

**IBN HALDUN UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY**

MASTER THESIS

**INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF
IBN MISKAWAYH'S NOTION OF JUSTICE**

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THESIS SUPERVISOR

ASSOC. PROF. BURHAN KÖROĞLU

ISTANBUL, 2021

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by

ELİF BAYRAM

**A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in
Philosophy**

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ASSOC. PROF. BURHAN KÖROĞLU

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AKADEMİK DÜRÜSTLÜK BEYANI

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ÖZ

İBN MİSKEVEYH'İN ADALET DÜŞÜNCESİNİN BİREYSEL VE TOPLUMSAL
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10. yüzyıl filozofu olan İbn Miskeveyh İslam felsefesi geleneğinin ahlak düşüncesine katkısı ile kendinden sonra gelen birçok filozofu etkileyen bir düşünürdür. Bu çalışmada, İslam ahlak felsefesinin Abbasi dönemi çeviri hareketinden sonraki döneme tekabül eden çağın filozofu olarak İbn Miskeveyh'in adalet kavramını etik ve siyasal düzlemde nasıl kullandığının tahlili ile, bu kullanımın nefis kavramı ve erdemler etiğindeki yansımaları ele alınmak istenmiştir. Bilhassa en önemli eseri Tehzibu'l-ahlak'la beraber nefis kavramına yaklaşımı ele alınmaya çalışıldı. Erdemlerin meleke olarak nefste yerleşmesi ve adalet erdeminin bu noktada işgal ettiği konum anlaşılmasına çalışılmıştır. Adalet konusundaki kısa risalesi Risale fi mahiyet'l-adl okuması üzerinden adaletin İbn Miskeveyh tarafından nasıl kısımlandırıldığı anlaşılacak istenmiş olup, bahsi geçen risalede yapılan adalet taksiminin Tehzibu'l-ahlak üzerindeki izdüşümleri analiz edilmek istenmiştir. Aristocu ve Yeni Platoncu tutumu ile üç-parçalı ruh ve orta eylem yaklaşımının kavrama yaptığı etkinin de ele alındığı çalışmada filozofun insanın doğasına dair yaklaşımı ile özellikle nefsi yetkinliği ve bu bağlamda adalet erdeminin tesisi düşüncesi tezin çekirdeğini oluşturmaktadır. Nefis kavramından başlayarak sistemleştirdiği bireyin ahlaki yetkinleşmesine dair düşünce dünyasının adalet kavramındaki yansımaları ve bu yansımaların medeni insanın sosyal ilişkilerinde oynadığı rol bu bağlamda incelenecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İbn Miskeveyh, Adalet, Nefis, Tehzibu'l-ahlak, Erdem

ABSTRACT

INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF IBN MISKAWAYH'S NOTION OF JUSTICE

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The 10th-century philosopher Ibn Miskawayh is a philosopher of the tradition of Islamic philosophy who influenced many philosophers who came after him with his contribution to moral thought. In this study, in particular, the main aim is to analyze how Ibn Miskawayh, as the philosopher of the era, corresponding to the period after the period of Abbasid translation movement of Islamic moral philosophy, handles the concept of justice on an ethical and political plane, as well as the reflections on the concept of self and virtue ethics. In particular, his approach to the concept of nafs has been discussed together with his most important work, Tahdhib al-akhlaq, and its approach to the position occupied by the virtue of justice at this point is important. With the support of his short treatise Risala fi Mahiyat'l-adl, it is aimed to understand how justice is divided into sections by the philosopher, and it is desired to analyze the parallel approaches of justice division made in the aforementioned treatise, with Tehzibu'l-ahlak. In this study, which also deals with the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic attitude and the impact of the trichotomy of the soul and the golden ratio approach, the philosopher's approach to human nature, especially the self-competence and in this context, the establishment of the virtue of justice constitutes the core of the thesis. Starting from the concept of nafs, the reflections of the world of thought on the moral perfection of the individual, which he systematized, on the concept of justice and the context of these reflections in the social relations of civilized people will also be examined.

Keywords: Ibn Miskawayh, Justice, Nafs, Virtue, Ethics, Tahdhib al-Akhlaq

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

Although justice seems to be an obvious concept that has been dealt with frequently in the history of philosophy, after the Ancient Greek and Islamic Golden Ages, it remained dormant and even neglected until the beginning of the 20th century. In these two special periods, in which it was handled by philosophers either in the fields of ethics and political, beyond today's bland definitions and approaches, the concept, which occupied a pivotal position, took shape according to approaches in line with periodic trends. Although the origins of the concept are strong in the Greek notion, it has been handled in the history of Islamic philosophy which has religious repercussions, including metaphysics and politics. Along with Ibn Miskawayh, it finds its place in a treatment with psychological approaches to human beings and, accordingly, in a virtue ethics circle. Ibn Miskawayh, as a controversial name¹, includes justice in his texts as the core of his philosophy due to the strength of the concept. Accordingly, the basis of the fact that the individual is a social being, a part of the cosmos and a microcosm stems from the fact that the order is based on justice. This atmosphere, especially felt in *Tahdhib al-Akhlaq* and *Risala*, is the main concern of this study, and it is aimed at understanding the mindset direction of this philosopher, as it directs many names after him.

Ibn Miskawayh, which we can observe as a micro example of the methodology and philosophical approaches of Islamic philosophy, occupies a different place due to his ethical thinking. In his work *Refinement Of Character*, in which he deals with the

¹ See for instance C bir , M.  . (2015). *Arap Ahlaki Akli*. ( ev. Muhammet  elik) İstanbul: Mana Yayınları. p.516. includes Ibn Miskawayh to *compilation* tradition along with al-Amiri. And also See Fahr , M. (1991). *Ethical theories in Islam* (Vol. 8) Brill Refers to the philosopher as one of the most important ethics philosopher of the tradition. The difference of how they approach is the solid representation to the controversial place of the philosopher p.171.

axiomatic acceptances of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic lines, as well as moral character, moral competence, and teleological happiness, he also allocates a special section for justice.² For this reason, I have mostly benefited from al-Akhlaq's, as well as his treatise, *Risala fi Mahiyat al-Adl*, in which he deals with the sections of justice.

Ibn Miskawayh's ethical concern is the possibility of a virtuous (*al-fāḍilah*) harmonized moral character; “The truly just man is he who harmonizes all his faculties, activities, and states in such a way that none exceeds the other” (Miskawayh,2002:100). While the questioning of human nature extends to evaluations about the human inclination to good and bad actions, it also points to inquiries about the moral competence or perfection of the individual. For these reasons, soul (*nafs*) and its content, which is the starting point of Ibn Miskawayh, constitute the leading point of this study. One of the main concerns of this study is the direct or indirect handling of the soul and individual and social justice and the scope of this context in the philosophical system of the philosopher. As the principle of ethics, *nafs* is also the mover of the body as a non-accidental abstract entity that will be a virtue acquisition for Ibn Miskawayh and can create a habitus (*hexis*). According to the philosopher, who proposed an ontological hierarchy and therefore received some evolutionist interpretations, *nafs* is found within each man. In addition to classical Islamic philosophers who followed the Neoplatonic tripartite soul, Ibn Miskawayh also provides an introduction to his morality by subclassing the corresponding virtues. Due to this contribution, we also witness the approach of the philosopher, who makes a broad classification, to the relationship between *nafs* and justice, and we understand the contribution of the paramount importance it occupies. Therefore, I will try to understand the reflections of this contribution in the ethical understanding of philosophers after him and thus expand the philosopher's position on the concept.

Justice as a cardinal virtue, the core of virtues, is the signal of the self's competence. This virtue, which is the sign that multiplicity and chaos result in a harmony, is also there as proof that human beings, who are microcosms, have reached a moral

² Al-Jabri, Mohammed Abed. underlines that the titles assigned and ordered by C. Zurayk in the 1962 edition of *Refinement of Character*. Cābirī, M. Ā. (2015). *Arap Ahlaki Akli*. p.519 (Çev. Muhammet Çelik.) İstanbul: Mana Yayınları.

perfection, pointing out more than Socrates handled. We understand how essential it is to understand how Ibn Miskawayh, who follows an agent-centered ethics, deals with human and nature for this reason, when we focus on his approach to the virtue of justice. With the structuring of the humanist³ treatment of the individual, we also discover the limits of the moral capacity of the human being with the soul. Since the relationship between soul and reason is the basic and unique principle of the human soul and distinguishes it from other living beings, the human being who is aware of the distinction between good and evil is a rational being who can also decide on just action. At the same time, Miskawayh's realistic approach to the human being, which he considers to have desires and appetites, is revealed with the balance of the four cardinal virtues. People who have reason as well as desire tend to create a theoretical and practical competency and are responsible for it. While reason presupposes a theoretical challenge, this is a two-way movement and in fact, it should come with a practical refinement. It also allows him to approach himself and therefore to his creator because of his theory of emanation. One of the concerns that this research tries to solve is, how Ibn Miskawayh inserted the subject between the text in the virtue ethics equation without taking the will into account?

This ordering, which extends from the individual to the social order, also finds its reflection in the concept of justice, and the order of this specific work has come into being with the same order. The classical teaching of soul paradigms is essentially an introduction to a refinement (*al-tahdhib*) process. For this reason, it is the first step to consider before justice, to establish justice as faculty (*al-quwwa*) and to understand the essence of the concept. In order to understand the place of justice as *malaka* in the soul, after the first chapter, which is a preliminary work, it is a secondary aim to underline meaning of the essence of virtue and that this essence can be understood more clearly with the help of Aristotelian golden mean. In order to be far from a relativist meaning, every action that is free from excess and deficiency corresponds to a golden mean (*al-wasat*), and in the context of justice, this should be a criterion both in one's self and in his external relations. Throughout his work (*al-Akhlaq*), Ibn Miskawayh underlines

³ See for instance Kraemer, J. L. (1992). *Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: the cultural revival during the Buyid Age* (Vol. 7). Brill.

that virtues should be located in the soul, together with an introspective search, is the focal point of the study, how he deals with the reflections of this context in the individual and society. In particular, it was aimed to understand the establishment of human justice in the soul and to what extent this sub-type of justice is related to the other three types of justice (*divine, natural, conventional*). The external dimension of justice is also inevitable in terms of considering the idea that the virtues of the soul should be in a constant challenge, as a social being and a being in need of the other.

Man, who is civilized and social by nature, must also cooperate for justice (El-Fevzu'l-Asgar,2002:91). Supporting the idea that man is a social being with the Aristotelian slogan, the philosopher underlines that another pillar of individual competency is essentially sociability. A research on this approach, which also includes the question of the “permanent” preservation of the moral character of the virtues established by the philosopher as faculties, also requires a research on the social context and types of justice. Justice, which is moderation of wisdom, courage and temperance, will pass into practical realm as a reflection of theoretical realm. Thus, a competent person who can calculate the result of his actions by following reason will have to take into account the non-virtuous consequences of unjust actions. The philosopher, believes that virtuous actions can be evaluated through virtuous people, concerning the value that he attain to virtues rather than being act-centered, and that they will be accepted in the circle of rationality, therefore sees this two-way exchange as a condition. He sees a matter and form relationship between theoretical and practical, and therefore he considers the conventional reflection of justice in depth. This type of justice, which he deals with under the title of conventional justice in his Risala, is a summary of the social agreements that people make locally and universally. While seeking answers to questions such as what kind of aggregation has the human sociality led him to, what are its dimensions and what is its binding, at the same time, where equality holds a place in the concept is another question asked.

Beyond the individual's happiness, people must also take care of social happiness and the protection of their rights. The idea that the social order is established by following justice rather than liberality or other virtues also exists because justice acts as a compass against other virtues (Refinement of Character,2002:42). The human being, which should be associated with both humane needs and moral needs, instinctively

created social norms and aimed to ensure equality of some objects that would regulate these norms. According to Ibn Miskawayh these are money, leader and Sharia. In the philosophical system, where we observe that Sharia, together with divine justice, constitutes the theological background of justice, the money economical and the leader represent the political background. These concepts, which appear as a basis in the equal distribution of rights, goods and honor, exist as pillars that support justice according to Ibn Miskawayh. In this study, it was necessary to try to deal with the determinants of these concepts in the fair system and the fate of the system.

Benevolence and friendship, on the other hand, which I have discussed in the last section, are references to how justice is handled in the context of relations as a result of mutual establishment, as two concepts that emphasize human being as a civilized being. While Benevolence is handled through comparison with justice in *Tahdhib al-Akhlaq*, Ibn Miskawayh also focused on friendship and it is desired to evaluate whether this is an Aristotelian effect or not. So much so that it contains clues about the relationship between friendship and justice.

1.2. Abū ‘Alī Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad ibn Ya‘qūb Ibn Miskawayh

Born in Rayy, Iran, Abū ‘Alī Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ya‘qūb ibn Miskawayh lived during the Buwayhi era as a philosopher known for his interest in the disciplines of history and philosophy. We understand that Miskawayh, whose name we have come across as being controversial, was actually later called Ibn Miskawayh by his contemporaries and intellectual circle (al-Din, 1994:131). The philosopher, who held high bureaucratic positions in the Buwayhi period (Kamaruzaman,2010:27), which dominated Baghdad during the weakening of the Abbasid dominance, took office in these positions with the request of the caliphs to appoint educated people as library and secretary. It is observed that the interest of the philosopher, who had the chance to benefit significantly from the translation movements of the Abbasid period, switched first to history and then to philosophy. Later, when he served as a librarian and secretary, Greek sources provided support for his further studies. While his contemporaries Yahya Ibn Adi, Abu Sulayman al-Sijistani, Ibn Zur'a Ibn Al Khammar are thought to have Greek and Persian influences in his works as well, he especially

deals with the issue of morality in his works and influenced names such as Tusi and Dawwani after him. He is said to have died around 1030 in Isfahan (Siddiqui, 2001:29).

It is among the notes that Miskawayh, who has writings in the fields of history and philosophy, left numerous works. In addition to his notes on the traditions of ancient nations, his philosophical literature, which deals with both metaphysical and psychological elements, gives clues about the intellectual adventure of the philosopher. In this part, where I will give brief summaries of his work, I would like to make a note of the philosopher's intellectual labors to be understood from a broad perspective, and besides, I think that a preliminary step on the works frequently referenced in this study is necessary.

First, the *Jawidan Khirad* can be given in terms of content as an example of the philosopher's approach to ancient traditions and aphorisms. The content of the work, which is thought to have been translated into Arabic by *Hasan ibn Sahal* but completed by Ibn Miskawayh, includes aphorisms from the treasures of various cultures (Omar,2003:48). Ibn Miskawayh's *Jawidan*, thought to have been dealt with near his death, along with this Persian tradition, contained quotations from Greek, Hindu and Arab wisdom, and edited by Badawi under the title *al-Hikmah al-Khalidah* (Marcotte,1998)⁴. Oldest manuscript is in Bodlein library in Oxford and edited by Badawai in 1952. Related with this piece of work *Tajaribu'l-Umam* is a composition, which is a history book covering the events that took place from the Flood until the death of vizier Adud-dawla in 372 (983), is an example of Miskawayh's historiography. The oldest and the only complete copy of the work, which also includes the stories of the prophets, is registered in the Suleymaniye Library. Michael Jan de Goeje is the first person to introduce him to the West (İslam ansiklopedisi, 1996).

Later, his metaphysical work, *al-Fawz al-asghar*, occupies a separate area in Miskawayh literature with its uniqueness. This work of the philosopher, which is unique in terms of its content, according to M. Arkoun, was written around 366-369,

⁴See also; Khan, M. S. (1998). An Apocryphal Work: The" Javidan Khirad" Of Miskawayh. *Islamic studies*, 37(3), 371-380 adds M. Arkoun's comment on this issue that the philosopher purpose may have been to show that every nation is doing intellectual activities in search of *truth*.

while *Tahdhib* was written around 375 (Fakhry,1975:42). The work, which deals with the subjects of nafs, prophecy and God in a metaphysical context, is a book with ten chapters that also deals with the ontological grading of beings. In the standard al-Fawz al-asghar at the beginning, Ibn Miskawayh refers of his work that the caliph asked him to discuss these three specific issues. Al-Fawz al-asghar refers to *Timaeus* and *Laws*, which form the foundations of his metaphysical thought. (Omar,2018:54).

Tahdhib Al Akhlaq and Tathîru'l-A'râk is Miskawayh's major work in which he deals with moral thought in the most comprehensive way. In the work, which we know that the titles are given by C. Zurayk in the 1968 edition, subjects such as soul, cardinal virtues, justice, happiness, and the health of the soul are discussed. In particular, the names referred to are Aristotle along with Galen, and the second name was used most intensively. He refers to Plato four different times as well. (Omar,2018:54). This work, in which Neoplatonist and Aristotelian elements are intensely discussed, is the work that this study also heavily benefited from, and it is the most important work that is identified with the philosopher today. Another work that we frequently refer to along with al-Akhaq, is a short treatise on justice. *Risala fi Mahiyat'Adl* is a short treatise, is a study in which he deals with the manifestations of the concept of justice (Khan,1962). In which Aristotelian and Pythagorean effects are observed, with the essence of justice, and therefore its metaphysical dimension, is also discussed. First time in Mashhad by Brockelman the work, which is stated to be found, was published by Mohammed Arkoun.

On the other hand, *Kitâbu'l-Hevâmil ve'-Sewâmil* although it is attributed to Abu Hayyân et-Tawhîdî in the sources, the work written by at-Tawhidi includes the questions of him posed to Ibn Miskawayh and the answers the philosopher gave to them. The only manuscript available in Cairo was published by Ahmed Sakr and Ahmed Emin (Cairo,1370) (İslam ansiklopedisi,1999). It contains short answers that deal with roughly philosophical and scientific issues.

In this study, which I think it is more appropriate to explain, especially his most important works, I think it is appropriate to consider this treatise, as it has both ontologies of the nafs and psychological elements; *Risalah fi al- 'Aql we al-Ma'qul*. It is a metaphysical and philosophical text whose English translation has been reached

by Roxanne D. Marcotte's translation from the Arabic original of M. Arkoun⁵. This short treatise on intellect includes anecdotes about souls-spheres and intelligences (Marcotte,1996). Theoretical and practical faculties and the soul and intellect approach provide insight into Miskawayh's noetic approach (Marcotte,1996).

Other short treatises that is issued by M. Arkoun; *Risala fi 'l-Lezzât ve'l-Âlâm*, *Risala fi 't-Tabia*, *el-Mekulâtu 's-Selâs*, *el-Fasl Beyne'd-Dehr ve'z-Zamân*.



