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MA THESIS

“MÜNAZARA” AND THE INTERNAL DIMENSION OF
ARGUMENTATION ETHICS:

A TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY ON AHMED
CEVDET’S *ADAB-I SEDAD* IN THE LIGHT OF SUFISM AND
WESTERN ARGUMENTATION THEORIES

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ABSTRACT

“MÜNÄZARA” AND THE INTERNAL DIMENSION OF ARGUMENTATION
ETHICS:
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Münazara is a contraction of *Adab al-Bahs ve al-Münazara* that could be translated as “Applied Ethics of Argumentation and Deliberation”. It refers to an institutionalized discipline of disputation that started from al-Sarmaqandi’s *Risala fi Adab al-Bahs* (mid. 13th century), comprehending juridical dialectics, philosophical dialectics and Sufi criticism of dialectics. After demonstrating the relation between Sufism and *Münazara*, I compare this eristic tradition with Western theories of argumentation, especially the New Dialectical School and the New Rhetorical School. I show that the main differences between these theories concern the understanding of “truth” and “ethics”. Based upon Ahmed Cevdet Paşa’s *Adab-ı Sedad*, I argue that argumentation discipline of *Münazara* does not only involve an external approach of ethics (i.e. etiquette) but also an internal one requiring from every discussant the control of their inner-self in order to implement a proper debate.

I claim this internal dimension of argumentation ethics has not only a procedural role (conducting a proper debate) but also an epistemic one (defining what is not true).

Keywords: Münazara, Internal Dimension of Argumentation Ethics, Sufism, Truth, Multiplex

ÖZ

MÜNAZARA VE TARTIŞMA EDEBİNİN İÇ BOYUTU: AHMED CEVDET PAŞA’NIN ADAB-I SEDAD ADLI ESERİ ÜZERİNDEN TASAVVUF VE BATI TARTIŞMA TEORİLERİ İLE MUKAYESELİ BİR İNCELEME

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Adab al-Bahs ve al-Münazara teriminin kısaca aynı anlamına taşıyan Münazara, Modern Türkçede “Tartışma ve Eleştirinin Edebi” olarak çevrilebilmektedir. Fıkıh, Kelam ve Tasavvufun Cedeli eleştirisinden ibaret olan Münazara, Semerkandi Risale fi adabi’l-bahs (m. XIII) adlı eserinden itibaren müesseseleştirilmiş bir tartışma metodunu ifade etmektedir. Bu tezde, Münazara ve Tasavvuf arasındaki mevcut ilişkilerin ispatıyla birlikte Münazaranın Batı Tartışma teorileriyle bir kıyası sunulmaktadır. Karşılaştırmamda teorilerin arasındaki en büyük farkın “doğru” (hak) ve “edep” (ahlak) kavramların anlamları olduğu açıklanmaktadır.

Benim Ahmed Cevdet Paşa’nın Adab-ı Sedad adlı eserini çevirmemin üzerinden Münazara ilminin sadece edebinin dış boyutu değil edebinin iç boyutunu da vurguladığı öne çıkarılmaktadır. Başka bir ifadeyle Tartışmanın edebinin iki kişi arasındaki saygı ve ihtiramı önemsemesinden ziyade (yatay yaklaşımı) her tartışan kişinin kendi nefsinin (ego) kontrol altında tutabilme gerektiğini ifade etmektedir (dikey yaklaşımı).

Nihayet bu edebinin iç boyutu, dürüst bir tartışma uygulamayı amaçlamakla birlikte bir epistemik rolü de taşımaktadır (doğru’nun ne olmadığını tasvir etmekte rolü var).

Anahtar kelimeler: Münazara; Tartışmanın Edebinin İç Boyutu; Tasavvuf; Doğru; Katmanlı İlim

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TRANSCRIPTION

Concerning the transcription of Arabic or Ottoman Turkish terms, I adopt the Latin edition of modern Turkish. Even if this transcription may not be familiar to Western readers, it is more appropriate to our study since *Adab-ı Sedad* is based upon Turkish grammar and frequently includes Turkish idioms.

z	ذ - ظ - ز - ض	h	خ - ه - ح
s	ص - س - ث		
ş	ش	p	پ
c	ج	b	ب
ç	چ	t	ط - ت
		k	ق - ك
‘	ع	g	گ - غ
’	ء	ğ	گ
n	ن - ك (Turkish possession suffix)	r	ر
m	م	l	ل
v	و	f	ف
u	و - for long vowel letters (madda)		
ü	ُ		
a	ا - for long vowel letters (madda)		
e	َ		
ı	ِ after “heavy letters” such as ض . ظ . ط . ق		
i	ِ after “soft letters” such as ب . س . ج . ه		
y	ی -for long vowel letters (madda) - ی (Persian possession suffix)		

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Central Argument, Research Question and Method

Münazara is a contraction of *Adab al-Bahs ve al-Münazara* that could be translated as “Applied Ethics of Argumentation and Deliberation”. It refers to an institutionalized discipline of disputation that started from al-Sarmaqandi’s *Risala fi Adab al-Bahs* (mid. 13th century), comprehending juridical dialectics, philosophical dialectics and Sufi criticism of dialectics. *Münazara* can be considered as both a science (*ilm*) that analyses rules, modes and soundness of a debate, and a discipline (*fen*) that concerns with the practice of deliberating.

In this thesis, I argue that ethics of discussion present in the *Münazara* discipline differs from the approach of ethics in Western argumentation theories. More than “etiquette”, I claim that the notion of *adab* (ethics) in *Münazara* refers to a deeper tradition of mastering one’s ego, itself inspired by the Sufi tradition (*tasavvuf*). Indeed, in *Münazara*, ethics does not only lead discussants to act properly to each other during the debate (external dimension) but also push them to purify their inner self through a spiritual connection to God (internal dimension). Put differently, it is required for any discussant to master his inclinations before and while getting involved into the discussion.

By comparing *Münazara* with Western theories of argumentation, especially the New Dialectical School and the New Rhetorical School, I also show that the main differences between these theories concern the understanding of “product/success” and “process/ethics” of argumentation. While Dialectical school considers that argumentation aims to “resolve a conflict” through an ethical debate that respects a set of universal standards, the Rhetoric school defines argumentation as the ability to impact the audience through a debate that is matching audience’s *topoi*. As for *Münazara*, it claims that argumentation should lead to disclosing the truth (either absolute, technical or conventional)¹ through a discussion that respects both external and internal aspects of ethics.

Finally, I discuss whether these different approaches to ethics and truth are revealing *Münazara*’s underlying discourses (the primacy of the hereafter over this

¹ For more details about these three notions, see 1.4.2 of this thesis: “Ahmed Cevdet Paşa distinguishes at least three understandings of self-evidence: absolute self-evidence (true in itself), technical self-evidence (accepted as true by specialists of a discipline), and conventional self-evidence (accepted as true by the discussants of the debate)”

world, the existence of truth, God's pleasure, notion of *tevfik*) as well as those of Western argumentation theories (the primacy of this world over the hereafter, notion of consensus, post-modernism, success of the debate).

I lead this discussion in three main steps: firstly, I show how *Münazara* is the fruit of the interconnection between many sciences including Sufism, which plays a central role (Chapter 1); Secondly, I compare *Münazara* with Western argumentation theories and underline the different conceptions of truth and ethics they are relying on (Chapter 2); Finally, I explore in details the concept of internal dimension of ethics and show how it has a substantial impact upon the debate in *Münazara*, playing both a procedural and an epistemic role (Chapter 3). All arguments will be supported by analyses and examples taken from Ahmed Cevdet Paşa's *Adab-ı Sedad*. that I translated from Ottoman Turkish into English (Appendix).

This thesis is the fruit of a collaborative research group on *Münazara* and Western argumentation theories conducted by Recep Şentük, Alparslan Açıkgenç, Önder Küçükural and Kareem Sadik from December 2016 to May 2017, and in which participated Heba Raouf, Feyzullah Yılmaz, and some students of the Alliance of Civilizations Institute.² Beside Ahmed Cevdet Paşa's *Adab-ı Sedad*, we read and discussed many important books of Western argumentation theories. Throughout the translation process of *Adab-ı Sedad*, the question of ethics and internal dimension of ethics appears to be one of the most distinctive features of *Münazara* in regard to Western argumentation theories. It is the reason why I decided to focus on this particular aspect.

My method is simple but clear: comparing the approach to ethics found in *Adab-ı Sedad* with the one provided by two modern schools of Western theories of argumentation, i.e. the New Dialectical school and the New Rhetorical school.³ Even if this methodology cannot encompass the whole scope of argumentation studies, it allows me to approach key questions and concepts in clear terms. In fact, my goal is to present some important questions in the area of argumentation studies that are still to be explored and discussed.

² By alphabetic order, Muhammad Makdod, Danish Naeem, Rahmi Oruç and Kadir Purde

³ for more details see. Chapter II

1.2. Key Concepts: Münazara, Argumentation Ethics, Sufism, Western Argumentation Theories

Münazara is a contraction of *Adab al-Bahs ve al-Münazara*, that could be translated as “Applied Ethics of Argumentation and Deliberation”. It refers to an institutionalized discipline of disputation that started from al-Sarmaqandi’s *Risala fi Adab al-Bahs* (mid. 13th century), comprehending juridical dialectics, philosophical dialectics and Sufi criticism of dialectics. The term *Adab* refers to **ethics** or more specifically to applied ethics, since *Adab* does not deal with the definitions of “good” and “bad” (that is the task of the whole religion of Islam) but rather with a *praxis*⁴. Therefore, in this thesis I use the notion of “argumentation ethics”, term that underlines the practical role of ethics in the specific field of argumentation. As for the term *al-Bahs*, it technically means “making a claim and supporting it with proofs”⁵, that it can be translated by the English term of “Argumentation”. Finally, the term *Münazara* expresses the idea of “debating in order to find the truth”, that I translate by “Deliberation” for different reasons it will be explained in chapter 1⁶. In his *Adab-ı Sedad*, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa reminds readers that this discipline “[can be interchangeably called] the science of applied ethics of argumentation (*‘ilm-i adab-i bahs*) or science of the deliberation (*‘ilm-i münazara*)”⁷.

In my thesis, I understand **Sufism** (*Tasavvuf*) as the mystical discipline of Islam that focuses on inner purification and spiritual self-control. Here, I interrogate to what extent Sufism reshaped the concept of *Adab* from the concept of etiquette to the broader notion of the internal dimension of ethics, i.e. controlling one’s ego in a spiritual sense.

As for **Western Argumentation theories**, I refer by this term to logical, dialectical and rhetorical schools of thought that European or North American thinkers have developed from the mid-20th century.⁸ Here, I am interested to see how *Münazara*’s approach to ethics (the internal dimension) differs from the nature of ethics in the Western New Dialectical and New Rhetorical schools.

⁴ We would like to thank Prof. Dr. Alparslan Açıkgenç for having reminded us this important nuance.

⁵ Gelenbevi, Ismail, *Tartışma usulü*, Trans. Taha Alp (2011), Yasin Yayınevi, İstanbul. p.12

⁶ See Chapter I, “What does Munazara mean?” p.7

⁷ See my English translation of *Adab-ı Sedad*, p.7

⁸ In Chapter 2 we especially debate the cases of Logic-oriented school, New Dialectical School and New Rhetorical School.

1.3. Ahmed Cevdet Paşa and his *Adab-ı Sedad* (1294 H)

This thesis is mainly based on my translation and analysis of *Adab-ı Sedad* (1294 H./1876 G.), a concise handbook on *Münazara* written by the Ottoman scholar and statesman Ahmed Cevdet Paşa (b.1822, Lovetch – d.1895, Constantinople)⁹. Ahmed Cevdet Paşa has originally written this book in Ottoman-Turkish language for a new generation of Ottoman students that were not only required to master as scientific languages Arabic and Persian but also a reformed version of Ottoman-Turkish (a reform that Ahmed Cevdet Paşa has himself partially conducted)¹⁰. The term “Sedad” mainly refers to the notions of “right” and “sound”¹¹ that is connected in the book to the proper manner to conduct a discussion (procedure) leading to sound knowledge (purpose). The handbook’s title is thus an invitation to ethical application (*adab*) of the rules of discussion in order to discover sound and valid knowledge. As an aside, “sedad” refers also to Ahmed Cevdet Paşa’s son, i.e. Ali Sedat (d. 1859-1900), who became also an important scholar of the late Ottoman period. He wrote, among others, a remarkable book on modern logic *Mizanü'l-Ukul Fi'l-Mantık-ı Ve'l-Usul*.

For the purpose of this study, I used both an original version of *Adab-ı Sedad* published by Asitane printing house¹² and a Latinized version of *Adab-ı Sedad* edited by Kudret Büyükcoşkun.¹³ Both editions helped me to understand the book’s teachings and to identify specific technical terms and idioms. Besides being one of the latest book written by Ottoman scholars on *Münazara* – and then including foremost issues of the topic – *Adab-ı Sedad* has a particular resonance as regards the late 19th century context, a period that debates the relevance of the Islamic scientific tradition in the face of the modern Western epistemology (humanism, materialism, scientism). Indeed, *Adab-ı Sedad* participated in the Ottoman policy of “adaptation”¹⁴ of the Western epistemology

⁹ See Chapter I, “Interconnection between sciences: Ahmed Cevdet Paşa and integrative epistemology in Ottoman education” p.29

¹⁰ Halaçoğlu, Yusuf and M. Akif Aydın, “Cevdet Paşa”, in TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DİA), 1989, vol.2, p.445

¹¹ Devellioğlu Ferit. 1962. *Osmanlıca-Türkçe Ansiklopedik Lugat*, Aydın Kitabevi, 31. Baskı (2015), Ankara. Entry “Sedad”;

Al-Maany Arabic-English Online Dictionary, <https://www.almaany.com/en/dict/ar-en/>, entry “سداد”

¹² Cevdet Paşa, Ahmed. 1303/1876. *Adab-ı Sedad*, Asitane Kitabevi, Istanbul.

¹³ Cevdet Paşa, Ahmed. 1303/1876. “Adab-ı Sedad” in Büyükcoşkun, Kudret. 1998. *Mantık Metinleri 2, Miyar-ı Sedad and Adab-ı Sedad* (Latinised edition), İşaret Yayınları, Istanbul.

¹⁴ Benjamin Fortna argues that Ottoman scholars never “adopted” the Western epistemology but rather “adapted” it to their own scientific tradition. See, Fortna, Benjamin C. 2002. *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.New-York, p.9

into the Islamic one: it is a traditional Islamic handbook written in modern Ottoman Turkish to Europeanized school system.¹⁵

1.4. Overview of the *Münazara* science

1.4.1. *Münazara* in relation with other Islamic terms for argumentation

In this paper I use the term *Münazara* in two different ways, in its **general meaning** referring to any eristic discipline in Islamic scientific tradition¹⁶, and in its **specific meaning** referring to the institutionalized discipline of *Adab al-Bahs ve al-Münazara*¹⁷. The general meaning of *Münazara*, that Abdessamad Belhaj use in his *Argumentation et Dialectique*, refers to any kind of eristic discipline in Islam from the first revelations of Qur'an to the development of sciences such as Law, Exegesis, Grammar, Poetry, Philosophy... The general meaning of *Münazara* permits to include many concepts in relation to eristic tradition in Islam such as *cedel*, *hilaf*, *hitaba*, *muanakaşa*, *hivar*, *nikaş*, *bahs*¹⁸ (respectively: dialectic, jurisprudential dialectic, rhetoric, discussion, dialogue, debate, disputation). However, the meaning of all these terms remains changing according to the scientific context (author, period and discipline), causing a certain etymological ambiguity of the *Münazara*'s literature. For instance, the word *cedel* could mean ethical argumentation in some treaties of philosophy and unethical dialectics in some other juridical books. Nevertheless, this ambiguity will end with the development of *Münazara* as a stable and institutionalized discipline in which scholars share paradigms and agree on main definition of terms: this discipline refers to the specific meaning of *Münazara*.

The specific meaning of *Münazara* is related to post-classical discipline of *Adab al-Bahs ve al-Münazara* that is an institutionalized discipline of disputation that emerged with al-Sarmaqandi's *Risala fi Adab al-Bahs* (mid. 13th century), and which

¹⁵ See Chapter I, "Interconnection between sciences: Ahmed Cevdet Paşa and integrative epistemology in Ottoman education" p.29

¹⁶ In his *Islamic scientific tradition in history* (2012), Alparslan Açıkgenç develops the notion of "scientific tradition" as an epistemological framework that interprets historical scientific outcomes "within a socio-cultural context of a space-time continuum". See. Açıkgenç Alparslan. 2012. *Islamic scientific tradition in history*, Penerbit IKIM Kuala Lumpur, p. vii

¹⁷ *Adab al Bahth wa al Munazara* refers to an institutionalized discipline of disputation – started from al-Sarmaqandi's *Risala fi Adab al Bahth* (mid. 13th century) – that articulates Juridical dialectics, philosophical dialectics and Sufi criticism of dialectics. See Chapter I, from p.16

¹⁸ Belhaj Abdessamad. 2010. *Argumentation et dialectique en Islam*, Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Louvain-La-Neuve. [Kindle format] Loc. 351-488

"Munazara est le terme le plus utilisé quand il s'agit de désigner un débat à un niveau abstrait, indépendamment de son contenu." Loc. 476

comprehends Juridical dialectics, philosophical dialectics and Sufi criticism of dialectics. Therefore, scholars of this discipline share clear and fix meaning of terms and concepts. As part of late developments of this institutionalized discipline of *Adab al-Bahs ve al-Münazara*, *Adab-ı Sedad* shares a lot of definitions with other books on *Münazara*. For instance, Ismail Gelenbevi's definition of *Münazara* in his *Risalat al-Adab* (1730) resembles Ahmed Cevdet Paşa's one (1876): "The science of argumentation (*bahs*) and deliberation (*münazara*) concerns [the art of] defending a claim in order to disclose (*li-yazhar*) the truth (*hakk*)."¹⁹ This definition reveals two main aspects of *Münazara*, which are [1] the dialogue or relational aspect between two discussants - one "defending a claim" which supposes another one contesting it - and [2] the ultimate objective of the dialogue that is "disclosing the truth". In the quotation below, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa describes these two aspects in details:

The science of the argumentation (*bahs*) and of the disputation (*mübahase*) is composed of one person that firmly (*kıyam*) formulates a claim (*isbat-ı müdde'aya*) and of another that contests (*i'tiraz*) it, i.e. that challenges (*mukabele*) the first person as an opponent (*hasm*).

[...]

Therefore, the disputation (*mübahase*) is either used for exposing the normative truth (*izhar-ı savab*) – i.e. for disclosing the nature of the reality (*hakikat-ı hal*) – or only for making silent the opponent (*iskat-ı hasm*).

A disputation in which actors look for exposing the normative truth is called deliberation (*münazara*). Those who argue (*bahs edenler*) in this kind of disputation are called deliberators (*münazir*). A disputation in which actors look for making quiet the opponent is called dialectics (*cedel*), it is the reason why we call those who argue in this kind of disputation dialecticians (*mücadil*).

The dialectician (*mücadil*), in what matter it may be, tries to make silent his opponent. But the deliberator's objective (*münazir*) is strictly to disclose the normative truth.

The objective truth (*hakk*) and the normative truth (*savab*) are whether disclosed (*zahir*) through his speech or through the speech of his opponent. By all means, it is impossible to mute (*ilzam*) the manifestation of the truth (*savabın zuhurunu iltizam etmez*).²⁰

In this definition, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa makes the distinction between four notions: *bahs* argumentation, *mübahasa* relational argumentation, *münazara* deliberation, and *cedel* dialectics. Although all of these notions are concerned with argumentation, he gives to each of them a specific dimension that differentiates them one to another and highlights our understanding of *Münazara*'s matter.

¹⁹ Gelenbevi, Ismail, *Tartışma usulü*, Trans. Taha Alp (2011), YasinYayınevi, Istanbul.p.20

²⁰ See my English translation of *Adab-ı Sedad*, pp.5-7

- **Bahs** (argumentation): Even if it literally (*lugati*) refers to the notions of research, looking for and inquiring, its technical meaning (*istilahat*) refers to proposing a claim – whether in positive or negative form – and to prove it.²¹ Similarly in English, the term “argumentation” means “the action or process of reasoning systematically in support of an idea, action, or theory”.²² We find here what Gelebenvi named “defending a claim”, with both the notion of “idea, theory” and of “support”.
- **Mübahasa** (disputation): Basically referring to the same meaning than *bahs* but in the 3rd Arabic verbal group (*vuzn*) that implies reciprocity. Therefore, the term *mubahasa* entails a “process of reasoning” between at least two persons, when this nuance was only suggested in the term *bahs*. Put differently, it is not only argumentation but relational argumentation. In English, the term “disputation” includes this latter idea as it refers to “formal academic debate” in which discussants are exchanging arguments.²³
- **Münazara** (deliberation): It is a kind of disputation (*mübahasa*) strictly motivated by the will of discovering or disclosing the truth without any concern about the winner of the debate. Because *Münazara* is also a word of 3rd Arabic verbal group we could translate it as “co-reasoning”, since *Nazar* refers to looking, thinking, and reasoning.²⁴ Yet, in addition to involve also the notion of reciprocity, the term “deliberation” better encompasses the idea of “disclosing the truth”, idea that suggests a tempered, wise and disinterested behavior from the discussants. In Latin, *deliberare* means “consider carefully” that gave in modern English *deliberation* referring to “long and careful consideration or discussion, slow and careful movement or thought”.²⁵
- **Cedel** (dialectics): In this kind of relational argumentation, the issue concerns who – from the two discussants – will win the debate. The discussants care about making silent the other and not about disclosing the truth.

This distinction between *Münazara* and *Cedel* permits to underline the most essential aspects of *Münazara* – also its *raison d’être* – namely [1] the objective of disclosing the truth, [2] through an ethical argumentation between two discussants.²⁶ In this paper, I

²¹ Gelenbevi, Ismail, *Tartışma usulü*, p.20

²² Stevenson, Angus, and Christine A. Lindberg. 2010. New Oxford American Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 3rd. ed., Oxford. Entry “Argumentation”

²³ New Oxford American Dictionary, 2010. Entry “Disputation”

²⁴ Gelenbevi, Ismail, *Tartışma usulü*, p.20

²⁵ New Oxford American Dictionary, 2010. Entry “Deliberation”

²⁶ for more details on the distinction between *Munazara* and *Jadal*, See, Muhammad al-Marashi al-Sacaklı Zade, 1715, *Tartib al-ulum*, p.142-143. He defines *Munazara* as the “knowledge of truth” (*ma’rifat al savab*) and “disclosing the truth” (*izhar al-savab*); and *Jadal* as “defence of any position” (hafız ‘ayi vada’) “whether right or wrong” (min ‘ay al ta‘mim al-hakk ve al-batıl).

give a particular attention to these two aspects since I argue that internal dimension of ethics impacts both epistemic and procedural aspects of *Münazara* (see, chapter 1).

1.4.2. How does *Münazara* take place?

- *Goal of Münazara: disclosing the truth (izhar-ı hakk and izhar-ı savab)*

First of all, *Münazara* is not a discipline that, alone, determines what is true and what is false. In the contrary, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa presents *Münazara* as a discipline (*fen*) that sets up a context as well as a range of techniques for conducting an ideal debate. In that sense, *Münazara* would be more a **procedural discipline**:

This science provides the rules for an ethical and healthy disputation (*mübahasatın sahti*). In addition, it permits to make the difference between valid and invalid, accepted and unaccepted elements of defence (*müdafa 'atın sıhhati fasidinden, makbulü merdudundan*).

Those who respect these rules are preventing themselves from mistakes (*hata*) in deliberation (*münazara*).²⁷

While *Münazara* discipline provides procedural rules in order discussants to disclose the truth through deliberation (ethics, techniques of defense, sequences of discussion...), it is up to other sciences to determine what truth is. Since *Münazara* is considered as a universal discipline, these sciences may change according to the subject of deliberation. Yet, in *Adab-ı Sedat*, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa mostly gives examples of deliberation that involve Islamic Jurisprudence, Theology, Qur'anic exegeses, and Arabic linguistics. Furthermore, he shows throughout the whole book that a statement that contradicts formal logical rules might never be considered as true. It is the reason why Ahmed Cevdet advises in introduction to read his handbook of logic – i.e. *Miyar-ı Sedat* – before reading *Adab-ı Sedat*:

As this science is mainly based on philosophy ('ilm-i hikmet), theology ('ilm-i kelam) and principles of Islamic jurisprudence ('ilm-i usul-i fikhı), its understanding is preserved.

*Hence, I entitled this book Adab-ı Sedat, it includes all the important topics (mesail-i mühimme) of this science and should be read after my book on logic called Miyar-ı Sedat.*²⁸

Ahmed Cevdet Paşa uses interchangeably the terms “*savab*” and “*hakk*” in reference to “truth”. However these two terms differ in meaning: while “*savab*” refers to a valid discourse about the matter of fact (normative truth); “*hakk*” refers to the matter of fact in itself (absolute truth). If Ahmed Cevdet Paşa maintains the ambiguity between both

²⁷ See my English translation of *Adab-ı Sedat*, p.7

²⁸ See my English translation of *Adab-ı Sedat*, p.7

terms it is because both can be considered as “self-evidence” (*bedihiyye*), i.e. a claim or statement that does not need any proof to be accepted as valid.

Indeed, in *Münazara*, a deliberation session lasts until one of the two discussants manages to connect his claim to self-evidence (*bedehiyye*). In other terms, the first among the discussants who manages to relate his claim to self-evidence has disclosed the truth and therefore has won the debate, since no one is able to contradict a self-evidence:

If someone does not just transmit an argument but formulates his own, he is considered as a claimant [of a new argument] (müde‘i).

Every claimant [of a new argument] (müde‘i) must support (isbat) his claim (da‘vası)²⁹ with an argument (delil)³⁰.

A claim that is not supported by any argument is an imposition (tahakküm) and this is not acceptable (mesmu’ değıildir).

Therefore any claim requires an argument, except for self-evident claims (bedihi) for which no argument is required. Hence, a self-evident proposition is exempt from providing arguments.

Nevertheless, if a self-evident claim is ambiguous (hafı), it should be clarified by a simple explanation (fikra) in the form of argument (delil suretinde).³¹

Ahmed Cevdet Paşa distinguishes at least three understandings of self-evidence: **absolute self-evidence** (true in itself), **technical self-evidence** (accepted as true by specialists of a discipline), **conventional self-evidence** (accepted as true by the discussants of the debate):

1/ Absolute self-evidence (bedehiyyat-ı ‘akliyye):

Absolute self-evidence or rational self-evidence (*bedehiyyat-ı ‘akliyye*) is composed of *a priori* knowledge (*evveliyyat*) and innate knowledge (*fitriyyat*).

A priori knowledge: healthy intellect (*akl-ı selim*) can determine the relation between the subject (*mevzu*) and the predicate (*mahmul*) rationally without using any medium (*vasıta*). For example: total is bigger than its parts; a circle is not a rectangle; a self-contradiction is invalid.

Innate knowledge: healthy intellect (*akl-ı selim*) can determine the relation between the subject (*mevzu*) and the predicate (*mahmul*) rationally by using previously accepted

²⁹ A *claim* is claimant’s plea that it is debated.

³⁰ An *argument* is composed of two premises (at least) and one conclusion.

³¹ See my English translation of *Adab-ı Sedad*, p.8

middle term as medium (*hadd-ı evsat*). For example: four [the subject] is an even number [the predicate] because it can be divided by two equal number [middle term].³²

Ahmed Cevdet Paşa says that everybody may necessarily accept the validity of statements that includes absolute self-evidence:

In the case of objecting self-evident a priori premises (bedehiyyat-ı evveliyyeden olan mukaddeme) or self-evident innate premises (bedehiyyat-ı fitriyyeden olan mukaddeme), even if questioner's objection (men') responds claimant's claim, it does not encounter it. Thus, objecting a priori (awaliyat) or innate (fitriyat) propositions belongs to arrogance (mükabere).³³

2/ *Technical self-evidence (bedehiyyat-ı hariciyye)*:

Technical self-evidence or empirical self-evidence (*bedehiyyat-ı hariciyye*) is composed of:

- Observation (*müşahedat*): Knowledge we determine through external or internal feelings (*hissiyyat* and *vicdaniyyat*). For example: fire burns; iron is not soft; I am hungry...

- Deduction (*hadsiyat*): “The capacity of the mind to draw immediate inferences from the data presented to it or to see through a kind of mental illumination the necessary connection between premises and conclusion”³⁴. For example: moonlight reflects sunlight.

- Experience (*mücerrebat*): knowledge that comes from a combination between repeated observation (*tekerrür-i müşahede*) and rational reasoning (*‘akl*). For example: magnesia is a remedy.

- Trustworthy and well-reported narration (*mütevâtirat*): a fact that must be true since a great amount of people attests its existence. In other terms, it is impossible to think that so many people agreed to lie about its existence. For example: the existence of Mecca; Muhammad (saws) claimed that he was Prophet and he showed miracles.³⁵

Although non-specialists could reject such knowledge, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa says that experts of a field can agree on its validity from mutual expertise:

³² Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Miyar-ı Sedat*. 1303/1876. in Büyükcoşkun, Kudret. 1998. *Mantık Metinleri 2, Miyar-ı Sedat and Adab-ı Sedat* (Latinised version), İşaret Yayınları, İstanbul. pp.90-91

³³ See my English translation of *Adab-ı Sedat*, p.12

³⁴ Sheikh, Saeed, and Alparslan Açıkgenç, Dictionary of Islamic Philosophical Terms, lasted viewed 2.1.2018 <http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/pd/index.html>, Entry “hads”

³⁵ Unless for “deduction (hadsiyat)”, we took these definitions from Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Miyar-ı Sedat ve Adab-ı Sedat*. 1303/1876. in Büyükcoşkun, Kudret. 1998. *Mantık Metinleri 2, Miyar-ı Sedat and Adab-ı Sedat* (Latinised version), İşaret Yayınları, İstanbul. pp.90-93

Even if [statements based on] observation (*müşahedat*), experience (*mücerrebat*), feelings (*hadsiyat*) and trustworthy and well reported narration (*mütevâtirat*) can be considered as invalid proofs for common people, they can also be held as certain knowledge (*'ilm-i yakın*) by experts of the discipline in question (*ashab*). Sometimes statements based on these methodologies become so well-known and wide spread among the scientific community (*cemi'-i nas*) that objecting them would belong to arrogance³⁶ (*mükabere*) too. It would be like denying the existence of sunrise or the existence of Baghdad.³⁷

3/ Conventional self-evidence (*müsellemat*):

The term *Müsellemat* refers to claims that are accepted as true (*yakın*) by the opponent (*hasm*) in the discussion.

