

**IBN HALDUN UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

MASTER THESIS

**CURRENT IDENTITY CRISIS IN PAKISTAN; A CLASH
OF WESTERN INTEREST AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
DISCOURSE**

HAMMAD SIDDIQUE

**THESIS SUPERVISOR
PROF. ERIK IVAR RINGMAR**

ISTANBUL, 2021

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DISCOURSE**

by

HAMMAD SIDDIQUE

**A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in
Political Science and International Relations**

THESIS SUPERVISOR

PROF. ERIK IVAR RINGMAR

ISTANBUL, 2021

APPROVAL PAGE

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and International Relations

Thesis Jury Members

Title - Name Surname

Opinion

Signature

Prof. Dr. Erik Ivar Ringmar

Doç. Dr. Talha Köse

Dr. Murat Aslan

This is to confirm that this thesis complies with all the standards set by the School of Graduate Studies of Ibn Haldun University.

Date of Submission

Seal/Signature

ACADEMIC HONESTY ATTESTATION

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name Surname: Hammad Siddique

Signature:



ÖZ

PAKİSTAN'DA GÜNCEL KİMLİK KRİZİ: ULUSAL KİMLİK SÖYLEMİ VE
BATI ÇIKARLARININ ÇATIŞMASI

Siddique, Hammad

Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans Programı

Öğrenci Numarası: 187039011

Open Researcher and Contributor ID (ORC-ID): 0000-0002-9200-3799

Ulusal Tez Merkezi Referans Numarası: 10395987

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Erik Ringmar

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Bu çalışmanın amacı, kimlik bunalımı ile bölgesel ve küresel güç yapısı arasındaki bağlantıyı araştırmaktır. Dünyadaki herhangi bir devletin nihai içgüdüğü, iyi entegre bir topluma sahip olmadan imkansız olan hayatta kalmaktır. Ulusal kimlik, insanları bir ulus devlet içinde bütünleştirme rolünü oynayan kaçınılmaz faktörlerden biridir. İç ve dış tehditler karşısında onları bir araya getirir. Ulusal çıkarlar ile batılı çıkarlar arasındaki tercih çatışması nedeniyle bugün kimlik krizinin Pakistan'ın temel sorunlarından biri olduğu konusunda yaygın bir anlayış vardır. Çağdaş zamanlardaki en kötü kimlik kriziyle karşı karşıya kalırken, toplum genel olarak parçalanmış durumda. Pakistan'daki farklı etnik ve dilsel gruplar arasında birliğin özünü verme potansiyeline sahip tek kavram, tüm farklı grupların "Müslüman kimliği"dir. İstatistiki verilere göre Pakistan'da Müslüman nüfusun oranı %95-98 civarındadır. Sonuç olarak, Pakistan'da devlet, 9/11/2001 olayına kadar kitleleri bütünleştirme ve birlik içinde tutma rolünü oynamak için İslam'a değer vermiştir. Afganistan'daki Amerikan işgalinden sonra, 11 Eylül saldırılarına yanıt olarak Pakistan, bir devlet olarak din temelli ulusal söyleminden geri adım atarak ülke çapında ve dünya genelinde kimlik krizine yol açmıştır. Sonuç olarak devlet, halkına ikame bir birlik fikri verme rolünü oynayamamış, ülkenin iç ve dış işlerinde daha kaotik bir ortam yaratmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İslam, Kimlik, Kriz, Müslüman, Söylem.

ABSTRACT

CURRENT IDENTITY CRISIS IN PAKISTAN; A CLASH OF WESTERN INTEREST AND NATIONAL IDENTITY DISCOURSE

Siddique, Hammad

MA in Political Science and International Relations

Student ID: 187039011

Open Researcher and Contributor ID (ORCID): 0000-0002-9200-3799

National Thesis Center Reference Number: 10395987

Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Erik Ringmar

September 2021, 37 Pages

The purpose of this study is to investigate the connection among identity crisis, regional and global power structure. The ultimate instinct of any state around the globe is survival, which is impossible without having a well-integrated society. National identity is one of the inevitable factors, playing the role of keeping people integrated within a nation state. It brings them together in the face of internal and external threats. There is a widespread understanding that, today identity crisis is one of the core problems of Pakistan due to a conflict of preferences between national interests and Western interests. While facing the worst identity crisis in contemporary times, the society, at large, is widely fragmented. The sole notion having the potential to give the essence of unity across different ethnic and linguistic groups in Pakistan is the "Muslim identity" of all varying groups. According to statistical data, the percentage of Muslim population in Pakistan is around 95-98%. Consequently, in Pakistan, the state has been valuing Islam to play the role of keeping the masses integrated and unified, until the 9/11/2001 incident. After the American invasion in Afghanistan, in response to 9/11 attacks, Pakistan, as a state, took a row back from its religion based national discourse giving rise to the problem of identity crisis across the country as well as across the globe. Resultantly, the state has failed to play its role to give a substitute idea of unity to its people rendering a more chaotic environment in external as well as internal affairs of the country.

Keywords: Crisis, Discourse, Identity, Islam, Muslim.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ÖZ	iv
ABSTRACT	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vi
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS	viii
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Research Questions	2
1.2. Research Methodology	2
1.3. Hypothesis	2
1.4. Theoretical Framework	2
CHAPTER II IDENTITY QUESTION IN POST-INDEPENDENCE ERA	5
2.1. Identity Question in Post-Independence Era (1947-71)	5
2.2. Ayub Khan’s Approach of Pakistan as a Nation	6
CHAPTER III IDENTITY DISCOURSE POST-DISINTEGRATION	9
3.1. Identity Question During 1971-2001	9
3.2. Constitution of 1973	10
3.3. Foreign Policy Under Bhutto	11
3.4. Identity Discourse Under General Zia	13
3.4.1. Zia’s Approach on Identity of Pakistan	13
3.4.2. Constitutional Changes Under Zia	13
3.4.3. Education Curriculum	14
3.4.4. Zia’s Approach on Economy	15
3.4.5. Concept of Women Rights	15
3.4.6. Foreign Policy of Zia	15
3.5. Role of Madrassas	17
3.6. The Role of Pakistan’s Military	18
CHAPTER IV POST 09/11/2001 IDENTITY DISCOURSE	19
4.1. Identity Question in Post 2001	19
4.2. Musharraf’s Solution to Terrorism	20
4.2.1. General Musharraf’s Approach on National Identity Discourse	21
4.2.2. Musharraf’s Education Policy and Identity Question	22
4.2.3. Women Empowerment	23

4.2.4. Freedom of Print and Electronic Media	24
4.2.5. Military Operations against Terrorism	25
4.2.6. Benefits of Collaboration with USA in Post 9/11	25
4.3. Reaction From Inside Pakistan.....	26
4.3.1. Madrassas and Military	27
4.3.2. Failure of Enlighten Moderation	27
4.3.3. Ethnic Uprisings	28
4.4. Appeasement of the Religious Factions	29
CHAPTER V CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION	31
REFERENCES.....	33
CURRICULUM VITAE.....	37



LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
PEMRA	Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority
PMLN	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Pakistan is on the pivotal position between gulf countries, South Asia, and China. It is the second most populous country in the Muslim world. It came into existence with a tag of religion. Historically, the sub-continent; today's India and Pakistan have never been under one rule. At the time of the British withdrawal, 565 princely states were officially recognized in the Indian subcontinent. Pakistan was constructed in its present form by unifying the Muslim majority (ethnically distinct) regions of the Indian sub-continent. Being exceptional throughout the history, distinct religious identity of Muslims was the foundation stone of the formation of Pakistan. Today the constitution of Pakistan is Islamic; the majority of the population is Muslim, and it has the biggest number of religious schools (madrassas) in the Muslim world. Keeping all this in mind, the unity and solidarity should have been prevailed in the country, a consensus should have been developed in the society, since the whole country has a common set of beliefs, which could have played an important role of uniting people and a vital role in nation building but the real facts are wholly inverse.

