for Gabriel Boric by applying the same mobilization K-poppers do for their idols (Muthmainnah, 2024). They replicate K-poper social media campaigns such as when they posted TikTok video that went viral with 387,000 likes, where they sent a cake decorated with Boric’s face, keychains, and photo cards of Boric to Boric’s campaign headquarters. They also distributed cup sleeves with QR codes linked to voter information sites when they hosted events at cafes. Seeing the increasing awareness, Boric incorporated K-pop to his campaign videos. Boric won the election in December 2021, and became the youngest president ever elected in Chile (Soo, 2023).

Similarly, K-pop fans united to campaign for Leni Robredo in the 2022 Philippine presidential election. Romero (2021) and her fellow k-popers initiated online voter education session for young people. She believed in the K-pop community to strategize and mobilize campaigns targeting youth. K-pop Stans 4 Leni was created, K-popers organized this community to campaign for Robredo, and convince youth to vote (Plug, 2023). With young people is voting that year for the first time, and a lot of them are

K-poppers, the organizations enlist fans in voter education (Romero, 2021). A study by Plug (2023) found that K-popification is effective in mobilized a large demographic in 2022 Philippines presidential election. Other examples of civic mobilization of K-pop fandom in Philippines was during Typhoon Vamco, where fandom of Red Velvet, BTS, and BlackPink were hosting donations for the typhoon victims. Furthermore, K-pop fandoms organized community parties to help people during the pandemic (Romero, 2021).

In the US, K-pop fandoms initiated big civic mobilizations that made headlines. In 2020, K-pop boyband BTS donated \$1 million to Black Lives Matter movement, and within 24 hours their fandom managed to collect funds and donated the same amount. With a lot of hate speech going around in X, K-poppers successfully hijacked the hashtags with K-pop GIFs and memes. Furthermore, K-poppers crashed Dallas Police Department app by flooding video clips of K-pop idols, when the police asked the public to submit videos of protestors (Soo, 2023). K-poppers have organized civic mobilization around the world. By replicating the tactics they used when campaigning for their K-pop idols, K-poppers managed to effectively advocate for social, civil and political matters (Romero, 2021). K-pop community continue to grows, and their networks help each country in execute successful campaigns for their idols, and their country's issues (Soo, 2023).

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY & APPLICATION

3.1. Research Design and Theoretical Framework

This study employs mixed methods using qualitative and quantitative methodology. The methodology aims to understand the sentiment of voters and the effect of K-popification of Anies Baswedan presidential campaign on online and offline political activism, using social media platform X and to describe observed phenomena as they are and draw conclusions based on numerical data.

A mixed methods approach integrating qualitative sentiment and network analysis from X data with quantitative inferential analysis from questionnaires is chosen for its ability to offer a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted dynamics influencing political campaigns in the digital age. Qualitative sentiment analysis is crucial for capturing the nuanced shifts in public opinion towards Anies Baswedan, particularly before and after the emergence of the Anies Bubble X account. This method not only identifies the emotional tone of tweets but also reveals underlying trends and changes in discourse, providing qualitative insights into how social media influences political perception. Complementing this, network analysis unveils the structural aspects of X interactions, illustrating how information spreads and identifying key influencers within the network. This qualitative approach enriches our understanding by highlighting the patterns of communication and influence dynamics that shape online political discourse.

On the other hand, quantitative inferential analysis from questionnaires offers statistical rigor to examine the relationships between variables such as PUT, PSE, OnP, and OfP. By quantifying these factors, this method allows for hypothesis testing and the identification of statistically significant associations. This quantitative approach not only validates qualitative findings but also provides empirical evidence of the broader impacts of social media engagement on political behaviors and attitudes.

Together, these methods complement each other by providing a holistic view: qualitative methods elucidate the intricate details and context of social media interactions and sentiment, while quantitative methods establish causal relationships and generalize findings across broader populations. This integrated approach ensures a robust and nuanced analysis of how social media dynamics influence Anies Baswedan's political campaign, addressing both the qualitative richness and quantitative validity necessary to understand contemporary political communication and engagement.

3.1.1. Network and Sentiment Analysis

Social media research in politics can describe the nature of the discussion and public sentiment towards the politicians in question. Additionally, researchers use social media research to forecast election outcomes using social media data. Sentiment analysis is one of the strategies that the framework uses (Suratnoaji & Arianto, 2018). Sentiment analysis is a subfield of natural language processing (NLP) that involves extracting information from text using artificial intelligence methods like machine learning and deep learning (D. R. Wulandari et al., 2023). Sentiment analysis determines user sentiment towards a topic by calculating the frequency of positive and negative word selections (Boatwright et al., 2019).

Previous studies explore innovative methods for election prediction and sentiment analysis on social media platforms like X, leveraging techniques such as machine learning algorithms and fine-tuned models like IndoBERT to detect hate speech and ensure fair and transparent electoral processes (Budiharto & Meiliana, 2018; Buntoro et al., 2021; Yulfa et al., 2023). This study explores the K-popification phenomenon within the campaign of Indonesian presidential candidate Anies Baswedan employed a computer-assisted content analysis method. This approach enabled a detailed sentiment analysis of the social media platform X, with a particular focus on the account @aniesbubble. The primary objective of this sentiment analysis was to quantify and investigate the presence and intensity of sentiment within the social media discourse surrounding Anies Baswedan's campaign. This research uses NodeXL software to execute Network analysis and Sentiment analysis. The coming subsections explain how the researcher conducted the analysis using NodeXL.

3.1.2. Inferential Analysis

The quantitative approach employed in this study is designed to address the second research question, which investigates the phenomenon of K-popification in Anies Baswedan's 2024 Indonesian Presidential Campaign, focusing on its precedents and antecedents. Sugiyono (2019) defines inferential analysis as a method used to examine the existence of independent variables without making direct comparisons or seeking relationships among them.

This study incorporates three types of variables: exogenous, intervening, and endogenous variables. The intervening variables, which serve as mediators, include the K-popification of Anies Baswedan's Presidential Campaign (denoted as K-pop or Y1) and Online Political Activities (denoted as OnP or Y2). The exogenous variables are the Political Use of Twitter or X (PUT or X1) and Political Self-efficacy (PSE or X2). The endogenous variable is Offline Political Activities (OfP or Z) conducted by voters in the Indonesian presidential elections.

The exogenous variables in this study are critical as they represent the independent factors that influence the intervening variables. The Political Use of Twitter (PUT) encompasses the strategies and frequency with which political messages are disseminated and engaged on the social media platform X (H. C. Yang et al., 2020). Political Self-efficacy (PSE) refers to the voters' belief in their ability to understand and influence political processes (H. C. Yang et al., 2020). These exogenous variables provide the foundational context within which the intervening variables operate.

The intervening variables act as bridges, linking the exogenous variables to the endogenous outcome. The K-popification of the campaign (Kpop) refers to the adoption of elements from K-pop culture, such as fan engagement strategies and multimedia content, to enhance political campaigning. K-popification encompasses technological advancements that have significantly influenced and shaped four key, often interrelated, aspects of digital fandom: (1) communication, (2) creativity, (3) knowledge, and (4) organizational and civic power (Lucy Bennett, 2014). Online Political Activities (OnP) include various digital engagements, such as sharing, commenting, and participating in online discussions related to the campaign (H. C.

Yang et al., 2020). These intervening variables capture the dynamic interaction between traditional political strategies and modern digital phenomena.

The endogenous variable, Offline Political Activities (OfP or Z), represents the tangible political actions taken by voters, such as attending rallies, canvassing, and voting (H. C. Yang et al., 2020). This variable is crucial for understanding how online engagement and cultural phenomena translate into real-world political behavior. By employing a quantitative approach, this study aims to provide a systematic and empirical analysis of how the K-popification of Anies Baswedan's campaign influences and is influenced by online and offline political activities. This comprehensive framework allows for the identification of significant patterns and the assessment of the broader implications of integrating popular culture into political campaigns. The findings are expected to contribute to the understanding of modern political communication strategies and their impact on voter behavior and engagement.




Figure 3.1. Research Framework for Quantitative Analysis

3.1.2.1. Political Use of Twitter (PUT)

The political use of social media platforms, notably X (formerly known as Twitter), encompasses various activities such as frequently sharing updates on political issues, responding to political posts, commenting on political content, and mobilizing others to participate in the voting process (H. Yang et al., 2020). These activities become particularly pronounced during periods of heightened political activity, such as general elections for the president and vice president. During these times, the integration of social media into election campaigns becomes a vital component of political communication strategies and political activism, both online and offline (Schroeder, 2018).

The integration of social media with political campaigns allows for real-time engagement and direct interaction with the electorate, which can significantly influence public opinion and voter behavior. This dynamic is evident in the way social media has been leveraged to disseminate campaign messages, counter misinformation, and mobilize supporters. The ability to reach a broad audience quickly and efficiently makes social media an indispensable tool for modern political campaigns (Boatwright et al., 2019). Political use of social media is affecting the fandom like K-pop fan in shaping the K-popification of Anies Baswedan Presidential Campaign (Muthmainnah, 2024; Pamugari, 2024). Therefore, the researcher proposes the following hypothesis:

- H1: Political use of X affecting the K-Popification of Anies Baswedan Presidential Campaign
- H3: Political use of X affecting the Online Political Activism
- H5: Political use of X affecting the Offline Political Activism

3.1.2.2. Political Self Efficacy (PSE)

H. Yang et al. (2020) refers to political efficacy as the belief in one's ability to understand and effectively participate in politics (internal efficacy), and the belief that government officials and institutions are responsive to citizens' needs and concerns (external efficacy). It is crucial for the functioning of a democratic government, as it fosters political participation and civic engagement. Previous researchers have shown

that higher political self-efficacy is associated with increased political use of social media, greater involvement in both online and offline political activities, and enhanced civic engagement (Kenski & Stroud, 2006; Moslehpour et al., 2024; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2004). Therefore, the researcher proposes the following hypothesis:

H2: Political Self Efficacy is affecting the K-Popification of Anies Baswedan Presidential Campaign

H4: Political Self Efficacy is affecting the Online Political Activism

H6: Political Self Efficacy is affecting the Offline Political Activism

3.1.2.3. K-popification of Anies Baswedan Presidential Campaign

One of the most notable impacts of social media on political campaigns is its effect on fandom culture, such as those seen in the K-pop community. K-pop fans, known for their highly organized and passionate online presence, have applied their digital engagement skills to political campaigns, thereby shaping the phenomenon known as the K-popification of political campaigns (Maros & Basek, 2022). This phenomenon involves the use of K-pop-inspired strategies to engage voters, such as creating fan content, organizing online events, and leveraging the power of social networks to spread campaign messages.

In the context of the 2024 Indonesian Presidential Campaign of Anies Baswedan, the K-popification phenomenon has been particularly prominent. Previous studies (Muthmainnah, 2024; Pamugari, 2024) have observed how the political use of social media by K-pop fans has significantly influenced the campaign. These fans have utilized their skills in digital content creation and online mobilization to support Anies Baswedan, thereby blending elements of K-pop culture with political activism both online and offline. The involvement of K-pop fans in political campaigns illustrates how technological advancements in social media have reshaped traditional political engagement. The frequency with which political issues are shared, the interactive responses to political posts, and the encouragement to vote all contribute to a more dynamic and participatory political environment. This intersection of entertainment fandom and political activism exemplifies the evolving nature of political communication in the digital age.

The political use of social media has transformed not only the strategies employed by political campaigns but also the ways in which individuals engage with politics. The K-popification of Anies Baswedan's campaign serves as a case study in understanding the broader implications of this transformation, highlighting the potential for fandom cultures to influence political outcomes and the importance of digital literacy in modern political discourse. Therefore, the researcher proposes the following hypothesis:

H7: K-Popification of Anies Baswedan Presidential Campaign is affecting Online Political Activism

H8: K-Popification of Anies Baswedan Presidential Campaign is affecting Offline Political Activism

3.1.2.4. Online Political Activism

H. Yang et al., (2020) refers to online political activism as political activities conducted in an online context to influence government structures, the selection of officials, and policies. This includes actions such as writing to politicians, making campaign contributions, and signing up to volunteer for campaigns or issues online. Recognized as a distinct form of political participation, online political activism encompasses various digital efforts to engage in the political process.

H9: Online political activism is affecting online political activism

3.2. Data Collection and Sampling

3.2.1. Data Collection of Qualitative Method

The research was conducted at Jakarta Indonesia from February 2024 to June 2024. Answering the first research question using sentiment analysis, data taken from social media X in June 2024. NodeXL allows the researcher to import data directly from X by allowing it to use the researcher's X API. The first data set downloaded from the X is in two sets, to compare the significance of @aniesbubble in influencing sentiment around Anies Baswedan. The researcher used Boolean terms in the query input, "Anies

(Capres OR Pilpres)”. *Capres* is the abbreviation of *Calon Presiden* (Candidate President). *Pilpres* is the abbreviation of *Pemilu (pemilihan umum) Presiden* (Presidential Election). The researcher downloaded 5,000 tweets for each data set, as the following:

- A. During campaign period of Indonesian Presidential election, but prior to the emergence of @aniesbubble, particularly, 28 November 2023 – 28 December 2023.
- B. During campaign period of the Indonesia Presidential election, since the emergence of @aniesbubble, until the end of campaign period, particularly, 29 December 2023 – 10 February 2024.

Boolean terms were used in the query input to ensure that the collected data comprehensively captured relevant discussions and sentiments related to Anies Baswedan's presidential campaign. Specifically, the terms "Anies (Capres OR Pilpres)" were chosen. "Capres" stands for Calon Presiden (Candidate for President), while "Pilpres" stands for Pemilihan Umum Presiden (Presidential Election). By including these terms, the query ensured that tweets mentioning Anies Baswedan in the context of his candidacy for the presidency were included in the dataset. This selection ensures comprehensiveness by covering both common abbreviations and specific election-related terms that users might use interchangeably. The specific dates chosen for data collection align with key events in Anies Baswedan's campaign timeline, particularly the Indonesian Presidential election period and the emergence of @aniesbubble. For the first dataset (A), tweets were collected from 28 November 2023 to 28 December 2023, capturing discussions during the initial campaign phase before @aniesbubble's emergence. Dataset (B) covers the period from 29 December 2023 to 10 February 2024, focusing on tweets during and after @aniesbubble's emergence, which marked a significant shift in campaign dynamics. These periods were selected to analyze how the introduction of @aniesbubble influenced sentiment towards Anies Baswedan, providing a clear before-and-after comparison crucial for understanding the impact of this influential X account on public perception.

The second data set downloaded from X is to determine the sentiment around @aniesbubble. The researcher used standard terms in the query input, “Anies Bubble”.

The second data set contains 5,000 tweets, since the emergence of @aniesbubble until the end of campaign period, 29 December 2023 to 10 February 2024. The third data set downloaded is to determine the sentiment around Olppaemi Project, which is a project initiated by volunteers who support Anies Baswedan under the theme of K-popification. The researcher used Boolean term in the query input, "Olppaemi OR Olpproject". The third dataset contains 5,000 tweets, since the emergence of @aniesbubble until the end of campaign period, 29 December 2023 to 10 February 2024.

The process of using NodeXL for data collection involved importing data directly from X using the researcher's Twitter API access. NodeXL facilitated the extraction of tweets based on specified queries (e.g., "Anies (Capres OR Pilpres)", "Anies Bubble", "Olppaemi OR Olpproject"). The researcher utilized the X API to access real-time and historical tweets that matched these queries, ensuring that the datasets were comprehensive and up-to-date. For each query, 5,000 tweets were collected per dataset to maintain consistency and enable comparative analysis. This methodological approach allowed for systematic data gathering and analysis, leveraging both NodeXL's capabilities for network analysis and the X API's access to real-time social media data, thereby supporting the study's objectives of examining sentiment and discourse surrounding Anies Baswedan's campaign, @aniesbubble, and the Olppaemi Project. The decision to collect 5,000 tweets for each dataset ensures a sufficiently large sample size for accurate sentiment analysis. This size strikes a balance between capturing a broad spectrum of opinions and sentiments while maintaining manageable data processing. Research by Pak and Paroubek (2010) suggested that a minimum of 2,000 tweets is necessary for sentiment analysis to achieve reliable results. However, the accuracy and reliability can improve with larger datasets. On the other hand, a study by Kharde and Sonawane (2016) on sentiment analysis of X data recommended datasets ranging from 5,000 to 10,000 tweets to capture variations in sentiment across different topics and time periods effectively. Selecting 5,000 tweets as sample size strikes a balance between capturing a broad spectrum of opinions and sentiments while maintaining manageable data processing.