It is also arrogance when the questioner objects a premise based on knowledge (*'ilm*) he himself recognises (*ma'lum*) and accepts (*müsellema*); whether it concerns certain knowledge (*'ilm-i yakını*), uncertain knowledge (*'ilm-i zanni*) or repeated knowledge (*'ilm-i taklidi*).³⁸

In *Adab-ı Sedad*, most of the examples of conventional self-evidence come from *Kelam* (Islamic theology) in which Mu'tazilite, philosophical and Sunni orthodox scholars debate on specific point of theology, such as anthropomorphism of God, corporal resurrection or world's eternity. In the following quotation, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa gives an example of conventional self-evidence among Muslim philosophers that none of them may deny:

For example, it would be arrogance for any theologian (*ehl-i diyanet olan kimse*) to object the statement that the world has been created from nothing³⁹ (*'alemin hadis olduğunu*) whereas it constitutes an absolute principle (*cezmen mu'tekid*) among theologians. Similarly, it would be arrogance for a philosopher to object the opposite claim, i.e. the world's eternity (*kadim*).⁴⁰

³⁶ Even in logic (*mantık*) the heart comes in, through ethics (*adab*). In the Qur'an, arrogance (*kibr*) is related to the heart. Here, denying the existence of truth is perceived as a disease in the heart.

³⁷ We know the existence of sunrise by experience and observation, and someone could have never seen Baghdad from his own eyes but still know its existence (trustworthy and well reported narration).

³⁸ See my English translation of *Adab-ı Sedad*, p.13

³⁹ i.e. created in time, having a beginning and an end.

⁴⁰ i.e. having no beginning and no end, following the existence of God by itself. As for the theologians with the created world theory, the eternity of the world is a very consensual principle among philosophers (*felasife*) in Islamic civilization. If a discussant is one of them, among them, he has to accept their position. How can he reject it?

- *Context of Münazara: 2 deliberators, 1 moderator, logical forms*

A deliberation takes place in a particular context constituted of two deliberators (*münaziran*) and one moderator (*reis*). The deliberators (or discussants) debate on a specific topic and should not go beyond the scope of it (rule of *tevcih*). There is a distinction between the claimant (*mu'allil*) – the one who proposes a claim and supports it with arguments – and the questioner (*sa'il*) – the one who questions arguments and/or the claim of his opponent in a scheme detailed below. This exchange of arguments and refutations between the claimant and the questioner takes place in logical forms, i.e. premises and conclusion such as “A = B and B = C, therefore A = C”. One should not understand the roles of claimant and questioner as unsurpassable positions attributed to each of the deliberators from the beginning of the debate until its end. They are rather switchable functions (*vazife*) that both deliberators may adopt alternatively throughout the debate. As for the moderator, he is a kind of referee that takes care of the respect of *Münazara* rules.

- *Sequences of deliberation: beginning/mid-term/conclusion*

Every *Münazara* follows also specific sequences. At the **beginning** (*mabadi*), deliberators meet each other and inform which standpoint, school of thought and intellectual heritage they came from. This step is short but crucial as it permits the deliberators to visualize the kind of opponent they face to and thus the kind of arguments they could rely on. The **mid-term** (*avsat*) is the main sequence, when deliberators are actually debating on a specific topic and exchanging arguments. The first to give a claim (*da'va*) becomes the claimant. He must support this general claim by an argument (*delil*), itself composed of logical premises (*mukaddeme*) and conclusion (*netice*). The other deliberator, that has automatically become the questioner, should first make an **objection** (*men'*) to one of the claimant's premises by questioning its soundness. If the claimant managed to answer properly, the questioner should make an **integral-refutation** (*nakz*), by contesting the validity of the relation between the argument and the claim. He tries here to demonstrate how claimant's argument may be sound but yet unable to support his claim. If the claimant managed to answer properly again, the questioner can finally make a **counter-argumentation** (*mu'araza*), by attacking directly the claim itself and providing another argument. Although the relation between the claim and the argument is sound, the claim itself may be not. As it has been indicated above, functions (*vazife*) are not fixed but switchable according to the evolutions taking place in the deliberation. Indeed, if the questioner makes an integral-

refutation (*nakz*) or a counter-argumentation (*mu'araza*) he has to support them with arguments... therefore he becomes automatically a claimant and the former claimant becomes a questioner. As a result, exchange of arguments in this mid-term sequence can be really long and complex.

Considering this explanation, these three functions (*vezaiif-i selasenin*) all converge to the same point, i.e. the claimant's claim is not firmly established (*mu'allilin da' vası sabit değil demektir*).

Attacking (*te'aruz*) the claim is stronger (*evka*) than attacking (*te'aruz*) the argument, therefore the stronger attack (*i'tirazatın eşeddi*) is the counter-argumentation (*mu'araza*) and then the integral-refutation (*nakz*). Although objection (*men'*) is the weakest of all the three attacks (*i'tirazin ez'afı*) it is the most comfortable (*eslemi*).⁴¹ In the process of disclosing the truth (*izhar al-sevab*) objection is also more relevant (*dahli*) than the two other functions. Indeed, after an objection it is up to the claimant to prove his contested premise (*mukaddeme-i memnu'a*) and his claim (*da'va*) is considered as true (*hak olduğunu zahir olur*) only after he has demonstrated it (*ledeyi al-isbat*). On the other hand, in the case of integral-refutation (*nakz*) and counter-argumentation (*mu'araza*) the claimant becomes the questioner and he can choose between the three functions (*vezaiif-i selaseden*) he wants.⁴²

Finally it is the **conclusion sequence (makati)** that puts an end to the deliberation. If the claimant manages to relate his claim to a self-evident argument⁴³ then he has found the truth and puts an end to the deliberation (what we call “compelling”, *ilzam*). If he does not manage to so, the debate finishes and the questioner is considered as the winner of the debate (what we call “confutation”, *ifham*).

<p>Claimant Claim <= Argument <= Premises + Conclusion (<i>da'va</i>) (<i>delil</i>) (<i>mukaddeme + netice</i>)</p> <p>Questioner 1- Objection (<i>men'</i>) 2- Integral-refutation (<i>nakz</i>) 3- Counter-argumentation (<i>mu'araza</i>)</p>
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Tab.1: Claimant and Questioner's roles

⁴¹ Objection is the most comfortable function because the questioner does not have to argue his objection with supporting evidence.

⁴² See my English translation of *Adab-ı Sedad*, p.42

⁴³ We have already explained in details the notion of self-evidence above.

CHAPTER I. INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN MÜNÄZARA AND OTHER SCIENCES

In this first chapter, I do not only present the main discussions about *Münazara* in the Western academic literature, but also shows to what extent the history of *Münazara* (in its general meaning) results from larger interconnections between different sciences within the Islamic scientific tradition. In addition, I argue that Sufism played a crucial role in those interactions by insisting on internal dimension of knowledge (i.e. purification of the inner self and sincerity of intention). I will support this claim by debating [1] genealogical approaches on *Münazara*, [2] integrative epistemology and Sufism, [3] the place of integrative epistemology in Ottoman teaching environment and Ahmed Cevdet Paşa's works. I will end this chapter by underlining the significance of *Adab-ı Sedad* in the late Ottoman intellectual context, as a book that represents the continuation of Islamic scientific tradition in a period of adaptation of Western knowledge throughout the Empire.

2.1. Interconnection between sciences: genealogical approaches to *Münazara*

First and foremost, Western scholars who have dedicated themselves to the study of *Münazara* – understood here in its general meaning – have tried to elucidate the genealogy⁴⁴ of this eristic tradition from the first centuries after the Revelation (7-8th centuries) to the end of the Ottoman Empire (19-20th century). Put differently, they propose a range of interpretations of *Münazarai*'s formation in history by analyzing relations between Islamic theology, philosophy, jurisprudence and Sufism. They generally agree on three historical periods of this tradition, i.e. the period of formation (from 1st to 3rd H. or 7th to 9th G. century), the period of development (from 3rd to 7th H. or 9th to 13th G. century) and the period of institutionalization⁴⁵ (from 7th to 13th H. or 13th to 19th G. century). In this context, one of the main academic frontlines opposes scholars who stress out the influence of theology and logic over jurisprudence in *Münazara*'s formation and those who underscore the role of jurisprudence over

⁴⁴ Here we understand "Genealogy" in Foucauldian sense: "The point of a genealogical analysis is to show that a given system of thought [...] was the result of contingent turns of history, not the outcome of rationally inevitable trends." in Gutting, Gary, "Michel Foucault", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/foucault/>>.

⁴⁵ By "institutionalization" we mean its development as a distinctive discipline within Islam. For example, see. Spahic Omer, "From the Mosques to the Khanqahs: The origins and rise of Sufi institutions", in *Kemanusiaan* Vol.21, No 1, 2014

theology and logic. The firsts consider Abbasid theological (*kelam*) and political debates as a fundamental starting point in the formation of disputation as a discipline. While they euphemize the role of jurisprudence (*fikh*) in the development of dialectical tradition (*cedel*), they underline the impact of Arabic translations of Aristotle's *Topics* as well as the impact of Aristotelian techniques in interreligious debates taking place in the Abbasid court (3rd H./9th G. century). The latter scholars, on the other hand, draw attention to the continuity between proto argumentation treaties written by Islamic jurists in the early period (1st-2nd H. century) and later theorizations as a proof to the prior role of juridical divergences (*ihtilaf*) in the development of Islamic argumentation tradition. According to them, logic's influence on Islamic dialectics mostly regards "formal procedure"⁴⁶ and not the matter of disputation *per se* that remains shaped by jurisprudence to a large extent.

External influence to Islamic argumentation

In his PhD dissertation *Islamic disputation theory*⁴⁷, Larry Benjamin Miller draws the evolution of Islamic eristic tradition in three steps:

- Firstly, the 1st and 2nd century after *Hicra*, when – according to him – theologians (*mutakkalimun*) developed first dialectical methods in Islamic tradition through question-answer oriented debates;
- Secondly, from 3th and 4th century, when jurists (*fukahā*) appropriated disputation methods and adapted them to their own juristic purposes. According to Miller it is also a period where Arabs translated Aristotelian works and as a result of it, the moment where Islamic dialectic tradition started to be "increasingly influenced by logical terminology and techniques"⁴⁸;
- The third and last step of Miller's genealogical approach refers to the process of fusion of theological and juridical approach of dialectics toward the 7th century into a more universal and systematic discipline, i.e. *Adab al-Bahs ve al-Münazara*.

In his PhD thesis, *the development of dialectic and argumentation theory in post-classical Islamic intellectual history*, Mehmed Kadri Karabela deepens this approach by underlining the decisive impact of logic not only on theological or juridical dialectics but on every Islamic disciplines. Indeed, he develops the idea that Greek logic and

⁴⁶ Belhaj, Abdessamad, "Adab al-Bahth wa al-Munazara: The Neglected Art of Disputation in Later Medieval Islam" in *Arabic Sciences and Philosophies*, vol.26 (2016), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. p.294

⁴⁷ Miller, Larry Benjamin.1984. *Islamic Disputation Theory: A Study of the Development of Dialectic in Islam From the Tenth Through Fourteenth Centuries*, PhD dissertation, Princeton

⁴⁸ Miller, "Islamic Disputation Theory," pp. 1–4.

dialectics⁴⁹ spread over the whole Islamic sciences from the 3th and 4th century. Following this translation period, each Islamic science assimilated it and developed their own understanding of dialectic and disputation based upon it. Finally these various argumentation traditions reunified later on into the discipline of *Adab al-Bahs ve al-Münazara*. Put differently, after a period of diffusion of “[Aristotelian] dialectic and argumentative discourse [...] into different fields of inquiry in classical Islamic intellectual history”, came a period of “fusion” in the post-classical period⁵⁰ into universal and institutionalized discipline of *Adab al-Bahs ve al-Münazara*.

Therefore, the origins of 7th H./13th G. century’s *Adab al-Bahs ve al-Münazara* would neither be logic *per se* nor jurisprudence but all Islamic sciences as they all assimilated Greek dialectics from the early Abbasid period. However, his claim is based on a contestable premise i.e. the totally absence of argumentation and dialectical approach in the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad (saws). As he declares: “it is plausible to claim that dialectics was distinctively “new” because the Qur’an, the source of this newborn religion, took only one side in a given field of debate and was not interested in presenting the other side. Consequently there was little opportunity to present opposed or contrasting sides of an argument within what quickly came to be viewed as a *canonical discourse*.”⁵¹ According to him, this lack of indigenous resources pushed Muslim leaders and scholars to stress on translation and assimilation of Greek treatises on this topic, as the Abbasid court used to organize debates and disputations between Muslim and non-Muslim scholars or between Muslims of different schools of thought.

Internal influence to Islamic argumentation

Other scholars argue the exact opposite, that jurisprudence activities gave rise to eristic and disputation methods in the first centuries of Islam. In this way, Georges

⁴⁹ Dialectics (cedel) is part of the Aristotelian logic (*Organon* and five arts, i.e. demonstration, dialectics, rhetoric, poetry and sophism).

⁵⁰ “Diffusion strengthened local communities (of poetry, grammar, law, philosophy and theology) and gave them their identity.” in Karabela, Mehmet Kadri. 2010. *The Development of Dialectic and Argumentation Theory in Post-Classical Islamic Intellectual History*, PhD dissertation, McGill University, p.60

⁵¹ Karabela, *The Development of Dialectic and Argumentation Theory in Post-Classical Islamic Intellectual History*, p.40

Makdisi⁵² claims that Islamic eristic tradition starts its formation through juridical sic-et-non method (*hilaf* or *ihtilaf*), that is “yes and no”, “for and against” way of deliberating: “the sic-et-non method was part and parcel of the Islamic orthodox process for determining orthodoxy. Having no councils or synods, Islam had to depend on the principle of *icma*’, or consensus, to define orthodoxy. And since consensus could be tacit, the doctors of the law, as a matter of conscience, felt obliged to make known their differences of opinion, lest a doctrine which they opposed be considered as having received their tacit acceptance”⁵³. Even if Makdisi associates dialectics (*cedel*) with translations of Aristotelian books from the 3rdH./9thG. century, he underlines the fact that disputation in the field of knowledge (what he calls *Münazara*) was already deeply established among scholars as early as the 2ndH./7thG. centuries: “*Münazara*, disputation, had a distinct function in Islamic education. It was through disputation that excellence in a field of knowledge was established. To be “top man” in one’s field, one had to prove that he was “unbeatable” in that field.” “For instance, Zufar and Abu Yusuf are reported as having carried on a disputation (*münazara*) in the presence of Abu Hanifa.”⁵⁴ Therefore, Makdisi argues the exact opposite of Miller and Karabela’s thesis by underlining the role of *fikh* in the early formation of *Münazara* and by euphemizing the impact of logic on this discipline later on.

Furthermore, Makdisi argues that both Islam and Islamic law have themselves eristic nature: “Islam being essentially a nomocracy, wherein the rule of laws reigns supreme, it is not surprising that it should have found its way to what came to be known as the scholastic method”⁵⁵; “But not only is law to be found at the birth of the scholastic method, it has also become its sole heir. One has only to sit in a court of law

⁵² Makdisi George. “The Scholastic Method in Medieval Education: An Inquiry into Its Origins in Law and Theology,” *Speculum*, Vol. 49, No. 4, Oct., Medieval Academy of America, 1974. pp. 640-661

⁵³ *ibid* p.649. In another book, Georges Makdisi affirms that “disputation is usually connected with theology ; but some of the earliest disputations were in the fields of law and grammar. The juriconsult Abu Qalaba al-Jurmi (d.104/722) disputed with contemporary juriconsults, in the presence of the Umayyad caliph ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-Aziz, on a question of criminal law (qasama).” Makdisi George. 1981. *The Rise of Colleges, Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West*, Edinburg University Press, Edinburg, p.123

⁵⁴ *ibid* p.650. Abu Hanifa passed away at around 767 AC.

⁵⁵ *ibid* p.660 see also, Makdisi, *The Rise of Colleges* p.105-106: “For this reason, consensus, *ijma*’, is determined, not by the yeas against the nays, for no clear count could actually be taken, but rather by whether voices of authoritative doctors of the law have been raised in the past *against* a particular doctrine. If not, then the doctrine was considered to have been accepted as orthodox. Thus, consensus was achieved in three ways: (1) by word (*qaul*), (2) by deed (*fi’l*), and (3) by tacit acceptance (*taqrir*). [...] *Ijma*’, consensus, had its counterpart in *khilaf*, disagreement, difference of opinion. This situation gave rise, very early in Islam, to the need for codifying all opinion on which there was disagreement among authoritative doctors. Here is a central fact of Islamic religious history: the anthesis of *ijma*’-*khilaf*, consensus-disagreement, sic et non”.

and watch trial lawyers put on their cases. One can readily recognize here the essential stages of a complete disputation, down to the “determination” – a term that has been preserved in the law, like so many others, with the same meaning it had in the Middle Age: the decision of a court of justice (or a medieval master at a university disputation) which puts an end to the controversy and settles the issue by authoritative sentence.”

Therefore, according to Makdisi, the use of logic and Aristotelian dialectic by Islamic jurisconsults came later on – around the first half of the 4thH./10thG. century – and only in order to adapt it “to their own purposes, that is, to the perfection of the art of disputation.”⁵⁶ He differentiates then between the dialectic (*cedel*) and the “legitimate dialectic” (*al-cedel al-hasan*) – the first in use among philosophers and philosophical theologians from the 3rdH./9thG. century (i.e. the translation movement of Aristotelian books) and the latter in use among jurisconsults from the 4thH./10thG. century. As stated by Makdisi, jurisconsults incorporated Organon’s dialectic into their eristic method in order to enrich a previous and older scholastic tradition based on law, which is itself mainly shaped by *usul al-fikh* (as a method) and by Qur’an, Sunna and grammar (as a matter).⁵⁷ Last but not the least, Makdisi quotes that in parallel to assimilation of logic into scholastic method, Islamic jurists of the 4thH./10thG. and 5thH./11thG. century⁵⁸ starts to differentiate two kind of dialectics: a general dialectic applicable to any branch of science (*al-cedel al-usuli*) – from which *Adab al-Bahs ve al-Münazara* might come from – and a pure juridical dialectic exclusively used by jurisconsults (*‘ilm al-hilaf*)⁵⁹.

In his comprehensive history of Islamic argumentation and dialectic, Abdessamad Belhaj also demonstrates the intrinsic role of law (*fikh*) in the development of scholastic – or pre-dialectic form of debate – on the one hand, and in the development of more sophisticated forms of juridical and general dialectic on the other hand.⁶⁰ Enriching Makdisi’s thesis, he argues that distinction between juridical dialectic

⁵⁶ Makdisi, *The Rise Of Colleges*, p.108

⁵⁷ ““for there is an obvious affinity between the two sciences, because grammar is a rational science derived from traditional knowledge, as is the case with law ; this is a truth known to scholars who know both fields’ ” in Makdisi, *The Rise of colleges* p.125

⁵⁸ Although Makdisi mainly focuses on the key role of Ibn Aqil’s *al-wadih fi usul al fiqh*, he also mentions the contribution of Ibn Aqil’s Shafi’i master as-Sirazi and of the Malikite al-Baji. See. Makdisi, *The Rise Of Colleges*. pp. 80-99

⁵⁹ Makdisi, George. “Le livre de la dialectique d’Ibn ‘Aqil”/لدينا بآقيل (ءاهقلا تميرط لء) لدجلا بآقيل. *Bulletin D’études Orientales* 20 (1967): 119-206. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41603287>. p.119
See also Belhaj, Abdessamad. *Argumentation et dialectique en Islam*. [Kindle format] Loc. 2255

⁶⁰ “La littérature dont on dispose aujourd’hui et qui est intitulée jadal relève presque entièrement de la dialectique juridique“ in Belhaj, *Argumentation et dialectique en Islam*. [Kindle format] Loc. 2437

(*al-hilaf*) and general dialectic (*al-cedel al-usuli*) finds its origin in the methodology of *usul al-fikh* itself⁶¹. While jurists of Shafi‘i school adopt inductive approach to analogy (that is fixing rules from which cases are derived), jurists of Hanafi school adopt deductive approach (that is analyzing cases from which rules are deduced). According to Belhaj, this difference of methodology explains why Shafi‘i scholars used *cedel* in order to discuss the sources of law in a broad sense and why they are those who have written most dialectic treaties. By contrast, he shows that Hanafi scholars have restricted the use of *hilaf* to particular cases of divergence between legal schools only⁶². He concludes by claiming that Shafi‘i *cedel* gave birth to a “complete methodology, homogenous and clear (related to theological and philosophical dialectic), whereas *‘ilm al-hilaf* stays prisoner to questions on divergence between Hanafis and Shafi‘is.”⁶³

Concerning Mūnazara’s history, Belhaj highlights three main periods:

- [1st-4th century] Rhetorical sequences of debate in Qur’an, Prophetic tradition, literature, theology and law, what Belhaj names “dialogue forms”. Although there are a high number of debates, discussions and even eristic treaties in this period⁶⁴, the place of narrative (*rivayet*) and persuasive (*hitabet*) methods remain prevalent.
- [4th-7th century] The parallel development of dialectic (*cedel*) as a science, firstly in law through debates around legal cause of analogy (*‘illa* or *ratio legis*)⁶⁵ – that is the *dialectique juridique* – and secondly in Aristotle-oriented philosophy through debates around premises of syllogism – that is *dialectique philosophique*.⁶⁶ However, Belhaj assumes that the influence of juridical dialectic is prior to the one of philosophical dialectic in the institutionalization of dialectic as a science of argumentation in Islamic scientific tradition.⁶⁷

⁶¹ *ibid* [Kindle format] Loc. 2348

⁶² *ibid* [Kindle format] Loc. 2348

⁶³ *ibid* [Kindle format] Loc. 2348

⁶⁴ See. Walter Edward Young. 2017. *Dialectical Forge, Juridical Disputation and the Evolution of Islamic Law, Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning*, Vol.9, Springer, Bonn

⁶⁵ “On ne peut supposer que l’ère de la dialectique en islam a commencé avec l’utilisation de la ‘illa, mais certainement ce concept a joué un rôle de premier plan. Lorsque les juristes ont limité les questions dialectiques dans une controverse à quatre: la thèse, la preuve, la cause juridique et le lien entre la cause et l’effet, ils ont consacré l’importance de la cause légale. La dialectique juridique est devenue, après tout, la validation ou l’invalidation d’une cause, *tashih al’illa/naqd al’illa*.” in Belhaj, *Argumentation et dialectique en Islam*. [Kindle format] Loc. 2128

⁶⁶ Belhaj, *Argumentation et dialectique en Islam*. [Kindle format] Loc. 3741

⁶⁷ “Malgré cet intérêt apparent de la part d’al-Farabi pour la dialectique que des théologiens, la grande évolution dans la dialectique arabo-islamique a eu lieu dans la première partie du IVe/Xe siècle, dans le fiqh. Les juristes ont fait la découverte d’un outil qui propulsera leur jadal, à savoir la cause légale (*ratio legis*), ‘illa.” Belhaj, *Argumentation et dialectique*, Loc 2081

“Pour ainsi dire, les juristes ont défini clairement un sujet scientifique de débat et cela a amélioré la qualité de leur argumentation. ‘illa, étant le lieu de discussion musulmane, transforme la jadal d’un stade

- [7th-10th] The emergence of a new discipline, *Adab al-Bahs ve al-Münazara*, as a synthesis between juridical dialectic – in matter – and Aristotelian logic – in form. Although Belhaj sees in the works of al-Ghazzali (d.1111) and Fahreddin al-Razi (d.1210) crucial efforts to translate juridical analogies into abstract logical terms⁶⁸, He shows also how in *Risala fi adab al-bahs* (Ethics of discussion) Shamsaddin b.Muhammad Ashraf as-Samarqandi (690/1291) has first fixed “rules of general theory of discussion”⁶⁹, including chapters on definitions (1), on organization of the debate (2) and on sophisms discussants should avoid (3).

Finally, Belhaj underlines the crucial role of both logic and ethics in this later *Adab al-Bahs ve al-Münazara*. Indeed, he highlights the fact that logical terms and tools spread out *Adab al-Bahs* discipline throughout history and acquired a more substantial role in later treaties (from 10th to 13th century) than in original al-Samarqandi’s version (7th century)⁷⁰. Secondly, he explains how ethical dimension of *Adab al-Bahs* echoes Ghazzali’s severe critics towards *cedel* at the end of the 5thH./11thG. century, accusing dialectic to lead discussants to vain disputes, pride, eagerness and selfishness: “Sometimes al-Ghazzali strongly criticizes *cedel* and other times uses it, but there is no contradiction here, it reflects rather a conception of *cedel* that is conditioned by ethics”⁷¹. To Belhaj “this [critic] could be considered as a moral critic motivated by his Sufism and his Sunni orthodoxy”⁷². Then, Belhaj mentions eight ethical conditions defined by al-Ghazzali to be able to conduct a virtuous *cedel*, and ten mistakes that would mislead the debate. Belhaj indicates that similar conditions can be read in al-Samarqandi’s *Adab al-Bahs* in equivalent terms⁷³ as well as in later books of *Adab al-Bahs ve al-Münazara* over centuries. According to him, this development refers to the term *Adab* (ethics) in the full sense: “[Ethics] form an essential part of *Adab al-Bahs*. In

de la rhétorique à un stade de dialectique. Pour le dire autrement, les débats musulmans deviennent plus scientifiques, car ils identifient explicitement la raison de l’écart entre les juristes sur une question. De meme, certains elements dialectiques existaient auparavant dans la literature de divergence juridique, ikhtilaf, mais dans un contexte dominé par la rhétorique à la fois dans la structure et dans l’argumentation.” Belhaj, *Argumentation et dialectique*, Loc 2081

⁶⁸ *ibid*, [Kindle format] Loc. 2793, 2841, 3078, 3541, 3591. Juridical Analogy, *qiyas*, is based on basis case of legal cause *asl*, legal cause ‘*illa* and judgment *hukm*. Converted into logical form, *asl* becomes *muqaddimat ad-dalil* (major premises); ‘*illa* becomes *dalil* (the all premises); and *hukm* becomes *madlul* (conclusion).

⁶⁹ *ibid*, [Kindle format] Loc. 3094

⁷⁰ *ibid*, [Kindle format] Loc. 3519 This note concerns also Ahmed Cevdet Pasha’s *Adab-i Sedad*.

⁷¹ *ibid*, [Kindle format] Loc. 2739

⁷² *ibid*, [Kindle format] Loc. 2728

⁷³ “Standardisées dans les manuels de l’argumentation, elles ne sont en fait qu’une paraphrase des huit conditions d’al-Ghazali” *ibid* [Kindle format] Loc. 3177

this context, the term *adab* means both ethic and etiquette. Non-respect of these conventions leads to a defeat in the debate.”⁷⁴

Performative role of Islamic argumentation

In the *Dialectical Forge, Juridical Disputation and the Evolution of Islamic Law* (2017) Walter Edward Young corroborates Makdisi and Belhaj’s position in favor of jurisprudence’s prevalent influence on argumentation in the classical period. He even shifts the terms of the debate by showing how jurisprudence disputation actually shaped the technical terms of *usul al-fikh* science in the first centuries of Islam. In other words, Young does not restrict argumentation to an “instrumental role”, tool of greater sciences, but assigns a performative role to it as an element that “forged” institutionalization of *fikh*⁷⁵. Indeed he demonstrates that the theorization of a sophisticated proto-juridical dialectic – or “proto system argument” – occurred a century after *Hicra* through Imam al-Shafi’i’s *Kitab al-umm*, i.e. before Translation Movement of Greek philosophies and the development of logical theology. According to him, this proto-system constituted one of the most decisive “backgrounds” for later developments in *usul al-fikh* and in theology. Young argues that it is through early disputation developments that episteme and common axioms’ borders of *usul al-fikh* have been shaped: “the larger genre of *usul al-fikh* is particularly marked by the argument epistememes of juridical dialectical disputation.”⁷⁶ Therefore, Young insists on the fact that argumentation in Islam is intertwined with other disciplines, not only in the way that without understanding *fikh*, *felsefe* and *kelam* one could not understand *Münazara* but also in opposite way that without understanding *Münazara* one could not fully understand the form, the content and the development of *fikh*, *kelam* and *felsefe*.

This performative characteristic of *Münazara* is not restricted to the formative period of Islamic scientific tradition. Khaled El-Rouayheb shows to what extent Ottoman specialization in *Münazara* science greatly impacted in return the development of rational sciences and logic in Ottoman lands: “The predilection for giving syllogistic presentations of dialectical exchanges, a novel feature common to the works of Adanavi and Saçaklızade, led to important developments in Ottoman logic in the course of the eighteenth century. It motivated a renewed interest in applied logic, after centuries of

⁷⁴ *ibid*

⁷⁵ Similar shifts can be found in other social sciences. For example, Le Gales and Lascoumes argued in many books the decisive impact of “instruments” in the content and orientation of public policies. See, Le Gales, Lascoumes. 2004. *Gouverner par les instruments*, Presses de SciencesPo, Paris.

