

**IBN HALDUN UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF RADIO, TELEVISION AND CINEMA**

MASTER THESIS

**THE INFLUENCE OF ISRAELI SOCIAL MEDIA
POLICIES POST ABRAHAM ACCORDS ON ARAB
PUBLIC OPINION: PERSPECTIVES FROM
MEDIAPERSONS**

GAMZE ABDEL FATAH

**THESIS SUPERVISOR
ASST. PROF. HAKKI OCAK**

ISTANBUL, 2022

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MEDIAPERSONS**

**by
GAMZE ABDELFAH**

**A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in Radio Television and Cinema**

**THESIS SUPERVISOR
ASST. PROF. HAKKI OCAI**

ISTANBUL, 2022

APPROVAL PAGE

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Art in Radio, TV and Cinema Program.

Thesis Jury Members

Title - Name Surname

Opinion

Signature

This is to confirm that this thesis complies with all the standards set by the School of Graduate Studies of Ibn Haldun University.

Date of Submission

Seal/Signature

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I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name Surname:

Signature

ÖZ

İBRAHİM ANLAŞMALARI SONRASI İSRAİL SOSYAL MEDYA POLİTİKALARININ ARAP KAMUOYU ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ: MEDYA ÇALIŞANLARININ BAKIŞ AÇILARI

Abdelfatah, Gamze

Radyo, Televizyon ve Sinema Yüksek Lisans Programı

Öğrenci Numarası: 187050015

Open Researcher and Contributor ID (ORCID): 0000-0001-6307-286X

Ulusal Tez Merkezi Referans Numarası: 10473306

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Hakki Öcal

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Çalışma, Arap kamuoyunu etkilemek için İbrahim anlaşmalarının imzalanmasından sonra İsrail politikalarının sosyal medyadaki değişimini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Ve Arap kamuoyunu çekmek için İsrail tarafından en çok kullanılan mekanizmaları incelemek Özellikle dijital diplomasinin iletişimi kolaylaştırmak için kullanılması ve Arap kamuoyuna nüfuz etmesi. Araştırmacı, medya kuruluşlarından 102 katılımcıdan oluşan bir ankete güvenmiştir. Daha doğru sonuçlara ulaşmak için uzmanlarla görüşmeler yapılmasına da değinildi. Araştırmacı, daha tutarlı modellere ulaşmak için nicel ve nitel yaklaşıma güvendi. Çalışmanın sonuçları, çalışmanın ilk hipotezinin geçerliliğini göstermiştir. Çalışma, İsrail'in Abraham Anlaşmalarını takiben sosyal medya politikasının çoğunu değiştirdiği sonucuna vardı. İçerikteki bu değişiklik dikkat çekiciydi. Ve İsrail Arap gençliğini çekmek için çeşitli mekanizmalar kullandı. Sonuçlara göre çoğu, İsrail'in Arapça sayfalarından etkilenmişti. Sonuçlar ayrıca İsrail'in Arap kamuoyunu planladığı stratejisine hizmet eden belirli bir açığa yönlendirmek amacıyla haberleri formüle ederken ve olayları sunarken medya çerçevesini kullandığını ortaya koydu. Sonuçlar, İsrail'in gençlerin sektörlerini etkileme yeteneğinin, onları etkilemeyi amaçlayan propaganda mekanizmalarına olan güveninden kaynaklandığını gösterdi. Gerçeklerin tekrarı ve tahrif edilmesi ve seçme ve görünürlük ilkesine güvenme dahil. Sonuçlar, Arapların İsrail ile kabulüne ve İsrail ile etkileşime karşı orta düzeyde tepkiler olduğunu gösterdiğinden, bu İsrail

yaklaşımının ciddiyetine vurgu yapıldı, özellikle sonuçların İbrahim anlaşmalarının Arap ve bölgesel sistem üzerinde bir etkisi olduğu sonucuna varılmasından sonra.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Abraham Anlaşmaları, Dijital Diplomasi, İsrail, Medya
Çerçeveleme, Normalleştirme, Propaganda, Sosyal Medya

ABSTRACT

THE INFLUENCE OF ISRAELI SOCIAL MEDIA POLICIES POST ABRAHAM ACCORDS ON ARAB PUBLIC OPINION: PERSPECTIVES FROM MEDIAPERSONS

Abdelfatah, Gamze

MA in Radio, Television, and Cinema

Student ID: 187050015

Open Researcher and Contributor ID (ORCID): 0000-0001-6307-286X

National Thesis Centre Reference Number: 10473306

Thesis Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Hakki Öcal

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The study aims to analyse the changes in Israeli policies about social media after the signing of the Abraham Accords 2020. These policies sought to influence the Arab public and examine the mechanisms most used by Israel to attract the Arab public, including particularly the use of digital diplomacy to facilitate communication and penetrates Arab public opinion after the Arab-Israeli normalization in 2020. This study relied on qualitative and quantitative approaches. A questionnaire was distributed to 102 respondents that work in various fields of media It also touched on conducting interviews with specialists to reach more accurate results. The researcher relied on the quantitative and qualitative approaches to reach more consistent models. The results of the study showed the validity of the first hypothesis of the study. The study concluded that Israel has already changed a lot of its policy on social media following the Abraham Accords. This change in content was noticeable. Moreover, Israel used various mechanisms to attract Arab youth. Most of them, according to the results, were influenced by Israel's pages in the Arabic language. The results also revealed that Israel used media framing in formulating news and presenting events with the aim of directing the Arab public to a specific angle that serves its strategy that it plans. The results indicated that Israel's ability to influence sectors of the Arab audience is due to its reliance on propaganda mechanisms aimed at influencing them, including repetition and falsification of facts and reliance on the principle of selection

and visibility. Emphasis should be placed on the seriousness of this Israeli approach, as the results indicated that there are medium-level reactions towards Arab acceptance and interaction with Israel, especially after the results concluded that the Abraham Accords had an impact on the Arab and regional system.

Keywords: Abraham Accords, Digital Diplomacy, Israel, Media Framing, Normalization, Propaganda, Social Media

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ÖZ	iv
ABSTRACT	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ix
LIST OF TABLES	xii
LIST OF FIGURES	xiii
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER II ISRAEL AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES	3
2.1. Background of the Israeli-Arab Conflict.....	3
2.1.1. The Balfour Declaration and the Creation of Israel	3
2.1.2. The War of 1948.....	4
2.1.3. The Tripartite Aggression Against Egypt - October 1956	6
2.1.4. Battle of Samu, 1966	8
2.1.5. The Six-Day War or the June Setback 1967	9
2.1.6. Battle of Karameh	10
2.1.7. October War of 1973	11
2.1.8. July War 2006	13
2.1.9. Gaza War	14
2.1.10. The Second Gaza War 2012	15
2.1.11. The Third Gaza War 2014	17
2.1.12. The Third Palestinian Intifada (Jerusalem)	18
2.1.13. Fourth Intifada (2021)	19
2.2. Arab-Israeli Peace Accords, Agreements and Treaties	20
2.2.1. Arab-Israeli Peace Relations	23
2.2.2. Paris Peace Conference, 1919	24
2.2.3. Faisal-Weizmann Agreement	25
2.2.4. The 1949 Armistice Agreements	26
2.2.5. Geneva Conference 1973	27
2.2.6. Camp David Accords 1978: The Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty 1979	28
2.2.7. Madrid Conference of 1991	29
2.2.8. Oslo Accords 1993	30