3.3. Data Collection of Quantitative Method

The quantitative research uses online questionnaire to collect data. The demography of the questionnaire are Indonesian citizens who are eligible to vote, including voters who support Anies Baswedan, do not support Anies Baswedan, and swing voters. This is because the sampling methods used is snowballing. Snowballing method is used because the time limit of the research, and the narrow network of researcher. The data for answering the second research question is obtained after the announcement of the Indonesia Presidential Election winner. The questionnaire was distributed in one week from 21 May 2024 to 28 May 2024. The data collected is from 124 respondents.

3.3.1. Research Instrument: Online Questionnaire

The research uses online questionnaire as quantitative method to collect data by using Google Form software. The researcher uses Likert scale to measure the variables and indicators in the online questionnaires. According to Sugiyono (2019), the Likert scale is used to measure attitudes, opinions and perceptions of both individuals and groups of people towards social phenomena. This scale is structured and valued as the following:

- i. Strongly agree, has value of five (5)
- ii. Agree, has value of four (4)
- iii. Neither agree or disagree, has value of three (3)
- iv. Disagree, has value of two (2)
- v. Strongly disagree, has value of one (1)

The first section of the questionnaire is adopted from H. Yang et al. (2020), including variables such as political use of twitter (PUT), political self-efficacy (PSE), online political activism (OnP), and offline political activism (OfP). The questionnaire was structured and adapted to K-popification of Anies Baswedan Campaign case study, as shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1. Quantitative Variables and Indicators

Variable	Indicator	Indicator Description (Questionnaire)
Political Use of Twitter (PUT)	PUT1	On Twitter, how often did you share/tweet anything about political issues (such as a text, photo, video or an article etc.) during Indonesian presidential election 2024?
	PUT2	How often did you respond/react to your friends' posts about any political issues on Twitter by liking the post during Indonesian presidential election 2024?
	PUT3	How often did you comment on your friends' posts about any political issue on Twitter during Indonesian presidential election 2024?
	PUT4	How often did you encourage your friends to vote on Twitter during Indonesian presidential election 2024?
Political Self Efficacy (PSE)	PSE1	I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics
	PSE2	I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country
	PSE3	I feel that I could do as good as a job in public office as most other people
	PSE4	I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people
	PSE5	Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.
	PSE6	People like me don't have any say about what the government does.
	PSE7	I don't think public officials care about what people like me think.
Online Political Activities (OnP)	OnP1	Tweet or tag a presidential candidate online
	OnP2	Made a campaign contribution online e.g. react to the candidate's post (like and retweet), using hashtags, create content related to the election (UGC), etc.
	OnP3	Signed up to volunteer for a campaign online, or supporting grassroots campaign.
	OnP4	Engaging in discussions about political issues and candidates to exchange perspectives

Source: H. Yang et al. (2020)

Table 3.1. (cont.)

Variable	Indicator	Indicator Description (Questionnaire)
	OnP5	Live-tweet during presidential debates or other political events to provide commentary, analysis, and real-time reactions to candidates' statements and positions.
	OnP6	Consuming news or information related to the presidential election 2024.
Offline Political Activities (OfP)	OfP1	Attended a political rally
	OfP2	Attended or arrange a gathering related to political events with your friends and family e.g. watching the presidential debates together
	OfP3	Buy or make political merchandise such as banners, shirts, stickers, etc.
	OfP4	Participated in any demonstrations, protests, or marches
	OfP5	Participated in groups that took any local action for social or political reform
	OfP6	Been involved in public interest groups, political action groups, political clubs, or party committees

Source: H. Yang et al. (2020)

Table 3.2. K-popification Quantitative Indicator

Dimension	Indicator	Indicator Description (Questionnaire)
Communication	KPop1	Anies Bubble effectively communicates Anies Baswedan's campaign messages through its K-pop-inspired communication style
		Anies Bubble's communication style relatable and engaging
		Anies Bubble's communication style enhance your perception of Anies Baswedan as a political figure

Source: Adapted from Lucy Bennett (2014)

Table 3.2. (cont.)

Dimension	Indicator	Indicator Description (Questionnaire)
Communication	KPop1	Portraying Anies Baswedan as an idol through Anies Bubble's communication strategy positively impacts his image as a political figure
		I believe Anies Baswedan's portrayal as an idol by Anies Bubble contributes to engaging younger voters in Indonesian politics
Creativity	KPop2	The creation of Anies Bubble and its K-pop-inspired approach demonstrate innovative campaign strategies in Indonesian politics
		Anies Bubble's creative approach make you more interested in following Anies Baswedan's campaign
		Anies Bubble's creative content make you more likely to share or engage with Anies Baswedan's campaign on social media
		Anies Bubble's creative initiatives memorable and impactful
		Anies Bubble's creativity attracts new supporters to Anies Baswedan's campaign
Knowledge	KPop3	I am familiar with the various initiatives undertaken by Anies Bubble, such as the creation of special emojis, website development, and organizing events
		I actively seek out information from Anies Bubble regarding Anies Baswedan's campaign activities
		Anies Bubble's communication strategy effectively resonates with the values and beliefs of Anies Baswedan's supporters
		Anies Bubble's communication effectively convey the key priorities and objectives of Anies Baswedan's campaign
		Anies Bubble's activities contribute to building a sense of community among Anies Baswedan's supporters
Organization and Civic Power	KPop4	Anies Bubble's organization of events and online activities has been effective in mobilizing supporters for civic participation beyond social media

Source: Adapted from Lucy Bennett (2014)

Table 3.2. (cont.)

Dimension	Indicator	Indicator Description (Questionnaire)
Organization and Civic Power	KPop4	Anies Bubble and its associates's initiatives contribute to a sense of empowerment among Anies Baswedan's supporters
		I am likely to participate in offline activities organized by Anies Bubble to support Anies Baswedan's campaign
		Anies Bubble's collaboration with groups like Olppaemi Project demonstrates the potential for grassroots movements to influence political campaigns in Indonesia
		Anies Bubble associates, humanies's involvement in initiatives like fundraising for flood victims showcases the civic power and social responsibility of Anies Baswedan's supporters

Source: Adapted from Lucy Bennett (2014)

The second section of the questionnaire is developed by the researcher based on Lucy Bennett (2014), as shown in Table 3.2. The second section investigates the K-popification of Anies Baswedan campaign (KPop) variable in the dimensions of communication, creativity, knowledge, and organization and civic power.

3.4. Methodology of Data Processing and Analysis

3.4.1. Qualitative Data Processing: Sentiment Analysis

To conduct this analysis, the researcher employed NodeXL, an advanced social media analytics tool known for its robust capabilities in content analysis. NodeXL is a network analysis programme that facilitates network overview, discovery, and exploration. The programme automates the collection and processing of network data, leading to final visualisations and reports (Pew Research Center, 2014). NodeXL features allow researcher to identify patterns and trends in sentiment expression (Joa & Yun, 2022) NodeXL's proven effectiveness in social science research, particularly in the context of presidential elections, added credibility to the methodology. Its widespread use by other researchers underscores its reliability and the value it brings to content analysis in political campaigns (Aldahdouh & AlDahdooh, 2019).

The researcher imports data from X using NodeXL version 1.0.1.535, employing advanced search queries with Boolean terms and date filters, as mentioned above. Once imported, the connected structure of the raw data is observed. NodeXL is then used to prepare the data, leveraging features that count and merge duplicates. Data is grouped by clusters using algorithm that looks at how vertices are connected to each other. As per recommendation of NodeXL, the researcher use the Clauset-Newman-Moore clustering algorithm for sentiment analysis to identify community structures in large networks. The researcher can then draw conclusions about modularity, a measure of the fitness of the groups formed in a clustered network, and graph density, a measure of the number of edges among a group of vertices over the total number if everyone was connected to everyone (Social Media Research Foundation, n.d.). Furthermore, metrics are calculated within the software to analyse network composition, as the following:

A. Overall graph metrics

According to Social Media Research Foundation (n.d.), vertex is an element of a network, and the vertices count is the number of people or things in the network. On the other hand, An edge is a connection between two vertices. In this step, the metrics calculated include vertex in-degree, vertex out-degree, vertex betweenness and closeness centralities, vertex eigenvector centrality, vertex PageRank, vertex clustering coefficient, vertex reciprocated vertex pair ratio, edge reciprocation, and group metric.

B. Time series analysis

NodeXL allows automation in creating time series analysis based on imported data. Time series analysis allows researcher to see the rhythms and spikes in the activity of users, groups and the whole network over time – by day, by the hour, the minute and the second. The researcher build a time series based on “Relationship Date (UTC)” by days, measuring the “Imported ID” as unique edges.

C. Sentiment Analysis

The researcher applied sentiment analysis by measuring the “Words and word pairs” metric in NodeXL. NodeXL provides a positive and negative sentiment words in English. However, the researcher uses Wahid and SN (2016) list of positive and

negative sentiment words, that is translated and modified from B. Liu et al. (2005)'s list of words.

Lastly, the network map is visualized in NodeXL. The visualization shows groups from the network, and the connection to other groups. The edge colour, edge width and edge opacity reflects the edge weight, or the strength of a connection between two vertices. The researcher set the smallest to largest value represented by edge colour of grey to red. The vertex size and vertex layout order represent the betweenness centrality of the vertices. According to Al-Ward et al. (2022), betweenness centrality is “a measure of the number of times a given node lies on one of the paths between all pairs of nodes in the network”, which has the following mathematical formula:

$$Betw(n) = \sum_{i \neq n \neq j \in N} \frac{a_{i,j}(n)}{a_{i,j}}$$

The betweenness centrality $Betw$ of node $n \in N$, where N is the set of all nodes in the network. $a_{i,j}$ is the total number of paths between i and j and $a_{i,j}(n)$ is the number of paths between the pair that pass through node n .

The researcher maps the vertex size in the range of 100 – 1,000, and the vertex layout order in the range of 1 – 9,999. Furthermore, the researcher set the label of the group name of the groups in the graph by the top words in Tweet. The researcher uses Harel-Koren Fast Multiscale as the graph layout. Each graph's groups is set to layout in its own box by using Treemap as the box layout algorithm. Additionally, each vertices is represented by image of each profile picture. In analysing the graph, the researcher will discuss the graph based on (Rainie, 2014) classifications of graphs in her report.

3.4.2. Quantitative Data Processing: Inferential Analysis

Researcher uses inferential analysis as the quantitative data processing method, which includes processing data that are clear and data collection is carried out randomly. The research uses Structural Equation Model (SEM) analysis as the data processing technique, particularly Partial Least Square (PLS) using SmartPLS software. From the data collected, each instrument is tested for its level of validity and reliability. The

validity test is intended to test the accuracy of the measuring instrument used in the research, namely the questionnaire. Meanwhile, the reliability test is used to test the consistency and reliability of the results obtained, to ensure the data obtained is useful for the researcher.

3.4.2.1. Instrument Testing Method

Quality in research is determined by the accuracy and correctness of the data. The data obtained in the questionnaire is processed, analyzed and tested, whether each statement in the questionnaire is valid and reliable. Because this research does not use a sample that is too large, this research uses the Partial Least Square (PLS) method to analyze and solve the problems studied. The measurement model used in this PLS research is the Goodness of Fit Outer Model to test the validity and reliability. The following section explains the research method in testing the validity and reliability of the Goodness of Fit Outer Model:

A. Validity Test

- i. Convergent validity aims to see the validity of each indicator with its latent variables or construct variables. To see the correlation, it can be seen through the reflective indicator scores with the later variable scores. In convergent validity, the factor loading value must be ≥ 0.70 (Solimun et al., 2017).
- ii. Discriminant validity aims to ensure that the concepts of various latent models differ from one variable to another. Discriminant validity can be measured with reflective indicators with later variable scores, where two different concepts that are conceptually different are required to have and show adequate differences. Therefore, the “Loading” value of each indicator is expected to be higher than each “Cross Loading” (Ghozali, 2018).

B. Reliability Test

The extent to which the data is generated using measurements with the same object. This research uses the PLS method, where reliability testing uses Composite Reliability and Cronbach’s Alpha

i. Composite Reliability

If a construct has a value > 0.70 , it can be said to have a high reliability value. Where reliability itself is related to the accuracy and precision of a measurement (Hair et al., 2013).

ii. Cronbach's Alpha

To see whether the consistency of data is adequate or not by looking at the Cronbach's Alpha value, the value can be said to be reliable if the value is > 0.60 (Ghozali, 2018).

3.4.2.2. Inferential Analysis

Inferential analysis is a statistical technique used to analyze sample data and the results can be concluded as a population (Sugiyono.2019). In collecting data and processing the data, researchers used the Partial Least Square (PLS) test tool. Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) is a method used to cover the weaknesses of the regression method. According to experts, the Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) method is grouped into two approaches, namely Covariance Based SEM (CBSEM) and Variance Based SEM or it can also be called Partial Least Square (PLS). Partial Least Square means that it does not assume certain data, which can be nominal, categorical, ordinal, interval and ratio (distribution free). PLS uses a bootstrapping method where random multiplication assumes normality will not be a problem for PLS. and Partial Least Square (PLS) does not have requirements for determining the minimum number of samples to be studied, so research that uses small samples can use Partial Least Square (PLS) and is classified as non-parametric so that it does not require data with a normal distribution. To analyze the data, researchers used the PLS method using SmartPLS Software Version 3.9.

A. Evaluation of the Measurement Model (Outer Model)

At this stage the researcher wants to evaluate each indicator that meets the requirements or standards for validity and reliability. The validity test is as explained above, where the validity test consists of two, namely Convergent validity and Discriminant validity, and the reliability test consists of two, namely Composite reliability and Cronbach's reliability.