To comprehend the contextual background behind respective approaches of the state heads, the formation of Pakistan's national identity discourse needs to be subdivided into three phases, ultimately exploring the domestic, regional and international political dynamics, which has played a vital role in building their national identity approaches as the heads of state. During first phase (1947-1971), national identity discourse was moderate and a bit lopsided towards secularism. Second phase started after the 1971 disintegration (Formation of Bangladesh) episode, leading Pakistan towards constructing a religion based national identity to avoid further disintegration. The third, the most important phase marks the post 9/11/2001 era, after the American invasion in Afghanistan. Pakistan as a state apparently took a U-turn from the previously adopted national identity discourse; consequently, the problem of identity crisis emerged once again.

1.1. Research Questions

- a. Why the state felt the need to construct a religion based national discourse in Pakistan?
- b. If a religion based national identity had helped Pakistan to unify the fragmented society, then why did the state take a massive turn around in post 9/11?
- c. More than 95% population of Pakistan shares the common identity of Muslim then why is there an identity crisis in Pakistan?
- d. Why do we see oscillations in identity discourse of Pakistan?

1.2. Research Methodology

The nature of research is to be Qualitative-Exploratory. For the primary resources, the researcher has tried to explore Policy statements, official websites along with analyzing the official documents. However, the secondary sources are journals, research articles, books, reports, web sources and newspapers.

1.3. Hypothesis

Survival is the goal of the states, so, as to meet that goal, foreign policies of the countries are driven by their instinct of survival in the global anarchic order. The pressure by great powers puts weaker states in a position where they are compelled to compromise their national interests. The attempt to survive as a weak state in international anarchic structure has caused the massive identity crisis in Pakistan domestically. The rationale, behind construction of religion based national identity in Pakistan, was the goal of its survival. The turnaround in national discourse, in post 9/11, was an attempt to make itself the fittest to survive.

1.4. Theoretical Framework

The existing literature on Pakistan's identity question analyzes it through a Western prism. It tends to put the blame of identity crisis on the religion. In other words, the

excessive use of religion by the state to build a radical national identity made Pakistan a state misfit in international structures and ultimately caused a crisis in Pakistan. The argument of Pakistan being a misfit and the need to make it fit is visible in different studies. Haqqani argues “The United States should help to contain the Islamists' influence in Pakistan by demanding reforms of Pakistan's governance. Strengthening civil society and building secular political parties as a countervailing force in Pakistan can contain the demands for Islamization” (Haqqani, 2010) The state of Pakistan has been accused of building a radical narrative. However, the global, regional, and domestic dynamics which compelled Pakistan to construct the religion based strong national identity discourse are completely ignored. Farzana Shaikh argues “The state has tried to interpret Islam in an exclusivist framework and thereby it has tried to distinguish Pakistan from the syncretic and pluralist tendencies in South Asia. This has led to growing rifts among the different ethnic and linguistic groups which form Pakistan today.” She further argues, Pakistan since its inception has been trapped in a ‘negative identity’ of defining itself as something which is ‘not India’. (Shaikh, 2018)

However, in fact the regional and internal threats of instability play a significant role in shaping Pakistan’s national identity policy. Fair argues that security policies of Pakistan are characterized by four beliefs. First, that Pakistan is an insecure and incomplete state second, Afghanistan is a source of instability. Third, India rejects the two-nation theory and seeks to dominate or destroy Pakistan, and fourth, India is a regional hegemon that must be resisted. (Fair, 2016) Additionally, the unresolved Kashmir conflict, the threat of internal instability and the haunting memory of disintegration of Pakistan in 1971 plays a significant role. The threat perception of Pakistan plays a central role in identity approach as well. The factors mentioned by Fair to explain the security approach of Pakistan also play a vital role in construction of national identity approach of Pakistan. Pakistan being a weak country feels isolated to face the perceived internal and external security challenges and that leads Pakistan to adapt an identity discourse in which religion plays a major role. The religious identity is used as a weapon to deter the external and internal threats to its existence. When this narrative of religion-based identity serves the interest of the West and Pakistan at once, Pakistan does not face any identity crisis. The moment this narrative starts clashing with Western interests, the identity discourse in Pakistan becomes the struggle for a balance between domestic and Western pressure or the struggle to

balance between national interest and Western interests. As soon as the Western pressure releases, Pakistan goes back to its identity approach purely based on religion. In short, the domestic, regional and global dynamics play a significant role in shaping the approach of state on the identity discourse in Pakistan.



CHAPTER II

IDENTITY QUESTION IN POST-INDEPENDENCE ERA

2.1. Identity Question in Post-Independence Era (1947-71)

Emergence of Pakistan as an independent state on world map was purely based on religion, “as a homeland for Indian Muslims”. The person, who became the voice of this idea and came forward to lead the movement of the separate homeland for Muslims, did not come from the religious cadre, but rather, he came from the educated Muslim elite groomed in secular educational institutions of the West. Mohammad Ali Jinnah presented the concept of Muslims, being a separate nation in the subcontinent from the Hindu nation. The constituents who constituted the idea of Pakistan as a community and nation were greatly influenced by the religion. The religious sentiments of the Muslims of subcontinent played the crucial role in Pakistan movement. The name of religion was excessively used during the Pakistan movement, however, nobody including Jinnah had a clear idea what post-independence Pakistan would look like. Jinnah himself contributed to long haul disarray on the ideological premise of the Pakistani state by making conflicting articulations, which emphasized majority rule and secularism at one time and the rule of Islam at another (Cohen, 2004).

After the demise of Jinnah, in order to reduce the contradiction, to give a singular direction to the nation, Jinnah’s deputy, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, presented a resolution, a set of principles, historically an unprecedented document titled as the Objectives Resolution in 1949. It gave a clear understanding of the road map for the narrative building of the state as well as constitution making on the basis of Islam, intrinsically a difficult task, ultimately, to get to the destination of a newly born state. Firstly, it changed the name of the country and added a word 'Islamic' devising a new name from the Republic of Pakistan to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Liaquat Al khan also had a clear idea about the role of Islam to constantly pull the young country together and give an insight to its leaders, to create a Western-style democracy.

However, coming to an end, to conciliate the liberals and minorities, Prime Minister Khan declared that the destination before us after establishing the state was to develop a liberal government in true essence where the greatest amount of freedom would be available to all its people. (Choudhury, 1955)

After Jinnah, where on one hand there was confusion on how Pakistan should look, the competition or conflict over power sharing between the elite was also an ongoing friction. The country could neither have a stable government nor did it have any constitution in 9 years after its independence. The first Constitution was framed in 1956, in which Pakistan was proclaimed as an Islamic Republic and according to the constitution; the President of the country was essentially to be a Muslim. Being an Islamic Republic, it was stated that no law contrary to Quran and Sunnah could be instituted. But interestingly, Islam was not given official recognition in the constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan as the religion of state. According to the constitution, a commission was to be appointed by the president of the state which would suggest and approve the new laws and review the concurrent laws to be in accordance with Islamic teachings. (Choudhury, 1956) However, the president, major-general Iskander Mirza, who was against the view of mixing the religion with politics, understandably, never worked in true spirit for the appointment of that commission. Consequently, the constitution could not withstand long in the anarchic and absurd political culture of Pakistan. In 1958, Mirza took advantage of the chaotic situation, annulled the constitution, and dismantled the political structure to avoid the elections to be held in February 1959. (Wilcox, 1965)