2.2.9. Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty	32
2.2.10. Camp David 2000 Summit	33
2.2.11. Abraham Accords 2020	34
CHAPTER III ISRAELI AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES.....	37
3.1. Israel’s Use of the Media as Propagative Tool through Digital Diplomacy ..	37
3.1.1. Israel’s Use of the Media in Propaganda.....	37
3.1.2. Israel and Framing the Media Messages	40
3.1.3. Israel and Digital Diplomacy	42
3.1.4. Israel’s Use of Arabic-Language Based Pages to Affect the Arab Audience ..	44
3.1.4.1. StandWithUs in Arabic	47
3.1.4.2. Israel in Arabic Page	48
3.1.4.3. The Jews of Iraq	49
3.1.4.4. Israel in the Gulf.....	50
3.1.4.5. Israel in Dubai	51
3.1.4.6. Israel in Bahrain	51
3.1.4.7. Sharakago Partnership.....	52
3.1.4.8. Peace Accords	53
CHAPTER IV LITERATURE REVIEW.....	55
4.1. Aspects of the Study	55
4.1.1. The Impact of the Abraham Accords on the Arab System.....	55
4.1.2. Israel’s Use of Social Media to Attract Arabs Directly.....	57
4.1.3. Digital Diplomacy and Israeli Arab Pages	59
4.1.4. Israeli Digital Normalization.....	62
4.1.5. Arab Social Media in the Face of Israel’s Plans and Content.....	64
4.2. The Study’s Distinguishing Factors from Other Studies	65
CHAPTER V ISRAELI SOCIAL MEDIA USAGE AFTER ABRAHAM ACCORDS TO INFLUENCE ARAB AUDIENCE.....	66
5.1. Methodological Framework of the Study	66
5.1.1. Problem Statement	66
5.1.2. Hypothesis of the Study	67
5.1.3. Research Question.....	68
5.1.4. Importance of the Study	68
5.1.5. Objectives of the Study	68
5.1.6. Limitations of the Study	69

5.1.7. Concepts in the Study	69
5.1.7.1. Abraham Accords	69
5.1.7.2. Digital Diplomacy	69
5.1.7.3. Social Media Platforms	70
5.1.8. Methodological Framework and Data Collection Techniques	70
5.1.9. Validity	70
5.1.10. Reliability	71
5.2. Quantitative and Qualitative Methods	71
5.2.1. Quantitative Method	71
5.2.2. Qualitative Method: Intensive Interviews	72
CHAPTER VI RESULTS	75
6.1. Demographic Characteristics	75
CHAPTER VII DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATION	94
7.1. Discussion	94
7.2. Recommendations	102
REFERENCES	104
APPENDICES	117
APPENDIX A	117
APPENDIX B	124
CURRICULUM VITAE	138

LIST OF TABLES

Table 6.1. Demographic Characteristics for the Gender	75
Table 6.2. Demographic Characteristics for the Age	76
Table 6.3. Demographic Characteristics for the Position at the Media	77
Table 6.4. Demographic Characteristics for the Participants Work Experience.....	78
Table 6.5. Demographic Characteristics for the Language of the Institution	79
Table 6.6. Demographic Characteristics for the Type of the Media Institutions.....	80
Table 6.7. Demographic Characteristics for the Nationality for the Journalists.....	81
Table 6.8. Did Israel Strengthen Its Media Sector After Signing the Abraham Accords	82
Table 6.9. Did Israel Try to Attract Arab Youth After Signing the Abraham Agreement to Expand the Circle of Normalization?.....	83
Table 6.10. Has Israel Changed Its Social Media Policy After Signing the Abraham Accords 2020?.....	84
Table 6.11. In Your Opinion, Has Israel's Interest Emerged After the Signing of the Abraham Agreement in Arabic Content and Arab Culture ?.....	85
Table. 6.12. What Tools Did Israel Use on Social Media Platforms After Signing the Abraham Agreement to Influence Arab Youth?	86
Table 6.13. Do You Think That Israel Has Intensified Its Presence on Social Media Networks Targeting the Arab Users Through Its Pages After Abraham?	87
Table 6.14. What Is the Most Content Offered on Israeli Social Media Platforms Directed at Arabs?.....	88
Table 6.15. Statements	89
Table 6.16. Do You Think That Israel Has the Ability to Affect Large Segment of Arab Youth Through Social Media Networks?	91
Table 6.17. Why Israel Tends to Use Social Media and Arabic Pages?	92
Table 6.18. Did the Abraham Accords Affect the Arab and Regional Scene?.....	93

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3.1. StandWithUs Arabic Facebook Page.....	47
Figure 3.2. Israel in Arabic Facebook Page	49
Figure 3.3. Jews of Iraq Twitter Page	50
Figure 3.4. Israel in The Gulf Twitter Page	50
Figure 3.5. Israel in Dubai Twitter Page	51
Figure 3.6. Israel in Bahrain Twitter Page	52
Figure 3.7. Sharaka. Website Screenshot.....	53
Figure 3.8. Sharakango Twitter Page.....	53
Figure 3.9. Abraham Accords Peace Institute Twitter Page	54
Figure 6.1. Gender of Participants	75
Figure 6.2. Age of Participants	76
Figure 6.3. Position at the Media	78
Figure 6.4. Work Experience	79
Figure 6.5. Language of the Institution.....	80
Figure 6.6. Type of the Media Institution	81
Figure 6.7. Nationality for the Journalists.....	82
Figure 6.8. Did Israel Strengthen Its Media Sector After Signing the Abraham Accords...	83
Figure 6.9. Did Israel Try to Attract Arab Youth After Signing the Abraham Agreement to Expand the Circle of Normalization?.....	84
Figure 6.10. Has Israel Changed Its Social Media Policy After Signing the Abraham Accords 2020?.....	85
Figure 6.11. Has Israel's Interest Emerged After the Signing of the Abraham Agreement in Arabic Content and Arab Culture ?.....	86
Figure 6.12. The Tools That Israel Used on Social Media Platforms After Signing the Abraham Agreement to Influence Arab Youth?	87
Figure 6.13. Do You Think That Israel Has Intensified Its Presence on Social Media Networks Targeting the Arab Users Through Its Pages After Abraham?	88
Figure 6.14. What Is the Most Content Offered on Israeli Social Media Platforms Directed at Arabs?.....	89
Figure 6.15. Level of the Statements	90
Figure 6.16. Do You Think That Israel Has the Ability to Affect Large Segment of Arab Youth Through Social Media Networks?	91

Figure 6.17. Why Israel Tend to Use Social Media and Arabic Pages?	92
Figure 6.18. Did the Abraham Accords Affect the Arab and Regional Scene?.....	93
Figure 7.1. The Page of the Writer of Promotional Content for Israel	98

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Palestinian-Israeli problem is the most important obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East. On the level of normalization, there were no official relations between Israel and the Arabs, except for Egypt and Jordan, which were in fierce wars with Israel, that prompted them at the time to conclude peace agreements.

The Abraham Accords 2020 was received with great uproar in all circles, but it caused conflict and chaos in the Middle East region, especially as Israel does not stop its continuous struggle with the Palestinian side. Israel had a desire to expand its relations with the Arab countries, and there have been secret relations between Israel and the Arab Gulf states since 2015. However, the 2020 Abraham Accords between the UAE, Israel, Bahrain, and Israel are a harsh and difficult diplomatic step that was taken against the background of the loss of the Palestinians (Rehman, 2020).