⁵ Marcotte, Roxanne D. (1996) "The "Risâlah fi al-'Aql wa al-Ma'qûl" of Ibn Miskawayh: an Epistle "On the Intellect and the Intelligible" (trans.), *Islamic Culture*, 70.2: 1-17.

CHAPTER II

MORAL VALUES and HUMAN NATURE

2.1. Ibn Miskawayh's Moral Standing

In the tradition of Islamic philosophy, moral thoughts come into being in the context of individual and social purification with the combination of politics, theology, and ethics. Following the translation movement during the Abbasid era (750-1258) influx of Aristotle, Plato, and Galen translations into the Islamic world, external moral problems of man, and introspective inquisition generated discussions. Although the scholars suggest that ethics is not the preliminary field of study of Islamic philosophers of the classical period, they reach a consensus that Ibn Miskawayh and the moral philosophers after him systematically dealt with morality in “*a philosophical context*”. Miskawayh is referred to as the most crucial moral philosopher by Fakhry (1991:170) in his periodical work of Islamic moral thought, “Ethical Theories in Islam”, after his references to the *Ilm al-Kalām* period and the Ancient Greek legacy. The Iranian philosopher had the chance to live during the golden age of Islamic philosophy and in the cosmopolite and intellectually active *Baghdad* (932-1030). Yet, contemporary philosophers of that period found themselves different positions with the philosophy by not scrutinize ethical thought as much as the Iranian philosopher and except for the al-Tawḥīdī and Abū Ya'qūb al-Sijistānī.

As far as we know from his biography, during his life in Baghdad, Miskawayh benefited eminently from the intellectual environment regarding his high-status political duties during the Buyids dynasty (934-1062). He served Buyid vizier Mu'izz-al'Dawla as a librarian and as a secretary. For these reasons, when he lived in Baghdad (975-), the Greek philosophical translated sources were easy to access for his research. Miskawayh started his intellectual life with historiography, and after his interest in history, his attention switched to philosophy, psychology, and ethics regarding his search for answers in ethical arguments. Especially in his *magnum opus* Tahdhīb al-

akhlāq (Refinement of Character), the main discussion shape around the man in which is considered as a *microcosmos* (ibid,2002:41), together with the discussion of moral cleansing through purification of the *soul* and the facility of *virtues* is in deliberation. An additional view on Ibn Miskawayh's philosophy is that his ethical approach has the value of being the admixture of the ideas from different Ancient Greek and Hellenistic philosophers. It is clear that, in addition to Aristotle, which he frequently refers to in his texts, i.e., Tahdhīb al-akhlāq, he adapted the *tripartite soul* doctrine of Plato in his comprehension of the concept of soul. Additively to the views that he harmonised pre-Islamic culture and Indian moral ideas also appear in his philosophy, Nichomecaen's Ethics and Neo-platonic idea of ethics dominate his ethics in general (Mahallati, 2018:53).

Analogously to the Aristotelian understanding, Ibn Miskawayh treats man as a social being. In Tahdhīb al-akhlāq, it is notable that he devotes the first chapter to the *nafs* or, in other words, soul, whereas he is describing the demonstration of morality. Hourani adds that an analytical approach like that of Kalam thinkers is not present in his works, but there is still a philosophical effort (2007:92), the philosopher renders a hierarchy concerning virtues peculiar to man. Moreover, to the classification tradition of the cardinal virtues, the illustration of the soul and its meaning for Islamic philosophers is significant to refer concurrently. The practical and theoretical categorization that Islamic philosophers follow as a classical way in the classification of sciences is also valid for Ibn Miskawayh. The construction of his ethical theory in Tahdhīb starts with the perfection of the soul, which is not in need of any substance that belongs to the corporeality and proceeds to the excellence of the human being as a social being⁶. By means of man being the *zoon politikon*, it is a usual approach for Islamic philosophers that philosophical argumentations on the ethical nature of human beings, by their very nature, also include examination of the soul or individuals (Karagözoğlu,2009:96) in addition to sociality .Islamic philosophers, who built their understanding of social, ethical order in the context of spiritual perfection, the faculties of the soul, and its improvement, accepted the sphere of existence as a tool to reach

⁶ See Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Ibn Miskawayh, & Zurayq, Q. (2002). *The refinement of character*.5-29 Great Books of the Islamic World.

the truth. Hence for Miskawayh, being a member of this tradition, the soul by having the faculty of reason is trainable via the virtues. The trichotomy of the soul, adapted from Ancient Greeks to Islamic philosophy, can be improved through virtues. While the philosophers before Miskawayh did not diversify the virtues as much as he did, it is clear that they aimed to find the possibility of true happiness through the hierarchy of these virtues and with the Aristotelian *eudaemonist* approach.

The fact that morality can change and develop with virtues is discussed concerning the soul. According to him, the character cannot become established until the virtues become faculty in the soul, at which point it is observable that he has an Aristotelian attitude. The virtues that have become habitus are finally exhibited externally, without the need for reflection or deliberation (Omar,2018:53). As mentioned above, this is considered as perfection and is necessary for happiness. In other words, spiritual growth is inevitable for the individual, who also needs sociability to experience and fixate virtues, to find and realize *true happiness*.

Nafs is at the center of metaphysics and epistemology for Miskawayh in terms of the relationship with the world that is sensible on the one hand and the perceivable on the other (Turan,2019:214). Whereas nafs give *life* to the body at one point, establish a relationship with the matter in a sensible content, its relationship with reason, as the phrase goes, is the necessary relationship for true wisdom. Along with the idea that human nature is changeable, he states human beings should withdraw from sensuality to approach a virtuous life, but that does not ignore sensuality. The significance of this statement is evident here; the very being of man, who is the microcosmos, is able to achieve spiritual perfection with internal growth rather than the external (Mohamed,2000:670). Thus, it is clear that he approaches the possibility of happiness, which becomes more of an issue as the goal of his moral philosophy and is also frequently observed in the Aristotelian approaches of different Islamic philosophers in the context of spiritual excellence. Miskawayh, who thinks that it is necessary to excel rationally via achieving of the listed virtues in the soul, also mentions in Tahdhīb al-akhlāq that virtues are inevitable for self-excellence. In parallel with the Neoplatonist interpretation of the virtues that we shall explain later in a hierarchical order parallel to his, his idea of the virtue of justice is vital. While Neoplatonist trichotomy is active as a condition for soul-purification, the definition of virtue as the mean between two

extremes is proof that it is an extraction from the Aristotelian approach. Justice (*al-ʿadl*), on the other hand, is handled in two different ways; individual purification to society. In both contexts, the aim is to reveal the possibility of moral competence.

2.2. Human Nature and Nafs (Soul)

Ibn Miskawayh, within the second discourse of the Refinement of Character, gives us a lead to understand what a character is and how its refinement is possible (Miskawayh,2002:29). In this section, he reviews the definition of character and the possibility of its perfection, and it is deducible that he used it in terms of training rather than educating. In the original book, he uses *ta'dib* (*paideia*) instead of education, which was in common usage during his time (al-Din,1994:136). Therefore, it would not be wrong to suggest that this is not an approach that only deals with education, yet it is an inquisition of character and its development in general. As we mentioned above, the adventure of the rational human being to know oneself and, in other words, “*al-kamālāt*” is at the core of the argumentation.

Ibn Miskawayh, who shares the Aristotelian idea that man is a social, virtuous being and requires sociability for the establishment of life, follows the Greek philosopher in his notion of accepting the variability of human nature and morality. He proposes that discussions about character are essentially discussions of human.⁷ This problem, which points to the problem of good and evil coupled with the human character, addressing human abilities and the possibility of virtues, has been handled right after the basic principles of the soul. By following his classical style, Ibn Miskawayh added his interpretation on the subject after discussing Hellenistic philosophers and Aristotle. He made a classification, notably for the Stoics and Galen, but stated his lack of support to their idea.

Noting that Aristotle's proposition in *Magna Moralia* of “those who aim to speak on ethics must first establish the moral character” argumentation, influenced Islamic

⁷ Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Ibn Miskawayh, & Zurayq, Q. (2002). *The refinement of character*. Pg 29-69. Great Books of the Islamic World.

ethical philosophers (Ansari,1964:318).⁸ Despite the Stoics' idea that human nature is good *per se* and to Galen's suggestion of its inclination to be both good and bad, Aristotle antithetically renders character development as a variable. And according to Miskawayh, for the Greek philosopher, habits that become attainment with repetition are inclined to be a disposition:

Aristotle made it clear in the Book of Ethics, as well in the Book of Categories, that a bad man may, by discipline, become good. But he did not consider this to hold absolutely, for he found that the repetition of admonitions and discipline and the good and virtuous guidance of people cannot but produce different results on different people: some are responsive to discipline and acquire virtue rapidly, while others also responsive but acquire it.⁹

Habitus, as an Aristotelian concept, includes the possibility of preserving morality (Naaman,2017:1). The reflection on Ibn Miskawayh's philosophy consists of the idea that man differs from other living beings with rationality (*al-natiqa*) which can attain good and bad perceptions and moral judgments with reason (*al-aql*). The philosopher demonstrates that while mentally constructing moral judgments, the practical shall also adapt to the theoretical. As said, the existence of irrationality in the soul forces to undergo moral training in order to choose rationality is inevitable. In addition to that, the individual who insists on the point of rationality will see the materiality and sensory pleasures of the external world at a lower level over time, which is another personality change opportunity offered by Ibn Miskawayh. Rationality which is the basic principle of the human soul, offers the opportunity to show the virtuous for the man who has both desire and reason to build personality (2002:44).

2.2.1. Nafs as the Principle of Morality

Previous to the process leading to the configuration of Islamic moral theories, philosophers first drew on the cosmological arguments that preceded them. It is apparent that the tradition, which started with al-Kindi (d.,873) and continued until the

⁸ In detail; 'Since we propose to speak on ethics, we must first consider of what moral character is a part' See also: Naaman, E. (2017). Nurture over Nature: Habitus from al-Fārābī through Ibn Khaldūn to 'Abduh. argues Farabi's idea of attainment of character traits by repetition, *Journal of American Oriental Society*,p.,6.

⁹ Miskawayh, Refinement of Character.p.31.

Farabi, dealt with the problem of understanding human nature by reaching political thought from cosmology until the period in which Ibn Miskawayh lived. With the availability of Arabic translations of Aristotle's works of Nicomachean Ethics, Politics, and Plato's State, Islamic philosophers formed a synthesis that ancient philosophers' interpretation of ethics and *politeia* could assist the questions of their time. Pursuant to a philosophical tradition that believes in every being has a purpose and an end, it's also inevitable to observe the pursuit to see parallels between nature and human soul (Butterworth,1983:225). And all, witnessable that tradition questions and challenges to understand the inner world of man in addition to the physical human body occupying a space in the world of formation and degeneration.

The fact of metaphysical inquiries being imperative to understand the human being is the continuation of a research process that questions the spiritual form beyond the physical form. Ibn Miskawayh, who suggests that man will gain the awareness that he is rational in his inquiries towards himself, expresses that the feature that distinguishes him from other living things is reflection and deliberation (2002:50). In addition to the idea that the soul is the essence (*jawhar*) and the source of the physical body's motion, the soul not being a subject but a principle of morality is professable. The soul, which receives light from the Creator of everything, is considered divine and immortal due to its source. Miskawayh thought of the soul as an essence that is not incompatible with the material things in the world and draws attention to the fact that the soul is the center of morality besides the virtues and its proneness to divine source. On the one hand, the soul is in contact with the physical world through the body, on the other hand, able to act towards spirituality with reflection and deliberation. Ibn Miskawayh's approach to this bilateral movement of the soul towards the material and spiritual realms is an opportunity to understand his idea of its faculties.

As we briefly referred to in previous chapters, for Ibn Miskawayh, the potentiality of a virtuous life is only possible with self-training. Aristotle's idea of virtue, reason and cognition being the core of life corresponds with the notion of Ibn Miskawayh in terms of virtues (Kaya,1983:214). It is vital to inquire of how Aristotle and Ibn Miskawayh treat the soul, which opens the doors of a happy life through virtues, in an ontological and moral sense? Or, in other words, how do the philosophers argue soul is the basis of morality? For Aristotle, the soul is the essence of the forms of physical bodies and,

he attends to the concept in a more physiological reference (Kaya,1983:236). However, Ibn Miskawayh attributes the faculty of reflection and deliberation, which is the source of moral maturity, to the soul. Referring to the soul, he conceived the faculty of reasoning that he thought separates man from other living things in the Aristotelian teleology since he accepted ethics in a teleological sense (Stafleu,2007:23). In other words, while the world of contemplation oppresses vices as an ability that estranges man from the physical world, direct towards the good because of its very essence. Wisdom and knowledge point to the most authentic way of happiness in Ibn Miskawayh's moral philosophy by benefiting Neo-Platonic interpretations. In short, the Aristotelian teleological sense of ethics by defining the final purpose as happiness is combined with the Neo-platonic definition of *true happiness*.

The trend of virtue ethics within the moral philosophy emphasized that external activity is generally, while there is also an implication of human actions being the reflecting the inner world. Rational men have the opportunity to attain virtues and find them settled in their inner world due to their ability to distinguish the good and the bad, in addition to the possibility of reflecting those virtuous externally. Ibn Miskawayh takes a character as an accuracy only when the virtues are *intrinsic (malaka)* in the Soul and, the only substance that can possess various faculties is also the Soul. In his answer to al-Tawhidi's question in *Al-Hawamil Wa-Al-Shawamil*, Ibn Miskawayh emphasizes its importance again by highlighting that the *Nafs* even more paramount than time.¹⁰ Keeping in mind that the body and soul are attached, Ibn Miskawayh conveys that the body and soul must be accustomed to the virtues to act accordingly. While he suggests that manner find the balance between theoretical and practical morality, he also considers the character refinement as dependent on these externally and internally reflected virtues.

The method of associating Islamic philosophy with Qur'ānic and Islamic principles is familiar, and Islamic philosophy and theology served as correlative among popular studies. The motive for this consideration is concerning studies, usually rooted in the

¹⁰ Şamil, Ö. Ç. A. L. Ebu Hayyan Tevhidi'nin İbn-i Miskeveyh'e Yönelttiği Felsefi Sorular. *Dini Araştırmalar*, 1(4), p.129.

al-Qur'ān urging man to use their reason and encourages those created at the point of collecting knowledge. Despite the idea that Aristotle and Plato's ideas in terms of Islamic moral theories have the intention to reconcile religion in this context among Islamic philosophers, there is no such interpretation or explanation in Ibn Miskawayh's philosophy. The difference of the philosopher at the point of the relation between the concepts of nafs and morality is that; divergent from the explanations of the previous tradition based on mostly fiqh principles and empirical explanations, he formed a moral cleansing theory and succeeded in combining it by adding Aristotle and Plato as well as Stoic elements. Karlığa (1981:250,251) propounds that at the subject of purification of body and soul, Miskawayh carries the influence of Pythagoras rather than the names we referred to prior. Before Ibn Miskawayh, Farabi combined the state of soul issue with akhlaq, but in terms of a framework ranging from cosmology to politics. Accompanied with Farabi, al-Ghazali also thought of morality as a concept rooted in the soul and tried to make sense of it through mystical interpretations, unlike Miskawayh.

Prior to Ibn Miskawayh, al-Kındi elaborated the concept of *nafs* superficially, in a moral context still, under the influence of Pythagoras, he said that the essence of the soul roots from the very existence of God (Karlığa,1981:247). In his work, *On Dispelling Sorrow*, which deals with the soul in a psychological context rather than a moral point of view, he says that when the soul leaves the body, it reaches the truth and can attain the knowledge of everything at this stage (Karlığa,1981:248). Hence, al-Kındi depicts the soul as an essence worthy of wisdom with its purpose that conducts towards the divine source. Conversely, al-Kındi passed over the sensory needs of the physical world at an entirely preceding level. In other respects, for Ibn Miskawayh, the association of body and soul shall form moral character, and through that, the soul shall achieve this with the establishment of virtues and reason (Turner,2016:124). In terms of superiority, the senses, and materials belonging to the physical world fall short of the beings that do not belong to the physical world. However, the fact that the social man has to have virtues to achieve by interacting with others makes him a part of the physical world.

In brief, the search for the physical world and beyond continued, with Islamic philosophers accepting the quest for knowledge as a divine command, turning towards

the metaphysical aspects of existents.¹¹ As a result of Hermetic themes and Aristotelian interpretations affecting the tradition of Islamic philosophy, which we accept as starting with al-Kindi, metaphysical inquiries about human beings who differ from other living things due to their rationality have taken an eclectic form. In Islamic philosophy, where Aristotelian, Neoplatonic, Galen, and Stoic themes blended, explanations on the soul shaped with assistance of theological input. The concept's position is beyond the world as formation and degenerating and identified with divine sources through emanationist philosophy. The theory of nafs is also determinant in the ethical theories of Islamic philosophers, in which they believed that every being comes into being for a reason. Ibn Miskawayh, the Islamic moral philosopher, considered the concept of soul, which counted as the moral principle of personal and social cleansing in his philosophical system, as the source of cognitive and sensory perception. The philosopher who believes that reflection and deliberation shall lead man to moral and spiritual perfection also suggests that these distinctive abilities will lead to God as the supreme knowledge. In this context, it is both the source of moral cleansing that man needs to become competent and the qualification that will bring him closer to the divine.

2.3. Nafs Concerning the Faculties

As a continuation of the previous chapters, it is necessary to stress that the soul is in pursuit of meaning to realize its perfection in the self establishment of morality, which happens by its nature. The intellectual *circular* realization of the search for meaning and contemplation and answering questions such as what is morality, what is a virtue, what is a soul in its essence through this search required a certain axiomatic acceptance among the philosophers who followed the Aristotelian virtue ethics. The question of how the self should know thyself and what kind of morality shall emerge with introspective inquiry suggested, as we have stated above, with exploration towards the inner world. Ibn Miskawayh thought, with his fundamental concern, both theological and philosophical, that the inner and outer tendencies of the person who has reason

¹¹ Ivry, Alfred, "Arabic and Islamic Psychology and Philosophy of Mind", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

and understanding are correlative. In his treatise *Risâla fî Mahiyyati'l-Adl*, he stresses the existence of a natural condition of human life. While voluntary life characterizes the worldly desires and needs of human beings, natural life is characterized by the fact that the soul establishes its eternal happiness with the search for higher knowledge, on the basis of staying away from ignorance. The quest for knowledge reveals the intellectual needs. Voluntary life reveals basic needs such as nutrition, drinking along with the inevitable need for socialness. On this occasion, there is a tacitness that the concept of the nafs, which is an transcendent being, is an essence that determines the ethical life of the individual, considering that the body cannot gain the act of movement without. The nafs allows this connection through its faculties. For this reason, he states and ranks as “He who examines the nature of this soul and of its faculties finds that it is made up of three parts ...” (Miskawayh,2002:14). The faculties of the soul will be explained in detail in the following section, how Miskawayh handles the subject.

