IBN HALDUN UNIVERSITY
ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS INSTITUTE
DEPARTMENT OF CIVILIZATION STUDIES

PHD THESIS

WHAT DO WE DO WITH ARGUMENTS?: SITUATING MUNĀẒARA IN CONTEMPORARY ARGUMENTATION SCHOLARSHIP

RAHMİ ORUÇ

THESIS SUPERVISOR: PROF. DR. RECEP ŞENTÜRK

ISTANBUL, 2022

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by

RAHMİ ORUÇ

A thesis submitted to the Alliance of Civilizations Institute for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy in Civilization Studies

THESIS SUPERVISOR: PROF. DR. RECEP ŞENTÜRK

ISTANBUL, 2022

ACADEMIC HONESTY ATTESTATION

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ÖZ

BİR ARGÜMANLA NE YAPARIZ?: MÜNAZARAYI MODERN TARTIŞMA LİTERATÜRÜ ÜZERİNDEN DÜŞÜNMEK

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Bu çalışma Âdâbu'l-bahs ve-l münâzara'yı güncel argümantasyon teorileri literatürüne tanıtmaktadır. Bu maksatla, biraz geniş bir araştırma sorusuyla yola çıkıyorum: Argümantasyon teorileri neden birçok farklı amaçlar vaz etmektedir? Bu amaçların şekillenmesi noktasında hakikat ve kişilik tasavvuru nasıl bir rol oynamaktadır? Tez, hakikat ve kişilik tasavvurunun, bir argümantasyon teorisi modelinin belirlenmesinde başat rol oynadığını iddia etmektedir. Şöyle ki, hakikat ve kişilik tasavvuru nazari tercihleri şekillendirdiği gibi; bir kurala uymak ya da uymamanın ne anlama geldiğini belirleyen analitik araçları da şekillendirir.

Metodolojik çerçeve olarak, pragma-diyalektik tarafından tanımlanan bir argümantasyon teorisi araştırma programının beş bileşenini kullanıyorum. Tezin ilk kısmında pragma-diyalektik, epistemolojik argümantasyon teorisi, erdem argümantasyon teorisi ve Habermas'ın formal pragmatik teorisini inceliyorum. Sonuç olarak, bu teorilerin hakikat ve kişiliğe dair bakış açılarıyla çeşitlendiğini gösteriyorum. Tezin ikinci kısmında Münâzara'ya geçiyorum. Önce, Münâzara'nın entelektüel tarihi, gelişimi, ve prosedürünü araştırıyorum. Sonra, alimler arasındaki çeşitli tartışmaları yorumluyorum. En nihayetinde, karşılaştırmalı bir perspektifle, Münâzara'yı diğer teorilerden ayrıştıran özelliklerini tespit etmeye çalışıyorum.

Hülasa, Münâzara, ne yalnızca diyalojik, epistemik; ne de yalnızca kişilik-merkezli bir argümantasyon teorisidir. Aksine, teori bu üç farklı yaklaşımı da mecz etmeye çalışmaktadır. Bu meczetme işleminin Merâtibu'l-Vücûd ve Merâtibu-l Nefs yaklaşımından kaynaklandığını iddia ediyorum. Şöyle ki; kişi hakikate irticalen ulaşır, bunun ilk basamağı istidlal ve argümantasyonken; ikinci basamağıysa erdemdir.

Anhatar kelimeler: Âdâbu'l-bahs ve-l münâzara, epistemolojik argümantasyon teorisi, erdem argümantasyon teorisi, Habermas, hakikat ve kişilik, pragma-diyalektik.

ABSTRACT

**WHAT DO WE DO WITH ARGUMENTS?:
SITUATING MUNĀẒARA IN CONTEMPORARY ARGUMENTATION SCHOLARSHIP**

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This study introduces Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓara, literally the manners of inquiry and argumentation, to contemporary argumentation scholarship. To do so, I begin with a rather broad research question: Why do argumentation theories envision different goals? To what extent do different conceptions of self and truth shape this diversity? The thesis argues that our conception of truth and self informs our model of argumentation by shaping the theoretical preferences and analytical tools such that they determine what amounts to observation and violation of the idealized rules of argumentation. Employing the five components of a research program in argumentation as its methodology developed by pragma-dialectics, in the first section, I explore pragma-dialectics, epistemological approach to argumentation, virtue approach to argumentation, and formal pragmatics of Habermas. I show how these theories are developed within certain philosophies of reasonableness shaped by considerations of truth and self. In the second section, I proceed to Munāẓara. I introduce the discipline and provide its intellectual history and development, its procedure, the disagreements between Munāẓara scholars, and finally, its peculiarities in comparison with the contemporary theories. I argue that Munāẓara is a dialogically-epistemic agent-driven theory of argumentation. I trace its attention to the dialogue, knowledge, and virtue to the multiplex theory of truth. The self can gradually arrive at truth, first through justification and argumentation, second through virtue.

Keywords: Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓara, epistemological approach to argumentation, virtue approach to argumentation, Habermas, truth and self, pragma-dialectics

Dedicated to my mother Ribaşa and brother Şiyar

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This work would not have been possible without the help of many. Among those, first and foremost comes Seyda Xelîl Îbrahîm Banûkî, who accepted me as a student and taught me not only the content of the madrasa curriculum but also its tahqīq. Next, Recep Şentürk dedicated much of his valuable time to supervising the thesis. The thesis received its final form thanks to his discipline and practical wisdom. Then came Önder Küçükural and Mehmet Ali Üzelgun, who introduced me to contemporary scholarship and accepted me as their colleagues. Last but certainly not least, I owe gratitude to Seyda Maşuk Yamaç, Nagihan Haliloğlu, Vahdettin Işık, Ercüment Asil, Hatice Meryem, Karim Sadek, Alpaslan Açıkgenç, Gökdemir İhsan, Sehel Oto, Çetin Baskın, Elif Gezer, Osman Seracettin Aydın, Berat Açıl and Rajeev Kumar for being with me in different junctures of my life.

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INTRODUCTION

0.1. RESEARCH QUESTION AND THESIS STATEMENT

A bird-eye view of contemporary argumentation literature baffles its readers with its richness and complexity. Envisioning different goals, there are rhetorical (Tindale, 2015), dialectical (Barth and Krabbe, 2010; van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003), and logical theories of argumentation (Lumer, 2005; Johnson and Blair, 2006). These goals might be truth (Lumer, 2010), persuasion (Tindale, 2015), or the resolution of difference of opinion (van Eemeren, 2009). Building upon either monological (Siegel and Biro, 2008) or dialogical argumentation (Garssen and van Laar, 2010), argumentation theories might primarily focus on the process or the product (Wenzel, 1992). A monological theory of argumentation might be subjectivist or objectivist (Lumer, 2005b). A dialogical theory of argumentation, on the other hand, might accept the truth or deny it (Habermas, 2014). Consequently, an argumentation theory might be act-based or agent-based. That is to say, in the agent-based theories, the goodness of an argument is measured by the virtues of an agent rather than the argument itself (Aberdein and Cohen, 2016).

This study introduces *Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓara*, -literally the manners of inquiry and argumentation,- to contemporary argumentation scholarship. To do so, I begin with a rather broad research question: Why do argumentation theories envision different goals? To what extent do different conceptions of self and truth shape this diversity? I explore pragma-dialectics, epistemological approach to argumentation, virtue approach to argumentation, and formal pragmatics of Habermas. I show how these theories are developed within certain philosophies of reasonableness shaped by considerations of truth and self. I then proceed to Munāẓara. I introduce the discipline and provide its intellectual history and development, its procedure, the disagreements between Munāẓara scholars, and finally, its peculiarities in comparison with the contemporary theories. I argue that Munāẓara is a *dialogically-epistemic agent-driven theory of argumentation*. I trace its attention to the dialogue, knowledge, and virtue to the multiplex theory of truth, according to which the self can arrive at truth in two complementary and interconnected layers, first through justification and argumentation; second through virtue.

The thesis argues that *our conception of truth and self informs our model of argumentation by shaping the theoretical preferences and analytical tools such that they determine what amounts to observation and violation of the idealized rules of argumentation*. While in pragma-dialectics, the goal is resolution of difference of opinion (van Eemeren et al., 2015, 35), for the epistemological approach to argumentation, it is acceptability, including truth; high probability, and verisimilitude (Lumer, 2005, 190). This is why pragma-dialecticians characterize the violation of the procedure as fallacies that obstruct the process of resolution (van Eemeren, 2015, 4). As for the epistemological approach, it somewhat preserves the classical logical conception of fallacy as deliberate or unconscious mistakes in reasoning (Lumer, 2000, 406). Formal pragmatics of Habermas envisions a dialogical theory of argumentation in which justification-dependent and justification-independent instances of truth are differentiated (Habermas, 2014, 230). Whereas the justification-dependent truth is always fallible, the presupposition of a justification-independent conception of truth serves as the intersubjective conditions for communication. Contrary to these theories, the virtue approach to argumentation prioritizes the arguer over the act. The definition of proper argumentation is neither resolution nor truth. The goal of argumentation is a virtuous exchange between parties, and a good argument is one that has been conducted virtuously by the virtuous agent (Cohen, 2007, 2). Therefore the approach zeroes in the vices and the virtues of the character. This results in a new paradigm that challenges the illegitimacy of certain fallacies, particularly ad hominem (Aberdein, 2013). Nevertheless, being a strictly normative theory, the approach is yet to propose an argument appraisal tool that will determine the parameters of practice and analysis.

Munāẓara is designed for a cooperative argumentation practice in which both parties aim to help each other while also testing their opposing positions (Āmidī, 1900, 60). It does not conform to contemporary points of divergence between the process, product, and agent-based theories. This is also reflected in the full name of the discipline: Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓara. Baḥth (inquiry) refers to justification, the act of giving reasons focusing on the product. Munāẓara (argumentation) refers to the dialogical process of co-reasoning. Lastly, Ādāb refers to the advised good conduct for inquiry and argumentation. I show that this threefold synthesis lies in the genesis of the discipline where Muslim spiritual ethics meets with Aristotelian analytics. Therefore Munāẓara does not solely focus on the product, the process, or the agent.

That is why in the discipline, there does not exist an agent-based or act-based concentration. Instead, the agency and the act are tied together, making the approach agent-driven. The agent-driven character of Munāẓara becomes visible with the names given to violations of the procedure. These violations are named after certain vices of character such as arrogance (Āmidī, 1900, 58), hastiness and usurpation (Jaunpūrī, 2006, 81), and subjugation (Cevdet Paşa, 1998, 112).

Whereas pragma-dialectics defines violations of the procedure as fallacies, for the Munāẓara, they are not fallacies but argumentative vices. That is to say, contrary to pragma-dialectics, in Munāẓara, violation of the procedure does not amount to some form of a dialogical fallacy. Rejecting foundationalism and adopting an extreme version of critical rationality, pragma-dialectics aims to shift the focus on the classical conception of fallacies from a monological point of view to a dialogical one (van Eemeren, 2015, 4). To do so, it adopts a contested rendering of critical rationality where the talk of truth is out of the picture (Lumer, 2012, 64). In Munāẓara, however, neither foundationalism nor the possibility of a dialogical process of reaching truth is denied. Therefore, the classical conception of fallacy as mistakes in the form or content of an argument is retained (Sāçaklīzāde, 1872, 5). Instead, next to the act-based norm of relevance (*muwaccah*), the agent-driven norm of admissibility (*maqbūl*) is introduced (Gelenbevī, 1934, pp. 33-36). This is where I argue how different conceptions of truth and self come into the picture.

It is in minute details and subtle points of divergence that the complex diversity of argumentation theories lie. Fortunately, beginning from its foundations (1984, 1990), pragma-dialectics aspires to be a complete research program in argumentation. This research program in argumentation allows us to map out the diversity we witness in contemporary argumentation literature (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, pp. 11-41). Accordingly, an argumentation theory should have five components, the philosophical one being the first and foremost. In the philosophical component, a research program in argumentation defines its *philosophy of reasonableness*, a meta-theoretical conception of what is acceptable. The philosophy of reasonableness informs the theoretical component of a research program in argumentation. It is where different goals in argumentation theories proliferate. Some research programs in argumentation, such as the formal logic, adopt a geometrical conception of reasonableness. Some others opt for an antropo-relativistic conception of

reasonableness and thus become a rhetorical theory of argumentation. To exemplify, pragma-dialectics subscribes to a critical-rationalist approach to reasonableness where, allegedly, the rigidity of formal logic and the obscurity of rhetoric stops being a problem. The theory thus becomes an intersubjective one much like the rhetoric, but without its inescapable relativity. In the same line, by coming up with an ideal procedure for critical discussion, pragma-dialectics becomes closer to formal logic, but without its foundationalism and truth-obsession. The definition of fallacy shifts from being a logical one to a dialogical one, namely derailment from the ideal discussion procedure.

The decision to label the derailments from the procedure as fallacious, thus, is a philosophical position taken due to critical-rationality. What then is the philosophical position taken by Munāẓara scholars to name the derailments from the procedure as irrelevant or inadmissible? That is to say, where are we to find the attention to both the act and the agent? To answer this question, the theoretical component and philosophical components of Munāẓara should be investigated.

Munāẓara is the latest form of Muslim argumentation theory. In its previous versions, i.e., *jadal* and *khilāf*, the focus is more on the intra-religious disagreements and arguments. With the development and adoption of the Avicennean theory of logic, the focus is enlarged to also include the epistemological disagreements. Syllogistic logic becomes the universal tool of reasoning, and Munāẓara is developed as a field-independent theory of argumentation. This is also attested by Samarqandī's pioneering epistle. He argues that, by employing the Munāẓara procedure, issues related to both juridical, theological, and speculative-theology can be discussed (al-Samarqandī, 1934, 130-132). This does not mean, however, that the conception of truth is solely syllogistic and thus justification-dependent. Samarqandī is also among the Muslim scholars who differentiate between a justification-dependent and justification-independent conception of truth (al-Samarqandī, 2020, 67-76). According to this multiplex approach, there are two layers of the truth: In its rational layer, truth is justification-dependent. In its second, experiential (*kashfī*) layer, truth is justification-independent (Ṭāshkubrīzāde, 1985, 67-70). This layered approach to truth is also complemented with a layered conception of self. The attainment of justification-independent truth is only possible with perfection of the self through habituating virtues of character and cleansing it from vicious behavior (al-Samarqandī, 2020, pp.

71-72). It is in the multiplex approach to truth and self, i.e., in its philosophy of reasonableness, Munāẓara's linking of abstracted ideal procedure and embedded agency becomes meaningful. For the justification-dependent layer of truth, Munāẓara relies on logic, and it does not change the classical logical conception of fallacy, as in pragma-dialectics. However, contrary to pragma-dialectics, the derailment from the procedure is named after vices of character. This, in turn, is related to the multiplex theory of truth, for which, next to justification, the self has to be cleansed from vices and be adorned with virtues of character as well. With its peculiarity in terms of linking the abstracted procedure to the agent and with its multiplex philosophy of reasonableness, Munāẓara awaits further study.

0.2. JUSTIFICATION AND CHAPTERS OVERVIEW

The thousand pages long 2019 edition of the *Handbook of Argumentation Theory* begins with Ancient Greek sources of argumentation to recent developments in the field (van Eemeren et al., 2019). Unfortunately, this valuable reference book does not mention *Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓara* in their account of the history of argumentation. However, it would be unjust to criticize the authors for omitting the long history of Munāẓara that extends over seven centuries. There are only a handful of studies on Munāẓara in English (Miller, 1984; Karabela, 2011; Belhaj, 2016; Young, 2018), and only a few translations are available (Faytre, 2018; Arif, 2020). We are yet to witness studies, papers, and research projects that will introduce Muslim argumentation theories to contemporary argumentation scholarship.

Making use of five components of a research program envisioned by pragma-dialectics as its methodological framework (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, pp.11-41), the thesis aims to illuminate points of divergence between contemporary theories in the first section. The framework allows differentiating argumentation theories in relation to their preferred philosophies of reasonableness, theoretical starting points, and analytical peculiarities. In the second section, I introduce Munāẓara by investigating its philosophy of reasonableness; its theoretical aspects, and analytical peculiarities.

Investigating how truth and self inform argumentation theories is indispensable and yet arguably a broad research question. However, it is justified on the grounds that Munāẓara is not yet introduced as a contemporary argumentation theory. As this

project has the ambition to introduce Munāẓara, beginning from broader questions of research rather than intricacies of existing literature seems only plausible. Moreover, as I demonstrate through the multiplex approach to truth and self, the broad picture is a perfect fit for delving into the intricacies of an argumentation theory.

It might be questioned whether it is plausible to bring together modern approaches and Munāẓara, which first emerged at the end of the 13th century. However, it stands to reason that, although Munāẓara emerged in the 13th century (Pehlivan and Ceylan 2015), scholars continued to produce original texts. Furthermore, Munāẓara is still part of the madrasa curriculum in the Muslim world. Scholars have written commentaries and introductory manuals until recently (Fathī, 2018; Ḥabannaka al-Maydānī; 1975; Qursī, 2013). These works aim to remind the Muslim audience of the theory's presence and importance. Unfortunately, they do not take into account the recent developments in the field of argumentation. Therefore, we can conclude that despite the fact that there are scarce secondary sources and fewer translations, Munāẓara is not part of the distant past. Furthermore, as we will see, the issues addressed in Munāẓara include the procedure of argumentation, what the violation of the procedure amounts to, and the relationship between different norms, to give a few examples. These issues are also addressed in existing theories, enabling us to view Munāẓara from the lenses of contemporary argumentation scholarship.

My choice of contemporary argumentation literature needs justification as well. There exist many other approaches that I do not take into account. Argumentation studies witness a "Renaissance" in the second half of the 20th century (Rigotti and Greco, 2019, 131). These new developments are referred to as "new dialectics" and "new rhetoric" in reference to Aristotelian dialectic and rhetoric (van Eemeran, 2004, 6). The renaissance brought by Toulmin's *The Use of Argumen*t (1958) and Perelman and Olbrechts-tyteca's *The New Rhetoric* (1969) influenced new approaches, including informal logic, audience reception rhetoric, formal dialectics, and pragma-dialectics. Among these theories, I take pragma-dialectics as a starting point for a number of reasons.

Informal logic primarily deals with the logical product more than the interpersonal act of arguing (Johnson and Blair, 2006). Audience reception primarily deals with how people persuade each other (Tindale, 2015). Formal dialectics envisions a different

sort of argumentative engagement between the protagonist and the antagonist, allowing the protagonist to become her own antagonist (Barth and Krabbe, 2010). Both pragma-dialectics and Munāẓara design a protagonist and antagonist to a claim. Furthermore, both approaches are procedural, dialectical theories of argumentation, albeit with different goals. Another reason for taking pragma-dialectics as the starting point is the fact that the approach has gained "a quasi-industrial" (Lumer, 2010, 42) character. That is, the theory is now employed by many scholars across all disciplines. Moreover, theories emerging after pragma-dialectics take it as their primary rival or "brother-in-arms" (Gascon, 2017). The last reason to begin from pragma-dialectics is the explicit difference between Munāẓara and pragma-dialectics in their desired goals. Whereas the argumentation functions as the tool for resolution of difference in pragma-dialectics, for Munāẓara, the goal is the manifestation of truth (al-Anṣārī, 2014, 227). I deal with pragma-dialectics in the first chapter. There I elaborate on the five components of a research program in argumentation which guides the remaining chapters as the methodological framework.

After pragma-dialectics, in the second chapter, the thesis continues with the critique of pragma-dialectics by two different theories of argumentation: The epistemological approach to argumentation and the virtue approach to argumentation. The back and forth between adherents of pragma-dialectics and epistemological approaches (Biro and Siegel, 2006; Lumer, 2010; Bottling, 2010; Garssen and van Laar, 2010) enable us to understand the epistemological foundations of these theories, shedding light on the points of departure. Epistemological differences between theories root in the ontological and psychological points of departure: The preference for a dialogical or monological argumentation is informed by ontology and psychology. While the epistemological approach prefers a logical conception in which arguments are viewed as products, pragma-dialectics prefers a dialogical argumentation in which arguments are viewed as a part of the interpersonal complex exchange. For the virtue approach, the focus is not on the monological act or the dialogical process but on the agent herself. However, what virtuous, monological, or dialogical self means remains uncovered.

In the third chapter, the thesis turns up to Habermas, more specifically, his *Truth and Justification* (2014) [*Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung* (1999)]. Habermas explains his renunciation of the consensus theory of truth, elaborates on his theory of non-epistemic

theory of truth, and the detranscendental (*detranszendentalisiertre*) self, thereby discussing on monological and dialogical conceptions of self (Habermas, 2014). He also provides a historical account of Western philosophy in relation to monological and dialogical conceptions of self. He argues that Western philosophy up to "linguistic turn" remains in the confines of the monological self. Accordingly, both the object and the subject are naively supposed to be given. He explains how even after the linguistic turn, continental and analytical branches of Western philosophy recreate classical dichotomies between empiricism, idealism, rationalism, and realism. Up until the linguistic turn, philosophy suffers from mentalism, according to which the subject represents (*darstellung*) the objects in the mind. Truth becomes an issue of correspondence between the subject and the object. Rejecting the mentalist philosophy of mind, the linguistic turn retreats from the philosophy of consciousness to a philosophy of language. Accordingly, the self is always already (*immer schon*) saturated with language and thus others. Whereas Heidegger and Wittgenstein's line of philosophy arrives at a justification-independent ontology of "opening of Being" in language, Dummett and others in the analytical philosophy disregard moral and epistemic autonomy of the self. Habermas puts communication (*Verständigung*) against representation as to the primary act of the self. Accordingly, humanbeings share the linguistic and social sphere (*sprachlich strukturierten Lebenswelt*) through rule-governed practices (*egelgeleiteten Handels*) such as argumentation.

Thanks to Habermas, the debate on the issue of truth between contemporary argumentation theories elaborated in the second chapter becomes clearer. For the epistemological approach to argumentation, the building blocks of arguments, the premises, and the propositions are abstract objects awaiting a monological subject's discovery. On the other hand, pragma-dialectics aims to arrive at a dialogical, intersubjective account of self and argumentation. However, in the process, the approach gives up on justification and truth altogether. Habermas argues that even after the linguistic turn and dialogical conception of self, the talk of truth remains a problem. He elaborates on the formal pragmatic conception of argumentation to solve the problem. There are two senses of truth for formal pragmatics: A justification-dependent conception of truth, albeit fallible, understands truth as ideal assertability and acceptability conditions. Alongside justification-dependent conception of truth, there exists a justification-independent, non-epistemic truth. This conception of truth

is non-epistemic as it is a precondition, an ideal. Thanks to the ideal of truth, subjects presuppose that they exist in the same world and refer to the same object while arguing.

Having elaborated on contemporary argumentation theories and their conception of truth and self in the first three chapters, I devote the fourth chapter to Munāẓara. To do so, other than perusing existing original contributions published, I surveyed many books and articles that introduce the theory in Arabic ('abd al-Rāzīq, 2020; 'abd al-Hamīd, 2015), Turkish (Alp, 2011; Kömbe, 2006) to name a few. Within the selection, I quoted the ones that are not just repetitions or summaries of previous books. I made a deliberate effort to present books from different centuries, beginning from Samarqandī's first book on Munāẓara -written at the end of the 14th century (Güney, 2010) to Pencweynī's and Ibn Karadagī's commentaries on Gelenbevī, published in the first half of the 20th century (Gelenbevī, 1934).

The chapter starts with an intellectual history of argumentation studies in the Muslim world. I then discuss different proposals to render the name of the theory into English. I propose to translate it as "Virtuous Conduct for Monological and Dialogical Argumentation". As classical logic (mantiq) and Munāẓara are inseparable, and as it would be impossible to understand Munāẓara without a basic grasp of Avicennean logic, I continue with logic. I elaborate on the division between concepts and assents. Following the Madrasa curriculum, I discuss the preliminaries of concepts, i.e., the five universals, and its objectives, i.e., the definition and description. I then continue with assents, its preliminaries, and objectives. The preliminaries of assents are the propositions, and its objectives are the five arts, i.e., analytics, dialectics, rhetoric, sophistry, and poetry. Having discussed the logic, I continue with Munāẓara. I detail the Munāẓara procedure to be followed in concepts and assents. I elaborate on how each item in the full title of the discipline, i.e., Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓara, represents different norms: the agent-based, the product-based, and the-process based. Building upon the primary literature, I locate two criteria for a good argument: Relevance and admissibility corresponding to the act-based and agent-based norms of argumentation.

Munāẓara resembles pragma-dialectics in its attention to the intersubjective process of argumentation. However, the theory is also based on logic (Karabela, 2010, 108), and the goal is claimed to be the manifestation of truth, making it closer to the

epistemological approach. Nevertheless, the violations of the procedure in Munāẓara are named after certain vices, stressing the close relationship between the agent and the act. Furthermore, the stress on ādāb, meaning virtuous conduct, is another indication of Munāẓara's proximity to the virtue approach. In Munāẓara, the primary goal is differentiating between quarreling and arguing proper. This results from the idea that just as "quarreling" is an attribute of the quarreler, arguing is the attribute of a proper arguer (Gelenbevī, 1934, 32).

I investigate Munāẓara's conception of truth in the fifth chapter and its conception of self in the sixth chapter. This allows me to elaborate on Munāẓara's philosophy of reasonableness. To do so, I return, among others, to Samarqandī's work on ontology and psychology called *'Ilm al-Āfāḳ wa al-Anfus* (2020). There he argues that there are two ways to truth. While the first concerns syllogistic demonstration, the other is non-syllogistic. The non-syllogistic truth is only possible after cleansing the self from vices and adorning its virtues. Accordingly, truth is both justification-dependent and justification-independent. Samarqandī is not alone in suggesting that there are two ways to truth. Recep Şentürk (2011) and his colleagues (Şentürk et al., 2020) argue that Muslim onto-epistemology is a "multiplex" one. Reality has layers of material, rational and spiritual. The truth of each layer, then, is ascertained with the methods proper to it. In the material layer, the causal relationship between objects is investigated. In the rational layer, the empirical study is coupled with laws of reasoning and logic through justification. The knowledge of the spiritual layer is not through justification but with the experiential knowledge of the opening (*kashf*) that comes only after cleansing the self from vices and assuming virtuous character traits.

The multiplex conception of truth emerged in the post-classical Muslim world is developed after careful negotiations between those who favor a rational approach to truth and an experiential approach to truth (Ṭāshkubrīzāde, 1985, 67-70). Eventually, reason and spiritual experience become different layers of the same reality. To survey this process, I discuss the reformation of Aristotelian logic in the hands of Muslim philosophers. I begin with Fārābī. Following Aristotle, he declares *demonstration* as the sole arbiter of truth. Dialectic does not serve as a medium of truth manifestation, and the religion employs rhetorical syllogisms to convince the untrained (al-Fārābī, 2008, 132). The demonstration is the sole arbiter of truth as the reality is syllogistically structured (Gutas, 2014, 372). Following the neo-Platonic tradition here, Fārābī argues

that there exists the First, which intellectualizes itself, and from the intellectualization of which the First Reason emanates. The series of intellections continue until the tenth reason, the Active Intellect. The Active Intellect is a bridge between the celestial intellects and sublunar human intellect. In conjunction with the Active Intellect, the human intellect is perfected alongside its ability to reason. When perfected, the human intellect becomes free of considerations of form and matter, becoming a mirror for mental existents (al-Fārābī 1938, 31-33). Having elaborated on Fārābī, I then discuss Ibn Sīnā and his approach to truth. Although he is on par with Fārābī in general, Ibn Sīnā argues that in these material life conditions, the human mind is not able to absolutely abstract itself from form and matter. Therefore, its conjunction with the Active Intellect is not possible in an absolute sense. This leads Ibn Sīnā to admit that other than rational demonstration, there exists another way to reach the truth, the spiritual experience of opening (Türker, 2019, 78).

After discussing different methods of truth, and the negotiations over the centuries that culminated in a multiplex approach, I examine a number of debates in the Munāẓara literature. I show how the disagreements between the Munāẓara scholars can be traced to applying different argumentative norms to a certain move. For instance, does it amount to arrogance when a party objects to an incontrovertible premise? al-Curcāni states that it is not and adds that, according to philosophers objecting to an incontrovertible premise is arrogance (Jaunpūrī, 2006, 59). Furthermore, there are also scholars such as Gelenbevī who hold that usurpation is admissible. Accordingly, if the move is relevant, shifting the burden of proof is admissible (Gelenbevī, 1934, 57-58). However, many other scholars, including Sāçaqlizāde, do not accept usurpation as admissible (Āmidī, 1900, 75).

Having investigated the multiplex approach to truth in the fifth chapter, I return to the issue of self in the sixth chapter. In the first half of the chapter, I begin with self according to Muslim philosophers. I discuss the process of abstracting universals and the conjunction with Active Intellect. I then elaborate on the virtue ethics adhered to by Fārābī. Following up on him, I reiterate Ömer Türker's (2019) claim regarding Ibn Sīnā's position as a multiplex scholar synthesizing the rational and experiential layers. I conclude the chapter with Sufis and their approach to self as an example of the detailed multiplex theory of self. There I discuss the different layers of the self and the process of cleansing from vices and adorning with virtues. Finally, I show how this

multiplex approach to self informs the relevance and admissibility criteria of Munāẓara, corresponding to the different layers of truth, with its justification-dependent and justification-independent attainment processes. In the second half of the chapter, I draft a Munāẓara argument analysis framework relying on these two criteria.

0.3. METHODOLOGY

Munāẓara is, until now, studied in the framework of the history of philosophy. This project aims to study Munāẓara through the framework of contemporary approaches. To that end, its methodology is inspired by pragma-dialectics. According to pragma-dialectics, argumentation has descriptive and normative dimensions (van Eemeren, 2015, 2). The descriptive dimension is related to how we argue in real life. On the other hand, the normative dimension relates to our proposed models regarding how we should argue (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003,10). Unfortunately, questions regarding *is* and *should* can not be easily differentiated (van Eemeren et al., 2019, 8). This is why pragma-dialecticians put forth five components of a research program in argumentation. These five interrelated components are: Philosophical, theoretical, empirical, analytical, and practical (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, pp. 11-41). In the philosophical component, argumentation scholars decide on their proposed philosophical position regarding reasonableness (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003,12-13). They decide what amounts to being reasonable. Is reasonableness geometrical, anthropological, or critical? The answer to this question determines what makes an argument acceptable. Building upon these philosophical foundations, different theories of argumentation are formulated. While a geometrical conception of reasonableness leads to a (formal)-logical argumentation theory, an anthropological conception leads to a rhetorical argumentation theory (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003,15). While a rhetorical argumentation theory will try to find the empirical grounds that enable arguers to persuade each other, the dialectical argumentation theory will compare their normative conception of argumentation theory to ordinary argumentative practice (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 21).

The third component of argumentation theory is analytical. It pertains to the argumentation analysis through the frameworks provided thanks to the theoretical models (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 26). In this component, the theory aims

at reconstructing the argumentative exchange. The fourth component is empirical. In the empirical component, scholars of argumentation test if their normative models can grasp argumentative reality or not. Lastly, the practical component aims at further developing the theory according to the needs of the day (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 34).

I focus on the normative and descriptive dichotomy in the argumentation theories in each chapter. Then I discuss philosophical, theoretical, and analytical components of argumentation theories through a comparative analysis. I apply the same dichotomy to Munāẓara. I also point out analytical disagreements between Munāẓara scholars on certain moves. In the fifth and sixth chapters, I try to uncover different philosophical positions regarding reasonableness. Is reasonableness determined in a logical (somewhat geometric, absolutist, and objective) validity, or is it possible that the logical validity is not the end in itself? Luckily this issue is discussed in greater detail in philosophical and Sufi schools of thought. The fifth and sixth chapters explore contested philosophical foundations of argumentation informed by the conception of truth and self through the rational level of multiplexity and experiential level of multiplexity. I characterize multiplexity as interconnectedness and multilayaredness of Being, interwoven through reason and experience. Multiplexity requires some sort of cognitive&moral achievements and discoveries that are attained by a combination of *reason* and *experiences of opening*.

0.4. LITERATURE REVIEW

Aristotle's *Organon* serves as the basis for later Roman and Medieval scholars. It is also the foundation of *New Rhetoric* and *The Use of Argument*, which brought about the Renaissance of argumentation theories in the 1950s (Rigotti and Greco, 2019, 131). Muslim Peripatetic scholars developed the *Organon* according to the "context theory" that understands there are five syllogistic sciences; demonstration, dialectic, rhetoric, sophistry, and poetry (Coşkun, 2011, 78)[1]. Before detailing the historical development of argumentation and other related sciences in the Muslim world, I will start by

[1] Contrary to dialectic and logic, Aristotelian or Platonic rhetoric did not directly influence another form of Muslim rhetoric, namely balāgha (Harb, 2020; Coşkun, 2014).

discussing the Medieval West and contemporary literature. Then I will continue discussing these sciences in the context of Islamdom[2].

While for the Stoics, dialectic is the science of reaching the truth (van Eemeren et al., 2019,53) over time its appeal diminishes. On the other hand, studies on rhetoric inspired by scholars like Cicero and Boethius continued with developments such as the study of maxims and *habitudo* (Rigotto and Greco, 2019, 94). Notwithstanding these developments, rhetoric loses its significance and becomes reduced to eloquence (van Eemeren, 2009, 130). Logic/demonstration becomes the primary tool of reasonableness. While logic is esteemed for its certainty, rhetoric and dialectic are marginalized. Authors of *New Rhetoric* blame Descartes:

> Now Descartes' concept, clearly expressed in the first part of *The Discourse on the Method*, was to "take well nigh for false everything which was only plausible." It was this philosopher who made the self-evident the mark of reason, and considered rational only those demonstrations which, starting from clear and distinct ideas, extended, by means of apodictic proofs, the self evidence of the axioms to the derived theorems. (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, 1)

This new conception of geometric reasonableness only considers deductive syllogisms at the expense of practical reasoning. Interestingly enough, the rise of geometric reasoning and the rift between dialectic (including logic) and rhetoric becomes visible after Westphalia Treaty:

> The formal paradigm involved an ideal of reasonableness that was quite different from that adhered to in the humanities. Argumentation was no longer seen as a means of resolving a difference of opinion between people in a reasonable way, but was equated with rational reasoning by means of formal derivations. (van Eemeren, 2009, 130)

The divide between humanist and geometric reasoning still prevails in our contemporary discussions in different forms. There seem to be two incompatible cultures (Snow, 2012)[3].

[2] See the fourth chapter for details of Aristotelian syllogistic arts.

[3] Dismissed as woke-leftist American academia; liberal arts, humanities and social sciences is now regarded redundant; studying gender for instance is caricatured. See latest comments of French minister on the issue where the need for a new "humanities" is also floated (Onishi, 2021).

In the 19th century logic became fully formalized to the extent that in the 1950s, Toulmin and Perelman waged an attack on this geometric conception of reasoning. They argued against the idea that demonstration is the only rational form of reasoning. Perelman and Tyteca reintroduce rhetoric with a new title, the *new rhetoric*. Instead of the formal logical validity criteria, they focused on the intellectual contact of minds and their attempts to gain adherence (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, 15). Perelman calls it practical reasoning (2012, vii). On the other hand, Toulmin creates what is now known as the Toulmin Model. He claims that the Model is field-independent and applicable to any form of reasoning. At the same time, some moves of the model are field-dependent, demanding knowledge of the field (Toulmin, 2003, 235).

Toulmin argued that classical logic is based on formal validity and soundness. Formal validity is naively established through propositions involving two premises and a conclusion (Lewiński and Mohammed 2016, 2). Nevertheless, he held that a formal logical validity approach was at best incomplete when we considered the richness and complicatedness of argumentative reality. His model moves beyond formal validity and is based on content-and-task-relevant argumentation (Lewiński and Mohammed, 2016, 3). We need this new model as formal validity is not the universal criterion of truth (van Eemeren, 2009, 140).

Formal logicians, with their understanding of knowledge and truth, are criticized for their "dogmatic" approach. According to those who adhere to the geometric conception of truth:

> We 'know' something (in the full and strict sense of the term) if-and-only-if we have a well-founded belief in it; our belief in it is well-founded if-and-only-if we can produce good reasons in its support; and our reasons are really 'good' (by the strictest philosophical standards) if-and-only-if we can produce a 'conclusive', or formally-valid argument, linking that belief back to an unchallenged (and preferably unchallengeable) starting point.(van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2003, 128)

Toulmin proposes a critical rationalist conception of reasonableness.

Toulmin Model and practical argumentation of *New Rhetoric* inspire a revival in argumentation studies. Unlike the Aristotelian counterpart, modern argumentation theories suffer from a schism, where dialectic and rhetoric are not differentiated to their fullest. The ideological divide between dialectic and rhetoric causes "a wide

conceptual gap between their protagonists" (van Eemeren et al., 2019, 30). Nevertheless, although they prioritize their own perspectives, each argumentation theory that emerged after the rebirth of argumentation acknowledges the fact that argumentative reality can be studied across different fields. According to these distinct perspectives, argumentation can be understood as a process, a procedure, and a product (Wenzel, 1990, 11). While rhetoric corresponds to the process of argumentation in which parties persuade each other, dialectic corresponds to the procedure of argumentation, such as argument schemes, inference rules, the order of discussion, etc. On the other hand, logic corresponds to propositions, syllogism, and inferences.

Logical studies in argumentation start to change with informal logic. Protesting the formality and thus the content-deprived character of modern logic, Canadian and American philosophers initiated a new normative approach to reasoning. Informal logic emphasizes the acceptability, relevance, and sufficiency of an argument:

> We replaced the criteria of deductive logic (true premises coupled with valid inference to the conclusion) with more general criteria (acceptable premises that are relevant to the conclusion and supply sufficient evidence to justify accepting it. The latter are known as Acceptability, Relevance and Sufficiency criteria for a logically good argument. (Johnson & Blair, 2006, xiii)

Informal logic goes hand in hand with critical thinking.

Rhetorical schools of argumentation stress the processes of persuasion. Heavily influenced by *New Rhetoric*, these scholars reject the claim that rhetoric is irrational or anti-rational. However, rhetorical studies have proliferated to such an extent that the term itself has become vague, and almost everything can be viewed as "rhetorical" now (van Eemeren et al., 2019, 34). Product-based and procedure-based approaches criticize rhetoric for its obscurity. Assessing the effectiveness of a rhetorical argumentation in terms of persuasion is not an easy job, oftentimes relying on intuition (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 25).

Inspired by Erlangen School, Barth and Krabbe developed formal dialectics (1984). It is a dialogue game:

> Their formal dialectic describes systems for determining by means of a regimented dialogue game between the proponent and the opponent of the thesis whether the proponent's thesis can be maintained given the premises allowed as "concessions" by the opponent. By skillfully exploiting the

> opponent's concessions, the proponent attempts to bring the opponent in a position of self-contradiction (van Eemeren et al., 2019,33)

Formal-dialectics influences pragma-dialectics.

In contrast to the "eternal city of well-founded truth" of the geometrical approach, pragma-dialectics adopts a critical rationalist approach. While the geometrical approach leads to "skepticism", the antroporelativist approach of rhetoric leads to "relativism" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 129). Pragma-dialectic claims to be a pseudo-geometric, i.e., a seemingly universal argumentation theory. This means while the discussion procedure and the rules that enable argumentation are field-independent, the content of actual argumentation is field and context-dependent (van Eemeren, 2009, 3). The normative aim of argumentation is to function as a critical tool for resolving difference of opinion. In resolution of difference of opinion, the goal is not the formal validity but problem validity (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 134). Problem validity requires that all the rules, procedures, and argument schemes be relevant and operationalized to solve the problem (Budzynska et al., 2014, 13). Intersubjective inference procedure and intersubjective identification procedure allow the parties to *decide* which propositions and argument schemes are valid on the issue at hand (Botting, 2010, 416; Lumer, 2010, 42).

The validity of propositions, inferences, and argument schemes are left to the intersubjective agreement as, according to pragma-dialectics, reasonableness is not external to the discussion: "There is a crucial distinction between the geometrical philosophers who want to demonstrate how something is and the anthropological and critical philosophers who prefer to discuss matters" (van Emeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 14). Furthermore, pragma-dialecticians claim imposing objectivist truth criteria is at odds with the spirit of critical rationalism. Critical rationalism argues against axiomatic, incontrovertible certainties (Botting, 2010, 424). Therefore it is dogmatic to claim there are objective truths and procedures for their demonstration (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 14).

Geometric reasoning falls into the trap of the Münchassen Trilemma of justificationism. According to the trilemma, all justifications are either in need of further justifications or are ended arbitrarily somewhere (Garssen and van Laar, 2010, 140). This makes justification fall prey to the fallacies of infinite regress or circular reasoning. In order to avoid these fallacies, justificationists stop the justification

process arbitrarily and claim to have reached axiomatic or incontrovertible certainties (Garssen and van Laar, 2010, 132). That is why geometric reasoning is an endeavor to show how some premises "ultimately derive from something that is an incontrovertible certainty" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 14).

Arguing for demonstrable truths is actually anti-argumentative. It is dogmatic. What argumentation theory needs is a critical discussion procedure by way of which problems are solved according to the problem and intersubjective validity. The discussion procedure is modeled after falsification. The protagonist advances a standpoint, and the opponent tries to falsify it (Garssen and van Laar, 2010, 135). The critical discussion procedure regulates which types of speech acts can be employed in one of the four stages of critical discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 20). Pragma-dialecticians posit that their theory's normative and descriptive aspects allow characterizing any obstruction of critical discussion procedure and thus resolution of difference of opinion as a fallacy (van Eemeren, 2015, 4).

The epistemological approach to argumentation criticizes pragma-dialectic for its preference for intersubjective validity. Accordingly, intersubjective validity leads to unqualified consensus. The approach has two distinct camps: The first disapproves of any subjectivity, and the latter leaves some room for it. A scholar in the first camp, Lumer criticizes pragma-dialectics for two other reasons: 1- Establishing resolution of difference of opinion as to the goal of argumentation rather than truth, 2- Misrepresenting critical rationalism. According to Lumer, Popper did not exclude truth (2012, 64).

While pragma-dialectics conceives argumentation dialogically, the epistemological approach conceives argumentation monologically. The first understands argumentation as primarily a process, the second as a product. Pragma-dialecticians agree that intersubjective validity might lead to some absurdities. However, they claim that the analyst can not put external objectivity criteria for the analysis (Garssen and van Laar, 2010, 137).

The virtue approach to argumentation is a continuation of virtue ethics and virtue epistemology (Aberdein, 2020, 98). It criticizes monological and dialogical argumentation theories for prioritizing act over agent (Aberdein, 2017, 4). The approach claims the conceptual priority of the agent over the act. An argument is good

if it is the argument of a virtuous agent. Critics argue that would make the approach an ad hominem fallacy in itself (Bowell and Kingsbury, 2013, 26). Proponents of the approach claim that ad hominem is valid under certain circumstances (Aberdein, 2014, 80). The approach is, so far, a purely normative theory that does not offer an argument appraisal criteria. There are three camps in the virtue approach concerning argument appraisal: 1-The radicals who deny the necessity of cogency for argument quality, 2-The moderates who admit that cogency is a necessary element for argument quality, and lastly, 3-The modest moderates who admit that cogency is necessary adding that the character of arguers is irrelevant to analysis (Gascón, 2016, 445). Gascón, a representative of the third camp, holds that the virtue approach should not deal with argument appraisal and instead should serve as a complementary pedagogy for existing theories such as pragma-dialectics (Gascón, 2017, 705).

Until now, I have discussed the development of the study of argumentation and how it informs contemporary discussions of the theories I deal with. First, I will return to Islamdom and discuss how Munāẓara emerged as a separate science in the 14th century. Then, I will introduce major approaches in the field.

0.4.1. Argumentation in the Muslim World

Qurʾān differentiates between good and bad argumentation (16:125). Nevertheless, the books focusing on the theoretical and programmatic study of argumentation in the Muslim world come after the translation of Aristotle's *Topics* into Arabic. Accordingly, some scholars trace the origins of Muslim argumentation back to Aristotelian *Topics* (Widigdo, 2016, 66). However, new studies on argumentation before the translation of Aristotelian *Organon* show that the art was practiced among individual scholars and their followers with a "proto" theoretical system (Young, 2017, 20). Individual scholars debated despite the lack of explicit formulation towards various schools with distinct normative and descriptive foundations (Young, 2017, 33). With this clarification, the history of argumentation can be divided into three distinct phases (Arif, 2020)[4]: khilāf, jadal, and Munāẓara. Khilāf is the disputations among individual Muslim scholars on issues where there was not yet a consensus, or in issues that allow a diversity of answers and positions.

[4] I will question this periodization in the fourth chapter.

Qurʾān, the traditions of the prophet, and the religious practice of the Muslims constitute the commonly-shared epistemic background of the Muslims. However, certain disagreements or uncertainties exist for which a definite answer can not be found from the corpus. Disagreements might arise out of the prophet's varying traditions and practices as well. What is more, there is also an inclination to preserve ambiguity (Bauer, 2011). Imām Mālik famously rejected the offer to distribute his books to other parts of the world, exclaiming, "The people have in their possession the traditions and the statements of the Companions which they are adhering to" (Kandhlawi, 2014, 21). The differences and disagreements are regarded as a form of divine providence, easing the life of believers as attested by a famous tradition of the prophet (Kandhlawi, 2014, 21). The differences can be substantial, that is, related to the methodology of law. For instance, the Shāfiʿī school stresses one particular kind of tradition (*akhbār al-aḥād*) of the prophet over religious analogical syllogism and the Mālikī school accepts the practices of the people of Madina as a powerful source for law methodology (Jabbar, 2007, 65). The differences can also be related to particular issues of *fiqh*, -roughly the law,- itself.

We are aware of a certain tendency towards the formation of distinct schools of thought and practice from the books that record the disputations of individual scholars, who in the future will be regarded as founders of law schools. This is why, Young, who studies *Kitāb al-Umm* attributed to Imām Shāfiʿī classifies these disagreements as "formative" and "proto-jadal" (2017, 35). These disagreements, later on, evolved into distinct schools of "law methodology" (uṣūl al-fiqh) and "argumentation" (jadal) theories (Young, 2017, 36). With the formation of distinct schools of law methodology and argumentation theories of each school, argumentation becomes disputations among these schools. Scholars who follow (imitate) certain Imāms try to establish the rightness of their leaders (Soufi, 2017, 5). Here we do not discuss disagreements between individual scholars but representatives of different schools, who also claim to be reaching the truth or the rightness of disputed issues.

Theoretically, there is a fundamental difference between two basic categories of law, the definitive (*qaṭī*) and probable (*ẓannī*):

> Qat'i is a reference to those laws which are not left to man's intellectual capabilities. They are all explicit, definitive, and unequivocal, and man has no right to reinterpret or to re-expound these laws. Anyone reinterpreting these

> laws is in error and would be considered misguided. The second set of laws is such that the Shari'a has placed no constraints upon them. In fact, this set of laws has taken into account the weakness of the Umma and is intended to make things simpler for the people. The one who reinterprets these laws differently and does not practice them will not be considered misguided. (Kandhlawi, 2014, 20)

Although, in practice and theory, there was a certain consensus on broad principles (for instance, that one should pray five times a day), when it comes to the intricacies of issues, it becomes clear that disagreements are ubiquitous. For instance, each school of law and thus their argumentation system have different definitions and standards on what makes a text unequivocal (Young, 2017, 573). Soufi argues that Hallaq's (1987, 199) claim that disputations aimed at consensus is misleading (2017, 4). It is debated whether there is only one true proof/argument that God expects human beings to find or if Allah intends to provide as many proofs as possible. That is, is there a one-true answer that scholars should seek, or are there many possible truths (Dabūsī, 2001, 408)? The answer to this debate determines whether the scholars can prefer one argument over another (Baġdādī, 2019, 717).

Around the tenth century, *khilāf* (disputations of individual scholars) transformed into distinct argumentation theories of each law school (*jadal*). Around the same century, Muslim Peripatetic logicians start developing argumentation in line with the Aristotelian tradition (Coşkun, 2011, 70). Ibn Sīnā discusses dialectics at length in the sixth book of his 'encyclopedia', *Book of Healing* (2005). Instead of following Aristotle verbatim and proceeding from differentiating kinds of syllogism, he opens up from a wider perspective: Humans are encouraged to perfect their individual beings by studying what helps and protects the *human species*. Ibn Sīnā clarifies what he understands from an individual being, "It is either the rational soul (*al-nafs al-nāṭiqa*) or the rational soul is the most honorable part of it" (2008, 2). Perfection is attained by knowledge[5]. Knowledge is either an end in itself, or it is a means for another kind of knowledge. Only after claiming that knowledge proper is acquired of demonstrative syllogism did Ibn Sīnā begin talking about different kinds of the syllogism (Ibn Sīnā, 2008, 3).

[5] See the fifth and sixth chapters of this study for a detailed analysis of knowledge and perfection, i.e. human flourishing according to rational multiplexity.

While demonstrative knowledge should be yearned for as an end in itself, other syllogisms serve as means for other goals: One that is useful in public space, and there exists another, the sophistic. Sophistic syllogism is studied so as to avoid the complications it causes. The hierarchy of syllogisms in his book is thus justified: Demonstrative syllogisms are learned for themselves, while dialectical syllogism is learned to be used for political/civilizational purposes, and the sophistic syllogism is learned to be avoided (Ibn Sīnā, 2008, 4). He then proceeds to differentiate syllogisms in terms of their content: While demonstrative syllogism seems to be posited by *nature* itself, the dialectical syllogism is different. They do not have to be true (Ibn Sīnā, 2008, 4). Ibn Sīnā differentiates dialectics from rhetoric in the sense that dialectic aims at universals, whilst rhetoric is concerned with particulars. Defining dialectic as a dialogue in which contentious parties are aimed at cogently silencing each other, Ibn Sīnā adds another aspect to the frame: Dialectics is not required to be cooperative, the dialectician is free to use tricks to reach her goal (Ibn Sīnā, 2008, 11).

Up until the end of the 13th century, Muslim Peripatetic logic (including dialectics) and juridical dialectics dominates the study of argumentation. Jurisconsultists and theologians claimed that their approach allowed the normative goal of manifestation of truth (Baġdādī, 2019, 827). Philosophers argued that jurisconsults mistook commonly-held opinions that only apply to Muslims with the universal truth (al-Fārābī, 2008, 132). While philosophical dialectics is criticized for the absence of truth as the goal of argumentation; juridical dialectics goes under fire for its dogmatic character in the sense that each school of thought does not really engage in real productive argumentation (al-Mardinī, 2015, 345). Together with the institutionalization of juridical dialectics as a gateway for moving the social ladders and with the disappearance of genuine truth-seeking in argumentation, a Sufi disdain for argumentation emerges. Scholars such as Ghazalī, among many others, begin warning against the "dangers of argumentation" (al-Mardinī, 2015, 354).

Although philosophical dialectics did not gain significance outside the philosophical circles, through time, their logic has been appropriated by the Muslim world. Neo-Platonic epistemological and ontological underpinnings of logic are naturalized (El-Rouayheb, 2019, 15). Combining methodologies of logical rationalism, Sunni jurisprudence, and Sufism, Ghazalī claimed that logic is, in fact, not alien to Muslims (2007, 9). After Ghazalī, who writes a lengthy introduction on logic and how it can be

used in law methodology (al-Ghazali, 2018), Āmidī developed an argumentation theory, the subject matter of which is not restricted to religious issues (Pehlivan and Ceylan, 2015, 4). After Āmidī, Nasafī wrote his study on argumentation in which he prioritizes rational arguments over the transmitted ones (Pehlivan and Ceylan, 2015,9). After systemizing Munāẓara, Samarqandī chooses three issues from philosophy, jurisprudence, and theology to show the field-independent nature of its procedure (Güney, 2010, 150-170).