In January 2020, US President Donald Trump announced in a joint conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, what he called a peace plan or the “deal of the century,” according to which the existence of the Israeli entity will be legitimated and granted acceptance in the Arab region. In addition, the plan would strengthen Jewish identity by declaring the city of Jerusalem as the unified capital of the State of Israel. This deal was the beginning of the announcement, of the signing of normalization agreements with the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain under the name “Abraham Accords.” Then, Sudan and Morocco joined the ranks of the Arab countries that normalized their relations with Israel (Bisharat S., 2022).

The Israeli and Emirati hostility to Iran was among the reasons for the signing of the 2020 Abraham Accords between Israel and the UAE, as the two sides worked to improve their readiness to confront Iranian threats in all fields. The withdrawal of US forces from parts of the Middle East region and the entire world prompted the two countries to develop relations between them in anticipation of the weakness of direct

support from the United States. On the other hand, Israel views the Iranian regime as “absolute evil” and an imminent existential threat to it (Vohra, 2021).

Israel has launched pages on social media platforms in Arabic language directed to the Arab audience, Tel Aviv aimed to spread issues of concern to the Arab public to attract and co-opt them and to distance the current generations from the essence of the Arab Israeli conflict. Using its electronic units with its intelligence services, and in close cooperation with all the Israeli ministry of foreign affairs, it was able to launch media platforms to serve this strategic goal (Ahmed, 2021).

The propaganda systems used by Israel do not target the Palestinian Arab observer only, but also have followers at the Israeli home front. Israel used digital diplomacy and focused on the method of emotional excitement, the method of repetition, persecution, and suspicion of the other. In its use of propaganda, Israel relied on destroying the morale of the Arab people, by glorifying Israeli military capabilities and focusing on its use of powerful weapons, in contrast to its portrayal of the Palestinian resistance as armed terrorist organizations that target Israel's security (Sobeih, 2020).

CHAPTER II

ISRAEL AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES

2.1. Background of the Israeli-Arab Conflict

2.1.1. The Balfour Declaration and the Creation of Israel

On October 31, 1917, the British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour hastened to write a letter to British banker and a leading figure of the Zionist movement” Lord Rothschild” to establish a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, promising to make every effort to achieve this while protecting the civil and religious rights enjoyed by the non-Jewish communities residing in Palestine. On November 2, 1917, the British government officially issued the Balfour Declaration and the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine It was the document that paved the way for the establishment of the State of Israel (Rhett, 2019).

The Balfour Declaration was closely linked to Weizmann, the chemist who discovered a biological process to produce acetone from corn, a basic substance for the British war effort. Weizmann was able to reap political gains, specifically in promoting the Zionist cause in the corridors of the British government through the discovery of acetone and its assistance in the ordeal of the British war. He promoted his discovery to the relevant officials of the Ministry of Munitions, the Admiralty and the War Office, Weizmann certainly played a central role from the point of view of Zionism in the launch of the Balfour Declaration. He constituted a great victory for the head of the Zionists in the United Kingdom, Chaim Weizmann, who later became the first prime minister in Israel (Reinharz, 2020).

The Balfour Declaration caused the Zionist ideology to seek to nullify many of the cultures around it as Zionism considered the words of the Balfour message as a promise of the right to land Israeli history makers and writers considered that the Balfour Declaration was not only a political grant, but rather sought to legitimize and

that the Zionist movement had the right to Jewish national sovereignty (Repollo, 2020).

The establishment of a national home for the Jews was not limited to what Weizmann made of his scientific contribution, but also for other reasons related to influence, as well as military, geo-strategic and strategic reasons. The establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine was motivated by the compatibility of Britain's goals with the Zionist movement considering the ambitions of the French in parts of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, Britain sought to declare the Balfour Declaration to avoid any conflict with its French allies or with the Arab forces' hostile to the Ottomans. The goal was closer to building a national home for the Jews under the control of British policy, which means freezing the role of France and others with their presence in Palestine after the First World War (Murad, 2020).

The opening words of the Balfour Declaration represented public support for a major political force for Zionism. The term "national home" was not commonly used in international law and was intentionally ambiguous as to whether a whole Jewish state or only parts were being considered. The intended borders of Palestine have still not been determined; the declaration had many long-term consequences. It greatly increased popular support for Zionism within Jewish communities around the world and became an essential component of the British Mandate of Palestine. The Balfour Declaration is considered the main cause of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Renton, 2016).

2.1.2. The War of 1948

After the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which provided for the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine, and the entry of Palestine under the British Mandate. the Zionist institutions became active, and the Mandate government played a major role in enabling the Jews to control large areas of Palestinian lands. The British Mandate phase is considered a basis for settlement, as Britain entered Palestine and was committed to the Balfour Declaration, and thus the Jewish settlement became under British direct control ,also the settlement was subject to political and strategic considerations. Settlements were established in strategic areas, and they were in the

form of closed communities. The settlement policy during the Mandate period was characterized by the strategic distribution of agricultural settlements on the borders of the Arab countries bordering Palestine (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2021).

Before declaring the termination of the British Mandate over Palestine, the United Nations General Assembly approved on November 29, 1947, a resolution to partition Palestine into a Jewish state (56%) of the total area of Palestine, an Arab state (43% of the area) and an internationalization of the Jerusalem area (1% of the area). The sectarian conflict within the British Mandate lands between Palestinian Jews and Arabs escalated into a large-scale Palestinian civil war in 1947. The neighbouring Arab countries invaded the former Mandate lands in May 1948 after the British government ended its presence in Palestine, but hours before the termination of the Mandate announced the Jewish Council in Tel Aviv the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine as soon as the mandate ends, without declaring the borders of this state (Shafya, 2015).

On May 15, 1948, the leaders of the Arab armies held a meeting in the city of Zarqa in (Jordan) to the entry of Arab armies to Palestine. Some of whose units entered Palestine upon the termination of the Mandate consisted of about fourteen thousand from Syria, Iraq, Transjordan, Egypt and Lebanon. Forces from the Saudi and Sudanese armies joined the Egyptian divisions later. However, these forces, with their small number in relation to the Zionist forces, complained of weak armament and corruption of military equipment (Samri, 2013).

After the advance of the Arab armies and the start of the war, they were able to achieve victories and annex many lands that were under the control of the Jews, on May 16, three brigades of the Jordanian army crossed the Jordan River into Palestine, and then a fourth brigade. Several infantry battalions crossed during the war, and while the distress telegrams were leaving Jerusalem for Tel Aviv, the Jews were demonstrating there to demand peace and lay down their arms. Britain submitted to the Security Council a letter of four demands. The first was a weekly cessation of hostilities, and a pledge not to send weapons or military equipment to Palestine during this period, and the application of the article of military and economic sanctions to those who violate the order. A four-week armistice was entered, and despite the prohibition of arming or

sending any new forces to the battlefronts, Israel did not abide by this condition, and sought to compensate for its losses, and resumed bombing with huge weapons, especially aircraft, with many European Jews volunteering to fight (Britannica, 2020).

Israel violated the armistice, and marched south towards Fallujah (in which the Egyptian forces were) to expand the area of lands it occupied, encircling the Egyptian army stationed there, and weakening the southern front that was approaching Tel Aviv. On July 8, 1948, the Israeli army resumed fighting on all fronts, and the Arab forces suffered a series of defeats that enabled Israel to extend its control over large areas of historical Palestine. On July 21, 1948, the fighting stopped after threats from the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on both sides of the battle. The Arabs accepted a second truce, and this acceptance was an admission of defeat. In the period between February 24 and July 20, 1949, the four Armistice agreements were signed, in which the Green Line was defined, and the Security Council had recommended on March 7, 1949, that Israel be accepted as a full member of the United Nations. On May 11, 1949, the United Nations General Assembly approved this recommendation (Samri, 2013).