However, prior to that, it is crucial to understand how Ibn Miskawayh embraces the metaphysical dimension to understanding the concept’s framework. Ibn Miskawayh is acknowledged and accepted in various studies as a philosopher who enfolds the theory of biological evolution of the species. It is observable of him in al-Fawz al-Asghar that he treats beings in a metaphysical coherence while at the same time discussing the idea about their coming into being by determining a hierarchical order between them. However, the output is self-evident; whether he supports a kind of close to the *Darwinist* theory of evolution occupies another area of discussion, it is evident that he determinately accepts a hierarchy in ontological existence among beings organic or inorganic. The metaphysical and cosmological reflections of this hierarchical structuring in the concept of nafs shall be in the following section.

2.3.1. Cosmic Scheme and the Ontological Hierarchy

While the soul is a principle rather than a subject of morality in Ibn Miskawayh's philosophy, it is also the object of cognitive and sensory perception. According to Miskawayh, knowing the foundations or resources that provide cognitive and sensory perception also contribute to a man's moral maturation process.

The ontological origin of the soul concept does not differ much depending on the understanding of Islamic cosmology. It is perspicuous that Greek doctrines and some Islamic elements were integrated into cosmological ideas from Ancient Greece to Farabi and following Ibn Miskawayh (Mohamed,2000:657). The dogmatical approach that God is the creator of every being also applies to the material world and the spiritual world that includes the soul. We have the inkling that Iranian philosopher stated that the physical materiality of this universe needs a creator because of its eternity. In his refutation against an anonymous opponent philosopher who claims that the soul is “heat”, *grosso modo*, Ibn Miskawayh articulates that the concept of heat is effective at certain levels of existents but, it is problematic to state this as the cause of its coming into being at the point of causality (Adamson&Pormann,2012:484). Despite this opponent's Stoic materialist origins, Miskawayh judges that the chain of causes of every being will end in God; God is the cause of all things, and knowledge of the causation of the particulars will bring us to the knowledge of God, cyclically. (Adamson,2012:484).

Although Ibn Miskawayh follows the classical Peripatetic thought regarding the origin of the universe, it's necessary to note his effort to reconcile the theory of emanation with the *ex nihilo* understanding. Regarding the relation between the Absolute and the multitude, the beings have emerged due to this activity that originates from the One. This approach, which qualifies the *Tawhid* (oneness) belief and that the creator's inclination to be understood by observing its creations, characterizes the idea of divine harmony in the multiplicity. In Ikhwan's system, the cosmos, the realm of the multitude created starting from minerals following a range of beings from plants to animals and then until humans (Mohamed,2000:671). That is to say, Ibn Miskawayh, similar to Ikhwan al-Safa', blends the Neoplatonic cosmos (Mohamed,2000:672). The man, the highest of all created creatures, is in this position as they have the least by comparison, accidents (*araz*), and composites. In Miskawayh's philosophy, multitude means corruption or depravity, and God who is the One, cannot be subject to corruption by not having accidents but create them. To that end, what is the importance of treating man as a composite or simple substance at the Nafs concerned point?

Ibn Miskawayh adapts the concept of nafs to his philosophy by blending it to the terrestrial and the celestial spheres. For the Peripatetic philosophers, the celestial involves heavenly bodies, celestial intellects, and celestial souls, while the terrestrial

embodies mind, soul, and body. His approach also predicts a hierarchy of entities. While objects gain matter and form through the unmoving mover, the soul comes to existence as an entity as competent to accept many epistemic forms.¹² It is the Active Intellect (or First Intellect) that is the First Cause, or in other words, the first light that emanates from the Absolute Being. Later, the Heavenly soul emerges and takes its source from the Active Intellect (Turan,2019:218). Except for the First cause, each of them is incomplete compared to the previous one and owes its existence in the chain of spheres.

Having said that by contrast to the distinction of potential, actual, active, and acquired intellect which Avicenna and Farabi contrive in their cosmos theories, in Miskawayh the trace that the concepts of *nafs-al natiqah* and *hayûlanî* are equivalent to the fact that the mind becomes actual is ensuant (Turan,2019:218). The difference between inorganic beings and organic beings in the formation process of the cosmos, which extends from minerals to the first elements, leads to the idea that the theory of evolution has reflections, which emerges here.

Aforementioned, the first competency of the soul is not only to give vitality but also to provide the principle of motion for the physical body. Also, we have added that man, as the most honorable living thing, gradually came into being from the First Cause. In addition, human beings are rational since they have *nafs* attached superior to their body and according to Miskawayh, man has the power of comprehension and contemplation with five senses to reach the perceptible and the power of reason to comprehend the intelligible. Thus, human sensory abilities, whose position will differ from other species due to the potency of intelligence, will share the sensory perception with animal species. For this reason, the soul, besides being a source of movement and vitality, holds the potential to collect all the accidental forms as a rational resource. According to the creation hierarchy of the soul shall both increase liveliness and determine the closeness to the First Intellect, which is the most intelligent being, according to its intensity, as it is a source of movement and intelligence *per se*.

¹² Turan, R. (2019) says that Miskawayh's idea is that the corporeal realm comes into being from ex-nihilo, and the spiritual realm comes into being with emanation. Ibn Miskeveyh'in Nefs Anlayışı. *Tasavvur Tekirdağ İlahiyat Dergisi*, 5(1), p.207.

The order of species of Ibn Miskawayh, starting from mines, proceeds according to the density of life and cognitive capacity juxtaposing corals, plants, animals (Saruhan,2016:407). In Miskawayh's *al-Fawz al Asghar*, the discussion of the hierarchy of existence is explained broadly by even including fruits in this order (Saruhan,2016:408). It emphasized by the philosopher that there is a hierarchy within each group of species claims that there is a conditional relationship between soul and body in organic and matter and form in inorganic beings (Turan,2019:208). The soul is a spiritual essence and is a resource that contains rational faculty that will filter the information provided by the five senses and cognitive information that are also prevalent in other living beings. While the five senses provide the knowledge of the sensual world, it deprives to be a source for the input of the universals (*al- kullī*) and, its illusion is apparent for the philosopher. Ibn Miskawayh explains the difference between the visible size of the Sun depends on senses and its actual size as an example (Adamson&Pormann,2012:491). The reason is the conducting authority that shall establish connexion with God as a competent essence that has the consciousness of knowing its own reasoning. Therefore, the Nafs which culminates into being from God, or in other words, by radiating, have the opportunity to approach him by using its faculties with the source it receives from him. In Plotinus philosophy, intellect approach God by always contemplating its very spring and manifests itself in the Nafs (Mohamed,2000:668). Similarly, Ibn Miskawayh believes that nafs can derive knowledge from its own essence and herewith establish a rational and ethical basis (Omar,2018:56).¹³

Following Aristotle, in terms of the nature of the soul, the philosopher theories an ethical basis by reconciling Greek philosophers propose with the Neoplatonic trichotomy of the soul. The base of the intellect in the soul and its possibility to clarify and falsify between the intelligible data and the sensible data take reference in previous chapters. As rational beings, human beings bear the opportunity to harmonize different faculties in their soul. Being aware of the nature of his own judgments as correct

¹³ In detail; "Thus, he refers to the prophetic tradition: "whoever knows his own self, knows his God; and to the Qur'anic verses (89: 27-30) concerning *al-nafs al-mutma,,inna*, already quoted above, perhaps to give an authoritative example of how successful is he who knows his own self, who is in command of his soul's passions, realising his God." p.56.

knowledge, Nafs is able to be a source in his ethical arguments through the intellect. Although the ontology of moral judgments is controversial given Ibn Miskawayh, there are also interpretations in terms of epistemology and ethics that mere reason cannot always lead to an accurate conclusion. What is important here is how intellect and the Neoplatonic idea of virtues take a position by Miskawayh on his argumentation of self-purification.

2.3.2. The Faculties

While Ibn Miskawayh emphasizes the possibility of human character alternation in his work *al-Akhlaq*, he constructs it starting from the principles of ethics. As a principle, the soul success through refinement and carries out this process of education in self-directed competency challenges to protect its health. Miskawayh sets out moral control as a condition from the earliest stages of human life to adulthood, explaining in his book how children's education should be through their parents and teachers. Rather than being solely moral education aphorisms, the book, which is within the possibilities of a rational and therefore a philosophical competence, has been shaped as a reflection of the traditional approach of Islamic moral philosophy in which has paramount importance regarding understanding human beings. (Karagözoğlu,2009:98). We understand that the pre-Tusi Islamic moral philosophers dealt with the moral context in line with the soul, the faculties, their healing, individual moral maturity, and Miskawayh was also included in this circle (ibid:96). As we have focused in the previous chapters, Ibn Miskawayh takes the point of the faculties of the soul in an Aristotelian-Neoplatonic synthesis way that is similar to milieu, after describing the soul as the *jawhar*. This point is noteworthy later on, as he deals with the virtues in this framework. The philosopher, take into account to synthesize the moderate and modest balance of the extreme points of the virtues of Aristotle with Plato's three-part soul, is included in the group of philosophers who form the ethical system through a justice-centered scheme.

Whilst Aristotle says that what is good for man should be investigated, he also propounds researching the concepts of soul and happiness and encounters with an approach extending from the first to the next. For Aristotle, happiness works teleologically; the query "what to do" of a person or a being, or in other words, the

realization of *telos* through their temperament, is the step that leads the human being or the being to his own creation. In his own words; “Mans aspirations should not be human though he be a man nor should he be content with the aspirations of mortal animals, though he himself be moral. He should strive with all his powers to live divine life; for man, though small in bulk, is great in wisdom and noble on intellect”.¹⁴ What is human nature? Or what work do human beings do? The answer to this question does not usually differ for antiquity. Ibn Miskawayh's *telos* convey the impression of continuing on the same line as a strict Aristotle follower and with theological motives. The being, whether living or non-living, will realize its perfection as long as it moves upward and completes what its nature dictates or what its reason of existence requires. Therefore, as touched on above, God thought to be the first cause, is the cause of beings, and it is possible for the being to approach him with the *upward movement*.

In this context, the paper requires us to point out that the Aristotelian *eudaimonia* takes place in two ways; theoretical contemplation and intellect. What is meant by the upward movement of the soul in Ibn Miskawayh's philosophy is points equivalently. Through deliberation and illumination, *nafs* perceives the intelligible and thus approaches oneself. Fakhry notes that this bilateral movement of the soul originates from the *Enneads* of Plotinus and specifying that the soul yearns for superior knowledge (1975:45). While self-knowledge and self-recovery are in a combination for Plotinus, *nafs* gets closer to The One with the activity of returning to himself (Mohamed,2000:668).¹⁵ So, the lexicon of the idea of from self to God legitimizes the philosopher's closeness, involving the similarities in the purification stages of the soul. The precondition that man's knowledge will increase by knowing the universals and the knowledge of the universals will lead to an approach to divine knowledge makes rationality constituting an exceptional point. As the authority of evaluation of virtues, rationality stands against the irrationality of the soul for Aristotle. Developing an

¹⁴ Y. Mohamed. (1998). Knowledge and Purification of the Soul an Annotated Translation with Introduction of Isfahani's "Kitab Al-Dhari'a ila Makarim Al-Shari'a (58–76; 89–92)" *Journal of Islamic Studies* p,16.

¹⁵ See again Mohamed, Y. (1998). In which Mohamed quote's Westra's suggestion that according to Plato, self-knowledge and souls knowledge are not combined, but this stage is essential for self-recovery for the sake of the philosophical knowledge of oneself. Knowledge and Purification Of the Soul an Annotated Translation with Introduction of Isfahani's " Kitab al-Dhari'a ila Makarim al-Shari'a (58–76; 89–92)". *Journal of Islamic Studies*, p.8.

argument in line with this dichotomy instead of the Platonic trichotomy, Aristo evaluates this two-way movement of the soul in this context (Fakhry,1975:45). Therefore, human beings, as rational, are the only organic being that can cognitively apprehend moral judgments, or in other words, evaluates the morality of good and bad actions. In Miskawayh's philosophy, human intellect, which we point out to be self-conscious at the point of knowing what he knows, symbolizes Neoplatonic axiomatic acceptance as one of the three faculties of the soul.

Ibn Miskawayh, appreciating Plato, thought of the soul as spiritual power and embraced the three-part theory of the soul. Although Nafs, which he thinks of as a single substance, differs from Plato at this point, he agrees with him that the soul has three exclusive abilities. In the first chapter of Refinement of Character, he devotes a short passage to this subject before discussing the virtues but, four cardinal virtues and the faculties of the soul are frequently discussed rather eclectic throughout the book. It sorts the human by underlining the rational faculty after touching the point of separation from other created living entities by reflection and deliberation;

...The faculty which has to do with reflection, discernment, and the consideration of the realities of things; the faculty which finds expression in anger, intrepidity, the risking of dangers, and the desire for dominance, self-esteem, and the different kinds of honor; and the faculty by which we have passion, the quest for food, and the desire for the pleasures derived from food, drink sexual intercourse, and the various sensual enjoyments. ¹⁶

Purification may occur as long as the named faculty are compatible with the means and, according to the philosopher, each can be counted as an attribution of a particular virtue. In other words, they mean the content of a singular being, not as different parts of the soul, both faculty and virtue.

The second discourse uses three different conceptual similitudes for each faculty. Rational faculty is also referred to as *kingly* while encompassing contemplation and the reality of things. *Beastly* is equivocal of the irascible faculty and finally the *leonine* for the concupiscent soul. At the individual efficiency, these faculties are concepts that

¹⁶ Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Ibn Miskawayh, & Zurayq, Q. (2002). *The Refinement of Character*. Great Books of the Islamic World.p.,14.

Ibn Miskawayh examines for the soul to be temperate, courageous, and wise, and extremes of the virtues should be avoided in practical life. At this point, the wisdom of oneself refers to controlling one's own beliefs while seeking genuine knowledge on the one hand. Temperance will help balance extravagance needs, while courage will allow you to limit the person (Omar,2016). The idea that physical organ functions with each faculty are also active in Ibn Miskawayh's philosophy. According to this solution, not surprisingly, while the instrument of intellectual faculty is the brain, the irascible faculty is linked to the heart and the appetite to the liver organ finally.

These three selves, who direct morality, are also equivocally used as irascible-concupiscent and angelic. While the rational soul is superior to creation, they differ from the other two souls in terms of their trainability. While irascible faculty is not cultivated naturally, its change with education is hypothetical, and concupiscent faculty is not a self-open to moral education. Therefore, from the point of being educable of the soul, he explains the virtues related to the parts of the soul (Kandemir,2017:245). Intellectual pleasures involve rationality faculty as the highest and noblest pleasures, and the needs and desires of human nature, or in other words, sensory needs, refers to appetitive faculty. Plato adds that these faculties, which he calls spirited or appetitive in *Timaeus*, represent irrationality, and they are the source of sentiments such as nutrition and reproduction (Omar,1994:49). Likewise, he critiques the hedonist approaches that consider reason only as a pleasure instrument and indicates that most noble happiness is reachable through intellectual pleasure (Adamson,2015:207,208). In the facility of these cognitive pleasures, the God factor gives complex signals. For instance, al-Ghazali, who has evaluations that his ethics have Ibn Miskawayh inspirations, explains rational competency in the context of joining (*ittisal*) to the intelligible world. (Mohamed,2000:670). Ibn Miskawayh thinks there will be a human level transcend with intellect, constructs an angelic or, in other words, divine state for human rationality (Mohamed,2000:661). This step, in which absolute happiness will find its final form, is completed with the Love of God, which is also valid for Ghazali. While al-Ghazali sees divine intervention as inevitable for the virtues, whether Ibn Miskawayh visions any divine intervention or relationship other than the Love of God is within a controversial framework (Vincent,2014:103).

2.4. Nafs and Body

Ibn Miskawayh clears up that the soul is an immaterial substance that does not dissolve and corrupts, on more than one account. Regarding the relationship between soul and body, he considers transcendental in his appraisal in two different points due to their difference in spirituality. The first is the relationship of metaphysicality due to the faculty of reason and the latter is the relationship with the sensible world, which shows the soul's ties to the body, of which is the mover. The place of the body is in domination in moral theories that put the self at the center, where the human soul aims to achieve refined actions. Although there are theological differences in the tradition of Islamic moral philosophy, the body is not the determinant of the actions chiefly but a temporary entity that gives vitality and form to the soul that determines actions. Its existence is possible depending on the soul and shall terminate via death.

For Ibn Miskawayh, actions and faculties function in parallel. The three faculties of the soul must act in harmony in order to establish true happiness, and this is an obligation to protect and sustain spiritual health correspondingly. For Ibn Miskawayh, who deals with cognitive and physical health in sync, the first is an eternal substance that does not suffer from corruption, yet the latter is subject to deterioration. Nafs is an abstract structure as a more superior substance and is positioned above the body in the ontological hierarchy because its source is the First intellect. On the other hand, the body is the center of perception of sensory pleasures and the authority to mediate sensual happiness merely. However, the body is able to practice this only through the soul, thanks to the principle that the soul is the mover and its only instrument of the soul in terms of actions. It is apparent that he has a different approach from Aristotle in the context of soul and body dualism and that he gives priority to the soul rather than a state of unity that he claims.

For Aristotle, the body represents potentiality, while the soul represents actuality (Siddiqui, 2001: 30). The soul as a “first actuality of a natural organic body” is also the form of the body (De Anima ii 1, 412a20–1). Regarding their similarities with the Iranian philosopher, they both agree that the human body only when its ensouled gains its form and, for this reason, it is accidental. It is possible to deduce that Islamic philosophers also accept the idea that the body acquires vitality through the soul but

monopolizes a lower area in the process of knowledge acquisition. For example, for Isfahani, along with Miskawayh, while the body indicates a temporal purposefulness, the implication of dissolving for the soul is out of the question and its movement rather indicates a transcendental occupation (Mohamed,2000:675).