B. Evaluation of the Structural Model (Inner Model)

The structural model describes the relationship model between latent variables which is formed based on the substance of the theory. The construct model looks at each significant value and R-Square value for each independent latent variable which is expressed as the predictive power of the structural model. In changing the R-square value, it is possible to use it to assess the influence of certain exogenous latent variables on the independent variable, whether the latent variable has a substantive influence. The structural model can be evaluated using the Goodness of Fit test, path coefficient and hypothesis testing.

a. Goodness of fit test (goodness test)

According to Ghazali (2018), the Nagelkerke R-Square value varies from 1 to 0, if the value is close to 1 then the model is considered good of fit, but if the value is close to 0 then it is considered not good of fit. Q-Square in PLS is used for predictive relevance in constructive models. In Goodness of fit, the Q^2 value can be seen. The Q^2 value has the same meaning as the R-Square (coefficient of determination) in regression analysis, which states that the higher the R-Square value, the better it is. The following is the formula to measure the Q-Square value:

$$Q^2 = 1 - (1 - R_1^2)(1 - R_2^2) \dots (1 - R_p^2)$$

R_1^2 R_2^2 ... R_p^2 *R-Square* of endogenous variables in the model, Q^2 is the same with the total coefficient of determination in the analysis track. On the other hand, Q^2 is total coefficient of determination in path analysis. According to Chin (1998), the R-Square value can be categorized as strong > 0.67 , if the R-Square > 0.33 but if < 0.67 , and < 0.33 and > 0.19 then it is categorized as weak.

b. Path coefficient test (path test)

The path coefficient is the direct effect value in the PLS SEM analysis. In measuring the path coefficient, it is intended to see the significance and strength of the relationship between constructs, the path coefficient value ranges from -1 to +1. If the path coefficient has a value close to +1, it can be said that the relationship between the two constructs is getting stronger, conversely, if the path coefficient value is close to -1, it can be indicated that the relationship is negative (Solimun et al., 2017)

c. Detection Test of the Influence of Mediator / Intervening Variables (Sobel Test)
 According to Abu-Bader & Jones (2021), the tool is used to test the indirect influence of independent variables through intervening variables on the dependent variable. Mediation hypothesis testing can be carried out with procedures maximized by Sobel. Independent variable (X), dependent variable (Z) and intervening variable (Y), the indirect influence from X to Z via Y is calculated by path switching X→ Y (a) with path Y→ Z (b) or ab. Therefore, coefficient $ab = (c-c)$, where c is the effect of X on Z without having to control Y. The standard error of coefficients a and b can be called S_a and S_b and the value of the standard error value of the indirect effect of S_{ab} can be calculated using the formula below:

$$S_{ab} = \sqrt{b^2 - s_a^2 + a^2 s_b^2 + s_a^2 - s_b^2}$$

Description:

- Sab the size of the standard error of the indirect effect
- a path of the independent variable with the intervening variable
- b path of the intervening variable with the dependent variable
- sa standard error coefficient a
- sb standard error coefficient b

For indirect significance, the t value of the ab coefficient must be calculated using the formula below:

$$t = \frac{ab}{s_{ab}}$$

The results of the t calculation are compared using the t table. If the t calculation results are greater than the t table then it can be concluded that there is a mediation effect.

d. Hypothesis Testing

In this research, the hypothesis test used is the partial test (t test). The t test can be said to be a temporary answer to the problem formulation, which states the relationship between two or more variables (Sugiyono, 2018). If the P - value <0.05 then the hypothesis can be said to be significant or accepted. A hypothesis testing design is used to see the correlation of the two variables, using the formula:

$$t \text{ count} = \frac{r\sqrt{n-2}}{\sqrt{1-r^2}}$$

Description:

t count	t value
r	correlation coefficient
n	number of samples



CHAPTER IV

RESULTS & DISCUSSION

4.1. Quantitative Research

4.1.1. Demographic of Respondents

The study involves a diverse group of 125 respondents. This demographic analysis provides a detailed understanding of the participants' characteristics, which is crucial for contextualizing the findings of the research. The gender distribution among the respondents reveals a higher participation of females compared to males. Specifically, 65.6% (82 respondents) are female, while 34.4% (43 respondents) are male. This gender disparity may reflect broader trends in social media engagement and interest in political campaigns, particularly in the context of K-pop culture, which often has a substantial female fanbase. The age distribution is varied, with a significant concentration in the younger age groups. The majority of respondents, 50.4% (63 respondents), fall within the 17–25-year age range. This is followed by 21.6% (27 respondents) aged between 35-50 years, and 13.6% (17 respondents) each in both the 25-35 year and above 50-year-old categories. Only 0.8% (1 respondent) is below 17 years old. The prominence of the 17–25-year age group is particularly relevant, as younger individuals are typically more active on social media platforms like X (Twitter) and are often more engaged in contemporary cultural phenomena such as K-pop.

A significant majority of respondents, 69.6% (87 respondents), have an X account, while 30.4% (38 respondents) do not. This is an important factor for the study as it underscores the relevance of social media in political campaigning. The high percentage of respondents with X accounts suggests a substantial portion of the study population is likely exposed to and possibly influenced by online content related to the K-popification of political campaigns.

The demographic profile of the respondents provides several insights for the research. The gender and age distributions suggest that the K-popification of Anies Baswedan's campaign might be particularly resonant among younger females, who are typically more engaged with K-pop culture. Additionally, the high rate of X account ownership indicates that a large portion of the study's respondents are likely to be influenced by social media dynamics, which is critical for analyzing the impact and spread of campaign strategies online. Understanding these demographic nuances helps in framing the research findings within the context of the target audience's characteristics, thereby providing a more comprehensive analysis of the K-popification phenomenon in the political campaign of Anies Baswedan for the 2024 Indonesian Presidential Election.

Table 4.1. Demographic of Respondents

No	Aspect	Nominal N=125	Percentage (%)
1	Gender		
1.1	Male	43	34.4
1.2	Female	82	65.6
2	Age		
2.1	Below 17-year-old	1	0.8
2.2	17 – 25-year-old	63	50.4
2.3	25 – 35-year-old	17	13.6
2.4	35 – 50-year-old	27	21.6
2.5	Above 50-year-old	17	13.6
3	X (Twitter) account		
3.1	Has X (Twitter) Account	87	69.6
3.2	Has not X (Twitter) Account	38	30.4




Figure 4.1. The Respondents' Activity in Using X

This data indicates that a significant portion of respondents, 25.6%, are never active on social media, suggesting a segment of the population that may not be influenced by online campaign strategies. Conversely, a combined 35.2% (19.2% highly active and 16% active) of respondents are actively engaging with social media platforms like X. This active engagement is crucial for understanding the impact of K-popification on the political campaign of Anies Baswedan, as these respondents are more likely to encounter and be influenced by K-pop styled political content.

Furthermore, 20.8% of respondents are rarely active, and 18.4% are somewhat active, indicating a moderate level of engagement. These groups represent a middle ground, potentially influenced by social media content but not as extensively as the highly active group. Overall, the variation in social media activity among respondents underscores the importance of targeting and tailoring campaign strategies to engage different levels of social media users effectively. Understanding these patterns helps in analyzing the reach and influence of the K-popification strategy in Anies Baswedan's campaign for the 2024 Indonesian Presidential Election

4.1.2. The First and Second Phase




Figure 4.2. The First Phase

The measurement model tests the relationship between observational data and latent variables and defines the measurement of the construct. The initial evaluation of this study focuses on several key variables: Political Use of Twitter (PUT), Political Self-Efficacy (PSE), K-popification (Kpop), Online Political Activism (OnP), and Offline Political Activism (OfP). Each variable is reflected by multiple indicators, with PUT having 4, PSE having 7, Kpop having 4 primary indicators subdivided into communication, creativity, knowledge, and organization and civic power (each with 5 statements and the value is accumulation of the five statements), OnP with 6, and OfP with 6 indicators. The SmartPLS analysis evaluates the outer model's effectiveness using four main criteria: convergent validity, discriminant validity, composite reliability, and Cronbach's Alpha. Convergent validity requires indicator factor loading values to exceed 0.70, which confirms their validity. Discriminant validity mandates that the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) for each variable be over 0.50

and that cross-loading values within one variable surpass those with other constructs, ensuring distinctiveness among variables. Composite reliability, which evaluates the internal consistency of indicators, requires a value above 0.70, as does Cronbach's Alpha, which measures the internal consistency or average correlation of items. Meeting these stringent criteria ensures that the constructs are both valid and reliable, thus substantiating the robustness of the research model and reinforcing the credibility of the study's findings on the K-popification of Anies Baswedan's campaign.

4.1.2.1. Convergent Validity of the First Phase

The results in Table 4.2. and Table 4.3. show that there are five indicators (PSE5, PSE6, PSE7, OnP6 and OfP2) were that do not meet the convergent validity requirements, the values of five indicators have loading factor values below 0.7, the recommended value should be 0.7. Subsequently, a second stage was conducted by reapplying PLS to measure convergent validity without these five indicators.

Table 4.2. Part 1: Convergent Validity First Phase

Variable	Convergent Validity					Conclusion
KPop1	0.951					Valid
KPop3	0.941					Valid
KPop2	0.937					Valid
KPop4	0.931					Valid
OfP1		0.751				Valid
OfP2		0.667				Not Valid
OfP3		0.888				Valid
OfP4		0.888				Valid
OfP5		0.889				Valid
OfP6		0.897				Valid
OnP1			0.789			Valid
OnP2			0.857			Valid
OnP3			0.729			Valid

Table 4.3. Part 2: Convergent Validity First Phase

Variable	Convergent Validity					Conclusion
OnP4			0.786			Valid
OnP5			0.851			Valid
OnP6			0.683			Not Valid
PSE1				0.806		Valid
PSE2				0.904		Valid
PSE3				0.774		Valid
PSE4				0.858		Valid
PSE5				0.212		Not Valid
PSE6				0.238		Not Valid
PSE7				0.351		Not Valid
PUT1					0.865	Valid
PUT2					0.907	Valid
PUT3					0.901	Valid
PUT4					0.855	Valid

4.1.2.2. VIF of the Second Phase

The second phase presented in Figure 4.3. is the calculation model after recalculation by removing or deleting items that do not meet the convergent validity requirements. Furthermore, convergent validity includes the average variance extracted (AVE), which ranges from 0.661 (OnP) to 0.884 (KPop), meets the recommended value of > 0.05 (see Table 4.4.; Fornell & Larcker (1981). In the outer model analysis, a key assumption or requirement is the absence of multicollinearity, which occurs when there is a strong intercorrelation among indicators. This issue is identified when the correlation value exceeds 0.9, and it is typically signaled by a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) value greater than 5 at the indicator level. Therefore, if an indicator exhibits a VIF value greater than 5, it suggests the presence of multicollinearity. As a result, one of the strongly correlated indicators may need to be excluded or removed. In the second stage of PLS, indicator Kpop1 is greater than 5 and it must be removed and reapply PLS without Kpop1.

Table 4.4. Convergent Validity Second Phase

Variable	Convergent Validity					Conclusion
KPop1	0.951					Valid
KPop2	0.937					Valid
KPop3	0.941					Valid
KPop4	0.931					Valid
OfP1		0.763				Valid
OfP3		0.895				Valid
OfP4		0.889				Valid
OfP5		0.901				Valid
OfP6		0.906				Valid
OnP1			0.806			Valid
OnP2			0.862			Valid
OnP3			0.769			Valid
OnP4			0.775			Valid
OnP5			0.850			Valid
PSE1				0.834		Valid
PSE2				0.905		Valid
PSE3				0.766		Valid
PSE4				0.875		Valid
PUT1					0.865	Valid
PUT2					0.906	Valid
PUT3					0.900	Valid
PUT4					0.856	Valid

The outer model of second phase meets all the requirements. Therefore, it can be proceeded to the inner model calculations. However, the result shows that there is multicollinearity among the indicators of Kpop. The outer model in SmartPLS concerns itself with the relationships between observed indicators and their respective latent variables (constructs). It evaluates the reliability and validity of the measurement model by examining indicator loadings, composite reliability, convergent validity (e.g., factor loadings, AVE), and discriminant validity. While aspects of reliability and validity are assessed in the outer model, VIF specifically addresses multicollinearity among predictors, which is a concern in the estimation of structural paths (inner model). As shown in Table 4.5. that Kpop1 and Kpop2 have value more than 5.

Table 4.5. VIF of the Second Phase

Indicators	VIF	Results
KPop1	6.721	High Multicollinearity
KPop2	5.721	High Multicollinearity
KPop3	4.858	Low Multicollinearity
KPop4	4.169	Low Multicollinearity
OfP1	1.802	Low Multicollinearity
OfP3	3.453	Low Multicollinearity
OfP4	3.439	Low Multicollinearity
OfP5	3.318	Low Multicollinearity
OfP6	3.580	Low Multicollinearity
OnP1	2.018	Low Multicollinearity
OnP2	2.403	Low Multicollinearity
OnP3	1.741	Low Multicollinearity
OnP4	1.846	Low Multicollinearity
OnP5	2.282	Low Multicollinearity
PSE1	2.390	Low Multicollinearity
PSE2	3.055	Low Multicollinearity
PSE3	1.693	Low Multicollinearity
PSE4	2.218	Low Multicollinearity
PUT1	2.675	Low Multicollinearity
PUT2	3.743	Low Multicollinearity
PUT3	3.487	Low Multicollinearity

Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) in SmartPLS is calculated for each predictor variable in a model and indicates how much the variance of a regression coefficient is inflated due to multicollinearity with other predictors. High VIF values (typically above 5 or 10) suggest high multicollinearity, which can lead to unreliable coefficient estimates and difficulties in interpreting the model. VIF helps assess the degree to which multicollinearity is present among predictor variables. It quantifies how much the variance of an estimated regression coefficient is inflated due to correlation with other predictors. High VIF values indicate that the associated predictors are highly correlated with other predictors in the model. This correlation makes it challenging to separate the individual effects of each predictor on the outcome variable, potentially leading to less precise and less reliable model results. Addressing Multicollinearity is by

removing highly correlated predictors from the model which KPop1 (VIF=6.721>5). This is becoming the third phase.

4.1.3. The Third Phase: Final Model




Figure 4.3. The Second Phase

4.1.3.1. Evaluation of Outer Model or Measurement Model

The final evaluation of the outer model (Third Phase) in this study results in the variables: Political Use of Twitter (PUT), reflected by 4 indicators; Political Self Efficacy (PSE), reflected by 4 indicators; K-popification of Anies Campaign for President, reflected by 3 indicators; Online Political Activism (OnP), reflected by 5 indicators; and Offline Political Activism, reflected by 5 indicators.

The stages in the SmartPLS analysis effectively evaluate the outer model using four criteria: testing the validity and reliability of variables by examining Cronbach's Alpha, Composite Reliability, and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) for each variable. The four testing criteria are as follows:

- Convergent validity: Indicators are considered valid if the coefficient value is > 0.70 . In this study, all indicators' variables in the third phase have factor loading values > 0.70 , indicating their validity.
- Discriminant Validity: Variables are considered valid if the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) for each variable is > 0.50 , and cross-loadings have values > 0.70 , greater than all other constructs.
- Composite Reliability: Variables are considered reliable if the Composite Reliability value for each variable is > 0.70 .
- Cronbach's alpha: Variables are considered reliable if the Cronbach's Alpha value for each variable is > 0.70 .

To test convergent validity, outer loading values or Factor loadings are used. An indicator is considered to meet convergent validity in the good category if outer loadings > 0.70 . The following are the outer loading values of each indicator in the research variables:

Table 4.6. Convergent Validity

Variable	Indicator	Loading Factor	AVE	Description
Political Use of Twitter	PUT1	0.865	0.778	Meets convergent validity
	PUT2	0.906		Meets convergent validity
	PUT3	0.900		Meets convergent validity
	PUT4	0.856		Meets convergent validity
Political Self Efficacy	PSE1	0.834	0.717	Meets convergent validity
	PSE2	0.905		Meets convergent validity
	PSE3	0.766		Meets convergent validity
	PSE4	0.875		Meets convergent validity
Online Political Activities	OnP1	0.806	0.661	Meets convergent validity
	OnP3	0.862		Meets convergent validity
	OnP4	0.769		Meets convergent validity
	OnP5	0.775		Meets convergent validity
	OnP6	0.850		Meets convergent validity
Offline Political Activities	OfP1	0.763	0.761	Meets convergent validity
	OfP3	0.895		Meets convergent validity
	OfP4	0.889		Meets convergent validity
	OfP5	0.901		Meets convergent validity
	OfP6	0.906		Meets convergent validity
K-popification in Anies Presidential Campaign	KPop2	0.937	0.884	Meets convergent validity
	KPop3	0.941		Meets convergent validity
	KPop4	0.931		Meets convergent validity

4.1.3.2. Internal Consistency Reliability

Composite Reliability (CR) is a measure used to assess the internal consistency and reliability of a set of latent variables or constructs in a structural equation model. In Table 4.7., the CR values for various constructs range from 0.907 to 0.968, indicating a high level of reliability. Composite Reliability is calculated to determine the extent to which the indicators of a construct consistently reflect the latent variable. It is similar to Cronbach's Alpha but is considered a better estimate because it does not assume equal weightings of the items. The formula for CR involves the standardized factor loadings and error variances of each indicator. According to Chin (2010) and other scholars in the field of structural equation modeling, a CR value of 0.7 or higher is considered acceptable, indicating good internal consistency. This means that the items within each construct are reliably measuring the same underlying concept.