2.1.3. The Tripartite Aggression Against Egypt - October 1956

The date of 1948 is a turning point in the political and military situation between Britain and Egypt. After Egypt's official participation in the 1948 war and its popular support for the Palestinian cause and the deal of corrupt weapons and explosive ordnance that reached the warriors, this led to the loss of what was left of the land of Palestine after the Nakba of 1948. The years following the 1948 war and the ensuing armistice changed the relations between Egypt and the aggressor countries. The conflict between Egypt and Israel continued despite the claims of the desire for peace launched by the Israeli government towards the Egyptian leadership at different periods. In addition, the state of enmity and hatred between Egypt on the one hand and Britain and France on the other, increased, especially after the Egyptian position in support of the liberation movements in the Arab region, especially the revolution in Algeria (Magani, 2013).

The nationalization of the Suez Canal, announced by Gamal Abdel Nasser on July 26, 1956, prevented England from profiting from the canal that it ran before the

nationalization. Therefore, England joined the tripartite aggression against Egypt. Therefore, seizing the Suez Canal and securing Israeli freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran was one of the goals that the Triple Aggression aimed at. Moreover, the participation of Israel in waging war on Egypt had strategic goals that it sought to achieve, the first of which was striking the *fedayeen* bases in the Sinai Peninsula, emptying the Sinai Peninsula from any Egyptian attack, making it a demilitarized zone, and controlling the Strait of Tiran, which controls the road to Eilat across the Gulf of Aqaba And securing the outskirts of Eilat by controlling “TABA” and expelling Egypt from the Gaza Strip and overthrowing the revolutionary Abdel Nasser regime (Hassan, 2019).

On 29 October 1956, armed conflict erupted on the Israeli-Egyptian border, Israel began military operations against Egypt, joined by France and the United Kingdom through its military support. From the Suez War, Israel aimed to achieve its goals and obtain strategic gains in the region, represented in freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, then be able to occupy the Sinai and loot the oil wells, and on top of these goals is the establishment of Jewish colonies in the Arab countries. Israel relied on a strategic plan in its attacks on Egypt, by focusing on the Gaza Strip and the Sinai desert. In its attacks, Israel relied on the air and sea military support provided by France (Magani, 2013).

However, Egypt decided to go according to another plan to spoil the way for the three countries that aimed to isolate the Egyptian army in Sinai . Egypt got ready and made its decision to block the Suez Canal so that no invasion would happen through it. The tripartite aggression failed because of the severity of the Egyptian resistance that joined with the army against the aggression. the opposition of the United States of America to the tripartite aggression, the support of the Soviet Union to Egypt and its threat of military intervention to stop the aggression, also, the United Nations condemning the tripartite aggression and demand for the withdrawal of the aggressor forces. At least the British and French forces withdrew from Port Said on December 23, 1956, and Egypt continued to celebrate this anniversary as a victory feast (Hassan, 2019).

2.1.4. Battle of Samu, 1966

The Arab-Israeli conflict continued and the battles didn't stop. On November 13, 1966, The Battle of Samu took place between the Jordanian army and the Israeli army when Israel invoked the pretext of the existence of a base for guerrilla action in the town of Samu and it carried out several military operations in the Israeli depth. This prompted it to attack the town in Hebron District. This operation was to lure the Jordanian army and test the effectiveness of the unified Arab military command and gain control of the confrontation. The nature of the land enabled the Israelis to reach the heights of Samu. The Jordanian forces arrived around it from two sides. A squadron of Jordanian aircraft participated in this battle and engaged in fierce and unequal combat with enemy squadrons. Jordanian forces fought valiantly with the much better-armed Israeli forces. However, the Jordanian forces managed to defeat the Israeli forces and inflict damage on them (Shemesh, 2002).

The Israeli forces retreated within their borders and the Jordanian forces managed to obtain several spoils of Israeli military weapons. The Palestinian and Arab masses reacted sympathetically to the steadfastness of the Hittin Brigade, despite its weak armament and the expansion of the area entrusted to it to defend it, but they demanded the Jordanian government to raise the level of armaments in the West Bank, introduce armoured weapons and tanks into the West Bank and secure air cover. The Jordanian leadership was criticized in this regard by the Unified Arab Leadership of the Arab League. Opinions say that this was incitement from outside Jordan on its people to put pressure on their government (Rajob, 2021).

Despite the fact that the Israeli army did not admit any losses in the battle of As-Sam, it did appear later that an officer named Colonel Yoav Shaham was killed in addition to the Paratroopers Brigade Commander and the Operation Commander. Moreover, ten other soldiers were wounded. However, no information was found regarding the loss of equipment. Yet, the number of forces on each side and the level of their armament, but the role of the Israeli Air Force, were mentioned (Shemesh, 2002).

2.1.5. The Six-Day War or the June Setback 1967

The 1967 war is the third in the series of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 1967 war broke out between Israel, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, which led to Israel's occupation of the Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Golan, and resulted in the martyrdom of approximately 15,000 to 25,000 people. This war also resulted in great human and material losses, the occupation of large parts of Arab lands, and the destruction of the majority of Arab military equipment (Fahmy, 2017).

One of the most important reasons for the outbreak of the 1967 war was that Israel considered the tripartite aggression that followed a threat to its security, and the most prominent of these events were the armament efforts made by Egypt under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Syria's activity against the Israeli settlements on the Syrian front and in front of the Jordanian front. In addition to that, the decision of the 1964 Arab summit in Cairo to divert the waters of the Jordan River in both Syria and Lebanon, and the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1965 were important reasons for Israel to launch this war. In mid-May 1967, Egypt demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations forces from the Sinai, and on the twenty-second of May it closed the Straits of Tiran in the Red Sea to Israeli shipping, which Israel considered an official declaration of war on it (Al-Hamza, 2021).

The war resulted in the occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and most of the Syrian Golan Heights. During the six days of the war, Israel occupied three times its area since 1948. The war also launched a project to expand Israeli settlements to the West Bank and Gaza and plunder their natural resources. Since 1967, the occupation authorities have confiscated about 353,000 dunums of Palestinian lands and classified them as "nature reserves" in preparation for their appropriation. Israel has violated the ceasefire agreement stipulated in Security Council resolutions, which was intended to put an immediate end to the aggression. In violation of international law and the Geneva Conventions, Israel has exploited the oil resources in Sinai and the water resources in Syria (aljazeera, 2022).

The 1967 setback, which began with the Israeli attack on the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian Arab forces, the occupation of parts of their lands and the consequences of

the 1967 war have not ended until today. Israel still occupies the West Bank, and it has annexed Jerusalem and the Golan to its borders, and one of its consequences was also the outbreak of the October War in 1973 and the separation of the West Bank from Jordanian sovereignty, and the acceptance of the Arabs since the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 with the principle of “Land for Peace” which stipulates a return to the pre-war borders in exchange for Arab recognition of Israel and peace with it. Although many Arab countries are now establishing separate political or economic relations with Israel (Asaad, 2008).