Miskawayh's approach says that bodily and spiritual dualism represents the human being composed of opposites and sensory pleasures, or the sensory world accommodate happiness when in harmony. The distinction between their epistemological backgrounds indicates that the body and soul have different foundations or sources in the process of acquiring knowledge (Mohamed,2000:665). Reminding that there is no possibility of body activity without the soul, we have to say the following; the body is a sensory source from the natural world and, therefore, a lower source of pleasure and happiness. Conflicting with Plato, Ibn Miskawayh describes that true happiness is only possible at a lower level, if not as much as the physical than the spiritual. With a more spiritual interpretation, unlike Aristotle's physiological body-soul relationship, we recognize that the colossal palpable difference between the two beings stems from here (Zuckert,2014:71). Intellect, which does not need particulars due to its intelligibility, shall not demand a form that can solely provide sensory information, since sensation concerns particulars (Adamson&Pormann,2012:482,509). Along with the misleading information, the fact that sensory pleasures are also misleading is prognostic that the body belongs to a deficiency area. Contrary to the substance that exists evermore, the body is in material formation and, degeneration which signifies the temporary being of the world.

In Refinement of Character's third discourse, Ibn Miskawayh discusses notion of good and their divisions and remarks that Aristotle lists happiness under five headings. While this classification includes sociological signs such as property and social dignity, it also refers to an internal dimension that including the individual's self, such as good judgment. Following this, he remarks that the body and soul dualism of some of the philosophers before him, also guided their ideas about which measure of human life is happiness involved. He underlines that Plato thought that happiness belongs only to the soul. According to this idea, which he will criticize later, the soul can be down-dragged with physical corruption (Mohamed,1998:8). Unlike Aristotle, Plato describes the happiness of the soul by taking the soul and body separately and counting the body

as trapped in the body by falling from the celestial sphere. Later, in a similar fashion Abū Bakr Muhammad Zakariyyā Rāzī interprets that the soul will be in pain as long as it connects to the body because the corruption will be presented through the body and thus longing to leave the body, by attributing this view to Plato.¹⁷

As a result, the self-body relationship in Ibn Miskawayh' philosophy has been given an ontic evaluation as different structures in the context of its epistemological and metaphysical origins. Miskawayh, since it is a nafs-centered system, underlined that it is soul incorruptible and immortal similar to Avicenna, adding that the non-mechanical nature of human behavior is decisive in the effects of the soul on the body and, accordingly the character dispositions of people differ (Ahmed, A., & Suleman,2019:161). In his treatise that deals with the fear of death, Ibn Miskawayh gives the signs that the body is an instrument of the soul and the death phenomenon means that the soul leaves the body that is in use. The body, then, is an entity that only acts as a tool until it reflects the moral state of intellect and the education and intellect acquired in the soul from childhood to adulthood and leaves the body in which it is occupying. That is how Ibn Miskawayh differentiates himself from Aristotle who treats happiness as an experience belonging to this world, along with the ideas that deal with the body and the soul well-adjusted in theological approaches of Kalām.

2.5. Significance of Virtue Ethics

The lack of a relativist interpretation in Islamic moral theories is due to the fact that they are based on theories about the soul. The knowledge of the self, the realization of the virtues, and finally, the drive towards the First Intellect are all vital aspects of a man's spiritual cleanliness. Although the soul is an axiomatic acceptance, concomitantly arguments about moral education shift from the citizen to the domestic economy and politics regarding moral theories.

It is candid to say that the aim of individual and social ethics is to achieve beautiful conduct, which Islamic philosophers can achieve by beautifying and correcting the self

¹⁷ See; KARLIĞA, B. (1981) suggests that its roots actually belonged to Pythagoras. Pythagorasçı Felsefenin Türk-İslâm Felsefesine Yansıması. *Felsefe Arkivi*, p.,249-250.

and repeating virtues. We've already stated that the aim of self-excellence is to navigate the boundaries of happiness. In terms of relation to the intelligible and the sensible spheres, man's responsibility is in the center of both individual and social contexts of human beings' lives. Regarding his approach, man is an antinomic being because he is connected to the outer world through his body and to the spiritual through his reason. Human beings, with their physical and spiritual needs, are prone to both good and bad behavior. However, for Ibn Miskawayh, this depends on how much the man can train the practical and theoretical faculties. Man who has both desire and reason also opens the door to the possibility of self and social happiness with various virtues.

The politics of man and politics' subordinating ethics is a characteristic of Aristotle's philosophy. The individual is a member of the *philia* (friendship or affection) and the *polis* (city-state), and social obligations and moral responsibilities are the facts that sustain these building blocks for the establishment of happiness (Laks&Schofield,1995:75). For a philosopher who thought that the possibility of a happy life is through socialness, it is necessary to make definitions that would characterize valuable activities. According to the Ibn Miskawayh, the virtues that lead to all of a human being's beneficial actions, along with intellect, are conditional on why a person does what he does, secondly thinking about the outcome of his conduct with complete will and believing that the contrary will not occur. (2002:69). Therefore, the social man will have to gain by reinforcing the virtues on the social grounds, which he will exercise for happiness. In practicing virtues, human beings need socialness, both because they are insufficient by creation and because they naturally need socialness. However, for people who are not self-sufficient, self-knowledge is required. A similar sequence is understandable in Miskawayh's philosophy. His idea of moral growth has progressed by factors ranging from the individual to the domestic economy and even politics. That's the point that makes dealing with the soul important in understanding the virtues since it is the first step of the knowledge besides the purification of the human soul. The problem of establishing such virtues as abilities in the soul, as well as social life, attracts particular attention. How will the virtues that are inextricably associated with sociability and relationships in the external experience be built in the soul? Is moral maturity complete constantly, where it is to settle in man, or is a constant ethical observation required? Or another question is, shall a person first establish sociality for self-betterment? Such questions are related to how philosophers

deal with human beings in their philosophical systems. Philosophical fabrication is also framed depending on the anecdote of the soul; for this reason, it is vital to grasp that Ibn Miskawayh regards the soul as a substance suitable for education and moral development. The naturally changeable self is purifiable and can be refined by virtues. In Ibn Miskawayh's theory, the circular movement of the nafs-virtue-society triad is a manifestation of a macrocosmic order as the microcosm, which is called the first phase of this. Therefore, it is inevitable to understand the order of the creator and to be able to establish happiness in this world and the next world.



CHAPTER III

JUSTICE AS A LEADING VIRTUE

3.1. Concept of Justice Overall

It is in the note that Ibn Miskawayh's approach to justice has various dimensions and that these dimensions cope within the book of Tahdhib al-Akhlaq and the treatise of Mahiyat, respectively. Ibn Miskawayh, who credits that the way to the highest happiness passes through theoretical and practical competence, seeks to explain his approach over self-refinement by adapting Platonic virtues. This refinement process, which shall lead to social purification, takes place with the inclusion of the virtue of justice in self-perfection. Before him, the tripartite soul and the idea that the virtue of justice as a consequence was accepted commonly among Muslim philosophers, and even this pre-acceptance continued including Al-Razi, Yahya Ibn Adi, and Ikhwan al-Safa (Fakhry,1975:45). It is a matter of debate whether the social dimension of the concept is directed from a completely similar point to the Aristotle tradition before Ibn Miskawayh. However, it is noteworthy that Farabi, al-Kindi, and Razi also assign justice, and especially Farabi made a distinction between distributive and protective justice (Turan, 2017:105).

One of the points that characterize the disparity between Ibn Miskawayh and the founding fathers is his treatise that engages the nature or essence of the concept. Furthermore, secondly, his effort of reflecting the individual and social dimensions both in ethical and socio-political contexts. The position suppressed in his philosophy is a synthesis of Plato's trichotomy and Aristotle's concept of social justice in which to explain the relationship of the individual to the others. The concept's establishment in the soul as a virtue and faculty, its position in the list of virtues, its reflections in society as a social concept are vital in a way that touches the comprehensive ethical philosophy of Ibn Miskawayh. So, this paper shall attempt to understand the reflexion of the view by focussing on the soul's aptitude.

3.2. Essence of Justice

We see that Ibn Miskawayh mentions the concept of justice, alongside al-Akhlaq, in a separate Risala, and because of the wide scope of the concept while discussing it with many topics. It is inevitable that his philosophical system should be reviewed at the point where it is desired to be understood since it is handled in a special section in Al-Akhlaq and separate Risala for the subject. In the first part of his book, he listed the sub-headings of the concept of justice, which he thought of as a virtue, under the title of 'the divisions of justice, and dealt with it in layers in the *Risâla fî Mâhiyyat'l-Adl* treatise. We see his approach, which has the quality of classification, in both works. Especially his treatise is important in terms of deep examination of the subject, but it can also be observed that it deals with the nature and various dimensions of the concept. This treatise, which was addressed on the questions of his contemporary and friend at-Tawhidi (923-1023), should have been the answer to a question asked about tyranny, but it is also the web of various fields and intricate relationships that the concept touched in the world of thought of Ibn Miskawayh can be observed (Khan, 1962:315).¹⁸

In Al-Akhlaq, the concept of justice is also reflected in various frameworks in the ethical philosophy, which is ordered from the soul to the social context. As it can be understood, the sub-headings are made within the framework of the ethical reflections of the concept, but still, the institutions that make up the social environment of human beings seem to be a list that he lists in order to organize the channels that should be in a relationship in the circle of sharing-communication. They are respectively the subtitles of friendship, concord, amiability, family fellowship, recompense, fair play, honor dealing, piety, and Miskawayh explained only the concept of friendship in the following chapters. However, as it is underlined, these classifications and interpretations include an Aristotelian interpretation of the daily life of social human beings rather than a deep understanding of the nature of the concept. The organization

¹⁸ See Khan, M. (1962). An Unpublished Treatise of Miskawaih on Justice, that Khan's suggestion on the matter of Ibn Miskawayh's answer to at-Tawhidi's request of him to answer a question about tyranny. Ibn Miskawayh's reply to the topic says the concept is about justice specifically, makes worthy to understand the importance of the concept. *Zeitschrift Der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 112 (n.F. 37) (2), 309-318.

of daily life and the construction of the concept starting from the individual is described as a stage of happiness and is actually one of the most important steps. While its subtiles and division of the concept contain claims that the philosopher benefited from both Aristotelian and Neo-platonist interpretations, it certainly supports the idea that the soul has Neoplatonic faculties and the four cardinal virtues. This approach, which he discussed in detail in *Al-akhlaq*, means that for Miskawayh, justice arises as a result of the moderation of the other three virtues.

In Ibn Miskawayh's system, justice is also handled both with its opposite and with an Aristotelian mid-way approach due to the Stoic influence:

Justice is a mean between doing injustice and suffering injustice, and justice is then, a virtue which causes one to be fair to oneself and to others, by refraining from giving, of the useful, more to himself and less to others, and of the harmful, vice versa, ie, less to himself and more to others. the just man applies equality, which is a proportionate relation between things, and it is from this meaning that his attribute, justice, is derived. The unjust man, on the contrary, seeks, of the useful, more for himself and less for others, and, of the harmful, less for himself and more for others.¹⁹

Therefore, justice both points to a Neoplatonic harmony and is one of the supporting pillars of social harmony. For this reason, it is important that the next section is named as “virtue can be achieved only by association” specifically to underline this relation. Because the dimensions of the order in the context of justice become more obvious in this way. Therefore, Ibn Miskawayh, metaphysical and socio-political contexts of justice are intertwined, and after quoting Socrates, who thinks that all parts of the soul are more instrumental than other virtues, he adds that the world order should depend more on justice. In his treatise, he differs from *al-Akhlaq* in considering the nature of the natural, conventional, divine, and human sections of justice in detail.

It can be said that the classification of justice, which differs in terms of its sources and effects, is essentially evaluated in the context of its distance and proximity to human beings. While he does not strip the justice that he thinks takes place at every point of existence from the classical divine plane, he bases natural justice on the senses,

¹⁹ Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Ibn Miskawayh, & Zurayq, Q. (2002). *The Refinement of Character*. Great Books of the Islamic World.p.24-10.

conventional justice on social agreement, and human justice on the nafs. Yet, divine justice is possible in metaphysical and eternal beings. The importance of this division lies in the following; In the context of practical and theoretical ethics, justice is a summary of the virtue ethics of Miskawayh philosophy, and it has permeated each concept.

Along with this formation, as the condition of happiness, virtues must be realized and virtue and reason must find balance and reach justice, which is moderation. As Aristotle said “a man who is unjust is more harmful than harmful beasts of prey”, and according to Ibn Miskawayh, the man who is naturally civic, he has to establish this virtue for both his own and social moral salvation for complete happiness (Pines,1975:151). For this reason, a large section has been devoted to the concept in his elaborate work, which even deals with the education of children. In which, the social man should practice virtues in society, starting with the family, and avoid any kind of isolation that will not establish this experience. He must morally support social pillars as well as be responsible for his personal competence.

3.3. Cardinal Virtues and the Hierarchy

The concept of virtue is attainable for Ibn Miskawayh through the purification of the soul. According to him, bad actions are practices that distance them from the nafs’ foundation, and purification of the soul is essential with an approach in the sense of salvation. A moral education from childhood to adulthood is essential because of this approach that the soul thinks is possible in line with the harmony of its faculty with virtues. A person who needs to grasp the importance of the result of his actions from childhood should know that he can reach a spiritual state that can balance primitive emotions, and therefore happiness, as a virtuous person. Ibn Miskawayh, who assumes that actions that do not lead to good will be rejected by cognition, also structures his system by including the four basic virtues in happiness. Man, as a social being, has the intellect and aims at happiness by aiming for the good. According to Ibn Miskawayh, who thinks that it would be more correct to choose the four virtues because of their own nature, this can be made possible by avoiding excesses and acting on the path drawn by the reason. He underlines that a person has more than one virtue and when he chooses villainy, it is impossible not to notice that it conflicts with his other virtue.

We know that virtue is a single point in the center (Aristotelian mean) but that there is an infinite set of points between a point placed in the center and a point added to it, which characterizes the extreme states of virtue. While Ibn Miskawayh says that virtue is mean with an Aristotelian approach, the Neoplatonic partition creates a list of human virtues with a list that has not been made before him in addition to the four virtues.²⁰

We understand the undeniable value of the concept of virtues in Ibn Miskawayh's philosophy from the fact that it underlines in a fashion that the concepts of nafs, intellect, and virtues together will create a top morality and cannot be taken away since they are not in materiality. As he deals with in his treatise on the nature of justice, existence contains disgrace only due to lack and spread of deficiency. It is possible to say that some things are more virtuous than others where there is abundance in the system where the absence of virtues, which are considered on the hierarchical plane, means vileness. Only by virtue of a unifying One, the state of multiplicity that will always be lacking in the face of Unity, and moving towards it, they can become more virtuous and honorable, while at the same time drawing closer to Him. In Refinement of Character, where he notes that without wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, spiritual degeneracy will occur, and there is the implication that we must constantly be in control of the virtues.

While virtue ethics paradigms emphasize activity, they mean the reflection of the inner world in practical life (Stafleu,2007:23). Ibn Miskawayh's list of virtues is also indicating the practical reflection of the balance in the soul. In the tradition based on Aristotle, the soul is intelligible and waged in terms of its perfection in the sensible realm. Sciences emerge when the human soul turns to what is higher than itself, and morality emerges when it turns to what is below. Perfection in the practical field includes the knowledge and ability of the virtues and the purification of the human soul from vice. For Ibn Miskawayh, theoretical and practical competence reflects the relationship between matter and form. Being a microcosm of a person who has these two competencies depends on having universal and basic knowledge and virtues along

²⁰ See Fakhry, M. (1975). *The Platonism of Miskawayh and its implications for his Ethics*. *Studia Islamica*, He refers to R. Walzer, Greek into Arabic, whom suggests that the Platonic listing of subvirtues is common among the philosophers of that period p.51.

with beings. Contrary to contemporary comments on this particular subject, it can be said that virtues were not addressed through social contracts but rather as human and social welfare (Floistad,2015: 8,15) during Ibn Miskawayh 's period, in an extent of individual competence, or in other words, agent-centered. Since he is agent-centered by method, he takes the human character as a problem and has a temperament where virtues are revealed as habits (Dimmock&Fisher,2020:54). Virtue ethics provide virtuous excellence while giving advice and prescriptions for virtuous people's attitude towards the situation (Dimmock&Fisher,2020:54), and virtuous people do virtuous acts, and virtuous behavior is understood through virtuous people.

For Ibn Miskawayh, while all virtues are part of a balance, justice is the ultimate morality that grasps them. He wanted to evaluate justice, which he said was not an activity, beyond classical theology, and he wanted to diversify the infrastructure of the concept with Aristotelian and Neoplatonic elements. Aristotle also thinks justice to be the greatest of all virtues because of intentionality; This action, which tends to be experienced both in the soul and in the practical field, pointed to an important place in terms of being dependent on being the result (Fakhry,1975:46). Among the four cardinal virtues that he dealt with sub virtues in Al-Akhlaq, he only partitioned justice; Firstly, it deals with wisdom and wisdom sub-headings: intelligence, retention, rationality, quickness, soundness of understanding, clarity of mind, capacity for learning easily. intelligence: flaring of conclusions retention, the persistence of image (it's mean is forgetfulness), rationality: conformity of the soul's investigation of objects (it's mean is going too far in consideration of the object), the capacity of learning easily: strength of the mind, it's mean is finding learning difficult.

Afterward, the sub-titles of the virtue of temperance follows; modesty, the self-restraint of the soul, sedateness, tranquility of the soul, self-control, resistance of the soul, liberality; the mean of giving and taking, integrity; righteousness a virtue that makes a person acquire money in a right way. By giving brief definitions Ibn Miskawayh details; sobriety; moderation in food and drinking, benignity; souls zeal to accomplish the good, self-discipline; a state that leads the soul to judge things rightly, good disposition complement of the soul with beautiful adornment, mildness; meekness innate aptitude, staidness; the tranquility of the soul, and finally piety; constant performance of good deed which lead to the perfection of the soul.

Just before the subheadings of Justice, the last subheadings of courage: greatness of spirit: the ability to bear honor, intrepidity: keeps the soul from being troubled by fear, composure: virtue that causes the soul to ensure both fortunes and misfortunes, fortitude: gives strength to bear pains, magnanimity: keeps the soul from moved easily by anger, calmness: shown ins disputes when one is defending one's women or the Law, manliness: aspiration to perform great deeds, endurance: which uses the organs of the body for what is good and continues with liberality: generosity: spending the right way, altruism: abstain from one's own need to give in, nobility: rejoicing from great deeds, charity: deserving persons, open-handedness: spending the part that should not be spent, remission: cancellation of part what is due.