According to Pehlivan and Ceylan, what makes Samarqandī's approach a "revolution" is twofold. The first has to do with the order. Samarqandī provides a clear order of the discussion moves, stressing the *ādāb* (i.e. the virtuous conduct) of argumentation. The second has to do with the operation of the moves. Accordingly, some discussion moves, such as refutation in Samarqandī's procedure, are organized according to rules of logic, not the rules of law methodology and jadal (Pehlivan and Ceylan, 2015, 25). Intra-religious issues were to be argued in the old manner, with the framework of Qurʾān, traditions of the prophet, the consensus of scholars, and the individual approaches of each school, i.e., "transmitted arguments". Next to transmitted arguments, a rational syllogical argument is introduced, called "rational argument"[6]. It is claimed that problems related to the transmitted issues will be solved by the first and other epistemological problems with the second (Jaunpūrī, 2006, 81).

Also, a logician, Samarqandī, discusses his reasons behind documenting the practice of Munāẓara on paper. As Muslims already have their own science of argumentation (khilāf and jadal), the Munāẓara will not replace these theories, but it will accompany logic as Aristotelian dialectics accompanies Aristotelian logic[7]. In fact, Samaqandī viewed argumentation as an appendage to the science of logic. He discusses Munāẓara at the end of his lengthy logical treatise (Samarqandī, 2014, 500). In this line, Samarqandī defines Munāẓara as "reasoning on the relationship between two things[8]" (Güney, 2010, 95). However, later generations did not view argumentation as an appendage to logic and they stressed the dialogical encounter between parties (Āmidī,

[6] I should note that the rational and traditional argument division existed before Munāẓara. What changes here is the character of rational arguments. It is now understood as logical syllogism.

[7] In an interesting turn of events, his theory indeed replaced them.

[8] The mentioned two things are two sides of a judgement: the judged-onto and the judged-with.

1900, 7) by defining argumentation as the "movement of opposing parties on the relationship between two things" (al-Jaunpūrī, 2006, 15)[9]. For centuries, Munāẓara continued to be developed. Khaled El-Rouayheb even traces the development and proliferation of the approach among different geographies in Islamdom in different centuries (2015, 13-128).

Let alone proposing Munāẓara as a contemporary argumentation theory, no studies on Munāẓara tries to understand Munāẓara through the lenses of contemporary argumentation other than Leonard Faytre's master thesis in which he presents an English translation of Ahmet Cevdet Paşa's book on argumentation. In the thesis, he presents pragma-dialectics and then discusses what he calls the "internal dimension" of ethics in Munāẓara:

> While external dimension of ethics focuses on horizontal code of conduct between discussants, internal one requires from each discussant to develop vertical relation with God in order to discipline their inner self. Therefore, both external and internal dimensions of ethics are necessary for the implementation of a proper argumentation. (Faytre, 2018, 40)

I discuss the vertical and horizontal code of conduct in relation to the multiplexity of truth and self.

0.5. CONTRIBUTION

Although there are a handful of studies that deal with Munāẓara or Muslim argumentation theories in general, these studies are written from the perspective of intellectual history, Islamic studies, and the history of philosophy. While their importance can not be denied, these studies do not conceive Munāẓara as a contemporary argumentation theory that might contribute to existing scholarship on argumentation. Instead of dealing with Munāẓara as food for thought, this project aims to introduce it to contemporary scholarship. The present study begins with pragma-dialectics and adds the epistemological approach to argumentation, virtue approach to argumentation, and Habermasian formal pragmatics. I do not stop short by comparing these theories to Munāẓara. Instead, I work from a broader perspective in which each theory is investigated in terms of descriptive and normative dichotomy in particular

[9] It might also be the case that disagreements between each school of thought and argumentation lost its preeminence. This is why Munāẓara actually replaced these theories.

and the five components of a research program in argumentation in general. This broader perspective helps to situate Munāẓara in contemporary scholarship.

The thesis identifies the points of departure for contemporary theories. Accordingly, in line with the preferred philosophy of reasonableness, an argumentation theory might be rhetorical, dialectical, or logical. Dialectical theories might establish the goal of argumentation as resolution of difference or truth. This normative choice also implies monological or dialogical conceptions of the self. While some dialogical theories such as pragma-dialectic exclude any talk of truth, Habermasian formal pragmatics argues that truth should not be left behind. Argumentation theories might be act-based or agent-based. Pragma-dialectics and epistemological approaches to argumentation are act-based theories. The virtue approach to argumentation on the other hand is an agent-based theory. Accordingly, it is asserted that argument appraisal should not deal with the product or the process aspect. That is, argument appraisal should not deal with propositions or interpersonal interactions. The goodness of an argument should be assessed in relation to the virtues of the agent. Having established points of divergence between argumentation theories, I characterize Munāẓara as a dialogically-epistemic agent-driven theory of argumentation. I also discuss relevance and admissibility as the criteria for a good argument. The first relates to logical and dialectical norms; and the latter to agent-based norms.

The thesis addresses the debates regarding the analysis of argumentation. Instead of primarily logical analysis of epistemological approach; dialogical analysis of pragma-dialectics or agent-based analysis of virtue approach, I argue that argumentation analysis might have three phases with two criteria: relevance and admissibility. In its first phase, the framework analyzes whether logical and dialectical norms are observed. The second phase concerns the agent, and the admissibility of a move is investigated. The comitance of an inadmissible move is not directly translated into argumentative vices that imply vices or virtues of character. Instead, contextual data of the parties are gathered through critical questions such as: Are these violations somewhat a response to violations of the other party? Does the other party have a history of quarreling and silencing? Does the agent have a history of quarreling and silencing? Does the institutional context of argumentation favor one side over the other, as in the example of debates in state-governed media between opposition and ruling parties? For, this third phase of analysis is not merely confined to a single

argumentation but is extended to a series of argumentations the agent takes part in. If the contextual data does not bring about a positive outcome regarding these questions, the violations are understood as *overt*. In *covert* instances of agency, on the other hand, it might not be possible to gather contextual data on the parties. The violations of the procedure such as committing a fallacy might be performed unknowingly. Therefore in those instances, the motivation of the agency is covert. In such a case, the analyst refrains from commenting upon the agency.

The thesis aims to contribute to academic scholarship on Munāẓara by elaborating on

1-Munāẓara's procedure,

2- multiplexity as the philosophy of reasonableness for the approach,

3-interaction between different norms at play,

4-disagreements between Munāẓara scholars,

5- drafting an argument appraisal framework,

6-paving the way for further studies that 6a- will not merely imitate Munāẓara tradition verbatim but rather 6b- address the contemporary challenges and opportunities.

In its aspiration to introduce Munāẓara to contemporary scholarship, the thesis suffers from certain limitations: 1-The absence of previous studies on the topic; 2-The absence of translations of Munāẓara books, and 3-The absence of studies on the different positions of reasonableness. These absences did not allow me to elaborate on many issues of contemporary scholarship, most importantly the relationship between logic and rhetoric[10]. Furthermore, I have to admit that there are issues that I could not comprehend fully. In those instances, I tried to remain loyal to the texts of Munāẓara books. Lastly, translating some of the technical terms from Arabic to English proved to be a tall order.

[10] In the conclusion chapter, I discuss how this link can be made.

SECTION 1: SELF AND TRUTH IN CONTEMPORARY ARGUMENTATION THEORIES

CHAPTER I: PRAGMA-DIALECTICS

1.0. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will explore the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. I begin with a short account of argumentation according to Aristotle and Plato. I continue with the movements of new rhetoric and new dialectics that emerged in the last century. I then lay down the normative and descriptive foundations of pragma-dialectics. I discuss the normative goal, i.e., resolution of difference of opinion, and the description of argumentative reality as speech acts in a critical discussion. I show how these considerations differentiate pragma-dialectics from rhetoric and logic. Next, I expand the normative and descriptive foundations to five components of a research program set out by pragma-dialectics. I explore the philosophical, theoretical, analytical, empirical, and practical components. The chapter ends with criticisms of the pragma-dialectic approach from other argumentation theories, an issue to be further dealt with in the second chapter.

Pragma-dialectics is a research program on argumentation developed by van Emeeran and Grootendorst from the 80s onward[11]. Beginning with *Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions* (1984), the first fruit of their research was *A Systemic Theory of Argumentation* (1984/2003)[12] which puts forth a full-fledged theory of argumentation. The theory is a response to years of debate between rhetoric, dialectic, and logic.

The year 1958 marks the 'renaissance' of argumentation theory in Europe and the US:

[11] For a summary of the development of the theory, see (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2004)

[12] The book, later on, was revised with the same title in 2003. From 2003 onwards, the pragma-dialectic theory of argumentation was extended to rhetorical insights (van Eemeren 2009). The theory is still expanding its domain with the inclusion of different parts of argumentative reality such as the study of argumentative styles (van Eemeren, 2019) and argumentative patterns (van Eemeren 2016). In this chapter, I'm mostly referring to the 2003 edition of *A Systemic Theory of Argumentation*.

> The year 1958 is famously remembered as the year of the European renaissance of argumentation theory (including the study of argument schemes—loci), thanks to the publication of Toulmin's *The uses of argument* (Toulmin 1958) and Perelman's and Olbrechts-Tyteca's *La nouvelle Rhétorique* (Rigotti and Greco 2019, 131)

These two books have paved the way for what will be known as 'the new rhetoric' and 'the new dialectic'. The pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation is part of the 'new dialectic'. Before exploring pragma-dialectics, I will address the following two questions: 1) What are the old rhetoric and the old dialectics that culminated in new rhetoric and new dialectic? 2) How did *The New Rhetoric* and the *Uses of Argument* understand argumentation?

1.1. CLASSICAL ARGUMENTATION

Following the general tendency to attribute any civilizational success to Ancient Greece, the history of logic and argumentation is also traced back there (Lewiński and Mohammed, 2016, 2). However, we learn that there existed in Ancient India a separate branch of science called *Ānvīkṣikī*, roughly translated as the science of inquiry (Vidyabhusana, 1920, 5). It is a misconception that the scholars of Ancient India devoted themselves to spirituality and spiritual practices rather than reasoning. This is not the case in the slightest (Tillemans, 2008, 2). Nevertheless, it can not be denied that the systematization of logic by Aristotle influenced both Arabic/Muslim argumentation sciences as well as the modern rebirth of the study of argumentation in contemporary scholarship (Üzelgün et al., 2020, 266).

In today's world rhetoric, logic and dialectic are viewed as separate sciences. However, in the context of Ancient Greece, such distinctions were not drawn up until Aristotle. For Plato, the science of reaching truth was called dialectic. This is why the authors of *Handbook of Argumentation Theory* do not separate between logic and dialectic in their discussion of classical argumentation. When it comes to the rhetoric, on the other hand, there seems to be a practical difference:

> Dialectic developed within contexts of private gatherings where philosophers discussed the nature of reality and mankind, while rhetoric developed within contexts of the public life where citizens delivered speeches regarding judicial and political issues in front of a judging audience. (van Eemeren et al., 2019, 53)

It was Plato who first used the term dialectic in a technical manner. For him, dialectic is somewhat the method of philosophy. As the books of Plato are generally divided into three categories, it is thought that in each category he uses dialectic to denote different meanings (van Eemeren et al., 2019, 54). In his early dialogues, named *aperotic*, dialectic is used by Socrates to refute the claims of other parties, namely the sophists. Often these early dialogues end fruitless with the assertion that a thorough understanding of *arete* (virtue/perfection) is needed. In his *Republic*, after defining arete according to the controversial theory of "ideas", Plato renders dialectic as a journey beginning from the visible world to the world of ideas and from there to the bestower of all ideas, the good[13] (Oruç 2014, 71). In his late dialogues, it is believed that Plato employed dialectic rather pedagogically (van Eemeren et al., 2019, 55).

After Plato, Aristotle gathered different kinds of syllogistic arts. He defines syllogism in *Prior Analytics* as "an argument (logos) in which, (i) certain things being posited (tethentôn), (ii) something other than what was laid down (keimenôn) (iii) results by necessity (eks anagkês sumbainei) (iv) because these things are so" (Aristotle, 2009, 24). Syllogisms are formed of two premises and a conclusion. If Socrates is a human, and human beings are mortal, it necessarily follows that Socrates is mortal. It is the epistemic qualities of premises that shape syllogistic sciences. While analytics (demonstration) is constructed with incontrovertible premises, dialectics is based on *endoxon* (commonly held opinions). Analytics is the science to be employed in relation to truth. However, this concept of truth is shaped through form and substance distinction, one of the crucial tenets of Aristotelianism:

> Rather than giving a particularistic analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of individual arguments, Aristotle's logic identifies argument patterns that can lead from statements already known to be true to other statements whose truth is yet to be established. These patterns apply universally, so that any content could be substituted for any other content with the same result. (van Eemeren et al., 2019, 28)

[13] In my master thesis, I speculated that we can understand differences in Platonic dialogues not as a progress towards a final idea but rather strategies intended for different purposes and audiences. I was intrigued by the fact that Plato uses dialogue rather than monologue. I linked this deliberate choice to his philosophy and aesthetics, claiming that the dialogue allows genuine experience rather than *catharsis* and *mimesis* (Oruç, 2014, 30).

Under the influence of Aristotle, the divide between substance and form in logic will further expand in Muslim Peripatetic and modern formal logic with varying degrees.

Dialectic, for Aristotle, is the art of defending or rejecting a claim. He uses the predicables developed in *Prior Analytics* and *Posterior Analytics*, albeit with slight changes in *Topics* (Bird, 1962, 307). He then lists topoi, inference structures to be employed according to each predicable both for the protagonist and antagonist. For him, the dialectic content is endoxon, of the philosophers, experts, and the lay-people. Aristotle does not conceptualize dialectic in relation to the truth:

> Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted about every problem propounded to us and also shall ourselves, when standing up to an argument, avoid saying anything that will obstruct us. (Aristotle, 2006, 1)

By detecting topoi related to predicables such as species and genus, each party tries to defend their claims:

> The Aristotelian concept of dialectic is best understood as the art of inquiry through critical discussion. Dialectic is a way of putting ideas to a critical test by attempting to expose contradictions in a position and eliminate them: One party puts forward a claim and then provides answers to the other party who acts as a skeptical questioner. (van Eemeren et al., 2019, 28)

Aristotelian dialectic inspires modern argumentation theories such as formal dialectic and pragma-dialectic, to count a few[14].

Developed out of the previous practice of sophists, Aristotelian rhetoric establishes rhetoric as the science of persuasion. In response to the Platonic derogatory conception of rhetoric as somewhat a threat and a pseudo-science, Aristotle views the art as complementary to the demonstration of issues where demonstrative certainty is untenable:

> When it comes to logical demonstration, the syllogism was the most prominent form; the enthymeme, thought of as an incomplete syllogism whose premises are acceptable to the audience, was its rhetorical counterpart. Enthymemes were usually only partially expressed syllogisms, their logic supposedly being completed by the audience (van Eemeren et al., 2019, 28).

[14] It was also studied by Muslim Peripatetic philosophers (Ibn Sīnā, 2008; Fārābī, 2008). The founder of the science of Munāẓara, Samarqandī had envisioned Munāẓara as an alternative to Aristotelian dialectic (Samarqandī, 2014, 500).

Aristotelian rhetoric serves as the basis for later Roman and Medieval scholars (Rigotti and Greco 2019, 59).

After Aristotle, late Greek and Roman scholars continue developing rhetoric and logic. For the Stoics, dialectic -which also includes what we know today as analytics- is the science of reaching the truth (van Eemeren et al., 2019, 53). Through time dialectic loses its importance. Studies on rhetoric inspired by scholars like Cicero and Boethius continued with developments such as the study of maxims and *habitudo* (Rigotto and Greco, 2019, 94). Notwithstanding these developments, rhetoric loses its importance and becomes reduced to eloquence (van Eemeren, 2009, 130). Logic/demonstration becomes the primary tool of reasonableness. While logic is esteemed for its certainty, rhetoric and other syllogistic sciences are marginalized[15]. Even in this brief introduction, from its Greek beginnings onwards, it is evident that the question of truth (its presence or absence) is central to argumentation. We will see that the question will further advance the polarization of the theory and practice.

1.2. THE NEW RHETORIC AND THE USES OF ARGUMENT

Aristotle's definition of dialectics in *Topics* as a "debate starting from premises the other party is willing to accept" becomes more important in the Medieval West, "at the expense of rhetoric" (van Eemeren, 2009, 130). As a result, rhetoric becomes limited to *elocutio* and *actio* that is to the delivery and eloquence of discourse; leading to a separation between the two arts:

> Toulmin asserts that the ideological division between dialectic and rhetoric only became a fact after the peace of Westphalia (1648); from then on, the 'geometrical conception of rationality' from the exact sciences prevailed. The formal paradigm involved an ideal of reasonableness that was quite different from that in the humanities. (van Eemeren, 2009,130)

The change in the conception of reasonableness affected the descriptive and normative dimensions of dialectic: "Argumentation was no longer seen as a means of resolving

[15] Unfortunately Muslim contribution to syllogistic sciences is not known in the contemporary argumentation literature. Muslim Peripatetic scholars developed the art according to the "context theory" that understands there are five syllogistic sciences; demonstration, dialectic, rhetoric, sophistry and poetry (Coşkun, 2011, 78). Contrary to dialectic and logic, Aristotelian or Platonic rhetoric did not directly influence another form of Muslim rhetoric, namely *balāgha* (Harb, 2020;Coşkun, 2014). See the fourth and fifth chapters of this work for an elaborate introduction.

a difference of opinion between people in a reasonable way, but was equated with rational reasoning by means of formal derivations" (van Eemeren, 2009, 130). According to Emeeren the ideological divide between rhetoric and dialectics is still in place (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2003, 6). I will return here when I discuss the normativity of pragma-dialectics as a critical discussion procedure to resolve difference of opinion in line with critical rationality.

The geometrical conception of rationality or *more geometrico* (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 1) is attacked by new rhetorics and new dialectics. These critiques are crucial for understanding the pragma-dialectical approach to descriptive and normative dimensions of argumentation. In his preface to *The New Rhetoric and the Humanities,* Perelman rejects the attempts to equate logic with formal logic:

> It means that as soon as demonstrative proofs are no longer available, reason will no longer dominate. Even the idea of the 'reasonable' becomes foreign to logic, and such expressions as 'reasonable decisions', 'reasonable choice' or 'reasonable hypotheses' would be put aside as meaningless. (Perelman, 1979, vii)

Against the formalization of reason, he suggests a theory of practical reasoning based on argumentation. This theory will be useful as a new approach for assessing the validity of arguments and will not be geometric. When it comes to argumentation, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca speculate that formal logic is "not sufficient or irrelevant, if not both" (van Eemeren, 2009, 122) In the same vein, in *Knowing and Acting*, Toulmin distinguishes three perspectives on reasonableness, namely, geometrical, anthropological and critical (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 13-14). While the geometrical is equated with formal logic, the anthropological perspective of reasonableness is reserved for rhetoric (Lewiński and Mohammed 2016, 2-3). It is dialectic that provides a critical dimension to reasonableness. Toulmin creates a procedure for analyzing the soundness of arguments. This model moves away from the traditional model of syllogism consisting of two premises and a conclusion. His model/schema consists of data, claim, warrant, rebuttal, and backing (Toulmin, 2003, 89-95). I will refrain from a detailed exposition here, just as I did with *The New Rhetoric*.

Toulmin claims his procedure for evaluating an argument is better than that of formal logic. On par with formal logic, his model is "field-invariant" (Toulmin, 2003, 91) in the sense that any issue can be evaluated with the proposed model. The way the

protocol proceeds from data to claims, from rebuttal to backing is always the same in each field. However, certain moves in the procedure are field-dependent. Toulmin's protocol is critical, that is, aware of the context and content of argumentation:

> What kind of backing is required, however, is dependent on the field to which the question at issue belongs. an ethical justification, for instance, requires a different kind of backing than a legal justification. Toulmin concludes from this that the evaluation criteria for determining the soundness of argumentation are 'field dependent' (van Eemeren, 2015, 121).

I have outlined the descriptive-normative dichotomy in theories of argumentation before pragma-dialectics. Both theories are against the over-formalization of logic; and are looking for a new opening to 'non-analytical' and 'non-formal' reasoning (van Eemeren, 2009, 140). They aim to extend the domain of reasonableness from logical-formal truth values to practical argumentation. Now I will continue with pragma-dialectics. I will begin its critique of *New Rhetoric* and *The Uses of Argument* as an introduction to the topic. I will continue by elaborating on the peculiarities of pragma-dialectics.

Although pragma-dialecticians agree with Toulmin and Perelman on the inadequacy of formal validity for argumentation; their conception of normativity is different. First of all, the authors of *A Systemic Theory of Argumentation* find both Toulmin and Perelman lack a normative dimension:

> What this set of theoretical instruments lacks is a normative dimension that does justice to dialectical considerations. A difference of opinion can only be resolved in accordance with a critical philosophy of reasonableness, in the way we explained, if a systematic discussion takes place between two parties who reasonably weigh up the arguments for and against the standpoints at issue. (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 50)

For a critical philosophy of reasonableness, there should be a critical discussion procedure, but Toulmin's model, they claim, is actually rhetorical:

> Although the reactions of others are anticipated, the model is primarily directed at representing the argumentation for the standpoint of the speaker or writer who advances the argumentation. The other party remains in fact passive: The acceptability of the claim is not made dependent on a systematic weighing up of arguments for and against the claim. (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 47)

It is possible to observe the same problem in the *New Rhetoric* as well. In the book, we can not locate rules and procedures that determine the acceptability of standpoints and the moves other than the persuasion of the adresse. That is, rhetoric works on the level of persuasion. Perelman can not accommodate a theory of argumentation with the necessary tools needed for assessing the validity of any claim other than a "murky mixture of introspection" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 16). Furthermore, resolution of difference of opinion should not be limited to persuasion. An argumentation theory should work at the level of conviction:

> While persuasion implies the immediate effect that the audience reacts to the argumentation in the desired way, conviction can only be reached after some further reflection on the part of the person who is to become convinced. Before proceeding to consider exactly how convincing the argumentation is, that person has to understand that argumentation has been advanced and exactly what it involves. Rhetorical devices often owe their success precisely to the fact that they are not recognized as such. (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 30)

The problem with persuasion, then, is that there are not any criteria that will save argumentation from relativism: What persuades me might not persuade others. Perelman introduces the concept of 'universal audience' (van Eemeren, 2009, 143) addressed during argumentation as a solution by stipulating that an arguer appeals to the universal audience for the assessment of argumentative acceptability. However, pragma-dialecticians doubt if the introduction of a universal audience solves the problem of relativism: "Each individual is free to determine who or what he considers to belong to the universal audience. Ultimately, whoever puts forward an argument can also decide whether this argumentation is sound or not" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 130). There should as well be an "external" criteria for argumentation (van Eemeren, 1990, 39). Their proposal for the external criteria of reasonableness will be the critical discussion procedure that aims at the resolution of difference of opinion (van Eemeren, 1990, 39). Note that notwithstanding the critique of rhetoric, the end goal in the pragma-dialectical model is not truth but resolution of difference of opinion.

With the critique of Toulmin and Perelman, we have entered the normative dimension of pragma-dialectics: From their critique, we can understand that 1) They search for criteria in the determination of the soundness of argumentation that will rescue their

theory from the falling trap of relativism or formal logic. 2) Argumentation should be dialogical.

1.3. PRAGMA-DIALECTICS IN TERMS OF DESCRIPTIVE-NORMATIVE DICHOTOMY

Argumentation theory should deal with describing and assessing the practices of arguers (van Eemeren 2013, 50). Nevertheless, there are also theories claiming to be purely descriptive or normative. As any descriptive foundation is not exempt from normative insights, pragma-dialecticians hold that there should be a fine-tuning between them in theory formation. The reason behind the descriptive-normative tension is twofold: 1) The fear of metaphysics in normative theories such as formal logic, and 2) The prioritization of empirical research in descriptive fields of study such as discourse studies:

> Perhaps out of fear of metaphysics or of "psychologizing," present-day logicians tend to concentrate exclusively on formalized arguments that lack any direct relation with how argumentation is conducted in practice.1 Among social scientists and linguists, however, the view is still widely held that observations on argumentation (or other phenomena) are only of interest to science if they are based on empirical research – some social scientists are in practice even opposed to any theoretical reflection prior to the collection of data collection. (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2003, 10)

Nevertheless, pragma-dialecticians argue that it is possible to have a full-fledged argumentation theory only when the descriptive and normative insights are combined. They dub their stance 'normative pragmatics' (van Eemeren, 1990, 44). The theory is founded upon insights provided from speech act theory, discourse analysis, and critical-rationality among others (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2003, 387). The definition of argumentation is "a verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 1). In other words, it is a verbal activity, a complex speech act with the aim of convincing a reasonable critic. People argue with an appeal to and even presupposition of the reasonableness. With the inclusion of reasonableness in the definition of argumentation; pragma-dialecticians claim to have constructed a bridge between normative theories such as formal logic and descriptive theories such as discourse analysis:

> The descriptive aspect of this definition lies in the concept of argumentation as a speech act that has similar pragmatic properties as other speech acts. The normative aspect is represented in the reference to a reasonable critic, which adds a critical dimension to the definition. (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 10).

By pragmatic properties—among other things—the felicity conditions of speech acts are implied. A speech act might be formally valid or grammatically correct, but still unsuccessful in the sense that the adresse fails to grasp the act or is not in the position of performing the act. If a certain person is not granted to announce a wedding institutionally, her utterance of "I now pronounce you husband and wife" would not be successful. Likewise, if a certain interlocutor is in no position of starting an argumentation; her performance of uttering its start would not count:

> This is why speech acts only form an argumentation if they are put forward in the context of a discussion of an issue that causes disagreement. In a different context, the same speech acts could function as an explanation or simply as a piece of information (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2003, 63)

Beginning with Austin's seminal work *How To Do Things Words* and Searle's contributions to the field, speech acts theory became a fundamental part of pragmatics and linguistics. Contrary to conceptualizing utterances in terms of their truth-value, that is their being either true or false, Austin concentrates on utterances that are neither true nor false. Changing the shift from truth-value to the performances enables him to criticize logical positivists such as A.J Ayer who held that:

> Meaningful statements, those which could play a legitimate part in scientific discussion, were restricted to analytic statements that were necessarily true by virtue of the meanings of the words they contained, to the statements of mathematics and logic, and to that subset of synthetic sentences which could be subject to empirical verification. (Chapman 2015, 108)

It is not hard here to discern the same vein we find in Perelman and Toulmin. Concentrating on speech acts instead of propositional content is handy for pragma-dialectics. Pragma-dialecticians claim that it is not the responsibility of argumentation theory to locate the rightness or wrongness of somebody. In the Aristotelian fashion, they busy themselves with how "a claim is put to the test by a methodical exchange of critical moves made by the party who challenges the acceptability of the claim and defensive moves made by the party who is out to maintain the claim" (van Eemeren, 2013, 59). However this similarity only holds true in the case of Aristotelian dialectics, but what about analytics and demonstration? We see that the approach equates modern

formal logic with Aristotelian analytics. This allows them to dodge the question of truth, the prima facie goal of Aristotelian demonstration.

To justify their position, pragma-dialecticians establish four principles: functionalization, externalization, socialization, and dialectification. Functionalization means that argumentation is viewed as a complex speech act that has a specific function. Externalization stands for the idea that the theory is interested in the commitments that are brought about by the speech acts. Socialization is the study of speech acts between two parties in disagreement aiming to resolve their difference of opinions. The last principle is dialectification:

> To transcend a merely descriptive stance, pragma-dialectics explicates the critical standards to which reasonable arguers appeal and to which they hold each other accountable when engaging in a regulated process of resolving a difference on the merits (dialectification) (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2003, 162-163)

With these principles in mind, pragma-dialecticians assert that the normative goal of argumentation is resolution of difference of opinion. To analyze argumentation according to the normative goal, they design an ideal procedure. And yet, why is the goal of argumentation a reasonable resolution of difference of opinion? Isn't it possible that in real-life settings argumentation is performed for other goals such as finding the truth about the issue at hand; or passing time? Pragma-dialecticians argue that their definition of argumentation actually relies on the word's everyday usage. Accordingly, they differentiate between the two senses of the word "argumentation" in English and other European languages

> The non-English words for argumentation are connected exclusively with constructive efforts to defend one's position by convincing the other party of the acceptability of the standpoint at issue. This means that in these languages argumentation is associated with reasonableness and acting reasonably. Unlike the word "argumentation" and the related word "argument" in English, the non-English words for argumentation have nothing to do with quarreling, skirmishing, squabbling, bickering, wrangling, haggling, or any other negatively charged verbal activity. The Dutch word "argumentatie," for instance, refers to a deliberate effort to resolve a difference of opinion (real or projected) by reasonably convincing the addressee. (van Eemeren et al., 2019, 4)

The differences between English and other European languages enable pragma-dialecticians to claim that argumentation is an activity aimed at the normative goal of

resolution of a difference of opinion. This is why they claim that an argumentation theory should deal with the descriptive reality with this goal in mind. This is also where pragma-dialecticians find their distinction from other theories such as formal logic and rhetoric.

If argumentation is for the resolution of difference of opinion then the soundness of an argument should also be viewed from the lenses of resolution of difference of opinion (van Eemeren 2015, 129). This change in the normative aim of argumentation enables the theory to be differentiated from rhetoric. While in rhetoric, the validity and the soundness of argumentation are determined through the internal criteria of intersubjective validity, for pragma-dialectics there is also the external criteria of problem validity:

> In their view, reasonableness is not solely determined 'internally' by using the norm of 'inter-subjective validity', which amounts to requiring intersubjective agreement, but also by applying the 'external' norm of 'problem validity', which requires this agreement to be reached in a manner that solves the problem at issue. Because dialecticians regard all argumentation as part of a critical discussion between two parties trying to resolve a difference of opinion, their main criterion for problem validity is whether an argumentation fits in with a discourse procedure that is instrumental to achieving this goal. (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2007, 166)

Also, it should shape argumentation through this normative frame: the ethics, and procedure, and rules of argumentation theory should be envisaged through the goal of resolution. For instance, a procedure that promotes the resolution of differences of opinion can not be exclusively confined to the logical relations by which conclusions are inferred from premises. It must consist of a system of regulations covering all speech acts that need to be carried out in a critical discussion to resolve a difference of opinion. This means that the procedure should relate to all the stages distinguished in a critical discussion aimed at resolving a difference of opinion (van Eemeren et al., 2019, 38).

Pragma-dialectics agrees with Toulmin in his classification of reasonableness. Accordingly, there are three forms of reasonableness: geometrical, anthropological, and critical. Determined by one's approach to reasonableness, the question of validity is answered in different ways. In the geometrical approach, the validity of an argument is about whether the correct argument form is used and if the premises can "be regarded as an incontrovertible starting point" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2003, 14). In the

anthropological perspective of reasonableness, the validity of any argument is measured if the adresse is persuaded by the argument. In the critical perspective, which is where pragma-dialecticians are, the validity of arguments will be measured by determining which argument scheme is employed and "whether the critical questions associated with this scheme can be answered satisfactorily" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 14).

Pragma-dialecticians make a distinction between geometrical philosophers and the remaining two. While geometrical philosophers aim at 'demonstrating' the truth of their claims, those who adhere to critical and anthropological reasonableness prefer discussing. Geometrical philosophers, -without actually appealing to the other party and her needs in the argument setting,- set out to prove their claims by holding that they "ultimately derive from something that is an incontrovertible certainty" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2003, 14). For this reason, -just as Toulmin and Perelman,- pragma-dialecticians find geometrical reasonableness problematic: "The geometrical view of reasonableness is an integral part of the demonstrative tradition, which is in fact anti-argumentative, although this fact is usually obscured by the veiled way in which this dogmatic view is presented" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2003, 14). Following the philosophy of Popper, the critical approach to reasonableness, claims that, "philosophically speaking we cannot be certain of anything" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2003, 16). This requires the arguer to be skeptical as human thought is fallible.

Pragma-dialectics argues that although dialectic is generally associated with truth, this emphasis on truth is undesirable. It is not only undesirable but also a simplification that ignores the possibility of using dialectic to deal with non-factual issues in testing the acceptability of standpoints (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2007, 170). With the geometrical perspective rejected - which is where formal logic is thought to be;- for argumentation there remain two approaches to reasonableness: anthropological and critical rationalist. The anthropological approach is reserved for rhetoric (van Eemeren, 1990, 40).

Rhetoric, claims pragma-dialectics, has an anthropo-relativistic philosophy behind it. It makes use of "a certain amount of knowledge about the way in which the beliefs of different audiences are systematically organized" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst,

2003, 20) and is characterized as epistemo-rhetorical. Epistemo-rhetorical character of the anthropological approach comes from the fact that they think "argumentation must be in agreement with the standards applying in the socio-cultural community where the argumentation takes place" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2003, 18). Nevertheless, according to van Eemeren and Grodondorst, there is not much to systematically analyze whether in rhetoric, the goal of persuasion has taken place or not. Moreover, how are we going to measure persuasion: "Most of the time, however, the analyses leave the impression of being rather ad hoc, because they seem to lean strongly on introspection and individual intuition" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 25). Consequently, there is not much to do when it comes to analyzing fallacious arguments in rhetoric, for instance.

Leaving aside the geometrical and anthropological approaches, pragma-dialectics opts for critical rationality. The latter two are based on justificationism. These approaches "assume that reasonableness is concerned exclusively with legitimizing standpoints definitively" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2003, 131). Pragma-dialecticians find justificationism problematic; as the process of justification has to stop somewhere in order to prevent infinite regress or circularity. Justificationists stop the process of justification at a point "which is declared to be axiomatic or is in some way or other elevated beyond further discussion" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 131). By setting up an ideal procedure for argumentation, the critical approach to reasonableness advocates "subjecting everything one believes in to a dialectical scrutiny" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 57).

According to the theory, the ideal discussion procedure aiming at resolution of difference of opinion consists of four stages: confrontation stage, opening stage, argumentation stage, and concluding stage (van Eemeren et al., 2019, 529). I will first briefly introduce the four stages and move on to the speech acts that are permissible in each stage. The confrontation stage is the beginning of a critical discussion procedure. In this stage, it is established that parties disagree with each other and that there is a difference of opinion[16]. In real life, the confrontation stage is often left implicit (van Eemeren et al., 2019, 529). The second stage of the procedure is the opening stage. If the confrontation stage is the zone of disagreement, the opening stage can be called

[16] A difference of opinion may be hypothetical as well.

the zone of agreement in the sense that parties try to agree on common knowledge and ethics. In order to argue for a certain disagreement, it is vital that parties at least agree on how to conduct the discussion. In this stage, one party becomes the protagonist and the other party becomes the antagonist (van Eemeren and Grootendorst,2003, 61).

Argumentation is the third stage of the critical discussion procedure in which argumentation actually takes place. In this stage, the protagonist defends her thesis from the critical reactions of the antagonist. Her role in this stage is to "investigate whether they consider the argumentation that is advanced acceptable" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 61). The fourth and last stage of argumentation is the concluding stage. In this stage both the protagonist and antagonist try to see the result of their discussion. They decide whether the resolution of difference of opinion succeeded or failed.

In the analysis of the critical discussion procedure, the approach discerns four types of speech acts that are performed in an ideal critical discussion: Assertives, directives, commissives, and usage declaratives. Assertives are speech acts "by which the speaker or writer 'asserts' a proposition" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 63). Pragma-dialectics differentiate between two usages of assertives. In the first case, the interlocutor claims to be asserting the truth of her proposition as in "I assert that Chamberlain and Roosevelt never met". However, another usage is when, instead of asserting the truth of a proposition, the interlocutor expresses her opinion with an appeal to its acceptability: "In my opinion, no exceptions are possible to the freedom to express one's opinion," and "I think that Baudelaire is the best French poet" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2003, 63).

The second kind of speech act is directives. They are performed to make the listener do or refrain from something. In pragma-dialectical argumentation procedure, they might be used so as to "challenge the party that has advanced a standpoint to defend that standpoint, to request this party to provide argumentation in support of the standpoint or to request a party to provide a definition, an explanation" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2003, 64). The directive in its literal sense of prohibition or order is not part of a critical discussion procedure.

The third kind of speech acts is commissives. Contrary to directives, when performing a commissive speech act, the interlocutor herself commits to undertake an action as in

the case of "I assure you that I shall show that your ideas are not worthy of consideration" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 65). Actions undertaken by the interlocutor herself might be various, a few examples of which are:

> (1) accepting or not accepting a standpoint, (2) accepting the challenge to defend a standpoint, (3) deciding to start a discussion, (4) agreeing to assume the role of protagonist or antagonist, (5) agreeing to the discussion rules, (6) accepting or not accepting argumentation, and – when relevant – (7) deciding to start a new discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 66).

The fourth and last type of speech act performed in the critical discussion protocol is the usage of declaratives. A declarative speech act is one "by means of which a particular state of affairs is called into being by the speaker or writer, such as when the chairperson says, 'I open the meeting'". However, not all declaratives are useful in the critical discussion protocol; only a sub-type of them, *usage declaratives*, can be performed in argumentation for "definitions, specifications, amplifications, and explanations" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 66)[17].

I detailed the procedure, and the speech acts performed in a critical discussion. The layout of descriptive aspects of pragma-dialectics will be over with which speech acts can be uttered in the discussion procedure. Usage declaratives, the speech acts performed for asking clarification of other speech acts such as assertives and commissives, can be used in all the four stages of the discussion. Meaning, that in any stage of critical discussion, parties are free to ask the other party to perform usage declaratives for defining, specifying, or amplifying speech acts performed beforehand. Similarly, the commissives by the performance of which the interlocutor commits herself to action can be used in all the stages of protocol for varying purposes such as accepting or rejecting a standpoint or upholding or retracting a standpoint. Assertive speech acts can be used in all the stages with the exception of the opening stage (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 60-64).

The normative aspects of pragma-dialectics, problem validity, and intersubjective validity, lead to two conclusions: 1) defining the discussion rules and procedures each party should follow in order to arrive at resolution, 2) labeling any move that is not

[17] There is another type of speech acts called expressives as in the example of "Thank you for your assistance". Pragma-dialectics discourage the performance of such speech acts as they do not serve the normative aim of resolution of difference of opinion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2003, 65).

conducive to the resolution process as 'fallacious' (van Eemeren, 2009, 129). In line with the ideal discussion procedure and the speech acts that might be performed during each stage of argumentation, pragma-dialectics devises 15 rules for critical discussion (van Eemeren et al., 2019, 535-542). As it is not directly related to the purposes of the thesis, I will contend myself with only one of those rules[18] :

> The protagonist has successfully defended the propositional content of a complex speech act of argumentation against an attack by the antagonist if the application of the intersubjective identification procedure yields a positive result or if the propositional content is in the second instance accepted by both parties as a result of a sub-discussion in which the protagonist has successfully defended a positive sub-standpoint with regard to this propositional content (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 147).

The intersubjective identification procedure is a method used both by the protagonist and the antagonist in order to identify which propositions they mutually agree on or if a proposition posited by the protagonist is already one that they did mutually agree on before (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2003, 147). These rules, later on, were simplified into 10 rules, known as the Ten Commandments (Zenker, 2007). It should be noted that pragma-dialecticians admit that these rules by themselves are not conducive to a critical discussion. They are labeled as first-order conditions. There are also second-order conditions that relate to the state of mind of the arguing parties. Furthermore, the institutional context of argumentation is the third-order conditions. For a proper critical discussion, all three orders of conditions should be fulfilled (Gascón, 2017, 714).

1.4. FIVE COMPONENTS OF A RESEARCH PROGRAM IN ARGUMENTATION

So far, I have provided an elaboration of pragma-dialectics. In this subsection, I will describe the five components of a research program in argumentation posited by the

[18] Critical discussion of pragma dialectics is made of "the right to challenge, the obligation to defend, the allocation of the burden of proof, the division of the discussion roles, agreements concerning the rules of discussion and the point of departure, the attacking and defending of standpoints, the 'intersubjective identification procedure' the 'intersubjective testing procedure,' the 'intersubjective explicitization procedure,' the 'intersubjective inference procedure,' the conclusive attack and defense of standpoints, the optimal use of the right to attack, the optimal use of the right to defend, the orderly conduct of the discussion, and the rights and obligations with respect to the performance of what we call 'language use declaratives'" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2003, 7).

pragma-dialecticians that guide approach in their study. These five components are philosophical, theoretical, analytical, practical, and empirical (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2003, 388):

> On the one hand, a philosophical ideal of reasonableness must be developed and, starting from this ideal, a theoretical model for acceptable argumentation. On the other hand, argumentative reality must be investigated empirically and it must be determined where, in practice, problems do occur. Then, the normative and the descriptive dimensions must be linked together by developing analytical instruments that make it possible to view argumentative reality in the light of the favored ideal of reasonableness. (van Eemeren 1990, 38)

We have seen that when it comes to the philosophical component, pragma-dialectic opts for critical rationality. Accordingly, it is argued that human knowledge is fallible. There does not exist any incontrovertible premises as justificationists claim. Justificationism falls in the trap of the so-called *Münchhausen trilemma* (van Eemeren et al., 2019, 193). This philosophical position differentiates pragma-dialectics from logic-oriented theories. It also allows them to build a truth-free theory of argumentation. Therefore it is easy to grasp that the discussion of truth, its presence or absence is determined by the philosophical component of argumentation.

The second component of a research program is theoretical. Scholars of argumentation devise argumentation theories in line with their philosophy of reasonableness:

> Such ideal models aim to provide an adequate grasp on argumentative discourse by specifying which modes of arguing are acceptable to a judge who is reasonable in the light of a certain philosophical conception of reasonableness. In such models, terms referring to properties and relations that are crucial to a theory of argumentation, such as 'acceptable' and 'unacceptable', and 'justification' and 'refutation', are given a specific meaning (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2007, 166).

In this component, pragma-dialectics opts for a dialectical theory of argumentation, rather than a rhetorical or logical theory of argumentation. They stipulate an ideal critical discussion procedure I have detailed above. The ideal critical discussion procedure serves as a heuristic tool in the analytical component; the third component. The analytical component is where scholars of argumentation apply their theories to argumentative discourse. It is according to this component that pragma-dialecticians label obstructions of the ideal procedure as *fallacies*. Instead of a monological definition of fallacies in the classical/logical sense, in which they are regarded as

moves that seem to be true but are not; for pragma-dialectics, the fallacy is primarily a dialectical and dialogical issue. Notice that, although the theory appreciates the product-process ambiguity; the analytical focal point of departure is nested in the process. This is why fallacies are not product-related but the process.

The analytical component is also the domain in which pragma-dialecticians establish their methods for the reconstruction of argumentation:

> If the reconstruction takes place within the framework of a philosophically motivated ideal model, then the well-considered operations of deletion, permutation, addition and substitution carried out in the analysis make the things the analyst is looking for more clearly visible. First of all, however, it must be established to what extent, in a certain speech event, the discourse can be regarded as argumentative. (van Eemeren, 1990 40-41)

While analyzing a speech event or a text, the duty of a scholar of argumentation is to determine if there are elements in the discourse that are not needed for the reconstruction of argumentation. Furthermore, she should locate implicit premises or 'virtual standpoints' that are needed to be added (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2003, 390).

The fourth component of a research program in argumentation is empirical. In this component, the scholars of argumentation should conduct empirical research regarding their ideal models. To what extent are their ideal models, their conception of fallacies, and other elements empirically provable (van Eemeren, 1990, pp. 41-42)? Furthermore, do their idealizations resonate with ordinary arguers? In this component, pragma-dialecticians carry out qualitative and quantitative research. For instance, they published their 15 years-long studies on fallacies in 2009. The aim of the study was to analyze whether ordinary arguers are on par with the descriptive and normative aspects of pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren et al., 2009). The fifth and final component of a research program is practical. This component deals with how the remaining four components can be further developed for practical purposes (van Eemeren, 1990, 43).

The ambitious research program of pragma-dialectics proved fruitful. One scholar characterizes the approach as "quasi-industrial" (Lumer, 2010, 42). Many scholars from various fields of study, now, employ pragma-dialectics in their research and papers. Nevertheless, the approach is not exempt from criticism. In the second chapter, I will detail the criticism of the epistemological approach to argumentation, and the

virtue approach to argumentation. The epistemological approach has trouble with the normative and descriptive aspects of pragma-dialectics. It rejects the normative goal of resolution of difference opinion.

According to the epistemological approach, the goal of argumentation is not resolution but acceptability including truth, probability, and verisimilitude (Lumer, 2012). Moreover, the approach is criticized for its dialogical perspective. It is argued that when it comes to argument analysis, the dialogical process is somewhat secondary (Lumer, 2005). Instead, the epistemological approach calls for a monological argumentation based on arguments as products. The virtue approach, on the other hand, criticizes pragma-dialectics for prioritizing the actions of arguers over their characters. They argue that in argumentation there is a conceptual priority of the agent over the act (Aberdein and Cohen, 2016).

While the second chapter deals with *the problem of truth* (Botting, 2010), the third chapter explores conceptions of self we find in the mentioned contemporary argumentation theories. In the fourth chapter, I start by introducing the normative and descriptive aspects of Munāẓara. The fifth chapter deals with the problem of truth according to Munāẓara and the sixth chapter deals with self and ethics in Munāẓara.

1.5. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I studied the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation. I have chosen pragma-dialectic as a starting point for contemporary argumentation theories for two reasons. Firstly, like Munāẓara, pragma-dialectics is a procedural theory of argumentation. Therefore it allows us to understand contemporary procedural theories of argumentation. Secondly, the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation carries out an elaborate research program in argumentation. It works on five components: Philosophical, theoretical, analytical, empirical, and practical. In that sense it is the most elaborate approach to argumentation, providing us with a methodological framework to understand contemporary theories and Munāẓara.

I began the chapter with a short account of argumentation from Plato and Aristotle. Then I discussed the new rhetoric and new dialectic movements initiated by Perelman and Toulmin. I continued with descriptive and normative aspects of the *New Rhetoric* and *The Uses of Argument*. This allowed me to understand how pragma-dialectics

differentiates itself from these approaches. I showed how pragma-dialectics works within a normative-descriptive dichotomy, culminating in the study of argumentation as normative pragmatics. Thus the approach differentiates itself from logic-oriented and rhetoric-oriented theories of argumentation. The descriptive part of the approach is the idealized critical discussion procedure. Accordingly, the goal of argumentation is resolution of difference of opinion. In line with this normative goal, pragma-dialectics envisions a dialogical theory of argumentation in which the primary unit of analysis is the process of argumentation explicated through speech acts. I elaborated on the four stages of the critical discussion procedure and then I detailed which speech acts are permitted in the critical discussion.

Having elaborated on the normative and descriptive aspects of pragma-dialectics, I showed how the normative-descriptive dichotomy is informed by the five components of a research program in argumentation. Pragma-dialectics opts for the critical rationalist approach to reasonableness. It is argued that human knowledge is fallible. Rhetorical and logical approaches to argumentation are criticized for their justificationist conception of reasonableness. In the theoretical component, pragma-dialectic opts for a falsificationist approach to argumentation in which the goal of parties is to resolve their difference of opinions on the merits. The analytical component in pragma-dialectics demands the argumentative discourse be reconstructed according to the ideal discussion. That is, the part of discourse not related to the resolution process is omitted and the parts that were left implicit are added. It is also where the ingenuity of pragma-dialectic lies: Instead of the classical, logical definition of fallacies that focuses on arguments as products and therefore does not take into account the dialogical process; the approach characterizes the moves that obstruct the process of resolution as fallacies.

With the completion of the first chapter, we have seen that the discussion of truth dealt with in the philosophical component of a research program in argumentation directly informs the theoretical and analytical components of argumentation. In the second chapter, I will elaborate on the criticisms of the pragma-dialectic face.

CHAPTER II: CRITIQUES OF PRAGMA-DIALECTICS: THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND VIRTUE APPROACHES TO ARGUMENTATION

2.0. INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the epistemological and virtue approaches to argumentation and details their critique of the pragma-dialectical approach. The first argues that the pragma-dialectical philosophy of reasonableness which leads the theory to turn away from the truth and characterize fallacies in a dialogical manner is problematic. Instead of a process-based orientation of the pragma-dialecticians, for the epistemological approach, the product, i.e. its logical properties, deserves attention. While the epistemological approach woes the absence of truth; for the virtue approach to argumentation, the problem is much more fundamental. It argues that the definition of a good argument should be sought in neither the product nor the process. A good argument is an argument by a virtuous person. These critiques will help us better understand contemporary theories, and the role truth and self play in developing a theory of argumentation. As we will see at the end of the chapter, for the critics of pragma-dialectics, the main point of departure is truth. Nevertheless, the issue of truth actually veils different conceptions of self. I will end the present chapter by demonstrating how different conceptualizations such as "product", "process", and "agent" imply differences in self. The role self plays in argumentation will be further elaborated in the third chapter.

Epistemologists conceive argumentation as a primarily monological act (Lumer 2005, 204). According to epistemologists, dialogic aspects of argumentation are somewhat secondary. The monological character of argumentation does not change in disputations between two parties either. Both argumentation and disputation should be conceived as a cooperative pursuit of truth (Lumer, 2010, 47). For the virtue theory of argumentation, argumentation theories should really take cognitive biases into consideration (Aberdein, 2007). The goodness of an argument can not merely be evaluated by the internal qualities of arguments themselves (Aberdein, 2010, 179). A good argument is the argument of a virtuous arguer (Cohen, 2007, 1). We had seen that in the case of pragma-dialectics, their methodology designed according to the five

components of a research program in argumentation leads them to change the definition of fallacies. For the approach, any move that obstructs the resolution of difference of opinion is a fallacy. The epistemological approach on the other hand argues that fallacies are qualities of the argument itself, irrespective of the dialogical process. On the other hand, as it is agent-based, the virtue approach to argumentation holds that *ad hominem* is not always a fallacy.

2.1. LUMER AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPROACH TO ARGUMENTATION

The critical rationality of pragma-dialectics reflected in its description and normativity differentiates itself from rhetoric and logic. Van Eemeren claims an "ideological divide" (2009, 130) is still at work in the theory of argumentation. In this chapter, the divide will be further visible as the main tenets of pragma-dialectics and its critique of rival theories will be delineated. I will first discuss the epistemological approach to argumentation. Should theories of argumentation search for objective criteria aiming at the truth? Is the truth as objective criteria helpful at all? If argumentation theories set objective criteria for seeking truth, then what should be the philosophical criteria of reasonableness in cases of uncertainty? These are the additional questions explored around the problem of truth in contemporary argumentation theories.

As there does not exist a unified theory of epistemological approach to argumentation, its descriptive and normative aspects vary from scholar to scholar (Lumer, 2005, 225). However, it is possible to brand them under the title notwithstanding the individual peculiarities. Because, 1) the theory defends justification (Aikin, 2008, 130); 2) stresses the objective truth conditions (Lumer 2005b, 191); 3) understands argumentation primarily as a monological act:

> The epistemological approach to argumentation treats argumentation mainly as instruments guiding cognizing for gaining knowledge or justified belief. Cognizing essentially is an individual activity. So the foci of the epistemological approach have been monological argumentation directed towards an audience and solipsistic inquiry by argumentation. (Lumer, 2005b, 204)

The normative goal in argumentation is the rational justification of truth:

> "Epistemology" here means a normative theory that among others provides criteria for rational justification, i.e., it provides the standards to be followed in

> rational cognition. (This is a rather broad concept of 'epistemology', which includes, among others, also logic and probability theory. (Lumer 2005, 215)

Descriptively, the argument consists of 3 elements: 1) thesis, 2) premises and 3) an indicator. An indicator such as 'therefore' expresses which judgment is the thesis and which are the premises (Lumer, 2005b, 214). Lumer (1988) differentiates between argumentation and disputation. Nevertheless, even in disputation, the monological aspect, presenting a good argument and its criteria are still monological:

> Epistemological approaches to argumentation take arguments to conceptually and systematically precede argumentation and discussion, which does not exclude that they also study the use of arguments in discussions. (Lumer, 2005, 214)

The job of an adherent of epistemological theory of argument is to "establish precise criteria for good arguments" (Lumer, 2005b, 214). Epistemological theory of argumentation should provide criteria that ensure the standard function of argumentation which is "to lead knowledge and justified belief"(Lumer 2005, 194). However, this is not enough: "It must also understand these terms in a strict normative epistemological sense, which relates knowledge and justified belief to objective truth conditions" (Lumer, 2005b, 192). The epistemological argument should be justified by "the epistemological principles on the basis of truth definitions" (Lumer, 2005, 215). This is how the argument goodness and its function of cognition and knowledge production are realized.