The CR values in the Table 4.7. range from 0.907 to 0.968. A CR value of 0.907 for Online Political Activities suggests that the items used to measure this construct are highly reliable, surpassing the minimum threshold of 0.7. Similarly, a CR value of 0.968 for K-popification in Anies Presidential Campaign indicates an excellent level of reliability, meaning the indicators for this construct are very consistent in measuring the latent variable. Having CR values that exceed the threshold of 0.7 provides confidence in the reliability of the constructs. It means that the measurement model is stable and that the constructs are consistently measured by their respective indicators. This high level of reliability enhances the validity of the conclusions drawn from the structural equation model. This supports the robustness of your measurement model, ensuring that the constructs are measured accurately and consistently.

Table 4.7. Composite Reliability and Cronbach's Alpha

Variable	Composite Reliability	Cronbach's Alpha
Political Use of Twitter	0.933	0.905
Political Self Efficacy	0.910	0.868
Online Political Activities	0.907	0.871
Offline Political Activities	0.941	0.920
K-popification in Anies Presidential Campaign	0.968	0.956

4.1.3.3. Discriminant Validity

Discriminant validity ensures that each construct in the latent model is distinct and not overlapping with other constructs. To evaluate the measurement model, the Heterotrait-Monotrait (HTMT) ratio was utilized. The HTMT ratio is a reliable method to assess discriminant validity in structural equation modeling. According to Kline (2015), an HTMT value above 0.85 indicates potential issues with discriminant validity. Similarly, Gold et al. (2001) suggest that HTMT values exceeding 0.90 raise concerns regarding the distinctiveness of the constructs.

In the context of this study, Table 4.8. presents the HTMT values for all constructs. All values were found to be lower than 0.85, which indicates that the constructs are distinct from one another and meet the discriminant validity criteria. This adherence to the threshold of 0.85 demonstrates that each construct is unique and measures a different concept as intended. Furthermore, the test for discriminant validity is satisfied if the HTMT value between constructs is less than 0.90. Table 4.8. confirms that all constructs in the study meet this standard, as none of the HTMT values exceed the 0.90 threshold. This provides additional assurance that the constructs are appropriately distinct and that the measurement model accurately represents the theoretical framework.

Table 4.8. Heterotrait–Monotrait (HTMT)

	KPop	OfP	OnP	PSE	PUT
KPop					
OfP	0.327				
OnP	0.443	0.594			
PSE	0.482	0.312	0.489		
PUT	0.477	0.326	0.729	0.373	

4.1.4. Inner Model Test Results / Evaluation of the Structural Model




Figure 4.4. The Third Phase: Final Model

4.1.4.1. R Square Value (R^2)

The R^2 value test, or coefficient of determination, is used to assess the strength of a model in predicting endogenous variables. This value ranges from 0 to 1 and is categorized into three levels: strong, moderately strong, and weak. According to Chin (1998), an R^2 value greater than 0.67 indicates a strong model, an R^2 value between 0.33 and 0.67 indicates a moderately strong model, and an R^2 value below 0.33 indicates a weak model.

The analysis results in Table 4.9. reveal varying levels of model strength for different constructs. For predicting K-popification in Anies Presidential Campaign, the model falls into the low category with an R^2 value of 0.296. Similarly, in predicting Offline Political Activities, the model also falls into the low category with an R^2 value of 0.299. These values suggest that the model has limited strength in predicting these particular endogenous variables. However, when it comes to predicting Online Political

Activities, the model demonstrates a higher level of strength, falling into the medium category with an R^2 value of 0.485. This indicates that the model is moderately strong in predicting this construct, showing better predictive power compared to the other two constructs.

Table 4.9. R Square, Adjusted R Square, Q Square dan SRMR Model

Endogenous Variable	The Goodness of fit Model Parameter			
	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Q Square	SRMR Model
K-popification in Anies Presidential Campaign	0.296	0.284	0.271	0.072
<i>Offline</i> Political Activities	0.299	0.276	0.082	
<i>Online</i> Political Activities	0.485	0.472	0.458	

Based on the test results shown in Table 4.9. the adjusted R^2 value for the variable K-popification in Anies Presidential Campaign is 0.296, or 29.6%. This indicates that 29.6% of the variance in K-popification in Anies Presidential Campaign can be explained by the variables Political Use of Twitter and Political Self-Efficacy. The remaining 71.4% of the variance is attributed to other variables that were not included in this study. Similarly, the adjusted R^2 value for the variable Offline Political Activities is 0.299, or 29.9%. This means that 29.9% of the variance in Offline Political Activities can be explained by Political Use of Twitter and Political Self-Efficacy. The remaining 71.1% of the variance is due to other factors not accounted for in this research. For the variable Online Political Activities, the adjusted R^2 value is 0.485, or 48.5%. This indicates that 48.5% of the variance in Online Political Activities can be explained by Political Use of Twitter and Political Self-Efficacy. The remaining 51.5% is explained by other variables not included in this study.

4.1.4.2. Predictive Relevance (Q^2)

Predictive relevance value or Q square (Q^2) is used to assess and evaluate structural models. Q-square can measure how well the observation values produced by the model

and its parameter estimates are. It can be said that the model has predictive relevance if the Q square (Q^2) value is greater than zero.

Based on the results of table 6 above, it shows that the Q-square value for K-popification in Anies Presidential Campaign is 0.271, for the Offline Political Activities variable it is 0.082, and for the Online Political Activities variable it is 0.458. So it can be concluded that the model in this study has a relevant predictive value, because the Q-square value in this study is > 0 , which indicates that the model has a predictive relevance value.

4.1.4.3. SRMR Model

The Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) is a key parameter for assessing the goodness of fit in a model. A model is considered to have a very good fit if the SRMR is less than 0.08. If the SRMR is between 0.08 and 0.10, the model is still considered suitable and fit. The SRMR provides an indication of the average magnitude of residuals between observed and predicted correlations, with lower values indicating a better fit. The analysis results presented in Table 4 show that the PLS-SEM model has an SRMR value of 0.072. Since this value is less than 0.08, it indicates that the model fits the data very well. This suggests that the discrepancies between the observed and predicted correlations are minimal, thus demonstrating a strong alignment between the model and the empirical data. This result supports the overall robustness and validity of the model, ensuring that it adequately represents the underlying theoretical constructs and their relationships.

4.1.5. Hypothesis Test

Hypothesis testing in Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) is conducted using the bootstrapping method to assess the relationships between variables. Bootstrapping involves repeatedly sampling from the data set and estimating the model each time to generate a distribution of the estimated parameters. This technique helps to determine the stability and reliability of the estimates.

During bootstrapping, the t value is calculated for each relationship in the model. The t value indicates the ratio of the estimated parameter to its standard error. A higher t value suggests a more reliable estimate. According to Henseler (2018), a t value greater than or equal to 1.96 corresponds to a p value equal to or less than 0.05. The p value indicates the probability that the observed relationship is due to chance. Therefore, a p value equal to or less than 0.05 signifies that the relationship is statistically significant. In practical terms, if the t value for a specific relationship in the model is greater than or equal to 1.96, the corresponding p value will be equal to or less than 0.05. This means that there is a less than 5% chance that the relationship observed in the sample data occurred randomly. Consequently, the relationship is considered statistically significant, providing evidence to support the hypothesis.

Based on Table 4.10., it is evident that there is insufficient empirical support for the influence of the K-popification of Anies' Campaign for the Presidential Election (KPop) variable on Offline Political Campaigns (OfP) and Online Political Activism (OnP). Specifically, the hypothesis H1 (KPop \rightarrow OfP) has a p-value of 0.196, which is greater than 0.05, indicating that this relationship is not statistically significant. Similarly, the hypothesis H2 (KPop \rightarrow OnP) has a p-value of 0.306, also greater than 0.05, suggesting no significant effect.

Further, the hypothesis H5 (Political Self-Efficacy (PSE) \rightarrow OfP) has a p-value of 0.699, showing that PSE does not significantly impact Offline Political Campaigns. Additionally, the hypothesis H8 (Political Use of Twitter (PUT) \rightarrow OfP) has a p-value of 0.343, indicating that PUT does not significantly influence Offline Political Campaigns either. However, the data reveal significant effects for other relationships in the model. The K-popification in Anies' Presidential Campaign, Offline Political Activities, and Online Political Activities can be better activated through Political Self-Efficacy (PSE) and the Political Use of Twitter (PUT). The PSE variable significantly affects KPop (H4: PSE \rightarrow KPop) with a p-value of 0.002, which is less than 0.05. Similarly, PSE has a significant influence on OnP (H6: PSE \rightarrow OnP) with a p-value of 0.000.

Moreover, the PUT variable significantly impacts KPop (H7: PUT \rightarrow KPop) with a p-value of 0.000, and it also significantly influences OnP (H9: PUT \rightarrow OnP) with a p-

value of 0.000. Additionally, the OnP variable significantly affects OfP (H3: OnP → OfP) with a p-value of 0.000. While the direct effects of K-popification on offline and online political activities are not supported by the data, the variables Political Self-Efficacy and Political Use of Twitter play significant roles in enhancing K-popification, offline political activities, and online political activism. These findings highlight the importance of PSE and PUT in activating political behaviors within the context of the Anies Presidential Campaign, but not such importance for K-popification.

Table 4.10. Direct Effect

Hypothesis	Relationship	Path coeff.	Standard Deviation	T-value	P-value	Description
H1	KPop → OfP	0.130	0.100	1.294	0.196	Not supported by data
H2	KPop → OnP	0.065	0.063	1.024	0.306	Not supported by data
H3	OnP → OfP	0.539	0.133	4.054	0.000	Supported by data
H4	PSE → KPop	0.332	0.108	3.062	0.002	Supported by data
H5	PSE → OfP	0.037	0.094	0.387	0.699	Not supported by data
H6	PSE → OnP	0.218	0.062	3.504	0.000	Supported by data
H7	PUT → KPop	0.332	0.075	4.449	0.000	Supported by data
H8	PUT → OfP	-0.122	0.128	0.949	0.343	Not supported by data
H9	PUT → OnP	0.554	0.084	6.580	0.000	Supported by data

After testing the hypothesis of the direct influence between variables for each path, a mediation test was conducted to assess the indirect effects. This mediation test helps in understanding how intermediate variables influence the relationship between the independent and dependent variables.

Based on Table 4.11., it is revealed that Online Political Activities significantly mediate the influence of Political Self-Efficacy (PSE) on Offline Political Campaigns (OfP). Specifically, the hypothesis H13 ($PSE \rightarrow OnP \rightarrow OfP$) has a p-value of 0.016, which is less than 0.05, indicating that Online Political Activities serve as a significant mediator in this relationship. This means that PSE impacts Offline Political Campaigns indirectly through its effect on Online Political Activities. Similarly, the hypothesis H17 ($PUT \rightarrow OnP \rightarrow OfP$) shows that Online Political Activities mediate the effect of Political Use of Twitter (PUT) on Offline Political Campaigns, with a p-value of 0.001, also less than 0.05. This indicates that PUT affects Offline Political Campaigns indirectly via Online Political Activities. Therefore, both PSE and PUT have significant indirect effects on OfP through the mediating role of Online Political Activities.

On the other hand, the K-popification of Anies' Presidential Campaign has not proven to be a significant mediating variable. The hypotheses H10 ($PSE \rightarrow KPop \rightarrow OfP$), H11 ($PUT \rightarrow KPop \rightarrow OfP$), H14 ($PSE \rightarrow KPop \rightarrow OnP \rightarrow OfP$), H16 ($PSE \rightarrow KPop \rightarrow OnP \rightarrow OfP$), H18 ($PUT \rightarrow KPop \rightarrow OnP$), and H15 ($PSE \rightarrow KPop \rightarrow OnP \rightarrow OfP$) all have p-values greater than 0.05. This indicates that the Kpopification variable does not significantly mediate the relationships between PSE, PUT, and OfP. Furthermore, the effect of K-popification on OfP through Online Political Activities is also not supported by the data.

The mediation analysis reveals that Online Political Activities play a crucial role in mediating the effects of Political Self-Efficacy and Political Use of Twitter on Offline Political Campaigns. This highlights the importance of online engagement in translating political efficacy and social media use into tangible offline political actions. Conversely, the K-popification of Anies' Presidential Campaign does not serve as a significant mediating factor in these relationships, suggesting that its influence on offline political activities is not substantiated by the data.

Table 4.11. Indirect Effect

Hypothesis	Relationship	Path coeff.	Standard Deviation	T-value	P-value	Description
H10	PSE → KPop → OfP	0.043	0.036	1.205	0.228	Not supported by data
H11	PUT → KPop → OfP	0.043	0.037	1.165	0.244	Not supported by data
H12	KPop → OnP → OfP	0.035	0.036	0.972	0.331	Not supported by data
H13	PSE → OnP → OfP	0.118	0.049	2.407	0.016	Supported by data
H14	PSE → KPop → OnP → OfP	0.012	0.014	0.844	0.399	Not supported by data
H15	PUT → KPop → OnP → OfP	0.012	0.013	0.929	0.353	Not supported by data
H16	PSE → KPop → OnP	0.022	0.024	0.903	0.366	Not supported by data
H17	PUT → OnP → OfP	0.299	0.091	3.277	0.001	Supported by data
H18	PUT → KPop → OnP	0.022	0.022	0.974	0.330	Not supported by data

4.1.6. Discussion in Quantitative Results

The findings of this study significantly contribute to the ongoing discourse regarding the impact of social media on electoral outcomes, drawing parallels with previous research (Doroshenko, 2022; Kovic et al., 2017; Russmann, 2022; Spierings & Jacobs, 2014). Kovic et al. (2017) investigated the role of candidates' exposure in traditional media and their activity on social media during the 2015 Swiss federal election, introducing the concept of "brute force effects," which extends the "mere exposure

effect" (Hansen & Wänke, 2009; Harmon-Jones & Allen, 2001). Their study concluded that while brute force effects were present, they were not decisive. Traditional mass media presence had a significant impact on electoral outcomes, while the impact of social media activity was less substantial. They also found that incumbency emerged as a potent predictor of success due to the two-step Matthew effect, where incumbents' media prominence reinforced their electoral advantage. However, social media resonance, particularly on Facebook, indicated that audience engagement was more critical than mere activity. The current study aligns with Kovic et al.'s findings by demonstrating that Political Self-Efficacy (PSE) and Political Use of Twitter (PUT) significantly influence Offline Political Campaigns (OfP) through Online Political Activities (OnP), emphasizing the critical role of engagement on social media platforms, such as Twitter or X. The significant mediation effect of OnP in the relationship between PSE, PUT, and OfP underscores the necessity of active and meaningful engagement, resonating with Kovic et al.'s assertion that social media resonance matters more than mere activity.

Spierings and Jacobs (2014) identified two main effects of social media on electoral outcomes: direct and interaction effects. Direct effects suggested that even minimal use of social media could influence the number of preference votes a candidate receives by showcasing their personality and signaling modernity. However, they concluded that the direct effect was conditional and could not be simply expected. Interaction effects highlighted the importance of active engagement on social media platforms, where merely having a large number of followers was insufficient; candidates needed to actively communicate with their audience to garner electoral dividends. The current study's findings that Online Political Activities significantly mediate the influence of PSE and PUT on OfP support Spierings and Jacobs (2014) conclusion. It underscores that active engagement and interaction on social media are crucial for translating online presence into electoral success. The mediation by OnP indicates that active communication and meaningful engagement with the audience are essential for enhancing offline political activities.

Doroshenko (2022) examined Volodymyr Zelensky's digital campaign during the Ukrainian presidential election in 2019. Zelensky's campaign was characterized by open communication and citizen engagement on social media, effectively mobilizing

a diverse populace and garnering widespread support. Despite a smaller campaign budget than his rivals, Zelensky's use of customizable hashtags and technological tools to foster engagement, particularly among younger citizens, played a significant role in his landslide victory. The current study's emphasis on the mediating role of Online Political Activities aligns with Doroshenko's findings, illustrating the power of social media in political campaigns. Zelensky's campaign demonstrates how engagement and interaction on social media can mobilize support and influence electoral outcomes. This parallels the study's finding that PSE and PUT significantly influence OfP through OnP, highlighting the importance of strategic social media use in political campaigns.