2.1.6. Battle of Karameh

A major turning point in the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict, an armed clash that lasted for fifteen hours between the Israel Defence Forces, the Jordanian Armed Forces, and the Palestine Liberation Organization in the Jordanian town of Karama on March 21, 1968, during the War of Attrition, when the Zionist forces attempted to occupy the Jordan River for strategic reasons. It actually crossed the river from several axes with bridges and under heavy air cover. The Jordanian army confronted it with force along the front line from the far north of Jordan to the south of the Dead Sea. In the village of Al-Karamah, the Arab army and the Fedayeen clashed with the Israeli forces, in a battle that lasted for nearly fifty minutes. Then the battle between the Jordanian army and the Israeli forces lasted more than fifteen hours, forcing the Israelis to withdraw completely from the battlefield, leaving behind for the first time their losses and their dead without being able to take it. The Jordanian army was able to defeat the Israeli forces and expel them from the battlefield, leaving behind mechanisms and dead people without the Zionist entity achieving its goals (Jordan News Agency, 2021).

Israel's real goal in the war was to occupy the eastern heights of Jordan and approach the capital Amman to pressure the Jordanian leadership to accept the terms of surrender imposed by Israel, and because Israel wanted to expand its borders and annex new lands from Jordan to it, because of its strategic importance. So, the Battle of Al-Karama was not limited, but its front extended from Prince Muhammad Bridge in the north to Prince Abdullah Bridge in the south. There was also a misleading attack on the area of Ghor al-Safi and Ghor al-Mazara (Fadilat, 2015).

The Israeli attack had been planned on more than one approach ,the battle front confirms that the multiplicity of approaches was intended to distract the defensive effort of the positions of the Arab army and to mislead them from the main attack. The forces present in the defensive positions were organized and established their defence on a series of defensive lines starting from the river to the depth of the defensive area, which did not make penetration easy for the attackers, especially since the battle came immediately after the 1967 war. Therefore, the unexpected intensity of the battle forced Israel to reshuffle its calculations about any existing rivalry between the Jordanian side and the Palestinian fighters (Ammon, 2011).

The Battle of Al-Karama did not start on the morning of March 21, 1968. For many weeks prior, Israel had already carried out attacks and aerial and artillery bombardments along the Jordanian front, and paved the way for this with wide-ranging preparations in the psychological, political and military fields. However, Israel's goals were first specified in its desire to compel Jordan to accept the settlement and peace it imposes and on the terms it sees directing powerful and influential strikes to the Jordanian forces. Israel also had aims in destabilizing the morale and steadfastness of the civilian population and forcing them to leave their lands to form new burdens. This allowed them then to preserve the morale of the Israeli army after the gains it made on the Arab fronts and the outcome of the June 1967 war (Fadilat, 2015).

2.1.7. October War of 1973

The October 1973 War is the fifth of the Arab-Israeli wars. It was launched simultaneously by Egypt and Syria against Israel, in sudden and simultaneous coordination. On the Golan front of the Syrian army and on the occupied Sinai front of the Egyptian army, some Arab countries also contributed to the war, with either military or economic support. After the attack, the Egyptian and Syrian forces achieved several goals in this war. The Egyptian forces were able to destroy the Barlev Line, cross the Suez Canal, and penetrated 20km into the Sinai. The Syrian forces were also able to penetrate deep into the Golan Heights and Lake Tiberias, all the way to the Houla Plain (Kathiri, 2021).

In 1973, Egyptian and Syrian military planners chose it as the perfect moment for a combined surprise attack on Israel. The Arab attacks were an effort to reverse the humiliating defeats of 1967 in which Israel had redrawn the map of the Middle East after the Israelis captured the vast Sinai Desert from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria and the West Bank of the River Jordan and the eastern part of Jerusalem from the Jordanians. When the attack occurred, Israel was stunned. It found itself facing a war of national survival on two fronts (Connolly, 2013).

After the Sadat meeting in July 1972 with the head of the General Intelligence, the Director of Military Intelligence, the National Security Adviser and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces to develop a strategic deception plan. It allows Egypt to outdo Israel's technological and arm a mental advances by hiding any signs of preparation for war, and so that Israel does not carry out a pre-emptive strike on the Egyptian forces in the preparation stage on the front. The plan included six main axes that included measures related to the home front, in addition to field and sovereign deception procedures that secured the movements and preparations of the armed forces and provided confidential information about the Israeli forces to mislead them (Kathiri, 2021).

In the south, Egyptian commandos crossed the Suez Canal heading eastwards into the Sinai capturing the Israeli forts along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. In the north, Syrian tank regiments swept on to the Golan Heights. The Israeli commanders scrambled to mobilize their reserves. Diplomatically, Egypt drifted out of the Soviet sphere of influence and became an ally of the United States. The war officially ended at the end of October 24, with the ceasefire agreement signed between the Arab-Israeli sides, but it did not actually enter into force on the Egyptian front until October 28. On the Egyptian front, the Egyptian army achieved its goal of war by crossing the Suez Canal, destroying the Bar-Lev Line, and taking defensive positions. Despite the siege of the Third Egyptian Army east of the Canal, the Israeli forces were also unable to control the cities of Suez and Ismailia, west of the Canal (Connolly, 2013).

2.1.8. July War 2006

The July war -or also known as the Israeli war on Lebanon 2006 and the confrontation of Israel-Hezbollah- took place on July 12, 2006. The combat operations between the forces of the Lebanese Hezbollah and the forces of the Israel Defence Forces started and lasted for 34 days in different regions of Lebanon, especially in the southern and eastern regions, in the capital Beirut, in northern Israel, in the regions of Galilee, Carmel and Marj Ibn Amer. The war was affecting the Golan Heights region as well. The Islamic Resistance fulfilled its promise to capture Israeli soldiers, and to free the dean of Lebanese prisoners in Israeli prisons, the captive (martyred in 2015) Samir Kuntar. However, Israel took it as a pretext to launch a free campaign against Lebanon (Barre, 2007).

The July war was part of the series of the Arab-Israeli conflict due to Israel's insistence on keeping its prisoners and the Lebanese Hezbollah's insistence on liberating them. After the failure of the indirect negotiations to release them, Hezbollah decided to capture Israeli soldiers to free the rest of the Lebanese from Israeli detention. On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah launched Operation True Promise. The Lebanese Hezbollah was able to capture Israeli soldiers, so the Israeli forces immediately took the initiative and stormed the border wall and entered the Lebanese territories. The next day, the Israeli army launched an air attack on southern Lebanon, targeting electricity stations, Beirut airport, and a network of bridges and roads, killing dozens (International, 2007).

Israel's goals differed from the operation, including returning the two prisoners, striking Hezbollah, and reaching the Litani, to prevent Hezbollah's missiles. Every day of the war there was a new goal, and despite the multiple goals, the war ended without achieving one goal. During the war, large numbers of Lebanese were displaced, estimated at half a million Lebanese displaced from the fighting areas. The city of Sidon received more than one hundred thousand displaced Lebanese, and a large part went to Syria and other countries (Barre, 2007).

Much of Lebanon's civilian infrastructure was damaged, including tens of thousands of homes, seaports, major roads, bridges, schools, petrol stations and factories. About 50 schools were destroyed and up to 300 damaged by Israeli bombardments. Many of

Lebanon's fishermen, factory workers and agricultural workers lost their livelihoods. A large oil spill caused by Israel's bombing in mid-July of the coastal Jiyye power station presented a long-term threat to the marine life of the region (International, 2007).

About 2,000 foreign nationals were evacuated to Syria and Cyprus, and 18 Lebanese civilians were killed during the displacement. In an Israeli bombing, the last raid took place on August 14, 2006, and targeted the orchards of the eastern outskirts of the city of Tyre. After that, the implementation of the “cessation of hostilities” resolution stipulated in Resolution 1701 of the UN Security Council came into effect. Resolution 1701 stipulated an end to hostilities on both sides and the addition of 15,000 soldiers to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) force to maintain Peace with the withdrawal of the Israeli army to the Blue Line, the withdrawal of the Hezbollah force to the north of the Litany River, and the deployment of the Lebanese army in southern Lebanon (Barre, 2007).