Lastly, al-Akhlaq deals with the justice he sees as belonging to both this world and the metaphysical field, with its subheadings as follows; Justice subdivisions: friendship: to take and sincere love in all concerns one's friend, concord: agreement of opinions in the management of livelihood, family fellowship: sharing with relatives, recompense: repayment with its equivalent, fair play: give and take with fairness, honest dealing: recompense without regret, amiability: a desire to win affections, piety: honoring and obeying God.

Therefore, just like Aristotle, virtues are essential concepts for Ibn Miskawayh, and each mode of living has to be followed by a virtuous path of life (Cornell,2014:98). As the Islamic philosophers before him followed, man can form his virtues as habitus in his character with his actions aiming at moral truth, and thus, he can reach the level of angels. While evaluating this point in the context of the nafs, it is inevitable for Ibn Miskawayh, who does not keep the practical area away from his theoretical approach in his system, to consider the concept in a social context as well. Virtues, which directly relate to happiness, therefore belong to both the spiritual and material realms. Just as their absence is disgraceful and causes diseases of the soul, it also leads to deterioration in the material world. And this degradation takes place from the possessor of virtue towards its surroundings.

3.4. Classification of Justice

The equivalent of the concept of justice in Islamic philosophy can mean wisdom, principle, virtue. While justice in Ibn Miskawayh's case refers to moral standing as a disposition or faculty, it is taken as a virtue and the nature of virtue means a combination of both Aristotelian and Neoplatonic ideas (Turner,2016:119). According to Ibn Miskawayh, the forms of manifestation of justice that mean between inflicting injustice and perpetuating it are handled in various ways. The virtues that emerge as a habitus are interpreted as for oneself and others at the point of justice, close to the Aristotelian interpretation. The virtue of justice, which emerges as the moderation of wisdom, courage, and temperance, is wide enough to touch various points as a reference to happiness in the practical and theoretical realm. As discussed in the previous section, in addition to the subheadings corresponding to the socio-political dimensions in al-Akhlaq, he made four different classifications for at-Tawhidi's question in his treatise, which deals with its nature overall. His approach, which extends from the moral competence of the soul to the individual's being a social being and the social establishment of morality, has led him to take justice seriously. However, the question of whether the Neoplatonic line is associated with the Aristotelian virtue approach is due to the desire to find a solution to the theory and action dilemma.

He starts by considering the concept that he evaluates with the titles such as; *for what is due to God, justice as a disposition of the soul, justice is intermediateness justice or love, from the point of not having a misleading virtue* in al-Akhlaq (2002: 106-112). According to him, the fact that it is established or not as a virtue allows us to have an ethical observation of the character of the person at the point of justice. The four basic virtues say that because they are virtues, they should establish a settled morality and that the temperant person should be restrained in bodily desire and avoid excesses. He then deals with the reality of courage respectively. He adds in exceptional cases in which temperate and courageous action gains reality and actuality and that reality can only be achieved through “resistance to his passions or in his submission to them ”.²¹

²¹ Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Ibn Miskawayh, & Zurayq, Q. (2002). *The Refinement of Character*. Great Books of the Islamic World. 95-14.[The Refinement of Character].

He then evaluates justice in terms of acting and being, in the context of *real justice*. With exceptional reactions, the person is considered just, and the establishment of fairness as faculties is in question; he adds that justice, which is a certain moral disposition of the soul mean, will be displayed in a balanced way with every action, and as a result, justice that is the most perfect of virtues and the nearest to unity will lead.²² We witness his interpretation of the manifestation of justice in a man's soul, in his *Risala* (Miskeveyh,2014:4). Since self-happiness is possible with the harmony of the virtues in the most virtuous way, the human justice section is important for understanding both self-purification and social cooperation. In fact, Miskawayh mentions that he first examines his soul to be temperate courage and wise.; “One would first improve one's soul and refine it, so as to reap the fruit of one's struggle which is justice”.²³

This approach, which can be seen as a reflection of Aristotle's idea of justice to be the greatest of all virtues (Fakhry, 1975:249), can also be observed in the chapter on equality. According to the philosopher, externally to us, justice is experienced in three areas; money and honors, and voluntary transactions in the conditions of violation of rights (*The Refinement of Character*, 102-114-5). It is seen that he considers three concepts to seek the possibility of equality and moderation; money, sharia, and leader. As he stated, these concepts, which are considered as external measures, have been evaluated as just an intermediary, and he supports this idea with a quote from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*; “In his work known as *Nicomachea*, he said: The highest law is from God (blessed and exalted is he!), the ruler is a second law on His behalf, and money is a third law” (2002:117). These three external concepts, which determine the social justice and equality of civilized people, serve as a balancing act towards justice to oneself to justice to others. It is possible to observe that the concept of justice is handled as a proportion, rather than an equivalent definition with equality, but the concepts are later discussed in the section where the social dimension of justice is discussed will be disclosed.

²² Ibid.,100-10.

²³ See Omar, M. (1994). Mikawayh's Theory of Self-Purification and the Relationship Between Philosophy and Sufism. *Journal of Islamic Studies*, 5(1), p.,42.

The order in which he deals with the concept of justice in his treatise does not list it in the same order as in the book. In addition to the above facts, he underlines that Aristotle treats justice as performing toward God. It is observed that the philosopher continues by supporting the performance of justice against God, who rewards people with goods. He then evaluates the person who is the civic and social person against others in the context of how to perform justice relating with fairness and honoring each other.

Similarly, but not exactly, it can be said that in the distribution of justice he made in the *Risala*, God held within the transcendental realm, in the soul of the human being, in the relations between people and in the whole society (Miskeveyh,2014:4). We have explained above that it will be realized through the balance, and harmony of the virtues in one's soul and that it will be based on sociability. It should be noted here that Miskawayh's divine, human, natural, and conventional distinction is not seen in the *al-Amiri*, Aristotle, and Plato before him (Turan,2017:107). This classification ultimately emerges as the grounding of human and human's practical and spiritual bonds. For example, he adds that the beginning of natural justice is sensory, and it can be understood that divine justice is subjected to an evaluation or comparison with the world of multiplicity and unity. Human justice, on the other hand, includes the concepts of universally accepted legislative human norms.

It is necessary to mention the comments on the idea that Aquinas has similar comments with Miskawayh on virtue ethics. In terms of both the four cardinal virtues and the interpretations of justice, it is common to see a similarity as both philosophers follow the Aristotelian line. Aquinas is similar to Ibn Miskawayh in virtue ethics, he gives a quartet list as follows; prudence: reasons habit of good governance, temperance: reasons preserving despite concupiscence self-serving, irascible: irascible passions such as courage and justice: governance of one's relations with others (Alavi,2009:005). Although normative ethics is based on virtues, similar to Ibn Miskawayh, it can be seen that they do not prioritize justice like Ibn Miskawayh and they differ in a virtue classification that carries Christian theological elements such as prudence. Also on the point of justice, al-Ghazali might be a closer interpretation,

which Fakhry sees as being analogous (Fakhry,1997:266).²⁴ According to Ghazali, justice arrives if irascible and concupiscent are suppressed. This paves the way for religious piety (Ibid.:267). At this point, the similarity between al-Ghazali and Aquinas is more vivid than with Ibn Miskawayh, but the denouncing of the world is more palpable in both philosophers than in Ibn Miskawayh. And Ibn Miskawayh's approach in that seems to involve piety appraisal of virtues as opposed to avoiding *zuhd* (renunciation) or ascetic interpretations are not the subject of this study, but are worth investigating.²⁵

3.4.1. Natural Justice

Ibn Miskawayh in the *Essence of Justice* also mentions three different types of justice and a type of justice within these three. In *Risala*, in which he deals with natural, conventional, and divine justice as well as human justice, he explains and interprets the titles, respectively. Emphasizing that he will deal with substance, its accidents, and attributes, and mentions that he will start with natural justice, which is closest to human beings. According to him, divine justice, as mentioned before, is the furthest from human beings. Ibn Miskawayh, approaching philosophical concepts in order to understand the syllogism of multiplicity and unity, and to understand beings through their opposites, also follows this path in his classification. At the point of natural justice, he turns to a critique starting from the four opposite principles and extending to equality in terms of substance and measure.

The reason why natural justice is handled first is that, according to Ibn Miskawayh, it is the closest to human beings since its beginning is the senses. Man is in a relationship with nature, and there is justice at every level of existence, from human to nature. But they diversify because of the areas in which they gain actuality; natural justice also

²⁴ See Abul Quasem, M. (1975). Al-Ġazālī's Conception of Happiness. *Arabica*, 22(2), 153-161. says that they differ from Miskawayh in his Virtue classification, that justice, which according to Miskawayh means between inflicting and perpetrating injustice, is expressed for Ghazali as a virtue in the justice faculty (quwwat al-adl), treated as an independent virtue p.121.

²⁵ See Renard, J. (2011). *Islam and Christianity*. University of California Press. He put forwards that Ibn Miskawayh lists virtues equivalent to Christian cardinal virtues (this may be due to the similarity with T. Aquinas). Aquinas does not attribute happiness to this world, p.173.

derives its difference from its belonging to the sensuous world. It states that the nature of good is equal to the nature of existence. According to him, its opposite must be evil or wrongdoing; therefore non-existence is attributed to the non-one multiplicity. In line with the theory of emanation, the idea of justice being the most just from the first existing beings has been evaluated within the emanation theory and has been continued in the tradition. The First Being, which is the first source and cause of existence, is also the source of the realization of justice. For Ibn Miskawayh, the multiplicity differs from the One in that it is incomplete against the prior. This connection is important for understanding Ibn Miskawayh's simple and compound entities. Because, according to him, those who have many components, and accidents in themselves will be the most distant from the One due to their own essence by their very nature. This is the criterion that determines the relationship between the terrestrial and the celestial world; this is how the terrestrial and celestial realms are associated with the concept of justice in Ibn Miskawayh's philosophy. Both spheres are evaluated in the context of equality, substances have to correspond to equality even though there are differences in their quality and quantity. The distinguishing qualities of earthly beings have equivalences to balance; After giving examples of soil and water, which he said to be different in essence, and if they were completely equal in terms of quantity and weight, he said that there would be equality between them in terms of justice and unity and that this balance would mean justice, which is natural. He continues by multiplying examples on the subject.

Ibn Miskawayh's celestial world radiates from God, and we can observe that notions reflection with the emanation theory regarding the celestial sphere. The terrestrial one, on the other hand, evolves towards God and towards him in the sensible world, things have matter and form (Mohamed,2000:660,661). The existence of natural justice is only in the matter is the key point here. According to Ibn Miskawayh, both of them are eternal, similar to divine justice, but what characterizes natural justice is that it adds integrity and identity to objects (Fakhry,1975:250).

Aquinas talks about a similar law, the *natural law*; involves intelligent beings being subject to the *eternal law*. It is qualified that we act with the principles that guide our knowledge. However, there is also the division of human eternal and divine law (Turan,2017:108,109). For Ibn Miskawayh, natural justice depends on divine justice,

and human justice emphasizes the fallibility of human justice. Aquinas also wanted to qualify this with human law, and the similarity of divine law and eternal law is visible (ibid:109).

3.4.2. Divine Justice

In the metaphysical understanding of Islamic philosophy, one of the two determinants of cosmological doctrines is tawhid, while the second is God accord to man in cosmos,²⁶ Islamic philosophers also made use of religious concepts to understand the concept of justice as a common denominator with medieval Europe (Vikør,2015:143). This approach, which is natural in the process, is observed in Ibn Miskawayh's *Adl* treatise, in which the tawhid approach is vividly expressed, that unity can only be attributed to God without attributing multiplicity, and multiplicity expresses lackness as its opposite. While it is seen that the creator is expressed in negation (El-Fevzü'l-Asgar,2020:49), it is stated that any anthropomorphic explanation will not be sufficient (Saruhan,2016:402). Regarding justice, the philosopher states that being comes into existence gradually, and that the process may start from the divine realm and lead to other dimensions. (Karagözoğlu,2009:107). According to him, the divine justice that he deals with in his treatise takes place only in these eternal beings.

Divine justice takes place on the non-matter sphere. The philosopher wanted to explain the divine justice part, which he dealt with as a relatively short chapter, with a more Pythagorean support, through tawhid, and he noted that this subject could not be dealt with in depth with the breadth of the subject. Although not included, the exceptional place of mathematics and geometry also applies to his approach. He is considered to appreciate the essentiality of philosophical competence, and Kraemer refers in one passage that he calls philosophy the only true education (*adab haqiqi*) that leads to salvation (1992:151). However, in his treatise, Ibn Miskawayh interpreted the importance of specializing in mathematics and geometry in order to understand divine issues, within the title of divine or, in other words, divine justice; “as for a person, it

²⁶ See, Mohamed, Y. (2000) cites from E Jachimowicz, “Islamic Cosmology”, in *Ancient Cosmologies*, 146. (1975). *Islamic cosmology, The Cosmology of Ikhwān al-Şafā', Miskawayh and al-İşfahānī. Islamic studies*, 39(4), p.,669.

is possible to specialize in these two sciences [arithmetic and geometry] only by studying divine matters that have no substance and are not derived from matter, but are abstracted from it” (Miskeveyh,2014:10). For this reason, he may have wanted to make a note of the difference between natural and divine justice with the Pythagorean approach; the existence of divine justice is in that which is immaterial. He states that the Pythagoreans explain this through numbers, in which that the number will not lose anything from its essence and will not change when abstracted from countable objects, in which they are unchangeable and belong to the metaphysical realm. As the attribute of the Creator, and the philosopher claims that justice does not deteriorate in the divine realm. When it comes to the realm of beings where human rights is in question, man must establish this competence.



CHAPTER IV

JUSTICE ON THE ETHICAL GROUNDS

4.1. Justice as Moderation

We know that Ibn Miskawayh thinks about justice in layers and classifies it in various ways and deals with its reflections with different dimensions. This section contains a question that should be asked about Ibn Miskawayh 's interrogations; The concept of justice, which is dealt with in the context of the soul and social human being, is considered as a premise for Miskawayh in the last instance. Or in other words, Ibn Miskawayh's lack to deal with the will issue comprehensively or examine it in depth leaves us in some deadlocks.

His approach to how he deals with virtues at the point of being a faculty alludes to the previous sections. We have also added that it is possible for the virtue of justice to become a habitus with repetition, and this must be ensured by being socially approved and tested. However, there are two questions to be asked; Has Ibn Miskawayh adequately considered the conditions under which a virtue that is established as a faculty can be treated as a character? Another question is, does the order of priority become complicated according to Ibn Miskawayh, who sees sociality as a condition for the establishment of virtue and therefore critically examines the life of ascetics? Contrary to Aristotle's comments that he does not refer to individuality, from what point does Ibn Miskawayh take the moral establishment; Is individual building necessary for the moral system first, or is friendship even more important than the virtue of justice, like Aristotle? While the last two chapters try to address this dilemma, this dilemma forms the core of this study.

In this section, the individual context of justice, which constitutes the first leg of the dilemma, how it is handled as a faculty, and how it is focused on the titles of cleansing the soul and protecting the health of the soul will be discussed. It is understood from

al-Akhlaq's flow line that Ibn Miskawayh proceeded along the line of traditional Islamic philosophy, focused on individual morality, and continued through the soul. Cardinal virtues and a justice-centered scheme are also available in chapters, with a special focus on the relationship between justice and soul. In the Neoplatonic sense, justice and the city binary express parallelism;

Then a just man too [435b] will not differ at all from a just city in respect of the very form of justice, but will be like it." "Yes, like." "But now the city was thought to be just because three natural kinds existing in it performed each its function, and again it was sober, brave, and wise because of certain other affections and habits of these three kinds." "True," he said. "Then, my friend, we shall thus expect the individual also to have these same forms [435c] in his soul and by reason of identical affections of these with those in the city to receive properly the same appellations." (Republic).

The concept of *Adl* also corresponds to the preservation of harmony in Islamic philosophy and it is tried to be interpreted within the circle of *i'tidal* (Smirnov,1996:344). Talking about harmony in the Platonic sense means not insisting on erroneous behaviors, and in the context of Ibn Miskawayh, insisting on established virtues that are faculties.

Moderation exists as a concept that can show developments in individual and social dimensions in the context of Islamic philosophy; "the root of it is *adl* and defined as the middle state between two extreme attitudes and behaviors, *i'tidal* is explained as being in the middle state, measured, balance, neatness, truth" (İslam Ansiklopedisi,2000). In fact, the concept interpreted in Islamic philosophy as a reflection of Aristotle's orthodox understanding is created by being influenced by Ancient Greek philosophical views. The concept, which points to social implication together with the justice-centered scheme soul, also points to the virtue of justice that emerges from moderation. It will be able to exercise both self and citizen moderate virtues that stay away from extreme behaviors and tendencies. In the tradition of Islamic moral philosophy, it has been tried to be understood by moderate philosophers within the line of Plato and Aristotle, starting from al-Kindi, and this approach has been tried to be supported by Qur'anic verses and hadiths. However, over time, the concepts of moderation and justice have become intertwined. The justice that emerges as a result of the harmony of the basic virtues will already point to moderation and will include the proposition that the balance of virtue in the soul is achieved. After Kindi,

Razi also predicted that there should be a balance in the context of virtues and emphasized that moderation should be established against excess and understatement. Ibn Miskawayh, on the other hand, evaluated justice in the context of moderation. Being the same root as moderate justice points to being between two extremes and the balance of the three cardinal virtues. In the questioning of one's self, he created a list of virtues that indicate moderation in spite of every excess and understatement within the scope of justice. And there is a sub-title for human justice in the treatise, which mentioned in the classification, that refers to this state of balance. Although he examines the social context rather than the moral ascetic meaning, he evaluates the moral process leading to self-actualization in this context.

4.1.2. Human Justice

Ibn Miskawayh refers to the human justice peculiar to man and inherent in man only in his treatise and lacks providing much detail on the topic. Along with the fact that the philosopher does not deal with it comprehensively, the idea may arise that the subjects he deals with within the concept correspond to his evaluations through the soul. In short, in the division of justice, the form of justice, which he calls human in terms of its relationship with the nafs, is evaluated within the other three forms of justice. At the point of justice, it is directly related to the first part of this study and points to the balance of the soul, and briefly mentions the possibility of establishing the soul in the short treatise. The moral character dimension that the concept of virtue refers to outside of social implication can be understood within this classification. The way to question the importance of Ibn Miskawayh's underlining that this type of justice is especially in the other three classifications (conventional, natural, divine) is to understand how he approaches the phenomenon of the soul. For this reason, it is obvious that it should be considered as another dimension of the evaluation of the soul. In the context of medicine (*al-Tibb al-Ruhani*), it is essential to learn the contribution of the philosopher.