2.2. Ayub Khan's Approach of Pakistan as a Nation

General Ayub ousted Mirza and became Pakistan's first ever martial law administrator. At the time when Ayub took over, Pakistan was around 11 years old. It was still looking for a constitution around which the whole nation could gather. There was a lack of consensus on what should be the national discourse of the country and what role religion should play in that? Along with that, there was inconsistency and a lot of confusion on the direction of foreign policy of the country. There was no development on the grave issues like resolution of Kashmir conflict, water dispute, border conflict with Afghanistan and border conflict with China. Ayub Khan's approach was lopsided

towards secularism and modernity. He had a liberal approach in foreign policy and was not in favor of a hardline religion based nationalistic approach. (Gohar & Sang, 1993) He thought of Pakistan being a Muslim country where Muslims, without being influenced by the state institutions, could live their lives in conformity with the Islamic values in true essence. To him, Pakistan was a nation state, owing to holding a national culture, consisting of Islam and local-regional cultural traditions including varying regional languages. However, he was not of the view of imposing the religious standards with force by the state. According to him and likes of him, Pakistan was a nation state comprised of varying national identities, linguistic factions, and religions. (Sakia, 2014) His modern/liberal approach is visible in the education policy of 1959, in 1962 constitution and in different public statements given by him along with his foreign policy approach. (Saigol, 2003) Under him Pakistan solved the water dispute with India, He tried to solve the Kashmir conflict with India by using backdoor diplomatic channels, and he also offered joint defense to India against Chinese threat. Pakistan joined security pacts like SEATO and CENTO on the hope to defend itself against Communist threat and to solve the Kashmir conflict. On the western borders Afghanistan with the support of USSR claimed on the Pashtun regions of Pakistan during the Ayub era. That was also a great foreign policy concern of Ayub era. Pakistan tried to balance that equation against Afghanistan with the help of its western allies.

In that era USSR kept helping India vis-à-vis Pakistan and USA stayed neutral, because it needed Indian cooperation to contain China. Annoyance for western support to India against China and neutrality in Indo-Pak conflicts, led Pakistan towards the policy of neutrality. After getting disappointed by the West, Ayub Khan devised a policy of "bilateral equations", which he presented in detail in his book. To establish typical ties with major powers (USA, USSR, China, and India) entangled in Asia, without provoking any one of them was the real purpose of the policy. To meet this very goal, a simple plan of action was made. It was essentially to develop multilateral terms with each one of them, having clear perception of the nature and complexion of the terms to create good and peaceful relations without exploiting the lawful interests of none of them. He had improved relationship with all of them but during the times of crisis, like 1965 war with India, no major power came to help Pakistan. It was only China who backed Pakistan that too on diplomatic front. (Khan & Friends, 1967) Ayub

tried hard during his tenure but the pivotal issue of right of self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir could not be sorted out. USSR Supported India by providing India military equipment during 1971 episode too while Pakistan was standing alone and helpless against a country which is five times bigger in size. A fragile, small in size country could not survive internal uprisings and foreign invasion at once, it had to face the humiliating defeat and disintegration in 1971.

The absence of strong identity discourse which could provide a common ground, feeling of oneness to ethnically, culturally, and linguistically different people, lack of equal representation of different ethnic communities, divisive economic policies, failure in foreign policy and the 'one unit' experiment of the Ayub regime widened the gap between East and West Pakistan which ultimately gave rise to the civil war in 1971. That civil war resulted into disintegration of East and West Pakistan. There was no clear position of the state of Pakistan on national discourse during 1947-71, yet, whenever the state required national unity in any unusual situation, the name of religion and religious slogans were being used during that period too. For instance, in 1948 during the war over Kashmir, Pashtuns from northern Pakistan came to fight along with Pakistan army. They did not have same language, race, color, or ethnicity as the people of Kashmir, the only motivating element to come all the way from their areas to Kashmir and fight was the common religion, since their Muslim brothers were being oppressed, and therefore, they thought it was their duty to help them to fight against the oppressor. During the 1965 India-Pakistan war, the President Ayub who is considered to be modern himself, declared, the fight against India, Jihad. It's clearly visible that even in that period religion was used by the state, whenever national unity was required, although, the state had adopted a secular/modern approach. (Shaikh, 2018)

CHAPTER III

IDENTITY DISCOURSE POST-DISINTEGRATION

3.1. Identity Question during 1971-2001

The secular inclination of Pakistan was discontinued, following the 1971 civil war. Pakistan withdrew from the pacts like SEATO and CENTO. There were multiple reasons behind that. Firstly, the only people who supported state of Pakistan from inside East Pakistan were Islamists; they formed civil militia named as Al-shams and Al-Badar to help the state to fight the rebels. Why they fought the rebels, who linguistically and culturally were the same as them? The motive behind was the idea of Islamic Pakistan, they fought for Islamic ideology of Pakistan which was given by the leaders of Pakistan. Secondly, the Kashmir conflict was still unresolved, and it was a consensus in Pakistan, on Kashmir conflict being an unfinished agenda of the partition of the Indian subcontinent. The issue of Kashmir is the root cause of incessant animosity amongst India and Pakistan. The claim by Pakistan on Kashmir is primarily because Kashmir is a Muslim majority region. Thirdly, the Durand line conflict with Afghanistan was unresolved as well. Fourthly, Bloch uprising against the state was a grave issue. Last but not the least issue was the threat of potential ethnic uprisings, being linguistically and ethnically heterogeneous society. (Siddiqi, 2012)

Moreover, the modern/liberal approach could neither help Pakistan to achieve its foreign policy objectives nor could it save Pakistan from internal disintegration, as during those times regional power structure and the interests of great powers in the region were contradictory to the interests of Pakistan. In addition to that, the social moments like Yaum e shaukat i Islam, Khatm e nabuwat moment and Nizam i Mustafa moment had put a pressure on the state by the public to form an Islamic republic. Hence, in such circumstances, the political elite of Pakistan thought a strong national identity discourse indispensable to knit the nation together, the only way to survive as a nation-state. The only idea which could bring the people of Pakistan together, while

nullifying the linguistic and ethnic activism, was their common Muslim identity. Islam discourages the ethnic, linguistic, provincial, and regional fragmentation amongst Muslims. It could help the state to give its people the idea of oneness while helping the state to formulate its foreign policy objectives like Durand line conflict with Afghanistan and Kashmir conflict with India. (Sherwani, 2017)

According to the popular narrative of Islamists, Pakistan at that time was only a country geographically inhabited predominantly by Muslims and was essentially to be transformed into a nation. They thought that the nation could only exist when the state would have an Islamic constitution; when the people would be seen respecting and observing the religious obligations mandatory for them as Muslims; when they would accept an Islamic national ideology which meant that the foundations of the state would not be laid on geographical, ethnic, racial, linguistic or other worldly ideas, rather on the teachings, principles and standards of Islamic ideology regardless of all the differences wealth, social rank or ethnicity. They considered the division of Pakistan a sign of Allah's fury to a nation that hadn't been successful being purely Islamic. Maulana Maududi, founder of Jamaat-i-Islami, ascribed the division of the country to Pakistan's leaders being non practicing Muslims and the absence of Islamisation, which stimulated a number of immoralities, including sub-nationalism like regionalism or provincialism, class conflict and localism. In short, the revival of the Islamic conscience of the people became the point of stress.

The practical step taken, for the awakening of Islamic consciousness of the masses by the consensus of all the political parties, was the Islamisation of the constitution of Pakistan, the re-orientation of foreign policy and the islamification of the educational curriculum.