2.1.9. Gaza War

The butchery of Gaza or the Battle of Al-Furqan was an extended military operation launched by the Israeli army on the Gaza Strip in Palestine from December 27, 2008, to January 18, 2009. The battle comes after the end of a six-month truce between the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and Israel brokered by Egypt in June 2008, and Israel violated the truce, as it carried out a raid on the Gaza Strip, which resulted in the killing of six members of Hamas, and elements of Islamic Jihad in Gaza responded by firing more than 130 rockets and mortar shells at areas in southern Israel (Cordesman, 2009).

The war began on Saturday, December 27, 2008, and resulted in the killing of at least 1,417 Palestinians (including 926 civilians, 412 children and 111 women) and the injury of 4,336 others, in addition to the killing of ten Israeli soldiers and three civilians and the injury of 400 others, most of whom were civilians who were terrified and not bodily injured, according to the army's recognition. The resistance, however, confirmed that it had killed nearly 100 Israeli soldiers during the battles in Gaza. The number of Gaza martyrs as a result of the Israeli aggression on the Strip has increased

to 1,328 and the wounded to 5,450, after 114 bodies of martyrs were recovered since Israel declared a ceasefire. Also, One Hamas gunman was killed and Palestinians launched a volley of mortars at the Israeli military. An Israeli air strike then killed five more Hamas fighters. In response, Hamas launched 35 rockets into southern Israel, one reaching the city of Ashkelon (theguardian, 2009).

The Israeli government announced that the operation may take time and will not stop until it achieves its goals by ending the firing of rockets from Gaza into southern Israel, while Hamas announced its intention to continue the fighting until Israel stops its attacks and ends the siege imposed on the Strip. The first day of the attack was the deadliest day in terms of the number of Palestinian casualties; more than 200 Palestinians were killed and more than 700 injured (Cordesman, 2009).

The war on Gaza severely isolated the Strip and paralyzed its economy and put Gaza under “State of siege” or “turned it into a prison.” Through the Battle of Al-Furqan, or the first Gaza war, Israel targeted the destruction of the infrastructure of Palestinian armed groups in the Gaza Strip and paralyzed their ability to launch rockets at southern Israeli cities and towns close to the Strip. The war destroyed 50% of the water networks, and 55% of the electricity networks. Moreover, it separated the Gaza Strip from the West Bank, so that the Palestinian lands turn into besieged enclaves and cantons controlled by Israel (Wafa, 2019).

2.1.10. The Second Gaza War 2012

In 2012, the second war on Gaza began and lasted for eight days. Launched by the IDF on the Gaza Strip, the Israeli entity began its aggression on the Gaza Strip with the assassination of Commander Ahmed Al-Jabari on November 14, 2012, in implementation of the decision of the Mini-Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs, which was taken secretly, despite the draft agreement truce with the resistance brokered by Egypt. The occupation forces used planes loaded with heavy bombs weighing a ton, bringing the number of its raids to nearly 1,500 air raids, and its targets were spread over all the map of the sector (Mustafa, 2012).

The war resulted in the death of 162 Palestinians, including 42 children and 11 women, and the injury of about 1,300. Meanwhile, 20 Israelis were killed and 625 others were injured, while most experienced some “panic attacks”. During this operation, Israel completely demolished 200 homes, and partially destroyed 1,500 homes, in addition to damaging dozens of mosques, a number of cemeteries, schools, universities, buildings, institutions, and press offices. The Palestinian resistance announced that it had hit Israeli sites and towns with 1,573 rockets, targeting Israeli planes, warships, and artillery, and for the first time used long-range missiles that reached Herzliya, Tel Aviv and occupied Jerusalem. Hamas managed to lift the Israeli restrictions on exploiting the border barrier, expanding the maritime borders of the Gaza Strip, and stopping the Israeli attacks and assassinations (Al-Jamal, 2013).

The resistance was able to target Israeli planes for the first time, to hit them or neutralize them from their goals. Electronically controlled and laser-guided missile launchers were used. The war demonstrated the resistance’s ability to break the prestige of Israeli deterrence, imposed new rules of engagement despite the imbalance of power between the two parties, which resulted in 3.5 million Jews in shelters. (Mustafa, 2012).

Indirect talks between Hamas and Israel were successfully conducted thanks to Egyptian support. After the late Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi received messages from US President Barack Obama, urging the latter to act as a mediator to reach a settlement, Egypt made significant efforts to prevent any escalation and achieve a cease-fire and a truce between the two sides. .

Given the above accomplishments, this war led to the consolidation of the role of Hamas on the Palestinian political map, raising its status. It opened up new opportunities for Hamas at the regional and international levels. The second war on Gaza in 2012 was a factor in crystallizing the Egyptian role after the Arab Spring revolutions. During the military operation, Israel gained legitimacy that was supported by the United States, about Israel's full right to defend itself (Al-Jamal, 2013).

2.1.11. The Third Gaza War 2014

Israel launched its third war on the Gaza Strip in 2014, a military conflict between Israel and the Palestinian resistance movements, after a wave of violence that erupted with the kidnapping, torture and burning of the child Muhammad Abu Khdeir from Shuafat by a group of settlers on July 2, 2014, Dozens of liberators of the Shalit deal were re-arrested, followed by widespread protests in Jerusalem and within the Arabs of 48 as well as the West Bank regions, and their pace escalated after an Israeli ran over two Arab workers near Haifa, and this resulted in mutual shelling between Israel and the Palestinian resistance in the Gaza Strip. The war broke out and developed into an unfinished ground incursion (Abboushi, 2014).

The trigger for the outbreak of war for Israel was the “Hebron operation” that took place on June 12, 2014. At that time, a Palestinian group kidnapped and killed a number of settlers, at the same time, the Netanyahu government thwarted the American preparations for peace negotiations that were supposed to be signed in April 2014, and Netanyahu refused to release the fourth batch of Palestinian Prisoners. In addition to the Israeli intransigence in the peace time, the city of Al-Quds witnessed unprecedented Israeli violations against the Al-Aqsa Mosque which Muslims consider a significant religious site (Studies, 2014).

This aggression paved the way for the outbreak of the Israeli bloody war on the Gaza Strip, and its first raids began on July 8, 2014, and the Islamic Jihad and Hamas responded with missiles. The physical and human damage as a result of the aggression on the Gaza Strip from July 8 to August 26, 2014, reached approximately 2,149 martyrs and about 11,166 injured with various injuries. In addition to the massacres that were carried out against nearly 91 families who no longer have any information in the civil registry. Moreover, the massacres carried out against UNRWA schools, which resulted in 40 martyrs and 280 wounded, Total demolition of 18,000 homes, partial demolition of 4,100 homes, damage to 145 schools, bombing of clinics and hospitals, 13 primary care centres, 16 ambulances, 180 mosques, including 71 mosques that were completely destroyed, 10 Islamic and one Christian cemetery (Abboushi, 2014).