Russmann (2022) conducted a longitudinal study of Austrian political parties, showing that parties increasingly recognized the potential of social media for building supporter relationships. This led to a greater focus on interactivity and professional community management, with more specific targeting options, including dark ads, emerging over time. By 2019, target group-centered campaigns dominated, evolving from a lack of clear target groups in 2013. The current study's findings that PSE and PUT significantly influence Offline Political Campaigns through Online Political Activities suggest that targeted and interactive social media strategies can effectively enhance political engagement and outcomes. This aligns with Russmann's observations that a strategic focus on interactivity and community management on social media platforms can build stronger supporter relationships and enhance electoral success.

The phenomenon of the K-popification of Anies Baswedan's presidential campaign reflects an innovative and culturally resonant strategy aimed at engaging Generation Z in Indonesian politics. This approach leverages the popularity and engagement dynamics of K-pop fan culture, which has demonstrated significant influence in various social and political arenas. The integration of K-pop elements into Anies Baswedan's campaign, such as the use of TikTok, Korean captions, fan accounts, merchandise, and organized events, aligns with the principles of "brute force effects" as discussed by Kovic et al. (2017). Their study emphasized the importance of media presence and engagement in influencing electoral outcomes. The "mere exposure effect," where repeated exposure to a candidate fosters positive attitudes, is extended

in this context through cultural resonance and active participation, as seen with the Anies Bubble's activities.



Picture 4.1. Emoji Owl Ahjussi

Source: Tasmalinda (2024)

Spierings and Jacobs (2014) highlighted the significance of both direct and interaction effects of social media on electoral outcomes. The direct effect of showcasing personality and signaling modernity through minimal social media use is conditional. In contrast, the interaction effect, requiring active engagement with the audience, is crucial. The Anies Bubble's use of interactive social media elements, such as voting polls for fandom names and the creation of an owl emoji, exemplifies this interactive engagement (Picture 4.1.). This strategy resonates with the findings of the current study, where Online Political Activities (OnP) mediate the influence of Political Self-Efficacy (PSE) and Political Use of Twitter (PUT) on Offline Political Campaigns (OfP).



Picture 4.2. Website HaveAniesDay Released by Anies Bubble 5

Source: Hernawan & Sukmaningtyas (2024)

The mobilization of K-pop fans for political purposes, as seen in the Anies Baswedan campaign, parallels Doroshenko (2022) analysis of Volodymyr Zelensky's digital campaign. Zelensky effectively mobilized a diverse populace through open communication and citizen engagement on social media, achieving significant electoral success. Similarly, volunteer groups of Anies Baswedan supporters, such as Anies Bubble and Olppaemi Project, apply K-popification and effectively mobilized their community to show supports towards the candidate. For instance, Anies Bubble released a website called *HaveAniesDay* (Picture 4.2.) containing information about the candidates, such as vision and mission.



Picture 4.3. Anies Baswedan Videotron in Jakarta 6

Source: Hayati (2024)



Picture 4.4. Anies Baswedan Videotron di Bekasi 7

Source: Fahmi (2024)

Furthermore, Olppaemi Project successfully organize fundraising for videotrons in various province, demonstrating the potential of K-pop fan mobilization in politics. Olppaemi Project planned the videotron to play for a week (15-21 January 2024) in

Jakarta (Picture 4.3) and Bekasi (Picture 4.4), but was taken down after only one day due to “reasons that is out of our hands” (Fahmi, 2024). Then, more videotrons started to appear in other cities, Olppaemi Project display their videotron in Surabaya (Picture 4.5.), and Anies Millennial Center, another supporter group, display a videotron in Aceh (Picture 4.6).



Picture 4.5. Anies Baswedan Videotron in Surabaya 8

Source: Gibraltar (2024)



Picture 4.6. Anies Baswedan Videotron in Aceh 9

Source: (Masroni, 2024)

Despite the innovative strategy, the findings of Yurcel et al. (2024) caution that high social media engagement does not necessarily translate into high voter turnout. The number of followers and interactions on @aniesbubble does not guarantee a corresponding number of votes, suggesting that while social media can raise awareness and engagement, it may not be decisive in electoral success. This aligns with Kovic et al. (2017) conclusion that brute force effects, while present, are not always decisive.

The historical context of Indonesian K-pop fans' involvement in political discourse, such as their opposition to the Omnibus Law in 2020 (Leonaldy, 2020; Rokhim, 2023), further illustrates their potential influence. K-pop fans have shown the ability to coordinate efforts and bring significant attention to political issues, demonstrating their capacity to influence public discourse and raise awareness without direct political manipulation. This ability to mobilize for social and political causes underlines the strategic potential of engaging K-pop fans in electoral campaigns. The K-popification of Anies Baswedan's campaign represents a novel approach to engaging Generation Z in politics by leveraging the dynamics of K-pop fan culture. This strategy aligns with previous findings on the importance of media presence, social media engagement, and active interaction in influencing electoral outcomes. However, while it successfully raises awareness and engagement, it may not be sufficient to guarantee electoral success. Future research could explore the long-term impacts of such strategies and their effectiveness in different cultural and political contexts, providing further insights into the evolving role of social media and popular culture in politics.

H. Yang et al. (2020) study on the 2016 US election highlights the nuanced impacts of social media on civic engagement and political participation. Yang found that while general use of Facebook had a small negative effect on political participation, political use had a significantly positive impact. This distinction is mirrored in the current study's findings on Anies Baswedan's campaign, where specific, targeted activities on the @aniesbubble account more effectively engaged voters compared to general social media use. This targeted engagement is crucial for fostering a sense of political efficacy and translating online actions into offline political participation.

Adding to this, the phenomenon of algorithmic enclaves as described by Lim (2017) provides a framework to understand the dynamics of social media interactions in

political contexts. Algorithmic enclaves are dynamic, affectively driven networks on social media shaped by the interplay between human users and algorithms. Unlike static filter bubbles or echo chambers, these enclaves evolve based on affective interactions, which can include intense emotional appeals and disinformation, as seen in the rivalry surrounding Ahok's political career (Hui, 2020). In the case of Anies Baswedan's campaign, the @aniesbubble account employs strategies that resonate with the theory of algorithmic enclaves. By creating content that appeals to the emotional and cultural affiliations of K-pop fans, the campaign leverages these affective interactions to build a supportive online community. This mirrors the way algorithmic enclaves' function, fostering intense emotional bonds rather than ideological alignment, and thereby driving engagement and participation.

H. Yang et al. (2020) findings that political use of social media can enhance both online and offline political engagement are further supported by the current study's results. The empirical data indicates that Online Political Activities (OnP) mediate the influence of Political Self-Efficacy (PSE) and Political Use of Twitter (PUT) on Offline Political Campaigns (OfP). This mediation suggests that effective engagement in online political activities can translate into tangible offline actions, emphasizing the role of targeted social media use in political campaigns. Moreover, the theory of algorithmic enclaves helps explain the effectiveness of such targeted social media strategies. The @aniesbubble account's activities, such as organizing fan events, creating interactive polls, and producing campaign-related merchandise, align with the affectively driven nature of algorithmic enclaves. These activities not only engage followers but also create a sense of community and belonging, which is essential for mobilizing political participation.

The findings also align with Hui (2020) observation of the emotional appeals and disinformation facilitated by social media algorithms, which create polarized communities. In the case of Anies Baswedan's campaign, the K-popification strategy has successfully attracted a large following, leveraging emotional and cultural connections to engage voters. However, it is important to note that such strategies can also contribute to the formation of algorithmic enclaves, where emotional bonds may overshadow moderate voices and ideological diversity. The role of social media algorithms in shaping these enclaves highlights the dynamic and evolving nature of

online political engagement. The @aniesbubble account's success in engaging voters through targeted, affective interactions demonstrates the potential of social media to enhance civic engagement and political participation. However, it also underscores the need to be mindful of the potential for polarization and disinformation that can arise from such strategies.

The K-popification strategy in Anies Baswedan's campaign exemplifies how specific, interactive social media activities can effectively engage voters by creating emotional and cultural connections. This targeted engagement can translate online participation into offline political actions, reinforcing Yang's findings on the positive impact of political use of social media. The concept of algorithmic enclaves provides a deeper understanding of the dynamics at play in such targeted social media strategies, emphasizing the role of emotional appeals and the potential for polarization. As social media continues to shape political landscapes, understanding these dynamics will be crucial for designing effective and inclusive political campaigns that foster genuine civic engagement and participation.

The findings of this study have several important implications. Firstly, they reinforce the critical role of social media engagement, particularly through platforms like X, in political activities. The significant indirect effects of PSE and PUT on OfP through OnP highlight the importance of active and meaningful engagement on social media for achieving electoral success. This supports the notion that strategic use of social media can significantly influence political behavior and outcomes. Secondly, the study's findings suggest that not all forms of online presence equally impact offline political behavior. The lack of significant mediation by the K-popification of Anies' Presidential Campaign indicates that specific forms of online presence, such as cultural phenomena, might not resonate as strongly in the political sphere compared to more direct forms of political engagement on platforms like X. This highlights the need for political campaigns to strategically select and utilize social media platforms and content that resonate with their target audience.

4.2. Qualitative Research

This research applied qualitative method, particularly sentiment analysis, to determine the significance of K-popification on public sentiment of Anies Baswedan during 2024 presidential campaign. The methodology will include network analysis and sentiment analysis. The research design is divided into two phases: (1) comparing the sentiment of Anies Baswedan as a presidential candidate before and after the emergence of @aniesbubble; (2) sentiment analysis on Anies Bubble and Olppaemi Project, which are groups of volunteers that characterize K-popification.

4.2.1. Results of the First Phase: “Anies (Capres OR Pilpres)”

4.2.1.1. Before the Emergence of @aniesbubble

The first data set is extracted to compare the sentiment around Anies Baswedan before and after the emergence of @aniesbubble. Data of 5000 tweets between the period of 28 November 2023 to 29 December 2023 was imported to NodeXL. The researcher uses NodeXL to prepare the data by counting and merging any duplicated vertex, leaving 4699 vertices. The researcher set the group by cluster. From this data set, 233 groups were formed using the group by cluster algorithm, sequenced from the most count of vertices to the lowest. Table 4.12 shows the first ten groups, labeled by top words in tweet.

Table 4.12. Pre-Anies Bubble Network Group by Cluster

Label	Vertices	Unique Edges	Edges with Duplicates	Total Edges	Self-Loops
G1: anies capres di dan pilpres debat prabowo yang baswedan 2024	856	675	425	1100	1100
G2: anies capres dan yg di pilpres aniesbaswedan ini pak amin	389	535	211	746	140
G3: anies capres yg di prabowo pak masing dan 2024 pilpres	326	562	92	654	33

Table 4.12. (cont.)

Label	Vertices	Unique Edges	Edges with Duplicates	Total Edges	Self-Loops
G4: anies capres yg arie_kriting dan yang ini pak di pilpres	305	313	57	370	23
G5: anies capres dan di pak yang pilpres yg baswedan 2024	247	277	214	491	166
G6: anies capres yg pak debat dan dia kikysaputrii di lebih	162	179	39	218	22
G7: anies capres pilpres yang ini jadi debat gak bukan lebih	158	158	21	179	8
G8: anies capres yg dan di pilpres prabowo baswedan fahrihamzah ini	147	144	88	232	47
G9: anies capres yang debat lebih di pilpres prabowo dengan dan	141	161	46	207	9
G10: anies capres di dan pilpres prabowo yg pak itu debat	117	125	34	159	37

Table 4.11. represents a network of 4,699 X users whose recent tweets contained "anies (capres OR pilpres)", or who were replied to, mentioned, retweeted or quoted in those tweets. From the data collected, there are total of 7,551 edges, with only 5,727 of them are unique edges, which reflects the number of connections where multiple connections between two vertices are counted only once. Data also shows there are 1,911 self-loops, or also is called isolates, which refers to an edge that starts and ends in the same vertex. There is an edge for each "replies-to" relationship in a tweet, an edge for each "mentions" relationship in a tweet, an edge for each "retweet" relationship in a tweet, an edge for each "quote" relationship in a tweet, an edge for each "mention in retweet" relationship in a tweet, an edge for each "mention in reply-to" relationship in a tweet, an edge for each "mention in quote" relationship in a tweet, an edge for each "mention in quote reply-to" relationship in a tweet, and a self-loop edge for each tweet that is not from the mentioned category.

Table 4.13. Network Graph Metrics Pre-Anies Bubble

Graph Metric	Value
Graph Type	Directed
Vertices	4699
Unique Edges	5727
Edges With Duplicates	1824
Total Edges	7551
Self-Loops	1911
Reciprocated Vertex Pair Ratio	0.003120125
Reciprocated Edge Ratio	0.00622084
Connected Components	1050
Single-Vertex Connected Components	856
Maximum Vertices in a Connected Component	3357
Maximum Edges in a Connected Component	6094
Maximum Geodesic Distance (Diameter)	15
Average Geodesic Distance	5,37338
Graph Density	0.000233014
Modularity	0.614908

The maximum vertices in a connected component is 3357, on the other hand, the maximum edges in a connected component is 6094. Furthermore, the graph density is found to be the value of 0,000233014. A high graph density means that most people are connected to many others, meanwhile, low graph density means that most people are not connected to many others. The research found that the modularity of this data set is 0,614908. The graph's vertices were grouped by cluster using the Clauset-Newman-Moore cluster algorithm.

The researcher built the time series analysis based on “Relationship Date”. Axis Y represents days, and axis X represents the imported ID, as unique edges, as shown in Figure 4.5.




Figure 4.5. Time Series Analysis Pre-Anies Bubble

The researcher then calculated the word and word pairs metrics to compute the sentiment analysis. The result of measurement per word is shown in Table 4.14.

Table 4.14. Sentiment Analysis Pre-Anies Bubble

Word	Count	Saliency
Words in Sentiment List#1 (Positive)	23,313	0.164
Words in Sentiment List#2 (Negative)	26,446	0.186
Non-categorized Words	106,802	0.750
Total Words	142,453	1.000

Furthermore, NodeXL is used to calculate word pairs metric. Table 4.15. shows the top ten-word pairs that has the highest saliency.

Table 4.15. Word Pairs Metric of Pre-Anies Bubble

Word 1	Word 2	Count	Saliency
pak	anies	1089	0,006
anies	baswedan	750	0,005
debat	capres	630	0,004
pilpres	2024	520	0,004
cak	imin	452	0,004
di	pilpres	326	0,003
capres	cawapres	317	0,003
desak	anies	314	0,003
capres	anies	307	0,003
jadi	capres	251	0,002

The top hashtags and domains used in tweets within the entire graph reveal prevalent topics and frequently shared sources. Table 4.16. represents top ten hashtags used in tweet in this data set. The most commonly used hashtag is "aminajadulu" with 118 mentions, followed by "aniesmuhaimin2024" with 65 mentions. Other significant hashtags include "anies" (36 mentions), "debatcawapres" (35 mentions), and "aminkanindonesia" (34 mentions). Additionally, "aniesbaswedan" (32 mentions), "pilpres2024" (20 mentions), "amin" (20 mentions), "desakanies" (20 mentions), and "aniespresiden2024" (19 mentions) also appear frequently.

Table 4.16. Top Ten Hashtags Pre-Anies Bubble

Top Hashtags in Tweet in Entire Graph	Entire Graph Count
aminajadulu	118
aniesmuhaimin2024	65
anies	36
debatcawapres	35
aminkanindonesia	34
aniesbaswedan	32
pilpres2024	20
amin	20
desakanies	20
aniespresiden2024	19

Table 4.16. shows the top ten domains in tweet in this data set. In terms of domains, "x.com" is the most shared with 317 mentions, indicating high engagement with X links. Following this, "dlvr.it" has 139 mentions, and "kbanews.com" appears 36 times. Other notable domains include "kontenislam.com" (33 mentions), "gelora.co" (29 mentions), and "youtu.be" (27 mentions). Additionally, "mediaindonesia.com" (26 mentions), "tribunnews.com" (24 mentions), "kompas.com" (23 mentions), and "ift.tt" (22 mentions) are among the top ten shared domains. These tables highlight the dominant discussions and information sources within the graph, showcasing the key themes and platforms utilized by users.