Physic harmony occurs as mediation in the rational man and virtues are the result of this rational faculty and distinguish them from the vices (Mohamed,2000:242). In a similar fashion, Plato separated the four essential qualities into two groups: wisdom (based on the reasoning part of the human soul that governs or harmonizes all other

parts) and bravery, temperance, and justice (based on the rational part of the human soul that regulates or harmonizes all other parts). The spirited component of the human soul of Plato corresponds to courage. There is no virtue that relates precisely to the appetizing aspect of the soul. Temperance is perfection or virtue that gives the soul an orderly disposition to satisfy its appetites and desires; however, it also provides which particles and which are dominated. Finally, justice is the virtue that allows all of the various parts of the human soul to function in harmony and without interference.

As discussed in the previous section, moderation corresponds to self-control in Miskawayh's philosophy, just as in the Platonic approach. For Ibn Miskawayh, this situation, which is tried to be interpreted through *nafs*, stems from a balance between the Platonic faculties touched on above. Justice, as the unifying and ultimate faculty, is both the result and the binder of this balance. In fact, while it refers to a balance within virtues, it is also a sign of a general balance of virtues. Adhering to his Platonic devotion to virtues and his Aristotelian conception of mean, Ibn Miskawayh deals with self-justice in this context. Human justice, as understood from his treatise, indicates that this balance is considered a condition. The reason why he considers human justice among the other three types of justice may be the acceptance that human being is in the center as an individual as a microcosmos, together with the fact that he considers a self-balance as a dominant condition. According to that; “as health is in relation to the body, human justice is also in relation to the soul and when people's faculties (*tabâi'*) have a balanced disposition, there is no conflict. In addition to the fact that the soul is honorable and virtuous towards the body, the health of the soul becomes honorable and virtuous compared to that of the body” (Miskeveyh,2014:9). On his account, as a result of human justice, it seems possible to observe the inner and outer balance together with the spiritual balance. Considering that the types of justice are part of a balance, it can also be understood that they are essentially interdependent. For this reason, the human soul and socio-political happiness are essentially related to natural and divine justice. On the one hand, Ibn Miskawayh, who drew a scene that they are connected to each other like parts of a chain, wanted to realize this through the soul, while there are criticisms that this expression is illogical because natural and divine justice is explained in a way that is disconnected from human will. Therefore, the question to be asked is how human justice is assumed in the other three types,

which can only be understood with an eclectic reading, although it does not give a detailed explanation.

For Ibn Miskawayh, who envisaged restraint in the face of excess and deficiency, morality had to be considered developmental. While individual development is a condition of social order, in his philosophy, which is inevitable for virtue ethics to be at the center, happiness is also intertwined with Aristotelian virtue ethics. So, while explaining the personal and social foundations of justice, Ibn Miskawayh explains natural and divine justice, without its individual context, but does not discuss it in detail because he thinks its relation to human justice is obvious. While natural justice is justice ordained by nature, it refers to physical things and the balance between them. In this type of justice, which he adds is similar to divine justice in terms of its eternity, its individual context is not discussed. We can only try to understand this through the classification of happiness. From the book *Refinement*, Ibn Miskawayh explains the Aristotelian classification of happiness as follows and parts of happiness accordingly, and there are five headings; the first is the *good functioning of one's health* and senses. The second is that *owning wealth* so that you can spend and spend as you wish. The third is to have a *good reputation* and the fourth is *to be good in human relations*. Fifth is good judgment; so that he can have religious competency (2002:70,71). Therefore, we can try to understand the senses and religious competence in the context of their comprehension, especially in Miskawayh. In other words, the importance of human justice may lie in the understanding of natural and divine justice. If the rational faculty is at the center for the individual, it is to be understood that Ibn Miskawayh's reasoning is grounded in this way, while having healthy senses and religious competence are also within the scope of this faculty.

Even Aristotle expresses all kinds of justice in conjunction with voluntary acts.²⁷ According to Aristotle, the function that man differs from animals and plants is rational

²⁷ See Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics*. Chapter 8; he goes: "Acts just and unjust being as we have described them, a man acts unjustly or justly whenever he does such acts voluntarily; when involuntarily, he acts neither unjustly nor justly except in an incidental way; for he does things which happen to be just or unjust. Whether an act is or is not one of injustice (or of justice) is determined by its voluntariness or involuntariness; for when it is voluntary it is blamed, and at the same time is then an act of injustice; so that there will be things that are unjust but not yet acts of injustice, if voluntariness be not present as

thought. As a result, it is rationality that is a uniquely human function. Man fulfills the basic function of his nature by exercising his rationality. This intellectual capacity has both a theoretical and a practical side to it, as well as intellectual virtues of both theoretical and practical application. Thus virtues, in particular justice, relates to the external and spiritual spheres. Yet, for the physical objects, Ibn Miskawayh 's articulation and rationality do not correspond. Natural justice for the physical objects and for human beings seem to occupy different positions proportionately.

As underlined earlier, human justice must be understood in terms of the relationship of the soul to the virtues, just as the body is to health. So, it is also important to consider the spiritual health of the soul in terms of ethical context. For this reason, Ibn Miskawayh continues to deal with mental health conventionally and makes a psychological evaluation of the state of morality at points where human justice cannot be provided within the soul.

4.2. Justice and Self-Purification

While Ibn Miskawayh deals with the health of the soul in the sixth chapter of Refinement of Character, he deals with the unsound conditions that the human character may face due to the lack of balance and virtues cultivated in the previous chapters. The tradition stemming from the idea that the duality of body and soul and health affect each other in Islamic thought was widely reviewed by Razi and especially al-Kindi before Ibn Miskawayh. Along with the thoughts that the tradition has Platonic reflections, it follows an approach that is shaped by the nafs and faculties in Islamic thought, and in which prescriptions are given to protect physical health as well as spiritual health. This process, which started with the tradition of trying to explain psychological challenges such as death, anxiety, and spiritual illnesses through the health of the soul, has been tried to be interpreted in the cause and effect relationship through moral actions. While we observe that Ibn Miskawayh deals with the subject

well. By the voluntary I mean, as has been said before, any of the things in a man's own power which he does with knowledge, i.e. not in ignorance either of the person acted on or of the instrument used or of the end that will be attained (e.g. whom he is striking, with what, and to what end), each such act being done not incidentally nor under compulsion (e.g. if A takes B's hand and therewith strikes C, B does not act voluntarily; for the act was not in his own power).” Ameriks, K., & Clarke, D. M. (2000).

of sorrow (*huzn*) under the influence of al-Kindi in the last part of his Refinement, on the other hand, we understand that he also included melancholy in these along with the Rufus' influence (Pormann,2008:194).

For Ibn Miskawayh, rational soul activities precede bodily activities and are decisive. As mentioned above, sensory information is misleading, and only cognitive data can be detrimental in terms of the discovery of truth (Adamson&Pormann,2012:482). The point underlined here takes us to the point of the health of the soul; Ibn Miskawayh does not explain the health and ills of the soul through pragmatist and empirical pleasures provided by these sensory dimensions. According to him, as long as the soul is not limited to discovering its teleological task and tries to be satisfied through corporeal pleasures, spiritual illnesses will arise. In other words, *al-sa'ādah* (felicity) will not reach the nafs that do not follow virtues, and there will be no human justice, and both individual and social disintegration will occur. In this context, the philosopher deals with the sorrow, fear of death, and melancholy, which he often prescribed in philosophers before and after him, while making philosophical analyzes of various diseases. Its general approach continues through the intrinsic and external structuring of morality. While accepting that human beings have some inclinations by nature, he explains what the reasons may be in this direction. If the soul is the source of all psychological and moral action, the authority of its health and moral development must also be sought.

4.2.1. Preservation of Health of the Soul

Ibn Miskawayh underlines that the health of the soul and body must be controlled, and states that it is necessary to be constantly on virtue. In the Refinement, he adds that the loss of health of the body and soul will occur when the soul forfeits rationality and search for meaning, and he elaborates in the second discourse of the education of the young that intellectual actions should be included in habitus from an early age (2002:50). Accordingly, he depicts that the rational faculty cannot develop in the absence of four cardinal virtues while dealing with the opposites of the virtues and their reflections in the soul with a Stoic approach. Physically and divinely, body and soul are related, and illness and health can apply to both. Thinking that illness and health can be observed through activities, Ibn Miskawayh says that in case of illness,

spiritual reflections can be seen with anger, grief, passionate love, agitated desires, and concrete changes can also be seen on the body; shaking, trembling, turning pale or red and various other changes (2002:157-158). Beyond the current psychological debates on human nature, an evaluation from an Islamic perspective along with the effects of Ancient Greece is in question, while Islamic ethics medicine, and care for the soul exist in parallel.²⁸

He similarly reviews the body phenomenon and the soul approach in order to preserve health and restore health in its absence. While a person's moral character and interaction with his social environment are revealed depending on virtues, the health of the soul should also occur in the same direction. We observe that all kinds of non-virtuous acts that will lead to infatuation should be avoided with a Platonic style and he adds that corrupt poetry is also included. According to him, man has primitive orientations and they exist as imperfections. Emphasizing that the guide is rationality, we have mentioned before that moral acts should be shaped within rational codes. The true path should be reached by supporting and challenging the actions whose infrastructure will be established with reason, with friends, and society. Adding that this is also a criterion for true happiness, Ibn Miskawayh says that besides the meaning of virtues, it is a theoretical obligation for the question of how to preserve the health of the soul. According to him power of thought and extensive searching for meanings leads to a higher status of the soul.

After the section on the prescription for young people, he makes notes in this context in the last section, emphasizing that the concept of intellectual exercise should be from an early age and that it will provide a preparatory stage for learning philosophy after the science of mathematics is initially adopted. Thus, we reach one of the few notes of his ideas on the science of philosophy which he did not deal with in detail. In this context, mental activity is as necessary as physical activity for him, and he says that reaching the ultimate science, philosophy, will be possible for a virtuous soul. So, according to him, human justice and the health of the soul must be realized in direct

²⁸ Karimullah, K. I., from the author's citation of Dimitri Gutas in (2017). *Avicenna and Galen, Philosophy and Medicine: Contextualising Discussions of Medical Experience in Medieval Islamic Physicians and Philosophers*. *Oriens*, 45(1-2), 105-149.

proportion. In other words, the soul that attains the light of this type of justice as a result of the four basic virtues will be both healthy and will lead to the provision of social justice as the cornerstone of a just society.

A virtuous person should communicate with virtuous people, and virtuous people will enable surroundings to fulfill their social needs in the most efficient and virtuous way, unlike ascetic life. Along with the Aristotelian line, Ibn Miskawayh explains this context of sociability with the opposites of virtues, including justice, as well as spiritual needs. According to him, virtues should be evaluated as follows in terms of extreme points; courage-recklessness and cowardice, temperance-profligacy and frugidity (apathy), wisdom-ignorance and stupidity, justice- tyranny and servility.

He does not elaborate on the attributes he qualifies as extreme, he just builds them with an ordered list. However, it does not seem possible to understand the question of whether they qualify as mental illnesses or from what aspects. But while other acts of non-justice appear as vices in man in their own context, counteracting self-purification, justice seems to have been dealt with more in the context of its practice in other humans. The question of whether Ibn Miskawayh's treatment of human justice in the context of the personal moral establishment can be interpreted as wanting to touch social repercussions with tyranny and servility can be debated.

In addition, Ibn Miskawayh examines spiritual diseases in particular in the last chapter, these are respectively; anger, fear, fear of death and, grief. According to the philosopher, psychological states, which he describes as the conditions in which the heart is ill, can occur in situations where the mind is shadowed and the moral criterion cannot be determined. Since the criterion in moral actions is a golden mean, one cannot control virtues, and eventually, the vice immune state ends (Siddiqui, 2001:40). In other words, these spiritual problems that will arise from the extreme states of courage, temperance, wisdom, and justice that we have referred to above, or their absence, will once again emphasize the importance of human justice. It is possible to connect as follows; the extremity of the first three virtues will allow neither the personal nor the social establishment of justice; While the person will be non-virtuous, his social reflection will be tyranny or servility.

While Ibn Miskawayh deals with anger, he deals with it through two extreme aspects of the virtue of courage. According to him, cowardice is related to recklessness and courage, and the conditions under which reason is blinded become anger take over. In the context of vices, the individual is obliged to be fair to both himself and his environment. Thus, anger is a psychological state that will push vices such as self-conceit, vanity, and derision. In the context of justice, anger leads us to the practice of wrongfulness and injustice on others (Miskawayh,2002:177-200). This context, which is explained through the other, is opened to warn against the prediction that the ultimate result of the relationship of revenge and anger will an injustice. According to him “He who has known justice and cultivated it as we have written in the preceding parts will find it easy to remedy this disease (anger), because it is a form of injustice and immoderation” (2002:179). While criticizing the situations in which anger is praised with the wrong perception, he adds that the right is not fulfilled and misconduct is inevitable in case of anger.

After considerations of anger treatment, Ibn Miskawayh deals with cowardice and fear. According to him, cowardice, as an extreme state of anger, is the situation that corresponds to the self-affecting humiliation, vile and offensive insult, and to endure all kinds of injustice without the desire for revenge. Emphasizing that this is a state of laziness without praising revenge, Ibn Miskawayh says that the irascible faculty will not be missing in any self, it just needs to be recalled. This position, which also characterizes the anxiety that contingent events will happen, can also encompass certain inevitable situations such as death. While he does not connect the concept with the virtue of justice, he then moves on to the fear of death and elaborates more here. According to the philosopher, the fear of death is a state in which the thought of death and the ultimate destiny of the soul and the destruction of his body follows the thought of punishment. Thinking that his remedy passed through the immortality of the soul and virtuous acts in worldly life, the philosopher says that it is a sign of belief that he is one who rewards wickedness in the face of divine justice (2002:189,214). With knowledge and wisdom we should take the virtuous path and according to him “knowledge is confident” and “He who is confident knows the way to happiness”.

Furthermore, finally, he takes grief as an example of spiritual diseases, and at this point, he references Kindi, whose eminent writings we know, and quotes his notes by

referring to the philosopher. He adds that it is necessary to realize that lamenting the loss of worldly things is a futile sadness towards transient things and that the person who wants to be fair to himself should have this perception of the world that is corruption and generation (ibid:192-218). Directing his efforts towards the permanent good should be the approach of the rational man.

4.3. On the Basis of Happiness

In addition to Ibn Miskawayh's *Kitab al-Saadah*, soul purification and happiness (*al-sa'adah*) are often mentioned together in his system and are discussed in parallel in the *Refinement of Character*.²⁹ Describing an image of moral competence in which the ultimate goal is happiness, the philosopher has also often referred to the establishment of moderate human virtues as the aim of the development of the nafs of social man. This teleological approach, which is frequently observed in the Aristotelian attitudes of Islamic philosophy, is also valid for Miskawayh in the circle of the virtue of justice. Ibn Miskawayh deals with the normative ethics of the human or self-possessed man in the context of his relationship with himself and the other and draws an image of character construction, respectively. The character's need to be ready for wisdom and knowledge in the process from childhood to adulthood points to the preparation process for happiness, which is the most authentic way. In short, the Aristotelian teleological sense of ethics by defining the final purpose as happiness is combined with the Neo-platonic definition of true happiness. True happiness for Ibn Miskawayh differs on its basis; it's either corporeal worldly pleasures or in eternal happiness which roots from the higher knowledge that we just refer to. As defined by Ibn Miskawayh, man is an organic being that has to continue to meet his basic needs within his human life. According to the philosopher, the needs shared with other living species do not serve a higher purpose for humans, while intellectual needs indicate the existence of a

²⁹ See Wakelnig, E. (2009) notes about the existence of a shorter version on the subject in a recent MS, which has parallels word for word (Esad Efendi). There are passages also in the Oxford edition that refers to Miskawayh's name. The significance of this passage is that it specifically deals with wisdom and happiness. Wakelnig states that it is analogous to *K. al-Saadah* in terms of gripping happiness and classification of sciences. For detail see; A New Version of Miskawayh's *Book of Triumph: An Alternative Recension of al-Fawz al-aṣghar or the Lost Fawz al-akbar?* *Arabic sciences and philosophy*, 19(1), 83-119.

microcosm. So, it is inevitable to draw a happiness scheme that extends to the competence of the nafs. The clearer the character's relationship with the soul is, the correlation between the possibility of self-happiness will also be based on virtues is more ready to occur.

The nature of man is determined by creating harmony in the soul of the individual and realizing happiness. While the salvation of spiritual health remains important to Ibn Miskawayh in the three-part soul, the salvation of happiness is also taken care of. Since, nafs as an abstract structure is also subject to worldly desires. The soul consists of true sciences and knowledge, it's a reflection of the understanding of eternal matters. Knowledge of the Creator is reached in the soundness of truth, and through the eternal bliss is obtained. The perfection of this is only possible with moral effort. Happiness in the body, on the other hand, is followed only on behalf of the first and tried to be acquired. This requires effort but also luck. In the context of the outside of the body, it characterizes honor, family, wealth. This is followed for the second, and only those who aim for it will suffer according to him. M. Abdul Haq Ansari, in his article on Ibn Miskawayh's approach to Saadah, mentions that Miskawayh has three types of ethical approaches; cognitive, accidental, conative (1964:320). The cognitive is the general state of knowing: including sensation, discrimination, intellection, and evaluation. The accidental one is desires, appetites, impulses, emotions, and feelings. They are accidental to the soul, that is, they do not belong to the soul's own nature, they are external and temporary. All these activities are purposeful for the soul and their aimless movement is unthinkable. Unlike Aristotle, he also thinks that what is spiritually good will provide body health, from vice to virtue. In other words, practical pleasure is based on virtue since its a reflection (Adamson,2015:209). We understand that he concludes that this is a happiness-focused approach, with the condition that activities must have a focus. Miskawayh deals with happiness from a non-hedonist point of view, after first reaching the good and identifying good actions indirectly. Al-Ansari says that the concept of good is considered as a being for Ibn Miskawayh's philosophy, which he thinks is closer to Aristotle than Plato (1963:321). The state of the person who experiences spiritual happiness is free from the situation of the person who has pain in the first rank, the emanation of the light consistently receives from the First. There is no concern for bodily things at this stage. (Adamson,2015:209).