The epistemological approach differs from the pure formality of deductive logic. In deductive logic, the premises should necessarily lead to truth. As this would lead to a narrowing of argumentation, Lumer agrees with pragma-dialectics in criticizing the narrowness of deductive logic. Instead of conditioning strict logical validity, Lumer coins "argumentative validity" (Lumer, 2012, 71). Argumentative validity is not confined to deductive logic but to a wider "acceptability" criteria: "'Acceptability' of a proposition here always is intended to be epistemically rational acceptability, i.e., truth, high probability or verisimilitude" (Lumer, 2015, 215). The basic procedure thus in the epistemological approach amounts to two steps. In the first step, the arguer claims that her thesis and premises are on par with acceptability conditions. In the case of deductive logic, this means "the premises are true and they logically imply the thesis" (Lumer 2005, 196). In the second step, the adresse observes the thesis and the epistemological principle on which its premises are based (Lumer 2005b, 235). If the

epistemological principle underlying the thesis is deductive logic, the adresse checks the premises and the thesis. Are the premises true and do they transfer justification to the thesis? If so, the argument is argumentatively valid.

The principles for argumentative acceptability are not confined to deductive logic as this would make argumentation in the pursuit of the strict sense of truth (Lumer, 2005, 220). However, by adding high probability and verisimilitude to the frame, the epistemological approach acknowledges the need for principles other than that of deductive logic (Goldman, 2003, 58). Our arguments about the future face an ontological uncertainty and seeking certainty would make the epistemological approach to argumentation silent on many issues. That's why the theorists "have to expand our epistemic goal from truth to acceptability" with the recognition that the acceptable might be false (Lumer, 2005b, 190).

Next to strictly deductive arguments; probabilistic arguments, interpretive arguments, statistical arguments, and practical arguments -among the many- are established (Lumer, 2012). Deductively valid arguments are principled as "a proposition is true if it is logically implied by true premises" (Lumer, 2005b, 196). This changes in cases such as expert opinion where the principle is called the *genesis principle*. Here the epistemologists seek correct verification in which probability is welcomed. The interpretative arguments "try to establish the causes for known facts and circumstantial evidence by an inference to best explanation based on Bayes's Theorem" (Lumer, 2005, 202). The principle for statistical arguments is statistics. The practical arguments which are non-analytical and in which values play the lead role are principled with utility theory and the theory of practical rationality (Lumer, 2012, 232).

I have listed the types of arguments and their underlying principles according to the epistemological approach. In the epistemological argumentation, the kinds of premises are defined and scrutinized in accordance with the listed epistemological principles. The epistemological approach takes justified true belief as to the definition of truth. In doing so, it theorizes the standard function of arguments "to lead the argument's addressee to rationally justified belief" (Lumer, 2005b, 214-215) and strives for developing criteria for good argumentation to perform its function: "Justified belief then consists of two components: the belief resulting from a positive outcome of this check and the subjective justification, i.e., the memory of at least some traces of the

cognition" (Lumer, 2005b, 220). In the first chapter, we had seen how pragma-dialectics rejects truth and justification. Why then do epistemologists insist on truth and justification as their philosophical foundations? As a preparation for the answer, I will outline the varying approaches to epistemological argumentation as epistemologists disagree if the intersubjective agreement plays a role or not.

2.2. THE DIFFERENCES IN EPISTEMOLOGICAL THEORIES OF ARGUMENTATION

It is not possible to claim that the criteria for good argument are the same for all the adherents of epistemological argumentation. The main difference amounts to what extent subjectivity plays a role. That is why Lumer differentiates between subjective and objective epistemological approaches. The difference occurs in the criteria for a good argument. The subjective epistemological approach defines a good argument in the following way:

> An argument is a good argument for person S if and only if (i) S is justified in believing the conjunction of all the premises of the argument, (ii) S is justified in believing that the premises are 'properly connected' to the conclusion, and (iii) the argument is not defeated for S (Feldman 1994, 179). (Lumer, 2005, 229)

Notice the involvement of subject's belief in the goodness of argument. Lumer finds this definition lacking in many aspects. The involvement of subjective beliefs is criticized as they are relative to agents. Instead of defining the criteria for a good argument, the subjective epistemological approach refers us back to epistemology:

> It does not tell us what the addressee has to check for to find out whether the thesis is true or acceptable or whether the argument shows what it is supposed to show. His criterion does not provide any assistance for assessing arguments and theses. And it cannot do so, because the objective part of the goodness of an argument is not worked out in the definition. (Lumer, 2005, 230)

Lumer questions the applicability of this definition in the analysis of fallacies as well.

The adresse might not be able to justifiedly believe in the thesis when in fact it is epistemically objective. Lumer proposes what calls the practical theory of argument which meets the subjective and objective requirements of epistemically sound argument (Lumer, 2000, 410). He claims subjective approaches to argumentation confuse "subjective situational adequacy" with "objective argumentative validity"

(Lumer, 2005b, 231). Relativity is twofold: strong and weak. Whereas strong relativity takes the goodness of arguments relative to the adresse as seen in subjectivist epistemological argumentation, weak relativity is different. The necessary condition of monitoring the addressee's epistemic situation notwithstanding, the goodness of an argument is not relative to the adresse (Lumer 2012). Argument quality is measured objectively. Nevertheless, the arguer still has to apply subjective situational adequacy. The addressee might be opposing the premises of the thesis or it might well be the case that he is not "linguistically proficient, open-minded, attentive, and discriminating" (Lumer 1991, 102; Hoffmann 2005, 252).

Lumer's version of epistemological argumentation claims only objectively valid arguments can be subjectively adequate (Lumer, 2005b). While the goodness of an argument is independent of the self, adequacy is situational. The premises might not be open to the adresse. He might be bluntly so ignorant or egoistical that he is ineffective in the cooperative pursuit of truth (Lumer, 2010, 47). If the adresse is actually open to the cooperative pursuit of truth, it might well be the case that the thesis or the premises are not open to her. Another scenario would be the case where she might not justifiably believe in the premises or the thesis. In that case, the cooperative pursuit of truth is still possible. The arguer's claim marked with argumentative indicators such as 'therefore' becomes an invitation:

> In addition the indicator calls his attention to the fact that with the help of this argument he, -at least in the arguer's opinion--can cognize the thesis's acceptability. The addressee now may accept this invitation and begin to examine the thesis and the premises. (Lumer, 2005, 221)

If the objective and subjective conditions are met, for epistemologists, the real function of argumentation is at work: The cooperative search for cognizing the truth (Lumer, 2000, 418).

2.3. PRAGMA-DIALECTICS AND ITS DISCONTENTS

I have detailed what is the epistemological approach to argumentation and the two distinct camps in the approach. I will proceed with their critique of pragma dialectics. When we consider the tenets of the pragma-dialectical approach elaborated in the previous chapter alongside the brief exploration of the epistemological theory of

argumentation above, it is not hard to imagine why pragma-dialectics is criticized. Looking through the titles of the papers, it is easy to discern how the debate escalated quickly: Lumer has penned a reply to Botting with the title "The Epistemic Inferiority of Pragma-Dialectics" (2012). The main criticism is directed towards its philosophy of reasonableness. It is claimed a proper normative theory can not miss taking truth into consideration. The difference between epistemological theories of argumentation and pragma-dialectics expands into the way argumentation is conceived. While for pragma-dialectics, argumentation is a dialogical act; the epistemologists claim argumentation should primarily take into account monological aspects (Lumer, 2005, 214). Biro and Siegel differentiate between two senses of arguments. For them, arguments are either abstract objects or sequences of events. Accordingly:

> The former consists of other abstract objects, on most accounts, propositions; the latter of acts of arguing, usually by people. Arguing consists in asserting propositions, and when the propositions asserted comprise an argument (the abstract object), their asserter can be said to be using that argument. (Biro and Siegel, 2006, 92)

Differentiating arguments as abstract objects and acts of arguing is actually axiomatic to different theories of argumentation. In the following subsection, I will further elaborate on the critique of the epistemological approach levies against the pragma-dialectics.

2.4. THE PROBLEM WITH PRAGMA-DIALECTICS: THE ABSENCE OF TRUTH

a. Pragma-Dialectical Conception of Argumentation is not Even Dialogical

By conceiving argumentation as 'discourse', that is dialogically, pragma-dialectics already lose the chance of being a proper argumentation theory. Nevertheless, they even fall short to meet their ideals of dialogical discourse as they banish genuine counter-attacks:

> It does not permit real critique of proponent's claims by advancing and justifying a counterclaim (not p) or by attacking the proponent's justification for his/her claim. It maximally permits the opponent to ask for justifications. (Lumer, 2012b, 63)

In such a discussion procedure, is it really possible to talk about a dialogically sound argumentation process? Lumer goes far beyond posing this question and claims his

version of argumentation to be more dialogical than that of pragma-dialectics as it allows counter-arguments (2012b, 64).

b. Pragma-Dialectics is not Critical-Rationalist at all

There are two fundamental differences between pragma-dialectics and critical rationality: 1) the roles of protagonist and antagonist, and 2) the conception of truth. In critical rationalism, foundationalist justification (Botting, 2010) is rejected. Instead of a positive justification for a thesis, negative criticism aimed at falsification is prescribed. Comparing the two approaches to argumentation, Lumer finds pragma-dialectics to be "exactly the opposite of" the requirements of critical rationalism:

> Ironically enough, van Eemeren and Grootendorst here have completely set aside the criticism of Critical Rationalism, which, of course, requires refutations by positive counter-evidence, and returned to justificationism. And still ironically, epistemological argumentation theories, which are often decried for their monological conception of argumentation, compared to Pragma-Dialectics are much more and only really dialogical when it comes to integrating argumentation in argumentative discourse. (Lumer, 2010, 59)

In a critical rationalist dialogue, the role of the protagonist is limited to conjecturing a hypothesis. On the contrary, the antagonist's role is vital. It is her job to refute the hypothesis in order to complete the falsificationist exercise. In that sense, pragma dialectics is found to be at odds with its own philosophy.

The second critique targeting pragma-dialectics is the absence of truth. Botting wrote a paper entitled "the problem of truth" (Botting, 2010). The problem of the truth that causes the main dissent for the epistemologists is all over their critique of pragma-dialectics. The upcoming subjections will endeavor to present the many malfunctions, -in the eyes of the epistemological approach to argumentation,- of the absence of truth in terms of 1) the function of argumentation; 2) justifying normative approaches to argumentation theories, 3) the problem of relativism in the 'unqualified consensus' of pragma-dialectics, 4) the selection criteria of proper arguments schemes, 4) the controversial debate on justification and many more. However, here in this specific subsection, I limited myself to the relation between pragma-dialectics and its critical rationalist philosophy in terms of truth. While critical rationalism does not dismiss truth, pragma-dialecticians exaggerate the strong foundationalist justification to the extent of rejecting truth altogether, despite the fact that Poper himself defended a kind of truth in science (Lumer, 2012b, 64).

c. Pragma-Dialectic has confusing philosophies in its background

Lumer claims the normative and descriptive problems in pragma-dialectic are rooted in its philosophical background, i.e., philosophical component. The theory has benefited from questionable philosophies and also mixed them to the extent of utmost confusion. That is why the theory is incoherent. Pragma-dialectic conceives argumentation as an endeavor of dispute resolution. This so-called dialogical choice, rather than an epistemic one, is the result of its misconception of logic. Their conception of logic is bequeathed from Erlangen School's theories (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003; Lumer 2010,41). The Erlangen School's logic then is mixed with critical rationality. As implied before, epistemologists find elements of epistemic rationality in pragma-dialectics; leading them to claim the pragma-dialectic is problematic in its foundation. Albeit implicit, the theory makes use of deductive logic (Blair, 2010). Therefore Lumer claims dialogical logic is somewhat meaningless (Lumer 2010, 51-52).

Pragma-dialectics bequeaths a "consensualistic program" (Lumer, 2010, 48) from the Erlangen School. If the end result will be "unqualified consensus", resolution of difference of opinion can be achieved in many other ways (Lumer, 2012b, 52). For instance, an unqualified resolution might well be achieved by a mediator:

> As Goldman nicely caricatures, the most effective way to reach unqualified consensus may be to engage a professional mediator, whose secret strategy would consist in finding out which party is more prone to make concessions and then to canvass this party for pulling it in the opponent's direction. (Lumer 2010, 49)

Other than consulting a mediator, "rhetorical and psychological tricks, eristic devices" might as well solve the issue (Lumer 2010, 49). Resolution of difference of opinion in the eyes of pragma-dialectic is by justifying standpoints to a rational judge. However, epistemologists find the appeal to rationality here somewhat verbal. Pragma-dialecticians underline the importance of argument schemes in order to differentiate their theory from rhetoric. However, the criteria for adopting appropriate argument schemes are left to the intersubjective agreement. Lumer finds it strange that argument schemes are demanded but then are left to the intersubjective agreement, leaving the theory at the hands of relativism:

> A theory that merely says these questions are up to the discussants' agreement simply has not done its homework. It is precisely the task of argumentation theorists to work out and explicitly discuss the respective theories and normative regulations, which then can be used in argumentative discourses. (Lumer 2010, 61)

Unqualified consensus brought by intersubjective agreement is deemed futile.

Pragma-dialecticians appraise Erlangen Logic for "its dialogical, communicative and interactive character" (Lumer, 2010, 52). Lumer begins his critique by rejecting such claims; Erlangen Logic is actually based on another monological logic. Leaving that aside, the supposedly dialogical logic of the Erlangen School has two elements that affected pragma-dialectics considerably: anti-Platonism and constructivism. Anti-Platonism of Erlangen Logic, -claims Lumer,- is the reason behind pragma-dialectics' initial rejection of propositions and concepts for their abstractness:

> For van Eemeren and Grootendorst anti-Platonist ideas are one of the reasons for insisting on externalization, i.e. insisting on making everything explicit and concentrating on procedures instead of products and abstract schemes, which implies that one cannot conceive an argument as an abstract sequence of propositions or judgement. (Lumer, 2010, 52)

Pragma-dialecticians seem to withdraw their rejection of abstract entities in later versions of the theory. Therefore Lumer calls for reconciliation with propositions. Although it is true that speech acts are effective, conceiving argumentation off propositions would make the theory more sound. This also means the abolition of the externalization rule and perhaps the dialogical logic (Lumer, 2010, 52).

Pragma-dialecticians bequeath another aspect of Erlangen Logic: constructivism. Its benefits in mathematics notwithstanding, he finds the theory exaggerated. In its exaggerated version, constructivism "ignores that in discourses we can and must rely on a shared and common language" (Lumer, 2010, 53). The problem with the 'mania' of constructivism is the distortion of epistemic practices: "Constructivism has a strong tendency towards a false form of conventionalism, namely to regard inference, reasoning and argumentation rules as something that is valid by convention and not as objective truths" (Lumer, 2010, 53). According to Lumer, this is unacceptable. He claims the meanings of logical operators and terms are fixed, leading him to argue that the truth of a proposition is fixed as well. Therefore the argumentation schemes and inference should be investigated according to analytical truth (Lumer, 2010, 56).

Interestingly for epistemologists, the pragma-dialectic is sending mixing signals. Although the theory requires argument schemes to be used in the process of inference, by allowing intersubjective agreement to be the criteria for the validity of such schemes, they blunder. It is advised that the theory rejects unqualified consensus and adopts an epistemological approach (Lumer, 2010, 67). In that manner, as summarized before, the validity of argument schemes is not left to the intersubjective agreement.

d. Truth and Justification: the Münchhausen Trilemma

Pragma-dialectic adopts a critical rationalist position and rejects justificationism (Botting, 2010, 416). However, adherents of epistemological argumentation cherish justificationism. For them, truth preserves its canonical definition: Justified true belief (Bermejo-Luque, 2016). When it comes to critical rationalism, epistemologists reject the foundation of the theory altogether. According to the epistemological approach the Münchhausen Trilemma; the epitome of all the problems of justificationism, is simply false (Botting, 2010, 424; Lumer, 2010, 51).

Münchhausen Trilemma is a metaphor for the invalidity of justificationism. According to the story, Baron Münchhausen is drawn into a swamp with his horse and he takes himself and the horse out by pulling his hair. The term is coined by Albert and employed by Popper. Accordingly, all justification needs further justification. In that case, justification either leads to circular reasoning or infinite regress. Circular reasoning happens when a claim and its argument make each other true. Infinite regress occurs when an argument for a claim needs another ad infinitum[19] (Garssen and van Laar, 2010, 132). These fallacies are rejected on the basis of incontrovertible premises. That is, the justifications lead to a state where no further justification is required. For critical rationalists, this is dogmatism (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 14).

If all justifications are in need of further justification, the philosophy of science and epistemology have to be reevaluated. This is exactly what critical rationalism does. Instead of justification, falsification is proposed as the appropriate procedure. Pragma-dialectics seem to follow the same philosophy: The protagonist posits a standpoint and the opponent tries to cast doubt upon the standpoint. However, there are two problems.

[19] See fourth chapter of this thesis for a discussion of foundationalism in the case of Munā ẓara.

First, the pragma-dialectical approach to falsificationism is confusing. Second, the Munchausen Trilemma is viewed as false by epistemologists.

In a falsificationist manner, pragma-dialecticians assert that resolution of difference of opinion is not "not to maximize agreement but to minimize disagreement" (Botting, 2010). Lumer claims minimizing disagreement can be achieved by simply "not believing or not claiming anything" (2010, 44). Moreover, this negative falsificationist position is "at odds with the positive justificatory core of the Pragma-Dialectical discussion, which is regimented by the discussion rules on justification" (Lumer, 2010, 44). What is more, we argue not to resolve differences of opinion but to make our opponent cognize our justified belief by the transfer of the justified belief (Lumer, 2005, 219).

The theories that reject Münchassen trilemma are foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism (Aikin, 2008, 135). While coherentism rejects the accusation of circular reasoning; infinitism accepts and defends infinite regress. As for foundationalism, there are basic beliefs that are free of the burden of justification: "Take, for example, beliefs such as I have a headache, 2+ 2= 4, and All things are identical to themselves - all you have to do is understand those sentences, and you're in a position to adjudge their justificatory status" (Aikin, 2008, 135). These new epistemological approaches defend justification and epistemologists defend a foundationalist argumentation for the purpose of knowledge and truth.

e. The function of argument

The epistemologists attack the pragma-dialectical approach to the function of argument in two ways: First, they hold that resolution of difference of opinion as the function of argumentation is unjustified. Second, it is false (Lumer, 2012b, 52) Argumentation, in their eyes, is practiced primarily to transfer knowledge and truth. Lumer concedes that argumentation might be performed for different purposes, such as dispute resolution. Nevertheless, even during resolution of difference of opinion as well, justifying belief is the primal aim: "Since to try to persuade is to give reasons for adopting a belief, and to try to resolve a dispute is to look for reasons to agree on one belief rather than another" (Biro and Siegel, 2006, 94). In that sense, pragma-dialecticians should justify why the resolution of difference of opinion is the function of argumentation.

We insist on our ideas and beliefs. It is not easy to see people changing their minds during disputes. This is because they have reasons to believe! For Lumer, this is a sign of epistemological argumentation in the process:

> They have acquired their beliefs by procedures that are, hopefully, connected to truth conditions for the believed propositions in such a way that following these procedures guarantees acceptability, i.e., truth, high probability or verisimilitude, of one's beliefs. (Lumer, 2010, 45)

We need to resolve a difference of opinion because one of the conflicting positions might be false[20].

In the first chapter, I summarized how pragma-dialectic adopts critical rationalism as an alternative to geometric and antroporelativist reasoning. Lumer finds this explanation *ad hoc*:

> It is quite astonishing that even though van Eemeren and Grootendorst repeat their aim for argumentative discourse, i.e., dispute resolution, countless times, they practically do not justify this most central assumption of their approach. (Lumer, 2010,44)

If resolution of difference of opinion is proposed as the function of argument; this proposal begs the question as well. Pragma-dialectical remarks on the advantages of dispute resolution, i.e., alleviating ourselves from intellectual isolation and curing inertia, are read differently. They might be read as "a euphemism for 'conformism'" (Lumer, 2010, 44).

The paramount attack on pragma-dialectic is its imposition of intersubjective agreement as the validity of argument schemes. Although the theory requires rational reduction of disagreement, "they leave open the question of why the procedures should be rational and what the nature of that rationality is" (Aikin, 2008, 130). Isn't it possible to arrive at a consensus in a justified manner; and isn't justified consensus a better way to solve problems:

> Try, however, to spell out what it is for a reason to fail to persuade to have something to do with the argument's intrinsic merit, and guess what you get: an epistemic account! The reason is that the intrinsic merit of an argument must

[20] The epistemologists fail to notice that, in pragma-dialectics there is explicit mention of the law of non-contradiction and the authors make use of the law in order to justify their model. However, this reference as well might be accounted as one of the mixing signals of pragma-dialectics. That is why, it is requested that pragma-dialectics elaborate on their preferred logic system (Blair 2010).

> be judged relative to the intrinsic goal, the raison d'etre, of arguments: to provide (good) reasons for belief. (Biro and Siegel, 2006, 94)

For epistemologists, epistemic rationalism is the philosophy of reasonableness. We argue because we have more or less justified convictions. These convictions are earned with founding principles such as deductive logic. If the validity of argument schemes is left to intersubjective validity, the problems such as the gambler's fallacy arise (Biro and Siegel, 2010, 473). While repeated occurrences in flipping a coin are statistically irrelevant to their past occurrences, the gamblers might still find it objectively valid. In the case of argumentation, if two arguers take gambler's fallacy as a valid argument scheme; they will resolve their problems, alas, in an epistemically disastrous manner:

> Arguing-based accounts thus leave no room for criticizing an argument if it succeeds in persuading (something it may do with one audience and fail to do with another). This would render 'He succeeded in persuading by using a bad argument' meaningless, which it is not. So, too, with 'He argued well, but unsuccessfully' (something that, alas, happens to us a lot!). (Biro and Siegel, 2006, 93)

Gambler's fallacy should therefore be avoided.

I have summarized the epistemological approach's attack on the unjustifiedness of resolution of difference; now, I will move on to their claim that it is also false. Epistemologists find the dialogical setting of argumentation somewhat secondary. Therefore they disagree with pragma-dialectic when the theory proposes "problem validity" criteria as a better method for locating fallacies: "Whether a particular set of argumentation rules fulfills these functions does not depend on conviction but is an objective fact—much like the functioning of a machine—it depends e.g. on how these rules refer to theses' truth conditions" (Lumer 2010, 64).

f. The Epistemological Act of Arguing: Disputation

I have provided the critique of epistemologists toward pragma-dialectics: Argumentation is a monological act. The theory is ignorant of the real function of argumentation and relies on unqualified consensus. This is partly because of the theory's confusing and distorted philosophical background. Argumentation is a means of knowledge transfer and justified belief, i.e., truth. How then does the epistemological approach to argumentation conceive argumentation in its second meaning? That is, how do they conceive argumentation as an interpersonal act of arguing (Biro and Siegel 2006 92)? Lumer defines disputation as a cooperative pursuit

of truth (Lumer 1988). Nevertheless, the primacy of monological argumentation is still preserved. The theory of disputation should be based on argumentation in its monological definition and the study of dialogical aspects in itself is not even fruitful:

> Disputation here will mean: (learned) dialogue in which the participants cooperatively though perhaps controversially attempt to find out by means of arguments and mutual criticism whether a thesis is true or false) (Lumer 1988, 441).

I detailed the definition and application of monological epistemological argumentation theory. In order to avoid repeating, I will only sketch out illuminating aspects of epistemological disputation. What is important in Lumer's account of disputation is its ability to show how complicated the argumentative reality is. He finds more than 30 moves in everyday argumentative exchanges. In this subsection, I will try to present a sketch of the epistemological disputation. Disputation includes two players; their possible moves; the rules regulating the moves and "the internal aims and ends of the game" (Lumer, 1988, 450)[21].

The epistemological argumentation preserves the opponent's right to counter attack. The proponent asserts a thesis and argues in favor of the thesis. This argumentation for the thesis also includes implicit arguments. By providing argumentation for a thesis, the proponent implicitly advances another argumentation that her premises and conclusion are true and the underlying principle for the transfer of acceptability to a thesis is observed (Lumer, 1988 451). In this stage, the proponent might as well employ external pieces of evidence[22] or make a definition[23]. The disputation might end with the opponent agreeing with the proponent. If not, the opponent demands substantiation and explication of the implicit arguments[24] (Lumer, 1988). This might lead the proponent to retract her thesis or it does not. The disputation proceeds with the opponent's counter-attack. For Lumer, a simple 'no' is actually a counter-attack[25]

[21] The moves listed by Lumer bear close resemblance to the moves of *Munāẓara*.

[22] *naql* in *Munāẓara*.

[23] *hadd* in *Munāẓara*.

[24] *man'* in *Munāẓara*

[25] Although this is not the case in the epistemological theory of argumentation, we know from *Munāẓara* that in case of counter-attack the opponent becomes the proponent. Nevertheless, what epistemological disputation and *Munāẓara* understand from counter-argumentation is dfferent. In

(Lumer 1988, 449). In this stage, the opponent might find an inconsistency with the proponent's argument. Other moves in this stage includes the opponent claiming the undecidability of the argument or further doubt. There are additional supportive moves and rules that are dispensable.

2.5. THE RESPONSE OF PRAGMA-DIALECTIANS: THE LIMITS OF TRUTH IN ARGUMENTATION

The pragma-dialectical responses to epistemological attacks vary. While there is also a defense of pragma-dialectics in the sense that the theory might be considered epistemological (Bottling, 2010), some other defenders chose to reject the epistemological theory of argumentation as a whole (Huss, 2005). Some address the particular attacks of epistemologists (Garssen and van Laar, 2010b). The mainline of responses include: 1) rejecting an objective epistemological truth; 2) stressing that argumentation is bound to relativism as it is always with another, and 3) underlining the dialogical character of argumentation with a focus on the importance of consensus since the truth has limits (Hoffmann, 2005). I will roughly divide the responses to epistemological theory into those who deny the possibility of an epistemological argumentation whatsoever and those who prefer pragma-dialectics to epistemological argumentation.

2.5.a. Is Epistemological Theory of Argumentation Possible?

Hoffman is one of the scholars who contributed to the discussion by questioning the theoretical foundations of epistemological argumentation. For epistemologists, the function of argumentation is to generate knowledge and truth. Hoffman doubts these claims: Can we talk about principles and rules deciding on the quality of arguments that are not relative? His answer is negative as there is a limit to truth (Hoffmann, 2005, 246).

What is more dangerous about relativism, according to epistemologists, is that it allows the power relations to dominate against otherwise much-needed objective criteria. Hoffman claims the contrary: It is universalistic appeals to the truth that is open to exploitation (2005, 249). Having warded off the meta-argumentative critique of

Munāẓara, objection and refutations are not viewed as counter-attacks. Please refer to the fourth chapter for a detailed elaboration.

epistemologists, he proceeds with his argumentation-relative critique by underlining three instances where relativism cancels any appeal to objectivity: First is the dependency of good arguments on the "evaluator's cognitive situation" (Hoffmann, 2005, 252). The second is "dependency on available knowledge" (Hoffmann, 2005, 254), which leads to the conclusion of unavoidable relativism in cases that Lumer calls interpretative arguments. The last situation where relativism is unavoidable in argumentation is the problem of belief-value systems (Hoffmann, 2005, 254). As Lumer himself accepts the first case and constructs his situational adequacy principle accordingly, I will present the first two.

According to Lumer, interpretive arguments can only be principled by probability theory. The principle certifies claims of objectivity to a particular argument with the condition that the said argument is the only possible explanation. Hoffman claims probability theory only works in "idealized models or in trivial situations" (2005, 253). In real life and scientific inquiry, it is "not only impossible to prove that there are no alternative explanations; it is also impossible to determine the probability of the adequacy of a certain interpretation" (Hoffmann, 2005, 253). Belief-value systems are entrenched in deep disagreements. Lumer proposes criteria adopted from utility theory and the theory of practical rationality (2005, 222). Hoffman does not specify Lumer's criteria. Nevertheless, the example he proposes is worth considering. In response to newly emerging embryo studies and artificial procreation, the Vatican issues an instruction fully in line with the reasoning provided by the Christian revelation. Hoffman asks, in such a case where values are deeply in disagreement, is it ever possible to find objective criteria (2005, 255)?

Instead of concentrating on the situations where relativism prevails over objective truth claims, Huss proposes consensus theory as the only argumentation theory. According to this line of defense, the issue is not whether epistemological argumentation or pragma-dialectics is better. It is already solved (Huss, 2005). However, Huss has a particular consensus theory that even requires some adjustments from pragma-dialectics. These adjustments notwithstanding, Huss rejects the objectivist account of truth. Epistemological argumentation imposes external criteria, whereas according to consensus theory the criteria should be internal; decided by arguers themselves (Huss, 2005, 263). Pragma-dialectics proposes two internal procedures -among the many,- that are suitable for consensus theory: The intersubjective identification procedure and

the intersubjective inference procedure (Huss, 2005, 262). While the identification procedure determines which propositions are valid during the discussion, the intersubjective inference procedure does the same for the inferences, i.e., argument schemes. Although completely in compliance with the mentioned procedures, Huss criticizes pragma-dialectics for introducing the condition that argumentation should be acceptable to the rational judge. This is where Huss thinks the consensual foundation of the theory is distorted:

> For if they allow for a rational judge who is bound by a certain conception of reasonableness to determine which modes of arguing are acceptable and which aren't, then they seem to be left with an epistemological view of good argumentation. Presumably, the imaginary rational judge mentioned here is committed to epistemic justification. (2005, 263)

The introduction of a rational judge has deemed an external imposition onto argumentation. Adherents of epistemological theory such as Biro and Siegel claim that pragma-dialectic is in a dilemma: The theory is either normative, i.e., epistemic, or descriptive, i.e., rhetorical. Huss asserts the dilemma is false and rhetorical normativity is in fact possible (2005, 264).

The epistemological theory of argumentation advises arguers to have justified beliefs, justified premises, and justified standpoints. This advice is empty as this is what arguers claim to be doing already (Huss 2005, 267). If they are dishonest, then they are not really partaking in critical discussion. And if they are honest, the epistemological advice does no good. If epistemological argumentation with all its honesty wants to prove the gambler's fallacy to be avoided, it is bound to engage in argumentation. In that case, it is not the epistemological advice of following objective criteria for justified belief, but rather the consensus theory advice that will be useful and followable: "Do not make use of an inference that even one participant rejects" (2005, 266).

2.5.b. Pragma-Dialectic is for the Better

It is Botting who tried to show pragma-dialectic has three claims: The functional claim of argumentation "is to resolve disputes on the basis of the better argument" (2012, 413). The instrumental claim is that the rules of pragma-dialectics allow the possibility of reasonable resolution. These claims are already present in pragma-dialectics. Botting, who is not a member of the school, adds another: the normative claim. The

normative rule is that the pragma-dialectical procedure and rules are headed towards an epistemologically sound argumentation. What else might be behind the idea of defining argumentation *on the merits*? Furthermore, pragma-dialectic aims to convince a reasonable judge. Epistemologists make the mistake of supposing "the propositions and types of inference initially agreed to drop out of the sky" (Botting, 2012, 431). Each arguer has their own set of rules and principles, and also argumentation is not limited to one of its instances. The epistemic progress is resumed by further argumentation, and if so, two theories actually define knowledge in a different way:

> If there is a disagreement at the highest-order between two scientists, then this is tantamount to a disagreement about how the word 'science' is to be defined, or the meaning-in-use of 'knowledge'. Beyond such a point philosophical analysis cannot go; what analysis can do is to show the consequences of various alternative definitions between which the community must make a decision. (Botting, 2010, 431)

According to critical rationalists, the rules of valid argumentation procedure are not external to the discussion itself. Pragma-dialecticians are aware of the fact that if two arguers agree in the opening stage of argumentation that the gambler's fallacy is valid, this might lead to absurdity. However, critical rationalism proposes an evergoing process of falsification. This process is reasonable; albeit different than how epistemologists phrase it: "There is a way of testing a system of rules, showing that the rules pass these tests is a good way of arguing for their acceptance, and acceptance is, in the long run, a reliable indicator of verisimilitude" (2010, 431). If so, pragma-dialectic also has epistemic norms (Botting, 2010, 433).

Garssen and van Laar, two members of the school, endeavor to address two attacks of epistemologists from a pragma-dialectical perspective. These two are the supposed lack of normativity in pragma-dialectics and the critique that pragma-dialectic is somehow a disguised version of justificationism (Garssen and van Laar, 2010). They acknowledge the fact that arguers might intersubjectively agree on fallacious argument schemes such as the gambler's fallacy. However, they do not think this would make pragma-dialectics less normative. It is not the job of argumentation theorists to decide on the validity of argument schemes. Argumentation is a dialogical act and pragma-dialecticians aim at theorizing this intersubjective process:

> We leave it up to the various disciplines to provide methods and criteria that help scholars to assess the acceptability of premises, and we leave it up to

> individual disputants to create what they conceive of as an appropriate common ground. But we assign argumentation theory the task of examining how to converse reasonably on the basis of whatever is deemed acceptable by parties. (Garssen and van Laar, 2010, 127)

Pragma-dialectic allows arguers to intersubjectively agree on which argument schemes they want to employ. This is on a par with pragma-dialectical discussion rules that aim at furthering the critical discussion. Therefore pragma-dialectic is not prey to relativism. The argument schemes should be conducive to asking critical questions and epistemologists fail to appraise that argument schemes and critical questions enabled by these schemes differentiate pragma-dialectics from rhetorics. Garssen and van Laar reject the claim that pragma-dialectics, in reality, is a disguised version of justificationism. Indeed pragma-dialectics employs terms such as justificatory force but in a critical rationalist fashion. The theory does not aim to increase foundation but "but nothing more nor less than coping with criticism" (Garssen and van Laar, 2010, 136).

Lo Presti also engages in warding off the attacks of epistemologists. His method is different from that of Garssen and van Laar. According to Presti, the claim that pragma-dialectic lacks normativity and epistemological argumentation is the desired cure begs the question (2012, 54). Whereas pragma-dialectics strives to establish procedural reasonableness, epistemologists define their own understanding of reasonableness and attack that of pragma-dialectics. This is unacceptable, and epistemologists should not criticize the theory on behalf of their presuppositions (Presti, 2012, 62). That is why Presti criticizes the defense by Garssen and van Laar as well. According to him, they should have returned the same criticism back to them. For instance, Biro and Siegel claim that what people understand from argumentation is the epistemological definition in everyday settings. Nevertheless, in reality, it is the epistemologists who should justify their claim (Presti, 2012, 64).

Pragma-dialectics puts forward procedural rules conducive to resolution of difference of opinion. The procedural rules of argumentation differ from epistemologically good monological argumentation. According to epistemologists, the quality of argument is independent of the states of mind and behaviors of arguers. However, Presti finds it problematic:

> I presuppose it is agreed that it is a good that arguers' social positions or the loudest voice is not allowed to settle opinion or belief in outcomes of

> argumentation. Pragma-dialectics provide brake-blocks for precisely such results because it provides a normative account for argumentation procedure. (2012, 66)

Nevertheless, one can also argue that the actions suggested here are not actually arguments to begin with.

We have seen the epistemological approach and its critique of pragma-dialectics. Its critique focuses on the idea that objective truth exists and that argumentation does aim for acceptability. Furthermore, instead of the process-based account of argumentation, the epistemological approach favors a product-based approach, where premises, standpoints, and connectives are regarded as abstract objects, much like Platonian ideas. In the remainder of the chapter, I will detail the virtue approach to argumentation. The approach criticizes both the pragma-dialectics and epistemological argumentation theory for their focus on the act, be it the process or the product.

2.6. VIRTUE APPROACH TO ARGUMENTATION

The virtue approach to argumentation is a relatively new branch of study that has emerged around 15 years now (Aberdein, 2014). The approach is still flourishing, getting attention from major argumentation schools and journals. The 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation that took place in 2013 was dedicated to the relationship between argumentation and virtue (Mohammed and Lewinski, 2014). Journals such as *Topoi* (2016) have dedicated special issues to the approach. Developed by different scholars, it is not possible to assert there exists a unitary program of the approach yet. There are different inclinations and distinct projects among those who contribute to the theory (Paglieri, 2015, 74). Nevertheless, the idea that argumentation can be studied from an agent-based perspective is the meeting point of various scholars (Godden, 2016, 347). Before delving into details of the virtue approach to argumentation, I will begin with the re-emergence of virtue ethics with the work of Anscombe that led to the development of virtue epistemology and the virtue approach to argumentation consequently.

Anscombe's paper titled "Modern Moral Philosophy" brings forth the re-emergence of Aristotelian virtue ethics into moral philosophy. She criticizes different versions of utilitarianism and consequentialism on the basis that these theories work on a half-pretense of "morally ought" (Anscombe, 1958,1). The law conception of ethics was

brought up by Christianity. Moral necessity only works within the borders of a divinely legislated law. Hume asserts that in the absence of such legislation, it is futile to talk about an obligation created from a morally-ought. Although Kant tries to fill the gap between law and obligation, his categorical imperative is a product of self-legislation and thus problematic (Anscombe, 1958, 2). In the same line, Mill's principle of utility is criticized as it may be bent towards any desired end.

When it comes to the moral philosophy of her time, Anscombe characterizes the many authors contributing to the field as consequentialists, the problem of which is their inability to present a ground for moral action other than the consequence (Anscombe, 1958, 13). Rejecting consequentialism and the concept of morally ought, Anscomble suggests returning to Aristotle. Nevertheless, she acknowledges that the concept of human flourishing "is a bit much to swallow" (Anscombe, 1958, 18)[26]. What then is the Aristotelian virtue ethics that Anscomble suggested returning to? Although virtue, *arete*, as a concept is visible in the works of Homer, it is Plato who gives a detailed elaboration on the concept. He makes a list of four cardinal virtues: Courage, temperance, wisdom, and justice. Justice is regarded to be the end result of the well-orchestration of the remaining four[27]. Although Plato's cardinal virtues are later on adopted into Christian ethics, thanks to his doctrine of the mean, it is Aristotle who becomes the major philosopher of ethics:

> A distinctive feature of Aristotle's approach is his 'doctrine of the mean': the thesis that each virtue represents the right degree of some property, of which either an excess or deficit would constitute vice. Hence every virtue is situated between a pair of opposite vices. For example, gentleness is the mean of irascibility and spiritlessness, and courage that of rashness and cowardice (Aberdein, 2010, 166).

We will see how some virtue argumentation scholars adhere to the doctrine of the mean (Cohen, 2005, 61).

2.7. VIRTUE ETHICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY

Virtue argumentation does not directly derive from virtue ethics. It follows the steps of virtue epistemology in terms of crafting alternatives to existing theories. Virtue

[26] We will see that the virtue approach to argumentation does not offer much on the issue either.

[27] This idea is well-preserved even in some books of Ghazālī, see: (al-Mardinī, 2015, 232)

epistemology deals with justification, while virtue argumentation relates itself to cogency. In virtue epistemology, questions regarding the nature of knowledge, justification, and justified belief are handled from a perspective that is not agent-independent but rather agent-dependent. That is, traditional theories are challenged and restructured with a focus on the agent:

> Whereas up to the twentieth century epistemology is generally characterised by the analysis of beliefs and the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for a belief to constitute knowledge, virtue epistemologists focus on the individual's intellectual and epistemic character. (Gascón, 2016, 441)

The role of an agent in virtue epistemology is handled in different ways. There are reliabilists and responsibilists. Reliabilists claim that knowledge is the outcome of reliable processes that are exemplified in sight, hearing, and memory, among many others. Responsibilities, on the other hand, claim that it is not innate skills but excellences developed over time that are subjected to will and accountability (Turri et al., 1999). That is to say, virtue requires an agent to desire a specific act and be responsible for it. Although this division is operationalized by some scholars (Gascón, 2018), Aberdein calls for a rapprochement between the two (Aberdein, 2010, 167).

Just as virtue epistemology managed to challenge existing theories of justification to allow an agent-based epistemology, virtue argumentation pushes for an agent-based perspective on argumentation, especially regarding cogency. This does not mean that virtue argumentation dismisses questions regarding cogency, but rather it questions the centrality of cogency:

> Good arguments1 should still have true premisses and conclusions that follow from them with certainty or high likelihood; good arguments2 should still be chiefly composed of good arguments1. But this will be because that is how a virtuous arguer is overwhelmingly likely to argue. (Aberdein, 2018, 4)

In fact, virtue argumentation scholars speculate that if they do not prioritize agents over the act, their assessment of argumentation and the overall theory might just be a poor man's somebody of a conventional argumentation (Aberdein, 2010, 170). That's why they envision the conceptional priority thesis. According to the thesis, it is not the acts but the agent herself on which the virtue approach zeros in.

One way to situate the arguer would be by discussing the virtues of argument rather than the virtues of the arguers. With such an approach, it would still be possible to describe a virtuous arguer as an arguer who is predisposed to conduct argumentation

with virtuous arguments. Nevertheless, the said problem of repeating the conventional theories holds the way:

> However, the virtue talk in this approach would be merely ornamental, since the 'virtues of an argument' could presumably be cashed out in terms of more familiar forms of argument appraisal. Hence, if a virtue theory of argumentation is to do any work, it must be agent-based. (Aberdein, 2010, 170)

Repeating the conventional approaches would be no good for the virtue approach to argumentation. The approach would either be a mere repetition of the existing theories or it would only be complementary to existing theories.

Gascon criticizes Aberdein as he thinks that he is promising a virtue approach that is complementary to informal logic.

> Hence, Aberdein's proposal could actually be that we should use an agent-based approach together with the traditional act-based criteria of informal logic as a way of enriching our current theories of argument appraisal. This, though, seems a rather unambitious project and a very limited conception of a virtue argumentation theory, as a mere complement to informal logic. (2016, 443)[28]

The conceptual priority thesis claims that it is not the qualities of the argument, but the agent herself that should be focused on. Furthermore, it claims that the conduct of the arguers are more important than "propositions, rules, inferences, procedures or even outcomes, as the heart of argument evaluation" (Gascón, 2016, 443). However, a virtue-based argument evaluation seems to be "less accurate and less informative" (Gascón, 2016, 444). It does not seem possible to evaluate an argument in terms of the qualities of the agent. Furthermore, there is an abundance of conventional methods offering argument appraisal. That's why some scholars propose leaving off argument evaluation as an asset of the virtue approach (Paglieri, 2015, 65).

2.8. THE VIRTUOUS ARGUER

I emphasized virtue argumentation's fundamental principle, i.e., conceptual priority thesis. In what follows, I will give examples from some applications of this principle, such as courage and open-mindedness as virtues. Later on, I will move on to the criticism the virtue approach faces and the different answers provided by the adherents

[28] We will see that in a different paper, Gascon will remind the externalization principle of pragma-dialectics and suggest that virtue argumentation should be thought as a pedagogy (Gascón, 2017).

of the approach. The overall goal of the virtue approach is "distinguishing good from bad arguers rather than good from bad arguments" (Aberdein, 2010, 171). In order to achieve this goal, in some papers, the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean, together with his classification of the virtues, are employed. These are responsiblist and reliabilist virtues such as prudence, wisdom, understanding, intuition, and resourcefulness. These virtues are later fashioned in a manner that would fit into the frame of argumentation:

> The ability to recognize the salient facts; sensitivity to detail; open-mindedness in collecting and appraising evidence; fairness in evaluating the arguments of others; intellectual humility; intellectual perseverance, diligence, care and thoroughness; adaptability of intellect; the detective's virtues: thinking of coherent explanations of the facts; being able to recognize reliable authority; insight into persons, problems, theories. (Aberdein, 2010, 172)

Adding the Aristotelian doctrine of mean to the virtues counted above, Cohen envisions an ideal arguer. An ideal arguer is willing to engage in argumentation, listen to others, and change her position if necessary (Cohen, 2005, 64). She is also courageous enough to question what is thought to be obvious. Alongside these virtues, Cohen also counts argumentative vices, again in connection with the doctrine of the mean:

> He explicitly situates willingness to listen between two positions he identifies as the 'Deaf Dogmatist', who ignores relevant objections and questions, and the 'Concessionaire', who undermines his own arguments with unnecessary concessions. [...] Willingness to question lies between the 'Eager Believer', who endorses positions uncritically, and the 'Unassuring Assurer', who insists on defending what he might otherwise have been freely granted. Lastly, willingness to engage is opposed to the 'Argument Provocateur', who argues at all times. (Aberdein, 2010, 174)

As for virtues and vices dealt with in virtue argumentation, there are many. For example, Aberdein defends courage as a virtue. Although the concept of courageous argument is mostly associated with indefensible argument and thus with aggression, for him, courage is a virtue that becomes handy in defending unpopular arguments. Furthermore, courage enables acknowledgment of defeat (Aberdein, 2017). In the

same line, arrogance is found to be an argumentative vice that can illuminate what is called "deep disagreements" (Aberdein, 2020a)[29].

Among the various works that deal with the virtue approach to argumentation, Gascón's paper is arguably the most successful one in showing that assessment of cogency or procedures is not the whole story (Gascón, 2016). He gives the example of a conversation between a child, and a man that takes place in the movie *Thank You for Smoking*. The child claims that her mother said to him that smoking kills. Naylor undercuts the claim by questioning the authority of the mother. Is she a doctor, or not? In the end, he does not claim that smoking is healthy but, by questioning the mother's authority, suggests that the child should think by himself without appealing to any authority. According to Gascón, informal logic or pragma-dialectics would not find any faults in this piece of argumentation. Nevertheless, cogency or obeying critical discussion rules are insufficient to decipher what happens here:

> Naylor displays a complete lack of intellectual empathy, understood as the willingness to ''put oneself in the place of others in order to genuinely understand them'' (Paul 1993, p. 261) and in order to adjust one's argumentation to the other's motives, beliefs, and capacities. In this case, the problem is that Naylor is completely ignoring the fact that he is arguing with a young child, treating her as though she was a mature and informed adult. (Gascón, 2016, 448)

The example is claimed to show that cogency or rules of critical discussion procedure are not enough to understand argumentation.

In fact, pragma-dialectics admits that the procedure and rules are insufficient to assess argumentation. The procedure falls within what is deemed to be first-order conditions. There are second-order conditions that are related to the arguers' state of mind and the third-order conditions are related to the institutional context argumentation that takes place (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 36). I will detail these conditions and how they relate to the virtue approach to argumentation later when I detail Gascón's rapprochement between pragma-dialectics and the virtue approach. I will now continue with the critique of the approach faces. Finally, I will resume the discussion with what the adherents of the approach have to say against these criticisms.

[29] Aberdein's bibliography on virtue approach to argumentation lists 450 works, be it articles, book chapters or conference papers (Aberdein, 2014).

2.9. THE CRITIQUES OF THE VIRTUE APPROACH

The single most effective attack on the virtue approach is that it commits the ad hominem fallacy (Bowell and Kingsbury, 2013). Critics of the approach claim that as the focus in the approach is to prioritize arguers over their acts, it commits the hominem fallacy. Aberdein himself acknowledges the threat:

> In general terms, an ad hominem argument may be said to 'consist in bringing alleged facts about Jones to bear in an attempt to influence hearers' attitudes toward Jones's advocacy-of-P' (Brinton 1995, p. 214). This seems to fit exactly. Jones's virtues (or vices) are alleged facts about him, his argument-that-P is an instance of his advocacy-of-P, and our appraisal of his presentation of that argument is presumably an attempt to influence hearers' attitudes towards it. Thus, if all ad hominem arguments are fallacious, agent-based appraisal must be fallacious too (Aberdein, 2010, 170)

However, adherents of the approach cite many works that do not accept ad hominem as a fallacy. The move has many forms, and only some of them are real fallacies (Aberdein, 2013, 13). Instead of going with the name ad hominem, scholars prefer using the title ethotic argument. Ethotic arguments are divided into two groups: negative ethotic arguments and positive ethotic arguments. Their use is justified under certain circumstances. Negative ethotic arguments are valid to use with the condition that they point out the vices of the arguer:

> For example, highlighting instances of bias, conflict of interest, or deception would be legitimate. Seeking to discredit one's opponent by focusing on his non-argumentational vices, or behaviour that is not vicious at all, would be illegitimate. (Aberdein, 2010, 171)

Other than the claim that the approach commits the ad hominem fallacy, there are two other major criticisms.

The first is known as the situationist challenge. Accordingly, our psychology is situational, we do not act the same in different contexts. The empirical data suggests that it is not our character traits that govern our actions:

> Doris draws attention to such psychological results as that willingness to help a passerby is more strongly conditioned by "whether the subject had recently found a coin in a public phone booth than by considerations of character" (Aberdein, 2016, 3).

Therefore the situationist challenge posits a danger not only to virtue argumentation but to virtue epistemology as well. However, the challenge is rebutted on the basis that acting the same in all circumstances is not a virtue. On the contrary, it is a vice of character (Aberdein, 2016,7).

The second criticism virtue argumentation faces is its inability to assess the cogency of argument. First, I will detail the criticism and elaborate on different responses by the adherents of the approach. Bowell and Kingsbury claim that an argumentation theory must account for argument quality. They define a good argument as such:

> A good argument is an argument that provides, via its premises, sufficient justification for believing its conclusion to be true or highly probable, or for accepting that the course of action it advises is one that certainly or highly probably should be taken. (Bowell and Kingsbury, 2013, 23)

As the virtue approach is focused on the arguer rather than her arguments, it is not possible to consider the approach as a proper argumentation theory (Bowell and Kingsbury, 2013, 24).

2.10. THE RESPONSES FROM THE VIRTUE APPROACH

There are mainly three different responses to this challenge (Paglieri, 2015). Aberdein concedes that cogency is important and insists on a virtue approach argument assessment program. Nevertheless, it is not truth preservation but rather truth propagation that is suggested by a virtue account of argumentation:

> Instead we might say that the virtues of argument propagate truth: where virtuous knowers are disposed to act in a way that leads to the acquisition of true beliefs, virtuous arguers are disposed to spread true beliefs around. The outcome of an argument between virtuous arguers would be a wider distribution of true beliefs (or a reduction in false beliefs). The truth-preserving, but non-virtuous, arguments discussed above would not achieve that outcome. (Aberdein, 2010, 173)

Paglieri suggests that the virtue approach should not deal with cogency or argument assessment at all. He cites many instances of "bogency", i.e., seemingly cogent argumentation (Paglieri, 2015, 70). Lastly, Gascón accepts that the cogency of argument is important. However, according to him, it is not sufficient: The virtue approach should not deal with cogency and leave the issue to the existing conventional theories (Gascón, 2017, 179).

As we have seen in the second chapter, the definition provided by Bowell and Kingsbury is on par with monological argumentation in general and epistemological argumentation in particular. Gascón criticizes the narrowness of this definition. Argumentation does not solely consist of premises or conclusions: "Arguing well involves much more than putting forward good arguments, and therefore, despite the inadequacy of virtue argumentation theory as a theory of argument appraisal, it could be a valuable theory of argumentative practice" (Gascón, 2017b, 39). If the virtue approach were adventurous enough to deal with argument evaluation, it would not do any better than conventional theories. In fact, it would be "less accurate and less informative" (Gascón, 2016, 444). Arguing well does not automatically translate into being a virtuous arguer. He suggests that the virtue approach should be a pedagogical tool rather than argument evaluation. Accordingly, virtue argumentation should act like brothers in arms with pragma-dialectical theory (Gascón, 2017,179).

Gascón asserts that both pragma-dialectics and virtue-argumentation theory can learn from each other. While pragma-dialectics can learn to be more open to second-order conditions that affect critical discussion, the virtue approach should learn from the externalization principle of pragma-dialectics asserting that only externalized acts, not putative assumptions count. Second-order conditions are from pragma-dialectic's classification of three orders that determine the health of any critical discussion. The theory's protocol, procedure, and rules only make sure of first-order conditions (Gascón, 2017, 180). There are, however, two more conditions: Second-order conditions are related to the arguer's state of mind, but, as the theory has an externalization principle, pragma-dialectics does not comment upon second-order conditions and leave them aside. There are also third-order conditions related to the institutional context argumentation that takes place. The proposal to develop virtue argumentation amounts to fulfilling the gap of second-order conditions: "The insights that virtue argumentation theory could provide, then, are not into how to present good arguments and how to assess the arguments of others, but into how arguments are used and how we behave in discussions" (Gascón, 2016, 446). The virtue approach is not for argument assessment but argumentation in general.