Table 4.17. Top Ten Domains Pre-Anies Bubble

Top Domains in Tweet in Entire Graph	Entire Graph Count
twitter.com	317
dlvr.it	139
kbanews.com	36
kontenislam.com	33
gelora.co	29
youtu.be	27
mediaindonesia.com	26
tribunnews.com	24
kompas.com	23
ift.tt	22

4.2.1.2. After the Emergence of @aniesbubble

Table 4.18. represents a network of 4.219 X users whose recent tweets contained "anies (capres OR pilpres)", or who were replied to, mentioned, retweeted or quoted in those tweets, taken from a data set limited to a maximum of 5.000 tweets, tweeted between 29/12/2023 00.00.00 and 10/02/2024 23.59.59. The network was obtained from X on Monday, 24 June 2024 at 04:54 UTC. The tweets in the network were tweeted over the 424-day, 11-hour, 18-minute period from Thursday, 27 April 2023 at 00:35 UTC to Monday, 24 June 2024 at 11:54 UTC.

Table 4.18. Graph Metrics of Network Post-Anies Bubble

Graph Metric	Value
Graph Type	Directed
Vertices	4,219
Unique Edges	4,974
Edges With Duplicates	2,064
Total Edges	7,038
Self-Loops	2,565
Reciprocated Vertex Pair Ratio	0.00244081
Reciprocated Edge Ratio	0.004869735
Connected Components	1,364
Single-Vertex Connected Components	1,139
Maximum Vertices in a Connected Component	2,484
Maximum Edges in a Connected Component	4,997
Maximum Geodesic Distance (Diameter)	15
Average Geodesic Distance	5.623896
Graph Density	0000230786
Modularity	0.5695

The directed graph under analysis consists of 4,219 vertices and 4,974 unique edges, with a total of 7,038 edges when including 2,064 duplicates. The graph also contains 2,565 self-loops. It features a reciprocated vertex pair ratio of approximately 0.00244 and a reciprocated edge ratio of about 0.00487, indicating a low level of mutual connections. The graph is divided into 1,364 connected components, of which 1,139 are single-vertex components, highlighting a significant number of isolated nodes. The largest connected component includes 2,484 vertices and 4,997 edges. The graph has a maximum geodesic distance (diameter) of 15, and an average geodesic distance of roughly 5.624. With a graph density of 0.000230786, the graph is relatively sparse. Lastly, the modularity of 0.5695 suggests a moderately strong community structure within the graph.

The graph's vertices were grouped by cluster using the Clauset-Newman-Moore cluster algorithm in the NodeXL software. There are total of 284 groups, sequenced based on the count of vertices. Table 4.19 shows the first ten groups, which have the higher count of vertices.

Table 4.19. Post-Anies Bubble Network Group by Cluster

Label	Vertices	Unique Edges	Edges with Duplicates	Total Edges	Self-Loops
G1: anies capres debat di ganjar dan prabowo baswedan yang pilpres	1139	863	680	1543	1543
G2: anies capres abah debat #aniesfinalstage rocks #aforevery1 dan di pak	523	800	380	1180	289
G3: anies capres prabowo dan pak yg di yang pilpres ganjar	241	478	114	592	53
G4: anies capres dan cakiminow aniesbaswedan di debat yang 2024 pilpres	122	132	111	243	57
G5: anies capres di debat yg pak dan abah pilpres ini	114	134	25	159	30
G6: anies abah capres debat #aniesfinalstage #aforevery1 rocks olpproject pak keren	94	90	32	122	13
G7: anies capres di yg pak pilpres jadi imanlagi ini dan	85	91	15	106	11
G8: anies capres di dan baswedan pilpres prabowo yg yang debat	85	88	109	197	100
G9: anies capres debat yg partaisocmed abah rocks #aniesfinalstage perubahan #aforevery1	81	84	14	98	12
G10: anies capres yg di pilpres dan itu prabowo ini ga	75	75	28	103	18

The researcher built the time series analysis based on “Relationship Date”. Axis Y represents days, and axis X represents the imported ID, as unique edges, as shown in Figure 4.6




Figure 4.6. Time Series Analysis Post-Anies Bubble

The researcher then calculated the word and word pairs metrics to compute the sentiment analysis. The result of measurement per word is shown in Table 4.20.

Table 4.20. Sentiment Analysis Post-Anies Bubble

Word	Count	Saliency
Words in Sentiment List#1 (Positive)	17551	0,140
Words in Sentiment List#2 (Positive)	19936	0,159
Non-categorized Words	97517	0,777
Total Words	125485	1,000

Furthermore, NodeXL is used to calculate word pairs metric. Table 4.21 shows the top ten word pairs that has the highest saliency.

Table 4.21. Word Pair Metric Post-Anies Bubble

Word 1	Word 2	Count	Salience
debat	capres	1914	0,007
abah	anies	1248	0,006
rocks	debat	1105	0,006
anies	rocks	1104	0,006
#aforevery1	#aniesfinalstage	995	0,006
capres	#aforevery1	942	0,006
pak	Anies	874	0,006
anies	baswedan	797	0,005
pilpres	2024	341	0,003
di	debat	279	0,003

The top hashtags and domains used in tweets within the entire graph provide insight into the most discussed topics and sources shared. Table 4.22. shows the top ten hashtags in Tweet in this data set. The most frequently used hashtag is "aniesfinalstage" with 1,193 mentions, followed by "aforevery1" with 1,056 mentions. Other notable hashtags include "debatcapres2024" (179 mentions), "debatcapres" (138 mentions), "aminajadulu" (122 mentions), and "aniesbaswedan" (86 mentions). Nonetheless, four unrelated hashtags are included in the top ten hastags in tweet: "zonauang" (80 mentions), "zonajajan" (79 mentions), "infoloker" (79 mentions), and "lokerwfh" (78 mentions).

Table 4.22. Top Ten Hashtags Post-Anies Bubble

Top Hashtags in Tweet in Entire Graph	Entire Graph Count
aniesfinalstage	1193
aforevery1	1056
debatcapres2024	179
debatcapres	138
aminajadulu	122
aniesbaswedan	86
zonauang	80

Table 4.22. (cont.)

Top Hashtags in Tweet in Entire Graph	Entire Graph Count
zonajajan	79
infoloker	79
lokerwfh	78

Table 4.23. Top Ten Domains Post-Anies Bubble

Top Domains in Tweet in Entire Graph	Entire Graph Count
dlvr.it	227
tribunnews.com	46
youtu.be	46
detik.com	46
kumparan.com	39
kontenislam.com	38
co.id	29
tempo.co	27
cnbcindonesia.com	25
youtube.com	24

Regarding the top ten domains in tweet as shown in Table 4.23., "dlvr.it" leads with 227 mentions, indicating it is a commonly shared URL shortening service. Following this, "tribunnews.com", "youtu.be", and "detik.com" each have 46 mentions, highlighting their significant presence in the tweet content. Other frequently shared domains include "kumparan.com" (39 mentions), "kontenislam.com" (38 mentions), and "co.id" (29 mentions). Additionally, "tempo.co" (27 mentions), "cnbcindonesia.com" (25 mentions), and "youtube.com" (24 mentions) are among the top ten shared domains. These tables illustrate the key topics and information sources circulating within the graph, reflecting popular discussions and the flow of information.

4.2.2. Results of the Second Phase: Anies Bubble and Olppaemi Project

The researcher done sentiment analysis and network analysis on “Anies Bubble” and “Olppaemi Project”, which are the two keywords representing the K-popification of Anies Baswedan presidential campaign.

4.2.2.1. Anies Bubble

The data set is limited to a maximum of 5,000 tweets, collected between December 29, 2023, at 00:00:00, and February 10, 2024, at 23:59:59. The network was obtained from X on Monday, June 24, 2024, at 06:56 UTC. The graph represents a network of 4,109 X users whose recent tweets contained "anies bubble" or who were replied to, mentioned, retweeted, or quoted in those tweets. The tweets span a 646-day, 4-hour, 55-minute period from Saturday, September 17, 2022, at 09:00 UTC to Monday, June 24, 2024, at 13:55 UTC. The graph includes an edge for each "replies-to" relationship, "mentions" relationship, "retweet" relationship, "quote" relationship, "mention in retweet" relationship, "mention in reply-to" relationship, "mention in quote" relationship, "mention in quote reply-to" relationship, and a self-loop edge for each tweet that does not fall into these categories.

Table 4.24. Graph Metrics of Network “Anies Bubble”

Graph Metric	Value
Graph Type	Directed
Vertices	4109
Unique Edges	7996
Edges With Duplicates	5532
Total Edges	13528
Self-Loops	500
Reciprocated Vertex Pair Ratio	0,018522554
Reciprocated Edge Ratio	0,036371416
Connected Components	203
Single-Vertex Connected Components	147
Maximum Vertices in a Connected Component	3831

Table 4.24. (cont.)

Graph Metric	Value
Maximum Edges in a Connected Component	13289
Maximum Geodesic Distance (Diameter)	9
Average Geodesic Distance	2,497311
Graph Density	0,000553799
Modularity	0,430145

Table 4.24. shows the result comprises 4,109 vertices and 7,996 unique edges, resulting in a total of 13,528 edges when including 5,532 duplicates. There are 500 self-loops present in the graph. The reciprocated vertex pair ratio is approximately 0.0185, and the reciprocated edge ratio is about 0.0364, indicating a modest level of mutual connections. The graph is divided into 203 connected components, with 147 of these being single-vertex components, highlighting a number of isolated nodes. The largest connected component contains 3,831 vertices and 13,289 edges. The graph's diameter, or the maximum geodesic distance, is 9, while the average geodesic distance is roughly 2.497. The graph density stands at 0.000553799, suggesting a sparse network. Finally, the modularity is 0.430145, indicating a moderate level of community structure within the graph.

The graph's vertices were grouped into 184 clusters using the Clauset-Newman-Moore clustering algorithm. Table 4.25. highlights the top 10 clusters, ordered by the number of vertices within each cluster. The group is labelled by the top words in tweet of each group.

Table 4.25. “Anies Bubble” Network Group by Cluster

Label	Vertices	Unique Edges	Edges With Duplicates	Total Edges	Self-Loops
G1: aniesbubble anies abah #aforevery1 #aniesfinalstage debat capres rocks 2024 2029	1895	2039	1172	3211	87
G2: aniesbubble aniesbaswedan cakiminow olproject imanlagi di abah dan anies ini	772	2203	1413	3616	145

Table 4.25. (cont.)

Label	Vertices	Unique Edges	Edges With Duplicates	Total Edges	Self-Loops
G3: aniesbubble timpenguinnas lilrwok anies abah ini min sama yang tpn	329	480	153	633	17
G4: aniesbubble elisa_jkt idextratime dayatpiliang arie_kriting ekowboy2 briankhrisna imanlagi poljokesid riweh_banget	182	1007	905	1912	24
G5: #aniesbubble anies aniesbubble di #aniesmuhaimin2024 dan yg ini yang ada	147	108	44	152	152
G6: aniesbubble aniesbaswedan prabowo jokowi dan gibran_tweet olpproject di #aniesbubble abah	83	104	23	127	10
G7: aniesbubble olpproject winjae_lis16 aniesbaswedan aku yg ini kak daedoso fadelll170	52	79	45	124	2
G8: aniesbubble ini anies abah bisa di aniesbaswedan imin yang ga	44	39	28	67	5
G9: aniesbubble zidanpragata zzzeen di aniesbaswedan zakkqi ajak janji jakarta elisa_jkt	28	27	38	65	2
G10: aniesbubble nn_artspace feryfarhati aniesbaswedan wow keren mdy_asmara1701 banget mba nana	22	38	0	38	0

The researcher built the time series analysis based on “Relationship Date”. Axis Y represents days, and axis X represents the imported ID, as unique edges, as shown in Figure 4.7




Figure 4.7. Time Series Analysis "Anies Bubble"

Table 4.26. provides a sentiment analysis breakdown of words in tweets. It categorizes words into three sentiment lists: Sentiment List#1 (Positive), Sentiment List#2 (Negative), and with non-categorized words. In Sentiment List#1, there are 6,636 words identified as positive, accounting for 10.4% of the total words analysed. Sentiment List#2 contains 7,346 negative words, representing 11.6% of the total. Sentiment List#3 does not contain any words. The majority of words, 51,624 (81.2% of the total), are non-categorized. Overall, the analysis covers a total of 63,577 words.

Table 4.26. Sentiment Analysis of "Anies Bubble"

Word	Count	Saliency
Words in Sentiment List#1 (Positive)	6636	0,104
Words in Sentiment List#2 (Negative)	7346	0,116
Non-categorized Words	51624	0,812
Total Words	63577	1,000

Table 4.27. lists the top ten word pairs in tweets based on their frequency. The most frequent pair is "abah" and "anies", appearing together 503 times, with a salience of 0.009 and mutual information of 1.356. Following closely is "#aforevery1" and "#aniesfinalstage" with 442 occurrences, salience of 0.008, and mutual information of 2.012. Other notable pairs include "debat" and "capres" (382 occurrences, salience 0.007, mutual information 2.076), "anies" and "rocks" (361 occurrences, salience 0.007, mutual information 1.639), and "rocks" and "debat" (also 361 occurrences, salience 0.007, mutual information 2.114). These pairs reflect frequent associations and co-occurrences of words in the analysed tweets, providing insights into prevalent topics and discussions.

Table 4.27. Word Pair Metric of "Anies Bubble"

Word 1	Word 2	Count	Salience	Mutual Information
abah	anies	503	0,009	1,356
#aforevery1	#aniesfinalstage	442	0,008	2,012
debat	capres	382	0,007	2,076
anies	rocks	361	0,007	1,639
rocks	debat	361	0,007	2,114
aniesbubble	abah	358	0,007	0,662
capres	#aforevery1	346	0,007	1,944
aniesbaswedan	cakiminow	340	0,007	1,701
2024	2029	334	0,007	2,158
anies	2024	328	0,006	1,568

Table 4.28 presents the top hashtags used in tweets across the entire graph, highlighting the most frequent topics of discussion. Topping the list is "#aforevery1" with 545 mentions, followed closely by "#aniesfinalstage" with 527 mentions. Other prominent hashtags include "#kpuvote" (333 mentions), "#pemilu24" (324 mentions), and "#aniesbubble" (181 mentions). Additionally, hashtags like "#aminajadulu" (130 mentions), "#aminkanindonesia" (92 mentions), and "#aniesmuhaimin2024" (77 mentions) reflect significant engagement on specific political and social themes. Furthermore, hashtags such as "#tiktokliveforevery1" (72 mentions) and "#aniesbaswedan" (45 mentions) also contribute to the diversity of discussions

observed within the analyzed tweet data. These hashtags provide insights into the trending topics and public discourse captured by the dataset.

Table 4.28. Top Ten Hashtags "Anies Bubble"

Top Hashtags in Tweet in Entire Graph	Entire Graph Count
aforevery1	545
aniesfinalstage	527
kpuvote	333
pemilu24	324
aniesbubble	181
aminajadulu	130
aminkanindonesia	92
aniesmuhaimin2024	77
tiktokliveforevery1	72
aniesbaswedan	45

4.2.2.2. Olppaemi Project

Olppaemi Project is a volunteer group supporting the presidential and vice-presidential candidates Anies Baswedan and Muhaimin Iskandar (Cak Imin), characterized by integrating K-pop concepts into their activities and. Their activities focus on mobilizing support and community engagement, resembling the fan-driven initiatives seen in K-pop culture, rather than political campaign efforts, as seen on their volunteer website and social media presence (Nariswari, 2024). The researcher investigates sentiment around Olppaemi Project, to get a better understanding on the K-popification of Anies Baswedan's presidential campaign. From a data set limited to maximum 5,000 tweets, tweeted between 29/12/2023 00.00.00 and 10/02/2024 23.59.59, the researcher form a graph represents a network of 3.315 X users whose recent tweets contained "olppaemi OR olpproject", or who were replied to, mentioned, retweeted or quoted in those tweets. The network was obtained from X on Tuesday, 25 June 2024 at 01:34 UTC. The tweets in the network were tweeted over the 182-day, 1-hour, 34-minute period from Tuesday, 26 December 2023 at 07:00 UTC to Tuesday, 25 June 2024 at 08:34 UTC.