3.2. Constitution of 1973

A third constitution was given to Pakistan by the government, led by Z.A Bhutto. It was, in fact, the first uniform constitution of Pakistan, endorsed by the members of Parliament, as well as approved by the religious leadership. The 1973 Constitution may not have been much different from its predecessors in many aspects, but it was flooding with Islamic values. (Rehman, 1973)

Islam was promulgated, for the first time, as the official religion of the state. Bhutto introduced a number of other Islamic values as well; besides it was clearly a more Islamic constitution than the previous ones. These values resulted in giving Pakistani society Islamic colorings from head to toe. He approved an Act of Parliament, in which Ahmadis were to be declared as non-Muslim minority. To Islamize the philanthropic organization in Pakistan, he also replaced the name of the Red Cross with Red Crescent. He made it mandatory to place copies of Quran in rooms of all five-star hotels all over Pakistan. (Shaikh, 2008) He also laid the foundation of a separate Ministry, for the first time in history of Pakistan, to deal with religious matters named 'Ministry of Religious Affairs'. (Hussain, Gillani & Abbas, 2020) Moreover, he persuaded the national television and radio stations to perform more religious programs than before, advocated Arabic instructions in schools as well as on radio and television, rendered improved services for the independent and discreet Islamic teachings of Shi'ah for Sunni children in schools in order to minimize the friction between the two, financed a global conference titled 'Life and Work of Prophet Muhammad', ended quota limitations inflicted on the people having a desire to perform the Hajj (pilgrimage) and enhanced the foreign exchange allowance of pilgrims to support them for more travelling to and from Saudi Arabia during the Hajj season. (Hassan, 1985) (Burki, 1988)

3.3. Foreign Policy Under Bhutto

Bhutto re-oriented the foreign policy of Pakistan towards Muslim world. At a time, Pakistan had been defeated in Bangladesh along with failure in resolving the Kashmir conflict and Arab Muslim world had seen multiple humiliating defeats at the hands of Israel. That was the high time when both Arab and non-Arab Muslim worlds were reassured that they needed to join hands to struggle together to resolve their conflicts and defend their interests. Since, Pakistan was in the western block in early 1950s and 1960s, Bhutto launched what he called a 'journey among brothers'. He visited twenty Middle Eastern and North African predominantly Muslim countries. It aided in rebuilding Pakistan's bond of understanding and companionship with fellow Muslim nations. Bhutto perfectly recognized the common interests among Pakistan, Middle Eastern and African Muslim nations. The interests of prime importance were the following:

- Pakistan had less foreign-exchange earnings and owned skilled labor, while the oil rich Muslim countries were foreign-exchange rich but labor poor.
- Pakistan had an advanced and appreciable military establishment, while Arab countries hadn't one and inadequately trained armies.

Resultantly, Pakistani officers were equipped enough to help them out in training. In reality, amid and post 1973 Arab Israeli War, Bhutto sent a huge number of Pakistan's exceedingly prepared and experienced civilian specialists and armed forces' officers to a number of Arab countries. Besides sharing their experiences in training, Pakistanis were distinctly eminent in the trade and armed operations of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, and several Persian Gulf states, Emirates and Sheikhdoms. These Pakistani training commissions were also given the tasks in Syria and Egypt having substantial military establishments throughout the Middle East. In the name of 'Islamic politics', Bhutto made it possible to make manpower export one of the important export commodities, raising approximately 48.9 per cent of Pakistan's foreign-exchange income by the fiscal year 1977-78, as compared to 15.1 per cent in the fiscal year 1974-75. By 1977, according to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) report, Pakistan was at the top of the list of labor-exporting countries both in numbers of workers, which was estimated at over 500,000, and in volume of remittances, which was estimated at \$1 billion, nearly double its previous year figure of \$590 million. Statistical data unveil that before Bhutto's premise of power; Muslim countries' foreign aid to Pakistan was not much significant. In 1974, Pakistan was one of the prime beneficiaries of plentiful aid from the Middle Eastern countries. At the end of 1976, foreign aid predominantly from the oil rich countries of Middle East, contributed nearly 50% of the development budget of Pakistan which was around \$1.7 billion. Bhutto opined that his 'greatest achievement' was being the major founder of nuclear energy program of Pakistan and the father of the 'Islamic Bomb' which was yet to be exploded. We know that the Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilizations had the capability. In the same way, South Africa and Israel had full nuclear capability. The Communist powers also had their own. In the whole scenario, Islamic civilization was the only one lacking it, but that scenario was near to change now. (Delvoie, 1996) (Hagerty, 1991)

3.4. Identity Discourse Under General Zia

The Islamisation project of the state was followed up by President Zia and that course of policy was continued later on too.

3.4.1. Zia's Approach on Identity of Pakistan

Zia ul haq played an unprecedented role to Islamize Pakistan. He clearly stated that, "Pakistan was achieved in the name of Islam, and Islam alone could provide the basis to run the government of the country and sustain its integrity"

In contrast to Ayub, Zia sorted it out that the enemy inside the country was in the shape of western, secular, modern and innovative, all the remnants of the colonizers. The greater stress of Zia's nationalism was on religion, tradition and the past as means of national dignity. Overall dissimilarity from others, varying traditions and regional culture were the key elements of his approach. Contrary to General Ayub's international approach, being different, according to Zia meant, in reality, being better than others on the basis of a 'golden past' and holding inherited 'great traditions'. He said that Pakistan would 'survive only if it sticks to Islam' because it was 'created in the name of Islam' (Pakistan times, 1977). Zia said, in a 1983 press conference, "My only ambition in life is to complete the process of Islamisation so that there will be no turning back on that process." (Reeves, 1984) Steps taken by the Zia regime to build the Islamic identity discourse were as follows:

3.4.2. Constitutional Changes Under Zia

He laid the foundation of a new Islamic bureaucracy and created a link between Ulema and the military regime. He set up sharia courts. He amended blasphemy law, under which derogatory language about Prophet Mohammad would be punishable with the death penalty. For the minorities, he revitalized the distinct electorate system again, which had been abolished earlier. In addition to that he introduced the controversial Hudood Ordinance. According to this ordinance women had to present four male adults as eyewitnesses of rape in order to try her rapist. In his project of return to Islamic values, the participation of women in public sphere was decreased. He took

multiple measures to restrict woman to inside the home to Islamize the community. (Kennedy, 1990)

3.4.3. Education Curriculum

The campaign of the Zia regime had a significant impact on the educational system of the country. The government set up a number of cells, commissions, numerous committees, different university departments and many other means, which were allocated the task to review the existing environment and implement the Islamic values throughout the society. In contrast to Ayub, General Zia said that religion should be an absolute part of all scientific and secular knowledge spreading institutions, and any material contrary to Islamic principles should be excluded from the curriculum. The policy document, which was issued in 1979 during his reign, initiated a model shift in the identity discourse of Pakistan stalking the narrative of developing the nationhood under the viewpoint of the global Muslim brotherhood. It, undoubtedly, was a point of shift definitely discrepant to the existing education policies' ideological perspective of using Islam as a medium for national cohesion.

The 1979 education policy financed the narrative of Muslim Ummah to be implanted in students' pursuits to acquaint them with their business of helping fellow Muslims and pass on the sole message of Allah around the world. The point of stress of the policy was propagating the Islamic principles and beliefs to make students' ideas regarding Islam loyal which in the end led to the incorporation of Arabic as a compulsory subject to construct the idea of Muslim Ummah (Pakistan, 1979, p. 48). The first step implemented was the development of a framework for the policy provided a framework for initiating Shariah faculty at Quaid-e-Azam University for making reforms in the higher education research process as a whole, deep rooted in the domain of Islamic education. (Qurban & Amin, 2019)

This policy had ratified a project of mosque school to develop the identity of Pakistan as a nation under the flag of Muslim Ummah (Kazi, 1994). No need of creating infrastructure was there in the shape of buildings and further staff specifically in countryside areas (Pakistan, 1979, p. 8). These schools were allotted a PTC teacher as well as an imam who educated the children with the Quran and Islamic studies. The

perspective behind this policy was being able to create staunch and loyal Muslims. This piece of document had a distinct section for recommendations regarding female education with the title 'Education of Female'. This section led the policy makers to plan an initiative of 'Mohalla Schools' to instruct Islamic principles and values to female students. (Saigol, 1995) These schools were identical to mosque schools but were set up to educate Quran and Islamic studies to female students 'at home' to make them faithful and devoted female Muslims (Pakistan, 1979, p. 14). This policy popularized the perception that education institutions were just for Muslim students and the objective was to market Islamic education only.