CHAPTER V

JUSTICE ON THE SOCIAL GROUNDS

5.1. Social Man and Practical Ethics

The duality of cognitive and practical competence points to the difference between knowledge and science, organization of action, and praxis in Ibn Miskawayh's standing. It seems impossible for a person not to be aware of the fact that he has more than one virtue, and not to realize that when he chooses the vile action, he does not realize that it conflicts with his other virtue. For this reason, the soul that follows the reason will realize that there is no harmony between the faculty of deliberation and the action or behavior after vile behavior, and thus will understand the balance of virtuous action. As noted earlier, the question of which morality is superior between the power of knowing and doing for Ibn Miskawayh held to be understood by analogy that the relationship of the two is like the relationship of matter and form. While theoretical power is like a form, practical power is like matter, and morality is at a point that covers both. Therefore, morality includes the practical reflections of the theoretical power on others, beyond the individual's cognition. Although the texts of Islamic moral philosophy have focused on the individual, the soul and, its competence, the social reflections of Ibn Miskawayh's moral literature are also observed in-depth, especially within the scope of the concept of justice.

We have underlined that Islamic philosophers, who continue in the line of Aristotelianism, also emphasize that man is a social being, and that this group, including Miskawayh, treats man as "civilized". In his *al-Khayrat*, Al-Amiri is citing supporting to the argument; "The master of Logic said society is necessary for man in his life; for one (individual) is not self-sufficient unless he be a beast of prey a divine being in living a good life, even he possesses all good things" (Pines,1975:151). Similar to Aristotelian *philia*, Ibn Miskawayh also mentions *mahabba*, an approach

that refers to the natural human need for association and mutual help. Kraemer adds to this by noting that it is due to the fact that we are not wild as nature (1992:162). He adds that he refers to the origin of the word *uns* as to be sociable. Man's sociality is based on association and mutual benefit, which always leads to urbanization (*madaniyya*) (ibid:162). In Ibn Miskawayh's philosophy, this feeling of *muhabba*, which naturally develops in man, gives clues to how he understands social relations, virtues, and morality. For this reason, he first explained the competence of human beings in order to codify an ethos, which caused his philosophy to be coded as humanist, and then underlined that humans need the other for self-sufficiency (Goodman,1996:132).

Man must first have virtue, but he has to practice these virtues in society. Miskawayh, attempts to understand the stages of self-development before adulthood through the education process and the concept of the other therefore gives a portrait of moral development starting from an early age in Refinement of Character. There is always the factor of otherness and sociability from the education process to competence. Parent-child, teacher-student, leader-subject relations are also tried to be explained in this circle. And virtues can be experienced without exception in these relationships. According to Aristotle, a human being's ability to perceive good and evil, right and wrong is only his own quality. The coming together of beings with this intuition creates the family first and then the state (Aristotle, Politics:1.10). He adds that it is impossible to establish some of the virtues he specifically enumerated outside of society; justice is among them.

In al-Akhlaq, he says that according to Aristotle, there are five types of happiness, and one of them is to be good in human relations. A person who will have difficulty in doing good without other means can reach complete happiness with good friends and personal and social harmony. While man repays the good things bestowed on him in the theological sense, this also includes the interpersonal balance of justice. Underlining the idea that the social order should proceed more depending on the virtue of justice, the philosopher underlines that this virtue, which serves as a compass for other virtues, is not an activity. According to him, the virtuous person will inevitably follow the social law, which we will list later, and will always maintain a state of ability

as his virtues are socially challenged. For this reason, although Ibn Miskawayh did not create a city portrait as broad as Farabi, he tried to portray the individual social role.

In Ibn Miskawayh's philosophy, the individual has to be social. For the authority of virtues, a person is obliged to understand himself through others, and this sociability is essential for perfection. According to Ibn Miskawayh, we see that the conception of morality is not close to the *Sufi* ideal, a person must be cognitively completed in order to realize himself; this happens in society. While asceticism breaks the virtuous moderation that it deals with in the Aristotelian sense, he says that the ascetic lifestyle alone will not lead to perfection. Although virtue ethics has an agent-centered approach, according to Ibn Miskawayh, unlike experiencing virtues in an ascetic life, individuals cannot even develop unless they have sociality, and while they get their necessities from others, they do not give it back to society (El-Fevzü'l-Asgar, 2020:92). Similar to Ibn Miskawayh, who examines the phenomena such as happiness and love through this context, Aristotle talks about the state of being unable to be happy in a solitary state (in *Nicomachean Ethics*), while Farabi also talks about the limitation of human happiness in the state of isolation (Omar, 2016:83).

As a result, while human nature has to be in a relationship with the other, it has to be associated to draw both natural needs and moral boundaries. Bhatt notes in his article that Ibn Miskawayh treated this need as an instinct, and therefore said that the city would be formed instinctively in human life (1985:207). Man, who is different from animals in terms of some of his needs, will need social and moral order by nature, so he will have to include various economic and political criteria in his life. For this reason, the philosopher, who dealt with conventional justice at the point of determining social norms in the distribution of justice, tried to understand humans by including concepts such as leader, money, and sharia in this social relations network. Moral judgments and virtues did not pass without considering the dimensions of the social dynamics of human life.

5.2. Social Justice

Ibn Miskawayh, while addressing justice as absolute good both in *al-Akhlaq* and in his treatise on the subject, underlined that justice is realized at every stage of existence. As a reflection of the theory of emanation, the idea that justice emerges from the most

just Being from the first being to the beings has been evaluated in the *Ishrāqiyyun* and has been continued in the tradition, and it is understood that Ibn Miskawayh blends the philosophy of emanation and ex nihilo in terms of beings. While the order existing in the world is related to divine justice, Ibn Miskawayh's classification also corresponds to conventional justice, which includes social justice along with natural, and human justice. While the first consideration of the concept of justice in the sphere of the soul starts with Ibn Miskawayh, his role is also important in dealing with this eclectic form of classification and Aristotelian social law approach in detail.

The life of this world, which is also the determinant of life in the hereafter, has been the factor that shaped the approaches of the Islamic philosophers to the point of practical philosophy while pushing them to question the practical field of human life. So that; while moral education, which is divided into two as individual and society, includes the individual, the regulation of home and political areas includes the social one. In this way, justice, as an individual and transindividual virtue, emerges as a concept that is wide enough to cover human life. Aristotle, who is influential in Ibn Miskawayh's approach to justice, sees a commonness between the virtue of justice and other virtues, and this corresponds to the sharing of citizens of ethical life (Huang,2007:272). The difference of the virtue of justice is that it exists as the only virtue that takes care of others, and man has to experience this virtue since he is a social being. According to Ibn Miskawayh, in the same way, a healthy environment cannot be provided and practical ethics cannot be experienced in which a non-social person can experience virtues such as generosity, justice, and tolerance.

In the way of identifying the Aristotelian notion of justice with Platonic psychology, which is decisive, Ibn Miskawayh deals with them in a parallel way at the point of social justice. Going beyond considering the virtue of justice as a mere faculty, the idea that all virtues are virtues has a common denominator with Aristotle, and the idea of one's own justice has to be the determining criterion of one's actions towards others. According to Aristotle, the best man should exercise excellence towards others (Mohammed,2000). In the context of the Aristotelian mean, justice is addressed as a mean towards others, between inflicting injustice and suffering injustice. Therefore, the concept is interpreted through the other, and this is what makes virtue dominant in the Aristotelian sense. The social relationship cannot be ignored for friendship,

prudence, benevolence, and ultimately felicity in the life of the individual, and therefore concepts pervade Ibn Miskawayh's entire philosophy (Bhatt,1986:207). The concept that Islamic philosophers, who made evaluations before him, made great emphasis on the theological background and the influence of Plato, was also embroidered into their philosophical systems as a reflection of the Creator and belief in him. For example; According to Farabi, every human being inherited justice and believing in the universality of reason which sharia and natural reason lead to the idea that there is no difference (Mahallati, 2018:48). That is to say, just action is taken into consideration towards man, family, nature, and God, as can be seen in Ibn Miskawayh's philosophy.

Similar to Socrates and Hayek, Ibn Miskawayh has also kept the social step of the virtue of justice from the absence of the concept, and is on the way to understand it through the concepts that establish the just system on the level of social relations; Both the domestic and customary distinction of justice and the way money, Sharia and leader are handled indicate this. The idea that he established an analogy between the spiritual order of man and the political order of the society in the Neo-platonic sense does not come to an end, but he paid attention to the concretization of the order extending from the individual to the society, stitch by stitch. Unlike Ibn Miskawayh, Aristotle does not refer to the word "individual" but evaluates the individual in unity over the other (Floistad, 2015:3). It does not support the idea that it does not focus on the moral development of the individual but deals with it to underline the interaction dimension of the virtue of justice. Pratorgoras' analogy can be cited here as a support for Aristotle's approach; other virtues are parts of a face but justice is the whole of the face (Huang, 2007:271).

The theory of Rawls, who is another important name who examines justice in the social sense, is that every person can meet at a point of justice, albeit regardless of their beliefs. While the philosopher thinks that moral judgments are based on rationality, he supports the idea that emotions can be the first step of the idea of justice, similar to Kant (Okin,1989:230), who says that it is an act of cognition. Similar to Ibn Miskawayh, he stated that justice is the basic virtue in terms of social institution in which is being followed by Rawls (Huang, 2007:275). Therefore, justice, considered as the basis of morality in ethical studies and the defining virtue or concept of social

construction, is an integral criterion of human relations. Ibn Miskawayh's philosophy has also been addressed in the spectrum from childhood to adulthood, from subject to ruler, from parent to child. It is obvious that throughout the period from ancient Greece to the modern period, philosophers have treated it as a moral state, with the exception of the pause until Rawls and Hayek.

5.2.1. Conventional Justice

In Refinement of Character's fourth discourse, Ibn Miskawayh discusses *real justice*. To illustrate the difference between practical and living in terms of morality, one says that a true act of justice must harmonize all faculty, and conversely, exceptional just acts cannot meet the point of stability as faculty. He says that this negative duality in the soul can be understood in transactions and honors, as it will emerge in the practical world and the external world. At this point, it should be noted that while prioritizing the individual competence of the soul over external acts, the social bond of justice is a secondary step according to him. Certain moral disposition is a prerequisite to balance these social interactions. This most perfect virtue, which will enable unity out of multiply, must exist to provide equilibrium in social unity beyond equality.

He discusses in Refinement that equality provides a proportional balance and that it is experienced in three different points external to us; "...the division of money and honors; second, the division of voluntary transactions such as selling, buying, and exchange; and third the division of things in which injustice and violation of rights have been committed" (p.,102-114). A similar approach is observed to Aristotle's method of dividing particular justice into two; he also chose a method that regulates the distribution of money and transactions with honor. Instead of Aristotelian political and natural justice, Ibn Miskawayh speaks of conventional and human justice (Fakhry,1997:266). Transactions, on the other hand, are again divided into two; voluntary and involuntary.³⁰ In such external actions, according to Ibn Miskawayh, the actions of the just person must provide an "equality" between the injustice and the

³⁰ See Zurayk's note in p, 204 Ahmad ibn Muhammad Ibn Miskawayh, & Zurayq, Q. (2002). *The Refinement of Character*. Great Books of the Islamic World.

oppressed. Liberality and justice can be enjoyed on the same events: trade, payment, etc., and people prefer liberality more because it can be viewed more actively. But the world order should proceed more in a way that depends on justice.

In *The Essence of Justice*, the philosopher considers conventional justice for external moral actions. There are two types of conventional justice, called *domestic* (local) and *general*. The general one is what all people agree on, like the trade with gold. The alliance of the people of the earth is exactly in this direction. According to the circle of life or in hereafter ontological hierarchy in al-Fawz al-Asghar, where Ibn Miskawayh explains his metaphysical views, there is a hierarchy in the earth and in everything created. Accordingly, in this order extending from minerals to living things, gold is also mentioned as the top of the mines, while in his treatise as the absolute representative of material substances. There is no change in gold, which makes it the representative of substances as the criterion by which work and labor are determined. Despite all their differences, people incline to gold because it is the most permanent of all things in the universe, the lightest to carry, the most pleasing to the soul, the most glamorous, the most precious, and the most deteriorating. Thus, gold is what people agree on as a substance that provides general justice. The general type of justice is universal, the type of justice that people agree on in economical terms. Long observations and past sciences form the source of this type of justice. The reference to gold stems from this reason; It preserves its value regardless of time and place. Private conventional justice, on the other hand, corresponds to a localized legislative type of justice as opposed to general. It covers the rules of justice that vary according to time, and place between different nations or between two people; the law that people agree on, etc. It includes the set of rules and the local evaluation of social relations such as distribution of goods and honors, titles, and buying and selling. Ibn Miskawayh states that he has many examples and will not go into detail, but says that this type of justice can be seen in every traditional group. The traditional ruler and legislator set rules according to the situation, which does not always have to last, but can change with the alteration of circumstances and customs. Each of these laws is just in its time, and it is unfair and unjust to turn away from them. Therefore, for Ibn Miskawayh, the rules of the nation to which each individual belongs are binding, and it is fair to act with the benefits of time and space. There is a suggestion that the opposite will disrupt the virtue of justice socially.

There are claims that Ibn Miskawayh's division of justice has similarities with different philosophers in terms of their social contexts. Miskawayh makes three divisions of justice according to three types of human action:

- Distribution of good and honors (discontinuous)
- Voluntary transactions (algebraic)
- Involuntary transactions are called violence and injustice (Fakhry,1997:266).

We deduce from Aristotle's definition of justice that he separates justice from general and particular. According to him, lawful justice includes general justice, while special justice is divided into distributive and corrective justice. Distributive justice characterizes the equal distribution of honor, money, rank, and honor among citizens.³¹ Equal sharing is what the site provides in return for the contribution on the site. Thus justice prevails. Corrective justice, on the other hand, includes acts done with and without willpower (Turan,2017:99). (Buying vs. theft, we have mentioned above). Here, the rate of loss is considered rather than the contribution to the site. It is taken from the surplus and given to the less. Voluntary relationships are those that depend on our will; purchase-sale, debt, surety, escrow, execution. Adultery, theft, bribery, murder, whether the crime committed is voluntary or involuntary, should be considered moderate at the point of punishment (ibid:96). It means equal control of the members of the society before the judge without any discrimination. This type of justice should be observed in all areas of social life. Corrective justice is implied here, or in short, the judge decides about actions disposition. According to Aristotle alone, the point of keeping the law superior, not man, is in question. Just men should bring equality and equality also serves justice (Mohamed, 2000:246). Ibn Miskawayh, al-

³¹ See Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics* (2000) in detail ; "Of particular justice and that which is just in the corresponding sense, (A) one kind is that which is manifested in distributions of honour or money or the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the constitution (for in these it is possible for one man to have a share either unequal or equal to that of another), and (B) one is that which plays a rectifying part in transactions between man and man. Of this there are two divisions; of transactions (1) some are voluntary and (2) others involuntary- voluntary such transactions as sale, purchase, loan for consumption, pledging, loan for use, depositing, letting (they are called voluntary because the origin of these transactions is voluntary), while of the involuntary (a) some are clandestine, such as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves, assassination, false witness, and (b) others are violent, such as assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with violence, mutilation, abuse, insult." Chapter 2 Cambridge University Press. Ameriks, K., & Clarke, D. M.

Amiri, and Farabi, unlike Aristotle, whom they inspired in the classification of justice, divide the voluntary and involuntary actions into three, not under the title of corrective justice;

- Distributive: Goods and honor
- Tradal: Trade (shopping), barter
- Corrective: includes the compensation of threats, assault, persecution (Turan,2017:99).

It is important not to overlook Farabi's contribution to the social dimension on that matter as well. According to Fakhry, Farabi's understanding of justice can be divided into foreign and domestic justice. Domestic, intrasocietal economic, etc. covers, the foreign one is divided into two as defensive and offensive (Mahallati,2018:51). And it follows roughly as a reflection of the distinction between domestic and general justice. The understanding that the individual should receive as much as he deserves is also valid for Farabi. In the context of this proportionate measure, Ibn Miskawayh and Aristotle consider a concept as a measure for each field: for example, regarding Ibn Miskawayh the sharia or the leader is the measure in social and political relations, while the criterion in economic matters is money (Fakhry,1975:248).

5.2.2. Three Laws (God, Ruler, Money)

In Ibn Miskawayh's philosophy, happiness is the ultimate goal of not only the individual but also the society. While talking about the necessity of man's involvement in social life in order to become morally competent, there is a need for an administration that will regulate man's need for others and different needs. The government should be in the direction of wisdom and the state, which should establish the relationship between individuals based on love and justice, thus paves the way for the realization of happiness. People who first come together to survive and meet their needs, then reach a competency phase where they aim for spiritual betterment (Butterworth,1987:232). Social and individual welfare and competence, as a result of questions of morality, pushes people to seek elements that will provide justice and balance. Man has to come to an agreement on his individual rights first. The resources that will establish justice at the social, political, and economic level can be a set of laws, a leader, and a commodity such as money.