Table 4.29. "Olppaemi Project" Network Graph Metrics

Graph Metric	Value
Graph Type	Directed
Vertices	3,315
Unique Edges	5,394
Edges With Duplicates	4,880
Total Edges	10,274
Self-Loops	242
Reciprocated Vertex Pair Ratio	0.028712566
Reciprocated Edge Ratio	0.055822329
Connected Components	38
Single-Vertex Connected Components	25
Maximum Vertices in a Connected Component	3,248
Maximum Edges in a Connected Component	10,092
Maximum Geodesic Distance (Diameter)	6
Average Geodesic Distance	2.248529
Graph Density	0.000606595
Modularity	0.419011

Table 4.29. describes metrics of the network from this data set. It consists of 3,315 vertices and 5,394 unique edges, with a total of 10,274 edges including duplicates. There are 242 self-loops in the graph, where a vertex connects to itself. The reciprocated vertex pair ratio is approximately 0.0287, indicating a proportion of vertex pairs that have mutual connections. The reciprocated edge ratio is 0.0558, showing the fraction of edges that have a corresponding reciprocal edge. The graph is divided into 38 connected components, with 25 single-vertex components indicating isolated nodes. The largest connected component contains 3,248 vertices and 10,092 edges. The graph's maximum geodesic distance, or diameter, is 6, and the average geodesic distance between vertices is 2.2485. With a graph density of 0.000606595, the graph is relatively sparse. Finally, the modularity of 0.419 indicates a notable structure of communities within the graph, reflecting its division into distinct groups or modules.

This data set is grouped by cluster, forming total of 95 groups, sequenced based on the count of vertices. Each group is labelled by the top words in tweet. Table 4.30. shows the top ten group, with the highest vertices.

Table 4.30. "Olppaemi Project" Network Group by Cluster

Label	Vertices	Unique Edges	Edges with Duplicates	Total Edges	Self-Loops
G1: olpproject abah #aniesfinalstage #aforevery1 anies debat capres rocks yg ada	2105	1881	1474	3355	75
G2: olpproject aniesbaswedan aniesbubble cakiminow abah di imanlagi anies ubahbareng yg	485	1337	710	2047	77
G3: olpproject idextratime aniesbubble arie_kriting briankhrisna poljokesid riweh_banget szeve dayatpiliang margianta	108	877	888	1765	18
G4: olpproject #aniesfinalstage #aforevery1 abah anies debat rocks capres aja mbakrystall	78	77	13	90	0
G5: olpproject txtdaripole ini yg dan di nya minnies ya ada	61	70	12	82	4
G6: olpproject di kak jis ke pajrig19915 mau aku ya ada	61	80	41	121	6
G7: olpproject mb4bil4 abah anies #aforevery1 #aniesfinalstage di aniesbubble keren ini	59	65	10	75	2
G8: olpproject clemoontyne aku di jis naasygowreng queenkenoy abah yg hanifahawalia	41	41	141	182	7

Table 4.30. (cont.)

Label	Vertices	Unique Edges	Edges with Duplicates	Total Edges	Self-Loops
G9: olppaemi nya yg olpproject aja project dan 01 gak itu	25	14	0	14	14
G10: _infj_olppaemi uj_as4 figs1111 unique_na_id i_n_f_j_3 enfp_enen anzuame0475 kay0125174 嬉し いや	18	14	136	150	23

The researcher built the time series analysis based on "Relationship Date". Axis Y represents days, and axis X represents the imported ID, as unique edges, as shown in Figure 4.8.




Figure 4.8. Time Series Analysis of "Olppaemi Project"

Table 4.31. presents the results of sentiment analysis conducted on a dataset. It categorizes words into three groups: Words in Sentiment List#1 (Positive), which includes 5,412 words accounting for 10.0% of the total words analysed; Words in Sentiment List#2 (Negative), comprising 5,951 words representing 11.0% of the total; and Non-categorized Words, totalling 45,423 words, making up 84.1% of the dataset.

Overall, the analysis covers a total of 54,033 words, aiming to provide insights into the distribution of sentiment across the analysed text.

Table 4.31. Sentiment Analysis of "Olppaemi Project"

Word	Count	Salience
Words in Sentiment List#1 (Positive)	5412	0,100
Words in Sentiment List#2 (Negative)	5951	0,110
Non-categorized Words	45423	0,841
Total Words	54033	1,000

Table 4.32. presents calculations on a metric involving word pairs, detailing their count, saliency, and mutual information. Each row pairs two words and provides their frequency count, saliency value, and mutual information score. Saliency indicates the relevance or importance of the word pair within the context analyzed. Mutual information measures the amount of information obtained about one word from observing the other in the pair, indicating their statistical dependence. For instance, pairs like "#aforevery1" and "#aniesfinalstage" have a count of 1514 occurrences with a saliency of 0.015 and a mutual information score of 1.452, highlighting their significant association in the analyzed data. This table thus summarizes the statistical relationships and importance metrics of various word pairs based on their occurrences and information content.

Table 4.32. Word Pair Metrics "Olppaemi Project"

Word 1	Word 2	Count	Saliency	Mutual Information
#aforevery1	#aniesfinalstage	1514	0,015	1,452
abah	anies	1400	0,015	1,346
debat	capres	1335	0,015	1,545
rocks	debat	1329	0,015	1,549
anies	rocks	1327	0,015	1,482
capres	#aforevery1	1306	0,014	1,462
olpproject	abah	1005	0,013	0,733
aniesbaswedan	cakiminow	218	0,006	2,057
aniesbubble	olpproject	128	0,004	1,020
olpproject	aniesbubble	126	0,004	0,518

Using the network metric in NodeXL software, the researcher determined the top hashtags in tweet in the entire graphs, and per group. Table 4.33. presents top ten hashtags in tweet based on the dataset. “aforevery1” and “aniesfinalstage” hashtags were used the most frequently in tweet on this dataset.

Table 4.33. Top Ten Hashtags "Olppaemi Project"

Top Hashtags in Tweet in Entire Graph	Entire Graph Count
aforevery1 aniesfinalstage	1495
aniesfinalstage	62
aniesfinalstage aforevery1	28
askminnies	24
aforevery1 videotronforevery1	15
aforevery1	12
aforevery1 humaniesfestival olpproject_at_jis	9
aniesiminjkt aforevery1 humaniesfestival olpprojectgoestojis	9
aminajadulu	8
02rangkulsemua waktunyaprabowogibran	5

4.2.3. Discussion: Network Analysis and Sentiment Analysis

The 2024 Indonesian presidential election saw a unique blend of political campaigning and K-pop fandom, exemplified by the "Anies Bubble" X account supporting Anies Baswedan's candidacy (Fairuz, 2024). This and similar supporter accounts, like Olppaemi Project, innovatively combined K-pop fan culture with political engagement, a phenomenon called K-popification (Nazma & KN, 2024). The active participation of Anies Baswedan's supporters, who named themselves "Humanies," significantly boosted youth involvement in politics through creative online campaigns and community initiatives (H. R. Putra, 2024). This research examined the significance of K-popification of Anies Baswedan 2024 presidential campaign on sentiment, political self-efficacy, and online and offline political activism. The research aims to understand the significance of K-popification in Anies Baswedan’s campaign on his sentiment by using sentiment analysis.

4.2.3.1. Comparative Analysis of Network and Sentiment Dynamics on the Anies Baswedan Topic Pre- and Post- Anies Bubble Emergence

The research compares the sentiment of Anies Baswedan before and after the emergence of @aniesbubble during his campaign period in X. Two data set was collected, containing 5,000 tweet each, before the emergence of Anies Bubble (28/11/2023 – 28/12/2023) and after (29/12/2024 – 10/2/2024). Table 4.34. presents the comparison of graph metrics of networks of people in X talking about Anies Baswedan in relation to the presidential election, before and after @aniesbubble. Both networks are directed graphs, indicating the flow and directionality of interactions. Network 1 has more vertices (4,699) compared to Network 2 (4,219), suggesting a larger initial engagement on the topic of Anies Baswedan in presidential election before @aniesbubble emerged. However, Network 1 has a slightly lower graph density (0.000233014) compared to Network 2 (0.000230786), indicating that both networks are extremely sparse, but the difference is marginal. A sparse network refers to a type of network or graph in which the number of edges (connections between nodes) is relatively small compared to the number of possible edges. In other words, in a sparse network, most of the potential connections between nodes do not exist. This is in contrast to a dense network, where a large proportion of the possible connections are present. Furthermore, Network 1 has more unique edges (5,727) and total edges (7,551) than Network 2 (4,974 unique edges, 7,038 total edges), indicating a higher volume of interactions on the topic of Anies Baswedan in the presidential election before @aniesbubble, but the difference is not significant. Both networks exhibit a high number of self-loops, with Network 2 showing a slight increase after @aniesbubble, possibly indicating more interactions or mentions within the network. Both networks show very low reciprocated vertex pair and edge ratios, suggesting a predominantly one-sided or asymmetric interaction pattern. Before @aniesbubble, there were 1,050 connected components, reducing to 1,364 afterward. This suggests a more cohesive network structure post-@aniesbubble, potentially due to focused interactions around specific topics or users. Modularity measures the strength of division of a network into communities. Before @aniesbubble, modularity was higher (0.614908) compared to after (0.5695), implying a clearer community structure before @aniesbubble emerged.

Table 4.34. Network Graph Metrics of Pre- and Post- Anies Bubble

Graph Metric	Network 1 (Before @aniesbubble)	Network 2 (After @aniesbubble)
Graph Type	Directed	Directed
Vertices	4,699	4,219
Unique Edges	5,727	4,974
Edges With Duplicates	1,824	2,064
Total Edges	7,551	7,038
Self-Loops	1,911	2,565
Reciprocated Vertex Pair Ratio	0.003120125	0.00244081
Reciprocated Edge Ratio	0.00622084	0.004869735
Connected Components	1,050	1,364
Single-Vertex Connected Components	856	1,139
Maximum Vertices in a Connected Component	3,357	2,484
Maximum Edges in a Connected Component	6,094	4,997
Maximum Geodesic Distance (Diameter)	15	15
Average Geodesic Distance	5.37338	5.623896
Graph Density	0.000233014	0.000230786
Modularity	0.614908	0.5695

The results shown in Table 4.34. indicate an increase in network fragmentation and isolation post-@aniesbubble. This is evidenced by the rise in the number of single-vertex connected components and the reduction in the size of the largest connected component. The emergence of @aniesbubble seems to have concentrated interactions among a more focused group of users, but at the same time, it has led to the formation of more isolated clusters within the network. This suggests that while @aniesbubble has effectively drawn attention to Anies Baswedan, it has also contributed to the development of more segmented and less interconnected communities. The increase in the average geodesic distance post-@aniesbubble indicates that users are more spread out within the network. While the maximum geodesic distance remains the same, the broader spread suggests a more dispersed network. This dispersion could imply that the campaign has reached a wider audience, potentially attracting supporters from more diverse backgrounds. However, the increased average distance also means that information may travel more slowly through the network, which could impact the

speed and efficiency of information dissemination. The decrease in modularity post-@aniesbubble suggests a less distinct community structure. This change indicates that while there is broader engagement across the network, the strength and cohesion of individual subgroups may have weakened. A less defined community structure can affect the campaign's ability to coordinate and mobilize supporters effectively, as more cohesive groups are typically better at organizing collective actions.






Figure 4.9. Network Graph Pre-Anies Bubble (Network 1)

Figure 4.9. presents the network graph from the dataset of 5,000 tweets with the keyword “Anies (Capres OR Pilpres)”, before the emergence of Anies Bubble. This type of network is called community clusters. A community cluster in network analysis refers to a subset of nodes within a larger network that are more densely connected to each other than to the rest of the network. This concept is often used to identify groups of nodes that share common properties or roles within the network, and these clusters can be indicative of real-world social, functional, or organizational groupings. Similarly, Figure 4.10., which is the network graph from the dataset after the emergence of Anies Bubble, can be identified as community cluster network type. Both graphs shows the characteristics of community clusters: (1) nodes within a community cluster have a high number of connections (edges) with each other compared to connections with nodes outside the cluster; (2) There are relatively fewer edges connecting nodes from different clusters, which highlights the boundary between different communities; and (3) Nodes in a community cluster often share similar attributes or interests, a phenomenon known as homophily. Furthermore, group 1 (G1) in both graphs presents large numbers of disconnected contributors who mention the topic but do not link to one another, which is another characteristic of community clusters.

From 233 groups in Network 1, Table 4.12. presents the top ten group by cluster with the highest number of vertices. As the largest group with the highest number of interactions and self-loops, G1 appears to be a central hub for discussions about Anies Baswedan, Prabowo, and the presidential debate. The significant number of self-loops in these groups suggests that users frequently retweet or reply to their own tweets, amplifying their messages within the group. This is because there are a lot of news channels in G1, which also explains why both networks show very low reciprocated vertex pair and edge ratios, suggesting a predominantly one-sided or asymmetric interaction pattern. Meanwhile, G2 is notable for its high unique edge count (535) despite having fewer vertices (389) compared to G1. This indicates a dense interaction network with significant repeated interactions (211 edges with duplicates), likely driven by discussions involving Anies and Amin.

From 284 groups formed from Network 2, the researcher showed top ten group by cluster in Table 4.19. Similar to G1 in Network 1, G1 in Network 2 is the largest group with the highest number of interactions and self-loops, it is a central hub for discussions about Anies Baswedan, Ganjar, Prabowo, and the presidential debate. The high number of self-loops suggests frequent self-referencing, possibly due to retweets or replies by the same users. On the other hand, G2 is notable for its high unique edge count (800) despite having fewer vertices (523) compared to G1. This indicates a dense interaction network with significant repeated interactions (380 edges with duplicates), possibly driven by hashtags like #aniesfinalstage and #aforevery1. #AniesFinalStage and #AForEvery1 are trending hashtags on X used by supporters of Anies Baswedan, a presidential candidate in Indonesia (Ramadhan, 2024). These hashtags gained popularity during the final presidential debate on Sunday, February 4, 2024, as part of a coordinated effort by the Olppaemi Project (@olpproject) to rally support for Anies. #AniesFinalStage signifies the crucial final stage of Anies' campaign, while #AForEvery1 represents a broader call for unity and support for Anies' vision for all citizens. These hashtags, along with others like #PahitManiesAlwaysWithAnies, were used extensively to generate online momentum and highlight Anies' participation in the fifth presidential debate and upcoming major campaign events, such as the grand rally at Jakarta International Stadium on February 10, 2024 (Setiawanty, 2024). The creative and energetic approach of Anies' young supporters, known as Humanies, showcases their dedication and the influence of K-pop fan culture in political

campaigning (Ramadhan, 2024). Furthermore, the significant number of self-loops in G1 and G2 suggests that users frequently retweet or reply to their own tweets, amplifying their messages within the group. Additionally, Anies Baswedan official X account and @aniesbubble are two of the top influencers in G2, which indicates the interaction between the two, as shown in Figure 4.10.