3.4.4. Zia's Approach on Economy

The Zia government, which was determined to establish an Islamic State, desired to approve two to three eminent Islamic economic ideas to give the public a sense that the state was steering in an Islamic economic system. Zia, confidently, proclaimed that, Pakistan would be reconstructed into a classless society by eliminating 'starvation and penury', as an outcome of the humanitarian steps taken such as Zakat and Ushr. (Baxter, 1991)

3.4.5. Concept of Women Rights

Under Zia the approach of gender-based roles in different spheres of life was prevalent. The policies were introduced to restrict women's public appearance. Some of the controversial laws made headlines in national and international newspapers. The most prominent of those was 'Hudood Laws'. According to that the rape victim has to present four male eyewitnesses of rape in order to prosecute the accused. (Imran, 2005)

3.4.6. Foreign Policy of Zia

The Soviet attack on Afghanistan provided Pakistan to settle its scores with USSR for its help to India in 1971 Indo-Pak war, along with that it brought the opportunity to secure its western border. On this occasion, United States, the Muslim world and particularly Pakistan were on same page. They all had the common interest to contain USSR in Afghanistan. It also increased Pakistan's importance as an OIC (Organization

of Islamic Cooperation) member and Zia, as the 45-nation Islamic bloc's an important spokesperson. The Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference, in the general session of the 11th annual meeting, with one voice, appointed Zia to give speech in the 35th session of the United Nations General Assembly which was to be held in September 1980. The Afghan war proved to be an opportunity for the Pakistani state to proceed with the project of Islamisation. The state right away directly put its nose in the jihad against Soviet initiated by Mujahideen indirectly sponsored by USA. The State took great benefits in terms of large-scale endowment from the states financing in the name of jihad, especially, from Middle Eastern countries. USA through Gulf States backed and assisted Pakistan technically to up skill the militants to fight against USSR in Afghanistan. That assistance helped Pakistan to off-balance all the regional threats (India and Afghanistan). Pakistan's National and regional objectives were in line with the interest of Western block led by USA. Global structural dynamics, in fact, helped Pakistan to achieve its entire domestic (Islamisation project) and foreign policy objectives and vice versa.

As representative for the OIC, Zia made numerous victories, and his regime played a central part within the UN, presented and supported talks in Geneva that at last got the Soviet troops removal from Afghanistan. Reliable statistics referred that the total average reserves from official and unofficial (including remittances) overseas means were, to be precise, \$4 billion per year by 1983. Pakistan was able to purchase the most recent military equipment from the West with funding from the oil-rich Middle Eastern states of the Persian Gulf; even Pakistan was also successful getting oil from these countries at deal costs and with delicate loans. (Burki, Baxter, La porte & kamal, 1991) Benazir Bhutto (Z. Ali Bhutto's Daughter) and Nawaz Sharif (A Businessman from Punjab), the two significant figures of the era of the civilian rule in Pakistan, both ruled the country in the eleven years (Decade of Democracy) after Zia. When the Soviets finally cleared out Afghanistan, tremendous infrastructure and foundations were still undamaged. These foundations and infrastructure were the creator of Taliban, assisted by the military and intelligence of Pakistan. The Taliban were the Pakistani state's product, at that time counselled by Benazir Bhutto and appraised as strategic assets by the state. Although both Nawaz and Benazir acted as mainstream civilian leaders, neither of them tried to dare the harmony well established throughout the country about the proposition of Pakistan as an Islamic state. Benazir Bhutto adopted it as a policy;

on the contrary, Nawaz Sharif did so blatantly and audaciously. Nawaz Sharif expressed that he desired to regularize Zia's Islamisation program by standardizing the implementation of Sharia laws. (Ahmad, 2012)

The two factions of the society which played the primary role to Islamize the Pakistan's social fabric are the military and the Mullahs. The prayer leaders using the social platform of the mosques and the religious scholars using madrassas played the role of the main collaborators of state in its religion-based identity construction project. The military as an institution is one of the most important institutions for a country like Pakistan which is under continuous foreign and domestic threats.

3.5. Role of Madrassas

Pakistan has one of the largest networks of Islamic religious schools (madrassas) in the world. They have their presence all across the country. There are two points of views regarding madrassas. Firstly, a lot of madrassas were built up with the help of individuals, the state, plus overseas financing too, to up skill the jihadists against the Soviets in Afghanistan amid Zia eras. But the other point of view opposes this to be true. According to the second point of view, the expansion of madrassas is neither linked to Zia era nor is it an accidental phenomenon as it is commonly said. Socio-economic progress of Pakistani society is linked with expansion of population that ultimately is dependent on the progress of system. Public sector couldn't excel enough with the progress in economy and expansion in population. The system was unable to provide compatible environment, better education system, and real inducements.

The whole education system in Pakistan was in trouble. Madrassa system of education gave a chance to the impoverished and underprivileged segment of the society if nothing else but to secure a fragment of knowledge using these conventional institutions and furnish the society's individuals with definite expertise to earn a livelihood. Factually, madrassas have been a major actor in giving an identity to Muslims in South Asia. (IPS Task force, 2002) President Ayub once, in 1962, established a committee to improve the syllabus in madrassas. The committee, in need of creating a nation with great morals in Pakistan, emphasized the significance of religious education. (Dogar, 2010)

President Zia formed a bench too, in 1979, to take an bird's-eye view of madrassa education. He was committed that the objective of religious education was to reinforce the state's Islamic Identity. The Ulema have always considered themselves as guardians of Islamic identity of Pakistan. They had and still have a substantial hold over Pakistani society due to the presence of madrassas. Madrassas in these circumstances, on one hand were playing the role to fulfil the gaps left by the state in the education system, on the other hand, madrassas, mosques, and prayer leaders were thought to be the natural allies of the state in its nation building project. Education plays a vital role in identity construction. A significant portion of the society was being educated in madrassas. (Rehman & Bukhari, 2006)

3.6. The Role of Pakistan's Military

Pakistan's military has also played a substantial role in governing and shaping the present-day Pakistan. Kashmir conflict, India's interference in East Pakistan, conflict over Siachin and Kargil war, with India and border conflicts with Afghanistan have strengthen the role of the military in Pakistan. Pakistan being a weaker state in comparison to India and after the use of non-state actors by India to dismantle Pakistan in 1971, the army of Pakistan had also the policy of assisting Islamic factions performing the duty of jihad against India and Afghanistan throughout the period of chaos in the region.

Additionally, from the discourse above, one can easily understand the only narrative which had helped Pakistan to meet its geographical and strategic interests is its Islamic identity. Therefore, the Pakistan Army also used Islam to meet its objectives on the ground. The Pakistani Army kept using the language of Islam during the training of the soldiers and the uneven might of Islamic 'guinea pig' to conduct proxies in Kashmir and Afghanistan. They all were habitual to come voluntarily to help the state, because of that having a very low tendency of anyone being forced by the state. To strengthen the religious discourse for a long time, the structure of conscription in the Pakistani military was drafted in a way that large number of its conscripts was coming from the regions in which religious affiliations had a stronger presence. (Rizvi, 1984)

CHAPTER IV

POST 09/11/2001 IDENTITY DISCOURSE

4.1. Identity Question in Post 2001

After 9/11/2001, Pakistan faced the worst dilemma of its history. The country's leadership did not have any idea about the path to follow and to avoid. The options, it had, were limited. The world had changed overnight. The biggest and foremost challenge of the world was 'Terrorism' leaving behind all other issues. Pakistan, already aggrieved with a bequest of several domestic and external threats, was shocked, when the catastrophe of 9/11/2001 presented it with new threatening realities. The world's only superpower was overpowered by fury and didn't wait in defining the form and value of its reaction. Bush the President announced strong measures to crush the terrorists and committed that the US would do that at every cost to punish the terrorists. While warning the other nations, he said, "There can be no neutral ground in the fight between civilization and terror. Strict disciplinary actions would also be taken against those who nurtured terrorists." (Ahmad, 2013)