In order to detail how the virtue approach can complement conventional theories, Gascón chooses pragma-dialectics as a theory of argumentation. He asserts that pragma-dialectic does not secure virtuous behavior despite the rules and procedures it

prescribes. Furthermore, he claims that sources of the norms in pragma-dialectics are obscure and dependent upon the will of arguers. Finally, he works through a few remarks that might contribute to both theories. Detailing the fifteen rules for critical discussion and the so-called ten commandments, he points out that even van Eemeren and Grootendorst admit these rules are necessary for a critical discussion, albeit insufficient (Gascón, 2017, 722). They merely encapsulate the actual procedure of argumentation. He claims that the virtue approach might fill in the gap in addressing second-order conditions. Pragma-dialecticians themselves seem to attach these conditions with some sort of virtue (Gascón, 2017,777). This leads him to claim that two approaches might complement each other:

> It is safe to conclude, then, that there is room in pragma-dialectics for the integration of a virtue approach to argumentation. There is no need to present both theories as opposite accounts of the same thing: they are merely different approaches to argumentation, one concerned with first-order conditions and the other with second-order conditions. (2017, 711)

His version of the virtue approach to argumentation is a pedagogy that concerns second-order conditions. This is the natural conclusion of pragma-dialectic's externalization principle. Pragma-dialectic claims that second-order conditions for the arguer's state of mind are inaccessible. We can only hold them responsible for their acts, not their state of mind. Gascón gives the example of biases. The bias is an arguer's state of mind that might not be visible through critical discussion, but it still affects argumentative reality. He cites many studies asserting that even a proper education on biases helps overcome them (Gascón, 2017, 714). This is, of course, what the virtue approach will pursue while acting as complimentary to pragma-dialectics.

Besides teaching the virtues and vices, he claims that the virtue approach is promising in understanding the roots of norms present in pragma-dialectics (Gascón, 2017, 714). Why do pragma-dialectics focus on those norms but not others? This is deemed to be a question left unanswered by the theory. It can be addressed with the virtue approach. Accordingly, it is stipulated that the rules and norms of critical discussion are already present in daily life, albeit implicit. What pragma-dialectic achieves is making the convention, the tradition explicit. Of course, the emphasis on tradition is employed by prominent virtue scholars like MacIntyre and contemporary virtue argumentation scholars. In that sense, the virtue approach to argumentation is deemed to show the

source of norms which are conventions of a long-evolving tradition (Gascón, 2017, 719).

Gascón argues that the relationship between virtue argumentation and pragma-dialectics is not unilateral. There is particularly one principle of pragma-dialectics that virtue argumentation should take into account:

> It seems, then, that in most cases virtue argumentation theory should respect the pragma-dialectical principle of externalisation and, as a consequence, contrary to Aberdein's claim, not take over the task of argument evaluation. Even allowing for exceptions, the principle of externalisation should function as a general rule that forbids arguers to refer to each other's traits in the assessment of arguments that do not require such references. (Gascón, 2017, 721)

The reason why pragma-dialectics refrain from dealing with the arguer's state of mind is our inability to infiltrate into it. That is to say, the theory zeroes on externalized acts rather than our assumptions about the agent's state of mind. This leads Gascón to descope argument evaluation from the virtue argumentation altogether. While pragma-dialectics is assigned to evaluator's role of a concrete discussion, it is suggested that virtue argumentation leave out concrete discussions and work on a broader scope:

> Intellectual vices such as intellectual arrogance or close-mindedness, as well as intellectual virtues such as intellectual humility or fair-mindedness, clearly influence how an arguer will behave during a discussion, but those traits cannot be understood only within the boundaries of a concrete discussion. What happens in that person's intellectual life between one discussion and the next is relevant to a virtue approach to argumentation. (Gascón, 2017, 721)

Virtue argumentation will serve as a complementary to pragma-dialectics. It will be a pedagogical program that elaborates on the vices and virtues of arguers. Its benefits notwithstanding, is it necessary for a virtue approach to argumentation, to descope argument evaluation and confine itself into a complementary pedagogical program? Is it not possible for the virtue approach to argumentation to become a full-fledged theory of argumentation on its own? Moreover, should it restrict itself to common sense for locating the sources and norms of argumentation? Some of these questions arise from the debate between adherents and opponents of the virtue approach to argumentation I have elaborated on above.

2.11. CONCLUSION

Argumentative reality is not solely a matter of description. Our normative aims shape what we observe as argumentative reality. The data from the second chapter shows that our conception of truth has a tremendous impact on what we understand to be argumentation. While epistemologists assert an objectivist account, pragma-dialectics deliberately leaves out the truth in their account of argumentation. For pragma-dialecticians, truth itself is a contentious matter, and it is not possible to find external criteria descending from heaven. As much as we are willing to take truth-pills, even the discussion on the relation between argumentation and truth proves controversial. Inspired by the virtue approach, on the other hand, one can argue that neither will the justification be enough to arrive at the truth.

In the first chapter, I have provided the five components of a research program and its application by pragma-dialecticians. In the present chapter, we have seen that the philosophical component, the first of the five, plays the most important role in the critique levied against pragma-dialectics. The epistemological approach argues that the pragma-dialectical version of critical rationalism is problematic since it excludes truth and favors a process-based analytical framework. The virtue approach to argumentation holds that neither the product nor the process is the proper analytical framework for argument assessment. We have also seen how the differences in philosophies of reasonableness lead to different characterizations of fallacies. Instead of the process-based approach of pragma-dialectics, the epistemological approach favors a product-based approach to fallacies. On the other hand, the virtue approach follows a different path and legitimizes ad hominem under necessary conditions.

Although the monological-dialogical divide already cues it, and notwithstanding the virtue approach's stress on the agent, we have seen that the discussions that fall within the domain of philosophy of reasonableness do not elaborate on the issue of self. However, in the third chapter, we will see that different philosophies of reasonableness and the problem of truth are informed by the conception of self.

CHAPTER III: ARGUMENTATION, INTERSUBJECTIVITY, AND SELF

3.0. INTRODUCTION

Having elaborated on the problem of truth in contemporary theories of argumentation through the critiques the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation faces from epistemological and virtue approaches to argumentation, in the present chapter I investigate the role self plays in argumentation. I argue that the philosophy of reasonableness, the first and foremost important component of a research program in argumentation, is informed by its conception of self. The different approaches to the truth -i.e., the most ostensible point of departure in the philosophical component- inevitably veils the problem of self, except for the virtue approach to argumentation. The approach is vocal in its attention to self from the get-go.

While the epistemological approach to argumentation conceives self monologically, the pragma-dialecticians conceive a dialogical self. The monological self is able to arrive at truth, and dialogical self-conception excludes any talk of truth. In order to better understand these self theories, I provide a close reading of *Truth and Justification (Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung)* of Habermas. I show that monological theories posit the self and the object as given. The dialogical conception of the self, however, was traditionally viewed to deflate any talk of truth, as in the case of pragma-dialectics. I show how Habermas maintains a dialogical theory of self in which the possibility of truth is retained, albeit in a non-justificationary manner. The chapter ends with the reevaluation of the philosophical component of contemporary argumentation theories, i.e., their philosophy of reasonableness. The contemporary approaches to truth and self will guide us to better understand truth and self in relation to Munāẓara, the discussion of which begins in the fourth chapter.

Is argumentation a monological act performed by a subject to arrive at and demonstrate her long-desired objective truth as the epistemological approach holds it to be? Or is it a dialogical act that conceives reasonableness gradually, as pragma-dialectics holds it to be? Consequently, can we posit a set of virtues next to the justification process in

which the self is flourished, as the virtue approach holds it to be? Indeed, these theories work very well after proclaiming that argumentation is a monological act or a dialogical action. Yet, how should we conceive the self, and why?

Pragma-dialectic aspires to search and set an intersubjective account of reasonableness governed by a dialogical conception of self. Getting started from a monological conception of self, the epistemological approach aspires for an objectivist account of truth. The pragma-dialectical claim that geometric reasoning is anti-argumentative seems, at best, to be unfortunate, and the epistemological attack that pragma-dialectic is a distorted theory of reasonableness is no less than problematic. Whereas pragma-dialectic exaggerates the role of value-related argumentation and disregards epistemic truth, the epistemological approach exaggerates the role of epistemic truth and expands it to all walks of life. The "virtue turn", on the other hand, imagines a meta-approach, but with the heavy price of waiving any claims of argument assessment.

3.1. CONTESTING THEORIES OF SELF IN ARGUMENTATION

The present chapter aims exclusively to investigate what an intersubjective understanding of self or an objectivist understanding of self means. The pragma-dialectic is founded on a dialogical approach to argumentation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003). Yet, for epistemologists, we do not need to delve into the see of the intersubjective world. Argumentation is the activity of a subject that aims to cognize and transfer truth claims (Lumer 2005, 221).

We intuitively think that there is an "I" who thinks about "objects". The epistemologists claim that arguments are abstract objects (Biro and Siegel 2006, 92). We speculate that truth is either in us somehow, i.e., immanent, or it is out there somehow, i.e., transcend. We utter sentences like "I do not think this is true", or "I want to know the truth" in our daily lives. Who and what are the objects and subjects of these sentences? Are we justified in supposing independent selves and objects? Habermas will claim the opposite.

Pragma-dialecticians mention an ideological divide in argumentation theories. While there is geometric reasoning according to which the subject can demonstrate objective truth, there are antropoletavistic and critical-rational conceptions of reasonableness that prefer discussing matters (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003 14). We will learn

that this ideological divide is actually a continuation of the debate between objectivist accounts of reasonableness and intersubjective accounts. The dialogue between Socrates and the Sophists continues. However, things have changed so much that it would be profanity to claim epistemologists play the role of Socrates and the pragma-dialecticians are playing the role of the Sophists. The same is true, and *vice versa*. Both theories claim to be the ones on the right side. Pragma-dialectic reminds us that their discussion procedure is on par with Platonic dialogue, where everything is open to investigation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 57). In the same vein, epistemologists claim that arguments are abstract Platonic entities[30] that are objectively there awaiting discovery. This reveals how the history of philosophy is read differently, or the meaning of the terms has changed remarkably throughout time.

In this chapter, I will not start from Platonic or Aristotelian roots of self that affect argumentation. The Platonic world where the self performs an experience of opening to the ideas (Oruç, 2014) has become an unpleasant anecdote in the course of contemporary post-metaphysical philosophy.

The philosophy behind intersubjectivity or objectivity is somehow associated with post-metaphysics. In this domain, transcend Truth is ridiculed, and the transcend Self is no more. Nevertheless, Habermas enables discerning the much afraid perennial underpinnings of objectivity or subjectivity:

> In our sublunar world, the unconditionality of moral validity has to be brought into unison with the kind of existential provinciality relative to the future that manifests itself in the revisionary force of discourses of application, for instance. (Habermas 2014, 272)

Habermas is well aware of the neo-Platonic tradition systemized by Plotinus, Avicenna, and Thomas Aquinas among the many others. One of the many reasons I have chosen Habermas to explore the theories of the self is his constant references to classical philosophy and his incorporation of the philosophical underpinnings of any contemporary theory into the classical tradition itself. The debate over object and

[30] I have elsewhere claimed the Platonic ideas should not be thought as abstract objects residing in the Platonic ideal world; but an instance of a multi-leveled re-presence process of the Good in the world we already live (Oruç, 2014).

subject is not limited to the sublunar world but to the order of Celestial bodies, Immaterial Intellects, and the Unmoved Mover as well[31].

Habermasian intersubjectivity responding to the contemporary debate over the object and the self is an attempt at redesigning the classical metaphysical philosophy in line with a "post-metaphysical" understanding of philosophy, truth, and self: "After Hegel, even philosophical reason, now fallible, have no better answer. The rose in the cross of the present may have grown pale, but it is not yet completely faded" (Habermas 2014, 40)[32]. Habermas aims to garden the rose of transcendence not in an other-worldly place; but in the language itself. We talk of objects and subjects without considering the language we share. This is misleading.

By this introduction, I hope to have shown what I find missing in contemporary argumentation theories. Presupposing a monological or dialogical conception of argumentation requires further justification. However, both theories finish already where they should have started: Argumentation is monological or dialogical, but what is this self that argues? Albeit enigmatic at times, Habermas not only addresses the controversial debate over truth and justification by discussing objectivist or subjectivist positions; he has a proposition to make: He is the name behind the "consensus theory of truth" (xvi) that has become a hot topic over the years. However, he has abandoned the consensus theory of truth lately. *In Truth and Justification*, he establishes a "non-epistemic theory of truth". Contrary to the consensus theory of truth, the non-epistemic theory does not contend with consensus. The consensus gives the idea that truth is justification-dependent, yet our intuition of truth is otherwise. Truth is not something we make, but we participate in it (11).

[31] Refer to the fifth and sixth chapters of this thesis on the issue.

[32] In this chapter I mainly quote from Habermas (2014). I will confine myself to providing page numbers from now on. The German originals of the concepts are taken from Habermas (2004)

3.2. THE ARGUING SELF[33]

While epistemologists are criticized for being objectivist, the pragma-dialecticians are criticized for being subjectivists. According to objectivist accounts, the monological argumentation is the only valid conception of the object and the self. For, the supposedly dialogical character of argumentation does not contribute to the study of argumentation. This epistemological position aligns with the correspondence theory of truth (James, 1909). The theory claims there are objects and subjects independent of each other.

Intersubjective understanding of argumentation, on the other hand, presupposes the subject not only to observe but to participate in the world. Further, according to this theory, the subject is always already (*immer schon*) with others. It is not possible to talk about subject and object relationships without referring to the constitutional role of language and communication (*Verständigung*). That's why pragma-dialectic chooses to ignore truth and propositions as abstract objects. Nevertheless, this does not justify abandoning justification and truth.

The critique of naive, geometrical truth is against the ready-made, always-accessible and unmediated Absolute (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2003, 14). Although the epistemological approach to argumentation criticizes pragma-dialectics for its relativistic, subjectivist account. The epistemological account presupposes a s*ubject*, representing true premises. However, the certification of these premises is achieved subjectively, through apperception. According to Habermas, the idea of a subject capable of representing the "outer" world through her mind is naive and misleading. Having based certainty through her own representation of herself (apperception), the subject moves to speak about the certainty of her own representation of things. This representational model produces the naivety of always- the accessible *object*:

[33] In late 2019, Habermas published a new book named *Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie*. Unfortunately, as the book has not been translated into English yet, and my German is definitely not enough to understand Habermas. Therefore, I can not incorporate his latest ideas into the thesis. A few sentences translated from the book shows that, in his new history of philosophy, he still works on the theory of self: "I am moved by the question of what will remain of philosophy once it no longer attempts to contribute to a rational explanation of our understanding of self and the world". (Habermas, 2019)

> These basic assumptions—the myth of the given, the grounding of knowledge in its subjective origins, and the idea of truth as certainty—articulate the conception of "the mental" as distinguished from "the physical". (76)

The correspondence theory of truth works on a correspondence between "physical" objects and their "mental" representations (*Darstellung*). Having established the correspondence between objects and subjects, the theory problematizes the "origin of knowledge, direction of fit and causal influence" (178). There are two theories: Empiricism conceptualized knowledge as a posteriori, and idealism did the same by knowledge a priori. Both approaches are founded upon mentalism.

Mentalism holds that the subject has "ideas" or "representations" and "the world consists of everything that can be represented by a subject" (178). This dichotomy is later on ascertained by self-perception. By way of being "certain" about our own self-conception we ascertain that we have the capacity to know things with certainty: "In representing my representing, I disclose an internal space, called 'subjectivity'" (178). With the opening of the space of subjectivity, we can now speak about the subject and the object, and about "in" and "out".

The propositions are abstract/mental objects represented by the subject. Justificationism is based on axiomatic beliefs and incontrovertible premises. However, the problem does not merely emerge because of justificationism; but from a naive conception of the subject and the object. There are no "objects" and "subjects" outside the realm of language and social interaction (12). In that sense, the correspondence theory of truth is based on a fabricated dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity. Theories that are uncritical of language usage, assuming unmediated access to 'objective truth' are "naive" (39).

If the fabricated certainty of subjective experience actually veils the linguistic and social sphere (*sprachlich strukturierten Lebenswelt*), what are we left with? Dialogical, intersubjective accounts of argumentation emerge as the long-waited answer. There are two approaches to truth in the intersubjective philosophy of self: While one approach still insists upon truth; the other does not. The first approach asserts that truth is a matter of consensus. It is actually our consensus that creates truth. Pioneered by Habermas, this idea known as the consensus theory of truth occupied social sciences for a long time (xvi). Constructivism and contextualism have almost become the norm (Burr 2006).

The consensus theory of truth claims that truth is the end product of an ideal discussion between all parties affected. While the consensus theory of truth still reserves a place for truth, the second approach in the intersubjective philosophy of self rejects truth as a whole. Pragma-dialectic is one such theory. Although the theory is based upon critical rationalism in which truth is the aim of critical discussion, pragma-dialectic deflates any talk of truth (Lumer, 2012, 64). If there are no objects and subjects but intersubjective interaction, then reasonableness does not have any validity criteria other than the problem validity (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 17). According to Habermas, this picture of intersubjectivity is misleading. On the contrary, it is intersubjective processes that enable objectivity and the *talk of truth* (xvi).

During the discussion of epistemological theory of argumentation and pragma-dialectic, the gambler's fallacy occupied a central role. Shortly put, the fallacy is as follows: Two gamblers believe that they can decide upon something by flipping a coin because there was a time this practice worked very well. Of course, we know that this is pure gambling, and there is no relation between flipping a coin and the desired end (Aikin, 2008, 132). However, pragma-dialectic still preserves its position of intersubjective agreement despite the possibility of such absurdities (Garssen and van Laar, 2010). This leaves us with two different dead-ends: Epistemological account and pragma-dialectical account. According to the first, we should adhere to "naive realism" according to which there are subjects and objects independent of language, social life, and communication. However, this is absurd:

> Propositional truth can certainly no longer be conceived as 'correspondence to something in the world'. Otherwise we would have to be able to step outside of language by means of language. We would not even be able to compare a linguistic expression of a presumably 'definitive' piece of evidence with a piece of uninterpreted or 'naked' reality—that is, with a referent that would elude our language-bound inspection. (250)

Nevertheless, we intuitively agree that what gamblers are doing is a fallacy.

While it is true that it is virtually impossible to impose any validity criteria into the argumentative reality as arguers will act the way they want, this should not let us forbear fallacious reasoning. There should be a way out. This alternative way will enable us to t*alk about the truth*. Furthermore, this truth will not be something outside the realm of language and intersubjectivity. For that matter, Habermas abandons his consensus theory of truth and introduces the non-epistemic theory of truth. According

to this theory, while the absolute truth is an idealization, our truth claims during the discussion can be communicated discursively. There is still the truth, albeit fallible (13).

3.3. HABERMAS AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Truth (*Wahrheit*) is an idealization we intersubjectively presuppose with the help of rule-governed (*egelgeleiteten Handels)* intersubjective processes. That is, when we argue, we claim to argue about the same issue that resides in the same world. Argumentation is only possible when arguers presuppose that they talk about the same issue. The agent of this presupposition is not the subject but the detranscendentalized (*Detranszendentalisiertre*) Kantian subject: We presuppose we are talking about the same world independently. This presupposition is the necessary subjective condition of an intersubjective agreement. Without the addressee, my representation of a truth claim does not mean anything at all.

Without an intersubjective agreement that we are talking about the same issue, there is no argumentation. However, this does not mean that we fabricate truth by consensus. According to the "non-epistemic theory of truth", truth is justification-transcendent. The consensus theory of truth, however, can only be arrived at after an ideal discussion It makes truth justification-dependent. Nevertheless, it is our intuition that truth does not reside in somebody's justification. According to Habermas, the normative goal of argumentation is participation in truth by means of rule-governed intersubjective processes.

What Habermas is trying to do is twofold: 1) securing a "non-epistemic" theory truth, 2) locating the talk of truth into a pragmatic worldview where subjects and objects are not naively regarded as given. For him, this is only possible with Kantian pragmatism (9). The theory is Kantian because the ideas of transcendental subject and the noumenal world are employed. The theory is "pragmatic" because the transcendence of the subject is thought in respect to language and intersubjective action. Transcendence in this theory does not mean a journey into the transcend world of noumenal or Platonic entities but a journey from subjective, world-creating spontaneity of language use and action to rule-governed objectivity of intersubjective public space. While moral rightness can be a matter of consensus, the truth can not:

> There are no facts independent of the (ideal) community of those affected to which normative rightness claims purport to refer. But talk of truth, in contrast to that of normative rightness, has certain specific ontological connotations. It presupposes reference to a single objective world that exists independently of our descriptions and is the same for all of us. (xvi)

Habermas differentiates between moral rightness and truth. Moral rightness can only be claimed and justified by an ideal discussion between the parties affected. However, a problem arises if the same procedure is applied to truth claims. In such a case, truth becomes something we make. This is why, after causing controversy in social sciences, Habermas retracts his consensus theory of truth. In daily life, we do not talk about truth as if something we fabricated; but in terms of objectivity. Is it possible to find a new place for objectivity? This place will certainly not be its former residence: The outside world. The objectivity will be in the rule-governed intersubjective processes, such as argumentation.

By introducing the subjective conditions of objective experience, Kant strived to solve the long-lasting debate between empiricism and idealism (21). While empiricism claims that knowledge is a posteriori, idealism claims knowledge is a priori. According to empiricism, knowledge comes from "outside", and according to idealism, knowledge comes from "inside". The transcendental philosophy of Kant opens a new door to the problems caused by empiricism and idealism. Accordingly, both empiricism and idealism are merged into a new philosophy. Transcendental philosophy asserts that knowledge is both a priori and a posteriori. The subject affected by objects regulates them "with perfect spontaneity" (179). Therefore objective conditions of experience are actually subjective.

Our language use is not reducible to objective behaviors; there is always normativity. However, this normativity is bound to be communicated with the rule-governed institutions of life. We argue when there is a problem within the already established learning processes. In a sense, only when objective rules of intersubjective communication or science "resist" our participation in life do our language use, and actions become transcendental (42). However, we still have to communicate our subjective beliefs to others by representing our language use to others. In order to communicate our beliefs, we can not expect the adresse to copy and paste our representations.

Truth is objective, but its objectivity does not reside "outside" of the subject, or "inside"; but in the rule-governed intersubjective life. This objectivity might be subjected to change when a problem arises:

> In the spatial dimension, knowledge is the result of working through experiences of frustration by coping intelligently with a risk-filled environment. In the social dimension, it is the result of justifying one's ways of solving problems against the objections of other participants in argumentation. And in the temporal dimension, it is the result of learning processes fed by the revision of one's own mistakes. (27)

Objectivity then has spatial, social, and temporal dimensions.

Some theories claim that the normative aspect of language-use is always justification-independent: We do not have to justify our normative language use to anyone. The philosophy of Heidegger and Wittgenstein, which situate ontology and being into normative language-use, are such theories. These theories lack objectivity (20). On the opposite side, some theories claim our language-use is reducible to objective behaviors. Quine and Dummett's theories are of such a kind. What these theories lack is normativity (23). In both cases, there arises a dead end: Either we will wash our hands of any appeal to objectivity, or we will surrender to an objectivity that devours our subjectivity. Habermas argues that purely normative or purely descriptive language theories continue the debate between empiricism and idealism. The only difference is that now we are not talking about the philosophy of consciousness but of language (2). He, on the other hand, wants to solve this dichotomy. The solution will find a way between subjective and objective theories of language use. As the debate between idealists and empiricists is not new, and as Kant once tried to solve this dichotomy, Habermas offers to review the Kantian response to the debate.

Kant's response is the famous Copernican Turn. After reviewing the Kantian response, Habermas will situate the Copernican Turn into the paradigm of Linguistic Turn. I will first restate his review of Kantian philosophy and then move into his Kantian-pragmatist response to theories of language-use.

Kant introduces his transcendental philosophy to the debate between idealists and empiricists. Both approaches agree that truth is a correspondence between the object and the subject. However, the debate is on the direction of fit. Roughly put, while idealists assert knowledge is subjective in the sense that the source of knowledge is

the subject, empiricists claim the source of knowledge is the object. According to the idealists, categories and universals of reason govern and order nature. The empiricists claim that reason is *tabula rasa* and the sensory objects govern reason. Kant aims to solve this dilemma by claiming that there are subjective conditions of objective experience: The knowing subject is conceived as an operating subject that frames "'with perfect spontaneity an order of its own according to ideas, to which it adapts the empirical conditions" (178). The trick Kant played, or the famous Copernican turn in the philosophy, was there; the subject is thought to be able to supervise the sensibility that he adheres to. He is free and dependent at the same time.

Kantian s*ynthetic a priori* solved the problem at the expense of causing another:

> Assumption that objective experience and true judgement result from two independent sources, spontaneous understanding (guided by ideas) and receptive sensibility, leads Kant to the distinction between appearance and things in themselves. (181)

While things in themselves become noumenal, their appearance is a matter of phenomenal reality. The problem is not just the division between appearance and things-in-themselves. In this new world, the transcendental subject now has split into two. The subject is categorized in two ways according to its relation to time and space. While understanding is not time and space-bound; sensibility is (179). Therefore, the subject becomes both noumenal and phenomenal.

The noumenal subject does not hold the knowledge of the universals in practical/ethical matters. Kant tries to solve this problem by the categorical imperative (94)[34]. Categorical imperative aims to universalize any action-plan with the question: If others were to be in my shoes, would I demand them to do the same thing? In practical matters, the self has to leave the outward domain of transcendental reason and communicate with others: "This requires decentering one's understanding of oneself and of the world by considering everyone else's perspective" (181). Considering the perspective of others adds another dimension to the existing object and subject dilemma. Now, the object of consciousness is not only the objects but also other subjects.

[34] In the fifth chapter, we will see that al-Fārābī argued for the universality of practical reasoning.

While Kant still monologically creates the subject's interaction with nature, when it comes to practical philosophy, he recourses himself to 'the other':

> Suddenly each party realizes the monadological past of his own view of the world and now feels the pressure for extending his own perspective so as to incorporate the fact that his opponent acts from a different point of view. (194)

If the subject is supposed to anticipate the other's perspective when it comes to practical philosophy, why should not the same role be extended to theoretical philosophy? Is it not possible that others are also active in the very processes of consciousness? These questions lead Hegel to problematize primary Kantian presuppositions. First and foremost of which is the dichotomy between phenomena and noumena:

> Hegel's aim is to set aside these contrasts and to free the essentially practical spontaneity of the transcendental subject from the prison of self-enclosed inferiority of an ego narcissistically aware of its own operations. Hegel instead describes the subject as involved in processes and embedded in contexts that anticipate the possibilities of, and provide the links for, any actual subject-object-relation. The subject finds itself already connected with an environment and functioning as a part of it. (182)

The subject is always already with the others. Our knowledge of ourselves is the product of this being-together. The idea of apperception, my perception of myself, should not be confined within the ego. Why should the self be confined to observing her own actions narcissistically? Instead of an I-perspective, we need a We-perspective.

The We-perspective seems to imply that Truth is an end-product of consensus. However, this is not what Habermas works toward. Truth is not something we can miss when there is no justification for it. In the same vein, truth is not objective in the sense of objects in real life. Language and reality are interwoven (216). The 'objectivity' (*Objectivität)* resides in the language in the sense that our subjective language-use becomes independent of us. A Kantian pragmatist conception of Linguistic Turn ensures objectivity in language and other rule-governed intersubjective processes such as argumentation. Although language-use and action are normative and thus subjective, our normative language-use gains independence from our actions and becomes objective.

In the following subsections, I will begin with the Linguistic Turn and the Kantian pragmatist conception of the Linguistic Turn that Habermas adheres to. Later on, I will elaborate on the goal of argumentation according to the non-epistemic theory of Truth. Finally, I will finish by reviewing the pragma-dialectical and epistemological theory of argumentation in the light of the present chapter.

3.4. THE LINGUISTIC TURN

Beginning with Hegel, it is proposed that the self is affected by others not only in practical issues but also in theoretical ones. Why should we abide by a solipsistic ego which determines her own actions? We need a We-perspective that emerges "from participants' cooperative quest for truth in the rational discourses of a self-justifying culture" (203). The We-perspective sets off from a critique of mentalism. The mentalist paradigm creates fake dichotomies such as "I" and "other"; "inside" and "outside", "phenomenal" and "noumenal". In the mentalist paradigm, the subject is thought of as an observer of reality (56). However, with linguistic turn, the idea of naively given subjectivities and objectives is rejected.

Self is always with others. Furthermore, the reality is interwoven with language. It is not possible to speak of an objective truth residing in real life. The mentalist paradigm creates an observer self that represents the world. However, representation should not be the only action of the self. It would mean we only copy reality. However, this is not the case: What we believe to be objective and true might change over time. That is why we do not just represent the objective reality but also communicate our normative/subjective approaches. Self is always in a dialectic of action and discourse.

Frege rejects the mentalist claim that propositions denote things outside the language. Instead, he replaces mentalism "with a semantic analysis of linguistic expressions" (2). What started with Frege turned into a paradigm shift with Wittgenstein: Philosophy is not viewed as the science of consciousness but as the science of language. Linguistic turn criticizes the history of philosophy for ignoring the constitutional role of language. History of philosophy tries to solve its problems outside, in real life. However, there is no real naked life outside the domain of language: "All experience is linguistically saturated such that no grasp of reality is possible that is not filtered through language"

(30). With Austin's speech act theory, language use has shifted from mere representation to communication by way of creating an intersubjective space.

The illocutionary force of a speech exists with the condition that the adresse understands what the interlocutor communicates: "The representational and communicative functions of language mutually presuppose one another in other words, they are equiprimordial" (5). Contrary to objectivist accounts such as the epistemological theory of argumentation, a proposition can be represented to an adresse only after its pragmatic conditions are fulfilled. Contrary to pragma-dialectic[35] which employs a Searlean account of speech acts, it is not possible to disconnect the communicative function from the representational function:

> A speaker does not merely express her intention (in Grice and Searle's sense) of making her interlocutor recognize that she takes p to be true and that she wants him to know this. Instead of her own thought p, she wants to communicate the fact that p to him. The speaker's illocutionary goal is that the hearer not only acknowledge her belief, but that he come to the same opinion, that is, to share that belief. (4)

Accordingly, a speech act is fulfilled not only when the pragmatic intention of the interlocutor is understood but also after the representational content is communicated to the adresse.

Contrary to the pragmatic goal of merely communicating intention, the epistemic goal of representing our belief should also be realized: "This is possible only on the basis of the intersubjective recognition of the truth claim raised on behalf of p" (4). Therefore, concludes Habermas, there is "an internal connection between successful communication and factual representation" (4). Cognitive abilities and linguistic abilities become interwoven.

Kant had claimed there are necessary subjective conditions of objective experience. Kantian pragmatism claims there are necessary intersubjective conditions of action, representation, and communication. With this paradigm shift, the Kantian outworldly Self that regulates nature with her ideas is detranscendentalized: "In place of the transcendental subjectivity of consciousness, we now find the detranscendentalized

[35] The virtue approach to argumentation creates an ideal form of subjectivity. Contrary to Habermasian formal pragmatics, it does not start with a *presupposition* but a *goal*.

intersubjectivity of the lifeworld" (30). The objects and subjects of communication, -the interlocutor and the adresse,- can not be conceived independently of each other. Furthermore, not only the intersubjective We-perspective is inevitable, but it also requires subjects to presuppose that they are talking about the same thing and there is an objective world. Communication obliges us to "undertake certain idealizations" (7). What would be the point of communication if we do not presuppose we are actually talking about the same thing:

> Communicative language use and the cognitive function of language interlock insofar as both sides must, from their own perspective share the assumption of, and refer to, the convergence point of an objective world. Linguistic expressions can be understood only by knowing the conditions under which they could be used to reach mutual understanding about something in the world. (57)

What makes this theory a Kantian pragmatist theory of communication is its ability to address both subjective and objective accounts of language-use and intersubjective action.

In this non-epistemic theory of truth, the objective rule-governed language use of intersubjective learning processes might be subjected to change. When we have a problem with the existing objective rule-governed learning processes, we might argue against it. In that sense, the arguer is both "outside" of the existing rule-governed objectivity and also "inside" of it. In such a case, her validity claim (*Geltungsansprüchen*) is both justification-independent and justification-dependent. She resembles the Kantian transcendent self who regulates the conditions of objective experience subjectively.

We act as if there are objective truths in daily life: We do not walk upon damaged bridges (39). However, we also know that our knowledge of life is fallible. If not, there would be no point in arguing. We have a problem with our rule-governed knowledge processes when "reality" or "others" resist us. We come up with a solution to that problem. We communicate that solution to those who disagree with us. If we can communicate our solution and the adresse can understand our belief, we solve a problem and arrive at a fallible truth.

Truth itself, however, is not justification-dependent. It is the necessary presupposition of intersubjective language use. It is non-epistemic. It has three instances: Practical,

discursive, and non-epistemic[36] (Strydom, 2019, 3). We live under the spell of intersubjective rule-governed processes such as language in daily life. The practical certainty of the meaning of words and concepts compels us to have a naive, Platonic understanding of truth. In this instance, it is as if we live in the Platonic cave of ominous practical certainties. However, when we have a problem with these practical certainties, we are compelled to argue against them.

When we abandon the practical certainties of the intersubjective world, we are as if outside of the real world. We observe a problem and solve it: We subjectively regulate the necessary conditions of objective experience. We transcend the daily life that is regulated by language. In this instance, it is as if we finally found our way out of the Platonic cave of shadows. However, this does not help at all: That is why we should abandon our outworldly transcendental position, and with the help of argumentation, we should ascend to the intersubjective processes of life. We establish the assertability and acceptability of conditions (*rationalen Behauptbarkeit*). In this instance, it is as if we are the Platonic sage who tries to convince her comrades; but this time *through* the cave.

While arguing, we realize that the use and reception of our sentences have a saying in their meaning. The pragmatics and semantics are interrelated. Due to this interrelation, once we argue, we realize that argumentation obliges us to presuppose that we are talking about the same objects and concepts with our addressee. Furthermore, we also presuppose that we live in the same world (99). Therefore, argues Habermas, we realize that truth is an idealization that we intersubjectively presuppose: It is non-epistemic. However, we also realize that truth claims become meaningful only when their justification is communicated to others, resulting in a fallible truth.

In the conclusion, I will reevaluate the pragma-dialectic and epistemological theories of argumentation[37]. I will argue that, according to Habermas, while epistemologists

[36] This multi-leveled understanding of Truth (and the self thereby) can be compared to three instances of certainty we find in Islam. There are practical certainties that can be "seen" by eyes. There are discursive certainties that can be arrived at by inquiry and there is transcendental certainty which is an ontological experience. While the first two are discursive and epistemic; the third is not discursive. More on the justification-dependent and independent truth in the fifth and sixth chapters.

[37] I do not take the virtue approach to argumentation in the subsection, for as it primarily boil downs to a different take on monological self.

are right to insist on a justification-dependent conception of argumentation, this does not mean that the dialogical conception of argumentation is dispensable. In the same vein, while pragma-dialecticians are right to insist on a dialogical conception of argumentation, this should not mean that we should leave justification altogether.

3.5. CONCLUSION

Pragma-dialectics defines argumentation as "a verbal, social and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2003, 1). Here argumentation is understood as a social and thus an intersubjective activity. The inclusion of the social aspect in the definition serves to differentiate the two senses of argumentation. These two senses of argumentation are specified as argumentation as product and as argumentation as process (Lewiński and Mohammed, 2016, 2). While in the first, the product aspect of argumentation is stressed, in the second, the process aspect is underlined. In the first sense, an argument is seen as an abstract object; in the second, it is a social activity occurring between people (Biro and Siegel, 2006, 92).

Argumentation as a process enables pragma-dialecticians to conceive argumentation as primarily a dialogical activity. For pragma-dialecticians, this is a strategy to avoid objectivist accounts of truth and address an ideological divide in the philosophy of science (van Eemeren, 2009, 130). Ever since the Westphalia Treaty, there have been two accounts on the nature of reasonableness. This divide reemerged during the Renaissance of Argumentation led by Toulmin in the US and Perelman in France. The objectivist formal accounts of reasonableness are challenged.

The epistemological theory of argumentation arises against pragma-dialectics. The normative and descriptive aspects of pragma-dialectic are heavily scrutinized and criticized. The theory attacks pragma-dialectics according to an objectivist truth stand-point. The epistemological theory of argumentation embraces justificationism (Lumer 2012, 52). By preferring an objectivist position, the theory attacks pragma-dialectics for 1) relying on unqualified consensus (Botting 2010, 414) and 2) taking arguments as primarily dialogical acts (Biro and Siegel, 2006, 92).

The function of argumentation is not to arrive at unqualified consensus but at a qualified consensus which can only happen if the goodness of the argument is analyzed with objective truth conditions (Lumer 2005b, 191-192). Pragma-dialectic admits the

importance of argument schemes. However, by tying the validity of argument schemes to intersubjective validity rather than objective epistemic criteria, it falls prey to relativism. Therefore Lumer accuses pragma-dialectics of misunderstanding Popper's critical rationality. Critical rationality is against foundationalist justicationism, but the whole philosophy behind falsificationist critical discussion is still truth-seeking. In his papers such as "Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge" and "Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge", Poppers "defends the view that truth and knowledge are the aims of science, relies on Tarski's definition of 'truth' and on this basis tries to define 'verisimilitude'" (Lumer, 2012b, 64-65).

The epistemological approach follows the mentalist paradigm, where the subjects and objects are naively thought to be given. It is not just that objectivity resides in real life as Platonic entities, the subjectivity is also thought to be given. In that sense, their conception of argumentation is an "I-perspective". On the other hand, pragma-dialectics opts for a "We-perspective". When a problem arises between parties, they start the argumentation in order to resolve the problem. The intersubjective agreement carries argumentation by choosing which argument schemes are valid and which propositions are valid. The problem with pragma-dialectic is the absence of positive justification. According to the theory, we do not argue in order to justify our objectivity claims; but to falsify a standpoint. However, argumentation might still be conducted intersubjectively even when the aim is justification. The fact that our justification-dependent, intersubjectively-shared objectivity claims are fallible in essence does not directly translate into the conclusion that the talk of truth should be abandoned for the sake of a dialogical conception of self.

SECTION II: SELF AND TRUTH IN ARGUMENTATION ACCORDING TO MULTIPLEXITY

CHAPTER IV: ĀDĀB AL-BAḤTH WA AL-MUNĀẒARA

4.0. INTRODUCTION

Building upon the points of divergence between contemporary argumentation theories according to the five components of a research program in argumentatiıon, the remaining chapters of the thesis explore Munāẓara. In this chapter, I argue that Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓara is a *dialogically-epistemic agent-driven theory* of argumentation. That is to say; its approach is neither a solely dialogic, process-based as pragma-dialectics discussed in the first chapter, nor solely monologic, product-based as the epistemological approach to argumentation discussed in the second chapter, or agent-based as the virtue approach to argumentation also investigated there. Elaborating on the discipline, its history, its procedure, and disagreements in its primary literature allows me to give a detailed account of normative and descriptive aspects of Munāẓara in its analytical component leading to the characterization I offer here. In conclusion, I investigate the philosophical, theoretical, and analytical components of Munāẓara. I show that the philosophical component in Munāẓara is founded upon multiplexity, an onto-epistemological approach to the post-classical Muslim world, which helps me discuss the justification-dependent and independent conceptions of truth; Habermasian versions of which are elaborated in the previous chapter. The fifth chapter discusses the relationship between multiplexity, Munāẓara, and truth. The sixth chapter details multiplexity, Munāẓara, and self.

The fact that Munāẓara is not known to a contemporary scholarship does not allow me to directly begin discussing the descriptive and normative dimensions of Munāẓara. Therefore, although this thesis refrains from intellectual history as much as possible as I endeavor to take Munāẓara as a contemporary argumentation theory, some clarification seems to be necessary and justified. I begin with different proposals for the English translation of the extended title of the discipline: Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓara, the literal translation of which is the manners of inquiry and argumentation. By discussing each word separately, i.e., Ādāb, Baḥth, and Munāẓara, I show that a technical translation would be: The Virtuous Conduct for Monological and Dialogical

Argumentation. I then show that while Baḥth refers to *monological argumentation*, the product, Munāẓara refers to *dialogical argumentation*, the process. I discuss why translating Ādāb as *virtuous conduct* fits better to normative dimensions of the discipline rather than the "protocol" or "applied ethics" proposals offered previously.

Having elaborated on the name of the discipline, I then discuss theories regarding the origin of argumentation studies in the Muslim world. Munāẓara is actually a continuation and -for some prominent scholars in the field- even a "revolution" (Pehlivan and Ceylan, 2015) in the trajectory of Muslim argumentation. I begin with an elaboration on the secondary literature's position on the origin of Muslim argumentation studies, where there are three claims: 1-Muslim argumentation is inspired by Aristotelian argumentation. 2- Muslim argumentation is original, initiated by the earlier Muslim theologians, albeit with significant inspiration taken from the Aristotelian tradition. 3-Muslim argumentation studies as a field is original, initiated by scholars who are not only theologians but also jurisconsults. Discussing these three positions, I show that although the available data favors the third position, further studies are necessary for a definite answer.

The discussion on the origin of Muslim argumentation studies is followed by the different periods of Muslim argumentation in different titles: Khilāf, Jadal, and Munāẓara. I elaborate on the meanings of these names and their intricate relationship. Thanks to the studies by pioneering scholars of the intellectual history of Muslim argumentation, such as Necmeddin Pehlivan and Walter Edward Young, we are now aware that although Jadal seems to vanish exponentially and books with the name Munāẓara proliferated, the latter does not imply that earlier Jadal tradition did entirely vanish as authors were writing Munāẓara books while remaining loyal to juridical jadal.

After initial remarks, I discuss Khilāf, Jadal, and Munāẓara separately. These discussions are significant in two aspects: 1- Pehlivan and Ceylan (2015) argue that preceded by earlier evolutions, Munāẓara is a revolution marking the synthesis of the previous practice and the Muslim Aristotelian analytical tradition. Although the claim that there took place a revolution with Munāẓara requires many further studies, it is clear that over the centuries, Muslim argumentation studies have taken an Avicennean turn alongside its continuous attention to the agent. Therefore, I locate the origins of

the dialogically-epistemic, agent-driven character of Munāẓara in this synthesis nurtured as a result of attention to action alongside the knowledge.

I then continue with the basic tenets of logic that are also the foundation for the Munāẓara procedure. Following the madrasa curriculum, I discuss the logic of concepts and assents according to figures such as al-Abharī (d.1265) and al-Qazwīnī (d.1276). I then discuss the procedure of argumentation for concepts and judgments, largely following al-Āmidī's commentary on Sāçaqlizāde's (d.1732) *al-Waladiyya* (1900), as this commentary also includes later debates around the subject. The chapter concludes with two subsections: 1- A comparison between Munāẓara and contemporary argumentation theories. 2-Five components of Munāẓara; its philosophical, theoretical, and analytical components, more particularly.

4.1. HOW TO TRANSLATE ĀDĀB AL-BAḤTH WA-AL-MUNĀẒARA?

At the moment, there are three English translations of Munāẓara books available. In his master thesis, Leonard Faytre (2018) translates *Adab-ı Sedat,* a late-19th century work written in Ottoman Turkish. Syamsuddin Arif (2020) translated Ṭāshkubrīzādah's (d. 1561) short epistle on the subject. Finally, and most importantly Walter Edward Young (2015, *unpublished*) has translated Samarqandī's founding epistle *al-Risāla* and its commentary by al-Kīlānī (fl. ca. 1427)[38]. Alongside these translations, there is also some significant secondary literature in English on Munāẓara; including figures such as of Miller (1984, 2020) Karabela (2011), Belhaj (2016), el-Rouayheb (2006, 2015). In this subsection, I will start with Munāẓara translations and continue with the prominent secondary literature when it comes to translating Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓara. The different translations I provide here will allow us to understand the relationship between contemporary argumentation literature and Munāẓara. Then I will provide my suggestion for the translation of the extended title: Virtuous Conduct for Monological and Dialogical Argumentation.

Faytre translates Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓara as Applied Ethics of Argumentation and Deliberation (2018, iv). He argues that Ādāb refers to "ethics or more specifically to applied ethics" (2018, 3). As defining what is good or bad is the task of Islam

[38] I would like to thank Dr. Young for sharing with me his yet unpublished manuscript.

altogether, the Munāẓara literature does not start with a general definiton of good and bad, but its application in the practice of argumention. That is why he translates Ādāb as Applied Ethics. Faytre translates al-Baḥth as argumentation as the term technically means "making a claim and supporting it with proofs" (2018, 3). As for Munāẓara, he translates it as deliberation, arguing that:

> It is a kind of disputation (mübahasa) strictly motivated by the will of discovering or disclosing the truth without any concern about the winner of the debate [...] Yet, in addition to involve also the notion of reciprocity, the term "deliberation" better encompasses the idea of "disclosing the truth", idea that suggests a tempered, wise and disinterested behavior from the discussants. In Latin, deliberare means "consider carefully" that gave in modern English deliberation referring to "long and careful consideration or discussion, slow and careful movement or thought. (2018, 7)

Faytre's attention to differentiate between Baḥth and Munāẓara is welcomed. However, as we will see below, they can be used interchangeably in most instances as well. Moreover, he seems to imply that there is a difference between Baḥth and Munāẓara in terms of ethics while this is not the case. Lastly, he prefers to translate Ādāb as applied ethics with regards to its end result.

In his translation of Ṭāshkubrīzāda's short epistle on Munāẓara, Arif renders the discipline as "The art of discussion and disputation" (2020, 187). This rendering does not aim to offer an exact translation, and he does not elaborate on why he preferred discussion as a translation of Baḥth, and disputation as a translation of Munāẓara either. Nevertheless, his detailed analysis of Ādāb is much helpful. He notes that understanding Ādāb is a tall deal as the term undergoes significant changes alongside the Muslim civilization itself. Accordingly, the literal translation of Ādāb denotes the norm of conduct and habit. The norm of conduct suggested here is obviously a praiseworthy one. The term, later on, starts to mean good upbringing and civility in contrast to the barbarity of law-culture. The aspect of civility is further strengthened during the era Abbasid Caliphate:

> The term adīb and its plural udabā' was applied to someone not only cultivated in Arabic poetry and prose [more particularly those educated in belles-lettres] but also acquainted with foreign (Greek, Persian, Indian) cultures, an Arab equivalent to the term 'humanist' in post-Renaissance Europe or 'liberal arts' in the modern age. (Arif, 2020, 190)

Alongside its intellectual and civilizational connotations, Ādāb started to be associated with manuals for the proper conduct of a profession, exemplified by books such as *Ādāb al-Kātib* (Manual for Secretary) and *Ādāb al-Qāḍī* (Handbook for Judges). However, Arif rightly argues that it was Al-Attas who, in his *The Concept of Education in Islam*, has incupsulated the ontological connotation of the term implicating the civilizational, political and professional underpinnings mentioned above. Accordingly, Ādāb is:

> The recognition and acknowledgement of the reality that knowledge and being are ordered hierarchically according to their various grades and degrees of rank, and of one's proper place in relation to that reality and to one's physical, intellectual and spiritual capacities and potentials. (Arif, 2020, 192)

We will return to this rendering of Ādāb in the conclusion of this chapter, where I introduce multiplexity as the philosophical component of Munāẓara, i.e., the idea that existence and knowledge have layers.

Walter Edward Young translates Baḥth as "dialectical inquiry," and he renders Munāẓara as "dialectical disputation". As mentioned earlier, Munāẓara scholars use these two words interchangeably. This might be why Young felt the urge to add dialectical to his proposals. He translates Ādāb as "protocols" (2015). This rendering captures the civil and professional connotations of the term but lacks the ontological aspect. Furthermore, the term protocol suggests that it is more or less ornamental rather than essential.

In his pioneering thesis on Muslim argumentation studies (1984), later turned into a book (2020), Miller argues that the ādāb al-baḥth or "general theory of disputation" arouses out of juristic and philosophical dialectics (2020, 103). He states that the literal translation of the term ādāb al-baḥth is "arts or rules of investigation" (2020, 107). Translating Ādāb as "arts or rules" is more fitting than translating it as protocols since the first emphasizes Ādāb's significance:

> Literally, this means the arts or rules of investigation. Baḥth, which means investigation, has a relatively early association with Aristotelian dialectic; for it appears on the margins of the Paris manuscript of the Organon with the word naẓar as an alternative appellation for the science of dialectic, there called the science of logic (ṣināʿat al-manṭiq). Ibn Ḥazm, again in his book on logic, says that the only way to arrive at truth is through demonstration (istidlāl) and investigation (baḥth). He notes that "this can result either from the thinking (fikr) of one person or a discussion (tadhākur) between two people…" This

> second meaning of baḥth is not peculiar to Ibn Ḥazm, for we often read in commentaries on theological and logical works from that period "wa-fīhī baḥth" or "wa-fīhī naẓar," meaning "there is some debate about this point" or "this opinion is open to objection." The word ādāb, which means rules, reminds us of the word adab, "politesse," and the first treatises on systematic disputation. The expression ādāb al-baḥth is used synonymously with the expression ʿilm al-Munāẓara as a formal designation of the new science of disputation. (Miller, 2020, 107)

Whereas Miller's work is pioneering in terms of the general history of Muslim argumentation studies, Karabela's (2011) thesis is pioneering in terms of its focus on the post-classical period where the Munāẓara as a title proliferates, and other appellations almost go through extinction. He argues that many local scientific disciplines, such as the linguists, the jurists, and theologians, would employ dialectics in their work. Accordingly, these local dialectics have evolved into a "general argumentation theory", Munāẓara (2011, iii)[39]. Belhaj (2006) gives the literal translation of the extended title of Munāẓara as "the etiquette of inquiry and disputation" (292). He refers to the *ars disputandi* of Medieval and Post-Medieval Europe, and it seems many other authors we have investigated take their inspiration to translate Munāẓara as "disputation" from the *ars disputandi*.

In his *Islamic intellectual history in the seventeenth century: Scholarly currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb*, El-Rouayheb (2015) refers to the discipline with many different appellations: "the science of dialectics", "dialectics" and "the rules of enquiry". His rendering of dialectics and enquiry as interchangeable is welcomed as, after all, the primary literature does so. However, although this is the case, there is a quite subtle difference between the two as well. Nevertheless, one can only appreciate the efforts to translate Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓara. In the rest of this subsection, I will be referring to primary Munāẓara literature to better understand these three terms.

Gelenbevī (1934, 32) states that Baḥth and Munāẓara is the exchange of defenses (*mudāf'ā*) for the manifestation of truth. However, his wording seems to be obscure in regards to whether the two are the same or different. This is why the commentator Pencweynī comments that the "and" in "Baḥth and Munāẓara" is for *explication* (1934, 32). Therefore the exact translation of Gelenbevī's definition would be "Know that,

[39] We will see hat the general theory of argumentation is in fact an earlier endeavor, beginning most probably with al-Baġdādī.

baḥth, -that is Munāẓara- is the exchange of defenses for the manifestation of truth". Munāẓara is explicative for Baḥth as the latter has four meanings: It literally means investigation. It seems that the Munāẓara translators that render Baḥth as inquiry are inspired by the close resemblance between the literal translation of the Arabic word and the Latin origin of inquiry as investigation. However, Baḥth also has three usages as its technical terminology:

The first is "predication" (ḥaml) as in the example "Rahmi is a student".

The second is "argument" (istidlāl)[40] as in the example of "Rahmi is a student because he goes to school".

The third is "argumentation" that occurs between two sides, where one party is the claimant and the other is the respondent (al-Jaunpūrī 2006, 12)[41].