⁷⁶ Walter Edward Young. 2017. *Dialectical Forge, Juridical Disputation and the Evolution of Islamic Law*, Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, Vol.9, Springer, Bonn. p.38.

neglect in the post-Avicennan logical tradition, and an interest in so-called “unfamiliar syllogisms,” that is, formally valid relational inferences that had not been recognized in classical Aristotelian logic.”⁷⁷“The roots of some of the most conspicuously novel developments in Ottoman logic in the eighteenth century – the interest in casting ordinary arguments into syllogistic form and the recognition of “unfamiliar” relational syllogisms – are clearly to be sought, not in the works of the older Islamic philosophers, but in Ottoman works on *Adab al-Bahs* from the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.”⁷⁸ He concludes by stressing the fact that *Münazara* became in the Ottoman context an indispensable discipline to master in order to approach other sciences: “For the Ottoman Turkish scholar Saçaklızade, familiarity with *Adab al-Bahs* was indispensable for following scholarly discussions, especially in logic, theology, and jurisprudence.”⁷⁹

To sum up, all genealogical approaches of *Münazara* debate the way different sciences interacted and influenced one to another in the development of eristic tradition in Islam. Furthermore, these genealogical approaches agree on the fact that the post-classical development of Islamic eristic tradition, i.e. *Adab al-Bahs ve al-Münazara*, constitutes a synthesis of the different ways Islamic sciences used to apprehend argumentation.⁸⁰ Finally, they all consider *Adab al-Bahs ve al-Münazara* as universal institutionalization of disputation in Islam that can be applied in any science and any context. In the next two sections of this chapter 1, I will discuss to what extent Sufism plays a central role in the interconnection between sciences in Islamic tradition [b] and how the intertwined relation between rational (*akli*), reported (*nakli*) and spiritual (*kalbi*) knowledge takes place in the education of the late Ottoman period, that is Ahmed Cevdet Paşa’s context [c]. All these discussions aim to underline the Sufi background of *Münazara* and how no one can approach *Münazara* – and even more ethics of *Münazara* – without taking Sufism into account.

⁷⁷ Walter Edward Young, *Dialectical Forge*. p.86

⁷⁸ *ibid* p.111

⁷⁹ *ibid* p.60

⁸⁰ “The universal theory of argumentation represented by the *adab al bahth*: a synthesis of all that came before it” in Karabela, *The Development of Dialectics*, p2

2.2. Interconnection between sciences: integrative epistemology (multiplex) and Sufism

By the notion of “integrative epistemology” or “multiplex”, I refer to the encompassing of different layers of truth within one and unique scientific tradition. Recep Şentürk claims in his *Açık Medeniyet* (Open civilization) that Islamic scientific approach does include multiple levels of knowledge and methodology (i.e. multiplex) without excluding each other (i.e. open science).⁸¹ In his article *Legal Knowledge by Application: Sufism as Islamic Legal Hermeneutics in the 10th/12th Centuries*, Abdessamad Belhaj similarly tries to reconstitute the articulation between *fıkh* and Sufism through the analysis of three important Islamic figures, i.e. Abu Nasr Abd Allah b. Ali al-Sarraj (d. 378/988), Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali (d. 505/1111) and Abu al-Faraj b. al-Jawzi (d. 597/1201). He argues, “that Sufism attempts at bridging the gap between the letter and the spirit of law.”⁸² “They [al-Sarraj, al-Ghazzali and al-Jawzi] primarily aim at showing the unity of sharia by stating that *fıkhi* interpretation and Sufi application are but two complementary and necessary levels of the understanding of sharia.”⁸³ Belhaj highlights the central role of Sufism in the first centuries of Islam (1-6th H. century) by demonstrating how Sunni Sufism at that time sought “a “hermeneutical unity” [...] where understanding, interpretation, and application intertwine through oral and practical transmission.”⁸⁴ According to Belhaj, Sufism promotes a “performative application of law”⁸⁵ that produces concrete transformation on human’s character and deeds. He adds that “the inclusion of Sufism within law and theology brought with it a deep psychological sensitivity to faith and practice in Islam. Later on, it affected language, exegesis and literature to the extent that it transformed the whole of the Muslim intellectual traditions in post-classical Islam.”⁸⁶ By this assumption on Sufi impact over “Muslim intellectual traditions in post-classical Islam”, Belhaj does refer to the moral critics of Sufism against legal formalism and egoistic dialectic, two features that were particularly esteemed in the intellectual environment of the 11th and 12th century Islamic world (i.e. the end of the classical period). “[Al-Jawzi’s] criticism of the jurists focuses on their ambition to excel in disputation sciences

⁸¹ “açık bilim çok katmanlı bir düşünce sistemine dayanır. Böylece düşünceyi tek bir seviyeye hapsedmeye çalışmaz.” in Şentürk Recep, *Açık Medeniyet, Çok Medeniyetli Toplum ve Dünyaya Doğru*, İz Yayıncılık, İstanbul. p.237

⁸² Belhaj Abdessamad, “Legal Knowledge by Application: Sufism as Islamic Legal Hermeneutics in the 10th/12th Centuries”, *Studia islamica*, Vol. 108, no. 1, (2013) pp.84-85

⁸³ *ibid* p.106

⁸⁴ *ibid* p.87

⁸⁵ *ibid* p.91

⁸⁶ *ibid* p.94

(*ulum al-cedel*) and the ways to beat their opponents. In this particular point, he reiterates the Sufi criticism of disputation, a motif that was underlined by al-Sarraaj and al-Ghazzali”.⁸⁷ By considering application of faith – or self-realization – as finality of any science, al-Sarraaj, al-Ghazzali and al-Jawzi shaped homogenous aspect of Sunni scientific tradition while they restore its deep meaning (*ma‘na*).

Belhaj introduces also an important nuance between al-Ghazzali and al-Jawzi’s understanding of Sufism and the role they attributed it in Islamic knowledge. While the first presents a proper Sufi epistemology⁸⁸ based on “direct experience” and gnostic approach of God⁸⁹, the second focuses on pious and ascetic aspects of Sufism in order to complete formal knowledge provided by *fikh*. While in both cases Sufism constitutes the corner stone that unifies Sunni knowledge activities, Belhaj considers the first as interior Sufism – or theosophical – and the latter as exterior Sufism – or ascetic.⁹⁰ This distinction is not without importance for our topic since I will debate in the third chapter to what extent *adab* (ethics) in *Adab-ı Sedad* does not only mean good manners and polite behaviour among discussants in a horizontal perspective but also transformation and transcendental elevation of the self in relation to the Divine – i.e. in vertical perspective.

This horizontal/vertical dyadic is deeply related to another dyadic of al-Ghazzali: the relation between external and internal approach to the object of knowledge. Indeed, in his encyclopaedic opus *Ihya ulum al-din* al-Ghazzali argues that realities of things (*haka‘ik al-aşia‘*) cannot be discovered as long as one is ignorant of oneself (*nefsihi*) – i.e. of his hearth’s nature and state (*kalb*).⁹¹ In other terms, in order to understand external objects we need to understand our internal nature, our soul. According to al-Ghazzali one can understand his internal ego only if he purifies his soul’s negative tendencies (1) and welcome divine qualities into his hearth (2). This combination permits to access spirituals realities (*haka‘ik*) or subtleties (*lata‘if*) of any

⁸⁷ *ibid* p.104

⁸⁸ What Belhaj calls a “philosophical theory of knowledge” in Belhaj Abdessamad, *Legal Knowledge by Application*. p.105

⁸⁹ *ibid* p.101

⁹⁰ *ibid* p.95

⁹¹ “Lorsque l’homme connait son coeur, il possède la connaissance de soi. Et lorsqu’il possède la connaissance de soi, il connait son Seigneur. A l’inverse, lorsque l’homme ignore son coeur, il s’ignore lui-même. Et lorsqu’il s’ignore lui-même, il ignore son Seigneur. Qui ignore son propre coeur, ignore toutes choses.” in Gazzali, *Ihya*, V, p.10-11, French translation found in Chouiref Tayeb. 2016. *L’alchimie du bonheur, connaissance de soi et connaissance de Dieu*, Editions Tasnim, Wattrelos, p.97

object of knowledge.⁹² It is important to notice that al-Ghazzali does not hesitate to employ logical syllogism form in order to explain this theory (see notes 88 and 89). Therefore, al-Ghazzali's approach provides convenient tools for my analysis: he underlines the internal role of *adab* in Islamic argumentation, as a relation between the control of ego's inclinations and the control of tongue and thinking, in order to establish ideal argumentation and be able to disclose the truth through deliberation.

Recep Şentürk contextualizes this integrative epistemology – with Sufism at the center – in the Ottoman intellectual life through the concepts of “open science” and “multiplex”. In his book *Açık Medeniyet* (Open civilization), Şentürk argues that Islamic scientific approach as applied in the Ottoman cultural world did include multiple levels of knowledge and methodology (i.e. multiplex) without excluding each other (i.e. open science).⁹³ In short, he shows how all branches of study can be similarly split into three *modus operandi*, which are the rational level (*'akli*), the traditional or reported level (*nakli*) and the spiritual level (*kalbi*). Even though he notices that these approaches of study could change according to the matter, triptych form tends to come again and again. For instance, in the case of multiplex ontology (*meratibu al-vücut*), he evokes among others the material world (*alem al-mulk*), the unseen world (*alem al-malakut*), and Lordly world (*alem al-lahut*) that is neither material nor immaterial; in the case of multiplex knowledge (*meratibu al-ulum*) he evokes the apparent (*zahir*), the esoteric (*batin*) and the divine knowledge (*ilahi*); or in the case of methodology, he mentions popular (*vehim*), intellectual (*'akil*) and inspirational knowledge (*keşif*). Although each of these three dimensions presents its own concepts, analyses and realities, all these dimensions cohabite each other and set up a whole knowledge.

Moreover, Recep Şentürk indicates that among these three aspects of knowledge Ottoman scholars such as Taşköprüzade (d.1561) or Saçaklızade (d.1732)⁹⁴ considered the spiritual one (*kalbi*) as the highest and noblest one, without denying legitimacy and veracity to the others.⁹⁵ Şentürk's “open science” and “multiplex” concepts are very

⁹² “Lorsque l'homme s'oppose à ses tendances negatives et qu'il les soumet à sa nature seigneuriale (*al-sifa al-rabbaniyya*), viennent s'installer dans son coeur les qualities seigneuriales de connaissance, de sagesse et de certitude. Il perçoit alors la réalité spirituelle des phénomènes (*haqa'iq al-ashiya*) et connait la nature réelle des choses.” in Gazzali, *Ihya*, V, p.43, French translation found in Chouiref Tayeb. *L'alchimie du bonheur*, p.99

⁹³ “açık bilim çok katmanlı bir düşünce sistemine dayanır. Böylece düşünceyi tek bir seviyeye hapsedmeye çalışmaz.” in Şentürk Recep, *Açık Medeniyet, Çok Medeniyetli Toplum ve Dünyaya Doğru*, İz Yayıncılık, İstanbul. p.237

⁹⁴ Both are authors of encyclopedic books, see. Saçaklızade Muhammad al-Marashi. 1715. *Tartib al-ulum*

⁹⁵ Geleneksel Osmanlı bilgi anlayışına göre, keşf en üstün bilgi edinme yoludur. Ancak farklı bilgi türleri birbirlerini dışlamaz” p.238 ibid

important for my thesis since they demonstrate a tangible link between al-Ghazzali's integrative approach of knowledge and Ottoman intellectual tradition. In both one can find at the same time multidimensional understanding of knowledge and primacy of Sufism in terms of scientific importance and finality.

2.3. Interconnection between sciences: Ahmed Cevdet Paşa and integrative epistemology in Ottoman education

Ahmed Cevdet Paşa's (1822, Lovetch – 1895, Constantinople) education path reflects Ottoman "multiplex" approach of sciences, in which students used to continually switch between rational (akli), reported (nakli) and spiritual (kalbi) understandings of knowledge. Hence, one of his biographers, Richard L. Chamber, tells us how Ahmed Cevdet combined passion for rational knowledge such as mathematics, logic and philosophy with interest for Sufism through personal course on Rumi's *Mesnevi* at Murad Molla Tekke in Istanbul.⁹⁶ Furthermore, Chamber notices that Ahmed Cevdet followed Qur'an, hadith and law curriculum and thus affirmed "[his] education had followed the traditional Muslim Ottoman pattern."⁹⁷ It is important to keep in mind that Sufism included itself multiple aspects at that time. Thus, even if Ahmed Cevdet learned Persian in the only goal to get lectures on one of the most famous book of Sufism – *Mesnevi* – he did not get involved into a Sufi disciple-master relationship by keeping his Sufi learning at an academic level.⁹⁸ This demonstrates the openness of Sufi teaching in the middle 19th century Ottoman educational system that was not close to guild filiation only but open to any interested students.

Moreover, if Ahmed Cevdet Paşa's "educational experiences [...] provide a particularly informative glimpse of the state of Muslim Ottoman learning and teaching in the early years of the Tanzimat"⁹⁹, his official and professional career disclose decisive information on intellectual and educative trends that Ottoman State was

⁹⁶ "The wide range of Ahmed Efendi's interests is to be seen by comparing his study of modern mathematics with the subjects he was taught in the Murad Molla Tekke" p.456 in Chambers, Richard L., "The education of a nineteenth-century ottoman alim, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Oct., 1973), pp. 440-464

⁹⁷ *ibid* p.441

⁹⁸ Hatice Özdil. 1994. "19. Yüzyıl İstanbulu'nun İlim Merkezlerinden Murad Molla Tekkesi ve Kütüphanesi", *Fatma Aliye Hanım, Ahmet Cevdet Paşa ve Zamanı*, (haz. Metin Hasırcı), Pınar Yayınları. İstanbul.

⁹⁹ Chambers, The education of a nineteenth-century ottoman alim, p.440

spreading in its territory in the second half of 19th century. Indeed, through his State positions and intellectual activities, one can see in Ahmed Cevdet Paşa a figure of “**adaptation**” of Western European attitudes in the way Benjamin Fortna describes it in his *Imperial Classroom* (2002): “In the newly competitive mode late Ottoman educational policy relied heavily both on Ottoman and Islamic tradition and on the modernity of Western models. The process of combining these two traditions altered both of them, creating a mixture that has been but little understood. The secular curriculum was infused with large doses of religious content, while various aspects of **the Islamic tradition were distilled to fit the curriculum and the regimented life of the new schools.** [...] Whereas the prevailing view has emphasized the *adoption* of Western European institutions and attitudes, I concentrate on *adaptation*, taking the field of education as my case”.¹⁰⁰

Ahmed Cevdet Paşa is a central figure of late Ottoman state that imposed his influence in educational, judicial and political fields. Actually, he has been four times Minister of Education - or its equivalent - in 1850, 1873, 1875 and 1876. He has been also appointed to the position of director of Men Schools (*darulmuallimin müdürlük*) in 1850, member of the Academy of Sciences (*Encümen-i Daniş*) in 1851 and received in 1854 one of the most prestigious position in the Suleymaniyye schools, i.e. *Musile-i Suleymaniyye*. In fact, Ahmed Cevdet’s main achievements in education field concern schools’ organization, State education system and school manuals writing. Indeed, while he was Minister of Education between 1873 and 1874, he re-organized the whole school programs from Primary schools to High schools, opened a modern primary school (*ibtidaiyye*) in the Nuruosmaniyye Cami’s court, reshaped the organization of Men schools (*Darülmualim*) in separating three grades, namely, *sıbyan*, *rüşdiye* ve *idadi*, and last but not least he wrote four major school manuals, i.e. *Kavaid-i Türkiyye* (on Turkish grammar), *Mi’yar-ı Sedad* (on logic), *Adab-ı Sedad* (on argumentation) and *Kıyas-ı Enbiya* (on Prophets’ History). **Here, one can see Ahmed Cevdet’s efforts for reforming the Ottoman education system while keeping a strong Islamic oriented scientific tradition.** According to Yusuf Halaçoğlu and Akif Aydın, he worked for [1] the implementation of new educational and cultural institutions, [2] for the preparation and publication of new schoolbooks at destination to different educational level, [3] and

¹⁰⁰ Fortna, Benjamin C. 2002. *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.New-York, p.9

for the development of Ottoman Turkish as a scientific language.¹⁰¹ This integrative approach of both modernization and conservation – what Fortna calls “adaptation” – is omnipresent in Ahmed Cevdet’s judicial activities too. In addition to become Qadi at the most influential localizations¹⁰² and Minister of Justice several times¹⁰³, he participated actively in the redaction of *Mecelle-i Ahkam-i Adliyye* as President of the Commission of Redaction between 1868 and 1876. *Mecelle-i Ahkam-i Adliyye* was a synthesis of Hanefi law and European codifications (mainly Napoleon Code Civil), and became the first legal codification applicable to the whole subjects of the Ottoman state regardless to their religion. Finally, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa was also a prominent figure in political affairs, as he became official chronicler-historian for the Ottoman State between 1855 and 1865, received the Imperial distinction of “*Nişan-ı Osmanî*” (63), has been appointed as governor of Halep (1866), Maraş (1871), Yanya (1874) and Syria (1877), and as Minister of the Foundations (*Evkaf naziri*) (1873, 1877), of Interior affairs (1877) of Commerce (1878), and even took responsibilities of Prime minister for ten days after the resignation of Hayreddin Pasha in 1879.¹⁰⁴

In sum, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa’s works and accomplishments reflected and participated in Ottoman policy of “adaptation” in the late 19th century. His handbooks – among them *Adab-ı Sedad* – constitute direct attempts to affirm legitimacy and validity of the “multiplex” Islamic scientific tradition, while seeking at the same time to reform and modernize its broad shape. In other terms, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa wrote traditional Islamic books in modern Ottoman Turkish to Europeanized school system.

In his *Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century, Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb* (2016), Khaled El-Rouayheb showed to what extent Ottoman scholars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries paid attention to the science of deliberation, i.e. *Adab al-bahs ve al-Münazara*, such as Abdurrahman el-Ahderi (1576), Ahmed Taşköprüzade (d.1621), Katip Çelebi (1657), Yanya’lı Es’ad Efendi (1731), Muhammad al-Marashi Saçaklızade (1732) or Ismail

¹⁰¹ Halaçoğlu, Yusuf and M. Akif Aydın, “Cevdet Paşa”, in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (DİA), 1989, vol.2, Ankara. p. 445.

¹⁰² Successively qadi of Galata in January 1856, the one of Makka in December 1856, of Istanbul in 1861, and finally Anadolu Kazaskeri in 1863, that was the most influential position after Sadrazam (Prime Minister) and Şeyhülislam. in Halaçoğlu, Yusuf and M. Akif Aydın, “Cevdet Paşa” p.445

¹⁰³ He became Minister of Justice in 1868, 1875, 1876, 1879 and 1886 for irregular paces of time, ibid. p.445

¹⁰⁴ ibid p.445

Gelenbevi (1790). All of them wrote important books, comments (*şarh*) and notes (*hawashi*) on *Münazara*, which have been taught in Ottoman schools under the category of “instrumental knowledge” (‘ulum-u eliyye).¹⁰⁵ In this regard, *Adab-ı Sedad* (1294.H/1876.G) constitutes both one of the latest treatises written in the Ottoman context and one of the first published in Ottoman language (previous books used to be written in Arabic). This book testifies the reshaping of Ottoman scientific tradition in the second-mid nineteenth century, a period where continuity of traditional Islamic disciplines cohabited with European positivistic-natural sciences as well as with modern ideals of spreading knowledge to a great number of people. Miri Shefer-Mossensohn demonstrated how, even before the 19th century, Ottomans used to mix influences (Islamic, Mongol, Persian, European...) and dimensions (rational, reported, spiritual, superstitious...) in their scientific approach, following their travels, conquests and integration of new people.¹⁰⁶ Yet, we can see in *Adab-ı Sedad* the confirmation of Islamic integrative epistemology in a period of “adaptation” of European and nationalistic scientific approaches. Furthermore, *Adab-ı Sedad* symbolizes integrative dimension (“multiplex”) of Islamic scientific tradition by combining rational, reported and spiritual understandings of knowledge.

Finally, it is important to notice that such integrative epistemology went on after the fall of Ottoman State and the apparent Western epistemological supremacy. For instance, in the post-ottoman Turkish context, Sheikh Muhammed Emin Er El-Mirani adopts in his *camî’ al-mutun al-dirasiyya* an intertwined scientific pattern for teaching scientific Arabic language. In this book, he aims to provide Arabic keys to interpret Qur’an and hadith (*nakl* sciences) through grammar, rational sciences such as logic (*akl* sciences) and through Sufism (*kalb* science). **In the same way than *Adab-ı Sedad*, spiritual teachings mostly take place at the beginning and at the end of the book, as if internal elevation of the self represents both initial condition and ultimate goal of scientific and educational path.**¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Necip Taylan, *Anahatlarıyla Mantık*, Ensar, 4.Baskı, 2011, İstanbul, p.80

¹⁰⁶ Shefer-Mossensohn, Miri. 2016. *Science among the Ottomans: The Cultural Creation and Exchange of Knowledge*, University of Texas Press; Reprint edition, Austin.

¹⁰⁷ Muhammad Amine Er Mijani, *jami’ al mutun al dirasiyya*. 2011 Dar al-Andalus. Damascus.

CHAPTER II. NOTION OF ETHICS IN MÜNAZARA AND WESTERN ARGUMENTATION THEORIES

In this chapter, I first summarize the different Western schools of thought relative to argumentation. Those can be split in two trends: the New Dialectical School that tries to combine universal method of argumentation with relativistic understanding of its success, and the New Rhetoric School that focuses on the performative impact of argumentation upon the audience. Then I explain why these two schools of thought share common interests with *Münazara* and to what extent they differ from this discipline. I show that the main differences between these theories concern the understanding of “product/success” and “process/ethics” of argumentation. While Dialectical school considers that argumentation aims to “resolve a conflict” through an ethical debate that respects a set of universal standards, the Rhetoric school defines argumentation as the ability to impact the audience through a debate that is matching audience’s *topoi*. As for *Münazara*, it claims that argumentation should lead to disclosing the truth (either absolute, technical or conventional)¹⁰⁸ through a discussion that respects both external and internal aspects of ethics.

3.1. Why are Western Argumentation Theories and *Münazara* comparable?

Here, I demonstrate that Western argumentation theories and *Münazara* are parts of the same academic field: the analysis (science, *ilm*) and the practice (discipline, *fen*) of debate.

3.1.1. Main schools in Western Argumentation Theories

Argumentation – as understood in his general meaning of disputation – is matter of debate since the very beginning of philosophy. Therefore my goal here is not to provide a comprehensive introduction to every philosophical school that got involved in this debate, but rather to give a general typology of the main theories taking place in the current field of Western argumentation. By the term “Western argumentation”, I mean the intellectual schools that have been developed by Western thinkers through western context and discourse in the second part of the 20th century. It is just a practical mean in order to better compare these schools with *Münazara*, considered as the product

¹⁰⁸ For more details about these three notions, see 1.4.2

of “Islamic scientific tradition”.¹⁰⁹ Here we mainly focus on three umbrellas of argumentation theories, namely the Informal Logic School, the New Dialectical School and the New Rhetorical School.

- *Between Ancients and Moderns: argumentation theorists’ approach to truth and to language*

First of all, one should keep in mind that until the 20th century, Aristotelian influence over argumentation theories was predominant. In his *Topics*, Aristotle classifies the art of disputation in five hierarchical levels – i.e. demonstration, dialectics, rhetoric, poetry and sophistry. **Demonstration** refers to discussion based on self-evident arguments, **dialectics** to discussion based on well-accepted arguments, **rhetoric** to discussion based on persuasive arguments, **poetry** to discussion based on aesthetic arguments, and **sophistry** to discussion based on fallacious arguments. Aristotelian considers demonstration as the best model for argumentation since it deals with exact truth and not with tangible knowledge. **Thus, Aristotelian approach to argumentation remains based on two specific conceptions of truth and language: truth is an external object that one can seize and language is a neutral instrument that one uses to transmit information to an interlocutor.** In other terms, Aristotle approaches truth and language as objective and universal realities that every rational human being can deal with. As a result, every human shares universal rational capacities and thus can debate through formal logical means. Haddad shows how Aristotelian approach of argumentation considers that “composite meanings are converged by propositions which could be judged to be true or false according to universal rules of evaluation. It is the universality of meanings and laws by which propositions are constructed and evaluated that accounts for the possibility of communication”¹¹⁰. Today, “**informal logic**” school perpetuates this close relation between logic and external truth. Yet its tenants focus more on the criteria premises must respect, as well as on the relation between premises and conclusions.¹¹¹ However, the conception of truth and language remains pretty much close from those of formal logic.

¹⁰⁹ In his *Islamic scientific tradition in history* (2012), Alparslan Açıkgenç develops the notion of “scientific tradition” as an epistemological framework that interprets historical scientific outcomes “within a socio-cultural context of a space-time continuum”. See. Açıkgenç Alparslan. 2012. *Islamic scientific tradition in history*, Penerbit IKIM Kuala Lumpur, p. vii

¹¹⁰ Haddad, Fuad Said, “Alfarabi’s views on logic and its relation to grammar”, *Islamic Quarterly*, Vol. 13, Iss. 4, (1969). London. p. 18

¹¹¹ van Eemeren, Frans H. 2001. “The state of art of argumentation theory”, ed. van Eemeren, Frans H. 2001. *Crucial Concepts in Argumentation Theory*. Amsterdam University Press. Amsterdam.

Nevertheless, truth and language are two concepts that theorists of argumentation theory are reshaping for more than fifty years now. Following Searl and Austin's studies on the **performative aspects of language** (speech act theory),¹¹² they support the idea that language is not a neutral device but a performance that participate to the construction of the social world. In other terms, language is only understandable within a specific cultural context that it participates to construct. For instance, if by saying, "I declare war", a State leader can involve his country into warfare it is only because his function embodies a series of social significance. Therefore we cannot understand language outside its context.

By reconsidering the nature of language, argumentation theorists reshape also the understanding of truth: although the existence of **broad facts** (for example, moon as independent to language even if we use language to describe it), the world is mainly composed of **institutional facts** that are dependent to language, even constructed by it. Then, truth mainly refers to constructed facts that should be contextualized. New argumentation schools that refer to this contextualized notion of truth can be split in two groups: the *Normative approach* that tries to combine universal method of argumentation with relativistic understanding of its success, and the *Descriptive approach* that focuses on the performative impact of argumentation upon the audience.¹¹³

- *Between normative and descriptive approaches*

Normative and descriptive approaches of argumentation take inspiration in two fundamental books, both published in 1958, respectively *The Uses of Argument* of British philosopher Stephen Toulmin¹¹⁴ and *La Nouvelle-Rhétorique* of Belgian philosopher Chaim Perelman and Belgian sociologist Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca¹¹⁵.

New Dialectical School

The criteria are 1/ relevance (a sound relation between premises and conclusion, 2/ sufficiency (premises provide enough evidence to the conclusion) and 3/ acceptability (premises themselves are true, probable, trustworthy)

¹¹² See, Austin, John Langshaw. 1969. *How to do things with words*. Harvard University Press. Cambridge (USA) ; Searle John. 1979. *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.

¹¹³ van Eemeren. "the state of art of argumentation theory". p.11

¹¹⁴ Toulmin Stephen E. 1958. *The Uses of Argument*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.

¹¹⁵ Perelman, Chaim and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. 1958. *La nouvelle rhétorique ; Traité de l'Argumentation*. Presses Universitaires de France.

Toulmin articulates both objective and relativistic approaches as he claims that argumentation's procedure should be established on universal standards ("field independent") while the evaluation of the argumentation's content and soundness must remain bounded by the context ("field dependent").¹¹⁶ This ambivalence between a normative form and a relativistic content can be found in modern dialectical school – and among them – pragma-dialectics theory: **“To modern dialecticians, argumentation is part of a procedure to resolve a difference of opinion [product] by means of a regulated discussion [process]”**¹¹⁷. It is the reason why Van Eemeren insists on the “product-process” ambiguity to show how argumentation aims to “resolve a conflict”¹¹⁸ (product/relativistic) through an ethical debate that respects a set of universal standards (process/universal).¹¹⁹ Hence, the combination made between *pragma* (referring to contextual awareness) and *dialectics* (referring to normative standards). These theories are commonly included under the name of New Dialectical School.

New Rhetorical School

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca propose an alternative approach to argumentation as they stand at distance from any normative diagnostic and prefer to adopt a sociologic reading of dialogue, i.e. a descriptive approach. According to them, argumentation is neither an *eristical* play (winning a debate whatever the cost) nor *logical* play (cold exchange of rational claim) but an interaction between discussants and their audience.¹²⁰ Therefore, accurate argumentation is not a discussion that respects normative rules but a discussion that is “acceptable” for the audience. In their theory, the audience takes a decisive role in argumentation and can be understood as whether “particular” (the one who attend the debate) or “universal” (the one who – according to the speaker – represents “the embodiment of reasonableness”). **According to them, “the soundness of argumentation is [above all] measured against its effect on the target group [audience]”**¹²¹. Therefore, they pay a specific attention to rhetoric as a legitimate and

¹¹⁶ van Eemeren. “the state of art of argumentation theory”. p.11

¹¹⁷ *ibid*

¹¹⁸ i.e. resolving a difference of opinion between two reasonable discussants instead of finding the truth and demonstrating a point. See. van Eemeren. “the state of art of argumentation theory”. pp.11-12

¹¹⁹ i.e. standard universal criteria split into compulsory stages, schemes and ethics. See. van Eemeren. “the state of art of argumentation theory”. pp.11-24 and van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst. 2004. *A Systematic Theory of Argumentation, The pragma-dialectical approach*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. pp.187-195.

¹²⁰ Perelman, Chaim and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. *La nouvelle rhétorique*. pp.1-10.

¹²¹ Tindale, Christopher W. 2015. *The Philosophy of Argument and Audience Reception*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. p.59

reasonable way to persuade the audience and make it act according to discussant's speech. In *The Philosophy of Argument and Audience Reception*, Tindale makes the distinction between *persuasion* – that refers to a speech transformed into action – and *conviction* – that refers to a speech transformed into beliefs. While conviction is close to the notion of *logos* (adhering to an idea), persuasion is close to the notions of emotions (*pathos*) and character (*ethos*). In fact, we do not act only upon our ideas, but also upon our emotions (*pathos*) and our character (*ethos*). Therefore, Tindale concludes that persuasion is more powerful upon opponent and audience than conviction. Yet, he notices that the degree of persuasion of an argument depends on the kind of audience.¹²² Therefore, the New Rhetoric School defines argumentation as the ability to impact the audience through a debate that is matching audience's *topoi* (audience's commonplace).