As shown in Table 4.35., Network 1 has a higher count of both positive and negative words compared to Network 2. The salience of negative words (0.186) is slightly higher than that of positive words (0.164), indicating a more negative overall sentiment in Network 1. Network 2 also shows a higher count of negative words than positive words, but the difference in salience between positive (0.140) and negative words (0.159) is less pronounced than in Network 1. This suggests that Network 2's sentiment is somewhat negative but less so compared to Network 1. Both networks have a high proportion of non-categorized words, with Network 1 at 75% and Network 2 at 77.7%. This indicates a significant amount of content that does not directly convey sentiment, such as neutral or context-specific terms. Key word pairs in Network 1 such as "pak anies," "anies baswedan," and "debat capres" indicate discussions focused on Anies Baswedan, his role in the presidential debate, and related figures like Prabowo and Cak Imin. On the other hand, in Network 2, word pairs such as "debat capres," "abah anies," "rocks debat," and "#forevery1 #aniesfinalstage" suggest a strong emphasis on the debate, Anies' supporters, and the hashtags promoting his campaign. The presence of K-pop-inspired terms like "rocks debat" and "#forevery1" indicates a creative and enthusiastic supporter base.

Table 4.35. Sentiment Analysis of Pre- and Post- Anies Bubble

Word	Network 1 (Pre)		Network 2 (Post)	
	Count	Salience	Count	Salience
Words in Sentiment List#1 (Positive)	23,313	0.164	17551	0,140
Words in Sentiment List#2 (Negative)	26,446	0.186	19936	0,159
Non-categorized Words	106,802	0.750	97517	0,777
Total Words	142,453	1.000	125485	1,000

Network 1 displays a more negative sentiment overall, with a higher salience of negative words. This could be due to critical discussions surrounding Anies Baswedan, his campaign, or the presidential debate. Network 2, while also slightly negative, shows a more balanced sentiment compared to Network 1. The presence of campaign-specific and fan-driven hashtags indicates an organized and passionate supporter network, which might help mitigate negative sentiment through positive engagement. The frequent mentions of "pak anies" and "debat capres" in Network 1, suggest that discussions are centered on formal aspects of Anies' campaign and the political contest itself. The presence of critical or demanding terms like "desak anies" indicates some level of expectation or pressure on Anies from his audience. The focus on hashtags like "#aforevery1" and "#aniesfinalstage" shows a strong campaign push and community engagement. The terms "rocks debat" and "abah anies" point to a personalized and enthusiastic approach to supporting Anies, possibly contributing to a more positive atmosphere despite the slightly negative overall sentiment.

4.2.3.2. Network and Sentiment Analysis on Anies Bubble

The network analysis of tweets mentioning "Anies Bubble" reveals a moderately active and sparsely connected social network. The network has a substantial number of users (vertices) and interactions (edges), showing that the topic "Anies Bubble" has generated significant interest and discussion. The presence of many unique and duplicate edges indicates both broad and repeated engagement among users. The moderate modularity value indicates that while there are distinct communities within the network, these communities are not strongly separated. This suggests overlapping interests and interactions among different user groups. The large connected component with a relatively small diameter and low average geodesic distance implies efficient communication within the main group of users. Information can spread quickly and reach a large portion of the network with minimal steps. The existence of many small, disconnected components and single-vertex components points to isolated users or niche discussions that are not integrated into the broader conversation. The low reciprocated vertex pair ratio and reciprocated edge ratio indicate that most interactions are unidirectional. This could be due to the nature of X interactions, where users often mention or retweet influential accounts without expecting a direct response. The presence of self-loops suggests some degree of self-promotion or continued engagement by individual users.

This network can be identified as tight crowd network community, as shown in Figure 4.11. The graph exhibits the characteristics of tight crowd network, including: (1) internal connections within groups are dense; (2) groups are densely interconnected; (3) hubs are key people in strategic locations at the center of the group; (5) very few users are “isolates”, where most users link to at least one and often more. G1 is the largest with 1895 vertices and exhibits a high level of interaction (2039 unique edges). It is heavily engaged with numerous duplicate edges (1172), suggesting intense communication and possibly repetitive interactions among its members. G2 shows substantial connectivity (2203 unique edges) despite having fewer vertices compared to G1. The presence of self-loops and high total edges (3616) indicates active engagement and potentially diverse interactions across various subtopics related to "Anies Bubble". The top influencer in G1 is @aniesbubble itself, as seen it is located on the centre of the group, meanwhile, Anies Baswedan official account is the top influencer in G2, along with Olppaemi Project. G3 is smaller but still cohesive with significant unique edges (480). The lower number of self-loops and total edges (633) suggests focused discussions among a tightly-knit community interested in specific aspects related to "Anies Bubble." Meanwhile, G10 is the smallest group (22 vertices), showing a compact but active interaction pattern (38 unique edges) without any self-loops, indicating a focused and possibly niche discussion within the broader "Anies Bubble" discourse. The analysis of these top ten groups within the "Anies Bubble" network highlights diverse levels of engagement, from large and highly interconnected communities to smaller, more specialized clusters. The presence of self-loops in several groups suggests active self-engagement and repetitive interactions, while varying total edges and unique edges indicate different levels of overall activity and interaction intensity. These insights provide a nuanced view of how conversations and communities form around specific topics on X, reflecting both broad participation and focused discussions within the network.

The sentiment analysis using word and word pairs metric results show that positive sentiment words slightly outweigh negative ones, with 6636 positive words (10.4% salience) compared to 7346 negative words (11.6% salience). Furthermore, in terms of word pairs metric, terms like "abah" and "anies" appear frequently together (503 occurrences), reflecting their interconnected discussion within the network. Hashtags such as "#aforevery1" and "#aniesfinalstage" (442 occurrences) are strongly


associated, indicating their role in thematic conversations. Terms related to elections and debates ("debat capres," "capres #aforevery1") also show high co-occurrence, suggesting focused discussions on political events and candidates. Additionally, The most frequent hashtags within the entire graph of "Anies Bubble" tweets indicate prominent topics and campaigns discussed on X. Hashtags like "#aforevery1" and "#aniesfinalstage" are the most popular, underscoring their central role in the discourse. Election-related hashtags such as "kpuvote" and "pemilu24" reflect ongoing political engagement, while hashtags specific to candidates and campaign events (e.g., "aniesbaswedan," "aminajadulu") demonstrate focused support and discussion within the network. In this network, positive sentiment slightly outweighs negative sentiment, with a majority of words remaining non-categorized. Key co-occurrences and mutual information values reveal strong associations among terms related to candidates, hashtags, and election themes, reflecting active and focused discussions within the network. The prominence of specific hashtags further underscores central topics and campaigns that resonate among users engaged in the "Anies Bubble" discourse on X.

4.2.3.3. Network and Sentiment Analysis on Olppaemi Project

The "Olppaemi Project" network, based on 5000 tweets with the keyword, exhibits characteristics of a directed network involving 3,315 vertices (nodes) and 10,274 edges (connections between nodes). The presence of self-loops (242) indicates instances where nodes are connected to themselves, possibly through retweets or self-references. The network's density (0.0006066) suggests a relatively sparse structure, typical of online social networks where not all possible connections between nodes are realized. The reciprocated vertex pair ratio (0.0287) and reciprocated edge ratio (0.0558) indicate a moderate level of mutual interaction and reciprocity among users within the network, implying some level of engagement and interaction reciprocity. The network comprises 38 connected components, with the largest component containing 3,248 vertices, indicating a core group of highly interconnected users actively engaged in discussions related to the "Olppaemi Project." The modularity value of 0.4190 suggests the presence of distinct communities or groups within the network that are more densely connected internally than with the rest of the network. This reflects the formation of cohesive clusters around specific topics or interests related to the activities and campaigns of the "Olppaemi Project."

This network is identified to be tight crowd network type, as presented in Figure 4.12. According to Rainie (2014), a tight crowd network structure is characterized by dense and interconnected groups where members have strong connections and frequently interact, forming cohesive communities around shared interests without distinct opposing groups like in polarized crowd networks. These networks feature minimal isolates, indicating most participants engage actively by following, replying to, and mentioning others involved in the topic, fostering continuous and inclusive conversations. The top groups within the "Olppaemi Project" network highlight clusters of users and discussions centered around specific hashtags and topics related to Anies Baswedan, Muhaimin Iskandar (Cak Imin), and their campaign initiatives. These groups are characterized by varying sizes and levels of connectivity, ranging from larger, more inclusive groups (G1 and G2) to smaller, more focused clusters (G3). G1 and G2 encompass large numbers of vertices and edges, indicating extensive interactions and discussions involving hashtags like #aniesfinalstage and #aforevery1, which are central to the campaign themes supported by the Olppaemi Project. G3 represents a smaller but densely connected group, possibly focused on specific content creators or thematic discussions related to humor and entertainment (e.g., poljokesid, arie_kriting). Analysis on this network underscores the active engagement and community-driven support fostered by the Olppaemi Project, leveraging social media and K-pop-inspired strategies to mobilize and organize support for their preferred candidates in the political arena.

The analysis of word frequencies and sentiment in the network of 5000 tweets with the keyword "Olppaemi project OR olpproject" reveals a balanced representation of positive and negative sentiment-related words. Positive sentiment words account for 10% of the total word count, while negative sentiment words constitute 11%. The majority of words (84%) remain uncategorized in terms of sentiment, highlighting the diversity and neutrality of discussions or the complexity in sentiment categorization within the dataset. The mutual information values between word pairs provide insights into the associations and co-occurrences within the network conversations.



Picture 4.7. Trending X in Indonesia on 4 February 2024

Source: Ramadhan (2024)

#aforevery1 and #aniesfinalstage have the highest mutual information (1.452), indicating a strong association and frequent co-occurrence of these hashtags in tweets related to the Olppaemi Project. Abah and anies (1.346) also show a significant mutual information. *Abah* is nickname give to Anies Baswedan by his supporters, it means “father”. Debat and capres (1.545) as well as rocks and debat (1.549) exhibit strong associations, indicating that discussions about debates involving presidential candidates are closely linked with the term "rocks." Reported by Ramadhan (2024), “Abah Anies Rocks Debat Capres” was trending in Indonesian X on Sunday, 4 February 2024, it refers to “Abah Anies rocks the presidential candidate debates” that was aired nationally. “Capres” and #aforevery1 (1.462) reflect discussions linking presidential candidates with the hashtag #aforevery1, suggesting thematic connections in campaign-related tweets. Furthermore, #aforevery1 and #aniesfinalstage (1495 occurrences) are the most prevalent hashtags, indicating their central role in the

campaign messaging and mobilization efforts. Other notable hashtags include askminnies, aminajadulu, and variations of aforevery1 and aniesfinalstage, highlighting specific events, campaigns, or community-driven initiatives associated with the Olppaemi Project.



CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The 2024 Indonesian presidential election witnessed a fusion of political campaigning and K-pop fandom through the "Anies Bubble" X, formerly known as Twitter, account supporting Anies Baswedan. This K-popification phenomenon, where fan culture merged with political engagement, significantly involved youth in politics through creative online campaigns and community initiatives by Anies' supporters, known as "Humanies." The study compared Anies Baswedan's campaign sentiment on X before and after the @aniesbubble account emerged. Data from 5,000 tweets before (Nov 28 - Dec 28, 2023) and after (Dec 29, 2023 - Feb 10, 2024) showed initial higher engagement, with more vertices and edges in the network before @aniesbubble. However, post-@aniesbubble, the network displayed higher graph density, suggesting slightly more interactions per user, and an increase in connected components, indicating a more fragmented but focused network structure. Sentiment analysis revealed a predominantly negative sentiment in both periods, but the post-@aniesbubble network was somewhat less negative, with more balanced sentiment dynamics and enthusiastic supporter-driven hashtags like #aforevery1 and #aniesfinalstage contributing to the engagement.

The "Anies Bubble" network analysis showed a moderately active, sparsely connected network with substantial user engagement. The presence of numerous unique and duplicate edges indicated both broad and repeated interactions. The network had a large connected component, allowing for efficient communication, despite many isolated components indicating niche discussions. Sentiment analysis showed positive words slightly outweighed negative ones, with hashtags like #aforevery1 and #aniesfinalstage playing central roles in the discourse. On the other hand, the "Olppaemi Project" network exhibited characteristics of a directed network with moderate interaction reciprocity and a significant core group of interconnected users. The tight crowd network type highlighted dense and cohesive communities centered

around campaign hashtags. Sentiment analysis showed a balanced representation of positive and negative words, with a large proportion of neutral content. Hashtags #aforevery1 and #aniesfinalstage were highly prevalent, reflecting their importance in campaign messaging and mobilization efforts. The network analysis underscored active community-driven support leveraging social media and K-pop-inspired strategies.

The analysis of X data before and after the emergence of the @aniesbubble account provides valuable insights into the dynamics of political discourse on social media. The network analysis reveals a transformation in user interaction patterns, with an increase in graph density and connected components post-@aniesbubble, indicating a more engaged and focused network structure. The sentiment analysis highlights a shift towards a more balanced sentiment dynamic, driven by enthusiastic supporter-driven hashtags, underscoring the potential of integrating popular culture with political campaigning. The findings from the "Anies Bubble" X account analysis reveal that while initial engagement was higher before the account's emergence, the subsequent period saw a more focused and interactive network. The presence of K-pop-inspired strategies, such as unique hashtags and community-driven support, contributed to this engagement. Despite a predominantly negative sentiment in both periods, the post-@aniesbubble phase exhibited a slight improvement in sentiment balance, suggesting the potential of fan culture to moderate political discourse. The study underscores the effectiveness of creative, culturally resonant strategies in mobilizing youth and enhancing political participation.

The quantitative findings of the study significantly contribute to understanding the impact of social media on electoral outcomes, building upon previous research. Kovic et al. (2017) examined the 2015 Swiss federal election, introducing the "brute force effects" concept. They found that while traditional media presence significantly impacted electoral outcomes, social media activity's impact was less substantial. The current study aligns with this by showing that Political Self-Efficacy (PSE) and Political Use of Twitter (PUT) influence Offline Political Campaigns (OfP) through Online Political Activities (OnP), highlighting the importance of engagement over mere activity. Spierings and Jacobs (2014) identified that both direct and interaction effects of social media on electoral outcomes are significant. The direct effect shows

minimal social media use can influence voter preferences, but this is conditional. Interaction effects emphasize the necessity of active engagement. The current study supports this by demonstrating that active communication and meaningful engagement (OnP) are crucial for enhancing offline political activities (OfP). Doroshenko (2022) analyzed Volodymyr Zelensky's successful digital campaign in Ukraine, highlighting the role of social media engagement. The current study's findings align with this, showing that strategic social media use can significantly mobilize support and influence electoral outcomes through engaged online political activities. Russmann (2022) found Austrian political parties increasingly focused on interactivity and professional community management on social media. The current study suggests that targeted, interactive social media strategies can effectively enhance political engagement and outcomes, resonating with Russmann's observations.

The innovative strategy of integrating K-pop fan culture into Anies Baswedan's campaign, termed K-popification, leverages the dynamics of K-pop fan culture to engage Generation Z in Indonesian politics. This strategy aligns with previous findings on the importance of media presence, social media engagement, and active interaction in influencing electoral outcomes. However, while it successfully raises awareness and engagement, it may not guarantee electoral success. Future research should explore the long-term impacts of such strategies and their effectiveness in different cultural and political contexts, providing further insights into the evolving role of social media and popular culture in politics. Future research should focus on longitudinal studies to examine the long-term impact of integrating fan culture with political campaigning, particularly its influence on voter turnout and political engagement across different demographics. Comparative analysis in various political contexts and cultures would help determine the generalizability and cultural specificity of K-pop-inspired political engagement strategies. Additionally, assessing the direct impact of fan-driven social media campaigns on actual electoral outcomes is crucial for understanding their effectiveness in translating online engagement into votes. Further analysis of sentiment dynamics over extended periods and across different social media platforms can provide a comprehensive view of how sentiment shifts affect political campaigns. Finally, exploring the role of offline community-building activities inspired by online fan culture will shed light on how these initiatives sustain political engagement and mobilization beyond election periods. These research avenues will enhance the

understanding of social media and popular culture's evolving role in political campaigns, contributing to more effective engagement strategies in diverse political landscapes.



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