In the context of Munāẓara, what is meant by Baḥth is the third one, argumentation between two sides, rather than the second. I have deliberately refrained from saying argumentation between two "people" as it is argued that one can be the claimant and respondent of herself through inner voice. al-Jaunpūrī states when referring to Baḥth in the context of the science of Munāẓara, one can also use the second one, i.e., the argument. However, in this case, some moves in the Munāẓara procedure would be left out (2006, 12-13). For instance, in Munāẓara, the respondent has the right to object without making an argument for it. She might simply say "No", or "I don't accept".

Note that the second meaning corresponds to *argument as a product* we have seen in epistemological approach to argumentation and the third meaning corresponds to the *argument as process* as we have seen in pragma-dialectics. Now that we have established that Baḥth and Munāẓara can be used interchangeably in some contexts,

[40] Samarqandī's commentator Kīlānī (2015, 37) argues that this second meaning is clarified by Ibn Sīnā, the master of Muslim logicians. However Young notes that he could not locate this clarification in any work of Ibn Sīnā.

[41] The terms *sā'il* and *mu'allil* corresponding to the two sides of the debate can be translated in a number of ways: The first can be translated as the respondent, questioner or antagonist. The second can be translated as claimant, answerer or protagonist. I have decided to go with the pairs of claimant and respondent. The antagonist sounds adversarial than it should be. The respondent, however, imagines a response rather than adversariality.

and also that there is a subtle[42] difference between them, a technical translation for the two senses of Baḥth can be given: *monological argumentation* and *dialogical argumentation*. Considering the argumentation theories we have investigated in the first three chapters of the thesis, it means that the Munāẓara is neither a solely monological nor a dialogical argumentation theory, making it a *dialogically-epistemic theory of argumentation*.

I have detailed the discussion of Baḥth and its two senses. In the first sense it is argument as product, i.e., monological argumentation and in its sense it is argument as process, i.e., dialogical argumentation. It should be noted that monological argumentation here also corresponds to the sum total of arguments employed by the respondent and claimant positions. We will return to monological argumentation and how a Munāẓara can consist of multiple monological argumentations where I elaborate on the legitimate and illegitimate instance of changing the Baḥth.

What then is Ādāb? In the introduction of his commentary, al-Qarsī, an 18th-century scholar, praises Allah for "instructing us the rules of Munāẓara, ordering us to dispute with goodness, teaching us (*addabna*) his Ādāb and prohibiting arrogance (mukābara)" (2018, 34). The meaning of "teaching us with his Ādāb" is explained as follows: teaching the duties that fall upon one for a good disputation which requires epistemic and practical virtues (faḍāʾil)" (2018, 35). Accordingly, Ādāb is the competence (*Ṣalāḥ*) and perfection (*Kamāl*) of the rational soul[43]. He also differentiates between competence and perfection of the soul in terms of its usage: Competence and perfection in terms of Sharia and competence and perfection absolutely (*mutlaqan*). al-Qarsī states that although both senses can be implied here, he prefers the first one. Notice that the notion of virtue here is connected to "duties that fall upon one for a good disputation" (2018, 34) (see also: Saçaḳlızāde, 2012, 16). Furthermore, he notes that Ādāb is the plural form of adab. *Adab* in the singular form, on the other hand, has two meanings: Noble character and its manifestation. This is where the Arabic equivalent to literature drives from: The words of people with noble

[42] It can be argued that argumentation as process and argumentation as product is not just subtle but a major one. However as we will see the argument as a product is not just simply an argument supporting a claim; it is much wider.

[43] I will discuss the concept of rational soul, *nafs al-nātiqa* in the 6th chapter extensively.

character (Goldzier, 2012). When it comes to argumentation, then, Ādāb in the plural form means the noble character traits and their manifestation during argumentation. Considering contemporary argumentation theories, the Munāẓara is neither an agent-based nor an act-based argumentation theory. This is where I argue that Munāẓara is an agent-driven theory of argumentation. More on this characterization is due at the end of the chapter. However, when it comes to translating the term into English, it becomes clear that the "protocols", "manners", "etiquettes" or "applied ethics" proposals we have seen are not satisfactory. For the technical usage, I propose translating it as "virtuous conduct".

In this subsection, I have listed the proposals to translate "Ādāb al-Baḥth wa-l Munāẓara", literally translated as the manners of inquiry and argumentation. In comparison with contemporary argumentation theories, I propose translating the extended title as "virtuous conduct for monological and dialogical argumentation". Having offered a technical translation for the discipline, now I will discuss what it is? Al-Āmidī states that Munāẓara is either a *fann* (tecnique) or *'ilm* (science) (1900, 8). This science or technique, in turn, might refer to three denominators:

1-rules and principles discussed in its literature.

2- the disposition (*malaka*) cultivated through habituating the rules and principles.

3- the cognizance (*idrāk*) related to the rules and principles (Āmidī, 1900, 8).

To exemplify what is meant by these three denominators, consider the objection (*man'*). In Munāẓara, the respondent has the right to object to the claimant's premise. However, this objection should refer to a premise that is not yet defended by the claimant (Āmidī, 1900, 8). This rule would be an example of the first denominator. If a Munāẓara student practices this rule so that it becomes a disposition for her to know the objection by heart, this would be the second denominator. Finally, if a Munāẓara student can perceive all the cases and different forms of objection and their relation to general science, this would be the example of the third dominator. The fact that the first and second denominators are intertwined shows how the act and agent relationship is viewed according to Munāẓara.

Having offered a general introduction to the science through different proposals to render it English, I will now elaborate on the history of Muslim argumentation theory,

its origins, and its development to situate Munāẓara in its trajectory. Munāẓara is a later product, first emerging at the end of the 13th century. The secondary literature locates it as the third and last façade of argumentation in Islamdom (Faytre, 2018; Karabela, 2011; Miller, 1984; Arif, 2020). Pehlivan and Ceylan (2015) go as far as labeling Munāẓara as a revolution in science history. This claim is justified in the sense that Samarqandī, the founder of the discipline, also claims that he is to be credited for giving a final shape to what was already in circulation among the scholarly circles. I will discuss his claims in detail, but first, what is the historical trajectory of argumentation studies in which Munāẓara becomes its final form? The following subsections deal with this question.

The question will also help us appreciate Munāẓara in terms of its descriptive and normative aspects, corresponding to the analytical domain of a research program in argumentation. We will see that Munāẓara distinguishes between transmitted (naqlī) and rational (aqlī) principles and methods of knowledge. The transmitted principles and methods are what modern argumentation scholarship identifies as "practical argumentation", albeit with a caveat: For the Muslim argumentation scholarship, there is also practical truth and its principles. Moreover, as we will see, there might even be "practical truths" in plural, because there might be more than one truth for a certain issue or claim in the practical domain. In contrast, for contemporary argumentation, practical argumentation is the domain of uncertainty, where it is not possible to argue for the truth, to begin with. What is understood from the rational principles and methods goes through a significant change, at least in form and content: Over time, Aristotelian demonstration reworked and further developed by the Muslim philosophers becomes the canon of truth.

4.2. THE ORIGIN(S) OF ARGUMENTATION STUDIES IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

The origin of argumentation studies in the Muslim world is still a heated debate in secondary literature. There are three positions: According to one approach, Muslim argumentation studies are authentic, a product of the development of Muslim civilization. The remaining two positions oscillate between a strong influence of Aristotelian, Assyrian, and Iranian influence to more or less fascinating parallelism between the two civilizations. The word debate *(jadal*) and its analogs (ḥujja, mirā',

munāzā',) are plenty in Qur'ān (Yavuz, 1993). Qur'ān not only mentions varieties of the word argumentation; but also differentiates between its good and bad forms (see for instance 16:121). Nevertheless, the books focusing on the study of argumentation in the Muslim world come after the translation of Aristotle's *Topics* into Arabic. Accordingly, some scholars -among them Maqdisi (2011)- trace the origins of Muslim argumentation studies back to Aristotelian *Topics* (58).

Search for originality in itself raises many questions and presuppositions alongside. What if *jadal* is original and what if it is not? Young in his entry of "Origins of Islamic Law" to *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and Law* catalogs three existing paradigms in the field of Muslim law methodology (*Uṣūl al-fiqh*): "orientalist/neo-orientalist", "post-orientalist" and "Muslim-traditionalist" (2). For the orientalists, the search for the Hellenic, Iranic, or Indian sources of Islam meant demonstrating unoriginality and thus eclectic nature of Islam and its sciences. On the other hand, demonstrating originality of Islamic sciences is a consolation for the Muslims who feel threatened by the potential common sources of many sciences (2). Orientalist/neo-orientalists paradigms, owing their doctrinal commitments to 19th century European imperialism are divided into two: While the first approach questions the authenticity of foundational Muslim sources, the second denies any authenticity whatsoever. Represented by Schact's narrative, this latter approach traces sources back to "foreign origins", "borrowings", "influence", and to "educated non-Arab converts" (4). Post-orientalists are somewhat more critical than their predecessors to the doctrinal aspects of orientalist discourse with their "a more empirical - less apriostic" method (5). Muslim traditionalists on the other hand, tend to deny any plurality of sources, appealing to tradition such that the narrative of authenticity falls into a "vague and dysfunctional unity" (2).

Debate on the authenticity of Islamicate dialectics is not innocent either. According to Widigdo (2016), Ebu Zehra, Barakat Muhammed Murat, Abdessamed Belhaj, and Walter Edward Young are in the view that dialectics is of Muslim origin (13-17). Joseph van Ess[44], Georg Makdisi, Wael B. Hallaq, and M.K. Karebela, on the other hand, believe that it was the Greek translations that influenced and even shaped

[44] Miller holds (2020) that van Ess does not argue for external origin or influence (5).

Islamicate dialectic (57). According to van Ess, Muslims did not have a full system of argumentation:

> Muslim theology had to think in the categories of defense and attack. There was no time for silent reflection about eternal truth; unequipped with systematic consistency, the mutakallimūn had to join the battle against Jewish, Christian, and Manichean intellectual skill. (2018, 241)

In the absence of time to develop argumentation systems, the Muslim theologians (mutakallimūn) started employing their enemies' tools. Furthermore, Karabela (2010) speculates that the constant dichotomies such as that of belief and unbelief might be presenting a black and white picture to the Muslims (41). The prophet was the only mediator between God and Muslims, and this mediation put him as an unquestionable authority.

Following years see the expansion of Muslim rule over non-Muslims. Furthermore, the fact that *Topics* and *Elenchi* were the first books commissioned by the Caliph to be translated into Arabic strengthens the idea that Muslims appropriated other dialectical systems (Karabela 2010, pp. 46-47). van Ess traces back dialectical phrases such as a-ra'ayta ("Have you considered..."), a-lā tarā ("Don't you see)[45], "if you say this I say" to Greek. "εἰ δέ φατε ... φαμὲν ὅτι ... or ἐὰν ἔρηται ... ἀποκρινούμεθα". He retraces dialectical and rhetorical mechanisms employed by Muslim scholars such as *istidlāl bish-shāhid ʿalā l-ghāʾib* for Greek ἀναλογισμός (2018, 254).

van Ess seems to imply that Muslim argumentation tactics were polemical and replete with sophistry. Accordingly, "those generations were happier about commonplaces than we are" (2018, 243). Interestingly, this is the only instance where he mentions τόποι (*topoi*) upon which the whole Aristotelian corpus of dialectics is built. He does not inform us of how Muslim scholars appropriated Aristotelian logic, how the syllogistic base of argumentation changed, or how the visible epistemic difference of commonly held opinions in *jadal* and *topica* withstand the appropriation of Greek dialectics[46]. As for Muslims, the premises employed in jadal, and their principles such as the Qur'an and the traditions of the prophet have an epistemic import.

[45] Young (2016, 9) reminds that these forms are also abundant in Qur'ān.

[46] Miller (1984, 2020) argues that although Vajda and van Ess have found many instances where Muslim dialectics seems to be borrowing from Aristotle, van Ess himself concludes that they did not

In his *Rise of Colleges*, Makdisi refutes the claim that Muslims needed dialectics to fight back against external attacks (1981, 105). According to him, the need for a science of argumentation originated in the internal context. Islam did not have an absolute authority to decide upon conflicting opinions. Without a clergy, Muslims had to find ways to solve their problems. In cases where there are conflicting opinions (khilāf), the ijtihād (more or less translatable as "the attempt to rule") of the jurisconsults were the only sources. Nevertheless, Muslims had to wait for the translation of *Topics* and other books of *Organon* to construct their theory of argumentation. After the translation of *Topics*, Muslim philosophers such as Kindī (d. 870) and Fārābī (d.950) write their own books following the Aristotelian method:

> The mutakallimun, philosophical theologians, followed suit. But the scholastic method, and all training that it entailed, was not the final product of the philosophers, nor of the philosophical theologians: it was that of the jurisconsults. The institutions of higher learning, the schools that produced the scholastic method, namely the madrasa. (1981, 108)

Makdisi recognizes the need for orthodoxy and creating an orthodox line in the scholastic method. That is why he claims Muslim jurisconsults followed the appeal of dialectics, and they started producing their version of dialectics, the good dialectics (*al-jadal al-hasan*), as a legitimate tool of orthodoxy and as a rival to mutakallimun and philosophers (1981, 108). Nevertheless, his account does not answer the question of which methods of Aristotelian dialectics were appropriated by Muslim scholars.

In his article "A Tenth-Eleventh Century Treatise on Juridical Dialectic", Wael B. Hallaq (1987) follows the historical account we have seen until now: Dialectics originated in the Greek books translated in the third century. Later on, it is assimilated into Muslim sciences:

> It appears that by the middle of the fourth century H. (ca. 950 A.D.) whole treatises on juridical dialectic were written in the Sunni tradition. By this time it had become totally Islamicized and, like juridical logic, its link to the 'ancient sciences' had dissipated. (1987, 198)

The claim that Greek dialectics was 'assimilated' into the body of sciences of Muslims allows Hallaq to refrain from answering which tools and methods of Aristotelian dialectics were appropriated. Hallaq, in his *History*, speculates if dialectic is rooted in

directly borrow from him. Miller holds the same position as well (1984, 10; 2020, 5). Miler cautions his readers that for the Muslims jadal is at the service of finding the truth.

Muslim theology or if it is directly borrowed from Greek sources? However, he claims it is "beyond dispute" that jadal was significantly influenced by Greek sources (1997, 136). Nevertheless, Hallaq provides us with the goal of *jadal*. Muslim scholars used dialectics in order to find the truth about a particular point of disagreement. He is of the opinion that for Muslim scholars "minimizing difference of opinion" was inevitable (1987, 198).

Widigdo has dealt with the debate regarding the origins of Muslim argumentation studies several times (2016; 2018; 2021). In his dissertation, he lays out the sides of the debate and refrains from making a call and takes a middle way slightly inclined towards Aristotelian influence (2016, 16). In his recent article, however, entitled "Aristotelian Dialectics, Medieval Jadal and Medieval Scholastic Disputation" in the *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* he argues:

> Medieval Christian and Muslim employed Greek dialectic to differing purposes Greek dialectic aims to defeat an opponent by exposing logical contradictions; Christian scholarship claims to use the dialectic to search for truth in a pedagogical setting and Muslim scholarship employs it to arrive at truth with a degree of certainty. (2018, 1)

Although he differentiates the goals of different traditions, he does not detail their peculiarities. Widigdo defines topos as "a series of attacking premises" (2018, 4). However, he does not further discuss how Muslims appropriated the function of topos in Islamicate dialectics.

In his most recent work on the issue, Widigdo argues that "Arab pre-Islamic, early Islamic, and Qur'anic dialectical practices have contributed significantly to the development of jadal theory, in addition to the contribution of Greek dialectical scholarship" (2021, 2). Accordingly, the former provides argumentation of its content, whereas the latter provides its form and structure. He argues that there are three stages to the development of jadal. The first is rudimentary or practical jadal that spans from Pre-Islamic Jahiliyyah times to the first half of the eighth century, the end of the Umayyad Dynasty. In this form of jadal, argumentation is "seen as launching a contradictory thesis or competing argument to the opponent through a series of questions, poetic expression or reasoning without a fixed dialectical procedure or style" (2021, 6). In the middle period, between the second half of the eighth century and the first half of the tenth century, rudimentary jadal practices became proto-jadal. It is still proto in the sense that the polemical attitude continues, but now the debates

take place "orally in a royal, legal or religious setting along with a referee and audience, or appeared in written form in various legal and theological polemical texts" (2021,7). Therefore, it now has a particular form and structure. This is when Muslim scholars have encountered non-Muslim argumentation traditions from Syriac, Stoic, or Greek sources. The third period, taking place after the second half of the tenth century, has fully developed the jadal structure.

Ibn Khaldūn (2005), in the relevant sections (pp. 20-105) of his *Muqaddima*, starts with the reasons that lead to disagreements among Muslims in the first centuries after Hijra. When the Prophet was still alive, the companions could just appeal to his authority and learn from him. However, after him, many possible readings of Qurʾān, the polysemy of Arabic words, uncertainties regarding the choice of which prophetic tradition to be used, and the emergence of unprecedented events that can not be solved with the knowledge at disposal caused disagreements among Muslims. These disagreements lead to the formation of two different approaches to juridical dialectics: Those who stick with the usage of prophetic traditions even if there is only one line of transmission and those who allowed space for proper reasoning in some cases, ahlu-l ḥadīth (Hijaz) and ahlu-l ra'y (Iraq) respectively.

Dihlevī, in his book, *al-Inṣāf fī bayāni sabab al-iḫtilāf bayna al-fuḳahāʾi wa al-mujtahidīn* agrees with Ibn Khaldūn on most fronts. However, we also learn that there are other sources of disagreement. Theoretically, there are incontrovertible general rules/principles learned through Qur'an and the prophet; however, when a disagreement arises in certain issues, the companions and the successors had their own methodology for the resolution of difference of opinion in the said disagreement. He tries to unravel the methodological differences of companions and successors, which led to different methodologies observed in the formation of proto-jadal of pioneering scholars. Although his resolution-oriented approach might picture an idealized past, it is important to recognize the role of more or less transmitted methodologies in disagreements of companions and successors that ended in different schools across the Muslim world. Moreover, different families, tribes, and groups had their own methods in the reception and gathering of traditions of the prophet (Dihlevī, 1890, 20-40).

Young takes up a different route. In his thesis (2012) turned into a book (2017) later, he undertakes two main tasks: 1) Delving into the khilāf literature before the

translation movement of Greek sources, 2) Investigating whether that literature is merely polemical as often implied. By analyzing the famous compendium *Kitāb al-Umm* he shows the dialectical nature of the books written before the Translation Movement. Young's primal claim is that Hallaq's approach of assimilation of ancient Greek sciences into Islamic sciences is only applicable with a condition:

> There is no doubt this narrative holds true in the main; what I will suggest is that what after the translation of Greek dialectic is best understood as a reinvigoration, a new systematization along more strictly Aristotelian lines in certain quarters and among certain theorists. (2017, 23)

Young holds that we need to investigate the methods of argumentation of both literatures and "associated concepts, terms and categorizations and orderings" (2017, 24) to claim any influence.

Young demonstrates that the disputations among Muslim jurisconsults were not topical either. His evidence indicates that alongside their established principles and rules, the argumentation sequences are so long sometimes that it is difficult to follow. Sure enough, Muslim jurisconsults do not employ any topoi as used by Aristotle, and the practice is truth-oriented. As later proper jadal books from the 10th century onwards carry on the same methods, definitions, and goals of the earlier period between the 7th and 9th centuries, the disagreement literature can be called "proto-jadal" (2017, 1-3).

What parallels lead him to think it is not easy to decide how Aristotelian is jadal? Young finds an Aristotelian dialectical character in the proto-jadal: The arguers 1) aim at finding contradictions in the arguments of the other party so that the argument will refute itself, 2) aim at locating "intra-doctrinal inconsistency; with charges of contradicting Qur'ān, prophetic traditions, and ijmāʿ (consensus of other scholars); and with charges of contradicting the substantive law or method of one's own juristic madhhab" (2017, 213). Another aspect that obscures the final verdict for Young is "the idea of an organizing principle based on categories of potentially problematic arguments, with the objective of 'locating' the proper material for critique and refutation is one and the same" (2017, 196); making it closer to the Aristotelian method. The final source of hesitation comes from the existence of shared lexicon in *Topica* and some Ḥanafī uṣūl al-fiqh such as "waḍʿ, mawḍiʿ, and ḥujja" (2017, 78). Young himself gives answers to some of his parallels. In the case of the shared lexicon,

he notes that sometimes the usage of the term topos/ mawḍiʿ resonates with the Aristotelian usage; and yet sometimes it is only the literal meaning of the word (2017, 193).

We have seen that the debate regarding the origins of Muslim argumentation studies needs further evidence. While this debate concerns whether Muslim argumentation science is authentic or original in the sense of possible external sources, there is another internal debate. We have two kinds of jadal books: Theological (*kalāmī*) and juridical (*fiqhī*). This second debate is fostered by Miller (1984, 2020). He argues that the theologians first developed a jadal system, and this system was later incorporated into jurisprudence. Widigdo (2021) is also on board with Miller on the issue. However, in his study concerning the argumentation practices before the development of jadal books, Young argues that even in their proto form, jadal procedure is much more similar to later jadal books proper, indicating the antecedence of juridical dialectics.

In the following subsection, I will investigate the theological and juridical jadal separately. I will endeavor to showcase the descriptive and normative aspects of each system. Apart from the debate on the antecedence of either system, tracing the juridical and theological jadal systems has another significance. The founder of Munāẓara, Samarqandī, argues that Munāẓara is field-independent because any issue can be studied through its procedure. To exemplify the field-independence of Munāẓara, he provides examples from the three fields, law and theology being two of them.

4.3. THE ORIGINS OF JADAL

Having elaborated on the issue of the origin of argumentation theory in the Muslim world, I will now study the jadal. Although the Qur'an, the traditions, and the Muslim practice are replete with argumentation, the systemization of argumentation begins with jadal. Miller (1984, 2021) argues that the first books on jadal were written by theologians. I will first follow his account and then move on to Young's account that is a bit different. Miller argues that the first book on jadal was written by Ibn al-Rīwandī (d.913) named *Ādāb al-Jadal*. This book is refuted or defended by many scholars, among them al-Ashʿarī and al-Māturīdī. Many of these books are not available now.

By employing later works written around the 10th and 11th centuries, Miller locates five themes/sections in the books of theological dialectics that occur in almost all later productions: "1. the relation of jadal to speculation (naẓar), 2. question and answer 3. counter-objection (muʿāraḍa), 4. the signs of defeat, 5. the rules of conduct (adab)" (Miller, 2020, 4) The relation of jadal to speculation (naẓar) concerns the difference between speculation and debate. Whereas speculation can be performed monologically, there need to be two people for a debate to occur.

Jadal has two definitions. The first definition concerns its subject matter, i.e., the descriptive domain. For al-Juwaynī, this is the descriptive definition:

> When two dialecticians present the core of their views on the basis of reciprocal attack (al-tanāfī) and defense (al-tadāfuʿ) through a linguistic expression or something that can substitute its function such as a signification (ishārah) and an indicant (dalālah). (Widigdo 2016, 149; al-Juwaynī, 1979, 21)

This descriptive definition is then subjected to a differentiation between blameworthy and praiseworthy conduct. This is how al-Juwaynī defines the normativity of praiseworthy jadal: it "aims to find truth and disclose falsehood, aims to obtain a divine guidance, along with those who want to return to the truth from the falsehood" (Widigdo, 2016, 45; al-Juwaynī, 1979, 45). We will see how the truth-seeking dimension also aligns with the competitiveness of argumentation.

Jadal is a truth-seeking approach to argumentation, as its epistemology is foundationalist. There are three sources of incontrovertible knowledge: The five senses, *khabar al-sadiq* (truthful reports), and the reason (al-Nasafī, 1990, 15). An example of truthful reports would be the existence of Japan for one who has never been there. It is not possible for billions of people to lie about the existence of Japan, therefore universally transmitted reports are regarded as a source of knowledge. These three sources are called the uṣūl (the principles). The aim of the dialectician is to arrive at these sources to certify the truthfulness of her claim[47].

[47] While discussing the issue, Ibn Fūrak (2005) attributes to al-Ash'arī the idea that the principles of rational knowledge can be likened to principles of religion (Qur'an and tradition). This leads me to speculate that it is more than likely that the principles of rational knowledge are modelled after the principles of religion, not vice versa. Nevertheless, the discussion of sources of knowledge seems to be inspired from Aristotle (2002, 5).

The debate starts with the questioner's question seeking to understand if the answerer has a position regarding a certain question: What the position is (mā'īyat al-madhhab). This question sets out the debate (Miller, 2020, 8). The questioner then asks for arguments for the opinion: dalīl. Having received an argument for the claim, the questioner then asks about the way in which the argument warrants the claim: wajh al-dalil. The final question is the verification of the cause (taṣḥīḥ al-ʿilla). In this one, the questioner asks the answerer to apply her cause provided in the previous answer to another similar case, also called *akhdh al-mūjibbi-ijrā' ʿillatihī fī maʿlūlātihā*. That is, the questioner asks if employing the same cause for a similar case would also lead to a rational conclusion. If understood more competitively, the fourth question aims to force the answerer to take up a certain position through a test case. The cause provided by the answerer is taken as a principle, and the new case in which the cause will be tested is regarded as the test case[48].

The first two questions, i.e., the opinion and argument, are merely informative in character, whereas the latter two are open to proper critique. The third question indicates that the questioner is either doubtful or critical of the way the argument warrants the claim. In the final question, by asking if the cause would also work in another case, the questioner might be legitimately in search of knowledge. It might well be the case that she grants the cause but implies that it does not actually apply to the case.

Another common item in the books of theological dialectics is muʿāraḍa, rendered by Miller as counter-objection (2020, 17). As he notes, there is a debate regarding the soundness of a counter-objection when employed in debating. The questioner levies counter-objection, and it is not a form of a question. The difference between the counter-objection and the fourth question, i.e., verification of the cause, is that in the case of the fourth question, the questioner grants the cause. In the case of counter-objection, however, the questioner aims to demolish either of the answers to the four questions: the opinion, the argument, the warrant, and the cause. Therefore it is possible to imagine the questioner countering the answerer with another position, argument, warrant, or cause.

[48] I will continue discussing these questions in detail below

According to Miller, there are two more sections in books dealing with theological dialectics that are common in the later literature: Signs of defeat (dalā'il al-inqiṭāʿ) and (Ādāb al-jadal). In terms of signs of defeat, Miller lists 11 of them. I will gloss over the most important of these (2020, pp. 20-24). If the answerer is silent in the face of a question, then she can not continue arguing for her claim. Even if she answers, the answer might not be provided properly. Remembering the last two questions and adding the counter-argument to the list, we can imagine three cases where a proper answer is not provided. Notice that the first two questions about the position and argument are informative. Thus the questioner can not reject them unless the argument contradicts the three sources of knowledge: Senses, reason, and truthful reports. In the case of the third question demanding the way argument warrants the claim, the answer might not be sufficient for the inference from argument to claim. It is also possible that the topic, the argument, or the cause is shifted. In the case of the fourth argument, it is possible that the answerer can not apply his cause to other instances where the same judgment should hold. In the case of counter-objection, the answerer might be able to ward off the counter-argument (Miller, 2020, 20-24).

When it comes to the ādāb of jadal, many items discussed in these sections are intuitive: Respect for the other, patience, and control of one's voice. However, one item strikes the most. Ashʿarī suggests that the debaters start their debate by praying. Furthermore, he cautions that if the aim of debating is not getting closer to God, the act of debating will move towards winning the argument, thus enjoyment. Enjoying the power to dominate is also witnessed by animals (Ibn Fūrak, 2005, 334). This dimension signifies the idea that a real debate is performed for knowledge. It is also attested by Ashʿarī's discussion regarding the religious obligation to reason when it comes to knowing God (Ibn Fūrak, 2005, pp. 334-335). We have seen that the questions and counter-objections are, in fact, truth-seeking in nature, and they have a specific order necessary for real truth-seeking practice. In the meantime, I also discussed how the same questions might take a competitive turn.

The fact that all these five sections are more or less preserved in the later literature leads Miller to hold that their origin is the work of Al-Rīwandī (Miller 2020, 27) . Furthermore there seem to be some earlier practices such as counter-objection, incorporation of which is contested between the scholars. Miller argues that building upon al-Rīwandī's pioneering work, the theologians developed a complete

argumentation system. Accordingly this system was later appropriated by the scholars of jurisprudence, leading to the *fuqaha* method in argumentation. He remarks that while reviewing the literature, he left out certain biographical books and books where the pioneering imams noted down their disagreements with each other. Miller argues that it is not possible to find a comprehensive argumentation system in these books. However, we have already seen that Young is not in the same position.

Before reviewing Young's position, we should understand juridical dialectics' descriptive and normative dimensions. Contrary to theological dialectics, juridical dialectics works in the domain of practical argumentation. Nevertheless this domain has its epistemic certainties taken from Qur'an and prophetic traditions. Theoretically if these sources denote that a certain action is obligatory or recommended, there is no argumentation whatsoever. Instead, the domain of argumentation commences when there are no epistemically certain rulings. Jadal in the eyes of jurisconsult companions and their successors is a vocation to apply general maxims learned from the prophet to matters of uncertainty. It is the answer to the question: What would God and Prophet judge? (Dihlevī, 1890, 10).

Finding proper arguments for the indication/justification (*istidlāl*) is deemed successful if there are no apparent contradictions from the corpus of Qur'ān and life of the prophet. It can well be the case that someone (a companion of the prophet or a person living in the year 2022) does not know the judgement on a particular issue or disagreement. Therefore, she looks for the proper indications and finally judges with utmost sincerity. Later on, it might be revealed that there is already an answer for the debated issue in the corpus (Dihlevī 1890, 23). This dimension of being competent enough to judge in cases of uncertainty by utilizing what is already known from the corpus and applying it to the unknown is a skill that Muslims aspire for. It can be likened to *pronesis*. Ibn Khaldun in his *Muqaddima* is resentful that the knowledge of Sharia has lost its "presence" in the hearts and actions of Muslims and that it has turned into an art that should be learned and memorized (1958, 295). The ability to infer practical conclusions from the corpus of Islam is called *fiqh*. Jadal, in a nutshell, is the proper methodology to be used when faced with uncertainties in matters relating to *fiqh*. The overall attempt in the vocation of getting closer to God in terms of judgment is called *ijtihād*, striving for judgement.

We have seen that in the case of theological dialectics, the sources of knowledge are the senses, reason and true reports. They serve as principles that enable building upon them. In the case of juridical dialectics, however, transmitted sources are the principles. In juridical argumentation as well, argumentation is in the pursuit of causes. The causes of each domain have their own qualities: Whereas the causes of theological dialectics are adjacent to their effects; the causes sought for in the juridical dialectics are not. What makes a certain cause to lead a ruling is Allah's intervention (Ibn Fūrak, 2005, 321). Therefore God may abrogate (*naskh*) a ruling in favor of another one. On top of this epistemic ambiguity, Qur'an and the prophetic traditions do not cover all possible rulings.

When faced with an uncertainty, the mujtahid tries to build her ruling on the already available corpus: Qur'an, the prophetic traditions and the consensus of scholars. She takes these sources as the principle and tries to extend them to a debated case. In contemporary argumentation, this process is called analogical reasoning, in the primary jadal literature it is called qiyās al-ʿilla, analogy from the *ratio legis;* generally translated as argument by analogy (Iqbal and Rahman, 2021, p. 76). As there is no authority to certify that the available data would also work for the new case, the arguments developed in the juridical argumentation are regarded as *amārāt*, i.e., probable signs.

After this introduction, we can return to Young's argument regarding the origins of jadal. Contrary to Miller, he speculates that even before the emergence of theological dialectics, there was already a proto argumentation system. Although its rules are not explicit, it is possible to infer them from the textual evidence. In his study on the *Kitāb al-Umm* attributed to al-Shāfiʿī, Young claims that the disputations among jurisconsult companions and their successors are formative in respect to law methodology (uṣūl al-fiqh) and they are the essences of jadal books we encounter from the 10th century onwards (Young, 2017, 2). Just as we will see in the proper jadal books, there is a hierarchy of sources: Qurʾān is the primary source of justification, followed by the life of the prophet and the acts of companions. Furthermore, the debates recorded in sources such as that of al-Shāfiʿī are not polemical. The debating practice of these pioneering scholars is extremely complicated; they endure a long series of turn-taking. Young argues that these practices can be called proto-jadal because later generations of scholars followed them in constructing their law methodology. These biographical

sources indicate a jadal system already established before the translation of Greek sources. Contrary to Miller, Young adds that in the case of Muslim scholars of the time, it is impossible to distinguish one as merely a theologian or a jurisconsult. In fact, as I alluded to above, it seems that the principle (uṣūl) and branch/test case (far') dichotomy was probably appropriated from juridical dialectics rather than vice versa.

We have investigated Young's and Miller's positions regarding the origins of Jadal. The fact that we have equally compelling, primary, data-driven opposing views shows that further research is necessary. Be that its origins are to be found in the hands of theologians or jurisconsults, the primary literature shows that there existed a division of labor in these domains. In his work on juridical dialectics, Ghazālī (2004) elaborates on the jadal. Only in the concluding remarks of his book does he acknowledge that theological dialectics has its peculiarities and that he leaves theological dialectics for another discussion (523). al-Baġdādī (2019), on the other hand, remarks that until his time -i.e., the eleventh century- practitioners of either method did not aspire two establish a method of argumentation that would operate on both theological and juridical domains. In his *ʿIyār al-Naẓar* (2019), he sets out to achieve this synthesis. We will see that this trend will continue, and later generations of scholars such as Āmidī, Nasafī, and Samarqandī himself will aim to achieve the same goal. In the following subsection, first I will discuss Baġdādī's *Iyār al-Naẓar*.

Following Baġdādī's account will be helpful in two aspects. First, we will problematize the secondary literature's consensus (Pehlivan and Ceylan, 2015; Young, 2018) on the idea that Samarqandī's founding works mark a revolution in the trajectory of Muslim argumentation. Second, we will be able to compare Baġdādī's procedure with that of Samarqandī; showcasing that if not a revolution, a foundational change certainly came about.

4.4. AN EARLY ATTEMPT TO UNIFY JURIDICAL AND THEOLOGICAL JADAL

al-Baġdādī starts his book by providing a survey of jadal books in his time, the tenth and eleventh centuries. Accordingly, there are theological and juridical dialectics and Muslim Aristotetelian philosophical dialectics. The method of the latter school does not contradict the first two on the surface level, however, they branch to different conclusions in their details (2019, 113). He is troubled by the fact that juridical and

theological dialectics remain in their own domains and therefore aspires to write a new book entitled: The Principles of Dialectics and Divisions of Speculations (2019, 129). As the title suggests, he believes that dialectics in itself is a field-independent domain, but the content of speculation might affect the operationalization of the field-independent structure according to specifics of speculation domain.

Both juridical and theological dialectics is an endeavor to find *causes*; they both are established upon principles, i.e., sources of knowledge. For juridical dialectics, the sources of knowledge are the Qur'an, the traditions of the prophet, and the consensus of scholars. Regarding theological dialectics, the sources of knowledge are senses, rational syllogism, and truthful reports (2019, 154). By taking these sources as principles, they aim to find causes upon which arguments will be built, i.e., *far'*. Therefore, the question and answer procedure concerns the why question, i.e., the causes. The difference, however, relates to the epistemic quality of the causes: Whereas in theological dialectics the causes are always together with their effect and thus the argument, this is not the case in juridical dialectics. Through God's intervention, a certain cause, for instance, intoxication, leads to the prohibition of alcohol (2019, 243). Moreover, in matters concerning juridical dialectics, one can simply follow (taqlīd) the ruling of a scholar by asking for the cause. However, this is not the case for theological dialectics. There one can not follow a scholar, she should verify the truthfulness of the argument herself (2019, 143).

Whereas the Qur'an, i.e., the principle, explicitly prohibits wine; it is open to debate whether the same cause would lead to the prohibition of grape juice or date brandy. Furthermore, if one party argues that intoxication is a cause for prohibition, she should also show how that cause also applies to other test cases such as date brandy, orange juice, etc. If these test cases inherit intoxication, they too should be prohibited. In the case that one party shows that notwithstanding the intoxication, the sources of knowledge do not prohibit the test case, then the whole argument built upon intoxication as a cause will fall. The domain of juridical dialectics, thus, is limited to cases to which an explicit answer can not be found in its principles.

The differences are not just limited to content, and their tools might also be different. In the case of theological dialectics, there are two tools: burhān, i.e., rational syllogism, and ilzām (2019, 150). Moreover, the tool in juridical dialectics is the religious

syllogism, referred to as analogical syllogism or *qiyas al-ʾilla*. This tool is used alongside the sources of religious syllogism, Qur'an, the traditions of the prophet and the consensus of scholars (2019, 287). Each source here has a varying degree of certainty. What the Qur'an says (*nass*), can be explicit or implicit, specific, or general, for instance.

The aim of dialectics, according to al-Baġdādī, is the inquiry of both parties with the help of each other to arrive at a speculative conclusion (140). Speculative here aims at restricting the domain of argumentation from apparent and incontrovertible issues. He holds that this definition is better than defining dialectics as the science in which one aims to verify the truth and demolish the falsehood, as the said aim can be found in monological speculation of one's own as well. The definition and thus the aim of dialectics should concern both parties in their joint endeavor of seeking a speculative conclusion (140).

In their joint quest for a speculative conclusion, the parties assume either the questioner's role or of the answerer. As Miller points out, there are four questions at the disposal of the questioner. al-Baġdādī differentiates between two forms of *ilzām*. The literal translation of *ilzām* is to force. In its first form, it refers to coercion. In its second kind, *ilzām* is achieved through muʿāraḍa, which Miller had rendered as counter-objection (441). That is, the questioner forces the answerer to apply her argument to another test case. To exemplify the question and answer procedure, al-Baġdādī provides a hypothetical debate by an answerer who is in the opinion that God is a corporeal being.

The questioner first asks the answerer his position on the corporeality of God. The answerer responds that God is a corporeal being. Then the questioner asks for her argument. The answerer argues that "God is corporeal because he is an agent". Having received the argument, the questioner then asks how the argument warrants the claim: What is the relationship between God being an agent and his corporeality? The answerer responds that "Every agent in this life is a corporeal being. Therefore, God is a corporeal being". After this answer, the questioner forces the answerer with a muʿāraḍa: If God is a corporeal being because every agent in this life is a corporeal being, then it must also be the case that God is a composite body. The answerer had argued that the cause for God being a corporeal entity is the fact that he is an agent.

The questioner applies the same cause to the discussion regarding God being a simple or composite body. To keep his cause warranting the argument and thus the claim, the answerer is either forced to accept the test case or show that these two cases are somehow different. This attempt -i.e., to show that there is a difference between God being a corporeal agent and him being a composite entity- is called *fasl* or *infīsāl* (dissociation).

Baġdādī notes a disagreement between jadal scholars regarding the fourth question. One camp argues that in the case of God being a corporeal entity, the fourth question should be the ilzām and muʿāraḍa, which we have shown above. For the second camp, in the said example, the questioner should demand the verification of the answerer's claim. Baġdādī, however, holds that this would unnecessarily increase the number of questions to five. Also, the question about the verification is already included in the third question about the argument (pp. 441-443).

During the dialectical process, it is the role of the questioner to be informed about a position; learn arguments and rebuttals for it. On the other hand, the answerer must respond to these questions. The answerer should show that her opinion is built upon already existing principles. The questioner aims to ensure that the principles and its branches are employed correctly. This task incorporates both coalescent and competitive dimensions. Both parties aim to arrive at opinions built upon principles so that the questioner can not further her questions. When the answerer arrives at a principle and shows that her opinion is branched out from those principles, the process of questioning ends (467).

Be it cooperatively or competitively, the questioner checks whether the answerer would lead to a contradiction (naqḍ). By bringing counter-objections, the questioner monitors whether the answerer can disassociate herself from seemingly contradictory opinions. Notice that the endeavor here is to make sure parties are closer to God's judgment on a particular issue. This is why both the process and the product of argumentation have a spiritual component. The severity of the spiritual component lies in its onto-epistemological underpinnings.

The discussion on the process of argumentation allowed us to understand the descriptive dimension of argumentation. However, to better understand the normative dimension, we should further discuss the idea of truth in relation to argumentation.

4.5. TRUTH OR TRUTHS?

Al-Baġdādī had argued that argumentation is built upon a similar process and related principles with different end-results in varying domains. There are rational and transmitted domains. The rational domain employs principles shared by all humanity: Senses, reasoning, and truthful reports. The rational domain, which also marks the scope of theology as a rational endeavor, aims at arriving at truth. For Muslims, the truth is manifested through the Qur'an: There is a creator, there is a prophet, and there is the content of the Qur'an, such as the afterlife. However, when indulging in theology, notice that the Qur'an and traditions of the prophet are not principles. Theological argumentation is a rational activity with universally shared tools. In this activity, Islam determines the end-result of argumentation. In theological argumentation, Muslims first defend Islam and its positions against non-Muslims. Secondly, the participants of argumentation can be two Muslim sides debating the specifics of Islam. This intra-Muslim debating determines the Muslim orthodoxy, i.e., *ahl al-sunna*, the people of the Prophetic tradition. The product of theological argumentation should be true or false, meaning that there is an epistemological certainty in which one party is right, and the other is wrong if they are on opposite sides. We can conclude that the theological domain is the contemporary epistemological domain of argumentation.

The domain of juridical argumentation corresponds to the "practical argumentation" we discussed in the second chapter. Remember that the nature of practical arguments in the contemporary argumentation scholarship is "non-epistemic" in the sense that there is no canon to determine the truthfulness or rightness of claims. Contrary to the domain of epistemic argumentation, the practical domain is not objective as it is value-laden. Nevertheless, when we view the Muslim context, there is true and false even in the practical argumentation domain. What is plainly stated in transmitted texts is true. Building upon these principles and facts, in juridical argumentation, Muslims aim to arrive at judgments on issues where a straight principle or fact is not available. Therefore these judgments and issues are open to disagreement, much like practical argumentation is open to disagreement. Remember that, in its modern rebirth, Perelman argued that the domain of practical argumentation is where there does not exist certainty and truth. However, in juridical argumentation, we have the opposite: a different form of foundationalism. Nevertheless, there is a vast terrain in the domain

of juridical argumentation open to disagreement. This leads to the question of whether we can talk about practical foundational truth in cases where there is no explicit inference to be made from the transmitted sources.

Whether we can talk about truth even in cases where no explicit, transmitted source is available has been tackled by the generations of scholars so that there are two broad positions: *mukhattia* and *musawwiba*. The first position argues that even when there is no traditional source to certify God's ruling, there exists one truth for each debatable issue. Therefore the mujtahid would be mistaken if she did not arrive at it. Dabūsī narrates that this position branches out into two sub-positions: Those who argue that it is possible to act upon and practice the ijtihad and those who negate it. He argues that the Ḥanafite position is the first sub-position (2001, 408). In contrast, there are multiple truths for the same issue for the second position as long as the mujtahid employs the principles of knowledge correctly. However, as it is impossible to acquire new transmitted knowledge regarding the truth after the prophet, the proofs employed in the juridical domain are not arguments per se but probable signs[49].

4.6. INTRODUCTION OF LOGIC INTO JADAL

We have seen Al-Baġdādī's account of philosophical Aristotelian dialectics, and his generic critique of it. He argues that the whole system and dialectics, in particular, are not even worth taking into account as it is ill-founded. However, following the introduction of logic through a naturalization process, the content of argumentation goes through a significant change. This leads to a new take on argumentation, under a new title *Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓara* (El-Rouayheb 2015, 4). The content of argumentation will be extended to logical syllogism, and the application of syllogism in the argumentative setting will be conducted just as it was in the jadal books: Beginning with objection (*man'*), continuing with refutation (*naqḍ*), and ending with counter-arguments (*muʿāraḍa*); without losing the normative goal, the manifestation of truth (Faytre, 2018, 13)[50].

[49] For a detailed discussion on the issue, see: Telkenaroğlu 2009; Esen 2010.

[50] Interestingly, it seems over the centuries the question-based jadal metholody lost its importance and an argument-based model has been established. In fact, when one reads jadal works just before, there is a contuniation. However when one considers the question-based method, it seems that the method has almost vanished.

Beginning with formative disputations and ending with proper jadal and law-methodology books, the first two phases of jadal end. Towards the 10th century, jadal and law methodology went through a significant change. The *Organon* of Aristotle is fully translated, and a new science as a source of knowledge emerges, Logic. Restructured by al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, among others, this new science reshapes knowledge production. While the demonstration is the proper methodology for certainty, dialectics is not seen as the source of truth (Ibn Sīnā, 2008, 17-20). According to al-Fārābī, Qur'an should be regarded as a rhetorical book teaching people the conclusions of demonstrative/rational science by using analogies (al-Fārābī, 2008, 132).

While the authority of the book and the prophet is acknowledged, the new system brought by Muslim philosophers rejects the jadal methodology as a proper source of knowledge: Truth is only achieved by syllogism as explained by Aristotle and further developed by al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā (Hasnawi, 2001, 29-30). For those philosophers, jadal is not a source of truth or certainty. al-Fārābī goes on to accuse the theologians and jurisconsults of mistaking demonstration with dialectics. While they think they are engaged with knowledge, they are actually dialecticians without a proper methodology for finding the truth (al-Fārābī, 2008, 133).

In order to exemplify the extent and the influence of critique of philosophers, I will provide a passage from Ghazālī's *Incoherence of Philosophers*:

> Yes, when they say that the logical sciences must be mastered, this is true. But logic is not confined to them. This is the principle which in the discipline of theology we name "The Book of Reflection." They changed its expression to "logic" to magnify it. We can [also] call it "The Book of Argumentation," and we may call it "The Cognitions of the Intellects." But when the one seeking to be clever, who is weak, hears the name "logic," he thinks it an unfamiliar art, unknown to the theologians, known only to the philosophers. (Ghazālī, 2007, 9)

Ghazālī will further his claim that logic is not alien to Muslims and will write a series of books on the subject such as *Mi'yār al-'Ilm* (1961). In the book, to show that logic is not foreign to Muslims, Ghazālī not only introduces the science of logic but also makes a deliberate effort to use issues of jurisprudence in the examples he gives (Ghazālī, 1961). This endeavor culminates in his magnum opus on the law methodology, *al-Mustaṣfā min 'ilm al-uṣūl*. In the introduction of the book, he

provides a 100-page long elaboration of logic (Ghazālī, 2018). Ghazālī's famous sentence about how it is not possible to trust the knowledge of those who do not know logic is also from *al-Mustaṣfā* (Hallaq 2019, 148).

I will elaborate on the basic tenets of the logic below while I talk about Munāẓara, here I will confine myself to changes that were brought by the incorporation of logic. Ibn Khaldun, in his *Muqaddima,* informs us of two different methodologies on jadal: Āmidī method and the Pazdawī method. While the latter is restricted to religious/transmitted issues that I briefed above, the Āmidī method is not limited to the book, the life of the prophet, and analogical syllogism. It includes both rational and transmitted sources of knowledge (Ibn Khaldun, 1958, 590). That is to say, alongside religious analogical syllogism, new concepts are introduced as purely rational sources: Talāzum (Necessary Implication) Tanāfin (Mutual Negation), Dawarān (Concomitance)[51]. After Āmidī, this method was further developed by Nasafī. Nasafī in his book on the disagreements of the schools of law furthers the incorporation of logic into jadal (Pehlivan and Ceylan, 2015, 8). Nesefi's book is regarded as the last evolution of jadal before the "revolution of Munāẓara" (Pehlivan and Ceylan 2015, 23). The revolution in argumentation theory is attributed to Samarqandī, a student of Nasafī. He writes the first work on Munāẓara, *al-Risāla* (Pehlivan, 2015, 324). However, from the 19th century onwards, Munāẓara loses its appeal. Nevertheless, even in the 19th century and 20th century, a minority of scholars kept producing educational content on the subject (Ḥabannaka 1975; al-Ġursī, 2013.; Pencweynī 1934; Ibn Karadagī, 1934, al-Shankīṭī, 2005).

4.7. THE DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE DICHOTOMY IN MUNĀẒARA

Scholars give 4 different definitions of Munāẓara. The first definition concerns the etymology of the word (*fī al-luga*). The second is about what Munāẓara is in daily life (*f ī al-orf)*. The third concerns what Munāẓara is in terms of its subject matter (*cihat-wahdat al-zatī*). The fourth definition concerns the method and goal of science (*cihat-wahdat al-araḍī*) (Āmidī, 1900, 8). Munāẓara etymologically either derives from

[51] I own these translations to Young's translation of Kitāb ʿAyn al-Naẓar fī ʿIlm al-Jadal by Samarqandī, available in an online format: https://pages.ceres.rub.de/ayn-al-nazar/#fn-idm217

Arabic roots of *naẓar* or *naẓir*. If the root *naẓir* is taken into account, this means there should be a balance between arguers in terms of power and position. If the root *naẓar* is taken into account, Munāẓara means either *ibsār*, *intiẓar* or *mukābala*. While *intiẓar* connotes that arguers should wait for the other party to finish with her argumentation, *mukābala* connotes the arguers should be facing each other. That is, the arrangement of the argumentation space should not favor any of the arguers[52] (Güney 2010, 97). Consequently, *Ibsār* connotes that there needs to be careful consideration and insight while practicing the science.

Munāẓara in daily life -that is, in lay-people's opinion of the act,- is *al-mudaf'a*: "the exchange/defense of words between two people with the aim of manifestation of truth, each of them wants to establish his claim and refute their adresse" (Āmidī, 1900,6). The subject matter of Munāẓara is to distinguish the correct conduct of inquiry and argumentation from the wrong conduct (Gelenbevī, 1934, 34). When it comes to the method and goal of Munāẓara, I will use Gelenbevī's definition. Gelenbevī defines the method and goal of Munāẓara as "a science in which the conditions of universal inquires are investigated for the truth to be manifested" (1934, 35). I will talk about "universal" and "inquiry" separately.

Ibn Ḥazm, in his *Taqrīb* informs the reader of the necessity of argumentation as such:

> Know that it is only by inquiry that it is possible to reach the knowledge of truth with proofs. And the inquiry might be by way of thinking by yourself or by way of a discussion between the two. These two can be either between a teacher and student or two opposing arguers. Due to the abundance of talk between arguers, this last kind of inquiry is the way to reach the exposition of truth. If its due is observed there isn't left to say about the issue consequently, bu rather "it is only with God success is attained." (2018, 433)

As I have elaborated above, the inquiry here refers to monological and dialogical argumentation according to the context (al-Jaunpūrī, 2006,12).

Samarqandī, in his *Risāla,* introduces the science of argumentation and chooses three issues from philosophical theology (*hikmā*); practical religious argumentation over

[52] In an forthcoming paper titled "The Etymological Connotations of the Word Argumentation and Munāẓara", I discuss how scholars of argumentation view the etymological connotation of the word argumentation as a means serving their normative goals.

disagreements (*khilāf*), and theology *(kalām*) (Güney, 2010, 86). We had seen in the case of Toulmin that he differentiates between field-dependent and field-independent components of argumentation. The same pattern can be recognized here. While the science of argumentation with its procedure in itself is field-independent; the issues are field-dependent. How does Munāẓara achieve field independency? This is where Gelenbevī's remarks on argumentation as a science investigating universal inquiries are headed. The universality is related to the discussion procedure of Munāẓara. Gelenbevī claims the procedure itself is universal (Gelenbevī, 1934, 37). I will begin with briefing the discussion procedure according to Munāẓara and later proceed with the claims of universality.

Munāẓara procedure makes use of logical and analogical syllogisms of jadal. The propositions are the content argumentation. While the difference between the propositional content and its pragmatic force is acknowledged, it is claimed that argumentation is about the propositional content. The difference between the propositional content and its pragmatic force arising out of context is epitomized by the difference between dialectical questions (*sual al-jadalī*) and informative questions (*sual al-istisfarī*). If there is not a disagreement and one party is not opposing but rather seeking knowledge, the exchange is not considered Munāẓara[53] (Ahmet Cevdet, 1998, 111).