3.1.2. *Münazara* and Western Argumentation theories as parts of the same field: argumentation theory

As one can notice, *Münazara* and Western Argumentation theories share the same themes and issues. This is the result of universal aspect of discussion (human beings of any civilization, debate, communicate, exchange ideas...) but also of Aristotelian legacy shared by both traditions. Hence, if none of these schools cannot be reduced to Aristotelian approach to argumentation, they all share common interest on ethics of debate, success of debate, proofs, arguments and relation to interlocutors. Therefore, *Münazara* remains part of the same field: argumentation theory. In “The state of art of Argumentation theory”, Van Eemeren discusses five transversal issues that take place in any Western Argumentation theories. Here, I demonstrate to what extent *Münazara* can be considered as an alternative school to Western Argumentation theories by giving the position of *Münazara* tradition in each of the following points.

- *Point of view*

Van Eemeren argues that argumentation is based on inexplicit points of view (or preconceptions, worldview) in which each discussant believes.¹²³ According to him, analysts should make the effort to deconstruct discussants' claim in order to disclose points of view hiding behind. In *Münazara* also, discussants should take preconceptions

¹²² *ibid*

¹²³ van Eemeren. “the state of art of argumentation theory”. p.17

into account in their debate. It is the reason why at the beginning step of *Münazara*, deliberators should reveal their academic background and intellectual affiliation with a maximum of transparency in order to keep their arguments clear from any ambiguities.

- *Unexpressed premises*

According to Van Eemeren, it happens that in the course of argumentation discussants may omit to mention one of their premises. He gives this example, ““Amos is pig-headed because he is a teacher” in which the unexpressed premise is “Teachers are pig-headed””¹²⁴. In such case, he notices that logical analysis may “reconstruct the argument as one that has a valid argument form” while pragmatic analysis may “define unexpressed premises on the basis of contextual information and background knowledge.”¹²⁵ As *Münazara* privileges logical form of arguments – composed of at least two premises and one conclusion – it approaches unexpressed premises through logical analysis. Ahmed Cevdet Paşa evokes this case in the chapter “Explanatory notes (*faide*)”:

Syllogism is either singular (*müfred*) or compounded (*mürekkebe*), and sometimes – in order to shorten the statement (*li-ecli al-ihitar*) – some premises are unexpressed (*tayy*).

1. If the expressed premise of the syllogism (*kıyasın mezkur olan mukaddemesi*) includes (*müştemil*) the subject present in the conclusion (*matlubun mevdu'*), it is then the minor premise and the major premise remains unexpressed (*matvi*).

2. On the other hand, if the expressed premise of the syllogism includes the predicate present in the conclusion (*matlubun mahmulu*), then it is the major premise and the minor premise remains unexpressed (*matvi*).

3. However, if the expressed premise of the syllogism does not include neither the subject nor the predicate present in the conclusion (*matlubun hiç bir tarafta*) then there is a problem (*nazar*).

4. Finally, if the expressed premise of the syllogism leads directly to the conclusion (*matlubu müntic*) in a simple manner, then it is a hypothetical single syllogism (*kıyas-i müfred-i istisna*) or a compounded syllogism (*kıyas-i mürekkebe*).¹²⁶

However in theory, the most important is the clarity of arguments, and this can be achieved in both logical and pragmatic analyses. Indeed, *Münazara* pays particular attention on both universal rational capacities and subjective intellectual affiliation of discussants.

¹²⁴ van Eemeren. “the state of art of argumentation theory”. p.18

¹²⁵ van Eemeren. “the state of art of argumentation theory”. p.18

¹²⁶ See my English translation of *Adab-ı Sedat*, p.44

- *Argument schemes*

Van Eemeren claims that one of the most debated topic in Argumentation Theory literature is argument schemes, i.e. the relation between arguments (*delil*) and main claim (*da'va*): “The speaker or writer who puts forward an argument aims to effect a **transfer of acceptance from the premises to the standpoint** [i.e. claim, *da'va*, in *Münazara*] that makes the listener or reader accept the standpoint”. In *Münazara*, theorists mainly approach this relation through formal logical paradigm of soundness/unsoundness between the premises (*mukaddime*) and the conclusion (*netice*) or between the whole argument (*delil*, i.e. composed of 2 premises + 1 conclusion) and the claim (*da'va*). In fact, the role of “integral-refutation” (*nakz*)¹²⁷ and “counter-argumentation” (*mu'araza*)¹²⁸ makes reference to this *Argument schemes* issue. Even though priority is given to the notion of soundness and truth, *Münazara* theorists also include subjective points of view of the discussants. Indeed, in lack of absolute self-evidence, discussants may connect their arguments to technical or conventional self-evidence, which both include subjectivity¹²⁹. **Therefore, while discussants should considerer objective soundness, their arguments should also be shaped in such a way that the opponent may be inclined to accept it (or, at least, to consider it).** It is the case for instance when Ahmed Cevdet Paşa advices deliberators not to base their arguments on Qur'an when they debate with Christians, since these latter do not even recognize Qur'an as a valid source of knowledge.¹³⁰ Van Eemeren reminds also this subjective aspect when he argues that “the speaker attempts to design the argument in such a fashion that it will convince the listener”, or that “writer can rely on a more or less ready-made argument scheme”.¹³¹ In sum, argument schemes issue introduces subjectivity in argumentation and interrogates to what extent an argument can be considered as valid or not from opponent's side. The fact that *Adab-ı Sedad* mostly discusses this point through formal logic and theological references does not mean that it excludes the notion of subjectivity.

Argumentation structures

¹²⁷ when the questioner contradicts the link between the argument (one or several premises) and the conclusion

¹²⁸ when the questioner contradicts the soundness of the claim itself

¹²⁹ For more details about these three notions, see 1.4.2

¹³⁰ Cevdet Paşa, Ahmed. 1303/1876. “Miyar-ı Sedad” in Büyükcoşkun, Kudret. 1998. *Mantık Metinleri 2, Miyar-ı Sedad and Adab-ı Sedad* (Latinised edition), İşaret Yayınları, İstanbul. p.102

¹³¹ van Eemeren. “the state of art of argumentation theory”. p.19

According to Van Eemeren, “Argumentation structures” refer to “the way the defence of the standpoint is built”, either simple (one reason), complex (several reasons), interdependent (several reasons connected to each others), or unrelated (several reasons disconnected to each others). Even if *Adab-ı Sedad* stresses out logical form of argumentation based on clear premises at the first hand, contradictions constantly push the claimant to complicate his argumentation and to enhance his defence. In *Münazara* this point is approached through the notion of *vazife* (positions, roles)¹³² that both discussants may use in their attempt to contradict opponent’s arguments.

Fallacies

Van Eemeren reminds that, “according to the standard definition, a fallacy is an argument that seems valid but is not”. Again he divides fallacies in two approaches, between logico-centric approach (“argument that is not true”) and modern approach (“something that in some way damages the quality of argumentative discourse”). The specificity of *Münazara* consists of including both aspects. Indeed, in *Adab-ı Sedad* Ahmed Cevdet Paşa refers to fallacy as invalid or unsound argument but also as unethical one. In this last case, ethics as an epistemic role, that is defining what is not true. This epistemic role concerns both external dimension (acting properly during the debate) and internal dimension (purifying the inner self) of argumentation ethics. In the 3.2. section, I discuss this relation between ethics and negative definition of truth.

3.2. Relations between the notion of ethics and success in Western Argumentation Theories and in *Münazara*

Here, I show that the main differences between the New Dialectical School, the New Rhetorical School and *Münazara* concern the definition of “product/success” and “process/ethics” of argumentation. I also demonstrate that process/ethics can in some cases determine the product/success of argumentation. Put differently, I discuss to what extent ethics have not only a procedural role (guaranteeing a proper debate) but also an epistemic one (determining what is not true).

¹³² Ahmed Cevdet Paşa says about the notion of *vazife*: “In the case where the questioner challenges (mukabile) the claimant with integral-refutation (nakz) or counter-argumentation (mu’araza), he has the obligation to support his statement with arguments (istidlal). In other words, the one who originally got the function (vazife) of “questioner” becomes “claimant” and the one who got the function of “claimant” becomes “questioner”. However, if the questioner only uses objection (men’) the obligation to bring evidence remains upon his opponent [the current claimant]. But if he uses integral-refutation (naqz) or counter-argumentation (mu’araza), his opponent [the claimant] will become the questioner. Likewise, both discussants can switch their function (vazife) one to another.” In *Adab-ı Sedad*, Appendix I, p.14

3.2.1. The “Product-Process” ambiguity

In his definition of argumentation, Van Eemeren underlines the intrinsic “process-product ambiguity” that “not only refers to the activity of advancing reasons but also to the shorter or longer text that results from it”.¹³³ In other terms, argumentation concerns both the way discussants are debating and the content they produce from this debate. Therefore, the notions of product and process are very similar to the ones of success and ethics, the first referring to the content that emerges from the debate and the second to the path discussants are following during the discussion. Yet, the New Rhetorical School, the New Dialectical School and *Münazara* have their own methods to evaluate the success of the debate (product) and the role played by ethics (process).

The New Rhetorical School pays attention to arguments’ adherence to the audience. In other terms, the criteria to evaluate the success of the debate is the discussants’ ability to influence the audience, in a way that the public puts their claims into actions. Here the normative dimension is restricted to **reasonableness**. According to Perelman there is no Cartesian meaning of reasonableness, human is considered reasonable the moment he can have an impact to the audience. Reasonableness is then the capacity to match the claim with public’s beliefs and values (*topoi*) in order to be convincing. Here, unless this notion of reasonableness there is no ethical standards that frame the discussion. Therefore, the difference between the process (trying to be convincing) and the product (being convincing) remains very thin in the New Rhetorical School. Still, both are totally relativistic and bound to the context.

The New Dialectical School insists also on reasonableness but in a less subjective way. Even if according to Toulmin anthropological understanding of reasonableness requires that society may decide what is reasonable and what it is not, normative theorists add to this notion an “objective code of conduct”, conceived as independent from any social/cultural context, out of the box. Van Eemeren sum up **universal ethics of the debate in “ten commandments”**¹³⁴. Each discussant should respect these commandments in the course of argumentation. These commandments are:

1. **Freedom rule** (discussants may not prevent each other from advancing standpoints¹³⁵ or from calling standpoints into question).

¹³³ van Eemeren. “the state of art of argumentation theory”. p.11

¹³⁴ van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst. *A Systematic Theory of Argumentation*, pp.190-196

¹³⁵ The notion of standpoint in Pragma-dialectics refers to the one of *da’va* in *Münazara* that we preferred to translate by “claim”

2. **Obligation-to-defend rule** (discussants who advance a standpoint may not refuse to defend this standpoint when requested to do so).
3. **Standpoint rule** (Attacks on standpoints may not bear on a standpoint that has not actually been put forward by the other party).
4. **Relevance rule** (standpoints may not be defended by non-argumentation or argumentation that is not relevant to the standpoint).
5. **Unexpressed-premise rule** (discussants may not falsely attribute unexpressed premises to the other party, not disown responsibility for their own unexpressed premises).
6. **Starting-point rule** (discussants may not falsely present something as an accepted starting point or falsely deny that something is an accepted starting point).
7. **Validity rule** (reasoning that in an argumentation is presented as formally conclusive may not be invalid in a logical sense)
8. **Argument scheme rule** (standpoints may not be regarded as conclusively defended by argumentation that is not presented as based on formally conclusive reasoning if the defence does not take place by means of appropriate argument schemes that are applied correctly).
9. **Concluding rule** (Inconclusive defences of standpoints may not lead to maintaining these standpoints, and conclusive defences of standpoints may not lead to maintaining expressions of doubt concerning these standpoints).
10. **Language use rule** (Discussants may not use any formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusing ambiguous, and they may not deliberately misinterpret the other party's formulations).¹³⁶

At first glance, these rules seem to contradict contextual approach of reasonableness. Actually, according to New Dialectical School, reasonableness – even contextualized – cannot rebut logical rules and universal ethical rules. **Therefore, while the success of the debate (its product) is the resolution of different points of view, the debate should still respect a standard process, or ethics, that is a combination of both contextual reasonableness and universal code of conduct.**

Similarly, *Münazara* makes the parallel between **process-ethics** (path discussants must follow in order to achieve success of the argumentation) and **product-success** (the claim or set of arguments that put an end to the debate, the content that emerges from the debate). However, *Münazara*'s approach differs in many aspects.

¹³⁶ van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst. *A Systematic Theory of Argumentation* pp.190-196

First of all, the notion of success is less anthropological than the one in use in New Rhetorical and New Dialectical schools. Argumentation's success is above all a matter of truth, of definition of truth. Although the notion truth does not only include absolute self-evidence but also more relativistic technical and conventional ones¹³⁷, *Münazara*'s goal remains to “disclosing the truth” (namely *izhar-ı hakk*). This Aristotelian aspect of *Münazara* includes series of logical rules that discussants are required to follow if they do not want to see their argument rejected as formal fallacies. Secondly, *Münazara* adds to external dimension of ethics (as defined in New Dialectics) an internal one. While external dimension of ethics focuses on horizontal code of conduct between discussants, internal one requires from each discussant to develop vertical relation with God in order to discipline their inner self. Therefore, both external and internal dimensions of ethics are necessary for the implementation of a proper argumentation. **It seems that internal dimension of ethics constitutes the most original feature of *Münazara* comparing with other argumentation theories. Indeed, internal dimension of ethics implicitly reshapes the relation between public and private sphere by imposing to each discussant the purification of their self (private, internal) and not only the purification of their behaviour with the other discussant (public, external). Thus in *Münazara*, argumentation is the fruit of the relation between God, logical discussants, the inner-self of discussants and the referee.** One can notice that these actors somehow refer to the constitutive sciences of *Münazara*, respectively Theology (*Kelam*), Logic (*Mantık*), Sufism (*Tasavvuf*) and Jurisprudence (*Fıkıh*). Finally, it is really interesting to see how *Münazara* articulates, *a priori*, two opposite visions of human being: the logical-rational animal and the ethical subjective self.

3.2.2. Procedural and Epistemic role of Ethics (process): how ethics influences the success of argumentation (product)

The relation between process and product, ethics and success, is even more complex since ethics gets not only a procedural role but also an epistemic one. Put differently, ethics can undermine, even determinate, the success of argumentation.

This intertwined relation between process and product is obvious in New Rhetoric theory in which the notions of process and product are almost equivalent. Indeed, if the claim is not matching audience's *topoi* it has no chance to persuade the

¹³⁷ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa distinguishes at least three understandings of self-evidence: absolute self-evidence (true in itself), technical self-evidence (accepted as true by specialists of a discipline), and conventional self-evidence (accepted as true by the discussants of the debate). For more details, see. 1.4.2. of this thesis.

public. In the other hand, a successful debate is the one that targets the audience's *topoi*. Here, the product (claim's adherence to the audience) justifies the process (the way to conduct the debate).

The relation is less obvious in New Dialectic theory, as the success – resolution of different of points of view – is different to the process of being ethical and reasonable. However, Van Eemeren claims that, “each violation of a [ethical] rule amounts to an incorrect discussion move that is an impediment to the resolution of a difference of opinion”.¹³⁸ This implies that no resolution can be found outside the scope of ethics. Here, process is a compulsory element of the product, and ethics a decisive move to argumentation's success. One could even claim that ethics prevails over the content of discussion.

In *Münazara* too, ethics gets an epistemic role over success, as sound argument can be rejected because of non-respect of ethical rule (either in its external or internal aspect)¹³⁹. However, if truth cannot come from unethical claim, ethical claim is not automatically synonym of truth. Here, ethics can only define negative truth (what truth is not) and not positive truth (what truth is). Yet, ethics prevails over the content of discussion.

To conclude this chapter, I argue that this ambiguity between “process-product” or “ethics-success” in argumentation is not a point of detail but reveals structural discourse that is supporting each of these theories. Indeed, one can see in both New Rhetoric and New Dialectics theories the influence of postmodern discourse, according to what truth is intrinsically subjective and thus could not be the goal of any discussion. By taking into account postmodern discourse one can also understand why audience or opponent's point of view remain so important in Western argumentation theories. Success of argumentation is above all a collaborative construction, in which reasonableness constitutes the cornerstone that keeps all sensibilities together in a common field. Besides postmodern discourse, New Dialectics theory is based on a democratic discourse that pays attention to the consent of participants, resolution of divergences, and does not focus on any objective achievement outside the discussants' will.

¹³⁸ van Eemeren. “the state of art of argumentation theory”. p.16

¹³⁹ See the paragraphs above & my Chapter III “Internal dimension of ethics in *Münazara*”.

As for *Münazara*, the discipline seems relying on *Tevfik* discourse. Here, the notion of *Tevfik* may refer to pursuing truth while looking for God's pleasure, which perfectly matches with *Münazara*'s combination between logic-oriented success and epistemic role of external or internal ethics. Here, if *Münazara* demands to pay attention to other discussants' points of view it is above all in a metaphysical relation with God and with truth, and not in a profane dimension that would just take discussants and audience into account. This divine dimension would also explain why training inner-self is so important in *Münazara*.

The question of truth in argumentation theory should not be limited to a debate between Ancients (followers of formal logic) and Moderns (critics of formal logic). In fact, most of debates in our daily life are constantly moving between seeking truth and claiming subjectivity. On one side, scholars of the New Dialectic and New Rhetoric schools may advocate that there is no point to debate if truth objectively exists. On the other, scholars of *Münazara* may reply that there is no point to share arguments if no one is looking for truth, even a conventional one. In sum, it seems that human beings make decision and take position upon a set of *a priori* and *a posteriori* believes of what truth is.¹⁴⁰

¹⁴⁰ Taylan, Necip, *Anahatlarıyla Mantık*, Ensar, 4. Basım, Ekim 2011, pp. 56-57

CHAPTER III. INTERNAL DIMENSION OF ARGUMENTATION ETHICS IN MUNAZARA

4.1. What do we mean by internal dimension of argumentation ethics?

As mentioned in introduction, the term *Adab* refers to ethics or more especially to applied ethics, since *Adab* does not deal with the definitions of “good” and “bad” (that is the task of the whole religion of Islam) but rather with their practice. Thus, *Adab* is a *praxis*¹⁴¹ that concerns the conduct of the deliberation (procedural) but also the definition of deliberation’s success (epistemic). **I argue in this chapter that *Adab* has in *Münazara* both an external dimension – i.e. horizontal set of good manners between the discussants, an “etiquette” – and an internal dimension – i.e. the control of inner-self, of one’s ego, before, during and after deliberation.** Indeed, in *Adab-ı Sedad*. Ahmed Cevdet Paşa considers the control of one’s ego as a prerequisite before getting involved in any deliberation (*Münazara*). According to him, if one cannot control his heart before the discussion, he will not be able to control his tongue during it. Thus, the author couples exterior-horizontal etiquette between both discussants with a prior interior-vertical relation between the discussant and his inner-self. Ahmed Cevdet Paşa uses different expressions to depict the internal condition of controlling one’s ego such as “deprivation of their ego” (*hezmen li-n-nefs*), “discipline of mind and character” (*inzibat*), “elimination of any whim from [the] soul” (*ve defea’an li-hazzi’n nefis*), “not rushing” (*teeni*), “inner vision” (*basiret*)...

Explicitly enough, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa insists on the necessity of controlling one’s ego in the introduction and the conclusion of his treaty, strengthening the idea that **internal dimension of ethics in *Münazara* constitutes a corner stone that shapes the success of both deliberation’s process (discussing in proper manners) and result (disclosing the truth).** Put differently, internal dimension of ethics in *Münazara* impacts both procedural and epistemic aspects of deliberation. On the other hand, he shows that discussants who do not pay attention to the education of their ego may not be able to debate properly:

If the questioner is [not a deliberator but] a dialectician (*mücadil*), he should not leave the objection (*men’*) – the safer mode of contesting (*eslem-i turuk*) – and jump directly to demonstration (*tarik-i istidlal*) as long as he is not sure of his own argument’s strength. Unfortunately, **in the intention to compel their opponent** (*ilzam-i hasm*) and to show their superiority (*izhar-i fazl*), some

¹⁴¹ We would like to thank Prof. Dr. Alparslan Açıkgenç for having reminded us this important nuance.

dialecticians (*ashab-i jadal*) neglect these precisions (*dakikalar*) and immediately rush to demonstration (i.e. providing evidence, *tarik-i istidlal*). **Sometimes, by excess of greediness (*hirs*) and hunger (*tehaluk*) they usurp their opponent's right of demonstration (*gasb*) without any reason.** Nevertheless, by doing this they leave the comfortable position of objection (*hisn-u mani'*) and make themselves a target for objection. Therefore while they could easily confute (*ifham*) their opponent through objection they cause their own confutation (*mufham*), trapped into the too difficult mode of demonstration (*vadi-i istidlalde kendisi mufham kalır*).¹⁴²

As it has just been said, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa refers to the control of one's ego at the introduction, by mentioning the authoritative - almost holy - example of the Pious Predecessors of early Islam (saws):

Especially, the pious predecessors (*salaf-u salihin*) wanted that the truth came out through their opponent's speech [and not through their own], because of their concern towards the deprivation of their ego (*hezmen li-n-nefs*) and the elimination of any pleasure of the ego (*ve defea'an li-hazzi'n nefis*).¹⁴³

In the text, this reference comes to underline honorable and virtuous objectives of *Münazara* (disclosing the truth, *izhar-ı hakk*) comparing to unethical aim of *Cedel* that is triumphing a debate whatever the manner it may be use for.¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, it clearly links these righteous goals to controlling – here purifying – the ego, the inner self, the soul (*al-nefs*).

In the conclusion, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa exposes even more explicitly this internal dimension of ethics in *Münazara* by listing ten rules of ethics that everybody should apply in any deliberation. Here, instead of quoting these rules according to their original numerical account, we split them in two categories: rules that refer to external dimension of ethics (etiquette and horizontal good manner between two discussants during the deliberation); and rules that refer to internal dimension of ethics (control of the inner self before and during the discussion).

¹⁴² See my English translation of *Adab-ı Sedad*, p.15

¹⁴³ See my English translation of *Adab-ı Sedad*, p.7

¹⁴⁴ See Chapter I, "What does Munazara mean?" p.8

4.1.1. Rules that refer to external dimension of ethics

1. In a deliberation session (*meclis-i münazarada*), [discussants] must not deliver long speech and circumlocution (*itnab-ı mekal*) that cause lassitude (*kelal*) and tiredness (*melal*).
2. [On the other hand, discussants] must prevent themselves from shortening too much their speech if it undermines the understanding of the meaning (*fehm-i ma'naya halel verecek mertebe*).
3. Especially, they must refrain to use strange terms (*elfaz-ı garibe*) that make difficult the comprehension and those too concise expressions (*lafz-ı mücmel*) that make the understanding doubtful.
4. The deliberator (*münazır*) can make his opponent repeat until he understands his intention (*meram*). On the other hand, it is not acceptable to attack his statement (*kelamina dahl*) before having understood it.
6. During the deliberation (*esna-i münazarada*), some attitudes are inappropriate such as laughing, writhing, and uttering with anger. Only ignorant people (*cahiller*) adopt these kinds of posture and by doing this they prove their ignorance.
9. Therefore, in deliberation (*münazara*), the one in charged of moderating the debate (*münazaraya me'mur olan meclislerin riyaseti*) has one of the most important roles (*mehamm-ı umurundandır*). Indeed, when the moderators (*reisler*) do not manage to run deliberation in the best manners (*hüsn-i idare*), argument sessions fall into tumults and disorders (*kargaşalık*). Because of that, we assisted thousand times in argumentations (*mübahasat*) and discussions (*müzakerat*) that do not produce anything.¹⁴⁵

4.1.2. Rules that refer to internal dimension of ethics

4. The deliberator (*münazır*) can make repeat his opponent until he understands his intention (*meram*). On the other hand, it is not acceptable to attack his statement (*kelamina dahl*) before having understood it.

This rule insists on the importance of discussants' intention that would be focus on the only aim (*maksad*) that is acceptable: disclosing the truth. It corresponds to al-Ghazzali's criticism of dialectic (*cedel*) in his *ihya ulum al-din* as I detailed in the first chapter. Especially al-Ghazzali's 6th condition, when he advises that, "the one who gets involved in the discussion should look for truth in the same way than a man who is looking for a lost object: he does not care if the object have been found by himself or by

¹⁴⁵ See my English translation of *Adab-ı Sedad*, pp.50-51

somebody else.”¹⁴⁶ In both cases, the unique objective should be the matter in discussion and not egoistic aspirations, whatever they are.

7. In a context of disputation (*meydan-ı mübahasede*), no one should see his opponent as disdained (*hakir*), otherwise such misesteem might lead him to utter weak statements and as a result, to lose the debate (*maglubu olmasına sebep olabilir*). In brief, before encountering the other side (*mukabeleye kıyam*), discussants must speak with insight (*basiret*) and pay attention to what they say (*sözü dikkat*), they must listen their opponent’s statement with care and consideration (*teeni*) and understand opponent’s intention as it deserves (*meramını layığıyla anlamalı*).

Here, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa use the term “*basiret*” that clearly refers to “insight” or “spiritual eye, vision” of the discussant. In other terms, he invites deliberators to develop inner skills and control (consideration, taking time, *teeni*) in order to get involved into deliberation accordingly.

8. Interrupting opponent’s statement in middle of his speech is a violation of etiquette (*hilaf-ı edeptir*). Especially, it is unsuitable (*na-beja*) and inappropriate for a third person to jump into a discussion (*bahs*) between two other persons and to interrupt them. However, human being is hasty (*‘acul*) and greedy (*hariss*) by nature (*bi-hasebi ’ l-fitra*), he does not contain his anger towards the other, and then falls intentionally in the mentioned mistakes.

In this rule, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa links the necessity of controlling one’s ego with human being’s ontology. He defines human being as intrinsically submerged by egoistic inclinations such as hastiness (*‘acala*) and greediness (*hırs*). Here it is clear that without a control of his ego, the discussant may “intentionally fall into mistakes”. In the first volume of *Ihya ulum al-din*, Al-Ghazzali evokes in similar terms “anomalies of disputation” (*afat al-münazara*), when “dialecticians try to display their superiority, their excellence and their honor, falling into satanic vices such as envy, pride, excessive self-esteem, grudge, calumny, self-justification, hypocrisy” etc...¹⁴⁷

10. In the other hand, argumentation sessions (*meclis-i müzakara*) that are animated by discipline of mind and character (*inzibat*), constancy and method (*intizam*) are respecting the requisite rules.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶ This quotation has been taken and translated from Belhaj Abdessamad. *Argumentation et dialectique en Islam*. Loc. 2748

¹⁴⁷ *ibid.* Loc.2758

¹⁴⁸ See my English translation of *Adab-ı Sedad*, pp.50-51

Finally, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa claims explicitly that a good deliberation implies that discussants work on their own ego and try to correct misleading penchants of the heart (“discipline of mind and character”).

Therefore, beside external behavior and mutual respect (external horizontal etiquette), ethics in *Münazara* impose to each of the deliberators a control of egoistic inclinations and efforts on their inner self (internal vertical dimension).

4.2. Procedural and epistemic role of internal dimension of ethics

Procedural role: deliberation that bring God’s pleasure

By procedure, I mean the way of conducting the deliberation. Procedural aspect of argumentation remains really decisive in *Münazara* since we do not only evaluate the success of deliberation on disclosing the truth (epistemic) but also on the ethic of discussion (procedural). According to what I have said above, one can easily understand that, in *Münazara*, the internal dimension of ethics directly impacts the way deliberation is taking place, the way discussants are actually deliberating, the way they are behaving to each other, the way they are orienting themselves to the topic of discussion. Indeed, by disciplining discussants’ ego, internal dimension of ethics permits to implement proper conditions for deliberation (such as sincerity, good intention etc.). **These conditions are essential in order to reach the truth but they are also compulsory to reach God’s pleasure. Indeed, beside the two discussants and the referee there is an unexpressed fourth actor in the discussion: God. The deliberation should please Him by disclosing the truth (external effort) and by controlling the self (internally effort).** Therefore, instead of “success of the debate” we should speak of “*muḥvafakiyyat*” or “*tevfik*” of the debate: that is disclosing the truth through a path that pleases God (and not the ego or the audience). Therefore, *Münazara* intrinsically differs from *Cedel* (dialectics, succeeding at all costs) and Western argumentation theories (inter-subjectivity, finding a consensus).

Internal dimension of ethics permits to make the link between [1] inner-self and subjective relation to God, and [2] the other discussant and external relation to the truth. In other terms, internal dimension of ethics implies that any internal unethical move (such as insincerity, bad intention etc.) should be sanctioned by the referee of the

deliberation. **Yet at first glance, it seems difficult to evaluate if discussants are actually controlling their own ego. How can we measure one's level of intention or sincerity? In *Adab-ı Sedad*, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa provides tools that permit to interpret internal dynamics through their manifestations in the external world.** In other terms, one of the discussants has been submerged by its own ego every time he is not respecting opponent's right of speech (*Gasb*) [1], not providing relevant argument to the subject in discussion (*Tevcih*) [2], or denying self-evidence (*Mükabere*) [3],¹⁴⁹ Such procedural mistakes cause the reject of discussant's argument or claim. Put differently, even if a claim is considered sound both in matter and in logical forms, it would be rejected if internal ethics were not respected. Therefore internal dimension of ethics is not only restricted to its procedural role but can get in some cases an epistemic role by participating to the negative definition of truth.