At the political front, the US efficiently mobilized the global support to form a worldwide association to deal with terrorism. The global community in majority raised its voice unanimously against the horrific terrorism, damned the terrorists and resolved to perform this job together not only for prevalence of justice but also to get rid of the terrorism, in spite of diplomatic, religious, traditional, and regional differences as well as discrepancies in financial progress and impact. After two weeks, the US was successful to get a more distinct and pragmatic bill, accepted in the UN Security Council on the execution of global actions to subdue terrorism with the help of a UN Counter-Terrorism Committee. No choice was left for any nation in its policy in its terms with the US. They had to choose between two choices of 'Black and White'. "You're either with us or against us" was the order for the world, unambiguous and loud. Taliban were accused of strengthening Osama's agenda and providing space to terrorist group "Al Qaida" to work and Pakistan was in everyone's eyes due to its links

with them. There was a great feeling of resentment towards Pakistan for its alleged collaboration with the terrorist organizations, even at the public level in USA. (Ayres, 2004)

In such an environment, Pakistan was left with no choice but to formalize the policy to be or not be a member of the coalition in war against terrorism or a target of western war against terrorism. President Musharraf was informed that inability or unavailability in cooperation with the US in war against worldwide terrorism would stand his realm in opposition with the US. Secretary of State, Colin talked to President Musharraf to ask for Pakistan's full assistance and collaboration in combating terrorism, he conveyed on the behalf of his people that they wouldn't digest it if Pakistan didn't collaborate with the US in the war to get rid of terrorism. Military rulers of Pakistan got a loud and crystal-clear message from the US that Pakistan could be a station in any reaction to the incident 9/11 attacks, if it didn't make a policy to collaborate with the US. President Musharraf gave a speech to the nation on 19 September, after having an important meet up of his cabinet's ministers as well as senior military officials and reminded the US of Pakistan's assistance and cooperation in the war to exterminate terrorism. That was a mammoth turnaround in national discourse and a humongous contradiction to the narrative the state had built in the last few decades. It had both pros and cons to it. (Akhtar, 2012)

In such circumstances the biggest challenge for the state was how to balance between the two extremes, the domestic pressure, and the global pressure. On the one hand, the state had the challenge to improve its global image from a terror financing state to a responsible state. On the other hand, the challenge was to negotiate with the society, particularly with the religious factions of the society which had been the states traditional allies in the society in its program to keep the nation united.

4.2. Musharraf's Solution to Terrorism

While addressing an international seminar on global terrorism, Musharraf described his strategy to counter extremism;

- a. Re-emergence and collecting funds of proscribed organizations must not be allowed.
- b. No publications promoting hate and militancy to be allowed.
- c. No misuse of mosques by clerics or obscurantists to spew out hatred and militancy against everyone at large.
- d. Redo the syllabus and curriculum in the educational institutions so as to remove divisive content.
- e. Reformation of the madrassas which are indoctrinating the students towards militancy and, in some tribal regions, nurturing terrorists, and to ensure that they are not only teaching religion (but also other subjects) because there is the need for mainstreaming the students into life.
- f. Recognize the need to carry out a Muslim renaissance with Pakistan in the lead. (Dawn,2005)

4.2.1. General Musharraf's Approach on National Identity Discourse

Since 9/11, Muslims across the world and Pakistan, has been receiving a great deal of criticism, as terrorism has been associated with Muslims and their religion. The incident had a profound effect on the whole Muslim world. After the attack, without any delay Western Media turned on the Muslim world and started to consider Muslims as terrorists, fundamentalists, extremists, and fanatics. In an environment when all the Muslims in general and Pakistanis in particular were being seen suspiciously by the western societies, President Musharraf thought that Pakistan had a momentous image issue which required to be dealt with by normalizing its national culture and attitude. For that purpose, he presented his idea of Enlightened Moderation for the emancipation of the Muslim world. He tried to counter the charges of extremism and fanaticism on Pakistan and Muslim world with his policy of "enlightened moderation". He suggested Muslims that they should follow the path of moderation to prove Islam to be a religion of humanity, harmony, and tranquility instead of terrorism, extremism, and fanaticism. (Ahmad, 2021)

He accentuated that Muslim world has to demonstrate that there is no connection between militancy and Islam through both, their words and deeds. While addressing the media in 2002 he said, “Neither Islam nor the Muslim world is known with reference to true Islamic teachings, our glorious past, or our core humanistic values” because the extremists have manipulated the fury in Muslim communities towards Western strategies to trade bigotry and conservatism. (Aziz & Khalid, 2017)

He took few steps to modernize the Pakistani society to improve its global image which are as follows;

- a. Development of Education/ Science and Technology
- b. Women Empowerment
- c. Freedom of Print and Electronic Media
- d. Operation against Terrorism

4.2.2. Musharraf’s Education Policy and Identity Question

Green Papers 2006, White Paper 2007 and education policy of 2009 were the policy papers published after 9/11. Being a promoter of moderate Islam, Pervez Musharraf initiated the Enlightened Moderation, under which these policy papers observed the most discernible change that provided a narrative of modernism to build a distinct identity of Pakistan. This disclosed the shift in discourse from Islamic identity to enlightened moderation. It represented political program of the regime to establish a multilateral society for development of Pakistani identity in international arena. Musharraf’s government had substituted the discourse of Islamisation with enlightened moderation to get rid of conservatism within society, being in compliance with the issued policy papers, Green Paper 2006 and White Paper 2007, for Construction of Enlightened Pakistani. (Qurban, Amin, 2019)

The government had issued a detailed discussion process in the form of green papers and white papers to devise education policy. A distinct turnaround, taken by policy makers, was the international frame of mind in the green paper in which “Vision”

substituted the term Muslim Ummah with Universal Brotherhood, while the White Paper substituted the term “Muslim” with Citizens. (Pakistan, 2007) In making the White Paper, policy framers executed faithfulness to Islam by appealing to a chairperson of Islamic ideological council as chief speaker, Javed Ahmed Ghamidi, known for his modern and moderate understanding of Islam, at National Educational Conference. (Pakistan, 2006) The Green Paper represented progressive and liberal goals of education by emphasizing the prevalence of standard, forbearance, ethics, accountability, and easy access to education facility. (Pakistan, 2006, p. 1)

It is important to observe that the White Paper mentioned qualities of citizens that were instilled with the help of education. Education was there to build creative writing, analytical abilities to think, economy of knowledge, and to develop a conscience of willingly participating in democratic operations to make a strong and lively society. (Pakistan, 2007, pp. 44- 45) A theme tilted “Religious Education” without mentioning the word ‘Islamic’ was the most fascinating and distinctive thing in White paper. It also presented new subjects of ethics for non-Muslims as a substitute of Islamic Studies and gave rise to an inclusive program of religious education for all citizens. Briefly, the White paper’s discourse of education served for developing enlightened citizens. It is observable that both green Papers 2006 and White Paper 2007 had served for a progressive narrative to build up enlightened identity in Pakistan in international context as per requirement of Musharraf’s government.

4.2.3. Women Empowerment

Women empowerment started receiving the attention amid Musharraf’s era as this field was supposed to be one of the major pillars for construction of enlightened moderation and unorthodox Pakistan. General Pervez Musharraf was very much anxious about the good image of Pakistan in the global community. He ratified laws to strengthen women and annulled the discriminatory laws towards them and endeavored to give a soft and civilized image of Pakistan in the world. His time of rule was regarded as a golden period of time in context of law formation for women empowerment in Pakistan. The procedure to empower and strengthen women was strictly acted upon and led to the formation of the Women Protection Law in 2006. This Act was the result of the consistent dictation from local and global women organizations and

commissions for the provision of the basic rights to women of the country.