In Munāẓara, the discussion takes place between the claimant and the respondent[54]. The claimant posits a claim, and the respondent starts doubting it. The moves of each party are minutely regulated. The respondent doubting or opposing the claimant's claim should start with objecting to the premises of the claimant's argument for the

[53] In passing it is important to note that the science that takes in the context in utterances is *belağa*. The *belağa* has three components: *meani*, *bayān* and *badi'*. *Meani* is the field in belağa that investigates what is necessary in the specific context of utterance (*muktada al-hal*) (al-Taftāzānī, 1891). There is no ideological divide between dialectics and rhetorics here. While dialectics is concerned with uttering what your point of view requires (*muqtada al-nazrat*) (al-Juwaynī, 1979) in argumentation; rhetoric is related to what the situation at hand requires (*muqtada al-hal)*.

[54] Remember that when it came to jadal, I had used the "questioner and answerer" pair to describe the opposing parties. In the context of post-classical argumentation, however, I have decided to go with the "claimant and respondent" pair. Questioner and answerer pair suits well with the jadal as in jadal, a party asks questions and the other answers. In it, the questioner is the initiator of the argumentation. But here, the claimant initiates the discussion with a claim and arguments in favor of it. The respondent responds. I could have gone with the antagonist and protagonist, but this pair denotes adversality from the face value, which is not on par with the ethics of the process.

justification of the claim. Objection (*man'*) actually means asking for arguments supporting that particular premise. The claimant answers. This process involves other legitimate moves: Refutation (*naqḍ*) and counter-argument (*mu'āraḍa*). The moves alternate in the same manner, that is, the claimant answers the respondent's objections. In counter-argument, the allocation of duties changes: The initial claimant turns into the respondent and *vice versa* (Belhaj, 2016, 293). What is universal in theory is not the propositional content as in the case of formal logic but the discussion procedure itself. The universal discussion moves are applied to particular argumentative settings. This is called relevance (*tawjīh*)[55]. The process of relevance goes, for instance, in the case of counter-argument:

Minor premise: The respondent performed a move toward the premise or the claim that the other party previously justified.

Major premise: Every counter-argument that is directed towards a premise or a claim that was previously justified by the other party is relevant and admissible.

Conclusion: This particular performance of the counter-argument by the respondent is relevant and admissible (Gelenbevī, 1934, 37).

With this syllogism, the particular move is compared to the ideal move. The study of argumentation aims at acquiring the disposition of becoming an arguer over time so that the performers do not need to compare particular moves to the ideal procedure (Gelenbevī, 1934, 38).

In the first section on pragma-dialectics, I have outlined how the descriptive-normative dichotomy allows the theory to differentiate itself from logic and rhetorics. The same applies for Munāẓara: By formulating an ideal discussion procedure for the normative goal of manifestation of truth, Munāẓara scholars aim to differentiate argumentation from quarreling and power-flexing (al-Jaunpūrī, 2006, 16). While quarreling means disputation to silence an opponent by using trickeries, invalid moves, and unorderly performance, in power-flexing, the goal is neither manifestation of truth nor silencing the opponent (al-Jaunpūrī, 2006, 17). The violations of the procedure also show the

[55] Relevance (*tawjīh*) is so important that it is regarded as a synonym to Munāẓara. Munāẓara is also called the *sa'nat at-tawjīh* (Öğük et al., 2015, 342.)

agent-driven and yet act-based considerations as well[56]. That is, the moves should not just be logically and procedurally relavent (*muwajjah*); they should also be admissible (*maqbūl*). Admissibility is an ethical requirement residing in the approach's philosophy of reasonableness. More on this criteria later. However, we should first investigate the logical dimension of Munāẓara that gives rise to the act-based criteria of relevance. In line with the Avicennian conception of logic, in Munāẓara, the logical products are divided into conceptions and assents. Both conceptions and assents are further divided into preliminaries and objectives[57].

4.8. CONCEPTS IN LOGIC

Logic is described as a "canonical tool" (Ibn Sīnā, 1984,117). This tool allows its user to refrain from errors. The act of reasoning, the mind's movement from the known to the unknown, "inevitably has order and form in the elements dealt with. Such order and form may occur in a valid or an invalid manner" (Ibn Sīnā, 1984,117). Often it is not easy to differentiate between valid and invalid manners. Logic as a canon aims to guide its users in reasoning. There is the metaphysical and ontological importance of logic as well. As I will explore these in the fifth and sixth chapters, it will suffice to say logic is thought of as a tool that allows conjunction with angelic reasons. In the introduction of his famous *Risāla al-Shamsiyya*, al-Qazwīnī elaborates why he has written a manual on logic:

> Whereas, agreeably to the opinion of all men of mind and virtue, the sciences, more particularly the incontrovertible sciences, are the highest pursuits in life, and whereas the professors thereof are the most noble among human beings, their minds being sooner prepared to be absorbed into the angelic minds, and farther, whereas it is impossible to comprehend the subtleties of sciences and to preserve the acme of their varieties except by the assistance of the science, which is called Logic (al-Qazwīnī, 2007, 2)

In the same manner, Ibn Sīnā claims it is only by contemplating the forms of things and avoiding this-worldly inclinations the purity of the soul is possible (Ibn Sīnā, 1971,

[56] I will elaborate more on the agent-driven character of Munāẓara in the second section of the sixth chapter.

[57] Beginning from here I will not include Arabic transliterations of terms as this would make reading these subsections almost impossible. Instead, I will provide a glossary of terms used in logic and argumentation as an appendix.

13-14). I leave aside the issue of conjunction and purity of soul through contemplating the pure form to the fifth and sixth chapters as not all Sunni Muslim logicians shared the same ontological and metaphysical grounds with Muslim Peripatetic philosophers. Instead, they have "naturalized" logic and employed it merely as a tool in reasoning (El-Rouayheb, 2019, 16).

The reasoning is our inference of the unknown through what we already know. This unknown can be a concept or an assent. For example, suppose that somebody does not know what plants are, and the other party defines them as "growing bodies". With the help of what we already know, i.e., "growing" and "body", we can now conceptualize what plants are. The same applies to assents as well. We can arrive at assents unknown to us by starting from assents we already know. For example, suppose that you want to know if the cosmos is created or uncreated; through assent, one party might claim that the world is uncreated, and some other party might claim the opposite. Both claims are called judgments as they might be true or false (al-Abharī, 2016, 1).

Both concepts and assents are divided into two: the preliminaries and objectives. The preliminaries in conceptions are called the five universals: genus, species, differentia, property, and accident (al-Abharī 2016, 2). The objectives of conceptions are explanatory phrases such as definitions and descriptions. Using the five universals, we arrive at explanatory phrases, such as the definition of the human being as "rational animal". "Animal" is the genus of human beings that they share with other animals. Rational is the differentia of human beings that differs them from other animals in the same genus. These conceptions, be it the five predicables or the definitions made out of them, become the content of the propositions. Propositions are the preliminaries for the assents. They can be deductive, inductive, or analogic. The objective in assents, on the other hand, is to arrive at five arts: demonstration, dialectics, rhetorics, poetics, and sophistry. Under certain conditions that I will briefly explore, each argument earns the title of being demonstrative, dialectical, or rhetorical (al-Abharī, 2016, 3).

Human beings need the science of logic as a canon because knowledge is either a priori or a posteriori. While a priori knowledge does not require effort from its graspers, a posteriori knowledge demands it. Conceptions and assents are therefore either a posteriori or a priori. A priori conception is like apprehending the cold weather or hunger. A priori judgment is like apprehending 2+2 equals 4. If all reasoning was a

priori, there would not be any need for the science of logic (al-Qazwīnī, 2007, 3)[58]. If all reasoning were a posteriori, this would lead to a vicious circle or infinite regress. However, logic and reasoning have both a posteriori and a priori components. We are saved from absurdities through the interaction of a priori and a posteriori knowledge (al-Qazwīnī, 2007, 3).

As conceptions and assents occur through language, logic requires a discussion on language use. Conceptions are directly related to language, and judgments using the conceptions as building blocks are indirectly related. Logicians refer to three forms of the word's signification to the concept: Complete, partial, and implicative. Complete signification refers to an expression's signification corresponding to its exact meaning. In partial, this correspondence is partial. For instance, when we signify something as "human being", we refer to its *quiddity*, "rational animal" in correspondence. By doing so, we are also partially signifying the concepts "human" and "rational". Consequently, for logicians, the signification "human being" implies being capable of learning and writing by implication (al-Abharī, 2016, 3).

Other than the signification relationship between the concept and the word, the expressions are examined in terms of their *singleness* or *compundness*. For example, the names of things or persons, such as "table" and "Rahmi" are single expressions. On the other hand, the sentences we utter, such as "All human beings are mortal" are compound expressions. In compound expressions, each element has its own signification as well: "All", "human" "beings", "are", and "mortal" have their own meanings; while the letters in single expressions such as in "R, A, H, M, İ" do not.

Every single expression is divided into two. They can be universal or individual (al-Abharī, 2016, 4). Take, for instance, the word "human being", this word can be predicated upon many other beings with the same wording. On the contrary, the name Rahmi was given to a particular human being only signifies that human being the word is used for: "An expression is universal when its mere conception does not prevent its predication to multiple instances" (al-Abharī, 2016, 4). The individual expressions are the opposite.

[58] I have discussed the issue of foundationalism and its critique in the second chapter.

Be it universal or individual; expressions are either univocal or ambivalent. In univocal names, the actual or imaginative existence of things shares the same meaning to the same degree. Take, for instance, the "human being". All human beings partake in the concept equally. There are no differences between human beings regarding bearing the qualities that entitle them as "human beings". However, when it comes to ambivalent significations, not all beings share the same qualities to the same degree. For instance, when it comes to the signification "white", the snow and the teeth are not the same. Likewise, God deserves the attribution of "existence" more than other created beings. Therefore "white" and "existence" are ambivalent. These expressions are frequently employed in sophistry as tools for trickery (al-Qazwīnī, 2007, 4).

Compound expressions in sentences are either constructive or not. In the case of constructive expression, which includes commands, promises, requests, etc., it is impossible to attribute truth-value to the sentence. For example, "Come here" is a command-constructive expression, and the adresse does not evaluate the sentence as true or false (al-Qazwīnī, 2007,5). Constructive expressions are not studied in logic except in certain conditions which do not interest us here. Furthermore, logic, generally, studies universal expressions rather than individual expressions. This is because individual expressions can not be predicated upon other expressions. For example, it is not possible to say, "Teacher is Rahmi". Studied in rhetoric, this usage is only metaphorically meaningful.

Following Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition, Muslim logicians differentiate between 5 universals that can be predicated upon subjects, albeit with some changes. The universals are first divided into essential and non-essential. (al-Abharī, 2016, 4). Essential universals are the genus, species, and differentia. Inessential universals are property and common accidents. Essential universals are answers to the question regarding the whatness/quiddity of the object in different respects. Take, for instance, humans and horses. The answer to the question "what are they?" will be "they are animals". "Animal" in that answer is a single, universal, essential expression, the genus of both horses and human beings. Now take, for instance, two persons, Mary and Rahmi. The answer to the question "what are they" will be "they are human beings". Human beings in that answer is a single, universal, essential expression; the species of Mary and Rahmi. The genus is the answer to the question of quiddity "solely with

respect to what is common in between them" (al-Abharī, 2016, 5), as in the case of human beings and horses sharing the attribute of animalness in their quiddities.

In the species, there are not only commonalities but also shared specialties. Mary and Rahmi are not only animals. They also share the specialties of being human. The differentia is what differentiates things that share the same genus. Both Rahmi and horses are animals, but Rahmi is differentiated from horses and other animals by being "rational". The word rational, predicated upon Rahmi and other human beings, is a single, universal and essential expression in response to the question "what is it essentially" (al-Abharī, 2016, 6). The quiddity of an object can not be conceptualized without the genus, species, and differentia. They are "essential" to the quiddity:

> I mean a predicate which the subject requires for the realization of its quiddity, and which enters its quiddity as a part of it. Examples are "figure" for "triangle," or "corporeality" for "human being." That is why, in conceiving the body as body, we can strip creaturehood from [our conception of] it inasmuch as we conceive it as a body. But in conceiving the triangle as triangle we cannot strip figure from [our conception of] it. (Ibn Sīnā, 1984, 54)

Concepts that are not constitutive of the defined entity are called accidents.

Whereas it is impossible to conceptualize the quiddity of a human being without conceptualizing her corporeality, the accidents of human beings do not go into her quiddity; they are accidental. The accidents are divided into two: They are either separable or inseparable. While breathing is an accident that can not be separated from the conception of human beings, having the ability to write is separable. In the same line, having the capacity to learn writing is an inseparable universal accident for human beings. Both separable and inseparable accidents are further divided into two. They are either properties or common accidents. Properties are single, universal accidents "only predicated of a single essence" (al-Abharī, 2016, 7). For instance, having the capacity and the ability to write is a property of human beings. It might be the case that simple, universal accidents can be predicated on many different entities. For example, breathing is a common accident shared by many animals.

The five predicables are either near or remote. For instance, "rational" and "animal" are near genera and differentia. However, when predicated on human beings, the "sensible body" is constructed of the remote genus and differentia. The remoteness of a predictable can be in degrees. The animal is the closest, followed by the body, which

is followed by the essence. According to Muslim philosophers, the essence is also the genus of reason and other reasonable celestial entities (Özpilavcı, 2018, 248).

Genus, species, differentia, property, and common accident; i.e., the five predicables are the preliminaries of conception. By using these preliminaries, logicians arrive at the objectives of the conception, which are definition or description. While the definition relates to the quiddity of a thing, the description allows differentiating the described from other things.

Both definitions and descriptions are divided into two: They can be perfect or imperfect. The perfect definition consists of the near genus and differentia of the defined, such as "rational animal" given as the definition of human beings (al-Abharī, 2016,8). On the other hand, if the definition consists of remote genus and the differentia, it is imperfect, as in the example of defining human beings as rational bodies. A perfect description consists of the near genus and inseparable properties of the described, as in the example of describing human beings as laughing animals. On the other hand, an imperfect description comprises accidents that belong to the described entity, as in the example of the walker on two feet, having broad nails, a skin without fur, and capable of laughter (al-Abharī, 2016 9). When I detail argumentation, I will provide more details and some other essential divisions relating to definitions and descriptions. Now I will continue with assents.

4.9. ASSENTS IN LOGIC

I have explained in detail the preliminaries and objectives of conceptions. In this subsection, I will move into assents. I will be speaking of its preliminaries, propositions, and objectives, the five arts (al-Abharī, 2016, 21). First, I will detail the categories, the kinds of propositions in terms of form and matter, and the logical operations, i.e., the conversion and the contradiction. Then I will detail actions on syllogisms. What are termed to be the objectives of assent in logic are the five arts consisting of demonstration, dialectics, rhetorics, sophistry, and poetry. In the fifth chapter, I talk in great detail about the difference between demonstration and dialectics. Furthermore, I will delve into the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of the five arts there. After the subsections on logic, I will move into how logic is employed in argumentation.

A proposition is an utterance that can be true or false. If someone says "Jack is a teacher" or "The cosmos is uncreated", these utterances are eligible to be deemed true or false. The propositions consist of subjects and predicates detailed in the section on conceptions. The particular or universal subjects are predicated on the five universal predicables in assent.

An example of predicating a particular with a universal would be: "Mary is a human being".

An example of predicating a universal subject with a universal predicate would be "Human beings are able to walk on their two feet". The two examples I have given are also examples of the first category of propositions: The *categorical* propositions consist of a subject and a predicate (al-Abharī, 2016, 10). It is not a precondition to know the actual reality of the things that become subjects or predicates. For instance, it is not possible to know exactly the reality of God. However, God can still become the subject of a proposition through attributes and adjectives that can be "predicated" (Özpilavcı 2018, 220).

Conditional propositions are either *conjunctive* or *disjunctive*. For example, a conjunctive conditional proposition would be: "If the sun has risen, then it is daytime" (al-Abharī, 2016, 10).

An example of a disjunctive conditional proposition would be: "Numbers are either even or odd". The first part is called the antecedent. The second is called the consequent.

The conjunction can be either *conjunctive proper* or *coincidental*.

A coincidentally conjunctive proposition is: "If humans are rational then donkeys bray" (al-Abharī, 2016, 11). Disjunctive conditional propositions have three forms: 1- It can be strongly exclusive, 2- merely truth exclusive, or 3- merely falsity exclusive.

A strongly exclusive disjunctive conditional proposition is "Numbers are either even or odd".

An example of a merely truth-exclusive conditional is "This is either a tree or a rock" (al-Abharī, 2016, 12). It can be something else, but it can not be a rock if it is a tree.

An example of a merely falsity-exclusive conditional is "Rahmi is either in the sea, or he is not drowning". But, of course, Rahmi might be in the sea, overwhelmed by his thesis, not drowning.

The subject and predicate, or the antecedent and the consequent of propositions, can be examined with their quantity. That is to say, they can be *singular, universally quantified, particularly quantified,* and *unquantified/natural.*

An example of a singular proposition would be "Rahmi is writing". An example of a universally quantified proposition would be "All human beings have the capacity to write". An example of a particularly quantified proposition would be "Some human beings have the ability to write".

Finally, an example of an unqualified proposition would be "Humans write". In the unquantified propositions, it is unclear if the utterer meant all human beings or some of them (al-Abharī, 2016, 10). There, the assent is attached to the nature of the subject (al-Qazwīnī, 2007, 96).

The propositions have two kinds of usages in logic. They can be used immediately, or they can be used through mediation. The immediate use of a proposition is through the act of conversion and contradiction. The contradiction is defined as: "To differ in affirmation and negation such that the difference intrinsically implies the truth of one and falsity of the other" (al-Abharī, 2016, 12). For instance, the proposition "Mary is writing"; and "Mary is not writing". Therefore the truth of one proposition implies the contradiction of the other. To contradict, they must be identical in 8 aspects: "1) their subject, (2) their predicate, (3) their time, (4) their place, (5) their relation, (6) their potentiality and actuality, (7) their wholeness and partness, and (8) their conditions" (al-Abharī, 2016, 12). If these rules are observed, the contradiction is possible. The contradiction of a universally quantified affirmative proposition is a particularly quantified proposition: "Every human being is an animal" contradicts "Some human beings are not animals". The contradiction of a particularly quantified negative proposition is a particularly quantified affirmative proposition: "No human being is an animal" contradicts "Some human beings are animals" (al-Abharī, 2016, 12). The quantified propositions should differ in particularity and universality because two particularly quantified propositions can be wrong at the same time: Some human

beings write. Some human beings do not write. The same applies to the universally quantified propositions: Every human being writes. No human being writes.

The second immediate use of a proposition is *conversion*. Conversion has two kinds (Ahmet Cevdet, 1998, 56). The first is defined as "The transposition of the subject and predicate in a way that preserves the proposition's negation or affirmation as well as its truth or falsity" (al-Abharī, 2016, 14). Take, for instance, the proposition "All humans are animals". The transposition would be "All animals are humans". However, this is wrong. The correct way to convert a *universally quantified affirmative proposition* is by *particularizing* the proposition and then converting it: Some animals are humans. This particularly quantified affirmative proposition can be converted into another proposition: Some humans are animals. The second form of conversion also includes the contradiction (Ahmet Cevdet, 1998, 58).

After this brief introduction to the immediate uses of a proposition, I will start detailing the use of propositions through mediation. As we have seen, the immediate use of a proposition does not require any other premise. The second usage of propositions is through the mediation of other premises, i.e., in the syllogism. It can be *deductive*, *inductive*, or *analogical*. The syllogism consists of two premises and a conclusion. If the premises are accepted, the conclusion should follow suit. The *induction* is the same, with the difference that rather than a universal one, a particular premise is taken as universal through generalization. The *analogy* is a form of reasoning where a judgment is bestowed on two entities because of a common cause or quality between them. To give an example: We can make an analogy between a room and the cosmos and claim that as the room is composed of bodies, the cosmos is also composed of bodies, and therefore it is created as well (Ahmet Cevdet, 1998, 61-62). In the same line, as explained above, a Muslim can claim that a certain grape vinegar drink is analogous to wine in causing intoxication. Therefore it is illegitimate to consume grape vinegar. Note that here we do not talk about two propositions but a common cause between properties of two things.

An example of syllogism would be: "Every body is composed, and everything composed is created. Therefore every body is created" (al-Abharī, 2016, 15). "Every body is created" is the *conclusion* of the syllogism.

The subject of the conclusion, i.e., "every body" is called the *minor term*. The predicate of the conclusion, i.e., "created" is the *major term*. Likewise, the premise that includes the minor term, i.e., "Every body is composed" is the minor premise. The premise that includes the major term, "Every composed entity is created", is called the major premise. The term that repeats in each premise, i.e., "composed" is called the *middle term*. The example I provided is for the categorical syllogism, which also applies to conditional syllogisms.

The syllogism can be composed of various *figure*s, four to be exact. It is the *first figure* deemed to be trusted for any science. Each figure has different conditions for the validity of inferences, resulting in different *kinds*. I will only exemplify different kinds of the first figure.

In the *first figure*, the middle term is the predicate of the minor premise and the subject of the major premise. Take our example here:

Every body is composed (Premise)

Every composed is created (Premise)

Every body is created. (Conclusion)

"Composed" repeats in the premises. Therefore it is the middle term. "Every body" is the minor term as it is the subject of the conclusion, and "created" is the major term, as it is the predicate of the conclusion. Therefore it is a categorical syllogism composed in the first figure. Some conditions apply to the validity of the inference in the first figure. The minor premise should be affirmative, and the major premise should be universal (Ahmet Cevdet, 1998, 67). Consequently, there are four kinds of the first figure where the conclusion is valid.

1) Each premise is affirmative and universal. Therefore, the conclusion is affirmative universal.

2)The minor premise is affirmative universal, and the major premise is negative universal. Therefore, the conclusion is negative universal.

3)The minor premise is affirmative particular, and the major premise is affirmative universal, resulting in a particular affirmative conclusion.

4) The minor premise is affirmative particular, and the major premise is negative universal, giving the conclusion of negative particular (Ahmet Cevdet, 1998, 68).

The *fourth figure* is the opposite. This means the middle term is the subject of the minor premise and the predicate of the major premise.

No human is stone (Premise)

Every rational being is human (Premise)

No stone is rational (Conclusion)

The subject of the conclusion, "no stone" is a minor term. The predicate of the conclusion "rational" is the major term. "Human being" is the middle term that repeats in each premise. The middle term is the subject of the minor premise and the predicate of the major premise:

No human is stone (Minor premise)

Every rational being is human (Major premise)

No stone is rational (Conclusion)

In the *second figure*, on the other hand, the middle term is the predicate of both premises:

Every human being is animal (Minor premise)

No stone is animal (Major premise)

No human being is stone. (Conclusion)

"Human being" is the minor term as it is the subject of the conclusion. Stone is the major term as it is the predicate of the conclusion. "Animal" in this example is the middle term that repeats in each premise. It is the predicate of both premises. It is a precondition that one of the premises is affirmative and the other one is negative in the second figure. The major premise should be universal. Therefore there are four kinds of valid inference patterns in the second figure.

In the third figure, the middle term is the subject of both premises:

Every human being is animal (Minor premise)

Every human being is rational (Major premise)

Some animals are rational (Conclusion)

Consequently, in the *third figure*, it is a precondition that the minor premise is affirmative and one of the premises is universal. It has six kinds of valid inferences, some giving out affirmative particular and some giving out particular negative conclusions (Ahmet Cevdet,1998, 69).

As the middle term moves from being the predicate in the minor premise to being the subject of the major premise, the first figure is deemed the most natural and most easily available figure of inference. The fourth, as it is the opposite of the first figure - i.e., the middle term is the subject of the minor premise and the predicate of the major premise- is deemed unnatural for application in logic. It is not widely used either. The second figure -where the middle term is the predicate of each premise - is used more than the third figure, in which the middle term is the subject of both premises. Conditional syllogisms are used independently by themselves or with categorical syllogisms (Ahmet Cevdet, 1998, 72-76)

I have given a brief overview of syllogism, its kinds, and its forms. The *objectives of assent* is "argument"[59]. The argument can be demonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical, sophistical, or poetic. Since there are five kinds of arguments, the objectives of assent are also called the *five arts*. The kinds of arguments are determined through the *content* of the propositions. If the content of a proposition is incontrovertible, then the proposition is demonstrative. The incontrovertible premises are 6: axiomatic, observational, tested, intuited, mass-transmitted, and propositions accompanied by their demonstrations (al-Qazwīnī, 2007, 35). The total is greater than the sum is an example of an axiomatic proposition. Observational premises are such as feeling cold or witnessing the sunrise. Tested premises are like medicines that cure certain illnesses. The claim that the medicine can cure the disease is the outcome of constant testing. Mass-transmitted premises are like our knowledge of the existence of a city even though we were never there. Propositions accompanied by their demonstrations are "like four is an even number", which "is deduced via an intermediary premise present

[59] I have decided to render dalīl as argument, rather than indicant or proof. The indicant is a literal translation and the proof in its contemporary usage denotes conclusiveness.

in the mind, namely, that four can be divided into two equal parts (al-Abharī, 2016, 20). I will elaborate more on incontrovertible premises and how to react when a party claims her premises are incontrovertible when I deal with argumentation procedure.

The argument is dialectical when the syllogism is constructed of premises that are commonly accepted among the general population, philosophers, and other experts in a field or they are merely accepted among disputing parties. The premises such as "Justice is good" or "Oppression is bad" are commonly held opinions (al-Abharī, 2016, 21) Contrary to incontrovertible premises, it is possible to argue against them. That is, their inferential force comes from the intersubjective context they are employed, not from the premise itself. While the incontrovertible premises are true in any case, the commonly held opinions can be true or false (Ahmet Cevdet, 1998, 102).

The argument is rhetorical when it "is composed of premises that are accepted because they are presented by someone whom one admires or; a syllogism composed of probabilistic premises" (al-Abharī, 2016, 21). The argument is poetical when it consists of imaginative premises. The aim of a poetical premise is not the truth of the content but its pragmatic force. A poetic premise aims at creating an effect such as attraction or repulsion in the soul of the adresse. A syllogism is sophistical when its is composed of false premises that resemble true or commonly held opinions (al-Abharī, 2016, 21). The falsity might relate to the content or the form of a syllogism.

I provided a brief introduction to logic in general in this subjection. In the coming subsection, I will explore how logic is used in the procedure of argumentation.

4.10. MUNĀẒARA: LOGICAL IN CONTENT, DIALOGICAL IN FORM

In the previous subsection, I have investigated the logic. In order not to get derailed, I kept the investigation very brief and I omitted certain subject matters of logic. First of all, I did not go into detail about many subforms, and submoods that are studied in logic such as figures of conditional propositions and their valid *moods*. Secondly, I did not delve into the considerations regarding the temporality of propositions: What makes a proposition *absolutely true* without taking into consideration the time aspect,

or what makes it *true at most times* or *sometimes*[60]. Thirdly, I did not delve into discussions regarding the *modality* of propositions: The proposition might be *impossible*, *necessary*, *possible*, *absolutely necessary*, or *necessary conventionally* (al-Qazwīnī, 2007, 24). The study of temporality and modality of propositions is in fact seems to be a contribution to logic that was given much attention by Muslim scholars (Strobino, 2018). Nevertheless, the point of the subsection was to show the drastic changes in the study of argumentation over centuries.

The effect of logic in argumentation was so colossal that Samarqandī held that argumentation is, in fact, an appendage to the study of logic (Samarqandī, 2014, 500). However, Samarqandī's proposal to regard argumentation as an appendage, as somewhat secondary of logic, was not accepted. The coming generations of scholars such as al-Shirwānī and Sāçaqlīzāda opposed to the definition of argumentation as "reasoning" (Güney, 2010, 95), instead, they stressed the interpersonal dimension of arguing between two parties (Āmidī, 1900, 7)[61]. The students of traditional Muslim education cirriculum would first study the Arabic language and its philology. Later they would start studying logic which was thought to be the grammar of reasoning. After the study of logic, they would start studying argumentation which was deemed to be the grammar of disputation (Gelenbevī, 1934, 37). So much so that Sācaqlīzāda (1872, 2) asserts that if the student has not mastered argumentation, she can not even understand law or theology.

The juridical and theological idea of performing argumentation through a mannerly, virtuous conduct was passed onto coming generations studying Munāẓara. The ideal of coming up with a universal theory of argumentation applicable to all fields of study was then realized[62]. I will begin from argumentation in conceptions and then continue with argumentation in assents. For topical integrity, I will be mostly referring to

[60] Interestingly the Munāẓara books I have studied do not make use of temporality and modality. Further research is required to determine if their study was restricted to logical books. I suspect that there should be some works on the issue as temporality and modality are the Muslim contribution to the study of logic.

[61] We will see in the fifth chapter that the disagreements over the definition can be extended to a number of issues, which relate to different norms.

[62] For more information regarding the historical context of argumentation in juridical argumentation and Munāẓara see (El Rouayheb, 20016).

Āmidī's commentary on Sācaqlīzāda's *Waladiyya* as it is the most detailed madrasa book on the issue that also presents views of the previous scholarship. I will be using other sources to discuss disagreements between scholars.

We will see that two criteria for a good argument are established: *Relevance* and *admissibility*. While the first corresponds to the act-based norms resulting from a logical or a dialectical approach to argumentation; the second, admissibility corresponds to the act-based norms, resulting from a virtue theoretic approach. After the elaboration of the argumentation procedure in concepts and assents, I will return to relevance and admissibility criteria where I discuss the five components of a research program in argumentation.

4.11. ARGUMENTATION AND CONCEPTS

We have seen in our exploration that logic is divided into two: concepts and assents. Over the years, Munāẓara scholars established the difference between concepts and assents in argumentation. However, before investigating them, it is important to note that while the study begins with concepts and continues with assents in logic, this is not always the case in argumentation. While some scholars such as Sācaqlīzāda (1872.) and Samarqandī (1934) prefer maintaining order present in logic, some other scholars, such as Kafawī (Pehlivan, 2012), prefer beginning with the assents. As we will be following Āmidī's commentary on Sācaqlīzāda, we will begin with the concepts.

We have seen in our exploration that logic is divided into two: concepts and assents. The first starts with the 5 five predicables, and its objectives are to arrive at definitions and descriptions. It is argued that if a party utters something in argumentation, "it will be either a description, a division, or an assent" (Āmidī, 1900, 10). Description, division, and assents are expressions in response to which it is possible to say "you are right, or you are wrong"[63]. These expressions, as they enable a response against, are called "complete expressions" (Āmidī, 1900, 11). The expressions can also be incomplete, singular, or constructive. This second group of expressions does not enable the other party to respond (Āmidī, 1900, 11). That is why there is no

[63] Description here refers to both definition and descriptions we have seen in logic. As we will see, the descriptions can be argued against not because they are conceptions, but because descriptions come with implicit claims (Sācaqlīzāda, 1872, pp 14-15).

argumentation in incomplete expressions, commands or singular expressions. If a person orders to or pleads with somebody to do something, there is nothing to argue over. But if somebody claims that X person should do something because it is ordered by law, others might respond to that claim.

Complete expressions involving descriptions, divisions and assents have their own rules relating to argumentation. While an assent can be objected, refuted or counter-argued, descriptions do not accept all those three forms (Āmidī, 1900, 11; see also: Mullā Ḥanafī, 2014, pp. 61-63). A description can only be refuted. One can not object against a description as objection occurs only in the presence of an assent. As there is no argument, it can not be counter-argued either[64].

A description can be refuted for a number of reasons: It might not exclude some elements that belong to the described. Human beings can not be described merely as black, as there are people with other colours. The description might not include some elements that actually do not belong to the described. Human beings can not be described as white, as other white entities are not human beings. A description can also be refuted with the claim that it leads to some sort of impossibility and absurdity. That is to say; the description entails a vicious circle, infinite regress, or other forms of absurdity (Āmidī, 1900, 12; see also: Sācaqlīzāda, 1872, 14).

When faced with a refutation, the descriptor, the party who performs the description act, has several options available to respond. First, she might claim the description she performs is merely *verbal*, as descriptions are either *real* or *verbal*. As we have seen, accurate descriptions in the science of logic include 5 five predicables. On the other hand, a verbal description is exemplified in the dictionaries. The descriptor might respond to the refutation by claiming that her description is verbal and verbal descriptions allow to include or exclude some elements of the described (Āmidī, 1900,16). The descriptor might also clarify what she meant. Suppose the descriptor has faced refutation with the claim that the description leads to absurdity. In that case, she has two options: Clarifying what she actually meant with the description or

[64] Some scholars believe that descriptions can be objected to and counter-argued as well. According to them, it is possible to come up with a counter-argument for a description by coming up with an alternative description (al-Jaunpūrī, 2006, pp. 22-23).

claiming that there are some forms of vicious circles and infinite regresses that is not absurd (Āmidī ,1900, 21).

A description is a conception without assent. Therefore an objection to an accurate description is legitimate only in the presence of an implicit claim. If a party describes or defines something, she implicitly claims there are genera, species, or accidents fit for the described. Take, for instance, the example of "rational animal" for the definition of human beings. By defining human beings as "rational animal", she implicitly claims "rational" is the differentia and "animal" is the genus. The opposing party might argue against the fitness or existence of such genera and differentia (Āmidī, 1900, pp. 27-28).

The second form of conception that occurs in argumentation is division. The division has two forms: Dividing the whole into its parts or dividing the universal into its particulars (Āmidī, 1900, 32; see also: Sācaqlīzāda, 1872, 20; al-Shankīṭī, 2005, 155). As in the case of descriptions, it is required that the division does not exclude the elements belonging to the *divided*. Also, the division should not include elements that do not belong to the divided (Āmidī, 1900, 34).

Dividing the universal to its particulars is either *rational* or *inductive*. In rational division, reason does not allow any elements that might exist outside the division. A rational division is such as "the known either exist or do not" (Āmidī, 1900, 37). Here the reason does not accept the possibility of elements of "the known" left behind in the division. That is why division is introduced in the form of affirmation and negation. In the inductive division, reason allows the possibility of not taking into account some elements. Take the example of humor. One party might divide humors and say, "they are either earth, fire, air, or water". In the case of inductive division, the division does not take the form of affirmation or negation, as there might be some elements that are yet to be discovered (Āmidī, 1900, 39).

As we have established so far, there are three forms of arguing against a claim. The opposing party might object to a premise, refute an argument, and finally might come up with a counter-argument of her own (Ṭāshkubrīzāda, 2012, pp. 25-30; see also: Qarsī, 2018, 43). We have seen that not all three options are available in the case of descriptions. One might refute and thus claim impossibility or absurdity in the description. Alternatively, one might object to the implicit claim in the description. In

the case of divisions, the scholars of logic and argumentation are not on the same page. Are divisions concepts or assents? According to al-Curcānī, the divisions are "seemingly" assents, but they are actually conceptions. al-Taftāzānī disagrees. For him, the divisions are assents both in form and reality (Āmidī, 1900, 40). If an argumentation scholar follows al-Curcānī, she will claim that divisions are conceptions in reality and thus they can not be argued against. In the case of divisions, the opposing party might refute the division or object to the implicit claim.

The opposing party might refute a division; in the same manner, she can oppose a description. For example, there might be elements excluded in the division; there might be elements that should not be included, and finally, she might claim that the division entails absurdity. One example of refuting the division with the claim of absurdity is dividing something into itself (Āmidī, 1900, 46).

The divider, the initial performer of the division, has a number of options in response to refutation. First, she might clarify what she meant. For example, it might be the case that she intended an *inductive division* rather than a *rational one*. Therefore, she does not claim that reason acknowledges no other divisions. Also, she might be performing a *nominal* division in which the aim is to differentiate parts from each other, not a rational or inductive division.

4.12. ARGUMENTATION AND ASSENTS

I have detailed descriptions and divisions as argumentation relating to the concepts. We have seen that they can only be refuted. Argumentation actually takes place in the presence of assents as they can be right and wrong. A concept is a cognitive act of picturing something. For example, suppose that there is a shadow far away. First, you cognize and picture the shadow as a hill. As you get closer, you start to picture the unidentified object like a tree, animal, or human being. Your conception does not stand as a topic for argumentation; it is impossible to stand against a painter and proclaim that what she has painted is not a tree (Sācaqlīzāda, 1872, 15). Unlike concepts, the assent carries the burden of proof. The party with the burden of proof is the claimant (Āmidī, 1900, 58). The other party is called the respondent (al-Jaunpūrī, 2006, pp.19-20).

A claim can be accompanied with an argument or without it. An example of a claim without an argument would be "The cosmos is created". If the claim is not justified, the respondent has the right to object to the claim (Mullā Ḥanafī, 2014, 31). Objection means vetoing a claim or a premise with the pragmatic force of asking for an argument (Āmidī, 1900, 59;). However, the objection does not merely concern premises. One can object whenever she believes there is a problem with the argument or the claim. These problems are grouped under two categories:

1) Parts of the argument, be its minor or major term. For example, the claimant might come up with an argument in the first figure. The first figure requires the minor premise to be affirmative and the major term to be universal. If not met, objection to a premise is valid.

2) The approximation of the claim to the argument. It is required that the conclusion is the same as the claim or more particular than it. For example, if the claimant claims that the thing approaching is a human being, her conclusion should result in "therefore it is a human being," or in "therefore it is a black person". In such a case, the claim and the argument are approximated. However, if the conclusion of an argument is more general than the claim, the argument is regarded as inapproximate and, therefore, not valid (Ahmet Cevdet, 1998, 118-118)[65].

The claimant should justify her claim. If not, insisting on a claim without proving it amounts to *subjugation* (Ahmet Cevdet, 1998, 122). However, it is also possible for a claim to be incontrovertible. While discussing demonstrative arguments, we have seen that the assents of incontrovertible premises are deemed demonstrative. We also had detailed kinds of incontrovertible premises: axiomatic, observational, tested, intuited, mass-transmitted, and propositions accompanied by their demonstrations. While the observational, tested, and intuited premises are regarded as incontrovertible *for the party that claims them*, axiomatic, mass-transmitted, and propositions accompanied by their demonstrations are incontrovertible *both for the claimant and the respondent* (Āmidī, 1900, 60). Therefore incontrovertible premises and assents are divided into two: *Ostensibly certain* and *latently certain*. Objecting to them would mean *arrogance* if a claim is ostensibly certain, constructed of premises that are axiomatic, mass-

[65] It is interesting that approximation falls into the domain of objection. We would expect that as approximations is related to argument, they be fall to domain of refutation. I could not locate any reasons or counter-arguments related to this issue.

transmitted, or premises the propositions of which are accompanied by their demonstration. However, if the claim is latently certain, the respondent might object. In that case, the claimant explains why the claim is incontrovertible with an *admonishment* (al-Jaunpūrī 2006, 25). An admonishment is a reminder to the other party that the disputed premise or conclusion is incontrovertible, and that it does not accept argumentation practically. For example, it is not possible to argue over sum being bigger than its parts or two plus two being equal to four, etc.

If the claim is not yet justified with an argument, the respondent's only valid option is to object to the claim. An invalid move would be usurping the role of the claimant. *Usurpation* is the respondent's disproof of the claim without listening to the claimant's argument for it. This only happens when the respondent attributes a proof to the claimant and argues against it. In an orderly manner of argumentation, the respondent is expected to wait for the claimant to present an argument to back up her claim. If the claimant justifies her claim with arguments, then the respondent has four relevant moves: Usurpation, objection, refutation, and counter-argument. Here usurpation refers to respondent's disproof of a premise. Nevertheless, among these moves, usurpation is not an *admissible* move (Al-Shankīṭī, 200, 60). We will see that this idea will be challanged.

The sequencing of admissible moves is not settled in the literature. However during this subsection I will follow Samarqandī's (1934, pp 126-127) preferred sequence of objection, refutation and counter-argument[66]. It might be the case that the claimant had already justified her premises as well. In such a case, the respondent might still object to the premise. This is called a *metaphorical objection* as objection means asking for argument and the claimant already gave her arguments for the claim (Āmidī, 1900, 61). The objection is regarded as the action most suitable for the manifestation of truth. However, it has to be in such a manner that helps the other party. For instance, one can not object to the sum and parts of the arguments simultaneously. This would be demanding too much from the other party (Āmidī, 1900, 100)

Dealing with the premise rather than the argument itself also eliminates the risk of usurpation. Objecting to a premise means asking for arguments that will also be

[66] I will discuss the debate on the sequence of moves after introducing the order according to the convention.

conceded by the other party (Āmidī, 1900, 62). By asking for further argument, the respondent helps the claimant convince her (al-Jaunpūrī, 2006, 77). Objecting to a premise is more helpful than refuting the argument or coming up with a counter-argument, as in the latter two, there is a possibility that the claimant's right to justify her claim is obstructed (Āmidī, 1900, 62). The burden of proof or the right to prove should not change without a necessary reason.

The respondent objects to a premise and demands from the claimant to justify the contested premise. When faced with an objection, the claimant is obliged to justify her premise[67]. This is performed in two ways: 1) Coming up with a syllogism, the conclusion of which is the contested premise. 2) Annulling the support that contradicts the contested premise. The claimant is obliged to annul the support only when annulling the support indicates the soundness of the contested premise. By annulling the support, the claimant successfully defends her premise (Āmidī 1900, 66). The claimant when faced with an objection can also prove her claim with another argument. Āmidī elaborates on two positions on coming up with a new argument. The first camp argues that changing it amounts to acknowledgment of defeat in a sense, the latter disagree. If the change benefits the common goal, i.e. manifestation of truth, then the move is admissible. Therefore there is no defeat. The respondent, in turn, might object again or claim that annulment of the support does not amount to the annulment of the contradiction. In such a scenario, the primary obligation of the claimant is to prove her contested premise. That is, instead of dealing with proving why the annulment of support amounts to an absence of contradiction, she should busy herself with proving her own contested premise (Āmidī, 1900, 70).

I have detailed argumentation in case of objection to the claim or one of the argument's premises. The respondent might invalidly justify her objection as well. She might start to prove why the contested premise is false. However, this is a usurpation. The right to justify the claim belongs to the claimant. Usurpation is busying herself with argumentation in a place where the respondent could have confined herself to objecting the premise. There is a debate regarding the admissibility of usurpation. Some scholars, among them Gelenbevī, argue that if the goal is to manifest truth and if the

[67] Āmidī speculates that the obligation to justify the contested claim is not only a conventional obligation but a religious one as well (1900, 65).

usurpation serves that purpose, then it is an admissible move (1934, pp. 122-124). al-Jaunpūrī argues that usurpation should be discouraged (2006, 36). Samarqandī (Güney, 2010, 118), Ahmet Cevdet Paşa (1998, 118), and Sāçaqlizāde (Āmidī, 1900, 77) argue that usurpation is not admissible in any case. The right to justify the claim or the contested premise belongs to the claimant. For the first camp of scholars who hold that usurpation is admissible, it seems that product-related norms are more significant than process-related norms.

Gelenbevī holds that it is possible to refute and counter-attack an unproven claim: Its refutation is called *refutation-in-appearance*. For example, suppose that I claim that the cosmos is eternal. The respondent attributes an argument to my claim and proceeds: "Although you claim that the cosmos is the product of God and the product of eternal is eternal, this argument does not *apply* to daily events which are clearly created. Therefore your argument is wrong". In the case of the same unproven claim, the respondent can also develop a counter-argument by attributing an argument to the claim (Gelenbevī, 1934, 56-57). This is a *presumptive counter-argument*: "You claim that the cosmos is uncreated. Although one can claim that being a product of God makes the cosmos eternal, I claim that the cosmos is subjected to change. That which is subjected to change is created, and therefore the cosmos is created" (Gelenbevī, 1934, 58)[68].

I have summarized objections and other issues related to objections. There is one last question: Is it procedurally valid for the claimant to object to the objection itself? As a matter of fact, every objection bears an implicit claim regarding the objection's validity. We implicitly claim that our objection is sound. In that sense, the claimant might respond to the implicit claim and deny it. However, objection to an objection would not benefit any parties (Āmidī, 1900, 82; see also: al-Samarqandī,1934, 127). The claimant's duty is to provide arguments for her claim. Going through a discussion on whether the objection is valid or not would derail her from her original duty. Furthermore, the claimant has another, much powerful move in her arsenal, she might

[68] It should be noted that both parties refer to the goal of argumentation, i.e. the manifestation of truth, in their arguments regarding the usurpation, refutation-in-appearance and presumptive counter-argument. It can be concluded that each camp in the debate meets in the normative aspect of argumentation, i.e. truth. Nevertheless, they differ in its analysis. I will discuss this issue in detail in the fifth chapter.

justify her claim with another argument (Āmidī, 1900, 84). The objection is an invitation to prove the objected premise. Dealing with the soundness of implicit claims is regarded as the equivalent of dealing with the grammar of the argument, rather than the argument itself. Whenever argumentation is derailed from the arguments themselves, the party that causes the derailment basically acknowledges her defeat (Āmidī, 1900, 85).

The second possible move by the respondent is to refute the argument. There are four kinds of refutation[69]. The first is to refute a description and I have described how it is performed and how to respond to a refutation above. The second refutation is against the divisions. I have detailed how it is performed and how to respond to a refutation as well. The third is refuting the grammar and the wording of the argument. This move is only admissible with some exceptions that do not interest us at the moment. The fourth kind of refutation is refutation in assents (Āmidī, 1900, 100). Whereas objection refers to the premise or the claim, the refutation addresses the argument overall.

A refutation occurs in two ways: The refutation points to some irregularities in the argument in the first form. For instance, in the debate regarding the createdness of the cosmos, the philosophers claim that the cosmos is uncreated and eternal because it is the outcome of God's work (Āmidī, 1900, 97). The outcome of an eternal agent is also eternal. Sunni Muslim scholars refute the argument on the basis of irregularity. They claim that the argument *falls short* of the daily events that are also the outcome of God's work[70]. According to them, it is ostensibly visible that daily events in life are created. Therefore, the argument that the cosmos is eternal as it is the outcome of God's work fails to include some elements, i.e., daily events, in the argument. Thus the argument is refuted by the *refutation based on irregularity*. This form of refutation is only possible in demonstrative arguments. Elements of demonstrative arguments can not fall short of the conclusion. However, in other forms of arguments where no certainty is sought, the refutation by irregularity has a limited capacitiy (Āmidī, 1900, 98).

[69] al-Qarsī (2018, pp. 47-48) argues that there are 8 kinds of refutation.

[70] We will see in the fifth chapter that, Muslim philosophers believe that daily events are created through Active intellect. Therefore they have a counter-argument against daily events (Gelenbevī, 1934, 44).

The second form of assent's refutation is the *refutation based on absurdity*. Here, the respondent claims an absurdity in the link between the premises and the conclusion. This absurdity might be an infinite regress, vicious circles, and the like (Āmidī, 1900, 99). In both forms of the refutation, the respondent can not just argue that there is irregularity or absurdity; she should show it[71]. If not, the move amounts to arrogance (Ahmet Cevdet, 1998, pp. 116-117). Therefore the refutation requires the roles to change, and the initial claimant then becomes the respondent. The claimant might respond to the refutation with another proof. This, on the one hand, is an acknowledgment of defeat and manifestation of truth, on the other (Āmidī, 1900, 99).

We have seen the objection and refutation. The counter-argument is the third relevant and admissible way to respond to the claimant[72]. Counter-argument is the respondent's disproof of the claim (Āmidī, 1900, 86). The disproving of the claim occurs in two ways. In the first one, the respondent proves the exact opposite of the claim. If, for instance, the claimant argues for the "nonhumanness" of a thing, the respondent aims to prove its humanness. In the second, the respondent proves something more particular. In the case of non-humanness, the respondent proves that the debated object is a white human being. The justification for the more particular justifies the general as well (Āmidī, 1900, 86).

Counter-argument is phrased as such: "Although your argument is in line with your claim, I have another that holds otherwise" (al-Jaunpūrī, 2006, 56). The counter-argument has three forms. If the counter-argument amounts to the same content and form of the opposed argument, -that is,- if the same middle term or the same figure is used, it is called a *counter-argument with inversion* (Āmidī, 1900, 92). If the counter-argument differs in content but meets in the form, this is called the *counter-argument with the like*. If both the content and the form of argument are not employed in the counter-argument, this is called *counter-argument with the unlike*. The example of counter-argument with inversion is witnessed in the debate between Sunni scholars and Mu'tazila scholars on seeing God. While Sunni scholars claim that Muslims will see Allah on the day of judgement, Mu'tazila opposes. Both sides use the same verse

[71] Please refer to Mullā Ḥanafī (2014, 33) for an elaborate discussion of the issue.

[72] The respondent might offer a counter-argument for the conclusion or a premise (Āmidī, 1900, 90). Here the criteria of admissibility posits that be it the claim or the premise, the respondent should first hear other parties argument and only then proceed with her counter-argument.

from Qur'an for their arguments: "Vision comprehendeth Him not, but He comprehendeth (all) vision. He is the Subtile, the Aware" [6.103]. According to Mu'tazila, this verse is a clear indication that God is never seen. But the Sunni scholars claim the fact that Allah negates vision, implies its possibility (Ahmet Cevdet, 1998, 133). It would be meaningless to negate something for which there is no possibility to occur. The form and the content of the argument are shared by both sides of the debate, making the argument a counter-argument with inversion.

The example of *counter-argument with the like* is witnessed in the debate between Muslim philosophers and Sunni theologians on the createdness of cosmos. While philosophers claim that the cosmos is not created, the Sunni scholars disagree. The argument of the Muslim philosophers is as such: "The cosmos does not need any effecient [cause]. That which does not need any effective cause is uncreated". The theologians respond with a counter-argument: "The cosmos is subjected to change. That which is subjected to change is created". In this counter-argument, the form of the arguments is the same, i.e., first figure. But the middle terms are different. It is being free of effective cause in the argument of the philosophers and being subjected to change in that of theologians. This makes the argument a counter-argument with the like. If the Sunni theologians respond to the same proof with another counter-argument in which both the form and content are different, this would be an example of the counter-argument with the unlike: "The cosmos is subjected to change. No changeable being is uncreated. The cosmos is created". Here the form of the argument is in the second figure, and the middle term is "subject to change", making the argument a counter-argument with the unlike (Ahmet Cevdet, 1998, 132).

The admissibility of a counter-argument against a counter-argument is disputed. That is, is it possible for the claimant to respond to the respondent's counter-argument with a counter-argument? Pehlivan and Çelik explain that scholars such as Samarqandī believed that counter-argument against a counter-argument would not serve the purpose of argumentation. If both parties endlessly come up with counter-arguments, the manifestation of truth would be obstructed (Pehlivan and Çelik, 2019, 436).

The second reason for denying the right to counter-argument against a counter-argument is a theoretical consideration: Imagine that the respondent comes up with a counter-argument; if the claimant responds with a counter-argument, the counter-

argument against the first argument will also be against the second one. However, scholars such as Mullā Ḥanafī (2014, 70) and al-Jaunpūrī (2006, pp. 80-81) disagree. Accordingly, the second argument might be more powerful than the first. Furthermore, the sum of two arguments might fortify the claim for the better (Āmidī, 1900, 89). The disagreement between scholars relates to counter-arguments in response to demonstrative arguments with incontrovertible premises. There is no debate on the other argument forms.

The most powerful attack is usurpation, counter-argument, refutation, an objection with absolute support, an *objection with potential support*, and lastly, the sheer objection. Nevertheless, an objection is the safest way of responding, helping manifest truth. The refutation and the counter-argument would amount to shifting the roles, the respondent's last resort.

4.13. CONCLUSION: FIVE COMPONENTS OF A MUNĀẒARA RESEARCH PROGRAM?

With this subsection, the chapter on the Munāẓara ends. First, I have elaborated on the historical development of argumentation over centuries in Islamdom. Then I examined the descriptive and normative aspects of argumentation in juridical and theological dialectics. Later, I described extending the scope of argumentation to reasoning in general through logic. As the scope of argumentation is extended to reasoning in general, students of argumentation are expected to master logic before studying it. The chapter continued with a general introduction to logic. Then I explored how logic is used in the practice of argumentation. Finally, I described the argumentation procedure.