Epistemic role: negative definition of truth

In this section, I define the three main tools that permit to evaluate whether discussants are actually controlling their own ego: [1] not respecting opponent's right of speech (*Gasb*), [2] not providing relevant argument to the subject discussed because of lack of good intention (*Tevcih*), [3] denying self-evidence (*Mükabere*). Besides revealing internal misguidances, these mistakes provide a negative definition of truth (what truth is not) since they lead to the rejection of any argument or claim even if they are sound in matter and in logical forms.

1- Gasb (usurpation): not respecting opponent's right of speech

In this case, the questioner does not let the claimant supporting his claim with proves, and directly contradicts him with his own arguments by lack of patience. Therefore, even if the questioner might be right in his contradiction, his intervention would be rejected because of his unethical move (i.e. not letting the claimant supporting his claim). **Here, the respect of internal dimension of ethics prevails over the external demonstration of self-evidence.**

¹⁴⁹ These notions are detailed see below on the same page.

Usurping opponent's legitimate position (*gasb*): Instead of objecting a premise, the questioner invalidates [opponent's claim] by providing an argument (*delil*); such attitude is rejected (*mardud*) in *münazara* discipline (*makam-ı münazara*)¹⁵⁰.

Indeed, even if usurper's argument (*gasibin delili*) is encountering (*dafi'*) claimant's premise – and is therefore oriented towards the topic of deliberation (*müveccih*) – the role of the questioner is [primarily] to ask evidence to the claimant. But here, he gives up his original position (*vazife*) and tries to argue (*iddi'a*) and prove (*isbat*) the falsity (*butlan*) of claimant's premises. According to scholars of *münazara* (*mebni nazar-ı erbab-ı münazarada*) such attitude is not acceptable (*makbul değildir*) because here, [the questioner] is confiscating (*elinden almış*) opponent's legitimate position of demonstration (*hasmının mansıbı olan istidlali*).¹⁵¹

2- *Tevcih: not providing relevant argument to the topic discussed because of lack of good intention*

In this second case, the discussant does not look for truth at such but for the approval of his ego. Put differently, his intention is not oriented towards *Münazara*'s goal but towards a *cedeli* one, i.e. winning the debate at all costs. **His bad intention would be reveled if he provides irrelevant argument to the topic.**

The dialectician (*mücadil*), in what matter it may be, tries to make silent his opponent. But the deliberator's objective (*münazir*) is strictly to disclose the normative truth. [...]

In order to reach the normative truth (*izhar-ı savab*), the deliberators must avoid argumentations that are not oriented towards the topic of discussion (*müvecceh olmayan bahsler*). Indeed, those argumentations are not useful in the field of deliberation (*münazara*). Futile debates (*bihude munakaşa*) do not go along with the discussion's aim (*matlub*). No attention should be given to discussions that do not take part in ethical and proper deliberation. Futile time goes quickly and as a result the normative truth can never be disclosed. [...]

¹⁵⁰ In this case the questioner didn't let the claimant develop his own argumentation before invalidating him.

¹⁵¹ See my English translation of *Adab-ı Sedad*, p.16

The claimant deviated from the purpose [of the discussion] (*sadedden çıkar*) if – instead of proving his contested premise either directly (*bizzat*) or indirectly (*bil vasita*) as mentioned above – he says to the questioner, “your statement does not respect grammar rules (*nahv*)” or “your objection’s support (*sened*) is more general (*e’amm*) from objection’s stand, thus it is not valid (*salih değildir*)”. [Indeed, in this case] the claimant tries to hide his incapacity to prove his claim as well as his confutation (*mufham*) behind a pseudo-defence (*setr ile def*). However, by doing this he has shifted to another topic of discussion and closed the first one.¹⁵²

However, shifting from the topic of discussion to another one (*bahsden bahs-i ahara intikal*) might be accepted if the discussant’s intention were not avoiding the confrontation but stressing his claim’s strength. In this case, it is up to the referee to judge if the discussant was sincere or not:

On the other hand, the claimant [might shift to another argument] while he is not pushed, by incapacity, to leave his first argument. In the contrary, while he has the ability (*muktedir*) to confirm (*tashih*) and complete (*itmam*) his contested premise (*mukaddeme-i memnu’ası*), [he might prefer to shift to another proof] in order to give a clear (*vazih*) and blank (*celi*) proof that the questioner could not contest, a one that would compel (*ilzam*) his opponent to consent his claim without extending his speech anymore. Here, claimant’s shift to another argument (*başka delile intikal etmesi*) means adding (*ilave*) and annexing (*zamm*) another argument to the first one. Therefore, in this specific case, [shifting] cannot be considered as a confutation (*ifham*) nor as the end of the discussion (*inkita’-i bahs*).¹⁵³

3- *Mükabere: denying one of the three kinds of self-evidence*

In this case, the questioner objects an argument or claim that is obviously true (whether absolute, technical or conventional)¹⁵⁴. Thus, his intervention cannot be ethical since the claimant has already disclosed the truth, i.e. he has connected his claim to self-evident argument. Therefore, when truth is established¹⁵⁵, any contesting voice is automatically considered as denial out of stubborn.

Denial out of stubborn (mükabere): [The literal meaning refers to] someone who knows [that opponent’s statement is] true but still opposes (*muhalefet*) and refuses it stubbornly (*inad*). However, [the technical term] in use among scholars of deliberation (*eh-li fenn-i münazara*) refers to quarrelling (*münaza’a*) through statements (*kelam*) that do not contribute (*nefi*) to the manifestation of truth (*izhar savab*).

In the same way that the questioner is doing arrogance when he objects an accepted, well known premise or an already proven claim (*müsbet olan da’*

¹⁵² See my English translation of *Adab-ı Sedad*, p.26

¹⁵³ See my English translation of *Adab-ı Sedad*, p.27

¹⁵⁴ See Chapter I, “How does Munazara take place?” p.9

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

vasını), he is doing arrogance when he invalidates an argument (*delil*) or a claim (*da'va*) without providing any evidence (*bila delil*).

In whatever manner it may be, arrogance (*mükabere*) is not acceptable (*masmu'*) because it does not encounter (*dafi'*) the opponent's statement.¹⁵⁶

Finally, internal dimension of ethics in *Münazara* has both a procedural and an epistemic role. In this last case, it is up to the moderator whether to put an end to the deliberation or to simply reject egoistic intervention and continuing the debate.

¹⁵⁶ See my English translation of *Adab-ı Sedad*, p.13

4.3. How can discussants learn about self-control of ego?

One can find throughout the whole book of Ahmed Cevdet Paşa the rejection of egoistic attitudes and the importance of mastering one's ego in argumentation. However, although these notions take place in the heart of *Adab-ı Sedat*, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa does not explain how to train this internal dimension of ethics. I have argued in the first chapter that *Münazara* discipline was part of a whole cosmology of sciences including Islamic jurisprudence, Logic, *Kelam* and Sufism. In this respect, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa clearly says that the one who wants to fully understand arguments' structures, should look at philosophy, theology and Islamic jurisprudence teachings:

As this science is mainly based on philosophy (*'ilm-i hikmet*), theology (*'ilm-i kelam*) and principles of Islamic jurisprudence (*'ilm-i usul-i fıkıh*), its understanding is preserved.

Hence, I entitled this book *Adab-ı Sedat*, it includes all the important topics (*mesail-i mühimme*) of this science and should be read after my book on logic called *Miyar-ı Sedat*.¹⁵⁷

Similarly, I argue here that the one who wants to fully understand internal dimension of ethics in *Münazara* should look at Sufi teaching. Indeed, I assume that Sufism constitutes compulsory knowledge in order to understand and fully apply *Münazara*'s rules and principles. Without acquiring self-control on ego, it seems impossible to correctly apply the rules and precepts of *Münazara*:

Especially, it is unsuitable (*na-beja*) and inappropriate for a third person to jump into a discussion (*bahs*) between two other persons and to interrupt them. However, human being is hasty (*'acul*) and greedy (*hariss*) by nature (*bi-hasebi'l-fitra*), he does not contain his anger towards the other, and then falls intentionally in the mentioned mistakes.¹⁵⁸

This quotation from *Adab-ı Sedat* confirms what the famous Moroccan Sufi master Ibn Ajiba said one day, "training our tongue without fixing our hearth is nothing but corruption and misleading".¹⁵⁹

As exposed in chapter I, knowledge of inner-self was part of Ottoman curriculum in correlation with Sufi teachings. I showed that Ahmed Cevdet Paşa's education path reflects Ottoman "multiplex" approach of sciences¹⁶⁰, in which students used to switch

¹⁵⁷ See my English translation of *Adab-ı Sedat*, p.7

¹⁵⁸ See my English translation of *Adab-ı Sedat*, p.51

¹⁵⁹ In al-'Alawi, Ahmad Ben Mustapha. 1911. *al-Minha al-qudsiyya*, transl. Ahmed Benalioua (2015), *Les très saintes inspirations ou l'éveil de la conscience*. al-Bouraq. Paris. p.40

¹⁶⁰ It is this integrative approach – with Sufism at the centre – that Recep Şentürk contextualizes in the Ottoman intellectual life (context in which Ahmed Cevdet Paşa involved in) through his concepts of

continually between rational (*akli*), reported (*nakli*) and spiritual (*kalbi*) understandings of knowledge. Therefore, I deduce that Ottoman scholars and students were trained to Sufi teachings. I can even assert that Sufi teachings were part of their worldview, a compulsory part of their approach of knowledge. At the time the book was published, students who studied *Adab al-bahs ve al-münazara* may also study the science of Sufism, like pupils nowadays who learn mathematics alongside physics, biology or IT.

It would be difficult – if not impossible – to resume here what Sufism tells us about ego and inner self. It would not only require lengthy theoretical study on treaties, trends and divergences in the field but also anthropological study on the way Sufism was actually practiced and perceived at the time of *Adab-ı Sedat*'s publication. Instead, I prefer to give a glimpse of Sufi approach to ego by quoting *kimya-ı saadet* (the alchemy of happiness) of Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali. As explained in the first chapter, al-Ghazzali are among scholars who criticized dialectic (*cedel*) in an ethical standpoint and who proposed conditions in order to guarantee the control of discussants' ego during the debate. Therefore, he is an authority that has explicitly made the link between Sufism and *Münazara*. Furthermore, Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali is also famous for his appeal for harmonization between external knowledge (*fikh, kelam, tefsir*, logic etc.) and internal knowledge (ascetism/*zuhd*, intuition/*ilham*, remembrance of God/*zikr*).

The following quotation is in fact Tayeb Chouiref's comment on *kimya-ı saadet* in which al-Ghazzali consider ego as an obstacle to man's self-realization. Here, al-Ghazzali first provides a Sufi ontology that conceives human being as an angelic, transcendental nature hidden and locked into a temporal, illusional ego. Secondly he proposes, as a method for purifying the ego, the double movement of rejecting the world ("inner struggle") and of desiring God ("Lordly reality"). In short, according to him the more we are attached to this mundane world, lesser we are conscious of Divine Presence, and vice-versa:

"The identification of man with his ego represents the ultimate illusion and this is the source of misguidance. Hence this warning from al-Ghazzali: 'It is the Spirit that is the reality of your substance; outside this what remains is foreign to you and is only a loan.'

The egocentric illusion degrades man and makes him forget the fact that he is, in his essence, a "Lordly reality". In exposing what he calls "the alchemy of

"open science" and "multiplex". In his book *Açık Medeniyet* (Open civilization), Şentürk argues that Islamic scientific approach as applied in the Ottoman cultural world did include multiple levels of knowledge and methodology without excluding each other. See Chapter I, "Interconnection between sciences: integrative epistemology and Sufism" p.26 and Şentürk Recep, *Açık Medeniyet, Çok Medeniyetli Toplum ve Dünyaya Doğru*, İz Yayıncılık, İstanbul

happiness," al-Ghazzali recalls that the purpose of the teaching of all the messengers of Heaven is to allow man to recover his first deformity:

‘The purpose of the Alchemy of Happiness is to get rid of everything that humbles the man and puts on the attributes of perfection.

Knowing the spiritual heart and its attributes is the key to knowing God, the Exalted. You will have to engage in the inner struggle to know the spiritual heart because it is of the same substance as the angels and its substrate has its origin in the divine Presence. From this place he comes and to this place he will return.’

The peculiarity of human nature lies in the apparent duality between its animal aspect and its lordly aspect. In the words of al-Ghazzali, "man belongs both to the world of Creation and to the world of the Order". The peculiarity of the spiritual path is to give man the means, in terms of both doctrine and method, to come out of confinement in the world of Creation to return to his true homeland in the world of the Order.”¹⁶¹

In this paragraph, al-Ghazzali describes the vertical relation that connects human being to God and calls readers to engage in a spiritual path, “return”, to Him. The notion of *adab* (ethics) in *Münazara* includes also this vertical dimension between God and the inner-self (internal dimension) besides the horizontal one between discussants (external dimension). While handbooks of *Münazara* are just implying this vertical relation, Sufi books are fully disclosing this “doctrine”. Furthermore, they expose a “method” in order to put this spiritual relation into practice. Thus, the science of Sufism might be a prerequisite for discussants of *Münazara* (*Münazir*) that wish to apply both internal and external dimensions of ethics during the debate.

¹⁶¹ Chouiref Tayeb. 2016. *Al-Ghazali, L'Alchimie du Bonheur, connaissance de soi et connaissance de Dieu*. Tasnim. Wattrelos. pp. 21-22

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I firstly put *Münazara* in the broader context of eristic tradition in Islam. I have demonstrated that the institutionalized discipline of *Adab al-Bahs ve al-Münazara* was the result of a complex interconnection between sciences, in which Sufism took a central role. This elementary discussion on *Münazara* laid the ground for a comparison between this eristic tradition and Western theories of argumentation, especially the New Dialectical School and the New Rhetorical School. I showed that the main differences between these theories were found in the consideration of “truth” and “ethics”.

Concerning the concept of “truth”, both Western traditions do not refer to this notion but rather to the resolution of conflict (New Dialectical School) or to the performative power of speech (New Rhetorical School). I suggested that this orientation was due to the underlying discourse of both schools of thought: post-modernism (or the deconstruction of any kind of truth) and democracy (or the consideration of every voice). On the other hand, the intrinsic goal of *Münazara* is “disclosing the truth” through the conduct of an ethical debate, revealing the influence of both religious discourse and Aristotelian tradition on *Münazara*. Yet, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa does not define “truth” as a monolithic concept but shows how discussants can either establish absolute truth (“true” in itself), technical truth (“true” according to the experts) or conventional truth (“true” according to the discussants).

As for the notion of “ethics”, I claimed that the *Münazara*’s internal dimension of ethics represents the most distinctive specificity of the discipline. Based on Ahmed Cevdet Paşa’s *Adab-ı Sedad*, I have demonstrated how ethics in *Münazara* did not only refer to etiquette but also to an internal dimension that imposes on every discussant the control of their inner-self in order to implement proper argumentation. I listed three external mistakes that are disclosing internal bad penchants: [1] not respecting opponent’s right of speech (*Gasb*), [2] not providing relevant argument to the subject discussed because of lack of good intention (*Tevcih*), [3] denying self-evidence (*Mükabere*). Besides revealing internal misguidances, these mistakes provide a negative definition of truth (what truth is not) since they lead to the rejection of any argument or claim even if they are sound in matter and in logical forms. Therefore, the notion of

ethics in *Münazara* does not only have a procedural role (conducting a respectful discussion) but also an epistemic one (defining what is not true).

While New Rhetorical School differs from *Münazara* by rejecting any normative approach to ethics that would not be strictly based on the context and the audience, New Dialectical School balances its conventional objectives (resolving a difference of points of view) with a universal conception of ethics and normative criteria. Yet, the articulation between logical notion of truth and internal notion of ethics remains a specificity of *Münazara*. This specificity might come from the underlying discourse of *Münazara*, i.e. the discourse of *tevfik*. *Tevfik* means to achieve something under God's pleasure. In the case of *Münazara*, the discourse of *tevfik* implies "disclosing the truth through a path that pleases God".

For all these reasons, I am convinced that the study of *Münazara* is enriching Western Argumentation theories and vice-versa. I hope that this thesis could be a beginning for deeper researches in the future on the relations between these different traditions of argumentation. Such developments would go along with the primary goal of our institute: Alliance of Civilizations.

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Appendix A: Translation of Ahmed Cevdet Paşa's Adab-ı Sedad (1876) from Ottoman-Turkish into English

Léonard Faytre

Foreword

This translation is the fruit of a collaborative research group on *Münazara* and Western argumentation theories conducted by Recep Şentük, Alparslan Açıkgenç, Assistant Önder Küçükürül and Kareem Sadik from December 2016 to May 2017 and in which participated Heba Raouf, Feyzullah Yılmaz, as well as some students of Alliance of Civilizations Institute.¹⁶² Beside Ahmed Cevdet Paşa's *Adab-ı Sedad*, we read and discussed together main Western literature on argumentation theories. Throughout the translation process, the question of ethics and internal dimension of ethics appears to be one of the distinctive features of *Münazara* in regard to Western argumentation theories. It is the reason why I decided to focus on this particular aspect even though many other topics could have been picked too (see. my commentary "*Münazara* and Internal Dimension of Ethics: A Translation and Commentary of Ahmed Cevdet Paşa's *Adab-ı Sedad* in the light of Sufism and Western Argumentation Theories").

I added some footnotes in this present translation in order to elucidate my translation choices and to provide extra explanation. Except when another reference is indicated, all these notes came out from our discussions during collaborative research sessions, either from teachers or students.

¹⁶² By alphabetic order, Muhammad Makdod, Danish Naeem, Rahmi Oruç and Kadir Purde

Transcription

Concerning the transcription of Arabic or Ottoman-Turkish terms, we adopt the Latin edition of modern Turkish language. Even if this transcription may not be familiar to Western readers, it appeared more appropriate to our study since *Adab-ı Sedad* is based upon Turkish grammar and includes a lot of Turkish idioms.

z	ذ - ظ - ز - ض	h	خ - ه - ح
s	ص - س - ث		
ş	ش	p	پ
c	ج	b	ب
ç	چ	t	ط - ت
		k	ق - ك
‘	ع	g	گ - غ
’	ء	ğ	گا
n	ن - ك (Turkish possession suffix)	r	ر
m	م	l	ل
v	و	f	ف
u	و - for long vowel letters (madda)		
ü	ُ		
a	ا - for long vowel letters (madda)		
e	َ		
i	ِ after “heavy letters” such as ض . ظ . ط . ق		
i	ِ after “soft letters” such as ب . س . ج . ه		
y	ی - for long vowel letters (madda) - ی (Persian possession suffix)		

Adab-ı Sedad
(min ‘ilm-i al-adab)

Applied Ethics for a Right Discussion
(from the science of applied ethics)

Author
Ahmed Cevdet Paşa

Istanbul
‘Amire Printing House

1294 (1876)

In the name of God, the Most Graceful, the Most Merciful

The science of argumentation¹⁶³ (*bahs*) and of disputation¹⁶⁴ (*mübahase*) is composed of one person that firmly (*kıyam*) formulates a claim (*isbat-ı müdde'aya*) and of another that contests (*i'tiraz*) it, i.e. that challenges (*mukabele*) the first person as an opponent (*hasm*).

However, asking with the unique purpose of learning something – while the other is not considered as an opponent (*hasm*) – is called inquiring question (*sual-ı istifsari*). Questions and answers in this dialogue refer to a pedagogic¹⁶⁵ process of explaining and informing (*i'lam ve ifham*). Then questions and answers that take place here are not considered as constitutive of disputation (*mübahase*).¹⁶⁶

In disputation (*mübahase*) if the answer is related to the matter of fact (*nefsu'l emr*), we call it an **investigatory answer** (*cevab-ı tahkiki*)¹⁶⁷. On the other hand, if the answer does not take into account the matter of fact (*nafs-ul amr*) but is based upon the unique intention to make silent (*taslim*) the opponent (*hasm*), we call it a dialectic answer (*cevab-ı cedeli*)¹⁶⁸. In order to convince (*ikna'*) those who are intellectually weak and deficient (*'aciz ve kasir*), we should propose a dialectic answer (*cevab-ı cedeli*), and its argument (*delil*) is either a convincing argument (*delil-i ikna'i*) or a slamming argument (*delil-i ilzami*).

¹⁶³ Literally (*lughati*) referring to the notions of research, looking for, inquiring, its technical meaning (*istilahat*) refers to proposing a claim – whether in positive or negative form – and to prove it. Similarly in English, the term “argumentation” means “the action or process of reasoning systematically in support of an idea, action, or theory”. See. Gelenbevi, Ismail, *Tartışma usulü*, Trans. Taha Alp, Istanbul: YasinYayınevi, p20; Stevenson, Angus, and Christine A. Lindberg. 2010. *New Oxford American Dictionary*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd., ed. Entry “argumentation”.

¹⁶⁴ Basically referring to the same meaning than *bahs* but in the 3th Arabic verbal group (*wuzn*) that implies reciprocity. Therefore, the term *mubahese* entails a “process of reasoning” between at least two persons, when this nuance was only suggested in the term *bahs*. Put differently, it is not only argumentation but relational argumentation. In English, the term “disputation” includes this latter idea as it refers to “formal academic debate” in which discussants are exchanging of arguments. See. Stevenson and Lindberg. 2010, Entry “disputation”

¹⁶⁵ “Pedagogy”: the method and practice of teaching, esp. as an academic subject or theoretical concept. in Stevenson and Lindberg. 2010.

¹⁶⁶ Indeed, in this kind of discussion the teacher (the one who makes understand) does not need to bring evidence to the student (the one who tries to understand). Therefore, this is not a opposition between arguments (disputation).

¹⁶⁷ i.e. an answer that aims to reach the truth

¹⁶⁸ “Dialectic”, in a sense that we formulate an answer that fits the attitude (*hal*) of the audience (the other). We intentionally make it understandable and easy to the deficient (*ikna'*) or we intentionally make it harsh and straight to the insincere disputer.

Therefore, disputation (*mübahase*) is either used for exposing the normative truth (*izhar-ı savab*)¹⁶⁹ – i.e. for disclosing the nature of the reality (*hakikat-ı hal*) – or only for silencing the opponent (*iskat-ı hasm*).

A disputation in which actors look for exposing the normative truth is called deliberation¹⁷⁰ (*münazara*). Those who argue (*bahs edenler*) in this kind of disputation are called deliberators (*münazir*). A disputation in which actors look for silencing the opponent is called dialectics (*cedel*), it is the reason why we call those who argue in this kind of disputation dialecticians (*mücadil*).

The dialectician (*mücadil*), in what matter it may be, tries to silence his opponent. But the deliberator's objective (*münazir*) is strictly to disclose the normative truth.

The objective truth (*hakk*) and the normative truth (*savab*) are either disclosed (*zahir*) through his speech or through the speech of his opponent. By all means, it is impossible to mute (*ilzam*) the manifestation of the truth (*savabın zuhurunu iltizam etmez*). In fact, the pious predecessors (*salaf-u salihin*) wanted that the truth came out through their opponent's speech [and not through their own], because of their concern towards the deprivation of their ego (*hezmen li-n-nefs*) and the elimination of any pleasure of the ego (*ve defea'an li-hazzi'n nefis*).

In order to reach the normative truth (*izhar-ı savab*), the deliberators must avoid argumentations that are not oriented towards the topic of discussion (*müvecceh olmayan bahsler*). Indeed, those argumentations are not useful in the field of deliberation (*münazara*). Futile debates (*bihude munakaşa*) do not go along with the discussion's aim (*matlub*). No attention should be given to discussions that do not take part in an ethical and proper deliberation. Futile time goes quickly and as a result the normative truth can never be disclosed.

¹⁶⁹ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa uses both “izhar-ı savab” and “izhar-ı hakk” interchangeably. However both terms differ in meaning: “savab” refers to “normative truth” as a valid discourse about the matter of fact; and “hakk” refers to the matter of fact in itself. If Ahmed Cevdet Paşa uses both terms it is because Münazara aims to disclose normative or/and absolute truth (as it is clearly mentioned in the Introduction p.10-13).

¹⁷⁰ It is a kind of disputation (*mübahasa*) strictly motivated by discovering or disclosing the truth without any concern about which of the discussants wins the debate. Because *Münazara* is also a word of 3th Arabic verbal group we could translate it as “co-reasoning”, since *Nazar* refers to looking, thinking, and reasoning. Nevertheless, in addition to involve also the notion of reciprocity, the term “deliberation” seems to better encompass the idea of “disclosing the truth”, idea that suggests a tempered, wise and disinterested behavior from the discussants. In Latin, *deliberare* means “consider carefully” that gave in modern English deliberation referring to “long and careful consideration or discussion, slow and careful movement or thought”. See. Gelenbevi, Ismail, *Tartışma usulü*, Trans. Taha Alp, YasinYayınevi, İstanbul, p20; and Stevenson and Lindberg. 2010, entry “deliberation”.

Therefore, a well-established discipline (*fenn-i müstakil*) has been set up in order to diffuse this art of orientation (*sina'at-i tevcih*). This discipline provides the conditions (*evhal*) of validity or invalidity of the subject of debate (*ebhas-ı külliyye*).¹⁷¹ We call it interchangeably (*dahi*) science of the applied ethics¹⁷² of argumentation (*'ilm-i edeb-i bahs*) or science of deliberation (*'ilm-i münazara*).

This science provides the rules for an ethical and healthy disputation (*mübahasatın sahti*). In addition, it permits to make the difference between valid and invalid, accepted and unaccepted elements of defence (*müdafa'atın sıhhati fasidinden, makbulü merdudundan*).

Those who respect these rules are preventing themselves from mistakes (*hata*) in deliberation (*münazara*). As this science is mainly based on philosophy (*'ilm-i hikmet*), theology (*'ilm-i kelam*) and principles of Islamic jurisprudence (*'ilm-i usul-i fikhı*), its teachings are preserved.

Hence, I entitled this book *Adab-ı Sedat*, it includes all the important topics (*mesail-i mühimme*) of this science and should be read after my book on logic called *Miyar-ı Sedat*.

From Allah comes the success, He is the Guide towards the right

¹⁷¹ This conditions (*evhal*) include logico-dialectic rules but also ethical requisites.

¹⁷² Indeed, the term “*adab*” refers to ethics or more especially to applied ethics, since “*adab*” does not deal with definition of goodness and badness (that is the task of the whole religion of Islam) but rather with their implementation. Thus, “*adab*” is above all a praxis.

INTRODUCTION

Well-known (*meşhur*) terminology in use among scholars of Münazara discipline

The one who put forward (*dereyan*) a subject (*mesele*) is either a transmitter [of a previous argument] (*nakil*) or a claimant [of a new argument] (*müde'i*). The transmitter refers to the one that transmits (*nakl*) or reports (*rivayet*) an idea from a book (*kitabdan*) or a person (*zattan*). He is asked to authenticate his transmission (*nakl*). After having authenticated his transmission by mentioning its source (from which book he took it), he cannot be questioned anymore. Nevertheless, for example, if someone transmits that a philosopher supported the thesis of corporal resurrection (*haşr-ı ecsadı*), his transmission would be refuted (*nakz olunur*). Indeed, this transmission is invalid (*batil*) because it contradicts the unanimous position (*mezheb*) of the philosophers on this question. Thus every transmission of similar nature is invalid.

If someone does not just transmit an claim but formulates his own, he is then considered as a claimant (*müde'i*).

Every claimant (*müde'i*) must support (*isbat*) his claim (*da'vası*)¹⁷³ with an argument (*delil*)¹⁷⁴.

A claim that is not supported by any argument is an imposition (*tahakküm*) and this is not acceptable (*mesmu' değildir*).

Therefore any claim requires an argument, except for self-evident claims (*bedihi*) for which no argument is required. Hence, a self-evident proposition is exempt from providing any argument.

Nevertheless, if a self-evident claim is ambiguous (*hafı*), it should be clarified by a simple explanation (*fikra*) in the form of argument (*delil suretinde*).

For instance, we can clarify the proposition, “the universe is changing” (*'alem mütegayyer*), by the following sentence: “in fact, we observe in the universe movements (*harekat*) and diverse things that are coming to existence all the time (*asar-ı muhtelif*), therefore the universe is changing (*'alem mütegayyer*).

For this purpose, by the term “argument” (*delil*) we understand a logical argument (*delil-i mantık*), i.e. syllogism (*kıyas*) clearly defined (*mubin*) in the logic discipline (*fenn-i mantıkda*). This kind of argument is divided in four categories: certain

¹⁷³ A claim is claimant's plea that it is debated.

¹⁷⁴ An argument is composed of two premises (at least) and one conclusion.

arguments¹⁷⁵ (*burhan*), uncertain argument¹⁷⁶ (*emare*), dialectical argument (*cedel*) and fallacious argument (*mugalata*).

- **Certain arguments (*burhan edille*)** are composed of certain premises (*yakiniyye*) that encompass all the conditions required (*şurut cami*). It leads to certain knowledge (*ilm-i yakin*).

- **Uncertain arguments (*emare edille*)** refer to syllogisms (*kıyas*) that are composed of one or two uncertain premises (*zan*). It leads to uncertain knowledge (*ilm-i zan*).

- **Dialectical arguments (*cedel edille*)** refer to syllogisms (*kıyas*) that are composed of one or two well-known premises (*meşhurat*) or accepted premises by the opponent (*hasmın 'indinde müsellemat*). For this reason, we use these arguments for silencing the opponent (*ilzam*) or for convincing him (*iqna*).

- **Fallacious arguments (*mugalata*)** refer to defected syllogisms (*fasid olan kıyas*) in respect to the form (*al-sura*) or to the content (*al-mad*). It is used to mislead the opponent.

a. *Form*: It is false in the form because it does not comprehend all the conditions of a true syllogism. For example, the following syllogism is false according to the first form (*şekil evvel*): man is an animal and animal is a genus (*cins*)¹⁷⁷, therefore man is a genus. Here the major premise in the syllogism (*kübra*)¹⁷⁸ is a “natural proposition” (*kazziyye-i tabiiyedir*)¹⁷⁹, whereas in the first form the major premise should be a universal (*külliyet-i kübra*).¹⁸⁰

b. *Content*: It is a invalid syllogism in the content when it includes a lying proposition that looks like a reality (objective truth, *hakk*). For example, “God the Almighty (*vacib te'ala hazretleri*) is existing being (*mevcud*), and every existing being

¹⁷⁵ i.e. premises are certain and the conclusion is certain. This syllogism reaches us to certain knowledge (*burhan*, demonstration).