A number of amendments were ratified to prevailing laws to ensure social prosperity of women and to weed out biased and unjust laws. Although these amendments couldn't fully get rid of evils, but at least welcomed the progressive approach and a supporting move towards forming a society based on egalitarian laws for men and women. (O'Hare, U. 1999) Honor Killing Bill, a Criminal Law for the honor killing was presented in 2004, which considered honor killing a criminal act punitive by law. (Madaik, 2005)

Women Protection Act 2006 was enforced to give women security at the workplace without gender discrimination, to save them from workplace bullying, harassment, and assault. (O'Hare, U. 1999) This change had moreover put rape laws under penal code with a comprehensive explanation of assault that rendered rape sufferers some comfort and expectation of justice without being cursed and accused of the act. Last but not the least certainly, Presidential Ordinance (2006) "the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance, 2006" authorized bail for women caught on all accusations except murder and an act of terrorism. Women couldn't be withheld more than 24 hours without a possible reason and would be presented within 24 hours in question before a Magistrate.

4.2.4. Freedom of Print and Electronic Media

The Pakistani media was given matchless liberty amid the rule of General Pervez Musharraf. Under the reign of Musharraf, Pakistani media boosted; modern media laws ceased the state's ascendance over media; private media channels were registered and licensed. The regime created Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA), an independent structure to modernize media. Its main goal was to remove restrictions and modernize electronic and print media in Pakistan to produce more options for the people to assess their common public interests freely. (Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002) Media modernization definitely provided a support to the government in global community, as he displayed the true image of democratic norms in the society. (Iqbal, 2012)

4.2.5. Military Operations against Terrorism

Under international community's pressure, Pakistan had to reverse its policy to back civil militias to use them to achieve its foreign policy objectives. In order to build an image of a responsible state, he ordered the Pakistan military to conduct operations. The Pakistani state launched multiple military actions to improve its image. The alliance of military and mullah which was once considered inevitable for the protection of national interest and security came almost to its end. (Khalid & Roy, 2016)

4.2.6. Benefits of Collaboration with USA in Post 9/11

The significance of Pakistan as a state in the eyes of global circle got progress as it took its new place as a pivotal actor in the international fight against terrorism and vowed to weed out terrorist groups on its own land. It opened the ways for Pakistan, for instance, it started receiving special attention in the USA and in European countries, and it allowed Pakistan to gain access to much needed economic and military assistance, which would help it to pursue its long-term strategic and economic goals. The US started a direct assistance program; under that program Pakistan got aid for the promotion of democracy, betterment of health facilities, education sector, food, establishment of counter narcotics programs, agencies and forces, elimination of all evils like child abuse and child labor, to maintain border security and to ensure law enforcement, and in addition to all that, trade priority policies. The United States also assisted in loan, grant, and debt revisiting projects for Pakistan with the help of the different global economic institutions. The US released a plan of five years of aid of worth \$3b, as financial and military might back in 2003. It not only ceded to debt of 1 billion dollars but also awarded 1 billion dollars in the span of first three years post 9/11.

As expected, benefits flowed fast for the government of Pervez Musharraf. His government gained international legitimacy as the agenda for the restoration of democracy took a back seat in US calculations. It also gave Pakistan a certain maneuverability to hold out on two crucial areas of its foreign policy concerns: its nuclear weapons program and Kashmir. Due to the nuclear experiments in 1998 and

military takeover in 1999, the US wasting no time gave up on restrictions inflicted on Pakistan. Furthermore, in 2004, Pakistan was allotted the designation of an important non-NATO ally of the United States and also got the US grants and sales, a large number of military equipment and weapons to enhance its military competence. This was an important gain for Pakistan given its quest for military parity with India, its traditional adversary.

4.3. Reaction From Inside Pakistan

It was also the beginning of a very painful chapter in political history of Pakistan. In a moment religious as well as the majority of the political parties in Pakistan raised their voices and strictly condemned the US war against the Taliban state and use of Pakistani land. They opposed the attack on Afghanistan from Pakistan's soil and started protesting against the betrayal of the state of Pakistan against a brotherly neighbor Afghanistan. President Musharraf was partially successful in his attempts to convince the religious and political leaders of country to back a coalition with the United States. The leadership of many conservative religious organizations was not contented. Numerous groups started countrywide protests against any US invasion in Afghanistan. The leaders of some of the mainstream religious political parties openly admired the Taliban and vowed their moral support for them in their jihad against foreign invasion. The state's historical allies, the religious organizations, Islamic schools (madrassas) which used to be custodian of the Pakistan's ideological base, were now being considered as a security threat to the country. The primary reaction which the state had to face came from the religious factions of the society. The Islamic militants who had been long term ally of the state in fulfilling the foreign policy objectives of the state, perceived this reversal of policy by Pakistan, a betrayal to Muslim Umma and Islam. Most of them denounced the state's collaboration with the USA. The state of Pakistan started conducting military operations against the militants under global pressure. In response, out of resentment, they declared war and started targeting the state. The state labelled these groups as terrorists. But the masses in the country were under the strong influence of jihadist narratives, since the nation as a whole was mentally radicalized, so the acceptability of the discourse shift was not an easy task. (Khan & Wei, 2016)

The “America’s war” fought by Pakistan’s army in the tribal areas played in favor of the extremists who enjoyed a wide range of silent support for their anti-US line. They were initially successful to convince the major portion of the society that they were fighting a true jihad for a noble cause against a foreign invasion on a Muslim country to save fellow Muslim brothers, while the state of Pakistan was collaborating with the infidels because of the cowardice and greed of its leadership for US dollars. (Hussain, 2008)

4.3.1. Madrassas and Military

The state had to face the worst opposition from inside the military ranks and its time-tested allies, madrassas, from where a large number of the recruits for non-state militant organizations used to come. The people who formed militia and started armed resistance against the state to change the behavior to what they thought defiant behavior towards Islam came from military and madrassas. There were many army officers especially who were inclined towards religion, had perceived the state’s action against the Taliban, and likes of them as betrayal to the ideology of Pakistan. They formed, trained, and fought against the state because they thought fighting against collaborators of foreign invaders in a Muslim land is equally justified as it is justified against the foreign invaders. (Shahzad, 2012) Pakistan had to pay not only the cost in monetary terms but also in terms of thousands of human lives. (Crawford, 2018)

4.3.2. Failure of Enlighten Moderation

The religious factions of society criticized and condemned Musharraf’s approach of enlightened moderation vigorously. To them, the purpose of enlightened moderation is only to pander to the West, in political and religious terms, and an act of repentance for the perceived Islamic militancy. In fact, for the Islamists, the West and its biased media has deliberately maligned Islam and the Muslims, turning the Muslim leadership defensive in their approach. Instead of colluding with Washington’s game plan to count Pakistan among pro-US moderate Sunni states, defiance and opposition should be the path to follow to address the problems imposed upon the Muslim world by

Western aggression in Iraq and Afghanistan, and not subservience as expounded by the upholders of “moderate Islam”.

The Islamists regret that Musharraf, while comforting those equating terrorism with Islam, did not have a word for state terrorism as practiced by countries like India and Israel. The responsibility is unfairly placed upon the Muslims, which smacks of an inferiority complex and a defeatist mind-set. They thought enlightened moderation was an attempt to introduce the imported concept of secularism into the Islamic discourse, even though, it had no place in it, since there is no church in Islam, hence, no divide between the religious and the secular and so between religion and politics. The “new religious order” sought to promulgate an image of Islam that limited religion within walls to mosques and homes, whereas the whole affairs of state should be run according to principles and ideas acceptable to the Western interests. This agenda suspended the hold of Sharia in Pakistan.