Situating Munāẓara in contemporary argumentation is a tall deal. In the first three chapters, I have studied product-based, process-based, and agent-based theories of argumentation. Our elaboration showed that in Munāẓara, these three norms merge and lead to the characterization I offered in the beginning. Munāẓara is a dialogically-epistemic agent-driven theory of argumentation. The product-based norms relate to the idea that argumentation is performed for the manifestation of truth. The approach defines an argument in its classical, monological sense as a syllogism consisting of two premises. Moreover, a foundationalist epistemology preserves the truth value. The syllogism should conform to rules of logic in their content and norm.

The product-based norms serve as the foundation of the process-based norms. The logical norm that any claim should be justified unless incontrovertible provides the basis for objection. The logical norm that the argument for a claim can not be fallacious provides the basis for refutation. Consequently, the logical norm of non-contradiction provides the basis for counter-argument.

The logical and dialectical norms constitute relevance (*tawjīh*). Nevertheless, the interplay of logical (*baḥth*) and dialectical (Munāẓara) norms allow to characterize the approach as a dialogically-epistemic theory of argumentation. For instance, in the case of the moves of the respondent, the number of relevant moves in the arsenal is actually four, with the addition of usurpation. Nevertheless despite its relevance, the usurpation is not an admissible move. This shows that there also exists a different set of norms concerning the conduct. This set of norms allows us to characterize Munāẓara as an agent-driven theory of argumentation.

The rules and manners posited in the theory prescribe arguing parties to value the manifestation of truth more than winning the argument. It is not important through whose voice the truth is manifested (Gelenbevī, 1934, p. 33). In other words, the goal in Munāẓara is to distinguish between the moves and manners of proper argumentation and those that amount to quarreling. Accordingly, not all disputations are argumentation (Munāẓara). For a dispute to assume the title of argumentation, it has to follow the rules and manners prescribed by the theory (al-Āmidī, 1900, 8). As in the case of usurpation, Munāẓara labels the violations of the procedure after certain procedural&ethical vices. For instance, objecting to an incontrovertible premise whatsoever or objecting to refutation and a counter-argument without providing arguments are labeled as arrogance (*mukābara*). Insisting on a claim without proof is viewed as subjugation (*taḥakkum*). Performing a counter-argument before exhausting the chances of objection and refutation is called *hastiness* ('ucūl) (Taiai and Oruç, 2020).

What, then, are the five components of a research program that Munāẓara scholars followed? In the philosophical component, we see that the approach adheres to a foundationalist epistemology in which epistemological arguments and some practical ones admit truth. This leads to a dialectical theory of argumentation in which parties seek truth in the theoretical component. Finally, the dialectical procedure

designates relevant and admissible moves in the analytical component. As we have seen, the "relevant" here refers to logical content and dialectical procedure, *baḥth* and *Munāẓara*. The "admissible", on the other hand, relates to the *Ādāb*. This aspect allows the approach to characterize the derailments from the procedure as argumentative vices. As Munāẓara is not yet a contemporary theory of argumentation practiced institutionally; or made use of empirically, it is impossible to discuss the practical and empirical components at the moment.

We have established that in Munāẓara two different criteria apply for a good argument that serves the truth manifest: Relevance and admissibility. But, why? The approach is not satisfied with just the act-based or the agent-based norms. Both of these norms require should be present. We will see that although Munāẓara adheres to a foundationalist epistemology, it also posits a non-justificatory, justification-independent layer of truth, thanks to its *multiplex* conception of truth and self.

CHAPTER V: CONTROVERSIES OVER ARGUMENTATION, TRUTH, AND MULTIPLEXITY

5. 0. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I argue that Munāẓara's attention to relevance and admissibility explored in the previous chapter results from a multiplex, i.e., the multi-layered conception of truth. Accordingly, a certain argumentative move should be logically and dialectically sound, but it should also be free from any ethical defects such as arrogance, usurpation, hastiness, and subjugation. I trace this twofold attention to the act-based and the agent-based norms back to two layers of truth: The first is founded upon foundationalist epistemology, which is justification-dependent. The second layer of truth, on the other hand, is justification-independent. This layer of truth is attainable only after the self is cleansed from vices and adorned with virtues. I investigate the philosophical trajectory of the multiplex conception of truth in what follows. I show that a rapprochement between Muslim spiritual ethics and Aristotelian analytics can be traced back to Ibn Sīnā, who has also inspired Samarqandī, the founder of Munāẓara. Consequently, I investigate a number of disagreements from the Munāẓara scholarship and show that they are a matter of inclination, either towards strict analytics or towards a more ethical approach to multiplexity, corresponding to rational and experiential layers of truth. I conclude that chapter with the claim that the multiplex conception of truth is informed by a conception of self, to be further developed in the sixth chapter.

5.1. MULTIPLEX LAYERS OF TRUTH: THE RATIONAL AND THE EXPERIENTIAL

In the previous chapter, I elaborated on how the synthesis between philosophical analytics and spiritual ethics gives rise to the peculiarities of Munāẓara resulting from its threefold attention to the epistemic product, dialogical process, and virtuous agency. This threefold attention is also reflected in the full title of the discipline: Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓara, Ādāb relating to the virtuous conduct, Baḥth relating to the epistemic product, and Munāẓara relating to the dialogical process. This leads Munāẓara scholars, among them Gelenbevī (1934, 32), to name the derailments from the

procedure as irrelevant and inadmissible. In the first three chapters, we have seen that the characterization of moves is an analytical matter. To understand the analytical component, the student of argumentation should understand the theoretical foundations of an argumentation theory and the philosophy of reasonableness that informs the theoretical foundations. For example, pragma-dialectics characterizes the derailments from the procedures as fallacies (van Eemeren, 2015, 4). This analytical preference results from the fact that pragma-dialectics establishes *critical discussion* as to its dialectical base in the theoretical domain. The critical discussion procedure, in turn, is informed by the critical rational philosophy pragma-dialectic adheres to. In agreement with its critical-rationalist philosophy of reasonableness, argumentation does not concern itself with the truth for pragma-dialectics. Moreover, the foundationalist approach to incontrovertible starting points is rejected. Consequently, the logical-monological definition of fallacy as flaws of reasoning is denied. According to the new dialectical-dialogical definition, fallacies are obstructions that hinder the process of resolution of opinion.

Investigating the philosophy of reasonableness in terms of Munāẓara will enable us to understand how the theory is a *dialogically-epistemic agent-driven* theory of argumentation. That is to say, how Munāẓara is epistemic and dialogical simultaneously, an oxymoron according to our contemporary lenses. Secondly, the theoretical and philosophical starting points enable us to grasp why Munāẓara scholars name irrelevant or inadmissible moves after a certain character vice. As expressed in the introduction, the short answer to these questions is the multiplex approach to truth.

The synthesis of Aristotelian Muslim philosophy tradition and Muslim disciplines relaying on transmitted knowledge practice and reasoning is a gradual one. 16th-century scholar who also wrote on Munāẓara (2012), Ṭāshkubrīzāde, gives us clues about how these two approaches have met on a higher layer:

> The first approach is referred to as theoretical reasoning (naẓar) or inference (istidlāl) and the second is referred to as purification of the self (tasfiya) or spiritual illumination (mushāhada). The first is the level of well-grounded scholars, and the second is the level of men of truth and sincerity (aṣ-ṣiddīqīn). Each of the two approaches culminates in the other, and he who masters both is referred to as 'Majma' al-Bahrayn,' which can be literally translated as 'the Mingling of the Two Oceans.' (Ṭāshkubrīzāde, 1985, 67; *translation from*, Şentürk et al., 2020, 119)

We will see that the founder of Munāẓara, Samarqandī, also argues that there are two ways to acquire knowledge, one through reasoning and another through purification of the self through virtues. When the history of Muslim philosophy is investigated, we see that many scholars, such as Ibn Sīnā, Ghazalī (1972), Samarqandī (2020), and Ibn Khaldun (1958) are of the same opinion.

It seems that the synthesis of reasoning and spiritual practice, and therefore, two methods to truth, have become mainstream with two foundational figures: Ibn Sīnā and Ghazalī. On Ibn Sīnā's side, he admits that the rational approach in the search for truth has its limits. He accepts the spiritual and epistemic authority of prophethood and Sharia. He also recognizes that other than justification, there exists another route to the truth: Cleansing the agent from vices and adorning her with virtues (Türker, 2019, 203). On Ghazalī's (2018) side, he naturalizes Avicennean logic and begins to popularize it even in the most foundational Muslim science based on transmitted knowledge, uṣūl al-fiqh. Moreover, agreeing with Ibn Sīnā, he argues that reasoning should be accompanied by spiritual experience of opening (*kashf*) (Ghazalī, 1972; see also: Şentürk et al., 2020, pp. 95-99). With Ibn Sīnā's and Ghazalī's negotiations, among others, the multiplex approach differentiating rational and experiential layers of truth flourishes.

Notice that Ṭāshkubrīzāde holds that these two ways to truth should be merged into one. This implies that, on their own, these practices are different, that they might lead to different conclusions, and that some can prefer one over the other. In fact, 15th-century scholar al-Jāmī, in his *The Precious Pearl* (1967), explains the different positions of the philosophers, theologians, and the Sufis. That is to say, although a multiplex approach to truth and the two methods of acquiring knowledge have eventually become the dominant paradigm, there were at least two approaches in the beginning: 1- that of *the people of reasoning*, 2-that of *people of experience* (Ṭāshkubrīzāde, 1985, 67).

For my purposes, I will limit the first camp to Fārābī. I will first elaborate on his epistemology and ontology. This epistemological position argues that one can arrive at truth solely through logic. This approach to truth, preferring its verification by means of demonstration, derives from the philosophical ontology. Fārābī argues that

existence has layers emanating from the First. This ontological approach is called emanation, *fayd*.

The discussion on Fārābī will continue with Ibn Sīnā's position, more specifically with the debate on the secondary literature regarding his mysticism: Was he a strictly rational philosopher, or did he admit the possibility of spiritual experience? In this regard, I will conclude with Ömer Türker's argument holding that Ibn Sīnā admitted the possibility of a justification-independent truth, making him a multiplex scholar. Parting his way from Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā argues that a solely rational approach to truth based on the demonstration is possible but limited. The structure of reality is not solely syllogistic and justificationary. There exists an experiential layer that can only be achieved by cleansing the self from vices and adorning it with virtues.

I will continue with Ghazalī's (1972), Ibn Khaldun's (1958), and Fanārī's (1955) critique of a strict rationalist approach to truth, built upon Ibn Sīnā's admittance of two-layers and two-methods to the truth. I will follow this discussion with ontology and epistemology for the multiplex approach, building upon Samarqandī among others. According to the multiplex approach, Being is multilayered and interconnected. Therefore, it is acknowledged that the practice of truth requires cognitive and moral achievements that move beyond everyday intuitions, intra-paradigmatic biases, and appeals to authorities. Finally, having elaborated on the multiplex approach, I will list a number of disagreements in the Munāẓara scholarship that can be explained as the tension between a more rationalist approach or a more experiential approach; in other words, the tension between act-based norms and agent-based norms.

5.2. AL-FĀRĀBI AND THE RATIONAL APPROACH TO TRUTH

Emanation theory adhered by the Neo-Platonists asserts that the heavenly and earthly beings are the product of the self-contemplation of the First, i.e., God. The first exposition of the theory comes from Plotinus. Complying with Proprys's will, Plotinus writes down his philosophy in the *Enneads* (Moore, n.d.). Interestingly in the Arabic translation, the book[73] is attributed to Aristoteles with the name *Theology of Aristotle*.

[73] The Arabic translation is thought to merely include its three chapters. Adamson speculates that it is a paraphrase from Porphyry. The Arabic translation of the paraphrase with the name *Theology of Aristotle* is attributed to a philosopher from Kindi's circle (Adamson 2000, 1).

Nevertheless, it was widespread around the philosophical chambers of Islamdom, as commented by al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā (Adamson, 2000, 2).

Plotinus himself was a follower of Plato and the founder of Neoplatonism. This explains why philosophers believed that Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus were not foes but developers of the same philosophy (al-Fārābī, 2002). This leads to two different conclusions. First, together with *al Khayr al-Mahd (Liber de Causis)* of Proclus, *Theology of Aristotle* became the foundation of emanation theory to be further developed by al-Fārābī (Adamson, 2000, 164). Second, Fārābī develops a theory of the history of philosophy. Accordingly, the first maturation of philosophy begins with Plato, and Aristotle becomes the one to perfect it (al-Fārābī, 2008, 87). Philosophy is viewed within an evolutionary trajectory, the end of which is a complete, finished system where all the sciences available to human beings are included. These sciences and their principles are discovered by a certain person and can be re-discovered independently by another (Gutas, 2014, 325). Hence, Aristotle is called the first teacher and Fārābī is the second teacher.

It is speculated that the basic premise of emanation theory can be found in Plato's *Timaeus* where he talks about two different moods of being (Aktaş, 2020, 50). In the first mood, Being never comes into presence but is still the principle of existence (Oruç, 2014, 4). In the second, all the beings we witness are discredited: Although they *seem* to exist -philosophically speaking,- they do not (Plato, 2000, 27d5-28b2). Whether in the same line as Plato or not, Aristotle elaborates on the divine being, the cause of all the other beings, the Unmoved Mover. The Unmoved Mover causes the movement of heavenly bodies (Easterling, 1976).

Plotinus developed these ideas into a uniform theory:

> Plotinus had introduced as a means of bridging the gap between the intelligible and the material worlds, on the one hand, and giving a coherent account of the coming-to-be of the universe from the One or First Principle, through a process of gradual overflowing or diffusion, on the other. This process generally known as emanation gives rise to the intellect (nous), the soul (psyche) and the world of nature, in succession (Fakhry, 2014,78).

In his *Virtuous City* (*Kitāb mabādi' ārā' ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila*), Fārābī asserts that the First (*Al-Awwal*) is the cause of all beings (2013, 8). The First is entirely free from the imperfection of potentiality or possibility (al-Fārābī, 2013, 9). It does not need

anything; it is without a cause, form, or matter. It is without definition (al-Fārābī, 2013, 13). It is not only One but also more worthy of the attribute of unity than anything else (al-Fārābī, 2013, 25). It is both the subject and object of its own intellection.

The order of intellection ends with the tenth, the Active Intellect. While the remaining intellects are free from the sublunar world, the tenth intellect is the cause of the sublunar world. It is, therefore, the converging point of divine and material. It governs the material world. It is also the source of human knowledge as it is the bestower of forms[74] (Kaya, 2009). The sublunar human mind is a possibility awaiting actualization. When it somehow makes conjunction (*ittiṣāl*) (al-Fārābī, 2013, 85) with the tenth intellect, it actively starts to apprehend the intelligibles/universals without taking into account the sensible objects (al-Fārābī, 1938, 31-33)[75]. It becomes the subject and object of its own illecttion. We will see that there is debate on Ibn Sīnā's position here, and the overwhelming evidence shows that he does not think this is possible in the sublunar world.

Having done with the supralunar world, we can move down to the sublunar world ours. The material world does not possess perfection but is capable of it *potentially*. The natural world consists of four elements: Water, fire, air, and earth. They make up the minerals (Kaya, 2009). The minerals make up animals among which humans are included:

> The chief characteristic of these material compounds is that they are made up of matter and form in such a way that neither can exist independently of the other. What distinguishes one from the other is the fact that form is the principle of actuality or perfection and matter is the principle of potentiality in the compound. (Fakhry 2014, 85)

The matter in itself is a possibility and it is undivided. It can be likened to the dough of which many other things are made up. It is the Active Intellect that gives form to the matter. This is why the Active Intellect is called the bestower of forms (Kaya,

[74] I think only in this ontological sense it can argued that Fārābī and Muslim philosophers developed a "formal" logic.

[75] In order to fully expose the syllogistic order of the ontology according to the rational approach to truth, I will give one example from the syllogistic quality of divine reasons and souls. It is the "logical" character of these supralunar beings that makes it possible to apprehend them. Already we have seen form and matter come up during the presentation of the theory, but the intellects and souls are also thought as genera and species as well. al-Fārābī asserts that the heavenly bodies/intellects are "one in genus but many in species" (Fakhry, 2014, 83).

2009). According to the theory, the human soul is an emanation of the Active Intellect. The human soul, in turn, causes its own subrational (animal, vegetative) faculties (Fakhry, 2014, 4). Whereas the vegetative soul governs the body, the animal soul is responsible for pre-intellectual tasks. In order to understand the role of Active Intellect during the reasoning process, the transformations of the reason should be discussed, starting from the material reason and ending with the acquired and the actual reason where conjunction with the Active Intellect becomes possible (al-Fārābī, 1938, 20). However, this process can only be grasped if the reasoning is understood.

5.3. PHILOSOPHICAL EPISTEMOLOGY

Objects of sensation become the subjects of certain questions. These questions are like "what, how, how many". The objects of sensation are called the "essence" and the answers in response to the questions are called the categories. The word "category" is translated into Arabic as "*maqū'lat*"; which in turn can be translated as "what is said of" or "what is being said to" (Fārābī, 2008, 5). This is why they are both linguistic and semantic. Categories are attributes of objects of sensation. The category of quantity, which is the answer to the question "how many", can be predicated on the essence. For instance, "this thing is white" and "this thing is tall" are the answers to the categories of quality. The essence, however, can not be predicated on another essence. This is because the mind goes through a series of abstractions, and thus the attributes of essences become independent of the particular object, as in the case of "whiteness" and "tallness" (Fārābī, 2008, 17).

The first categories gain some more attributes when they occur in the soul. These new attributes are called the five universal predicables: genus, species, differentia, essential property, and accidental property (Fārābī, 2008, 5); the preliminaries of logic we have seen in the previous chapter. These new attributes predicated on the essences are called the second-order intelligibles. They are independent of the object of sensation. Once the conjunction with Active Intellect is secured, the mind acquires the skill of apprehending intelligibles without considering the objects themselves, becoming universal by itself (Fakhry, 2014, 72). The essences, the categories, the intelligibles, and the second-order intelligibles lead to axiomatic premises that become the object of different sciences such as geometry, physics, music, and metaphysics. Logic on the

other hand is a tool that these sciences use in their respective places (al-Fārābī, 2008, pp. 8-12).

To recap, let's take a yellow bottle as an example. Without the intervention of reason, this particular object of sensation is somehow like *noumenon*. There is no word for it and it can only be pointed out. However, with the categories, the bottle starts to be predicated on the object of sensation: It can be tall, white, many, made by somebody, etc. Later on, this particular bottle is abstracted from the object of sensation and becomes an indeterminate "bottle". In this instance, the particular bottle is subsumed in the indeterminate bottle. Later on, the bottle goes for another abstraction, and the word "bottleness" is created. This word does not signify an entity outside the soul. It is either representation or imitation of objects of sensation that are produced by the soul (Fārābī, 2008, 17). In this sense, the reason has the capacity of *world-making*.

We can not use "this x" to be the subject of another particular predicate; i.e. "this y". A sentence such as "This flower is this mountain" is not meaningful. Indeed, being subject or a predicate are not essential qualities of things outside; our reason makes them subjects or predicates. After differentiating between four levels of abstraction, the soul starts to imitate the outside world. These imitations become concepts or categorical or hypothetical judgments. It aims to reconstruct the outside world through its reasoning capacities (Fārābī, 2008, 17). This is how a strictly rational method to truth is developed. In the demonstration, at least in the Fārābīan version, truth is regarded to be the work of a thinking self who can discover it by employing concepts and assents. In his system, dialectic is somewhat secondary, and it does not concern the discovery of truth (al-Fārābī, 2008, 133).

Having elaborated on the reasoning process, we can discuss the transformations of the reason according to the order of abstraction. As long as it stays as potential, the human soul is called material reason. When the potential is actualized, it is called the acquired reason (al-Fārābī, 1938, 20). The acquired reason apprehends the universals emanated from the Active Intellect. During this process, the acquired reason is *identical* to its objects. Furthermore, the intelligibles, the objects of acquired reason, are actually free from the matter (al-Fārābī, 1938, 21). When reason acquires the ability to apprehend them without the help of matter, it is called the actual reason. There is a difference between acquired reason and actual reason because, in the first, apprehension is still

bound to time, position, quality, quantity, and other physical properties (Adamson, 2004).

Now I will study Ibn Sīnā's position on the possibility of a strictly rational, justification-dependent conception of truth. More specifically, the debate in the secondary literature revolving around his position.

5.4. IBN SĪNĀ AND THE QUESTION OF MULTIPLEXITY

The debate in the secondary literature regarding Ibn Sīnā's position has two sides. While Nasr (1978) argues that Ibn Sīnā is a mystic, Gutas (2014) holds the opposite. Adamson (2014) and Janssens (2016) are on the same page with Gutas. He holds that Ibn Sīnā is from the Aristotelian intellectual tradition and there does not exist a whiff of mysticism in his philosophy. The controversy is bolstered by the three different remarks of Avicenna[76]. First, In his late years, he starts to name the spontaneous acquisition of universals as "taste" (ḏawq). The terminology is widely used by the Sufis to describe the experience of opening. Another statement at the beginning of his *The Easterners* fosters controversy. Ibn Sīnā claims that "he acquired knowledge 'from a direction other than that of the Greeks" (Gutas, 2014, 199). These remarks led Nasr to believe that Ibn Sīnā had a Sufi, perennial, "Eastern" dimension to his teaching. For Gutas, on the other hand, the experience of taste does not lead to any secret knowledge. The knowledge acquired thanks to "taste" is still syllogistic (Gutas, 2014, 372). That is, Ibn Sīnā is no different from his philosophical predecessors. Both sides seem to strive hard to pull Ibn Sīnā to their sides. While the Ibn Sīnā presented by Gutas appeases the need for a post-metaphysical philosophy, Nasr appeals to the "oriental" image of sacred knowledge (Gutas, 2014, 393).

I will first detail Gutas' position and then continue with Ömer Türker (2019) who argues that Ibn Sīnā combines rational and the mystical. Avicenna's methodology is built upon grasping both the concepts and assents. The grasping occurs in two ways. It is either by discursive thinking, that is from syllogism to syllogism (Adamson, 2004). Or it occurs in a non-discursive manner, which in contemporary literature is rendered as correct guessing. Avicenna differentiates two forms of getting knowledge,

[76] I use Ibn Sīnā and Avicenna interchangeably.

baḥthi, and *ḏawqi*. *Baḥthi* means knowledge acquired after a strict application of logic, *ḏawqi,* on the other hand, is also syllogistic. However, this knowledge is acquired all of a sudden; without the need for syllogism (Adamson, 2004). Nevertheless, this is not a kind of mystical knowledge (Gutas, 2014, 341).

As the reality is syllogistic, the verification of truth will be syllogistic as well. The inference from the known to the unknown is performed through the middle terms of the syllogism. As we had seen in the fourth chapter, constructing a syllogism is actually an attempt to find the middle term that produces a conclusion. Discursive detection of the middle term is analyzing all the arguments with the tools provided by logic. Ibn Sīnā analyzes all the arguments in a manner which Gutas likens to working with index cards:

> Avicenna thus examined in the sciences he studied all arguments, regardless whether these were in the form of a syllogism, induction, or analogy; in other words he examined every passage in which an author professed to progress from the known to the unknown. (Gutas, 2014, 203)

What he tries to do is locate the epistemic qualities of each argument. The fourth chapter elaborated that syllogisms have five epistemic qualities: Demonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical, sophistical, or poetical. The argument is deemed certain and true if the author moves from the known to the unknown through demonstrative syllogism.

The second mode of verification, according to Ibn Sīnā, is *ḥads*. The term can be translated as intuition. Gutas prefers to translate the term as "guessing correctly" (2014, 88). Guessing correctly or intuition is detecting middle terms without recourse to an actual syllogism. It is divine affluence with which the mind conjuncts with the Active Intellect without any effort. To give an example: "When one sees that the moon is bright, according to its phases, only on the side that faces the sun, and his Mind tracks down a middle term by means of Guessing, namely, that the cause of its brightness comes from the sun" (Gutas 2014, 184). Grasping that the moon's brightness actually comes from the sun is still syllogistic, albeit instantly.

Having explored Gutas' position on the issue, I now continue with Ömer Türker (2019). Contrary to Gutas, Türker argues that Ibn Sīnā was critical of the idea that the self can represent or imitate the world through conjunction with Active Intellect absolutely. The self-sustained, extremely idealist philosophy of world-making argues that when actualized, the reason has the capacity to apprehend universals and their

efficient causes: the celestial reasons. That is to say, as we have seen in Fārābī, the reason abstracts sense data to the degree that it can apprehend universals without their instantiations in the particulars. Through abstraction, the reason arrives at a point where its self-intellectualization also includes the representation or imitation of the world to become self-sustained and universal (Türker, 2019, 68).

This potential exists in all human beings, but only real philosophers enjoy this state. Beginning from the First to the Active Intellect, the celestial reasons are self-sustained: When they appherend themselves, the reason and the reasoned become one. This is also what our material reasons aspire for. When actualized in conjunction with the Active Intellect, the reasoning derives "mental existence" (wujūd al-ḏihnī). This mental existence is *identical* to existence proper because their quiddity (māhīya) is the same. However, the rational self can never become self-sustained; it can never differentiate itself from the material world and its body absolutely (Türker, 2019, 75). Therefore the philosophical idea that conjunction with Active Intellect in perfection and thus becoming a self-sustained universal reason is not possible.

Türker argues that notwithstanding this dismal picture, Ibn Sīnā held that apart from rational means, it is possible to arrive at truth in a non-syllogistic manner. This method, however, is not what Gutas refers to as "correct guessing". To achieve this justification-independent truth, the philosopher should sharpen her knowledge of science to the utmost degree and achieve the highest possible abstraction. Moreover, alongside reasoning, the philosopher should aim to free herself from the burden of the material world as much as possible through cleansing from vices and adorning with virtues. The more the soul becomes a *polished mirror* (Zargar, 2017), the more it reflects its efficient causes; the celestial reasons and the First.

5.5. THE CRITIQUE OF DEMONSTRATION

Ibn Sīnā marks the beginning of a new era for the intellectual life of his time to the extent that scholars divide the lines of the history of philosophy as pre-Avicenna and post-Avicenna (Novaes and Read, 2016). The new era surely begins with the many controversies that busied thinkers for centuries[77]. For the purposes of this chapter, I

[77] Beginning with Ghazālī, it has become a tradition to write on the incoherence of philosophers (Türker, 2010). The later traditions of scholars find many "drastic" errors in the works of

only deal with the Sufi critique of the rational perspective. For instance, I do not discuss the debate between Illuminationism and Peripateticism instigated by al-Suhrawardī.

Fanārī characterizes the Sufi approach as the prevalence of *"meshūd*" (somehow divinely experienced and seen) against "*ma'qūl*" (reasoned)[78]. This does not mean that reasoning and demonstration are not sources of knowledge. On the contrary, the critique of reasoning here levies on the absolute authority of demonstration over experiential knowledge. Fanārī lists nine reasons why knowledge through reasoning and demonstration is limited. I will present those that are most relevant to the present discussion. The first reason he counts is the diversity of people. People have varying degrees of reasoning capacities; thus, knowledge varies. That is, knowledge depends on the capacities of the thinking subject. These capacities are dependent upon the inclinations of reasoners. Our inclinations in turn, are dependent upon our goals. These goals themselves are determined by our beliefs and habits. These beliefs and habits are relative to names and attributes of Allah which are determined by the capacities of people experiencing the manifestations. Although they are not subject to change in themselves, our capacities that accept them are relative to time, place, and other variables (Fanārī, 1955, 33).

The second reason why the discovery of truth is limited with mere reasoning is the fact that conflicting views are not able to refute each other rationally. The third reason is the bias of reasoners. People tend to distort the reasoning process. The fourth roots from the tool of reasoning. We reason with our particular thinking capacity which can only apprehend its like; i.e, particulars. Fifth reason results from the complexity of the intellectualized object. We can grasp objects in so far as they are surrounded by objects' own attributes. It is impossible to intellectualize objects in their simplicity. Sixt reason is a natural consequence of the fifth: Objects in their simplicity can not be properly described and defined. The art of demonstration, however, is built upon

philosophers. These include the claims that 1) God does not know particulars, 2) God is indifferent to being as it only causes the First Reason but not other levels of being. Some modern commentators are not happy with the generic quality of arguments against the philosophers (Kaya 2009). Indeed there seem to be many instances of straw-man fallacy. Luckily, we will only focus on the multiplex critique on reasoning and demonstration; a thoroughly established point of divergence.

[78] This is the subtitle of his commentary on Qunawī (al-Fanārī 1955)

descriptions and definitions. He argues that the philosophers also admit this last point. (al-Fanārī, 1955, 33-35).

The Sufi practice of verification seeks the highest possible level of certainty and relief from the burden of imitation as well as from the limits of rationality. Ibn Arabi devotes a section of his *Meccan Revelations* to the concept of realization. The 165. section of the book, "On Acquaintance of the Rank of Verification and Verifiers" begins with the claim that verification is an attribute of the verifier which does not yield to doubt (1999, 402). This small section consisting of a few pages, contains the gamut of the practice of verification turned into a separate scientific discipline by Fanārī. Building upon Arabi, he argues that:

> Discovery of truth is impossible unless from the special way [*wach al-khas*] in which the determinations and relational judgements *[hukm al-nusub*] caused by existence [*kawn*] are detached from the wise. This happens in the process of verifying 'I become his hearing and his seeing' (al-Fanārī, 1955, 35)[79]

This special relationship can be summarized as *the oneness of being* in all manifestations. Although there are different levels of being, there is no being other than God in reality.

The Sufi critique against a strictly rational approach to truth mostly focuses on metaphysics. According to Ghazālī, metaphysics is not demonstrative as philosophers claim it to be (Adanali, 1996, 55). Scholars like Ibn Khaldun follow suit. Although logic is the most esteemed methodology at hand, the Neoplatonic metaphysics exaggerates its usage:

> All the judgments of the mind are general ones, whereas the existentia of the outside world are individual in their substances. Perhaps, there is something in those substances that prevents conformity between the universal (judgments) of the mind and the individual (substances) of the outside world. At any rate, however, whatever (conformity) is attested by sensual perception has its proof in the fact that it is observable. (It does not have its proof) in (logical) arguments. Where, then, is the unequivocal character they find in (their arguments)? (1958, 698)

[79] In the sixth chapter I will discuss the methods of cleansing and adornment with which the Sufi aims to reach truth.

Although the sense perception and ideas of the reason might attest to something as true, the universal character the mind conceives might not be the case for the individual (*shahs*) beings.

To understand the oneness of being, it is a must that we know Being. The Arabic root of the word means (w.j.d) finding. Awareness and cognition are literal meanings (Aladdin, 2012, 3-5). Ahmet Avni Konuk states that wujud, according to the Sufi terminology, stands for a reality/truth "whose being is from itself and with itself" to the extent that "the remaining beings are from it and stand with it [*qaim*]" (Ibn Arabi, 1999, 4). This being has interminable, never-ending manifestations, also called the coming-downs (*tajalli*). Among these coming-downs, some fixed patterns to existence and knowledge become visible. The names of these coming-downs are: 1)Non-determination, 2)First-Determination, 3)Second-Determination, 4)Level of Souls, 5)Level of Imagination, 6) Level of Visible World, 7)Level of Perfect Human Being" (Ibn Arabi, 1999, 10).

In its non-determination, being does not accept any determinations. Therefore it is not possible to speculate on this level. It can not even properly be called "one". In its first determination, Being is named the one. This is not in the sense of the mathematical concept of one but as uniqueness (Ibn Arabi, 1999, 11). In the second determination, it is possible to attribute mathematical oneness to the being since, in this instance, all the possible beings somehow demand from their God what is required for their own being. Beings demand their essences from the divine being, and the divine attributes work through meeting the demand. The end product of meeting the demand of other beings is called *a'yân thâbita,* the fixed entities (Chittick, 2010, 12).

At the level of souls, the fixed entities gain souls. However, even at this level, there is no physical appearance. The entities that earn their souls know themselves, other souls, and their creator. It is the following level, the level of *mithal*, -also called the realm of imagination- where things earn physical appearance albeit imaginal (Ibn Arabi, 1999, 66). It is possible to witness beings belonging to this level even in our daily lives. The visible realm of us follows this level. The last level is the level of the perfect human being. This level is only potential unless the self realizes its capacities (Ibn Arabi, 1999, 67).

5.6. MULTIPLEXITY AND THE NORMS OF ARGUMENTATION

In his *'Ilm al-āfāḳ wa al-anfus*, Samarqandī (2020) argues that knowing God, the absolute source and cause of everything is incumbent upon every rational being (pp. 71-73). There are three ways to attain this knowledge: 1-Through what is revealed to the prophets; 2-Studying existents to the extent that one can ascertain their need for an omnipotent and omniscient creator; and finally, 3- The cleansing of the soul and abstaining from material desires. The latter two are what Ṭāshkubrīzāde has characterized as the rational and the experiential. The first way compliments the other two. Through the third way, the self acquires the virtues and the perceived distance between it and the God disappears (2020, 73).

Having elaborated on the multiplexity, it becomes visible that whereas the relevance, the logical and the dialectical norm-conformity is about the rational, the justification-dependent layer of truth. Admissibility, on the other hand, concerns the ethical, justification-independent layer of truth. Although one can have a limited sense of truth through relevance, it is ascertained with the experiential knowledge that is possible after virtue. The multiplex conception of truth also explains why the derailment from the procedure is named after argumentative vices. The rational and experiential layers of truth compliment each other and a flaw in one will impact the other. Moreover, it also explains why next to relevance, admissibility is regarded as foundational; to the extent that even when the rational requirements of product-based and process-based normativity is fulfilled, the full picture is not attained. Therefore they should be accompanied by agent-based norms.

We have studied the multiplex conception of truth and how it impacts Munāẓara. However, until now I have presented Munāẓara as a univocal field without any debates. However, with its centuries long history, Munāẓara also hosts many debates. I have located a number of debates in the primary literature. Note that I am only discussing a few of them. As the primary literature of the field lies primarily as manuscripts, many debates remain uncovered.

The first disagreement I located in the literature is on the definition of argumentation; is it reasoning or opposition? Samarqandī (2014, 500) had envisioned Munāẓara as an appendage to logic. Therefore he defines Munāẓara as reasoning. Later generations of

scholars, however, reject this definition with the idea that the primary character of argumentation is interpersonal opposition (Āmidī, 1900, 8). Interestingly Samarqandī himself criticizes his teacher al-Nasafī for his definition of argumentation as reasoning (naẓar)[80]. Accordingly not all discussions are argumentation. Argumentation exists when there is a difference of opinion. Otherwise the discussion amounts to thinking-together (*mufākara*).

To understand why the genus of argumentation is put as "reasoning", it is important to remember that reasoning is ambivalent. Reasoning does not merely refer to the act of rational self, it is also an attribute of the agent. As much as "quarreling" is an attribute of the quarreling agent, reasoning -read it as arguing here, is thought to be an attribute of the arguer. Notwithstanding its ambivalence that enriches our understanding of the relationship between the act and the agent, this definition misses the oppositional context. This debate reminds of the contemporary controversy on the monological or dialogical definition of argumentation. However, so far, I could not locate any discussion elaborating on the significance and impact of defining argumentation reasoning or opposition between parties in the Munāẓara literature.

There might be a reason why Munāẓara scholars do not develop upon the points of divergence between reasoning and opposition. This reason becomes visible in another debate on the finitidute of argumentation. Initiated by Samarqandī, the debate on the finitude of argumentation is actually a hypothetical scenario: Whenever the claimant provides an argument, the respondent responds with objection. Imagine that this exchange continues ad infinitum. For Samarqandi the exchange ad infinitum translates into the defeat of the claimant. As we had seen in the previous chapter, both reasoning and argumentation is in fact an attempt to find the *cause* that works as the middle term in between two premises. Whenever the respondent asks "Why?", the claimant goes "Because..". Samarqandī holds that if a claim demands an infinite number of steps in the form of "becauses", it amounts to infinite regress and infinite regress from the side of cause (*min ṭaraf al-mabda'*) is both impossible and absurd (al-Samarqandī, 1934, 127).

[80] Argumentation is defined as reasoning with insight (baṣīra). At the time of writing, I could not locate any comments or elaborations on insight and its meaning in the context of argumentation.

A 16th century commentator of Samarqandī, Shirwānī notes that another commentator of Samarqandī has a problem with how he discusses the finititude argument (Güney, 2010, 115). The commentator -whom I could not identify,- questions the possibility of an ad infinitum exchange resting on "why&because". Accordingly this exchange is possible only when the respondent limits her responses with objections or refutations. How come a counter-argument from the claimant would enable an infinite regress of "because"s?

To defend Samarqandī, the anonymous commentator provides an explanation. The counter-arguments of the respondent enables the claimant to furnish arguments against the counter-argument. If this is the case, then the claimant and her claim actually needs the responses from the side of the respondent; as thanks to these responses the claimant can perform further her moves. The commentator adds that if the exchange between parties is inevitable, this would mean that it serves a cause for the claim (Güney, 2010, 115).

Notice that the anonymous commentator deviates from the classical epistemology of cause and effect. The cause is always ontologically prior to the effect. This is where Shirwānī establishes his position on the debate. The exchange between parties can not serve as causes or grounds for the claim neither ontologically nor epistemologically. If it served as an ontological cause, we would be forced to hold that the demonstrandum (*madlūl*) depends on that exchange. The exchange can not count as an epistemological cause either. If it was to be regarded as the epistemological cause, the argument's assent would have to follow from it (Güney 2010, 116).

The debate between Shirwānī and the anonymous commentator signals possible deviations from the classical epistemology, what I have so far referred to as analytics or product-based norms. Whereas Shirwānī provides the classical idea of arguments or the causes taken as abstract objects with ontological and epistemological priority, the commentator seems to question the classical conception of causes and extends it with a dialogical take on argumentation. Indeed, if the exchange between parties is necessary for a full exposition on the issue, is it not possible to argue that the exchange serves as some kind of cause? However this would mean a completely different take on causation, thus epistemology and ontology. This new take would make the debate on the definition of argumentation as reasoning or opposition meaningful as well.

Taken as opposition, one could argue that argumentation has its own foundation of causes, that does not depend on the ontological or epistemological priority of causes.

Another debate that plays on the tension between different norms is about the counter-arguments against a counter-argument: Is the claimant allowed to respond with a counter-argument to the counter-argument of the respondent? According to Samarqandī, it is futile (Pehlivan and Çelik, 2018, 436). The move is futile as this second argument for the claim will not push back against the respondent's counter-argument. Scholars such as Mullā Ḥanafī and Jurjanī, on the other hand, argues that the second counter-argument might benefit the claimant as it might be more powerful than her initial argument for the claim (Mullā Ḥanafī, 2014, 40; al-Jaunpūrī 2006, pp.80-81). Nevertheless, an argument's power is not important when we consider the product-based norm that states there can not be two opposing arguments for the claim. The second argument will still be hampered by the claimant's counter-argument. It is not obvious, however, if Samarqandī's position arguing for the futility of the move addresses the analysis or the practice of argumentation. Does he mean that the move should not be practiced? Or does he actually claim that the second counter-argument should not be taken into account when analyzing an exchange between parties? Further elaboration is needed for a definitive answer. Nevertheless here we can feel the tension between a product-based norm and a process-based one.

Another debate in the primary literature showcasing the interplay between different norms is about objecting to incontrovertible premises. Jurjanī argues that the respondent does not have to adhere to any school. This means that she might act as a Sophist to the extent that she might object to incontrovertible premises. He adds that while the *philosophers* render objecting to incontrovertible premises as *arrogance*, they do not (al-Jaunpūrī, 2006, 59). Here we can see another expression of the tension between relevance and admissibility. This is because the fact that for philosophers incontrovertible premises are in fact are given by the Active Intellect itself (al-Fārābī, 2013, 89). Objecting these incontrovertible premises creates not only epistemological problems but ontological problems as well. Notice that, the debate here is not about the relevance of objecting to incontrovertible premises; but the characterization of the move after a vice of character. The response, when faced with an objection to an incontrovertible premise, might just be answering with an admonishment stating that

the premise is incontrovertible. The incontrovertibility of the premise stands as a metaphorical counter-argument (al-Jaunpūrī, 2006, 59-60).

Another disagreement that showcases the tension between different norms concern the usurpation: Is it admissible or not? Scholars such as Gelenbevī argue that if the normative goal of argumentation is observed, usurpation is admissible (Gelenbevī, 1934, 56-57). That is, he argues that relevance of the move also makes it admissible. However this position is not widespread in the literature. The counter-position argues that the move is not admissible since it disrupts the order. The parties should not change roles: The claimant should defend and the respondent should criticize. A counter-argument levied against the argument building upon the disruption of discussion is provided by Mullā Ḥanafī. He questions the norm and asks why it is not applicable in the cases of refutation and counter-arguments? Since with these moves the roles also change. The answer is that these two moves are necessary for the manifestation of truth, while the usurpation;- i.e. providing arguments for a counter-argument,- can wait (Mullā Ḥanafī, 2014, 73).

The final disagreement I will discuss concerns performing a counter-argument before an objection and refutation. Opting for the conventional sequencing of respondent's moves as objection, refutation and counter-argument, Ahmet Cevdet Paşa argues that performing a counter-argument before exhausting the later two would amount to hastiness (1998, 112). However this conventional sequencing is also debated. Next to the conventional sequencing defended by figures such as Samarqandī (1934, pp.126-127) and Jurjanī (al-Jaunpūrī, 2006, pp.76-77), there exists two different proposals for the sequencing of respondent's moves. Among the two, Sāçaqlizāde's proposal interests us here. He argues that the order should proceed as an *objection*, *counter-argument* and *refutation* (al-Āmidī, 1900, 60). Clearly he does not consider performing a counter-argument before the refutation problematic, let alone characterizing it after a vice of character.

5.7. CONCLUSION

According to pragma-dialecticians, a research program of argumentation has to account for five components; Philosophical, theoretical, analytical, empirical, and practical (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2003, pp. 11-41). These components lead to

different renderings of argumentation that show themselves in differences in descriptive-normative dimensions of argumentation. In the philosophical component, an argumentation theory decides on which philosophy of reasonableness will be preferred in coming up with a theory of argumentation. A geometric philosophy of reasonableness will claim that truth exists independently of the subject and it is demonstrable. The geometric reasonableness leads to a strictly logical, -and even formal,- theory of argumentation. An antropo-relativistic philosophy of reasonableness will claim that instead of claiming an objective reality, it is needed to study how people persuade each other. That is to say, even if there exists the truth, it should be sought in different intersubjective processes. The antropo-relativistic reasonableness leads to a rhetorical theory of argumentation.

When it comes to Munāẓara, we observe that although each scholar agrees on the normative goal; i.e. the manifestation of truth, they disagree on certain fundamental issues such as the admissibility of objecting to an incontrovertible premise or usurpation. Both sides of the debate argue that their preference on the issue is governed by the general normative goal: Manifestation of truth. For instance, according to Gelenbevī usurpation is admissible when this move serves to the manifestation of truth. If we consider components of an argumentation research program (i.e., the philosophical, the theoretical, and the analytical), it becomes visible that the disagreements I listed are analytical issues. For instance, Gelenbevī and other scholars who argue for the legitimacy of usurpation do not call for a rhetorical or logical argumentation. They still opt for a procedural theory of argumentation (Munāẓara), albeit with different takes on the performance or the analysis of argumentation. The present chapter showed that, despite their different takes on applicable norms in a certain move, the Munāẓara scholars posit relevance and admissibility as the criteria of argumentation. I argued that the interaction between product-based, process-based and agent-based norms are due to the multiplex approach to truth. Building upon foundational figures such as Ibn Sīnā, Samarqandī, and Ṭāshkubrīzāde I elaborated on the difference between justification-dependent and justification-independent layers of truth; i.e., the rational and the experiental. I showed how these two layers correspond to relevance and admissibility criteria. Consequently I detailed a number of disagreements in the Munāẓara literature and showed how opting for different norms concerning a particular move gives rise to these debates.

In the present chapter I elaborated on how the multiplex approach shapes Munāẓara. However the multiplex approach to truth is actually informed by a multi-layered conception of self. The next chapter deals with the conception of self.

CHAPTER VI: ARGUMENTATION, MULTIPLEXITY AND SELF: HOW TO ARGUE VIRTUOUSLY

6. 0. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will elaborate on how the concept of self informs the multiplex conception of truth. Our conception of truth, in turn, determines our philosophy of reasonableness. In the case of Munāẓara, the philosophy of reasonableness admits two different layers of truth and self. In the first layer, truth is justification-dependent; and is attained by argumentation. In the second layer, truth is justification-independent, attained by self's transformation from vice to virtue. In the previous chapter, I investigated how the multiplex truth requires a self that constantly checks her actions and thoughts to avoid biases or vices. In this chapter, I begin by reiterating the agent-driven character of Munāẓara. Then, I show how with ādāb, Munāẓara aims to differentiate between attributes of the agents: quarreling or arguing proper (al-Āmidī, 1900, 8). Finally, I argue that by postulating a multi-layered conception of self, the multiplex approach understands virtue as a means of attaining perfection (*kamāl*). Perfection requires the cleansing of the agent from vices and adorning her with virtues.

The chapter has two subsections. As in the previous chapter, I first discuss the self, virtue, and perfection according to Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā as representatives of Muslim philosophers. I show how virtue transforms the agent's capacities and allows the rational soul to function properly (al-Fārābī, 1998, 35). Then I elaborate on Ibn Sīnā's position on self particularly. As in the previous chapter, his position seems ambiguous: Whereas scholars such as Wisnowsky (2003), Black (2008), Özturan (2019), and Kaya (2014) argue that his position on the self and virtue has drastically differed from Aristotelianism, scholars such as Fakhry (1991) and Adamson (2014) argue that he remains loyal to the Aristotelian tradition. Consequently, I elaborate on the multiplex approach where the self's transformation from viciousness to virtue, explained in terms of different levels of the self, also transforms the object of sensation and reasoning. The universe starts to be understood as a book that requires certain semiotics. A rose,

for instance, is viewed not merely through material cause and effect relationship but also as a locus (maẓhar) of attributes such as beauty and grace (Şentürk, 2017, 159).

In the second subsection, I draft a Munāẓara argument analysis framework. I show how the product, process, and agent can be analyzed in three steps. The first step checks whether a certain move is *relevant*. The second step checks if the move is also *admissible*. The third step checks the agent. In this stage, the agents and their actions are interconnected through their motivation: quarreling, power-flexing, or arguing. However, checking the motivation of the agent over one single argument or a single process of argumentation is not only insufficient but also dangerous. For, the violation of, or conformity with, the procedure does not directly translate into the state of mind. Virtue is relational and contextual. Nevertheless, the relationship between the agent and the motivation can be *overt* or *covert*. Therefore, the analyst should gather contextual data on the agents: Do they have a history of subjugation, usurpation, hastiness, and arrogance? Is it possible to ascertain that irrelevant and inadmissible moves are committed on purpose? Does the social or institutional context of argumentation favor one party over another as in the case of argumentation in state-governed media between the government and the opposition or argumentation between an abusive husband and his partner? If the gathering of contextual data can answer these questions, then the agent's motivation and acts are regarded *overt*. On the other hand, if the contextual data does not yield a conclusive outcome, the analyst refrains from talking about the character. Because in such cases, the relationship between the agent's motivation and her actions is *covert*.

6.1. PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS

Muslims meet the idea that the self should be perfected. The main difference, however, is rooted in the consequence of self-perfection (Sviri, 2002, 196). While for the regular Muslim, the reward of self-perfection is to be attained in the afterlife, the scholars of multiplexity claim that the consequence of self-perfection is also to be expected in this life. While self and self-perfection are a hot topic for successive traditions, Black claims that self-perfection is somewhat secondary to Aristotle. For Aristotle, without its proper perfection, the mind is only a capacity: "Thus that in the soul which is called mind ... is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing" (Black, 2008, 63).

The actualization of the mind is preconditioned for the process of reasoning to start. Therefore self-conception in Aristotle is related to the object of reasoning. When the mind starts reasoning about other objects, through this very act, i.e., the reasoning about reasoning, self-conception commences: "Thought is itself thinkable in exactly the same way as its objects are"[81] (Black, 2008, 63). That is why she claims that Ibn Sīnā diverts from the Aristotelian conception of the self. While in Aristotle, self-knowledge comes second only after reasoning the other things, Ibn Sīnā employs a two-dimensional concept of the self. Black calls the first instance of self "primitive self awareness". The second is named as "the awareness of awareness" (Black, 2008, 64). The latter follows the neo-Platonic theory of the mind, where perfection is achieved only after the secondary intelligibles are apprehended.

Avicenna's two-dimensional self-conception is explained in his famous thought experiment, the "Flying Man". The experiment demands its readers to think of a human being floating in non-gravitational space. The human being does not have any access to her internal or external senses (Tiryaki, 2020, 8). Presuming such a condition is possible, Ibn Sīnā wants us to reflect if the flying man will be conscious of himself or not? Accordingly even in such a condition, the flying man will be conscious of himself:

> Our awareness of ourselves is our very existence [...] Self-awareness is natural (*gharīzah*) to the self, for it is its existence itself, so there is no need of anything external by which we perceive the self. Rather, the self is that by which we perceive the self. (Black, 2008, 67)

All other forms of awareness, whether internal or external, is possible only after a primitive self-awareness is granted.

Why, according to Ibn Sīnā, do we need to assert this obscure being who is both the subject and object of itself, i.e., whose awareness *it is*? This diversion from Aristotele amounts to the Neoplatonic philosophy of separate intellects (Black, 2008, 86): In the fifth chapter we have seen that, Neo-Platonism is built upon emanation theory. The First reasons itself and causes a series of separate intellects whose characteristic is pure intellection of their Principles, i.e., The First and themselves. This process continues until the tenth intellect, named the Active Intellect. When our sublunar material

[81] Please refer to the third chapter for a critique of naive objectivity and subjectivity.

intellect conjuncts with the Active Intellect, it becomes actualized. When actualized, the material intellect transforms into the acquired intellect (al-Fārābī, 2013, 21). The acquired intellect earns the capacity to reason forms without the sensation of objects themselves (al-Fārābī, 1998, 32).

In one of his booklets on self, Ibn Sīnā elaborates on the issue. He begins by discussing two main positions. The first asserts that the self is the body itself, for the latter, it is separate from the body:

> Some have thought that self is neither a material body nor a corporeal entity but a spiritual substance that emanated into this structure and this spiritual substance gives life to the body, and uses it as a vehicle for acquisition of sciences and cognition until it becomes perfect and recognizes its Lord and becomes acquainted with the truth of his Creation. The substance is then prepared to return to his presence. (Mokhtar, 1994, 61)[82]

Ibn Sīnā asserts that the self is the subject predicated. He denies that the self is the body and details the views of those who claim that the self is not the body, matter, or material. Instead, the self is a spiritual substance emanated to the body through which acquaintance and knowledge are gained. Through knowledge and acquaintance, the self starts to know its creater and achieves perfection. Accordingly, Fakhry claims Ibn Sīnā's position is a "philosophical mysticism" (Fakhry, 1971, 206) different from other prevailing forms of mysticism.

Before delving into the matter of examining the different positions on "perfection", and mysticism, I will detail the philosophical framework of self which defines the goal of human flourishing as the perfection of the reason (Ibn Sīnā, 2008, 1-3), leading to the perfection of the human soul (al-Fārābī, 1938, 20). I will first elaborate on how "perfection" became the goal of human flourishing throughout the ages in the Aristotelian tradition. Then I will continue with the debates around what perfection might mean.

In the secondary literature, Ibn Sīnā is not credited with a genuine theory of ethics. That is, allegedly, he remains loyal to the general framework rationalistic approach of Muslim philosophers. However, this is misleading. Examining his influence on the later generations, it becomes clear that Ibn Sīnā's twofold self-conception and its

[82] I have slightly modified Mokhtar's translation.

ability of either justification-dependent or justification-independent attainment of truth had an enormous impact. Nevertheless, Ibn Sīnā does not detail these different layers. To elaborate on these layers, I will return to Sufi scholars and discuss the *marātib al-nafs*, the multiplex self (Şentürk et al., 2020, 113).