¹⁷⁶ Literally “sign”, in this case premises are conjectural, as a result the conclusion is also uncertain. But it means something, so it is not totally invalid.

¹⁷⁷ Genus (*cins*) is the first of the five predicables (*al-alfaz al-khamsah*); “a *cins* is predicated of many things differing in species (*nev*’), i.e. it is a wider class which includes within it narrower sub-class called species.” In, Sheikh, Saeed, and Alparslan Açikgenç, *Dictionary of Islamic Philosophical Terms*, entry *jins*, last viewed 2.1.2018 <http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/pd/index.html>.

¹⁷⁸ A major premise is the proposition that contains the major term, here: “animal is a genus”.

¹⁷⁹ An affirmative proposition is “natural” (*tabiiyye*) if it is universal (*küllî*) and its conclusion (*hüküm*) works upon the universal in itself (*li nafsi al-küllî*), and not upon its members (*efrad*). For example, man is a specie (*nev*’), and animal is a genus (*cins*) and reasoning a differentia (*fasl*). However, the affirmative proposition is “universal” and its conclusion (*hüküm*) works upon its members (*efrad*): for example “every animal is moving”. For more information, see. “Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Miyar-ı Sedat*, 1303/1876”, in Büyükoçkun, Kudret. 1998. *Mantık Metinleri 2, Miyar-ı Sedat and Adab-ı Sedat* (Latinised version), İşaret Yayınları, p.44

¹⁸⁰ Indeed in logic, since man is not divided in several species (*nev*’), it is not a genus

(*mevcud*) tends toward a direction (*cihet*)” is an invalid syllogism of first form since the content of the major proposition is a lie (*kaziba*).¹⁸¹

c. *Begging the question (musadere 'ala al-matlub)*¹⁸²: knowing the conclusion (*netice*) requires knowing part of the premise. In this case, syllogism’s invalidity concerns both content [and form]. Knowing the conclusion (*netice*) entails first to know the syllogic argument (*delil*), and knowing the syllogic argument (*delil*) entails to know a part of it and so on. Finally, knowing the conclusion entails to know the conclusion. In other terms, a thing (şey) becomes a premise (*mukaddeme*) of itself (*nefs*). This is circular reasoning (*devr-i fasid*) and it is invalid.

For example: human being (*insan*) is a human (*başar*), and every human is laughing, therefore human being is laughing. In this proposition, while we want to know if human being is laughing, it is first necessary to know that human being (*insan*) and human (*beşer*) are synonymous. A syllogism that includes begging the question is a circular reasoning proposition (*kıyas-ı devir*), and such propositions are invalid (*kıyas-ı fasid*).

This proposition includes also the same mistake: “every human being is laughing and every laughing being is surprised, therefore every human being is surprised”. If in order to support the major premise [“every laughing being is surprised”], we say “every laughing being is a human being” and “every human being is surprised”, it means that part of the argument is the conclusion itself. Therefore it is also an invalid circular reasoning proposition (*devr-i fasid*).

The claimant (*müde'i*) has to set up himself as the one who presents arguments (*müstedill*) and justifies his point (*mu'allil*); The one who contests him is called the questioner (*sa'il*). The one who justifies his point – the claimant (*mu'allil*) – supports his claim by an argument that fulfils the rules of logic (*mantık*).

¹⁸¹ The author argues here that God is beyond any kind of form or matter, is not restricted by any space notion. Yet the major premise might look like a true proposition since existing creatures that we observe on earth tends indeed towards a direction.

¹⁸² Literally, “Rushing to the conclusion”.

If the questioner does not accept (*teslim*) one of the premises (*mukaddemelerinden*) of the [claimant's] argument (*delil*), he says "I am not convinced" (*la nusselimu*)¹⁸³, and he asks for evidence. We call this way of objecting, **objection (*men'*)** or **refutation (*münakaza*)**.

As an alternative, the questioner – without interrogating (*teşrih*) argument's premises – may demonstrate the futility of [claimant's argument] in itself, as a whole (*nefs-i delil*) by proposing another argument¹⁸⁴. We call this way of contesting (*i'itraz*) **integral-refutation (*nakz*)** or **inconsistency (*münakaza*)** in the terminology of principles of Islamic jurisprudence (*usul-ı fikh*).

As another alternative, the questioner may not attack (*ta'raza*) the argument (*delil*) but may rather nullify (*ibtal*) claimant's claim (*mu'allil da'vasını*), i.e. he supports the opposite claim (*da'vanın nakizi*) by proposing another argument (*bir delil ile isbat eyler*). We call this way of objection a **counter-argumentation (*mu'araza*)**¹⁸⁵.

Therefore, objection (*men'*), integral-refutation (*nakz*), and counter-argumentation (*mu'araza*) constitute the three positions (*mansi*) or functions (*vasife*) of the questioner. Each of these three modes of contesting (*turuk-i selasi*) implies specific postures for both questioner and claimant.

Nevertheless [any intervention], either questioner's contesting or claimant's answer, must be **oriented towards the topic of deliberation (*müveccih*)**.

If there are not, there are not considered as valid in the deliberation (*münazara*) discipline.

The art of orientation (*tevcih*): The deliberator (*münazir*) wants his statement (*söz*) to respond (*mukabil*) and to encounter (*dafi'*) the statement of his opponent (*hasima*). If

¹⁸³ In Arabic in the text.

¹⁸⁴ Therefore the questioner demonstrates that the claimant's argument is not efficient to support his claim.

¹⁸⁵ For the translation of these three functions (*men'*, *nakz* and *mu'araza*) or take inspiration in or we directly adopt Abdessamad Belhaj's translation, in Belhaj, Abdessamad, "Adab al-Baht wa al-Munazara: The Neglected Art of Disputation in Later Medieval Islam" in *Arabic Sciences and Philosophies*, vol.26 (2016), Cambridge University Press, pp. 298

the deliberator's statement does not respond (*mukabil*) the opponent's one, thus it is not oriented towards the topic of deliberation (*müveccih*).

For example, in order to prove his claim that “this silhouette is a man”, the claimant (*mu'allil*) may say that “this silhouette is speaking, and every one who can speak is a man”. If the questioner objects (*men'*) a premise that is not entailed by claimant's syllogism (*mukaddeme-i gayr-i mültezime*) such as “I do not accept his whiteness”, his objection would not be considered as oriented towards the topic of deliberation (*müveccih*). Indeed, something does not have to be white to be able to speak; the speaking one could be black. In this case, both questioner and claimant's statements (*kelime*) are not rejecting each other (*cerh etmez*). According to this, there are not responding (*mukabil*) each other and there is no relation whatsoever between the two statements.

Similarly, if questioner's statement is responding (*mukabil*) claimant's ones but does not encounter it (*dafi'*), again it will not be considered as oriented towards the topic of deliberation (*müveccih*).

For instance, objecting (*men'*) self-evident *a priori* premises (*bedehiyyat-ı evveliyyeden olan mukaddeme*) or self-evident innate premises (*bedehiyyat-ı fitriyyeden olan mukaddeme*), even might respond claimant's claim but might not encounter it. Thus, objecting *a priori* (*awaliyat*) or innate (*fitriyat*) propositions belongs to arrogance (*mükabere*).¹⁸⁶

Even if [statements based on] observation (*müşahadat*), experience (*mücerrebat*), feelings (*hadsiyat*) and trustworthy and well reported narration (*mütevâtirat*) can be considered as invalid proofs for common people, they can also be held as certain knowledge (*'ilm-i yakın*) by experts of the discipline in question (*ashab*). Sometimes statements based on these methodologies become so well-known and wide spread among the scientific community (*cemi'-i nas*) that objecting them would belong to

¹⁸⁶ In the first chapter of my thesis, I include “self-evident *a priori*” and “self-evident innate” knowledge into the term “absolute self-evidence”.

arrogance¹⁸⁷ (*mükabere*) too. It would be like denying the existence of sunrise or the existence of Baghdad.^{188 189}

It is also arrogance when the questioner objects a premise based on knowledge (*'ilm*) he himself recognises (*ma'lum*) and accepts (*müsellem*); either it concerns certain knowledge (*'ilm-i yakını*), uncertain knowledge (*'ilm-i zanni*) or repeated knowledge (*'ilm-i taklidi*).¹⁹⁰

For example, it would be arrogance for any theologian (*ehl-i diyanet olan kimse*) to object the statement that the world has been created from nothing¹⁹¹ (*'alemin hadis olduğunu*) whereas it constitutes an absolute principle (*cezmen mu'tekid*) among theologians. Similarly, it would be arrogance for a philosopher to object the opposite claim, i.e. the world's eternity (*kadim*).¹⁹²

Arrogance; Denial out of stubborn (*mükabere*): [The literal meaning refers to] someone who knows [that opponent's statement is] true but still opposes (*muhalefet*) and refuses it stubbornly (*'inad*). However, [the technical term] in use among scholars of deliberation (*eh-li fenn-i münazara*) refers to quarrelling (*münaza'a*) through statements (*kelam*) that do not contribute (*nef'i*) to the manifestation of truth (*izhar savab*).

In the same way that the questioner is doing arrogance when he objects an accepted, well known premise or an already proven claim (*müsbet olan da'vasını*), he is doing arrogance when he invalidates an argument (*delil*) or a claim (*da'va*) without providing any evidence (*bila delil*).

¹⁸⁷ Even in logic (*mantık*) the heart comes in, through ethics (*adab*). In the Qur'an, arrogance (*kibr*) is related to the heart. Here, denying the existence of truth is perceived as a disease in the heart.

¹⁸⁸ We know the existence of sunrise by experience and observation, and someone could have never seen Baghdad from his own eyes but still know its existence (trustworthy and well reported narration).

¹⁸⁹ Conventional truth can become absolute truth according to the degree of agreement among experts of a specific field. In the introduction of our thesis we refer to this as "technical self-evidence".

¹⁹⁰ In the introduction of our thesis we refer to this as "conventional self-evidence".

¹⁹¹ i.e. created in time, having a beginning and an end.

¹⁹² i.e. having no beginning and no end, following the existence of God by itself. As for the theologians with the created world theory, the eternity of the world is a very consensual principle among philosophers (*felasife*) in Islamic civilization. If a discussant is one of them, among them, he has to accept their position. How can he reject it?

In whatever manner it may be, arrogance (*mükabere*) is not acceptable (*masmu'*) because it does not encounter (*dafi'*) the opponent's statement.

Therefore, the way the questioner has to adopt a clear method of confronting an idea (*müveccih*), the answer must both respond (*mukabil*) and encounter (*dafi'*) the question.

Regarding this, if the questioner objects (*men'*) one claimant's premise, this latter must argue (*isbat*) his point, otherwise it would be impossible to refute (*müdafa'a*) [a claim] through objection mode (*men'*).

Indeed, if [the questioner] says "we don't accept your position" (*la nusallim*), [the claimant] cannot reply the same (i.e. "we don't accept your position" (*la nusallim*)). No one can ask evidence to the one who is asking evidence.

Therefore, we understand that [the claimant] must support the contested premise (*mukkademe-i memnu'a*) with an argument (*isbat*).

If the questioner raises another objection to this second argumentation, then the claimant should start to give evidence to this second one also. Hence, until the questioner stops to ask for evidence the claimant must continue to provide evidence (*istidlal*).

In the case where the questioner challenges (*mukabile*) the claimant with integral-refutation (*nakz*) or counter-argumentation (*mu'araza*), he has the obligation to support his statement with arguments (*istidlal*). In other words, the one who originally got the function (*vazife*) of "questioner" becomes "claimant" and the one who got the function of "claimant" becomes "questioner". However, if the questioner only uses objection (*men'*) the obligation to bring evidence remains upon his opponent [the current claimant]. But if he uses integral-refutation (*naqz*) or counter-argumentation (*mu'araza*), his opponent [the claimant] will become the questioner. Likewise, both discussants can switch their function (*vazife*) one to another.

Finally, either the claimant relates (*müstenid*) his claim to self-evident arguments (*bedehiyyat*) and silences (*iskat*) the questioner consequently, or the claimant does not manage to prove his point (*isbatdan aciz kalıp*), meaning that the questioner has silenced him.

When the claimant makes silent the questioner, we call this **compelling (*ilzam*)**¹⁹³, and when the questioner makes silent the claimant, we call this **confutation (*ifham*)**.¹⁹⁴

In any case, the one who is incapacitated is called the **defeated (*maglub*)** and the **overthrown (*mabhub*)**; the one who makes the other incapable is called the **defeater (*galib*)**.

In respect to overcoming (*galp*), compelling (*ilzam*) is stronger than confutation (*ifham*), because it is easy to object (*men'*) a premise but difficult (*güçtür*) to prove (*isbat*) a point. Saying “we don’t accept” (*la nusallim*) looks like the defence from inside fortress [in war context]; but providing evidence (*istidlal*) looks like attacking the enemy without any protection. Therefore, whoever is in the position of providing a proof carries the heavy weight of demonstration (*bar-i giran-ı mübahase*) on his shoulders.

As mentioned above, the only objective of *münazara* discipline is to disclose the truth (*izhar-ı savab*).

Therefore, the first thing a deliberator-questioner should do is to examine (*teftiş*) the premises of claimant’s argument. If he considers one of them as weak (*muhtac*) he raises an objection.

And if on first consideration he cannot find (*goremez*) any premise to object, then he must choose between integral refutation (*nakz*) and counter-argumentation (*mu’araza*), i.e. [in both cases,] supporting his opposition with evidence (*istidlal*). In brief, if he understands well the aim (*maksad*) of these three modes (*vezaif-i selase*)¹⁹⁵ he chooses [the] one among them [he judges the most appropriate]. He is not afraid to be either confuted (*mafhum*) or compelled (*milzam*).

If the questioner is [not a deliberator but] a dialectician (*mücadil*), he should not leave the objection (*men'*) – the safer mode of contesting (*eslem-i turuk*) – and jump directly to demonstration (*tarik-i istidlal*) as long as he is not sure of his own argument’s

¹⁹³ i.e. to compel someone to accept your point.

¹⁹⁴ i.e. showing that an argument is invalid.

¹⁹⁵ That are Objection (*men'*), Integral-Refutation (*nakz*) and Counter-Argumentation (*mu’araza*).

strength. Unfortunately, in the intention to compel their opponent (*ilzam-i hasm*) and to show their superiority (*izhar-i fazl*), some dialecticians (*ashab-i jadal*) neglect these precisions (*dakikalar*) and immediately rush to demonstration (i.e. providing evidence, *tarik-i istidlal*). Sometimes, by excess of greediness (*hirs*) and hunger (*tehaluk*) they usurp their opponent's right of demonstration (*gasb*) without any reason. Nevertheless, by doing this they leave the comfortable position of objection (*hisn-u muni'*) and make themselves a target for objection. Therefore while they could easily confute (*ifham*) their opponent through objection they cause their own confutation (*mufham*), trapped into the too difficult mode of demonstration (*vadi-i istidlalde kendisi mufham kalır*).

Usurping opponent's legitimate position (*gasb*): Instead of objecting a premise, the questioner invalidates [opponent's claim] by providing an argument (*delil*); such attitude is rejected (*mardud*) in *münazara* discipline (*makam-ı münazara*)¹⁹⁶.

Indeed, even if usurper's argument (*gasibin delili*) is encountering (*dafi'*) claimant's premise – and is therefore oriented towards the topic of deliberation (*müveccih*) – the role of the questioner is [primarily] to ask evidence to the claimant. But here, he gives up his original position (*vazife*) and tries to argue (*iddi'a*) and prove (*isbat*) the falsity (*butlan*) of claimant's premises. According to *Münazara*'s scholars (*mebni nazar-ı erbab-ı münazarada*) such attitude is not acceptable (*makbul değildir*) because, [the questioner] is confiscating (*elinden almış*) opponent's legitimate position of demonstration (*hasmının mansıbi olan istidlali*).

Here, a premise (*mukaddeme*) does not only refer to the different parts of an argument (*delilin yalnız cüzleri demek değildir*), but also to the thing (*şey*) that unanimously makes the premise sound¹⁹⁷. In this regard, arguments (*edille*) are not only composed of their **all parts (*eczasına*)**, but also of their **formal conditions (*şera'it*)**¹⁹⁸ and of their

¹⁹⁶ In this case the questioner didn't let the claimant develop his own argumentation before invalidating him.

¹⁹⁷ i.e. the thing on what is based the soundness of the premise.

¹⁹⁸ i.e. rules of formal logic

targeting towards the intended plea¹⁹⁹ (*takrib*). Then, the soundness of an argument relies on the soundness of its parts (*cüzler*) as well as on the completeness of its formal conditions (*şartlarının müctemi*) and perfectness of its targeting (*takribinin tam*).

A part of arguments (*edillenin eczası*) is either a minor (*sugra*) or a major (*kübra*) premise, or in conditional syllogism (*şartiyyesiyle*) either an affirming (*vazı'a*) or a negating (*rafi'a*) premise.²⁰⁰

Since **formal conditions of arguments** (*edillenin şeraiti*) are well detailed and explained in formal logic science (*ilm-i mantık*), there is no need here to describe them.

The same way each part of the argument (*edillenin eczası birer*) constitutes the explicit aspect of the claim (*da'va-yı sariha*), each condition of the argument (*edillenin şartları birer*) constitutes its implicit aspects (*da'va-yı zımniyyedir*). In other terms, whoever makes a syllogism (*kıyas*) of the first figure (*şekl-i evvel*) implicitly claims, “this is the affirmative minor and this is the universal major of my argument”.

The targeting of the argument (*delilin takribi*), is what necessarily leads (*sevkidir*) to the original plea (*matlub*). This is also an implicit aspect of the claim (*da'va-yı zımniyyedir*). Therefore, whoever who brings an argument (*delil*) implicitly (*zımnen*) claims “the targeting of the argument is perfect”.

In the field of disputation (*bahs*), the perfectness of the targeting (*takribin tamamı*) is provided in three cases: when the conclusion (*netice*) is **identical** (*'ayn*) to the **original plea** (*matlub*), when it is **equipollent** (*musawi*) to the plea, or when it is **absolutely particular from plea's stand** (*mutlakan ehass*).

Identical (*'ayn*): For example, in order to support (*isbat*) the following claim “some animal are rational” [1] we say, “because, some animals are human beings and every

¹⁹⁹ In the language, takrib refers to the “process of being or getting near in number, quality, etc”. See, <https://www.almaany.com/en/dict/ar-en/>, entry “taqrib”. lasted viewed 2.1.2018

In the terminology, it refers to the “presentation of arguments in a controversy in a logical form so that they **necessarily leads to the desired conclusion**”, that we translated here by “**targeting towards the intended plea**”. See. Sheikh, Saeed, and Alparslan Açıkgenç, *Dictionary*, entry “taqrib”

²⁰⁰ For example: “if the sun rises, the room is enlighten”; “and the sun rose” [affirming premise]; “therefore, the room is enlighten”. OR “If the sun rises, the room is enlighten”; “but the room is not enlighten” [negating premise]; “therefore, the sun did not rise” in Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Miyar-ı Sedat*, 1303/1876”, in Büyükcoşkun, Kudret. 1998. *Mantık Metinleri 2, Miyar-ı Sedat and Adab-ı Sedat* (Latinised version), Istanbul, İşaret Yayınları. pp.63-64

human being is rational” [2]. Here, our argument [2] and our original plea [1] product identical outcomes.

Equipollent (musawi): If in order to support the same claim [some animals are rational], we say, “because every rational being is moving with will and every moving with will is animal”, we come to the result that, “every rational being is animal” which is the equipollent conversion (*müsteviyen mün’akis*) of the proposition “some animals are rational”. The equipollent conversion (*aks-i müstevi*) is equal to the original proposition (*asl-ı kazıyyeye müsavirdir*).

Absolutely particular from its stand (mutlakan ehass): Again, if in order to support the same claim [some animals are rational], we say, “because some animals are black human beings and every black human being is Negro”, we come to the result that, “some animals are negro” which is absolutely particular from our plea’s stand “some animals are rational”. Because this particular [Negro] is compulsory included in the general [Human being].²⁰¹

In these three cases, the plea (*matlub*) results necessarily from the argument (*delilimiz matlubu müstelzim olmakla*). Therefore, the argument’s targeting is perfect (*takrib tamdir*).

However if the conclusion is **absolutely general from the original plea’s stand (*mutlakan e’amm*)** or **general from one aspect of the original plea’s stand (*e’amm min vechin*)**, the targeting cannot be perfect. Indeed, the general does not require the particular.

Absolutely general from the original plea’s stand (mutlakan e’amm): For example, if in order to support the following proposition “this silhouette is a human” we say, “because this silhouette is moving with will and every moving with will is an animal”, the conclusion that comes out is “this silhouette is an animal”, that is absolute more general (*mutlakan e’amm*) from the stand of our original plea [“this silhouette is a human”].

²⁰¹ We note that at the time the book was published (1876), racist movements in European academia prospered under the influence of social Darwinism (for instance, the first publication of Ernst Haeckel’s *the struggle of races* was in 1883). Thus, basic logical rules taught in the Ottoman Empire were refuting biological racism and classification of races in the 19th century. Indeed, in the mentioned example it is self-evident that, Negro is a species (*nev’*) of Human Being (genus).

Indeed, the fact that the silhouette is an animal does not systematically mean that it is a human. It could be another species (nev') of animal. In this case, our proof – that should have led necessarily (*matlub-i mustalzim*) to our original plea – failed to lead (*sevki*) [to this plea], thus it does not present a perfect targeting (*takrib tamm değıldir*).

General from one aspect of the original plea's stand (e'amm min vechin): Likewise, if in order to support the following claim “the body that appears in the dark is a human” we say, “because this body appears in the dark and everything that appears in the dark is white”, the conclusion that comes out is “this body is white”. However, in our mind the relation between white and human being refers to the relation between “the general and the particular from one aspect” (*umum ve husus min vechin*), thus the fact that the body is white does not imply that it is a human. Therefore, the proof's targeting is not perfect.

Of course, no one can conceive a perfect targeting if the conclusion (*netice*) of the argument is completely distinct (*mubayn*) from the original plea. It is like supporting the following claim “this silhouette is a stone” with the following premises “because this silhouette is moving with will and every moving with will is an animal”.

Therefore, if the claimant wants to propose an argument that necessarily leads to his original plea, he should pay attention to the organization of his premises (*tertibi mukaddemat*) with a perfect insight (*kemal-i basiret*). On the other hand, the questioner should meticulously pay attention to explicit (*sariha*) and implicit (*zımna*) aspects of argument's premises [of the claimant] and ask questions according to that. It is constitutive of deliberation's ethics (*adab-i münazara*) that both discussants behave with care and patience (*teenni*) to each other and that they [start to] defend (*müdafa'a*) their own idea after having well (*güzelce*) understood (*tefhüm*) the idea of their opponent.

As a result, it is authorized for one to make repeat the other in the case where he has not properly understood his statement. Similarly, he can ask (*istisfar*) him to clarify (*istizah*) his intention (*murad*).

Imposing specific formats to the other (*Ta'yin-i tarik*) is not accepted in *Adab-i Münazara*. By indicating specific forms of argument to the claimant such as “your

argument is too long” or “there are some futilities (*haşviyat*) in your evidence” or “your expression is not clear, don’t say that, you should say this”, the questioner get out from the purpose [of the deliberation] (*sadedden çıkıp*) and get busy with words that are not related with the purpose, i.e. disclosing the truth (*izhar-ı savab*). Thus he is not oriented towards the topic of deliberation (*müveccih*).

However, saying “you could have correctly support your claim in such way...” after having invalidated claimant’s argument (*ibtal ettikten sonra*) with an attestation (*şahid*)²⁰² is not considered as part of “imposing specific formats to the other” (*ta’yin-i tarik*) but as part of “integral invalidation” (*nakz*), i.e. the second of the three modes of contestation (*vezaif-i selase*).

To conclude, in the context of deliberation (*münazara*), questioner’s well-oriented (*müveccih*) and accepted (*makbul*) positions are objection (*men’*), integral-refutation (*nakz*) and counter-argumentation (*mu’araza*).

In the next chapters, we will explain in details each of these three positions, and provide their *modus operandi* (*keyfiyyet-i icrası*) as well as claimant’s appropriate defence to them.

Nevertheless, we should say here that the integral-refutation (*nakz*) and the counter-argumentation (*mu’araza*) that we mean [in this book] are the real integral-refutation (*nakz-i hakiki*) and the true counter-argumentation (*mu’araza-ı tahkiki*). We do not include the pseudo integral-refutation (*nakz şabihi*) and the precocious counter-argumentation (*mu’araza takdiriyye*).

Pseudo integral-refutation (*Nakz şabihi*): Before the claimant could bring evidence to his claim, the questioner invalidates the claim by saying “there must be an error” and by bringing arguments.

²⁰² For more details on the notion of “attestation” (*şahid*), see below the second chapter this translation, p.90

Precocious counter-argumentation (*Mu'araza takdiriyya*): Similarly, before the claimant could bring evidence to his own claim, the questioner counter-argues by advance his potential argument. In other terms, it means counter-arguing evidence that the claimant has not yet provided, integral-refuting (*nakz*) opponent's hypothetical evidence with another argumentation.

Both cases (pseudo integral refutation and precocious counter-argumentation) are [assimilated to] usurpation of opponent's legitimate position (*gasb*), since they don't give any chance to the claimant to prove his claim but instead invalidate this latter at first stance through demonstration (*istidlal*). Therefore, these two modes (*ahval*) are not considered in the field of argumentation (*bahs*).

First Chapter
Concerning the questioner's objection (*men'*)
And how claimant should respond to it

As mentioned in the introduction, objection (*men'*) constitutes in asking evidence for a specific premise (*mukaddeme-i mu'ayyene*). [The questioner] objects a particular premise by formulating expressions such as “this premise is invalid”, “this needs a proof”, “it is not acceptable”, “we don't accept it” or “you have to explain”.

If the questioner formulates his demand for proofs only with such expressions, therefore it is a **pure objection (*men' mücerred*)**. But if the questioner enhances his demand by giving additional statement, therefore it is a **supported objection (*men' me'a as-sened*)**

Pure objection (men' mücerred): For instance, in order to support that “this body is the one of an animal” the claimant says, “this body is moving and every moving being is animal”. If the questioner replies by saying, “the major premise of this argument is invalid” or “it is not acceptable”, thus it is a pure objection.

Supported objection (men' me'a as-sened): But if after having showed his objection (“the major premise is not acceptable”), the questioner replies by saying, “why is it not acceptable? Because a moving being can be a tree” or “why should I accept your premise since some trees are moving because of wind?” or “if the body was moving with will then it would have been an animal but we don't know if it was moving with will”. In these three examples, [questioner asks for evidence] through a supported objection (*men' me'a as-sened*).

Sometimes in order to make the support of the objection (*sened*) more explicit we add some statements. We call this latter **clarifying support (*tenvir-i sened*)**.

Clarifying support (tenvir-i sened): For instance, in one of the mentioned case (“what is it not acceptable? Because a moving being can be a tree”), after having formulated [this supported objection] the questioner gives as a clarifying support (*tenvir-i sened*) the following statement: “don't you see, sometimes wind makes the trees moving”.

Sometimes the support (*sened*) is formulated in the form of argument (*delil*). For example, if the questioner says, “the major premise is forbidden, because if every moving beings were animals, the tree that is moving with wind would be an animal, and this is invalid (*batil*)”.

Here the aim is to underline the strength of the support (*sened*) and not actually to provide an argument, otherwise it would be usurpation of opponent’s legitimate position (*gasb*), as explained in the introduction.

Objecting parts of the proof

In order to be a useful (*nafi*) to the objection and to strengthen it, the support (*sened*) should be either equipollent (*müsavi*) to the objection or absolutely particular from the objection’s stand (*mutlakan ehass*). However, if the support is absolutely general from the objection’s stand (*mutlakan e’amm*) or general from one aspect of the objection (*e’amm min vechin*), then it does not satisfy the purpose (*nafi’ olmaz*).

For instance, if the claimant makes the following statement: “this silhouette is not laughing because it is not the one of a human being, and every laughing being is human being, therefore this silhouette is not laughing”; The questioner can object by saying “the minor premise is not acceptable”, “Why could not this silhouette be a human being? This silhouette could be rational (*natik*)²⁰³” – in this case the support is *equipollent (müsavi)* to the objection. If he says “Why is it not acceptable? It could be a Negro (*zenci*)” – in this case the support is *absolutely particular from the objection’s stand (mutlakan ehass)*. In these two examples, the support is satisfying objection’s purpose.

In the other hand, if the questioner says, “Why is it not acceptable? It could be an animal”, then the support is *absolutely general from the objection’s stand (mutlak e’amm)*. And if he says, “Why is it not authorized? It could be black (*siyah*)”, the support is *general from one aspect of the objection (e’amm min wejh)*. In both latter cases the support is not satisfying objection’s purpose.

Objecting formal conditions of the proof

²⁰³ The concept of *natik* – what we translate by “rational” – exactly refers to the Greek notion of *logos* (encompassing both reasoning (rational) and speaking (utterance)).

As mentioned in the introduction, the questioner can object (*men*’) each of the formal conditions (*shara’iti*) of claimant’s argument since they constitute implicit aspects of his claim. In brief, if the claimant provides a syllogism of the first logical form in which the major is a natural proposition (*kazıyye-i tabi’iyye*), the questioner can contest it (*i’tiraz*) with an objection by saying “the conditions in this proof are not respected, because [in the first logical form] the major should be a universal proposition (*kazıyye-i külliyye*).”²⁰⁴

Objecting the proof’s targeting

Likewise, the questioner can object the targeting of the proof (*takrib*) since it also constitutes an implicit aspect of his claim. For instance, if the claimant proposes the following claim, “this silhouette is a human’s one”, “because it is moving with will and everything that moves with will is an animal”, the questioner can contest by replying “this proof does not present a perfect targeting, because the result that comes out from it is “the silhouette is an animal”, but an animal is not necessarily a human, it could be rather any other species (*nev*’) of animal”.