Aristotle underlines that the political dimension is more essential at the point of eudaimonia, and says that the bond of relations between citizens and legislators should be in a way that maintains the balance of justice. This balance of justice, which is also necessary for the leaders, should be established together between the ruler (*al-hākim*) and the ruled (Huang,2007:274). Aristotle differs from Ibn Miskawayh and justice's socio-practical understanding as follows; According to him, the judicial law establishment of justice is more prior. Aristotle does not consider education or individual competence to justice, which we see that Ibn Miskawayh gives importance to individual reflections in line with his harmonizing with Platonic elements (Mohamad,2000). Rather, the justice of the city rulers, and hence the establishment of happiness in the city, depends on the law and the authority is the leader. In Refinement of Character, Ibn Miskawayh discusses Aristotle's reference to three laws in his Nichomachean Ethics. The first of these is from God, the second is the ruler and the third is just laws, which is money. According to Ibn Miskawayh, the leader or ruler is the one who follows the law for Aristotle. Approaches to these three laws are important in determining the criteria of neglect of social laws and accordingly unfair behavior. The person who ignores these concepts and equality, which ensures that the equality between people is balanced proportionally, is an unjust person. Respectively, this unfairness can be listed in three ways; "The most unjust is the one who rejects the Law and does not live by it, the second is the one who does not accept the decisions of the just ruler. The third is the one who does not earn money or gives too much to himself or too little to others. The person who follows The Law will follow justice and equality, in short, he will want virtue and stay away from evil..." (2002:104). According to Aristotle, man's ability to sense good and bad, right and wrong is a quality that belongs only to him. The coming together of beings with this intuition first creates the family and then the state. Therefore, it has to be a set of rules and its protector. In the case of Ibn Miskawayh, the duty of city administrators is to guide each individual to seek his own happiness (2002:128). First step is to divide his responsibility for them in two ways: first, he must try to give them the necessary intellectual development. And this leader should be inclined to direct them to practical arts and encourage sensible activities. Therefore, a leader profile is observed not only in the context of human rights but also in terms of intellectual requirements. The leader, whom he calls the Custodian of the Law, must understand his relationship with citizens not through indifference, but through the analogy of father's love for his son and son's for father

and along with mutual boundaries and duties. With the exception of love for God, he says, the content and love for parents can only approximate or resemble this type of love. In this regard, there may be several reasons why he does not follow the Platonic approach; firstly, Plato's idea of removing private property and family institutions from the social system is rather infeasible in moral system. At the same time, the convention and affection of the prophet should be followed in the ruler-ruled relationship, which is similar to the father-child relationship, and the ruler should ensure religious matters as well as social and intellectual matter, otherwise he becomes a tyrant king (Bhat&Bhatt,1985:34). Similar to the fact that he thinks in the *imam* (leader), who is a political leader, that there is necessary conditions such as having the sciences (2002:128,129). Ibn Miskawayh attributes some features to the leader as well. The leader, who must have wisdom and virtue, can achieve these only when justice is socially maintained, and otherwise social and political corruption is likely; love and affection will be replaced by hatred, and friendship-brotherhood will be replaced by hypocrisy. By inference, virtues give way to vices in the absence of justice.

Ibn Miskawayh 's attitude towards the leader is another matter in terms of which set of laws he will be the protector and follower of. According to him, the most unjust is the one who rejects the Law and does not choose to live according to it, and the person who follows The Law will follow justice and equality, in short, he will desire virtue and be free from evil. This Law, which Ibn Miskawayh attributes to Aristotle, is the law of God, which corresponds to the religious Law. In this context, although he does not evaluate it as broadly as Farabi, the fact that the concept of leader has prophetic attributes and is a religious custodian can be evidence that it indicates an approach close to Avicenna.³² The parallelism of the behaviors directed by virtues and justice with Sharia and the fact that the Leader thinks that Sharia or Code of God will become worthless if this morality is not maintained also indicates that the religion-government approach is theocratic by following the classical approach. Since moral perfection is also a requirement of religion, self and social purification is also a command of religion. And on this occasion, just individuals and societies are also compatible with Sharia.

³² Butterworth, C. E. signifies that, unlike Farabi, Avicenna keeps the leader active in a religious framework (1983). Ethics in medieval Islamic philosophy. *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, p.231.

In the socio-political context, the law is Sharia and thus the leader is the authority, while the corresponding economic law is money. Money, as a commodity mimicking this law, is more of a stabilizing factor. Thanks to it, while things get a fair return, it also helps cities to maintain their economic balance. While it provides the balance between the two separate workloads in the degree of equality and welfare, it becomes an equal distribution of the wages that an engineer will receive for a worker in the distribution of labor. So for Ibn Miskawayh, the just person maintains this balance, while the unjust person either does not earn money or gives more to others than their own labor. While Fakhry says that Miskawayh follows Aristotle on the point that money is the provider of economic balance, we understand that the idea that money is just coming from the Aristotelian line (Fakhry,1975:248). But the fair balance of the money will be realized thanks to a rational man who will regulate it (Mohamed,2000:250). Yet, Mohamed (2000:250) adds that money is also the principle of justice for Aristotle, however, Ibn Miskawayh says above that Aristotle did the same order, but Nichomachean Ethics does not coincide with such a ranking, so he suggests that it must have taken it from an Arabic paraphrase. Apart from this difference, Ibn Miskawayh considers a just Imam in addition to law and money. Again, as for the person who will regulate the rational men community, the leader is the authority that will determine whether the exchange between things is fair and what should be done in case it is not, in this case, it's the Custodian of the Law.

5.4. Benevolence

Benevolence as a concept does not have a broad explanation in Ibn Miskawayh's work. The concept, which is intertwined with virtues in his conceptual studies, is worth examining in the context of its relevance to justice. Justice also touches the benevolence dimension in social relations as a covering of other virtues. It is not possible without justice and has been handled in a way that does not violate the rules of justice. While Ibn Miskawayh implies that this concept transcends justice, he also discussed the possibility of adding caution to virtue.

According to the philosopher, law, which has specific definitions at the point of justice, has a different approach to the concept of benevolence. The Law defines justice universally and does not explain it in terms of particulars. Although sometimes

quantitative and qualitative explanations reveal, benevolence is more ambiguous in terms of its boundaries. However just as we cannot compare air and water, we cannot do the same for fire and air, otherwise, one would be reduced to the other. So, in other words, they function in the same direction even though their definition differs.

But even though benevolence is not handled clearly in the face of particular events, and it is explained to people in a way that is advisory as Code of God. For this reason, Ibn Miskawayh also wanted to understand benevolence in terms of justice and friendship, but he added notes that we can describe as beyond it (Mahallati, 2018:54). For this reason, the law is a phenomenon that draws the boundaries of justice and protects it at the same time. On the other hand, it also determines the boundaries of the leader who will custody the establishment of justice. But benevolence involves uncertainty and yet, as we understand, according to Ibn Miskawayh, benevolence is a two-pronged and diverse phenomenon. Benevolence may have an extremity such as giving more than necessary, but it is discussed in sections for Ibn Miskawayh; the division depends on the actions related to benevolence and its linked with purpose, being a non-goal of the action, and sometimes because of its essence, by someone else, in addition to generally results good, with not resulting good for all people, and finally application of favors to categories and being sensible and imaginable (2002:70,71).

In this context, although this diversity obscures the concreteness of Ibn Miskawayh's approach to benevolence, it still tries to make sense of its opposite with the classical approach. As follows; "...the person who is benevolent and donates money, for example, to people who will not use it for good, will only be a waste". While trying to make sense of equality and social justice through the other, it seems to serve as a guide to more objective reason at the point of benevolence. Benevolence as a recommended and prescribed virtue will become meaningful with individual and social happiness. Therefore, it has an intricate relationship with justice and happiness without excess or deficiency, but the concepts should not be confused with each other.

5.5. Friendship

While the idea is that man is a social being and needs others to survive, Ibn Miskawayh says that this dynamic needs a balanced movement like the organs of the human body.

And the fact that a person is born with some deficiencies by nature in which makes his need for other people inevitable also leads to the extensions of this level of needs can be in various areas of life. Friendship (*al-sadāqa*) is one of these dimensions of life for Ibn Miskawayh and it is discussed in the context of being the binding element of social balance. Just as justice is the greatest to be all virtues because of intentionality, friendship also serves as a key sub-concept for Aristotle regarding the bond between. (Fakhry,1975:249). While considering the concept from an Aristotelian perspective, Ibn Miskawayh aimed to evaluate it within the framework of justice and love and to discuss its reflections in relations with various sub-titles and its importance for morality.

According to Ibn Miskawayh, a virtuous soul must associate thyself with virtuous people. While the fairness, courage, or moderation of the person towards himself causes him to create a habitus area that will be reflected in his environment, at the same time this will function bilaterally and provide harmony in social-political relations. Our state of trying to overcome our individual deficiencies through the other comes not only from our sensory needs but also from our needs in various common denominators. At this point, friendship and love (*mahabba*) have an important place in Ibn Miskawayh's philosophy as a concept that considers benevolence and fellowship. The concept that he takes as a hierarchy by making use of Aristotle is presented as a type of love; for this reason, he first deals with the various reflections of love;

- First reflection is which is established quickly and dissolves quickly
- Second is appears in terms of establishing quickly and dissolves slowly
- Third one is that establish slowly but dissolves quickly
- Fourth and the final form is that establish slowly dissolves slowly

They can also be shaped according to purposes, age, and location. While Ibn Miskawayh discusses the subject of pleasure through love, he adds that the first love type is stems from pleasure, the next is good, the third is useful and, and the last is their composite.

At the point of justice, he is of the opinion that virtuous people will form friendships with virtuous people in the direction of good and since the good itself will not change, their friendship will remain constant. For example, according to the philosopher; In young people, the concept of friendship can develop and disappear quickly, and pleasure is observed. The elderly, on the other hand, look more for the benefit of this type of connection. And if this benefit is common, the friendship continues (2002:125). While he supports this approach by quoting from Aristotle, he also gives a prescription on how to choose friends; "...Look how your friend approached his family, relatives, siblings as a child. Find out about his relationship with the friends he made before you. See if he's grateful or not. What activities does he prefer and how much does he like the money?". It's rather a broad approach on the topic relatively.

The key point, for Ibn Miskawayh, goes beyond knowing the virtues and practicing them. As we have mentioned before, justice had to be observed in the relationship between king-subject or ruler and ruled. This would also be similar to the parent-child relationship. On the other hand, while examining the parent-child relationship in the second-order, that is, in the circle of utility-benefit, Ibn Miskawayh calls this type of bond the highest level of friendship because the parent or father, for example, put themselves onto the child's position (DeYoung,2015:313). Therefore, as will be observed in every type of social relationship, justice must also be observed at the point of friendship. Although a clearer answer will be given for Aristotle as to which of the two concepts is superior, this approach is relatively more ambiguous in Ibn Miskawayh. While Renard comments that the virtue of justice expresses itself in friendship and harmony in the Ibn Miskawayh system, in the philosophy of Aristotle, an atmosphere is created in the form of framework, friendship and sociality precedes justice (2011:173).³³ He thinks that in this network of relations where justice is not established, virtue will be replaced by negative adjectives such as hatred, mutual utility, and benefit by vices (DeYoung,2015:314).

³³ DeYoung, T. (2015) explains Aristoteles' stance with the support of a quotation from Nichomachean Ethics: "...And also 'lawgivers seem to pay more attention to friendship than justice' in regulation social relations and also 'there is no need justice between people who are friends". Mahmud Sami al-Barudi: Reconfiguring Society and the Self. Syracuse University Press p.312.

On the other hand, the social dynamic has to allocate the strength of the above-mentioned network of relations; While this includes a humanist approach in order to ensure socio-political peace in the local and universal sense, it can be thought that a social structure built on friendship will be more robust as a structure (Mahallati,2018:54). Civilized people, civilized society, the whole of civil relations, and ultimately the establishment of justice are essential. This state of practical competence, which is inevitable because the social person mutually desires benevolence and happiness, is in fact a desire on the Sharia basis. For this reason, according to Miskawayh, who we see mentioned in Refinement, religion also supports rituals that bring together and promote friendship (Goodman,1996:133). While Ghazali makes use of Ibn Miskawayh's mention of religion's unifying and friendship-promoting worship, he also cares about friendship at the point of warning each other about mistakes and counseling (Goodman,1996:134).

Ibn Miskawayh, who thinks that ascetic life will also shake the friendship pillars, has given importance to the friendship phenomenon in the mutual exchange of virtues of social interaction for these reasons. Therefore, the question of whether there is a criticism of religious life lived without contacting people can be asked. In the relationship of virtuous people, there are no external expectations but an exchange of experience and advice. Friendship can also be thought of as a reflection of the origin of the word 'uns', since it promotes virtues and offers a practical field. M.J. Amir Mahallati's words on that point are worth regard; he says that Miskawayh brought together the pre-Islamic *adab* culture and Indian moral views Tahdib al-Akhlaq, by adding that he thought friendship as determined humanity, and noted that by referring to the origin of the word *uns*, which Fakhry referred as gregariousness (2016:53).

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The human being is a social being that needs equality and just order as and also is a subject to various perspectives that are handled in terms of their place in the cosmos and its relationship with other living things. The soul-body relationship of Islamic philosophy, and therefore the fact that man is both a physical and a metaphysical being, as well as being rational, has been the basis of his philosophical attitudes, and the shaping of Islamic moral thought has taken place in this direction. The general line of this tradition of moral thought is structured by the cleansing or purification of the soul, which is an abstract being, and it's being the source of all moral activities of man, and the source of these activities is understood through the powers of thinking and imagination. Reason-nafs-soul phenomena proceed in the same framework in which the soul is presented as a separate substance from the body in Ibn Miskawayh's moral thought. While the potential of the perfect human finds its place in the faculties of the soul, the possibility of his moral character depends on the balance between the Neoplatonic virtues attached to these faculties. While the soul contains a dual-action with the physical and divine source, it can only turn to the source of its light through moral actions, and at the very beginning of the virtues that will determine this is justice, which represents morality.

The movement of the virtue of justice in Ibn Miskawayh's philosophy will also act in two directions. The journey to understand and analyze the phenomenon of the soul, which is the first step of the possibility of moral character, which is instrumental in separating the first part of the work, first passes through understanding its essence and accepting that it is a jawhar. Ibn Miskawayh's particular emphasis has also determined the course of the study, and it does not differ from the classical line of Islamic moral thought. However, by comparing the researches on the nature of man and the evaluations of the Stoics, Galen and Aristotle, respectively, we observe that his work signals that it will proceed in the Aristotelian line in particular. Being one of the

representatives of the Aristotelian attitude in Islamic philosophy, the harmonization of nafs trichotomy with Platonist thought is the antecedent of determining both the individual and social attitudes of justice. The virtue of the power of reasoning is wisdom, and it constitutes the first leg of the manifestation of moral competence by providing one to another proper relation with other cardinal virtue (courage, temperance) and justice and soul; “As for justice it is a virtue of the soul which it gets from the union of the three above-named virtues, when the three faculties act in harmony one with another and submit to the discerning faculty so that they do not combat among themselves or Follow their desires according to the dictates of their natures” (Refinement of Character, 16). Thus, the management of the mind will help first to reach fairness in the soul and then to the golden mean in external relations.

The function of justice in human nature and the grounding of its moral character are associated with both theological reasons and it's being a social entity. In addition to the fact that the soul is a substance that is the mover of the body, its external action is determined and reflected by deliberation, it is also believed that its source is based on the emanation theory, which is thought to be the source of everything from its Creator, and in this context, it is concluded that it tends to divinity spontaneously due to its source. Therefore, this non-material essence of the rational man will transition to a spiritual realm by providing virtues and competence and will approach its Creator. It may be a question of the possibility of nafs, which is unalterable in essence, to approach this immaterial realm in order to approach the field of this type of justice that occurs in this context, non-materiality, which we can relate to with the divine justice that he mentioned in the Adl treatise. However, divine justice, which is considered too short and ambiguous in the text and, leaves these ideas in ambiguity. At the same time, it is understood from the fact that nature, where there is the idea that justice is realized in the sequence that extends from the beginning to the end of the Creator's creation, reaches the non-material plane and then the external order of human life.

At the core of all these evaluations, the notion of exploring the idea of happiness and thus the limits of its individual and social facilities takes its place as the final purpose. Aristotelian teleological sense of ethics by defining the final purpose as happiness is combined with the Neo-platonic definition of true happiness, and this is achieved in the most competent way through the convergence of the human soul and this protection

of concern in its bilateral relations. While the knowledge, measure, and constant repetition of the virtue are essential for happiness, the stabilization of these virtues in the soul as faculties are among these conditions. We find that the philosopher, in the same context as Aristotle, thought that moral character would be morally competent only as long as this stability is constant. Repeated virtues are now built-in mechanisms of the soul, and this is possible after accustomed and after the soul has been cleansed. From this point of view, the question may arise at what stage these established virtues will point to purification and what will be the moral competence of the character in cases where it is neglected. According to Ibn Miskawayh, vices will be loathed and avoided in a soul that has acquired virtue over time (Miskawayh,2002:10). Therefore, while it seems inevitable to challenge an acquired virtue, the idea is that the solution should be to insist on virtue and that some virtues should be developed and repeated through sociability.

This idea underlies Ibn Miskawayh's intense criticism of the ascetic lifestyle. While the idea that human beings are social and civilized is obvious, it is underlined that interaction should also be necessary for moral perfection to be completed. The social dimension of justice is also discussed in this context. The provision of individual and social needs on a level of equality should be realized as a reflection of the entire cosmos. In the corporeal world where plurality is dominant and lacking in unity, there is a just existence for every being, as we mentioned above, and man is the epitome of the macrocosm, which was created for order as a microcosm. This just created state of the cosmos also refers to self and social restraint. Human beings, who we know must always make decisions with virtuous restraint in their actions, also need to know that some virtues can only be experienced on a social plane (generosity, justice and, tolerance.). For this reason, it means that a secluded lifestyle will not meet social needs and is contrary to human nature. These conditions will not provide the self-purification process, nor will it allow to fulfill the responsibilities towards other people. When we assume that the ultimate goal of this empowerment process is happiness, this will actually be shelved.

The ability of reason, which distinguishes humans from other living things, indicates a reasoning power, and this reasoning power refers to different intellectual needs. Therefore, human beings, who can distinguish between good and evil with the power

of reasoning, have to reach the true just and equal in line with individual and social interests through rational inferences. Justice also has to be established in every area that vastness touches. It serves as an inevitable virtue for the healthy functioning of the social environment from the individual's health of the soul, and cannot be ignored for friendship, prudence, benevolence, and ultimately felicity in the life of the individual, and therefore concepts pervade Ibn Miskawayh's entire philosophy. The concept embroidered to the entire system is a prerequisite to balance these social interactions. The actions of the just person must provide an 'equality' between the inflicting and suffering injustice and thus the elements that must keep social norms proportionate.

Respectively, the self-empowerment of the individual will have met the social challenge with strong morale, first starting with his childhood familiarity with social law, and then being established as a faculty with repetition. Later, the philosopher, who considers a leader management obligatory in which equality and justice are observed, will be the assurance of the protection of the rights that the individual practices with the social agreement and will be the criterion in Sharia. Thus, it is understood that the philosopher follows Plato's idea that justice exists in the state as well as in the person, in the same direction and only synthesizes it through his own cultural perspective. In addition to the leader, who is the guardian of the rights of the individual, this context in which the idea that the rational one will progress in parallel with Sharia is felt, is Ibn Miskawayh's philosophical expression of a religious justice dimension. It is discussed how each individual should be acquainted with various sciences and familiarity with social law step by step, it is understood that just action and order will be about to go through this stage of learning. In addition to individual development, special conventional and general conventional justice will continue to be binding on people, but it is essential to show loyalty to them for the social order and we have to follow the principles ordered by the rational and guarantee the virtues. An atmosphere of ultimate happiness that is common and accessible to all is possible only under such conditions.

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