The Israeli aggression, despite favourable regional and international circumstances, was not able to impose its conditions on the resistance in Gaza. Rather, the cost of its operations increased, and its failures continued. Hamas made a great effort; for six years, it worked to dismantle Israeli espionage networks within the Strip, which were considered the tool that provided the Israelis with a wide penetration in Palestinian society and in the resistance groups. The other reason is due to the tactical deception efforts that the resistance forces had succeeded in developing. The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and Al-Quds Brigades, the military wings of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and other resistance forces, fired hundreds of missiles at Israeli camps and cities. Al-Qassam succeeded in developing long-range missiles, enabling them to target Tel Aviv and Haifa for the first time (Studies, 2014).

2.1.12. The Third Palestinian Intifada (Jerusalem)

The third Palestinian Intifada or the Jerusalem Intifada, also called the Intifada of Knives because of the stabbing attacks that took place in it, was called the “run-over uprising” or “the uprising of individuals”. It began with a wave of protests and violence in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Israel since the beginning of October 2015 until 2023. The events of the Jerusalem Intifada coincided with the Israeli forces carrying out air strikes on the Gaza Strip, from which rockets were launched towards Israel (Ibrahim, 2017).

The Israeli attacks did not stop during the third intifada On September 9, the Israeli Defence Minister decided to ban the flag and ribat terraces in Al-Aqsa. On September 14, the Israeli Minister of Agriculture, Uri Ariel, stormed Al-Aqsa Mosque, accompanied by forty Israeli special units and undercover elements stormed the mosque’s courtyards. On September 17, dozens of youths The Likud party stormed Al-Aqsa Mosque. The most important characteristic of the third intifada was the increase in pace. The attacks and incursions into Al-Aqsa Mosque reached several times per day, in addition to participating in Several extremist deputies and ministers in the occupation government, which means a doubling Attack on Al-Aqsa by settlers (Qidra, 2015).

One of the most important reasons for the intifada in Jerusalem was that the settlers burned the house of the Dawabsheh family on July 31, 2015. This led to an increase in acts of resistance directed against the Israelis also the case of Muhammad Abu Khdair, a Palestinian child from Shuafat neighbourhood in Jerusalem, was kidnapped, tortured, and burned alive by extremist settlers in July 2014. His body was found in the forests of Deir Yassin. Khudair's death came after the killing of three settlers in June of that year. In addition to that, the Israeli war that was launched on the Gaza Strip, which killed more than 2,100 Palestinians (Ibrahim, 2017).

Most of the perpetrators of operations in the third intifada were individual and they are young men, and statistics also indicate that the average age of the martyrs was 23 years. That is, they are among those who were born and raised after Oslo. During the events of the Third Intifada, an emergency meeting of the permanent representatives of the League of Arab States was held on October 13, 2015, to discuss the Israeli escalation in the Palestinian territories and the attacks on Al-Aqsa Mosque. The meeting decided to invite the United Nations to provide an international protection system for the Palestinian people from Israeli attacks (Qidra, 2015).

2.1.13. Fourth Intifada (2021)

The Fourth Palestinian Intifada is a wave of protests in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Israel since the beginning of May 2021 and continues until 2023. Several areas in East Jerusalem witnessed clashes between Palestinian demonstrators on the one hand, and Jewish settlers and the Israeli police forces, against the backdrop of Israeli judicial decisions to evict homes from the Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood of their Palestinian residents, in favour of Israeli settlement associations (Marefa, 2021).

Residents defended their properties and homes in Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood, and Jewish settlers claimed that they bought these properties from Jewish associations. The events also coincided with the Israeli forces carrying out air strikes on the Gaza Strip while the Palestinian resistance launched missiles towards Israel. The escalation in the Fourth Intifada began as a result of the Israeli Supreme Court's decision to evict Palestinian families from their homes in the Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood to the eastern side of the Old City of Jerusalem in favour of housing Israeli settlers. Israeli

courts had issued decisions regarding the entitlement of a group of settlers to the homes that were built on land owned by Jews before the 1948 war (Al-mughrabi, 2021).

The Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood witnessed violent clashes between the Israeli police and the Palestinians, who denounced the Israeli provocations and practices against them, the imposition of an Israeli siege on the entrances and exits of the Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood. The events erupted on May 7, 2021, after thousands of Israeli policemen stormed the courtyards of Al-Aqsa Mosque and attacked worshippers, injuring more than 205 Palestinians in Al-Aqsa Mosque, Bab Al-Amud and Sheikh Jarrah (Royanews, 2021).

On May 10, 2021, after thousands of Israeli policemen stormed Al-Aqsa Mosque, more than 331 Palestinians were injured. Al-Qassam Brigades published a statement threatening Israel to withdraw its soldiers from Al-Aqsa and release the detainees. After the Israeli side ignored the threats of the resistance the resistance forces launched a rocket attack from the Gaza Strip towards the Israeli settlements, with the expiry of the deadline set by the resistance leadership. On May 9, 2021, the Israeli Supreme Court postponed the expected decision on the evictions by 30 days, following the intervention of the Attorney General, Avichai Mandelblit (DW, 2021).

2.2. Arab-Israeli Peace Accords, Agreements and Treaties

The visit of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem in October 1977 was the event that changed the pattern of Arab-Israeli relations. This step caused Egypt to split from the Arab alliance against the Jewish state, and the treaty aroused widespread official and popular anger in the Arab countries. Egypt and Israel signed the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty on March 26, 1979, in a ceremony that included the Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, under the observation of US President Jimmy Carter. The treaty included the normalization of relations and security arrangements, the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and the end of the war. (syildirim, 2004)

The Camp David Treaty between Egypt and Israel was signed in 1978, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed in 1979. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed the Camp David Accords on

September 17, 1978, after twelve days of secret negotiations at Camp David and fourteen months of diplomatic efforts between Egypt, Israel and the United States aimed at searching for a peace agreement. Upon taking office on January 20, 1977, President Jimmy Carter moved to revive the Middle East peace process. On November 9, 1977, Sadat announced his intention to go to Jerusalem and speak before the Knesset. The first step led to completing the second framework by signing the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979 to agree on the basic conditions governing the normalization process (Jaghloush, 2015).

Among the results of this agreement is Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai after twelve years of occupation, and its return to Egyptian sovereignty. The agreement stipulated that the permanent borders between Egypt and Israel are the recognized international borders between Egypt and Palestine during the British Mandate without prejudice to the status of the Gaza Strip, and an agreement of nine clauses obligating the two parties not to issue any of them. An act of aggression or incitement against the other party in security coordination with the joint border areas if they are limited in armament and are subject to international control by the United Nations. The agreement also granted the right to Israeli ships and goods heading to and from Israel to free passage through the Suez Canal and its entrances in the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea (rkishli, 2020).

After the Camp David Accords of 1979, the Oslo Accords were concluded in 1993 between Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and the Declaration of Principles was signed. The Declaration of Principles Agreement provided for negotiations for the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza in two phases; The first is in which Israel withdraws from Gaza and Jericho within two months to establish Palestinian self-rule, in which power will be transferred to Palestinian representatives and the internal security forces will be subordinate to the Palestinian Authority. As for the second transitional phase, it begins after the withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho and will last for 5 years, during which elections will be held to select the members of the Palestinian Council that will supervise the transitional Palestinian Authority, under the Oslo Accords (syildirim, 2004).

After signing the 1993 Oslo Accords, Jordan entered the line of normalizing relations with Israel on October 26, 1994. King Hussein bin Talal of Jordan and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres signed the Wadi Araba agreement. With the aim of achieving peace and ending the war between the two countries within internationally recognized borders, according to the mandate time British, with the exception of the lands of Al-Baqoura and Al-Ghamr, which the agreement granted Israel the right to use for a period of 25 years. This period has already expired in October 2019, and the lands returned to full Jordanian sovereignty. The treaty also included complete normalization between the two countries, including opening an Israeli embassy in Jordan and a Jordanian one in Israel (Ahren, 2019).