Sometimes, the [first] premise can be invalid according to one supposition (*ihimal*) while the [second] premise can be invalid (*memnu*’) according to another one. In other terms, the questioner says, “if your intention (*murad*) is this [A], then your [first] premise is invalid, and if your intention is that [B], then your [second] premise is invalid”. In this case, the questioner **bounds** (*terdid*)²⁰⁵ his objection (*men*’).

For example, the claimant argues that “using spoon is an innovation (*bid’at*)” “and every innovation is detestable (*mekruh*) therefore, using a spoon is detestable”. The questioner can contest this statement by saying, “if you mean by innovation, an innovation in religious affairs (*emr-i dinde*), then your minor premise [i.e. the spoon] is invalid (*memnu*’); and if you mean by innovation, an innovation in its common sense (*lugaviyye*) - i.e. a thing that has been invented later²⁰⁶ - then your major premise [i.e.

²⁰⁴ See above footnote n.179

²⁰⁵ i.e. contesting both possible meanings of the argument by objecting intention of both premises..

²⁰⁶ *Later*: after the life of the Prophet Muhammed (saws) and His Companions (ra)

detestable] is invalid. Indeed, there are a lot of things of common affairs (*umur-i 'adiyye*) such as foods and clothes that have been invented later on [after the Prophet *saws*]. They do not have any impact on religious affairs, therefore such things cannot be detestable.”

Sometimes the questioner bounces his objection (*terdid ile men' eder*) upon the **very object of the premise** (*mukaddeme-i matviyye*) according to one supposition (*takdire göre*), and upon the **argument's targeting** (*takrib*) according to another supposition.

For example, if the claimant says, “this silhouette is a human being”, “because it is a moving with will”, the questioner can bounce his objection upon the very object of the premise (*mukaddeme-i matviyye*) and upon the argument's targeting (*takrib*):

“If the intended meaning of the major premise is “every moving being with will is a human being”, then the very object of the premise (*mukaddeme-i matviyye*) is invalid”; and if the intended meaning of the major premise is “every moving being with will is an animal”, then the argument's targeting is invalid [since it doesn't lead us to the conclusion that “this silhouette is a human being”].

In the case where the questioner objects a premise as mentioned above, the claimant must support it with arguments (*isbat eyler*).

For example, the claimant says, “[if] the world is contingent and will cease to exist in any case, hence it must have a creator (*mucid*)”, “and the world is contingent” “therefore it has a creator (*mucid*)”. If the questioner objects (*men'*) the accepting minor premise (*delilin vazi'ası*) [i.e. the world is contingent], the claimant can prove his point by replying, “the world is changing (*mütegayyer*) and every changing is contingent, therefore the world is contingent”.

If the claimant invalidates the questioner's support - that is equipollent to his objection – thus he has managed to prove his contested premise (*mukaddeme-i memnu'ası*).

For instance, the questioner objects [claimant's premise] that “this body is not human” by saying, “it could be rational”. Here, if the claimant invalidates [the hypothesis] that the body could be rational, thus he has proved that the body is not human.

Indeed, the cancellation (*irtifa'*) of one of the two equipollent statements entails the cancellation of the other one [i.e. by cancelling the hypothesis of rationality, the

claimant cancels the hypothesis of humanity, because what is not rational cannot be human, and what is not human cannot be rational.]

While a support (*sened*) based upon the absolutely general from the objection's stand (*mutlak e'amm*) doesn't benefit the questioner, its invalidation (*ibtali*) benefits (*nafi'*) to the claimant. For instance in the previously mentioned example [i.e. this body is not human], if the questioner objects by saying "it is invalid because it could be an animal", the claimant just needs to invalidate the hypothesis that it is an animal in order to invalidate the hypothesis that it is a human. Indeed the cancellation (*irtifa'*) of the more general (*e'am*) entails the cancellation of the more particular (*ehass*). However, if the support is not equipollent to the objection (*müsavi*) or not absolutely more general from the objection stand (*mutlakan e'amm*), then its invalidation (*ibtali*) does not profit to the claimant [i.e. it doesn't prove his case].

When the questioner refutes (*i'tiraz*) [claimant's statement] with an objection as mentioned above, the claimant can sometimes responds by **making his intention explicit (*tahrir-i murad*)**. Hence he can protect (*def*) himself against the refutation of the questioner, such as: "In the premise that you don't accept (*mukaddeme-i memnu'a*) I mean this [A] for the subject (*mevzu'*) and that [B] for the object (*mahmul*)".

For example, the claimant says, "the being in front of us is giving some utterances (*söylüyor*)" and "every beings that give utterances are human beings", therefore "the being in front of us is a human being"; The questioner contests the premise by saying "the major premise of this argument is invalid (*memnu'*) because it is possible that the being in front of us is just doing tweeting-like speech, and could be therefore a kind (*nev'*) of birds". The claimant can become protected (*mündefi'*) against questioner's contestation by making his intention explicit (*tahrir-i murad*), such as "I mean [the being in front of us] is giving some utterances by its very nature (*bi-tab'i söyler*)". "Indeed, natural articulate speech (*nutk-i tabi'i*) is the differentia (*fasil*) of human being, and a differentia (*fasil*) is equipollent to a species (*nev'*). Based upon that, every animal that makes articulate speech by nature is a human being. Objecting that is objecting a self-evident premise (*mukaddeme-i bedihi*); and this is invalid (*batil*).” Having invalidated the objection, the claimant has managed to support his contested premise.

Therefore, making his intention explicit (*tahrir-i murad*) is an **indirect mean** (*bi-l vasita*) for the claimant to support (*isbat*) his contested premise (*mukaddeme-i memnu*). In brief, after the questioner has objected one of his premises, the role of the claimant is either to prove **directly** (*bizzat*) this contested premise by bringing evidence (*delil*); or – as mentioned above – to prove **indirectly** (*bi-l vasita*) this contested premise by invalidating the objection’s support of the questioner (*ibtal-i sened*) or by making his intention explicit (*tahrir-i murad*).

However, it does not satisfy the purpose [for the claimant] to object (*men*) objection’s support (*sened*) or objection’s clarifying support (*tenvir-i sened*). Indeed, even if we nullify them the objection in itself (*men*’ *mücerred*)²⁰⁷ would remain, and again, the claimant would have to prove the contested premise.

Sometimes, after having objected (*men*) one of the premises, the questioner finally accepts it (*teslim*) and objects (*men*) the other (*diđerini*). This is either called **abasing oneself** (*tenezzül*), **conformity with the opponent** (*mücarat-i hasm*) or **unstringing the control of discussion** (*irha*’-i *inan-i bahs*). It means accepting a premise (*teslim*) in order to strengthen his power of conviction over the opponent (*mümaşat*), thus it does not really refer to acceptance (*teslim*) and attestation (*tasdik*).

Therefore, as long as the claimant has not proved his both premises, he has not proved his conclusion (*müdde*’a).

For instance, the claimant claims, “wearing underpants is detestable (*mekruh*), and argues it by saying “underpants was not worn in the prophetic period (*vakt-i se’adet*), it has been created (*ihdas*) later, and everything that has been created after this period is detestable (*mekruh*)”. The questioner responds, “the minor premise is not acceptable, *and even if* I accept this one I cannot accept the major premise, because there are so many things that has been discovered (*icad*) after this period – like the holy minarets of the mosques – that it could not be detestable (*mekruh*).” In this case, the questioner unstrings the control of discussion (*irha*’-i *inan-i bahs*) by accepting the minor premise

²⁰⁷ What we translated above by “pure objection”.

[in order to better defeat his opponent]. However, he doesn't really accept it [i.e. this minor premise].

The claimant deviated from the purpose [of the discussion] (*sadedden çıkar*) if – instead of proving his contested premise either directly (*bizzat*) or indirectly (*bil vasita*) as mentioned above – he says to the questioner, “your statement does not respect grammar rules (*nahu*)” or “your objection's support (*sened*) is more general (*e'amm*) from objection's stand, thus it is not valid (*salih değildir*)”. [Indeed, in this case] the claimant tries to hide his incapacity to prove his claim as well as his confutation (*mufham*) behind a pseudo-defence (*setr ile def*). However, by doing this he has shifted to another topic of discussion and closed the first one.

Therefore, in the science of argumentation (*'ilm-i adab*), **shifting from a topic of discussion to another one (*bahsden bahs-i ahara intikal*)** is considered as confutation (*ifham*). According to the terminology of the discipline, it is a kind of confutation (*ifham*) when the claimant shifts to another argument (*delil*) because he is incapable to face questioner's contestation (*i'tiraz*) by completing (*itmam*) his own [original] argument (*kendi delil*).

Actually, the second proof is considered as a second discussion, meaning that the claimant did not manage to take benefit from his first argument and then left it. In this case, the first discussion has been ended (*münkati'*) and the claimant is considered as confuted (*mufham*)²⁰⁸.

However, this matter is an object of debate (*emr-i i'tibari*) between scholars of this discipline regarding the terminology (*istilahi*). Indeed, in reality (*hakikat-i halde*) it is not a confutation (*ifham*) *per se*. In addition, the original aim [of an argumentation] is to demonstrate the claim through the support of argument (*isbat-i müdde'a*). As for the claimant, by supporting his claim with the second argument, he accomplished his goal and compelled (*ilzam*) his opponent to accept [his claim].

On the other hand, the claimant [might shift to another argument] while he is not pushed, by incapacity, to leave his first argument. In the contrary, while he has the

²⁰⁸ In other terms, the questioner managed to invalidate claimant's argument through his support (*sened*) or clarifying support (*tenvir-i sened*).

ability (*muktedir*) to confirm (*tashih*) and complete (*itmam*) his contested premise (*mukaddeme-i memnu'asi*), [he might prefer to shift to another proof] in order to give a clear (*vazih*) and blank (*celi*) proof that the questioner could not contest, a one that would compel (*ilzam*) his opponent to consent his claim without extending his speech anymore. Here, claimant's shift to another argument (*başka delile intikal etmesi*) means adding (*'ilave*) and annexing (*zamm*) another argument to the first one. Therefore, in this specific case, [shifting] can neither be considered as a confutation (*ifham*) nor as the end of the discussion (*inkita'-i bahs*).

Second Chapter

Concerning the questioner's integral-refutation (*nakz*) of an argument And how claimant should respond to it

The argument (*delil*) that comes with integral-refutation (*nakz*) in order to invalidate (*ibtal*) claimant's argument is an **exposition** (*ṣahid*). Exposition (*ṣahid*) is of two kinds (*kısm*):

- *First kind*: The claimant's argument is operative (*cari*) in another matter, and this contradicts (*mütehallef*) the conclusion of the claim (*hükm-i müde'a*).
- *Second kind*: The claimant's argument entails some invalid elements (*fesad*) such as self-contradiction (*ictima'i nakizayn*)²⁰⁹, begging the question (*devr*) or infinite regress of causes (*teselsül*).

First kind of exposition (ṣahid)

The first part is applied as follow: "This argument is operative in such matter (*filan maddede*) but this contradicts the conclusion of the claim; and every argument that presents such form (*hal*) and such nature (*ṣan*) is invalid (*fasid*); therefore this argument is invalid".

It is impossible to object (*men'*) the major premise²¹⁰ of this exposition (*ṣahid*). Indeed, it is not possible to accept an argument that is operative in a matter in such way that it is contradicting the conclusion of a claim. On the other hand, it is possible to object its minor premise²¹¹. Indeed, this minor premise is composed of two propositions (*iki mukaddemeyi mutazammındır*): an *operative statement* (*cereyan*) and a *contradicting statement* (*tahallüf*). Each of them can be objected (*men'*).

Therefore, the claimant can reply to the one who brought the integral-refutation (*nakiz*) [i.e. the questioner] such as: "saying that my argument is operative in such matter it is not acceptable"; "if the situation (*vak'ia*) were as you understand it, then [my argument] would be operative"; "However, my intention is this". In this case, the claimant managed to object the *operative statement* of the argument (*delilin cereyanı*).

²⁰⁹ i.e. it cannot be B and NOT B at the same time

²¹⁰ i.e. "and every proof that presents such form (*hal*) and such nature (*ṣan*) is invalid (*fasid*)"

²¹¹ i.e. "This proof is operative in such matter (*filan maddede*) but this contradicts the conclusion of the claim"

On the other hand, the claimant can accept the operative statement (*cereyan*) but object the contradicting statement (*hük-m-i mühtelif*).

In both case, the one who brought the integral-refutation (*nakiz*) [i.e. the questioner] should support his statement with arguments (*isbat*).

For example, in order to prove that the world is eternal, a philosopher (*felasife*) says, “indeed the world is a oeuvre of the Eternal (*eser-i kadim*) and every oeuvre of the Eternal (*eser-i kadim*) is eternal (*kadim*)”; to what the questioner may reply, “your proof is also operative (*cari*) in the case of human being”; “and this contradicts the conclusion of your claim, i.e. the attribute of eternity. In other terms, even if human being is also an oeuvre of the Eternal (*eser-i kadim*) he is not eternal; and every argument that is such is invalid (*fasid*), therefore this argument is invalid too.”

To this integral-refutation (*nakz*), the philosopher can reply in two ways:

[1] “I mean the world is the oeuvre of the Eternal by essence (*bizzat*); but in the creation of human being (*takvin*), there is the role of astronomical periods (*edvar-i felekiyye*) and the combination with the first material substance (*isti'dadat-i heyulaniyyenin dahli*). Therefore, it is invalid to say that my argument is operative (*cereyan*) in the case of human being.

[2] Even if I accept [that my argument is operative in the case of human being], this does not contradict the conclusion of my claim. Indeed, even if each member of human being group (*efrad-i insaniyye*) is contingent (*hadis*), it is still possible (*caiz*) to say that human being as a logical species (*nev'-i insan*) is eternal (*kadim*).

Finally, the one who brought the integral-refutation (*nakiz*) [i.e. the questioner] must demonstrate, [1] in the first case, that the argument is operative (*cereyan*) in the case of human being;

[2] and in the second case, that this contradicts the conclusion of his claim (*hük-m-i müdde'anin tahallüfü*) – i.e. human being as a logical species (*nev'i*) is not eternal.

Therefore, it is another clear example that objection (*men'*) is the more comfortable way of contesting a claim (*eslem tarik*), since the questioner whom get involved in integral-refutation (*nakz*) has to deal with demonstration (*istidlal*). Nevertheless, if the major premise of the previous argument – i.e. “every oeuvre of the Eternal is eternal” – were objected, the questioner would still have to deal with demonstration by bringing philosophical arguments (*felsefi isbat*).

Second kind of exposition (şahid)

The second part is applied as follow: “this argument is invalid (*fasiddir*). Indeed, this argument entails such a part (*husus*) and this part is invalid. And every proof that is such is invalid (*fasid*).”

The minor premise of this proof is composed of two propositions: one refers to the *entailment of a part* in the argument; the other refers to the *invalidity of this part*.

Therefore, both components of the premise – sometimes the first, sometimes the second – can be objected. Nevertheless, if the invalidity of the part results from self-evident knowledge (*bedihiyyatdan*), thus premise’s second proposition cannot be objected, unless [by] arrogance.

For example, it is impossible to object (*men’*) premise’s second proposition if one says, “the argument that entails self-contradiction (*ictima’i nakizayn*), or equipollent conversion between the biggest and the smallest is invalid”. Indeed, self-contradiction (*ictima’i nakizayn*) and equipollent conversion between the biggest and the smallest are self-evident fallacies (*bedihiyyu al-butlan*).

However, it is possible to object (*men’*) premise’s second proposition if one says, “the argument either entails a vicious circle (*devr*)²¹² or an infinite regress of causes (*teselsül*), therefore the proof is invalid (*fasid*)”. Indeed, all vicious circles (*devr*) and infinite regresses of causes (*teselsül*) are not considered as fallacies. Indeed, vicious circle (*devr*) refers to two things that are mutually stopping each another. Vicious circle is constituted of two species (*nev’*):

- The first species: **Preceding circle (*devr-i takaddümi*)**, such as begging the question (*müsadere ‘ale’l-matlub*)²¹³. This is a thing that cannot be without a preceding thing (*bir şeyin nefesine takaddümünü müstezim*). It is a fallacy (*batil*).

- The second species: **Sequencing circle (*devr-i me’id*)**, such fatherhood and prophethood. Here, conceiving one thing entails to conceive another one without beginning or end (*takaddüm ve ta’ahur olmaksizin birinin tasavvuru diğerinin dahi birlikde tasavvurunun müstezim olur*). However, in this case the thing can be without another thing that precedes it. Therefore it is not a fallacy (*lakin, birinin nefesine takaddümünü mucib olmadığı cihetle batil değildir*).

²¹² a synonym of “begging the question”

²¹³ Literally “rushing to the conclusion”

Infinite regress of causes (*teselsül*) that concerns causation (*'ilel*) and reasons (*asbab*) is invalid. It is because of the existence of this invalidity that one can prove the Necessary Being (*vacib-ul vucud*)²¹⁴. Indeed, if possible beings (*mumkinat*)²¹⁵ do not end up to the necessary existence (*vacibe müntehi*) there are thus causes (*'illet*) one to another. For example, today's blowing wind has been caused by yesterday's coldness that has been caused by previous day's rain, that has been caused by previous day's first manifesting cloud and likewise, events (*hadisat*) are causes one to another throughout an all ascending chain (*mütesa'idan birbirine 'illet*). Finally, either [1] one of the down side is caused (*ma'lul*) by one from the upper side, or [2] it goes endlessly to an infinite [causalities chain]. However, the first case entails preceding circle (*devr-i takaddümi*) and this is a fallacy. As for the second case, since it entails an infinite regress of causes (*teselsül*) – that is also a fallacy – it proves that this chain of possible beings (*silsile-i mümkinat*) necessarily end up to the Necessary Being (*vacibe müntehi olmasına istidlal olunur*).

Therefore, in the same manner the circle (*devr*) – in which [premises] are causes to each other – is vicious (*fasid*), the infinite regress of causes (*teselsül*) is also vicious.

However, in another meaning, infinite regress of causes (*teselsül*) means “to continue until a certain limit” (*hadd-i mu'ayyende durmamak*).

For example, one is half of two, and third of three, quarter of four and likewise, one is the decimal of ten and the centesimal of hundred. It can go likewise to the infinity, or put differently, human being can count as long as he can without any limit where he would stop. However, the accounting of the one who counts (*mu'tebirin i'tibari*) might stop at some point (*münkat'i*), therefore this regress of causes (*teselsül*) might also stop (*münkat'i*) [at some point]. In this sense, regress of causes (*teselsül*) is a relative matter (*emr-i i'tibari*) and this is not invalid (*muhâl*).

Therefore, [if the questioner says] in order to integrally refute (*nakz*) an argument, “indeed, this argument entails an infinite regress of causes (*teselsül*), and infinite regress of causes is invalid”, [the claimant] can object the second component of questioner's

²¹⁴ “Necessary Being, i.e. that which exists by itself or that which cannot but exist, for non-existence of it is unthinkable; an expression used by philosophers for God.” in Sheikh, Saeed, and Alparlan Açıkgenç, *Dictionary*, entry “al-wajib al-wujud”

²¹⁵ “The possible being, i.e. that which receives its existence from another and the non-existence of which is thinkable or possible like this world of ours”. in Sheikh, Saeed, and Alparlan Açıkgenç, entry “al-mumkin al-wujud”.

premise by saying, “I accept the fact that my argument entails a regress of causes, but I don’t accept the fact that regress of causes is invalid. Indeed, regress of causes (*teselsül*) is valid as long as it refers to relative matters of counting (*umur-i i’tibari*).”

To sum up, in both kinds of exposition (*şahid*) the minor premise can be objected (*men’*), and the one who brought the integral-refutation (*nakiz*) [i.e. the questioner] should prove this contested premise (*mukaddeme-i memnu’a*). However, in both kinds of exposition (*şahid*) the major premise cannot be objected. Indeed, it is no place for contesting (*cay-i itiraz olamaz*) the invalidity of a proof that entails invalidity.

Nevertheless, this is more complex in the case of [exposition’s] second kind and it needs more explanations (*takrir*). In the case where the minor premise is the first proposition (*mukaddeme-i vahide*) and the major premise the second one (*ikinci mukaddeme-i zimniyye*) – such as: “This proof is invalid. Indeed, this argument entails a vicious circle (*devr*); and every argument that is such is invalid” – the major premise can be objected unless the invalidity in question refers to self-evident fallacies such as self-contradiction (*ictima’-i nakizayn*).

As we mentioned it in the introduction, the way the questioner becomes the claimant after having invalidated claimant’s argument through an exposition (*şahid*) and taking himself the burden of proof, the claimant becomes also a questioner and the three functions (*vezaif-i selase*)²¹⁶ are transferred to him. As it has been explained, he can object (*men’*) one of the exposition’s premises or integrally refute the exposition (*nakz*), or oppose it a counter-argumentation (*mu’araza*).

If [the previous claimant that became the questioner] doesn’t perform (*icra*) any of these three functions (*vazife*), but brings instead a new argument (*delil*) in order to prove his original plea (*müdde’a*), then there is a problem (*nazar*).

As mentioned in the first chapter, if he shifts to another argument (*intikal*) before having completed his first one, then he has shifted to another discussion (*bahs-i ahara*) in such a way that the first discussion is considered interrupted (*münkati’*). In the terminology of deliberation discipline (*fenn-i münazara*), this is considered as a kind of confutation (*ifham*).

²¹⁶ i.e. objection, integral-refutation and counter-argumentation

And if while he is still able to complete his first argument, he shifts to another argument only in order to compel his opponent to accept his point (*ilzam*) through a more explicit argument, thus it is neither considered as [a sign of] weakness (*'acz*) nor as confutation (*ifham*). On the contrary, by adding to the first argument a one that is more explicit, the opponent may defeat (*mebhut*) his opponent in a powerful manner.

The famous argumentation (*mubahasa*) between Ibrahim (as) and Nimrod belongs to this latter category. In fact, in order to prove the Lordship (*rububiyyet*) of Allah the Almighty, Ibrahim (as) said, “My Lord (*Cenab-ı Hakk*) is He Who gives life and causes death”. Nimrod claimed, “I also give life and cause death”, and then released one prisoner among those who deserved death penalty and executed another one. By doing this, he integrally refutes (*nakz*) Ibrahim’s argument. As an answer, Ibrahim (as) said, “Allah the Almighty brings the sun from the east; then bring it from the west” and Nimrud was defeated (*mebhut*).

By the expression “giving life (*ihya*)”, Ibrahim (as) meant, “giving soul to death body”. This action is particular to Allah the Almighty and there is no place for doubt on this matter. In fact, at this point, Nimrud’s court has accepted (*müsellim*) and recognized (*ma'lum*) [Ibrahim’s argument]. But Nimrud dismissed (*sarf*) this meaning and – following the path of sophistry (*mugalata*) – replied, “I also give life and cause death; therefore, submit yourself to my Lordship”. By saying so, Nimrud contested in such manner that stupid people among his court could hesitate. While Ibrahim (as) could complete his argument by explicating his intention (*tahrir-i murad*), he preferred not to extend his speech and immediately shifted to another example (*missal-i ahara intikal*) in such way that no one, even stupid people, could still hesitate. As a result, he compelled Nimrud to accept his point (*ilzam*).

Third Chapter

Concerning counter-argumentation

Counter-argumentation is composed of three parts (*kısm*):

- Internal counter-argumentation (*münazara bi al-kalb*)
- External counter-argumentation (*münazara bi al-gayr*),
- Medium counter-argumentation (*münazara bi al-misl*).

Indeed, if counter-arguer's argument (*mu'arizin delili*) is identical ('*ayn*) in form (*suretten*) and in matter (*maddeden*) to claimant's argument (*delil-i mu'alil*), thus it is an internal counter-argumentation (*münazara bi al-kalb*); if it is totally different [both in form and in matter], thus it is an external counter-argumentation (*münazara bi al-gayr*); if it is identical in form only, thus it is a medium counter-argumentation (*münazara bi al-misl*). In the case where counter-arguer's proof (*mu'arizin delili*) is different in form but identical in content, thus it is part of external counter-argumentation (*münazara bi al-gayr*).

1. *Form*: By the expression "identical in form", we mean, in the case of categorical syllogism (*iktiraniyyat*), presenting identical logical forms (*şeklleri*), and, in the case of hypothetical syllogism (*istisnaiyyat*), that both should be either direct (*mustaqim*) or indirect (*gayr-i mustaqim*).²¹⁷

2. *Matter*: By the expression "identical in matter", we mean in the case of categorical syllogism (*iktiraniyyat*) the use of the same middle term (*hadd-i evsat*)²¹⁸, and in the case of hypothetical syllogism (*istisnaiyyat*) the use of the same repeated part (*cüz-i mükerrer*).

²¹⁷ If we take the same example than in footnote n.200:

Conditional premise (*mukaddeme-i şartiyye*): "if the sun rises, the room is enlighten";

Hypothetical premise (*mukaddeme-i istisnaiyye*): "and the sun rose";

Conclusion (*netice*): "therefore, the room is enlighten".

If the conclusion is affirming (*vazı'a*) the conditional premise such as: "therefore room is enlighten"; therefore it is a direct hypothetical syllogism (*kıyas-ı istisna-yı müstekim*). On the other hand, if the conclusion is negating (*rafi'*) the conditional premise such as: "therefore the sun did rise"; therefore it is an indirect hypothetical syllogism (*kıyas-ı istisna-yı gayr-ı müstekim*)." More details in Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Miyar-ı Sedat*, 1303/1876", in Büyükcoşkun, Kudret. 1998. pp. 62-64

²¹⁸ "The middle term; the term which is common to the two premises in a syllogism and functions as a uniting link between them; it is, however, absent from the conclusion." in Sheikh, Saeed, and Alparslan Açıkgenç, *Dictionary*. entry, "al-hadd al-ausat".

For example, the philosophers say, “the world is exempted of any cause [for existing], (*müessirden müstagni*) and everything that is exempted of any cause [for existing] is eternal (*kadim*), therefore the world is eternal.” To what the theologians (*mutakkalimin tarafından*) give the following counter-argumentation (*mu’araza*), “the world is changing (*mütageyyer*), and no changing thing is eternal, therefore the world is not eternal.” [Here], both arguments are built on the first [logical] form (*şekli evvel*) but their middle term (*hadd-i evsat*) are different, therefore they are identical in form only (*yalnız suretten muttahid*). Based upon that, it is a medium counter-argumentation (*münazara bi al-misl*).

And again, the theologians reply to the same philosophers’ claim by giving the following counter-argumentation (*mu’araza*), “the world is changing, and no eternal (*kadim*) is changing, therefore the world is not eternal”. [Here], while philosopher’s argument was built on first [logical] form, the counter-argumentation’s argument is built on the second [logical] form. Therefore it is an external counter-argumentation (*bi-l gayr*).

The argument relative to the vision of the God (*ru’yet-i bari*, i.e. beatific vision) is a good example for internal counter-argumentation (*bi-l kalb*). Indeed, according to Ahl al-Sunna’s scholars²¹⁹, “In the day of Judgment (*ruz-i ceza*), believers observe the Creator (*Cenab-i Bari*)”. However, according to Mu‘tezile’s scholars²²⁰, “The vision of the Creator is impossible” and they give the following Qur’anic verse as a proof (*istidlal*): **No vision can grasp Him, but His grasp is over all vision.** (An’am, 103), in other terms, “no eyes can see Him but He see the eyes...” Yet, Ahl al-Sunna’s scholars use the same verse in order to prove that the vision of the Creator it’s possible.

In this example, the middle term (*hadd-i esvat*) that drives the argument is the same in both arguments, thus they are identical in content (*maddeden müttehîd*). Moreover, both arguments present the same [logical] arrangement (*tertîb*)²²¹, therefore there are also

²¹⁹ Literally, “People of the Tradition and Consensus”, i.e. Sunni orthodoxy

²²⁰ i.e. Unorthodox theological group that bases his credo upon strict rational reading of Qur’an and Tradition.

²²¹ Sheikh, Saeed, and Alparslan Açıkgenç, *Dictionary*, entry “tartib”

identical in form (*suret den dahi müttehîd*). In sum, it is an internal counter-argumentation.

Namely, Mu‘tezile’s scholars prove (*istidlal*) their point by saying, “the vision of God is impossible. Indeed, the vision of the Creator is denied (*nefy*) in the Holy Qur’an, and everything that is denied (*nefy*) in the Holy Qur’an is impossible”. To what Ahl al-Sunna’s scholars reply, “although this argument demonstrates (*delalet*) your plea (*mudde’a*), we have also something that negates it and this is precisely the same argument”. Namely, “the vision of God is possible. Indeed, the vision of God has been denied in the Holy Qur’an, and everything that is denied in the in the Holy Qur’an is possible.”

Since both arguments are built on the same first [logical] form, Ahl al-Sunna’s scholars present here an internal counter-argumentation (*mu’araza al-kalb*). They support their counter-argumentation’s argument in such manner: “if things that have been denied (*nefy*) in the Holy Qur’an were not possible, there would be no sense to deny them. Especially in the stand of the Lord (*makam-i temeddüh*), it would have been meaningless to deny (*nefy*) something impossible²²². Therefore, the consequent (*tali*) is invalid.” In conclusion they say, “as a result, everything that has been denied (*nefy*) in the Holy Qur’an is possible.”

And if the counter-argumentation’s argument were built on the second [logical] form it would be different in form (*suret*), thus it would be an external counter-argumentation (*bi al-gayr*). For instance: “The vision of God has been denied in the Holy Qur’an; and any possible cannot be denied in the Holy Qur’an; therefore, the vision of the Creator is not possible.”

Likewise, if the counter-argumentation’s argument is an indirect hypothetical syllogism (*kıyas-ı istisnai-yi gayr-i müstekim*) it would be: “if the vision of God were not possible, it would not have been denied in the Holy Qur’an. However, it has been denied in the Holy Qur’an. Therefore, the vision of God is possible.” By settling the proof in this manner, both arguments become different in form, thus the counter-argumentation is necessarily external.