The intellectual journey of the term perfection begins with Aristotle's invention of the term "*entelechie*". Translated as "actuality", the word is used to "define the soul (*psukhe*) as well as to define change (*kinesis*)" (Wisnovsky, 2003, 25). Aristotle claims the soul is the first *entelechie* of a natural instrumental body possessing life potentially. Before entelechie, the body is merely matter, but we can start to talk about the self when this matter is actualized. However, as Aristotle used the term in two different contexts -soul and change- it became ambiguous. Whereas modern commentators are not interested in finding common ground where the actuality of change and soul lays concurrently, classical commentators of Aristotle tried to find a usage of entelechie applicable both to the change and the soul (Wisnovsky, 2003, 26). It is argued that while in the first actuality, the entelechie "refers to the capability to perform some function, in the latter, it refers to the active exercise of that capability" (Wisnovsky 2003, 8).

The endeavor to find common ground in the usage of actuality, Wisnosky argues, ends up finding new concepts the meaning of which are transferred to actuality. Aphrodisias comes up with completeness. Themistius adds to the semantic range of completeness a new concept: endness. With these two concepts, the meaning of actuality shifts toward performing an end. Bequeathing the concept of endness from the commentators, Neoplatonic philosophers like Ammonius understood endless as "perfection, to refer in a strict sense to superiority in the cosmic hierarchy" (Wisnovsky, 2003, 5). In this hierarchical order, every being desires the position of its superior and aspires towards it: "The Neoplatonists used the perfect to refer to the efficient cause of the existence (*to einai*) each thing received from above in the downward procession (*proodos*) of being" (Wisnovsky, 2003, 5). This passage gives an idea of how Ibn Sīnā understood the soul's perfection as its ability to know *the way* God and celestial intellects know. When perfected, the rational soul can receive knowledge from higher realms. Furthermore, Fārābī claims that when the perfection is

achieved, the rational soul has the ability to reason self-sufficiently, now being similar to higher intellects (al-Fārābī, 1998, 35)[83].

As the perfection of the human soul resides in its actual intellectualization of the intelligibles, the more perfected this capability, the more its well-being is achieved. The soul is understood as a final cause transcending its effect, i.e., the body. While Wisnowsky claims that for Aristotle the soul was not separate from the body, for the Neo-Platonists the idea that the soul is a spiritual substance was more than welcomed (Wisnovsky 2003, 6). With the help of the history of Aristotelian exegesis, the first actuality and the second actuality become to be understood as "necessary for being" and "necessary for well-being", echoing the Greek Neo-Platonists:

> My being as rational as I can be consists simply in my thinking about universal intelligibles as much as I can; and by thinking about the universal intelligibles as much as I can, I revert upwards to the higher level of the Active Intellect, which is thinking about universal intelligibles all the time. (Wisnovsky 2003, 11)

Wisnowsky argues Ibn Sīnā was able to finish the project of Ammonian synthesis, reconciling Aristotle with Plato. It was how Ibn Sīnā was able to designate the human soul as a separate substance, diverting from Aristotelianism and getting closer to Platonism (Wisnovsky, 2003, 266). This last claim is also the root of a philosophical debate between Ibn Sīnā scholars we had discussed in the previous chapter: Is Ibn Sīnā an intellectualist like Aristoteles, or is he an advocate of Platonic mysticism? Does the process of conjunction with the Active Intellect amount to a substantial experiential change in the human soul, an experience peculiar to those who achieved it (Fakhry 1991, 123)?

We have seen in the previous chapter that -claiming he is a devotee of Aristotelian rationalism- Gutas ardently denies any attribution of "experientality" to Ibn Sīnā. In contrast, Nasr interprets the former differently (Gutas, 2014, 37). Fakhry, on the other hand, claims that Ibn Sīnā was a philosophical mystic finding a middle way between Platonian practical mysticism and Aristotelian intellectualism (Fakhry, 1991, 213). Nevertheless, the conjunction achieved in the philosophy of self remains a rational, philosophical one: The soul, in fact, becomes through "conjunction" with this intellect

[83] This is where Ibn Sīnā and Fārābī depart. According to Türker, Ibn Sina does not think self-sufficient, world-making of material reasons are possible in our sublunar world.

a replica of the intelligible world and achieves that "perfection" proper to it as a citizen of that world (Fakhry, 1991, 210) Harvesting happiness, in conjunction with the Active Intellect is the end of the many hardships of intellectual life. Staying on the course of Aristotelian intellectualism, Ibn Rushd claims that the conjunction is "no other than apprehending something entirely immaterial in a manner analogous to sensation" (Fakhry, 1971, 202). With the conjunction, the self starts to apprehend itself the way higher intellects apprehend themselves. However, in some of his writings, Ibn Sīnā likens the conjunction to the experiential ideals: "To love the absolute good instinctively [...] and the highest degree of approximation to it is to receive its manifestation truly; I mean, in the most perfect way possible, and this is what the Sufis call unification" (Fackenheim,1945, 225). These remarks leave secondary literature in utter confusion.

Following Black, we had earlier distinguished between two kinds of perfection according to Ibn Sīnā: primitive self-awareness and the awareness of the awareness (Black, 2008, 71). While primitive self-awareness is thought to be "what is necessary for being", the awareness of awareness is "necessary for well-being", i.e., perfection. In that case, self-awareness achieved by the conjunction is the one necessary for soul's wellbeing. The role of ethics and practical wisdom in this endeavor is to complement the theoretical intellect.

As their conception perfection seems to vary, their approach to virtue differs among the Muslim philosophers. The primary point of rapture lies in how much of virtue; thus, practical wisdom depends upon theoretical considerations. In other words, to what extent theoretical is their conception of ethics? While Fārābī tends to claim that even the principles of practical wisdom are deduced as universal premises just as the principles of theoretical wisdom are (al-Fārābī, 1998, 73), Ibn Sīnā's position is ambiguous (Black 1996, 460). I will start with Fārābī and then continue with Ibn Sīnā. When it comes to him, the secondary literature presents two options: According to the first, he does not dominate the philosophical discussion on ethics (Adamson 2014, 114), and he is satisfied with repeating the old philosophical repertoire (Fakhry, 1991, 85). According to the second position, on the other hand, as we have seen in the examples of Black and Wisnowsky, he diverts from Aristotelian tradition and initiates a new discussion. I will argue that this new discussion is related to the multiplex conception of self.

Aristotle divides reason into two: Theoretical and practical. Virtue ethics is in the realm of practical reason. The principles of virtue ethics do not depend upon any authority, i.e., God or celestial intellects (Black 1996, 451). Fārābī, on the other hand, does not seem to be happy with the practicality of virtue. He tries to develop a theory in which even practical philosophy will take its principles from the theoretical faculty. Theoretical wisdom encompasses apprehending the One "from which the rest of existents derive virtue and perfection" (Black, 1996, 455). Happiness also consists of applying the universal principles one grasps when the conjunction is actualized. As God is happy with self-apprehension and as the whole cosmic hierarchy is dependent upon God's self-apprehension, the happiness of human beings is the knowledge of universals with which they are perfected. This perfection allows self-subsisting intellectualization without taking the content and form of particular objects into account. The theoretical reason dominates virtuous life: "Practical deliberation concerns the particulars, the universals of which is grasped by the theoretical intellect" (Black 1996, 456). In this sense, there are two types of practicals: 1-particular practicals obtained from sense experience and 2- universal practical premises[84]. Acquired from Active Intellect, the latter gives the universal premises to the practical intellect to be instantiated in particular cases. Happiness consists of contemplation. As the theoretical intellect grasps that the conjunction with the Active Intellect is the ultimate aim of perfection, the appetitive soul desires it (al-Fārābī, 1998, 52).

As for Ibn Sīnā, there is a debate over his idea of practical wisdom. Özturan and Kaya claim he gives full credit to the religious authority of the prophet (Kaya, 2014; Özturan, 2019). Their sound arguments notwithstanding, this claim seems unorthodox for many Ibn Sīnā scholars, such as Gutas (2004), favoring a more secular reading of him. Noting that Ibn Sīnā does not mention any universal principles taken from the Active Intellect in the domain of practical reasoning, Black claims the difference between Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā might be a difference of tone. This is because there is a "universalizing influence of the theoretical intellect" (Black, 1996, 460) to the extent that dialectic and rhetoric, which are thought to be matters of practical philosophy in modern argumentation literature, are merely seen as ways of expressing the wisdom, not the ways to reach it. Ibn Sīnā's practical philosophy gives the idea that his ethics

[84] Fārābī argues that human beings need four kinds of virtues for happiness; theoretical virtues, practical virtues, moral virtues and practical techniques. (al-Fārābī, 1995, 25)

are derivative of his theoretical philosophy (Black, 1996, 460). Nevertheless, he also acknowledges that "the testimony of the revealed law" (Black, 1996, 460) also plays a role.

Having laid down general remarks on the ethics of Muslim philosophers based on their conception of self and its perfection, I will now elaborate on the details of practical life. Muslim philosophers; Ibn Rushd and Brethren of Purity included developed a theory of ethics in which Platonic, Aristotelian and Galenic theories are merged. The Galenic part comes from the idea that the soul, like the body, can be healed of diseases. The physician[85] is the doctor of the body, as well as of the soul (Adamson, 2014, 111). She prescribes certain diets to cure diseases, whether physical or psychological. This idea of offering some kind of therapy will find many applicants and a larger audience among Muslims (Arıcı, 2016). Accordingly, whether psychological or physical, it is the four humors that cause the well-being or the illness.

Just as the sublunar world the body is composed of four elements: Earth, water, fire and air.

> These four natures, within the human body, interact and oppose one another. For the sake of health and even life itself, the natures must achieve a balance appropriate to that individual's age, sex, place of birth, occupation, and surroundings, although each of these factors might also adversely affect the balance. (Zargar, 2017, 41)

The job of a physician, a doctor of the body and the soul, is to balance out the four humours that originate with four natures. So she orders- for instance- a dry diet or wet one to balance the humouric complexion.

Originated from four elements and four humours, human beings have different souls or faculties of the soul. These are called the vegetative soul (*al-nafs al-nabātiyya*), animal soul (*al-nafs al-haywāniyya*), and the rational soul (*al-nafs al-nātiqa*). All the three souls have their peculiar "inclinations and desires, virtues and vices" (Zargar 2017,42). The vegetative soul is responsible for the growth of the body. The animal soul is responsible for sensation and movement. The last one, the rational soul, is

[85] The physicians, called *al-hukama*, are often confused with al-felasifa, the philosophers. While Galenic medicine was distinct from the philosophy of philosophers, the fact that Ibn Sīnā was both a philosopher and physician explains why these two distinct approaches are confused. For more information on the subject, see: (Hall, 2004).

responsible for intellectual duties. The practical intellect governs the body to prepare the self for achieving theoretical perfection. It governs the humours and ideally balances them in a manner that allows the body not to be disrupted by the remaining souls:

> The forces of the body and those of the practical intellect contest for influence over the soul; one side will end up being active and dominant, while the other side will end up being passive and receptive. The decisions one makes over time, in favoring one side or the other, leave certain propensities in the soul. If those propensities favor the practical intellect, so that the practical intellect is active and the body is passive, then those propensities are virtues, or virtuous character traits (al-akhlāq al-fadīliyya) (Zargar 2017 58,)

On the contrary, if the body enjoys dominance over the practical intellect, it is claimed that the self acts viciously. Therefore, the spiritual physician must eliminate the excessive behavior of one faculty by empowering another.

Peter Adamson claims that the obscurity of the relationship between practical intellect and theoretical intellect is bequeathed from Aristotle. While Fārābī tries to solve the problem by asserting universal principles of the practical intellect, Ibn Sīnā is not bothered. His approach seems to prefer theoretical excellence. That is why he "does not dominate the discussion of ethics as he dominates the other fields of inquiry" (Adamson 2014, 114). According to the position that holds the absence of ingenuity in Avicennean psychology, the discussion of ethics, thus the self, is derivative of theoretical intellect and wisdom. The theoretical intellect becomes perfect when the self achieves acquired intellect, i.e., *al-ʿaql al-mustafād* (al-Fārābī, 1938, 20-21). In this endeavor, the practical intellect's role is to serve the theoretical intellect. It governs the desires and inclinations of the body.

Now I can present a brief account of virtue according to Muslim philosophers. It will be seen that the account follows the Platonic scheme of cardinal virtues and the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean. There are three principal virtues with their subdivisions. When the said three is mastered, the fourth, justice arises. These virtues are regarded to be the perfection of each faculty residing on the soul: "The principal virtues are then given as temperance, courage, and wisdom, corresponding to the three powers of the soul, the concupiscent, the irascible and the rational respectively"

(Fakhry 1991, 86[86]). Temperance, the virtue of the animal soul or faculty, is defined as "curbing the passions by subordinating the concupiscent power to the rational" (Fakhry, 1991, 89). This virtue frees the self from dealing with redundancy. Wisdom consists in busying oneself with the matters of the intelligible and divine world. The principle virtues are then subdivided as such:

> The subdivisions of temperance, or the virtue of the concupiscent power, are munificence and contentment; those of courage, the virtue of the irascible, are steadfastness, patience, generosity, forgiveness, pardon, broad-mindedness, moral stamina, and keeping confidences; those of wisdom, the virtue of the rational, are eloquence, keenness, sagacity, firmness, truthfulness, loyalty, friendliness, mercifulness, modesty, magnanimity, promise-keeping and humility (Fakhry, 1991,86)

At first sight, Fakhry's claim that Ibn Sīnā's take on the matters of ethics is "almost trivial" (Fakhry, 1991, 85) is undeniable. Even his short booklet on ethics opens with the assertion that, the duty incumbent upon self is to perfect theoretical capacities achieved by mastering the sciences listed in books (Ibn Sīnā, 1900, 1). At this point, it is important to remember the observation of Gutas on the fact that the Aristotelian canon gains an ontological dimension rather than merely an epistemological concern (Gutas, 2014,149). It might well be the case that, -as Özturan (2009) and Kaya (2004) claim,- Ibn Sīnā preferred to stay under the shadow of prophetic legislation[87]. However, remembering Ömer Türker's (2019) argument regarding the multiplexity of truth and self in Ibn Sīnā's philosophy and the fact that this approach is preserved in later generations of scholars such as Samarqandī elaborated in the previous chapter, we can argue for the opposite. Although Ibn Sīnā highlights the importance of theoretical wisdom for the self, he does not diminish every aspect of life to it. The awaited conjunction with the Active Intellect occurs only in a limited sense, and thus the perfection of the self and its well-being is impaired. Nevertheless, the rational soul

[86] It is argued that although there does not exist cardinal virtues in Fārābī, the philosopher seems to hold that the attributes of the One are the cardinal virtues to be assumed by the self (Türker and Aksu, 2018).

[87] In a workshop held in 2005, Halil İbrahim Üçer argues that Ibn Sīnā's theory of complexion and therefore ethics is different than other Neoplatonic and Muslim commentators of Aristotle. See: (accessed: 20 June 2022) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h2MxY3RJFz0&t=3203s

knows not only through conjunction or intellection. Next to the rational layer of soul and truth is an experiential layer.

6.2. SELF AND ETHICS IN MULTIPLEXITY

For the multiplex approach, when the self goes through a series of stages, beginning with the commanding self to the tranquil self, the objects of sensation and reasoning go through a transformation. The universe becomes to be understood as a book that signifies multi-layered meanings. For instance, a material object, the rose, is not only viewed due to the material cause-effect relationship. In addition to the material cause and effect relationship, a new dimension is added: It now becomes the locus (*maẓhar*) of attributes such as beauty and grace. In this subsection, I will first discuss self according to multiplexity. Then I will discuss how through purification (*taṣfiya*), the self goes through certain stages to attain tranquility.

Self is defined as a "vaporous substance that bears the faculty of life, love, and volitional movement" (Er, 2010, 175). Before its relationship with the body starts, the self is the soul (*al-ruh*). It is claimed that the soul is in the province of God, having no other knowledge except that of God. With the interaction, it starts to learn about other beings, and its knowledge of God diminishes. Sleep, death, and daydreaming result from the soul's interaction with the body. If the soul shines both inwardly and outwardly, the self is awake. If the soul shines inwardly without shining outwardly, sleep is produced. If the soul does not shine either inwardly or outwardly, the result is death (Er, 2010, 185). Apart from these medical and ontological usages, the self is also regarded as the source of deplorable and vicious acts (Sviri, 2002). Therefore, its cleansing (*taṣfiya*) and adornment (*tazkīya*) are prerequisites.

The constant striving (*mujāhadah*) is mostly explained in the seven stages of cleansing and adornment (Er, 2010, 186). The striving, in turn, is practiced and glossed upon by the Sufis, producing the science of Sufism. It is "a science with which the state of the self is known in terms of its reputable and deplorable actions" (Er, 2010, 164). Its subject matter is the cleansing and adornment of the heart. With the purification of the heart, the self can experience matters (*'umūr*) that are not open to others (Er, 2010, 164). It is claimed to be the most important science as the perfection of the human being brings her closer to God (Er, 2010, 164). Although I will present a small sketch

of the striving in four stages, numerous manuscripts even detail the different elements one might expect during her journey in seven or more stages (Sarioğlu, 2017).

In its first stage, the nafs is called "*ammāra*", i.e., commanding. This self is immersed in daily life. In this stage, the self is the source of all deplorable qualities such as egoism, arrogance, grandeur, and wrath, corresponding to the argumentative vices we have seen in the previous chapters. In its second stage, the self is called "*lawwāma*", regretful. It is sometimes freed from the deplorable qualities, sometimes not. It is the source of constant remorse because of the deplorable actions and the resentment that comes after. The regretful self has a vague idea about its relation to being in general, albeit insufficient. In its third stage, the self is inspired by the knowledge of being. Actions that cause regret diminishes. Humility, patience, generosity, gratitude, and "bearing the burdens of others" (Er, 2010, 186) become its character. The fourth stage, called the tranquil self, is characterized by the immersion in the presence of God: "In speaking with people, his heart is far removed, due to his fierce attachment to the Truth" (Er, 2010, 186). The tranquil self is the initial stage where the self starts to experience actual gnosis.

The idea that the world has multiplex meanings even has its etymological roots for the Muslims: "The Muslim thinkers perceived the world as *'ālam*, which literally means 'sign'.The *'ālam* is defined as everything other than God, and thus stands as a sign for His existence, providence, knowledge, and power" (Şentürk, 2017, 159). In that sense, nature is viewed to be the book, the text of which is "both one and many" (Şentürk, 2017, 161). Therefore, the perfection that comes with ethics is a process where the multiplex character of nature is grasped. Without the perfection with which nature becomes a book that signifies multiple layers, the human being might be considered in the "prison of nature" (Şentürk, 2017, 164). The liberation from the prison of nature is possible through "acquiring good qualities" (Şentürk 2017, 164). With the attainment of tranquility and experiencing fierce attachment to Truth, the self starts to view things in a multiplex manner. This experience is not syllogical. It is justification-independent.

We have seen that virtue is viewed as a *means* of achieving human flourishing. In this, Muslim scholars are not alone. Aristotle himself had developed a theory of ethics in which virtues serve the ultimate purpose, eudaimonia (Duignan, 2020). Translated as happiness or human flourishing, eudaimonia is the ultimate goal of ethics. However,

other than Aberdein (2020), the virtue approach to argumentation has not dealt with eudaimonia. In his paper, he reminds us that not all virtue ethicists follow Aristotle in linking virtues to eudaimonia (Aberdein, 2020, 98). Nevertheless, he thinks there is a connection.

The virtue approach to argumentation might be excused in its hesitation to link virtue with Aristotelian eudaimonia. After all, Aristotle's view of eudaimonia is complicated. Although there is an emphasis on contemplation, it is unclear what it entails (Duignan, 2020). Instead, we might opt for the rationalistic approach to eudaimonia. Translated as "happiness", *saʿāda* means the agent's ability to contemplate without presenting to the mind the form and matter of objects. Accordingly, without the help of practical intellect, theoretical intellect can not reason properly. Building on a reliabilist approach to virtue, the rationalist approach in a way agrees with the virtue argumentation in its emphasis on agents. The ultimate goal of human flourishing is the ability to reason without matters and forms from the material world. The ultimate happiness of the agent is thus an immaterial self-contemplation. The self becomes a replica, a mirror in which truth is reflected. On the other hand, happiness does not change the objective truth; it complements the verification of truth. It would be absurd to deal with arguers rather than agents in this sense. The truth is somehow related to the agent's capacities, but it is still independent of the agent. This truth is independent of the agent because it is out there in the Active Intellect.

Achieved in conjunction with the Active Intellect, happiness gives the agent a thoroughly certain knowledge that she is right. Arguing virtuously means that the agent should argue to demonstrate the rightness of her claims. If the other party can not grasp the truth, the virtuous arguer should use dialectic and rhetoric to persuade. In this line of thought, arguing well means the proper assessment of the audience, the ability to reason properly, and the capacity to determine which form of argument is needed for persuasion.

Due to its strict monological tendencies and its equalization of epistemic virtues with happiness, the rationalistic approach to eudaimonia does not lend itself to a dialogical argument appraisal in the domain of epistemic arguments. Nevertheless, Eudaimonia and monological demonstration are reciprocal. In this sense, it does not differ from the epistemological approach to argumentation. Furthermore, -as detailed in the fifth

chapter- a more rationally inclined approach to argumentation 1- would not accept objecting to incontrovertible premises; 2- would not accept counter-argument against a demonstrative argument, 3-would allow shifting the burden of proof if deemed necessary. As incontrovertible premises, primary intelligibles and secondary intelligibles are believed to be given by the Active Intellect; objecting to incontrovertible premises and counter-arguments against the demonstrative syllogism are viewed as a vice of character. It is argued that unless the rational self is not able to balance vegetative and animal souls with the help of practical intellect, the theoretical intellect is not able to function properly[88].

In the multiplex approach to self, virtue is also seen as a means of human flourishing. In this approach to human flourishing, the goal is not merely the transformation of the self. It is claimed that with human flourishing, the universe, -i.e., the objects of sensation, reasoning, and experience- starts to be viewed as a book. Objects are not merely understood as what common sense posits them to be. Through the agent's experience, objects are also transformed into being the locus of attributes such as beauty and grace. Therefore a multiplex approach to truth, self, and ethics would posit the equiprimordiality of the agent and the act. Nevertheless, in this approach, the goal of the arguer is not to *demonstrate* the rightness of her claims. Instead, they cooperate. However, this does not mean that there will not be any opposition. On the contrary, by assuming their roles as claimants and respondents, they would oppose each other in an *ādāb* that allows each party to perform their duties. Each party takes on themselves to help the other party *manifest the truth* of their claims. The contested multiplex ontologies in the background demonstrate the diversity and shift over time as different schools become more fashionable. However, the goal always remains the same.

[88] And yet the claim that without practical intellect, theoretical intellect can not function properly deserves attention. This can serve as a principle in practical arguments.It can be argued that without theoretical and practical virtues of the agent who wishes for happiness, practical arguments can not be analyzed properly. Virtues serve as the means for the phronesis (practical wisdom). In fact, the practical discourse analysis framework developed by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) argue that a practical argument is a claim for action. This claim is informed by goal, circumstance and means-goal premises. Among them, particularly the goal premise is governed by values of the agent (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012, 48). Practical discourse analysis can serve as the framework for the analysis of practical arguments from an agent-based perspective.

6.3. ARGUMENT APPRAISAL FRAMEWORK FOR MUNĀẒARA

After these considerations, now I can discuss how Munāẓara can serve as the argument appraisal framework. This framework will also include the agents and thereby contributing to agent-based approaches to argumentation. In what follows, I will sketch a Munāẓara analysis framework that works on three levels: 1-the monological level that deals with each claim and arguments as products, 2- the dialogical level that deals with the interpersonal act of arguing as processes, and 3- the level of the agent in which dialogical and monological considerations are brought forward to speak about the agent. This sketch will also allow me to discuss the limitations of an agent-based argument appraisal framework. I will begin with general remarks on contemporary theories and Munāẓara in terms of act-centered and agent-based considerations.

During my analysis of contemporary argumentation theories, I laid down the fundamental differences between argumentation theories. In the first chapter, I investigated pragma-dialectics. The approach is procedural. It designs an ideal procedure both for the antagonist and protagonist with the normative goal of resolution of difference of opinion. Pragma-dialectics is also a dialogical theory of argumentation. Against theories such as formal logic that deals with arguments as products, pragma-dialectics is primarily interested in the intersubjective act of arguing (as process). In the second chapter, I first investigated the epistemological approach to argumentation which primarily focuses on arguments as products. The epistemological approach views dialogical aspects of argumentation as somewhat secondary. Accordingly, it is claimed that argumentation is performed with the normative goal of acceptability that includes truth, probability, and verisimilitude. In the second chapter, I also discussed the virtue approach to argumentation that argues against approaches like pragma-dialectics and the epistemological approach to argumentation. It is argued that argumentation should not be act-based but agent-based. Instead of the cogency of monological arguments or the procedures of dialogical argumentation, the virtue approach claims that what makes an argument good is the agent. If the agent is virtuous, then her argument is also good. In the third chapter, I investigated the meaning of dialogical and monological conceptions of self and Habermas' proposal for a dialogical conception of truth. Accordingly, there are three instances of truth:

Relating to sense perception, discourse, and finally to the justification-independent ideals of communication.

Having these contemporary points of divergence in mind, in the fourth chapter, I investigated Munāẓara. Munāẓara is also a procedural theory of argumentation. But, contrary to pragma-dialectics, argumentation's goal is the manifestation of truth. In the fifth chapter, I introduced the multiplex approach to truth, and in the present chapter, the multi-layeredness of the self.

The argumentation analysis framework I propose consists of three layers and two criteria. The three layers are

1-The monological layer of arguments,

2- The dialogical layer of arguing,

and 3- the layer of agents.

The twofold criteria for a good argument and argumentation are *relevance* and *admissibility*. Whereas relevance concerns the first two layers of logical arguments and dialectical process, admissibility concerns the agent vis-a-vis the act.

The claimant comes up with a claim, and the respondent questions the very claim. It is the right of the claimant to support her claims with arguments. The duty of the respondent is fashioned in five stages:

1- Asking for clarification of the premises and conclusions,

2- Objecting to a certain premise with the pragmatic function of asking for further proof,

3- Suggesting an alternative to the premise as a means of objecting and asking for further arguments for the contested premise,

4-Refuting the argument overall. The respondent has two options to refute the argument:

4.a- Claiming there is an absurdity in the argument, such as a vicious circle or infinite regress;

4.b- Claiming that the argument does not achieve the desired conclusion due to some irregularities in the argument,

5. Coming up with a counter-argument. In the fourth and fifth stages, the roles change. The respondent becomes the claimant. If parties observe logical and dialectical rules, the argumentation is rendered *relevant*.

In this sketch of the Munāẓara's procedure, the most important aspect is the allocation of moves in such a manner that the claimant is able to prove her claim and the respondent fulfills her own duties following the relevance criteria. The claimant should not stop short at coming up with a claim without justifying her arguments through the many syllogism forms suitable to the situation. If not, she will be insisting on a claim without justifying it. This unjustified insistence is called subjugation. In the same manner, if the respondent stops short at merely objecting to a premise or a claim over and over without further arguments, this insistence will be called arrogance. In the same line, refutation and counter-argument without proper justification will also be called arrogance. If one party steals the burden of proof, this act will be called usurpation. Coming up with a counter-argument without exhausting the available moves will be called hastiness. These assessments are *provisional* as translating inadmissible moves into a vice of character requires further information.

In the analysis, the analyst aims to locate irregularities that did not catch the eye of arguing parties. For example, one party might have committed a fallacy. However, violations of the procedure or fallacies are not directly translated into character vices. This is not only wrong but also dangerous. Furthermore, the analyst should not limit the analysis to one single process of argumentation. Instead, she should gather contextual data by analyzing the same agents over a period of time. For example, agents might have a history of committing violations of procedures or fallacies in the context of similar issues. Furthermore, the data collecting process should include social and institutional contexts such as argumentation between an abusing person and his partner or argumentation in state-regulated televisions between the opposition and the government.

The gathering of contextual data might change the provisional assessment. If the contextual data indicates that the agent has a history of violations and fallacies then the provisional assessment is conclusive. In that case, the violations of Munāẓara rules indicate an argumentative vice that is *overt*. On the other hand, the contextual data might not be sufficient enough to make an assessment. Therefore the analyst refrains

from a conclusive assessment on the agent as the link between motivations and actions are *covert*[89].

6.4. CONCLUSION

The chapter had two subsections; in the first, I discussed how self, virtue, and perfection vary according to Muslim scholars. Then, I elaborated on Fārābī as a representative of Neo-Platonic Muslim Aristotelianism. There I investigated different faculties of the soul: the vegetative, the animal, and the rational. Accordingly, by regulating the actions and desires peculiar to each faculty, the practical intellect serves the theoretical intellect. The theoretical intellect, in turn, is responsible for the contemplation of universals and celestial reasons. This contemplation is the ultimate happiness, the goal, and the perfection of the human soul. Then I discussed Ibn Sīnā and how there is debate over his position on the self and virtue in the secondary literature. Whereas Black and Wisnowsky argue that he has diverted from Aristotelian tradition by the self-subsistence of the self, Adamson and Fakhry argue that his remarks on the self and virtue are almost trivial. Another camp in this debate is that of Özturan and Kaya, who argue that Ibn Sīnā relied on the prophet and Islam overall. Coupled with Ömer Türker's argument regarding the multiplexity of truth and Ibn Sīnā's influence on scholars such as Samarqandī, it seems that Ibn Sīnā had a genuine theory of the self as well, leading to the multiplex approach to truth and self.

Informed by the importance of agents in relation to truth and argumentation, in the second subsection, I drafted a Munāẓara analysis framework by considering different norms relating to the product, the process, and the agent. The draft envisions a three-step analysis where first, the relevance of a certain move is investigated according to

[89] In daily life and communications we not only assess the acts but the agents as well. For instance, in April 2021, the weekly news show *Last Week Tonight with John Oliver* aired a segment on Tucker Carlson. In the segments, the show first gives examples from the discourse of Tucker Carlson. The show then makes a provisional assessment of Tucker Carlson as a white-supremacist. The segment then continues with gathering contextual data on the life and views of Tucker Carlson. It is argued that Carlson consistently dodges questions regarding white-supremacy. He seems to not understand what white-supremacy is. In Munāẓara terms, Carlson insistently commits the argumentative vice of arrogance by asking for further clarification on an issue that he already knows. Another example of arrogance is Carlson's insistence to refute the arguments on white-supremacy without providing any arguments.

logical and dialectical norms. In the second step, the admissibility of the move is determined. In the final step, the overtness of the agency is established.

The chapter allowed me to elaborate on how the concept of self informs our conception of truth. In the case of Munāẓara, our conception of self admits two different layers of truth: In the first layer, truth is justification-dependent and is attained by argumentation. In the second layer, truth is justification-independent, attained by self's transformation from vice to virtue.

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION

In this concluding chapter, I will present a brief discussion where I reiterate the arguments from previous chapters; the overall contributions, and shortcomings. Furthermore, I would like to focus on the implications of the thesis from a number of angles: 1) In terms of contemporary argumentation literature, 2) In terms of a research program that will envision Munāẓara as a contribution to contemporary literature, 3) In terms of extending the research in argumentation to rhetoric (balāgha) and logic (mantiq).

This study started with a rather broad question: How do our conceptions of truth and self inform argumentation argumentation theories? Building upon this research question, the thesis aimed to 1-grasp the points of departure among contemporary argumentation theories in the first section, and 2- situate Munāẓara among contemporary argumentation theories in the second section. To this end, instead of intellectual history, I have chosen the five components of a research program in argumentation envisioned by pragma-dialectics as the methodology of the thesis. It determines philosophical, theoretical, analytical, empirical, and practical fields in the study of argumentation. The framework helped me understand the key aspects of each theory and its underlying principles.

The study of contemporary argumentation theories showed that in the theoretical component an argumentation theory is either rhetorical, logical, or dialectical. Philosophically these theories differ in the normativity: For pragma-dialecticians, the goal of argumentation is resolution of difference of opinion. The epistemologists argue that the goal should be acceptability, including truth and its like. Although this difference is explained in terms of different conceptions of reasonableness, I argued that the discussions of reasonableness veil two fundamental approaches to self: The monological self and the dialogical self. In agreement with Habermas, I argued that dialogical theories might also aim for truth. Moreover, in the analytical component, argumentation theories are either act-based or agent-based. While pragma-dialectics and epistemological approach to argumentation are act-based theories, the virtue approach to argumentation is an agent-based theory.

Building upon the points of divergence between contemporary argumentation theories, in the second section of the thesis I introduced Munāẓara. I characterized it as a dialogically-epistemic, agent-driven theory of argumentation. I also explored the disagreements between Munāẓara scholars on the analytical component. Although Munāẓara scholars meet in the philosophical component and hold that the goal of argumentation is truth, it might be the case that they apply different norms. Following scholars such as Gelenbevī, I argued that in Munāẓara two sets of norms can be distinguished: Relevance and admissibility. While the first directs to logical and dialectical rules; the second works through agent-based considerations. Accordingly, Munāẓara can be conceived either monologically and dialogically.

To contribute to the study of Munāẓara in the empirical realm, I drafted a three-leveled argument analysis framework in which the arguments, the argumentation, and the arguer is taken into account. Morever, this draft directly contributes to the modern virtue approach to argumentation. In the present discussion section, I first provide a brief summary, and elaborate on main arguments throughout the chapters. Having done with the chapters, I will expand on the empirical and practical components and discuss the future directions for the study and employment of Munāẓara. I will also discuss how Munāẓara and other related theories can be helpful as an exploration for the practical component of the study of argumentation.

I began with pragma-dialectics in the first chapter. I explored the role of speech acts in the critical discussion procedure for the resolution of difference of opinion. Then I explored the epistemological and ontological considerations that lead to differences in argumentation theories. Fortunately, pragma-dialectics and epistemological approach to argumentation are very articulate on their epistemological foundations. Furthermore, both approaches are to some extent rivals demolishing the foundations of each other. Pragma-dialectics argues against foundationalism and attacks the idea of an objective, absolute and geometric conception of epistemology. The epistemological approach on the other hand views the function of argumentation in the traditional line of truth. After the exploration of *truth-talk* in pragma-dialectics and epistemological argumentation, it becomes visible that the differences in the conception of argumentation veil preferred self theories be it monological or dialogical.

It was through Habermas and his *Truth and Justification* that I was able to understand the ontological and psychological considerations that lead to a monological or dialogical conception of self in relation to argumentation. Habermas argues that a monological, objectivist account of epistemology is problematic. The objectivist account relies on "naive realism" and "mentalism" which presuppose the first and third person points of view. Through the mental representation of an independent and noumenal "I", the phenomenal world is objectified. Instead of an "I- perspective" that leads to solipsism and obscurity, he suggests a "We-perspective" paradigm that operates on the interwoven relationship between language and the world. In the end, the semantics of propositions are only meaningful with their pragmatic force. Both semantics and pragmatics necessitate each other.

Habermas differentiates three instances of truth: as practical certainties, as ideal assertability conditions, and as formal pragmatic presuppositions. While the ideal assertability conditions require a justification-dependent conception of truth, the formal pragmatic presupposition of truth is justification-independent and therefore non-epistemic. In agreement with Habermas, I conclude that dialogical theories argumentation allows a three-layered conceptualization of truth.

Having explored contemporary argumentation studies, I devoted the fourth chapter to Munāẓara. There I first started with a brief overview of the history of argumentation in Islamdom. Munāẓara did not emerge from a vacuum. The approach is a continuation of juridical and theological dialectics. I tried to show what changes in terms of content and form with the evolution of the old theory to Munāẓara. In Munāẓara the content of argumentation is extended to reasoning in general. The form of argumentation changes accordingly. The agent-driven procedure of argumentation is preserved in Munāẓara, albeit with changes.

Munāẓara differs from pragma-dialectics and epistemological approach to argumentation in that it is primarily a theory of practice rather than a theory of analysis. It gets closer to pragma-dialectics when the procedure is based on intersubjective validity rather than the objective truth. It is enough for one party to believe something as true to perform a move. That is, the procedure allows logically invalid moves based on sheer belief.

Munāẓara is closer to the epistemological approach in content. The argumentation is carried through the usage of syllogisms and the goal is the manifestation of truth. However, contrary to the epistemological approach, the process of arguing is not regarded as secondary. In this line, Munāẓara gets closer to pragma-dialectics and virtue approach to argumentation. It aims at differentiating argumentation from quarreling and power-flexing. This is done by crafting a discussion procedure and suggesting an order in which both parties try to help each other for truth to manifest. It intends to serve as a practical manual for the students of madrasas who are already immersed in logic studies. That is why, in the fourth chapter, I also provided a detailed summary of classical logic. This logic serves as the foundation of argumentation. Consequently, I detailed the argumentation procedure according to the theory.

In the fifth chapter, I discussed a number of disagreements in the primary Munāẓara literature to demonstrate how these disagreements can be traced different norms, -relevance and admissibility,- that result from a multiplex theory of truth and self. In the multiplex approach, the divine, the immaterial, and material realms of being are interconnected and interrelated. The multiplex character of being and self requires certain cognitive&moral achievements from the agents. This is why the agent has to attain cognitive and moral achievements so as not to fall into the imitation of everyday concepts and assents. The sixth chapter dealt with the relationship between ontology and self to explore the agent-driven character of argumentation. I discussed the philosophical ethics of practical intellect. I continued with the multiplex approach to self, where self-perfection requires virtues alongside theoretical excellence. This exploration allowed me to show how different layers of self correspond to different layers of truth.

This study was necessary for various reasons. There are only a handful of papers, dissertations, and studies in English that deal with Munāẓara. Notwithstanding their meaningful effort to remind the scientific community of the presence of such literature, the methodological framework of these works is the history of philosophy. This thesis dealt with Munāẓara from a different methodological framework. Instead of taking the theory as a part of the distant past, as a material for the history of philosophy, the thesis tried to handle the approach as a potential contributor to contemporary discussions. In that regard, other than Leonard Faytre's master thesis, there is no other work that views Munāẓara from the lenses of contemporary approaches. Faytre deals with pragma-

dialectics. This project extended the number of contemporary theories by including the epistemological approach to argumentation, formal pragmatics, and virtue approach to argumentation.

The thesis contributed to academic scholarship on the Muslim sciences 1) by detailing the intricate relationship between logic and argumentation, 2) by elaborating on the Munāẓara 's procedure with details that were not presented beforehand, 3) by detailing the disagreements between Munāẓara scholars and 4) by elaborating on the multiplexity as the foundation for different argumentative norms. The analysis of the history of argumentation in Islamdom from the disagreements between individual scholars to different schools of thought might serve as a starting point for further comprehension of Muslim world history. The details and the different points of view when it comes to Munāẓara might serve to better understand the intricacies of argumentation theory. Other than its contribution to modern academic scholarship, the thesis might be useful in the institutional and individual revival of indigenous scholarship on argumentation. As I employed the five components of a research program in argumentation, I was able to show the richness of philosophical, theoretical, and analytical elements in Munāẓara.

I will now elaborate more on the empirical and practical components in relation to Munāẓara. I hope that these rudimentary explorations will serve as a starting point for aspiring Munāẓara and argumentation scholars. The thesis operated from a broad, bird-eye view of argumentation and different perspectives on truth and self that shape the conception of argumentation. Although this allowed me to situate Munāẓara in the context of modern contemporary theories, there is still a lot to do. The thesis does not offer a qualitative or quantitative study that will test the claims made in Munāẓara. Furthermore, it was not possible to address many more contemporary issues such as argument schemes; the relationship between rhetoric and argumentation; the difference between adversarial and cooperative argumentation, to name a few. The thesis did not elaborate on the difference between practical and theoretical argumentation due to the nature and historical context of Munāẓara.

FUTURE STUDIES

The incorporation of Munāẓara into contemporary argumentation literature requires translations of Munāẓara books. There exist many Munāẓara manuscripts that have not been published yet. These books should be detected, published, and translated. The translations should be in a manner that will both preserve the original meaning while also taking into account the contemporary scientific vocabulary. Unfortunately, contemporary books and scholarship are simply unaware or do not mention the approach. There needs to be original work that introduces Munāẓara in the form of books, papers, and projects that introduce the approach to the scientific community. Through international research projects, scholars from different schools of argumentation can meet to benefit from each other. Consequently, as Munāẓara is primarily concerned with the practice, Munāẓara can be used an argumentation procedure in various venues. One such place is university debating tournaments.

The relationship between Munāẓara and contemporary argumentation theory is not unilateral. Fortunately, argumentation studies as a field have seen enormous growth over the years and Munāẓara scholarship should benefit from these developments. For instance; pragma-dialectics does not only provide a framework for the analysis of argumentation; it also differentiates different argumentative activity types and argumentative styles. The Munāẓara analysis framework should also be employed for different activity types and argumentative styles. Furthermore, in an attempt to incorporate rhetoric to pragma-dialectics, the approach has extended its procedure with strategic maneuvering. The argumentative styles are employed in different argumentative activity types with strategic maneuvering. Recently, linguistic-stylistic analysis was incorporated into the strategic maneuvering framework. This development is a perfect opportunity to incorporate *balāgha* (rhetoric) into Munāẓara.

Munāẓara alongside logic and rhetoric was regarded to be one of the sciences of *'ulum al-ālāt*; sciences that are auxiliary for higher sciences. These sciences can be reinvigorated as research methodologies for social sciences. These approaches can also be employed in literary studies as a frameworks for literary theory.

THE PAST, THE PRESENT, AND THE FUTURE

The thesis introduced Munāẓara tradition to contemporary argumentation scholarship. It is hoped that Munāẓara will receive more attention from argumentation scholarship and future generations of students. In this subsection, I will discuss the possible directions of future studies in argumentation and related fields. This will allow me to discuss the practical aspects of Munāẓara as a research program in argumentation. However, to understand the direction of future studies I will provide a historical context.

Argumentation studies in Islamdom enjoyed overwhelming attention over the ages. This was partly due to the argumentative nature of Islam. The religion comes with the controversial claim that it is the last religion, that its book is a miracle in itself and the prophet is a role model for all humanity. Moreover, Qur'an claims to be *bayān* and *burhān*: It gives all the necessary tools for the rhetorical and analytical apprehension of life and afterlife. On top of it, Allah orders the prophet and thus the Muslims to perform argumentation beautifully and ethically. This is why it is no surprise that argumentation is a primordial element in the lives of Muslims. Following secondary literature, we can divide the history of argumentation in Islamdom into three stages. In each stage, argumentation comes with different facets.

In the first three centuries of Islam, the argumentation takes place between individual scholars who strive to get closer to Allah's judgment on matters that are deemed uncertain. There is a certain religious practice bequeathed from the prophet but when inspected closely almost all issues can turn out to be ambiguous. However, the most peculiar characteristic of argumentation is its employment in *fiqh*, which can be understood as *religious phronesis*. Rightly labeled as "proto-jadal" by Young, the disagreements between scholars, later on, evolve into a full-fledged system of argumentation. Until the emergence and widespread employment of *Munāẓara* in the 14th and 15th centuries, argumentation took place among representatives of *fiqh* and *kalam* schools. The content of the argumentation is still not profane and the religion is institutionalized. Nevertheless studying argumentation enables incoming scholars to earn titles in the government and civil society. Thus, a derogatory name emerges: *'ulamā al-rusūm*, which could be roughly translated as so-called scholars. These scholars will be attacked by Ghazalī and others who feel that argumentation lost its

role as a tool of phronesis. A strong sentiment against argumentation finds soil and some scholars, -most influentially Ghazalī,- writes about the dangers of argumentation. I will return to this issue.

In the meantime, Muslim rule around the world is at its peak. Muslim philosophers who do not situate themselves in the orthodoxy emerges. As explored in the fifth and sixth chapters, Muslim philosophers have their peculiar epistemology and ontology. Through a hierarchy of reasons, beginning from the First to the material intellect, Being is interconnected. For philosophers, religion tells no other story either. It explains the hard-earned demonstrations arrived with the canon of logic to lay people through rhetoric. The philosophers' unorthodox undertaking of epistemology and ontology is not welcomed.

Led by Ghazalī, Sunni scholars waged a war against the so-called scholars and the philosophers. Ghazalī's method is twofold. He naturalizes the epistemology of philosophers; starts to use their methods and with their methods, he attacks their philosophy. In the second front, he writes extensively on the project -what he calls- the revival of religious sciences. Ghazalī renounces his past scholarship as insufficient and most importantly *imitative*. He becomes a role model for future generations.

When it comes to today, the traditional madrasa curriculum should be translated, rearranged, redesigned for various stages of secondary and higher education in a manner that also takes into account contemporary scholarship. Interestingly, Ahmet Cevdet Paşa had already started such a project. Students who are acquainted with those disciplines should take courses on philology, logic, argumentation, rhetoric, and other related sciences. Master and Ph.D. programs that focus on traditional and contemporary sciences should pursue a research agenda that furthers the study. Research centers that focus on particular sciences such as argumentation, rhetoric, and other related sciences should connect scholars and students of both the contemporary and traditional approaches. It is only in such an environment that the traditional sciences might not only survive, but also respond to problems of contemporary scholarship and the world.

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APPENDIX: GLOSSARY OF TERMS

by

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Term	Arabic Original	Arabic Transliteration
absurd	محال	**muhāl**
admissible	ماقبول	**maqbūl**
admonishment	تنبيه	**tanbīh**
affirmative	موجب	**mujab**
ambivalent	مشترك	**mustaraq**
analysis	تهليل	**tahlīl**
antecedent	مقدم	**muqaddam**
approximation	تقريب	**taqrīb**
a priori	ضروري	**ẓharūrī**
a posteriori	كسبي	**kasbī**
arguer	مناظر	**munāẓir**
arrangement	ترتيب	**tartīb**
art	صناعة	**ṣināʿa**
argument	دليل	**dalīl**

arrogance	مكابرة	**mukābara**
argumentation	مناظرة	**munāẓara**
assents	تاصديقات	**tasdīqāt**
attribute	صفة	**sifa**
axiomatic	أولي	**awwalī**
categorical	اقتراني	**iqtirānī**
cause	علة	**ʿilla**
certain	يقين	**yaqīn**
changing the subject	إنتقال	**intiqāl**
claim	دعوى	**da'wa**
claimant	معل	**mu'alil**
cognizance	إدراك	**idrāk**
conditional	استثنائي	**istiṯna'ī**
confirmatory questions	مسألات تقرير	**mas'alat taqrīr**
conclusion	نتيجة	**natīja**
concomitance	دوران	**dawarān**
coincidental	إتفاقية	**ittifāqiyya**
conjunctive	متصلة	**muttasila**
conjunctive proper	لزميا	**luzumiyya**

consequent	تالي	**talī**
contemplation	مشاهدة	**mushāhada**
contradiction	تناقض	**tanāquẓ**
conversion (aks)	عكس	**‘aks**
commonly accepted	مشهورات	**mashūrat**
corrective objection	حل	**ḥall**
correspondence	مطابقة	**mutābakat**
command-constructive expression (amr)	عمر	**‘amr**
common accident	أعراض عامة	**a'raḍh 'ammah**
counter-argument	معارضة	**mu‘āraḍa**
compound	مركب	**murakkab**
definition	حد	**ḥadd**
demonstration	برهان	**burhān**
demonstrandum	مدلول	**madlūl**
described	معرف	**mu’arraf**
describer	معرف	**mu’arrif**
differentia	فصل	**faṣl**
disjunctive	منفصلة	**munfaṣila**
dialectic	جدلي	**jadal**

dialectical question	سؤال الجدلي	**sual al-jadalī**
disagreement	إختلاف	**Ikhtilāf**
disassociation	فصل	**faṣl**
discussion	مذكرة	**muḏakara**
description	تعريف	**ta'r*īf***
distinction	فرق	**farq**
division	تقسيم	**taqs*īm***
essential universal (zati')	الذاتي	**ḏatī**
evidence (testimony)	شاهد	**shāhid**
explanation	تفهيم	**tafhīm**
figurative	مجاز	**majāz**
form	صورة	**sura'**
genus	جنس	**cīns**
hastiness	عجلة	**u'clat/ u'cūl (ott.)**
incontrovertible	بديه	**badī**
inference/justification	استدلال	**istidlāl**
individual	جزئي	**juz'ī**
induction	استقراء	**istiqrā'**
infinite regress	تسلسل	**tasalsul**

informative questions	سؤال الإستفساري	**sual al-istisfarī**
inquiry	بحث / مباحثة	**baḥth/mubāḥatha**
inseparable accidents	أعراض لازمة	**a'raḍh lazima**
intuitive (propositions)	حدسيات	**ḥadsiyyāt**
imitation	تقليد	**taqlīd**
imperfect	ناقص	**nāqis**
implicative signification	التزامي	**iltizāmī**
implicit claim	دعوى الضمني	**da'wa al-ḍimniyya**
judgment	حكم	**hukm**
logic	منطق	**mantiq**
logicians	أصحاب المنطق	**aṣḥāb al-manṭiq**
manners, protocols, virtuous conduct	آداب	**ādāb**
mass-transmitted (propositions)	متواترات	**mutawātirat**
content	مادة	**madda**
meaning	معنى	**ma'nā**
merely falsity exclusive	مانعة الخلو	**māni'at al-ẖuluw**
merely truth exclusive	مانعة الجمع	**māni'at al-jam'**
mutual negation	تنافي	**tanāfī**

near	قريب	**qarīb**
necessary implication	تلازم	**talāzum**
non-essential	أعراض	**a'raḍ**
objection	مناقضة/ المنع	**man'/munāqaḍa**
obstinacy	معاندة	**muʿānada**
opinion/position	رأي	**ra'y**
opponent	خصم	**ḫasm**
partial (signification)	تضمن	**taḍammum**
particular	جزئي	**juz'ī**
perfect (tam)	تام	**tāmm**
premise	مقدمة	**muqaddima**
predication	حمل	**ḫaml**
preference	ترجيح	**tarjīh**
philosophical theology	حكمة	***hikmā***
power-flexing	منازع	***munāza'***
praiseworthy	محمود	**maḥmūd**
predicate	محمول	**maḥmul**
preliminaries	مبادي	**mab*ā*di'**

poetical syllogism		**qıyas al-shi’ri**
property	خاصة	**khassa**
proposition	قضية	**qaḍīya**
quarreler	مجادل	**mujādil**
quiddity/whatness	ماهية	**mahiyya**
quantified	مسورة	**musawwara**
quotation	نقل	**naql**
rational sciences	علوم عقلية	**'ulum 'aqliyyah**
refutation	نقض	**naqḍ**
relevance	توجيه	***tawjīh***
relevant	موجه	***muwajjah***
remote	بعيد	***ba’id***
restrictive questions	سألات التفويض	**mas’alat al-tafwīḍ**
rhetorical syllogism	قياس الخطابي	**qiyas al-khatābi**
rhetoric	بلاغة	**balāgha**
reasoning/speculation	"نظر	**naẓar**
respondent	سائل	**sā’il**
science	علم	**‘ilm**

separable accidents	أعراض مفرقة	**a'raḍh mufariqa**
signs of defeat	دلائل الإنقطاع	**dalā'il al-inqiṭāʿ**
single	المفرد	**al-mufrad**
species	نوع	**naw**
subject (mavdu')	موضوع	**mawḍu'**
subjugation	تحكم	**taḥakkum**
support	سند	**sanad**
sophistry	مغالطة	**mughālaṭa**
syllogism	قياس	**qiy*ās***
tested (propositions)	مجربات	**mujarrabāt**
theology	كلام	***kalām***
thinking	فكر	**fikr**
thinking-together	مفاكرة	**mufākara**
topics	مواضيع	**mawāḍiʿ**
transmitted sciences	علوم نقلي	**'ulum naqliya**
trick	حيلة	**ḥīla**
truth/rightness/just	حق	**haqq**
understanding	فهم	**fahm**
universal	الكلي	**al-kullī**

univocal	مشك	**musakkak**
usurpation	غصب	**ghaṣb**
verifier	محقق	**muhaqqiq**
verification	تحقيق	**taḥqīq**
verification of cause/warrant	تصحيح العلة	**taṣḥīḥ al-ʿilla**
vicious circle	دور	**dawr**
virtues	فضائل	**faḍāʾil**

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