In short, Enlightened moderation got bogged down by the impression that it was created to cope with the debilitating image problem of Pakistan and to satisfy foreign actors impatient to see the containment of violent political Islam. Consequently, it had little domestic outreach (Boquérat & Hussain, 2011).

4.3.3. Ethnic Uprisings

The state lost its allies, Islamic militants, who had their strong hold in Pashtun and Bloch concentrated regions for decades. The militants used to get support from madrassas, mosques, and religious factions of the societies all across the country. The institution of religious clergy has played the role of very important institution to counter the ethnic uprisings in the Pakistani society. They were empowered by the state in opposition to tribal leaderships in most of the tribal regions of the country. They helped the state to build religion-based identity in opposition to the identity on ethnic basis. But after the state decided to join the American camp, it pushed the Islamic militants to the camp of anti-state elements. Both Islamic militants and ethnic based separatist militant organization had a common enemy for the first time. The Pashtun regions were the primary target of the military operations by the state because of the presence of terrorists in those regions, the destruction in Pashtun regions, gave

a sense of deprivation to Pashtuns which gave rise to the ethnic uprising against the state. (Grare, 2006)

Along with that, resurgence of the Bloch movement also came to the fore once again in 2004 with the Al-Qaeda/Taliban camp transferred to Baluchistan. Ethnic separatist movements found the engagement of the state with the Islamic militancy as an opportunity. There was a threat of the Bloch collaborating with Al-Qaeda/Taliban forces for strategic reasons, which would add the evil of ultra-conservative terrorism in Pakistan. On one hand, as an important partner on the global fight against terrorism, it is committed to fight Islamist terrorism; on the other hand, it faces severe domestic constraints to do so. (Majeed, 2010)

4.4. Appeasement of the Religious Factions

In these circumstances the state adapted an approach to engage the religious factions of the society it tried to give the impression that this war is targeted against only the enemies of the state of Pakistan. For the engagement purpose political Islamists were given the biggest ever space in Pakistan's political spectrum by keeping the mainstream political parties like PMLN and PPP partially out of the election race. Although that was not the only reason behind the success of Islamists but still it was amongst the main reasons. Political Islamists governed frontier provinces of Pakistan starting from 2002 until 2007. Along with that they led the opposition in the national assembly. (Nasr, 2004)

The State drew the binaries like good Taliban's (ones who do not target the state of Pakistan) and bad Taliban's (The ones whose primary target was state of Pakistan) to give an impression domestically that the state's only target and enemies of the state of Pakistan are the bad Taliban who attack security forces and innocent civilians of Pakistan. (Burki, 2010) Pakistan has been accused for allegedly playing the double game by its allies repeatedly. It kept denying those allegations and declared that these were the baseless allegations. (Tellis, 2008) However, as the war against terrorism is moving towards the end the Taliban is being seen to be the potential ruler of Afghanistan. (Al Jazeera, 2021) In their attempt to take over Kabul there is an imminent threat of civil war in Afghanistan. The ethnic forces in Baluchistan and the

Pashtun dominated regions are on the rise. The deadlock on Kashmir conflict is at an all-time high level. (Khan, 2019) The contemporary relations between US and India are of unprecedented level. The US needs India more than ever to contain China. (Rajagopalan, 2017) Pakistan keeps accusing India of destabilizing Baluchistan from their consulates in Afghanistan. (Dawn, 2020) The scenario is somewhat similar to that of 1960s and 1970s. Pakistan is once again becoming irrelevant in US foreign policy interests. The relation between the two countries is strained. It is left alone to face the regional threats to its existence yet again. Therefore, the state of Pakistan seems to be moving back to its approach on the national identity the hybrid policies are shifting. The prime minister Imran Khan called Osama bin Laden a martyr while addressing to a session of parliament of Pakistan. He declared the partnership with the USA in the war against terrorism a mistake. (BBC, 2020) During an interview while addressing a question on a rape incident he put the blame of rapes on the imported Western culture and immodest dressing by the women in Pakistan. (The Guardian, 2021) He has committed to make Pakistan state of Medina time and again. (The news, 2021) The education policies under him show that Pakistan is reclaiming the Islamization policies. Under him, the Arabic language in schools has been made compulsory. The Quran education has been made compulsory for university students to graduate. (Dawn, 2021) Which shows that as the war in Afghanistan is ending, and the US is withdrawing its forces from Afghanistan, Pakistan is reversing the approach of modernization which was started under Musharraf to manage the international pressure. In order to counter all the regional and domestic threats Pakistan once again seems to have reclaimed the Islamization approach.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION

The primary goal of any state is survival. In order to achieve this goal states, work on improvement of their security measures against all kinds of external and internal threats. Pakistan in the early years of its inception, considering the global, regional, domestic dynamics adapted a west centric foreign policy. To make it look like the west to get attention from the west, political leadership tried to adapt a modern/secular identity discourse. But consecutive humiliating experiences left Pakistan with the feeling of being less relevant for the west. The behavior of west gave Pakistan a feeling that west is an ally only when western interest is under question vis-à-vis USSR but when Pakistan's interest or security vis-à-vis India is under question it hardly ever got any gesture of alliance from the west.

The identity conflict was the basis of the crisis that led to the disintegration of the young country. In such a situation in order to survive the state of Pakistan adapted a policy of weaponing the common Muslim identity of different ethnic groups in Pakistan. The domestic, regional, and global dynamics altogether played a role to push Pakistan into that policy. By adapting that policy Pakistan successfully off balanced all the regional and domestic threats to its security. Religion based national identity discourse was constructed at a time when it served both the national interest of Pakistan and the interests of west. It had no contradiction with the interest of Western powers during those times. However, in the years to come with the changing global dynamics the interest of great powers also changed. With the changed interest of the great powers Pakistan's national identity discourse became contradictory to it. Pakistan's national identity discourse, which once had helped the west to achieve its interest in Afghanistan, was being seen as a threat. The threat of being a target of the sole superpower was perceived as a bigger threat than the threat of domestic unrest. It had to adjust itself in the global structure. Therefore, Pakistan being a weak country was forced to revise its national discourse once again. In attempt to adjust herself in global

power structure and domestic pressure Pakistan has faced a serious identity crisis at home. It can also be implied that the identity discourse in Pakistan became negotiation between the global power dynamics and domestic dynamics. Pakistan's attempt to handle both international and domestic pressure at once and its desire to accomplish the western objectives without having devastating impacts on national objectives has led it to the identity crisis. By the changing global dynamics Pakistan once again is turning back to its Islamisation policies. The domestic, regional, and global dynamics are again pushing Pakistan into the adaption of same old Islamisation campaign domestically.

The dynamics of Pakistan as a country are very different than western nations, the concept of nation in Pakistan is very different than that of the west, and the religious national identity has helped Pakistan to avoid further disintegration and to counterbalance the foreign threats in order to survive. The global structure/ western interest has dictated Pakistan's national identity discourse in post 9/11, consequently, the country is facing the identity crisis.

In the post 9/11 world, the state of Pakistan changed its narrative and tried to come up with a different discourse in Pakistan to dilute the established image in the west but at the same time it engaged the religious factions of the community to handle the situation or to cope up with the potential backlash. The apparent reversal of its stance left Pakistan's society in chaos on the idea of Pakistan. In order to handle that chaotic situation to bring all the ethnic groups together in Pakistan in post US withdrawal state is turning back to its pre 9/11 policies.

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CURRICULUM VITAE

Personal Information:

Name - Surname: Hammad Siddique

Education:

2015-2019 BS International Relations, University of Management and Technology,
Lahore, Pakistan

2019-2021 MA in Political Science and International Relations, Ibn Khaldun
University, Turkey

Experience:

1. Researcher at SETA, Istanbul (Internship)
2. Teaching Assistant at University of Management and Technology, Lahore
3. International Desk at Al-Khidmat Foundation Pakistan
4. Monitoring Officer at 92 News