²²² i.e. in the stand of the Lord, everything that is saying should be relevant.

Total fallacies (*Mugalatat-ı 'ammet'il-vurud*)²²³: They are fallacies through which every thing – even two propositions that are contradicting each other (*yek diğeri nakizi olan iki kazıyye*) – can be proved (*istidlal*). In fact, even these fallacies are included in internal counter-argumentation (*bi al-kalb*).

For example, “the thing that entails (*istilzam eden şey*) existing human (*vücudi insan*) and non-existing human (*'ademi insan*) to be inanimate body (*cemad*) cannot be free of both [states at the same time] but must be in any case either existing (*mevcut*) or non-existing (*ma'dum*). Therefore, it is proved that human is an inanimate body.” Likewise “if in any case (*behemehal*) the existence or the non-existence of the thing that entails existing human and non-existing human to be inanimate body is firmly established (*sabit*), [then] human must be an inanimate body; the antecedent (*mukaddem*) is verified (*hakdır*), i.e. in any case the existence or the non-existence of the thing that entails existing human and non-existing human to be inanimate body has been firmly established; therefore, we conclude that human is an inanimate body.²²⁴

Since this argument is a fallacy it can prove the opposite claim, which is “human is not an inanimate body”. Namely, “if existence or non-existence of the thing that entails existing and non-existing human not to be inanimate body is firmly established, then human must not be an inanimate body; the antecedent (*mukaddem*) is verified (*hakdır*); therefore, the consequent (*tali*) is likewise, i.e. human is not inanimate body.”

Both arguments are direct hypothetical syllogisms (*kıyas-ı istisnai-yi müstakim*) and share identical repeated part (*cüz-i mükerreleri müttehid*), thus it is internal counter-argumentation (*mu'araza bi'l-kalb*).

²²³ Literally, “Fallacies of general appearance”

²²⁴ P and not P; if P and not P = Q; but then P and not P

This fallacy presents such state that we object (*men'*) the effectiveness of the condition (*şartıyyenin mülazemesi*) in the case where the non-existence of the thing [that entails existing human...] would be selected (*ihtiyar*).²²⁵

Indeed, if – as the sophists argues – the entailing attribute (*iltizam sıfatı*) of fallacy's claim were remaining whereas the thing that is tied up with the entailing attribute (*istilzam etmek sıfatıyla mukayyed olan şey*) of fallacy's claim is non-existent, therefore the effectiveness of the condition would be verified (*mülazeme tamam olurdu*). But this is invalid (*memnu'*). [In fact,] it is probable (*caiz*) that the entailing attribute ends (*müntefi'*) with the end of this thing, or, that the thing remains while the entailing attribute ends. Indeed, two [combinations] are possible: either the end of both the tied thing (*mukayyed*) and what it is tied with (*kayd*), or the end of what it is tied with only (*kayd*).

For example, when we say, “in this room there is no black cassock” [where cassock is the tied thing (*mukayyed*) and black what it is tied (*kayd*)], there is the possibility (*muhtemel*) that no cassock could be found in the room at all, but also the possibility (*ihimali*) that cassock of other colours – other than black – could be found. However, in these two forms (*surette*) the effectiveness of the condition cannot be verified (*şartıyyenin mülazemesi tamam olmaz*).²²⁶

The counter-argumentation (*mu'araza*) is based on both invalidation of the claimant's claim (*mu'allilin da'vasını ibtal*) and opposition to the claimant's argument (*mu'allilin deliline mukabele*). However, the internal counter-argumentation (*mu'raza bil kalb*) has the meaning of integral-refutation (*nakz*). Indeed, a valid argument (*delil-i sahih*) cannot be built on two premises that are contradicting each other (*nakizayn*). As a result, the internal counter-argumentation (*mu'raza bil kalb*) can be arranged in the way of integral-refutation's argument (*delil-i nakz*).

²²⁵ If the hypothetical premise accepted (*vazi'a*) this part of the conditional premise (“i.e and the non-existence of the thing”), it cannot lead to the conclusion that (i.e. “then human must be inanimate body”). In other word, the condition could not be applied, effective. [“if existence or **non-existence of the thing** that entails existing and non-existing human to be inanimate body **is firmly established**, then human must be an inanimate body.]

²²⁶ Because the result remains unclear, no strict conclusion can be deduced from this hypothetical syllogism.

It is as follow: “If as mentioned above, the argument demonstrates your claim, I have with me something that denies it, and this is exactly the same argument (*bi-‘aynihi bu delildir*).” If it is arranged in this way then it is an internal counter-argumentation (*mu’raza bil kalb*). However if it is arranged as follow then it is an integral-refutation (*nakz*): “this argument is not true (*sahih*); indeed, this argument is also operative (*cari*) in the opposite claim (*müdde‘anın nakizinde*) and this contradicts the conclusion of your claim (*hükm-i müdde’a mütehallef*).”

As it has been exposed in the introduction, both the refuter (*nakiz*) and the counter-arguer (*mu’ariz*) are those who present arguments (*mustadill*). So in such situation the [original] claimant becomes the questioner and the functions (*vazife*) of objection (*men’*), integral-refutation (*nakz*) or counter-argumentation (*mu’araza*) has been transferred to him. As a result, he can object (*men’*) or integrally refute by exposition (*şahid ile nakz*) one premise of the counter-argumentation’s argument (*mu’araza delilinin bir mukaddemesi*). However, it does not satisfy the purpose to oppose a counter-argumentation to a counter-argumentation. Indeed, the same way counter-arguer’s argument is counter-arguing first claimant’s claim (*evvelki delil*), it would also counter-argue the second one (*ikinci delil*). Therefore, the claimant’s claim could not be firmly established in this case (*sabit olmaz*). Based upon that, counter-argumentation’s argument should be challenged (*ta’arruz*) through either objection (*men’*) or integral-refutation (*nakz*).

Nevertheless, if claimant’s second argument takes advantage (*müstefad*) from weak aspects of counter-arguer’s argument (*mu’araza delilinin vech-i ihtilali*) – by including counter-arguer’s prerequisites (*müsellem*) or content of his objection (*men’-i zımniyi*) – then, opposing a counter-argumentation to a counter-argumentation may satisfy the purpose.

Application

(*temrin*)

Among the scholars of *Ahl al-Sunna*, speech (*kelam*) is one of the divine eternal attributes of God (*sifat-i ezeliyye-i ilahiyye*). However the *Mu'tezile* scholars deny this and claim that God's speech (*kelamullah*) is created. Yet, it is said in the Holy Qur'an "**...wa kalaamullahu Musa takliman**", i.e. "Allah the Almighty really (*hakikaten*) spoke to Moses" [Nisa, 164].

In fact, the scholars of *Ahl al-Sunna* prove their claim with this verse and say: "*kelam* – i.e. to utter (*söylemek*) – has been attributed (*musned*) in the Holy Qur'an to Allah; And everything that has been attributed to Allah in the Holy Qur'an refers to an eternal attribute (*sifat-i ezeliyye*). Therefore, speech (*kelam*) too is an eternal attribute (*sifat-i ezeliyye*). In other terms, Allah the Almighty (*Cenab-ı Hakk*) is really (*hakikaten*) characterized by it (*onunla muttasıftır*)".

Mu'tezile scholars refute this argument in three manners (*turuk-i salasa*), and *Ahl al-Sunna* scholars provide an answer to each one of them.

It is as follow:

1. Firstly *Mu'tezile* scholars **object (*men'*)** the minor premise of the argument, "it is invalid to argue that in this verse [the term] *kelam* (speech) has been attributed (*musned*) to Allah the Almighty. It is acceptable here to say (*caiz*) that *kelam* (speech) is a metaphoric expression (*mecazen sözü*) that means, "to create" (*halk etmek*).

Ahl al-Sunna scholars can support their contested premise (*mukaddeme-i memnu'a isbat*) by saying, "if it were not attributed to Allah the Almighty, then there would be no relation at all (*bi-la karine-i mani'a 'udul*) between the intrinsic meaning of the term *kelam* (*asl olan man'a*) and the reality (*hakiki*). But this is not acceptable (*caiz değildir*). Therefore, it has been firmly established (*sabit*) that *kelam* (speech) is really attributed to Allah the Almighty.

2. Secondly, *Mu'tezile* scholars might propose an **integral-refutation (*nakz*)** such as, "the creation too (*halk dahi*) has been attributed in the Holy Qur'an to Allah the Almighty, so your argument is also operative (*cari*) in this case. However, creation

(*halk*) is a relative issue (*emr-i izaft*) and not a eternal attribute, thus this contradicts the conclusion of your claim.”

The scholars of *Ahl al-Sunna* may object the validity of this contradiction by saying, “it is acceptable to say that creation (*halk*) – understood as constitution (*takwin*) – is an eternal attribute for which its occurrence is temporal (*te’alukkat-i hadis*) and relative (*emr-i izaft*) such as life, knowledge, power, will, hearing, seeing, and speech.

3. Thirdly, *Mu’tezile* scholars may propose a **counter-argumentation (mu‘araza)** such as: “*kelam* (speech) is composed of contingent letters (*huruf-i hadiseden murekkeptir*), and every thing that is composed of contingent letters is contingent, and no contingent can be eternal attribute, therefore *kelam* (speech) is not an eternal attribute.

Ahl al-Sunna scholars may reply that, “things that are composed of letters are phonetic speech (*kelam-i lafzi*), and no one can contest (*münaza’a*) the fact such speeches are contingent. However, here [by the term “speech”] we refer to the divine essence of speech (*kelam-i nefsi-yi ilahi*) that is not composed of letters. Therefore, if you mean by speech the essence of speech (*kalam-ı nefsi*) then the minor premise of counter-argumentation’s argument is invalid, and if you mean phonetic speech (*kalaam lafzi*) then the targeting (*takrib*) of your counter-argumentation’s argument is invalid.

Summary

(Fezleke)

- **Objecting** (*men' etmek*) a proposition (*kaziyye*) does not render it invalid (*butlan*), but it does point out its ambiguity (*hafası*). A proof that includes an ambiguous premise leads to non-established knowledge (*ma'lum al-subut değil*). No one can firmly establish a thing based on non-established knowledge. Therefore claimant's claim (*da'va*) cannot be firmly established (*sabit*) if it is based on this argument (*delil*).

- **Integrally-refuting** (*nakz etmek*) something means *to invalidate it (ibtal)*. Therefore, integrally-refuting an argument (*delil*) means to *render it invalid (butlan)*. However, argument's invalidity does not automatically imply claim's invalidity. In fact, the argument is entailed by the claim (*delil da'vanın melzumudur*). It is possible (*caiz*) that the entailing thing (*lazim*, i.e. the claim) would be more general (*e'amm*) than the entailed thing (*melzum*, i.e. the argument). As a result, negating (*intifa'*) the entailed thing (*melzum*, i.e. the argument) does not necessarily lead to negating the entailing thing (*lazim*, i.e. the claim). Finally, even if this claim cannot be firmly established (*sabit*) with this proof, it might be with another one.

Based upon that, even if objection (*men'*) and integral-refutation's (*nakz*) consequences on the argument differ [one reveals its ambiguity and the other renders it invalid], their consequences on the claim are identical (*müttehid*) [in both cases, the claimant has to support his claim with an new argumentation].

The result of **counter-argumentation** is the *dismantlement at every stage (musakata)*. In other terms, arguments (*deliller*) has been counter-argued (*mute'ariz*) and dismantled (*mutesakit*), [therefore] the claim (*da'va*) is left without any argument (*bila delil*). In brief, it means that the claimant's claim has not been firmly established (*sabit olmamış olur*).

Considering this explanation, these three functions (*vezائف-i selasenin*) all converge to the same point, i.e. the claimant's claim is not firmly established (*mu'allilin da'vası sabit değil demektir*).

Attacking (*te'aruz*) the claim is stronger (*evka*) than attacking (*te'aruz*) the argument, therefore the stronger attack (*i'tirazatın eşeddi*) is the counter-argumentation

(*mu'araza*) and then the integral-refutation (*nakz*). Although objection (*men'*) is the weakest of all the three attacks (*i'tirazin ez'afi*) it is the most comfortable (*eslemi*).²²⁷ In the process of disclosing the truth (*izhar al-sevab*) objection is also more relevant (*dahli*) than the two other functions. Indeed, after an objection it is up to the claimant to prove his contested premise (*mukaddeme-i memnu'a*) and his claim (*da'va*) is considered as true (*hak olduđunu zahir olur*) only after he has demonstrated it (*ledeyi al-isbat*). On the other hand, in the case of integral-refutation (*nakz*) and counter-argumentation (*mu'araza*) the claimant becomes the questioner and he can choose between the three functions (*vezaiif-i selaseden*) he wants. However, if he chooses objection or counter-argumentation, his original claim could not be fully considered as true. In order to save his claim from any doubt he should integrally-refute (*nakz*) the opponent's proof.

²²⁷ Objection is the most comfortable function because the questioner does not have to argue his objection with supporting evidence.

Explanatory Notes (*faide*)

Syllogism is either singular (*müfred*) or compounded (*mürekkebe*), and sometimes – in order to shorten the statement (*li-ecli al-ih̄tis̄ar*) – some premises are unexpressed (*tayy*).

1. If the expressed premise of the syllogism (*kıyasın mezkur olan mukaddemesi*) includes (*müştemil*) the subject present in the conclusion (*matlubun mevdu‘*) it is then the minor premise; in this case, the major premise remains unexpressed (*matvi*).

2. On the other hand, if the expressed premise of the syllogism includes the predicate present in the conclusion (*matlubun mahmulu*) then it is the major premise; in this case the minor premise remains unexpressed (*matvi*).

3. However, if the expressed premise of the syllogism does not include neither the subject nor the predicate present in the conclusion (*matlubun hiç bir tarafı*) then there is a problem (*nazar*).

4. Finally, if the expressed premise of the syllogism leads directly to the conclusion (*matlubu müntic*) in a simple manner, then it is a hypothetical single syllogism (*kıyas-i müfred-i istisna*) or a compounded syllogism (*kıyas-i mürekkebe*).

For instance, when one says, “it is daytime because sun rose”, the premise “sun rose” does not include neither the subject nor the predicate present in the conclusion (i.e. it is daytime). Yet, it is a hypothetical syllogism in which the premise leads directly to the conclusion in a simply manner.

We can elucidate this syllogism as follow: “Indeed, every time that the sun rises, it is daytime”. “And the sun rose”. “Therefore, it is daytime.”

When one says, “the world has a Causer (*müessir*); indeed every changing thing is created (*her mütegayyer hadisdir*)”, the expressed premise – i.e. “every changing thing is created” –cannot lead to the conclusion [alone]. Therefore, it is a compounded syllogism. We can elucidate this syllogism as follow: “the world is changing, and every changing thing is created, and every created thing has a Causer (*müessir*), therefore the world has a Causer.

Chapter four
Concerning apprehensional notions²²⁸ (*tasawwur*)

First part
Definition (*ta'rif*)²²⁹

Definition (*ta'rif*) is composed of an apprehension (*tasvir*) of a thing in the mind (*zihn*). Definition cannot be objected (*men'*) nor counter-argued (*mu'araza*). However, a definition can be integrally refuted (*nakz*) if it does not satisfy all the conditions (*şartlarını müstecmi ' değil*) or if it entails invalidity (*fesad*).

In this case, the one who contests the definition is the one who gives argument (*mustedill*) and the one who answer him is the one who refuses this argument (*mani'*).

In fact, if the definition does not includes all its members (*efradını cami'*) nor exclude its non-member (*ağyarını mani'*), then it could possibly entail a vicious circle or an infinite regress of causes. Therefore, such definitions can be integrally refuted (*nakz*). On the other hand, the one who gave the definition can object (*men'*) this integral refutation.

It is as follow: “this definition is not valid (*sahih*) because it is does not include all its members, and every definition that does not include all its members is not valid, therefore this definition is not valid”.

Concerning definitions, there is a place for integral-refutation only when it refers to a real case (*muhakkık*) in the matter of fact (*nefs-i al-emrde*). Therefore, the minor premise (of the integral-refutation) should be proved.²³⁰

The minor premise is demonstrated as follow: “indeed, this definition does not include such thing (*filan şey*), however the thing defined (*mu'arref*) is reliable (*sadik*) with it.”

²²⁸ al-Qazwini al-Katibi, Najm al-Din, *Al-Risala al-Shamsiyya*. 13th century C.E. Trans. Aloys Sprenger, 1854 in *First Appendix to the Dicyionnary of Technical Terms used in the Sciences of the Mussalmans*, containing the Logic of the Arabians, Bengal Military Orphan Press, Calcutta. p.3

²²⁹ We translate by “definition” and not by “description” since the term “*ta'rif*” is used in order to clarify scientific concepts (*istilahi*). However, in daily life this term mainly refer to “description” in a general meaning (*lugavi*).

²³⁰ The minor premise refers to the premise with the smallest component. Therefore, we should explain – here – why the definition does not include all its members.

“And every definition that presents such form (*hal*) and such nature (*şan*) doesn't include all its members.”

However, the minor premise of this argument is itself composed of two premises: (1) this definition does not include this thing; (2) the defined is reliable with this thing. The one who gave the definition can object both of them.

It is as follow: “in this definition, the meaning (*murad*) of this word is that (A), therefore it is not acceptable (*müsellem degil*) to say that the definition does not include this thing”.

or

“the meaning of the thing defined (*mu'arref*) is that (B), therefore it is not acceptable to say that the defined is only reliable (*sadik*) with this thing.”

Likewise, the definition can be refuted as follow: “this definition includes this thing, and the thing defined (*mu'arref*) is not reliable with it, and every definition that is as such doesn't exclude non-members (*agyarini mani' degildir*); every definition that doesn't exclude non-members is not valid (*sahih*). Therefore, this definition is not valid.”

As mentioned above, when one of the two propositions (*mukaddeme*) that composed refutation's minor premise (*sugra*) is objected, the one who originally gave the definition (*mani'*) can answer by making his intention more explicit (*tahrir-i murad*) concerning what he understands by definition (*ta'rif*) or by the thing defined (*mu'arref*).

It is also possible to refute the definition as follow: “this definition entails a vicious circle (*devr*) or a infinite regress of causes (*teselsül*), and every definition that presents such condition (*hal*) is not valid (*sahih*). Therefore, this definition is not valid.”

The one who gave the definition can object (*men'*) the minor premise by saying, “it is not acceptable to say that there is a vicious circle (*devr*) or an infinite regress of causes (*teselsül*).”

or

by objecting the major premise: “it is possible that the circle is a sequencing circle (*devr-i me'id*), and the infinite regress of causes (*teselsül*) a relative matter of counting

(*umur-i i'tibari*), and both sequencing circle (*devr-i me'id*) and relative regress of causes (*teselsül-i i'tibari*) are not invalid”.

Second Part

The division of concept (*taksim*)

The division of concept (*taksim*) is a species (*nev'*) of definition (*ta'rif*). As a result, divisions of concept (*taksimler*) too cannot be objected (*men'*) or counter-argued (*mu'araza*). However, if they do not include all the conditions (*şaraitlerini müstacmi' değil diye*) they can be integrally refuted (*nakz*).

In this case, the one who contests the division of concept (*taksim*) is the one who gives argument (*mustedill*) and the one who answer him is the one who refuses this argument (*mani'*).

The division of concept is composed of two kinds (*nev'*):

- **Firstly, analysis (*tahlil*) and division of a universal concept into all its [ultimate] members (*küllinin eczasına tahlil ve taksimidir*).**

For example: “a room is composed of four walls and one ceiling”; or this second example: “every element (*her cism*) is composed of soil, water, air and fire”; or this third one: “lemonade is composed of lemon juice and a bit of sugar with drinking water”.

In this kind of division, the division is composed of the total of all divided members (*mukassem olan küll mecmu-i ecza*). Every divided member should be strictly different one to another (*mubayin*).

- **Secondly, the classification of a universal concept into its members (*küllinin cüz'iyatına taksimidir*).**

For example: “animal (*hayvan*) is either a rational animal (*hayvan-i natik*) or a non-rational animal (*hayvan gayr-i natik*)”; or this second example: “an element (*unsur*) is either oil or water or air or fire”.

In this kind of division, the universal concept that has been classified (*mukassemin*) should be absolutely more general (*mutlakan e’amm*) than its parts (*kısmı*). If a part (*aksam birisi*) is equal (*‘ayn*) or strictly different (*mubayin*) to the universal concept (*mukassemin*), then the classification is invalid.

For instance, the classification is invalid in the following three examples: “human being (*insan*) is either man (*beşer*) or horse (*feres*)”; “human being is either man or Negro”; “human being is either Greek or Persian”.

The classification should comprehend its parts (*taksim in aksamını hasır olması*). In other terms, the universal concept that has been classified (*mukassemin*) should perfectly comprehend all its parts (*kaffe-i müştemilatı aksamında münderic*), without excluding any part outside [the concept]. Otherwise the classification can be integrally refuted.

For example: “in this classification, this thing is missing among the parts, however the universal concept that has been classified should comprehend it (*mukassemin ona şamildir*). Every classification that is such is not comprehensive enough (*aksamını hasır değildir*). And every classification that is not comprehensive enough is invalid. Therefore, this classification is invalid.” The one who provides the classification (*kasim*) can object the allegation that this thing is missing among the parts, or that the classified universal concept (*muqassim*, concept) should comprehend it.

However, in the classification there are two methods for comprehending the parts:

- absolute mind based (*‘aqli*):
- inductive practical based (*istikra ‘i*)²³¹

The **absolute mind based comprehension** (*hasır ‘aqli*) results from rational restriction (*‘aklen münhasır*) of the classified universal concept into its parts (*aksamında*) by

²³¹ “Induction, i.e. arriving at a general conclusion or a universal proposition through the observation of particular instances, e.g. "All crow are black" or "All ruminants are cloven footed"” in Sheikh, Saeed, and Alparslan Açıkgenç, *Dictionary*, entry “istikra”

interrogating either in affirmative or negative manner (*nefy ile isbat beyninde mutereddid*).

Therefore, we call it **absolute mind based classification** (*taksim-i ‘akli*) because if rationally we accept another part (*kism-i diđer*), the classification would be refuted (*mankuz*).

For instance, the classification of the concept of “animal”, between “rational” (*natik*) and “irrational” (*ghayr-i natik*): by interrogating either in affirmative or negative manner – i.e. “an animal is either rational or not” – we [come to the conclusion that] rationally we cannot find another part to the concept of “animal”.

The classification of number (*‘aded*), between even (*zevc*) and odd (*ferd*), is part of this definition too. Indeed, the meaning of even is “a non-odd number” (*ferd olmayan ‘aded*) and the meaning of odd is “a non-even number”. By interrogating either in affirmative or negative manner, [we come to the conclusion that] number is rationally restricted (*munhasir*) in these two parts (*kism*).

In the case of **inductive practical based comprehension** (*hasr-i istikra‘inde*), the restriction of the classified universal concept into its parts (*mukassemin aksamında*) is not determined through rational means but through induction (*istikra‘*) and observation (*tetebbu‘*).

Therefore, we call it **inductive practical based classification** (*taksim-i istikar‘i*). There is a place for integral-refutation (*nakz*) only when it refers to a real case (*muhakkık*) in the matter of fact (*nefs-i al-emrde*).

In the example mentioned above, element (*unsur*) is divided in four parts, but rationally we could admit additional parts without rendering the classification invalid.

Therefore, in order to refute the classification in four parts, it is required to find [in the matter of fact] a fifth element (*besinci unsur*) and to bring it [in the debate].

Epilogue (*hatime*)

Concerning Applied Ethics of Deliberation

(*Adab-ı Münazara beyanındadır*)

1. In a deliberation session (*meclis-i münazarada*), [discussants] must not deliver long speech and circumlocution (*itnab-ı mekal*) that cause lassitude (*kelal*) and tiredness (*melal*).
2. [On the other hand, discussants] must prevent themselves from shortening too much their speech if it undermines the understanding of the meaning (*fehmi-i ma'naya halel verecek mertebe*).
3. Especially, they must refrain to use strange terms (*elfaz-ı garibe*) that make difficult the comprehension and those concise expressions (*lafz-ı mücmel*) that make the understanding doubtful.
4. The deliberator (*münazır*) can make repeat his opponent until he understands his intention (*meram*). On the other hand, it is not acceptable to attack his statement (*kelamina dahl*) before having understood it.
5. Discussants must not leave the primary goal of discussion (*sadedden çıkmamalı*) by disputing (*ta'rruz*) things that do not participate to the disclosing of the truth (*izhar-ı savab*), the real aim (*maksad*). Otherwise, they are just digressing and spreading irrelevant statements (*söz dağılıp*).
6. During the deliberation (*esna-i münazarada*), some attitudes are inappropriate such as laughing, writhing, and uttering with anger. Only ignorant people (*cahiller*) adopt these kinds of posture and by doing this they prove their ignorance.
7. In a context of disputation (*meydan-ı mübahasede*), no one should see his opponent as disdained (*hakir*), otherwise such misesteem might lead him to utter weak statements and as a result, to lose the debate (*maglubu olmasına sebep olabilir*). In brief, before encountering the other side (*mukabeleye kiyam*), discussants must speak with insight (*basiret*) and pay attention to what they say (*sözü dikkat*), they must listen their

opponent's statement with care and consideration (*teeni*) and understand opponent's intention as it deserves (*meramını layığıyla anlamalı*).

8. Interrupting opponent's statement in middle of his speech is a violation of etiquette (*hilaf-ı edeptir*). Especially, it is unsuitable (*na-beja*) and inappropriate for a third person to jump into a discussion (*bahs*) between two other persons and to interrupt them. However, human being is hasty ('*acul*) and greedy (*hariss*) by nature (*bi-hasebi'l-fitra*), he does not contain his anger towards the other, and then falls intentionally in the mentioned mistakes.

9. Therefore, in deliberation (*münazara*), the one in charged of moderating the debate (*münazaraya me'mur olan meclislerin riyaseti*) has one of the most important roles (*mehamm-ı umurundandır*). Indeed, when the moderators (*reisler*) don't manage to run deliberation in the best manners (*hüsn-i idare*), argument sessions fall into tumults and disorders (*kargaşalık*). Because of that, we assisted thousand times in argumentations (*mübahasat*) and discussions (*müzakerat*) that don't produce anything.

10. In the other hand, argumentation sessions (*meclis-i müzakara*) that are animated by discipline of mind and character (*inzibat*), constancy and method (*intizam*) are respecting the requisite rules.

These words are for those who are engaged in deliberation (*Ehl ve Erbab-ı Münazara*)

Discussing with people who don't know deliberation's ethics and rules (*adab ve kavanin-i münazara*) is futile pursuit (*bihude yorgunluktur*). Deliberation should be practiced by trained deliberators (*ahl ve arbabiyle munazara olunmalı*), and likewise, ethical dialectics (*hüsn-i cedal*) should be practiced by trained dialecticians. They must prevent themselves from entering into opponent's fallacy.

**Allah leads to the truth (*va Allahu al-muvaffiku li l-sawab*)
and He inspires good thoughts (*ve hüve al-mülhim li l-sedad*)**

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CURRICULUM VITAE

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- MA graduate from both Sciences Po Paris and Alliance of Civilizations Institute (Istanbul)
- 5 years experience in academic researches and field surveys (3 in Istanbul)

1. Work experience

- [Feb. 2018 - Today] **Research Assistant at the European Studies Department** (Istanbul)
Employer: SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research)
- Conducting studies on Turkey-EU relations, Turks in France, Islam in Europe
 - Writing Book chapters, reports, analyses and press articles
- [2014 - Today] **Project Manager in Publishing** (Istanbul)
Employer: Erkam Publications
- Turkish-French Translator in the International Publishing Service
 - Editing, review and advice on the quality of journals and books
- [Summer 2017] **Project Manager – Coaching in Academic and Professional fields** (Istanbul)
Employer: Türkmeç in cooperation with TIKA and Istanbul Chamber of Commerce
- Giving conference on entrepreneurship, coaching, co-organizing activities
 - Translating trainings and conferences for a group of Nigerian professionals
- [2015 - 2016] **Event Manager (Publishing division)** (Istanbul)
Employer: University of Marmara
- Responsible of French Publications for “Turks and Armenians” Conference <http://turksandarmenians.marmara.edu.tr/fr/>
 - Team Coordinator of 5 translators: organizing workshops, planning missions, following the project and its implementation

2. Education

- [2014 – 2017] **Alliance of Civilizations Institute (Ibn Khaldun University)** (Istanbul)
- **MA(Res) in Civilization studies:** Islamic and Western thoughts, relations, and history
 - **Thesis:** Ahmed Cevdet Paşa's *Adab-ı Sedat*: a comparative study between Islamic theory of argumentation (*munathara*) and contemporary Western literature on argumentation.
 - **Supervisor:** Prof. Dr. Recep Şentürk

- [2008 – 2013] **Sciences Po Paris** (Paris)
- **MA in Urban Policy** – Design and implementation of public policies and urban projects, Urban strategies for companies, Economic and sociological surveys
- BA in Social sciences** – General training in political sciences, economics and sociology

3. Languages

French – Mother tongue **English** – Fluent (language of study and work)
Turkish – Fluent **Arabic** – Operational

4. Internships

- [2013] **Junior Consultant (Marketing division)** (Paris)
Employer: Veolia Transdev, international company for public transportation services
- Designing and implementing public transport networks in several French cities
 - Providing reports, analysis and propositions on public transport networks
 - Development of Marketing tools for intern communication
- [2012 – 2013] **Student Consulting Team Coordinator** (Amiens, North of France)
Employer: Aduga, Urban planning agency
- Economic and social survey on the reconversion of industrial areas
 - Providing urban planning tools to improve analysis of post-industrial urban transformation
 - Meeting and elaborating strategies with local politicians and professionals
- [2011] **Communication assistant** (London, UK)
Employer: LK Bennett
- Web marketing assistance, eBay-selling analysis, clients analysis

6. Additional information

Driving Licence
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