In the context of Arab-Israeli relations, the late Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz launched an "initiative to end the conflict" between the Palestinians and the Israelis, specifically in March 2002, and at the convening of the Arab summit in the Lebanese capital, Beirut, based on two United Nations resolutions: 242 (1967), and 338 (1973), soon endorsed by Arab and Islamic countries, and represented the basis of their "vision" for the implementation of peace. The texts of the initiative were based on the fact that the only solution to that historical conflict lay in the establishment of a Palestinian state consisting of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as per the borders of June 4, 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital. It also stipulated Israel's withdrawal from the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, finding a just solution for the refugee Palestinians, and recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and Palestine as a Palestinian state. Several initiatives were launched, but they failed. The Palestinian-Israeli negotiations have been suspended since April 2014 without achieving any significant results (Palestine Studies, 2002).

On December 6, 2017, US President Donald Trump recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and on May 14, 2018, the United States moved its embassy to Jerusalem. Then, in March 2019, the US President signed a decree recognizing Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights. On January 28, 2020, he launched talk of a "deal of the century", to include Israel's annexation of parts of the occupied West Bank. On August 13, 2020, Trump announced the signing of a "historic peace agreement" known as the Abraham Accords between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, according to which the Hebrew state agrees to suspend the ongoing annexation of Palestinian

territories. On September 11 of the same year, Trump announced that Bahrain and Israel would normalize relations between them (Landau, 2020).

2.2.1. Arab - Israeli Peace Relations

Over the course of the series of Arab-Israeli conflicts documented by history, the situation regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict has witnessed a great development. This appeared through the Israeli-Arab agreements and peace treaties and the change of the Israeli role in the region, but it cannot improve much more than that. Even if the advanced peace process continues its course, because achieving the kind of normal relations between democratic countries may take generations to develop in the Arab-Israeli arena. Acceptance of Israel in the Arab region as a reality is subject to considerations Israel was attempting to deal in terms of power politics, which led to the acceptance of Israel among the Arab political leaders and to the signing of peace deals, in an effort to elevate Israel's standing among the Arab nations. (Inbar, 2000).

The cold Israeli peace with Egypt and Jordan was the only model for peace between Israel and the Arab countries. These normalization agreements were characterized by standing at the level of governments and political and economic relations between the countries that agreed to make peace with Israel, but the signing of the Ibrahim agreements with the Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco showed the development of a warm model of relations. The differences have been resolved, and there are ties between peoples, and Israel plays to support the Abraham model to be repeated with other Arab countries to implement its strategy for the peace process in the Middle East (Podeh, 2022)

The most important reason for the peace process was the growing realization of the Arab political elites of the futility of trying to eliminate Israel by force. Since 1973, there has been a clear decrease in the military intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict. After the peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, the Arabs lost the strongest military force mobilized against Israel, Israel certainly has better relations with the Arab world than it was a few decades ago, and this pattern is likely to continue. However, there are limits to what Israel can achieve in its relations with its Arab neighbours. For several reasons rooted in the strategic and cultural realities of the region (Inbar, 2000).

Among the negative aspects of Arab-Israeli peace relations is dealing with Israel as a natural state entity, as if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was no longer present, which indicates the securing of the cultural and political cover for Israel and the removal of the cultural, political, and moral dimensions of the legitimacy of the Palestinian struggle. Israel aims to obtain peace in exchange for peace with the various Arab countries, this indicates that the Israeli side has no intention to provide solutions to the Palestinian issue in exchange for strengthening relations with the Arab countries (Hassoun, 2021).

Several changes have occurred in the Gulf-Israeli relations since 1967, The Gulf countries' view of Iran is also a cornerstone of this relationship, which has witnessed successive developments, especially with the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. This relationship was governed by the commitment of the Gulf states to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The commitment changed with the signing of the Oslo Accord with Israel in 1993 by the Palestine Liberation Organization. However, the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada in 2000 contributed to stopping the growing normalization of Gulf-Israeli relations. Until relations were officially restored with the signing of the Abraham Accords 2020 Building a new era in the Middle East (forum, 2019).

2.2.2. Paris Peace Conference, 1919

The first diplomatic gathering to bring together many countries from all continents, the Paris Peace Conference was tasked with ending World War I diplomatically. The Paris Peace Conference was held in 1919, and it was a meeting of the allies who won the First World War to divide the gains that they obtained from the defeated countries and lay the foundations for the next peace with them after the Armistice 1918. Delegations from 27 countries participated in it divided into 52 committees of experts. The parties discussed various issues, from prisoners of war to undersea cables, to international aviation, to responsibility for the war. The five major powers (France, Britain, Italy, the United States and Japan) dominated the conference. The major decisions resulting from the conference were the creation of the League of Nations. And peace treaties with the defeated countries, imposing reparations on Germany, drawing new national borders (Encyclopaedia, 2022).

The conference began its work on January 18, 1919, and concluded on January 21, 1919, and resulted in the signing of treaties between countries. The victorious and representatives of the defeated nations in the war. The outcome of the conference was Five major peace treaties that were prepared at the Paris Peace Conference; Treaty of Versailles on 28 June 1919 -the treaty that officially revealed the facts of the First World War-, the Treaty of Saint-Germain on September 10, 1919, the Treaty of Neuilly on 27 November 1919, the Treaty of Trianon on 4 June 1920, and the Treaty of Sèvres on August 10, 1920. But the formal inauguration of the League of Nations on January 16, 1920, brought the Paris conference to an end, before the conclusion of treaties with Turkey (1920, 1923) or with Hungary (1920) (Alaa, 2021).

The League of Nations was established at the Paris Peace Conference, and it was the first attempt to establish a joint international organization that brings together several cultures, working to prevent war and settle conflicts around the world. The aim of the conference was to bring lasting peace to the world. However, it caused other conflicts that resulted in the Second World War, and some subsequent conflicts such as the Lebanese Civil War and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Redrawing the map of the world at these conferences led to the emergence of several international contradictions, which became one of the causes of the Second World War (LANIOL, 2014).

2.2.3. Faisal-Weizmann Agreement

Chaim Weizmann is the most famous Zionist figure, and he played the most important role in issuing the famous Balfour Declaration in 1917 and was president of the World Zionist Organization from 1920 until 1946, then was elected as the first president of the State of Israel in 1949. The Faisal Weizmann Agreement was signed on January 3, 1919, between Prince Faisal, third son of Hussein bin Ali al-Hashemi, the short-lived king of the Kingdom of Hejaz, and Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist leader who had negotiated the Balfour Declaration of 1917 with the British government, which had been signed two weeks earlier from the start of the peace conference in Paris. The two sides discussed ways to enhance cooperation between the Zionist movement and the Arab nationalist movements. The Faisal-Weizmann agreement included Arab recognition of the Balfour Declaration, in return for the Jews' promise to help build and develop the Arab state (Hayajneh, 2011).

The Faisal-Weizmann Agreement stipulated the demarcation of the boundaries of the Jewish settlement in Palestine, so that the settlers would form an independent administrative unit with governance, this is what the Zionist movement considered a recognition of the right of the Jews to Palestine and the Balfour Declaration, and a good basis for gradually building a Zionist settlement society in Palestine. As for the leaders of the Arab revolution, they quickly evaded this agreement on the pretext that Faisal was not authorized by the Arab revolution to speak on its own. The agreement also stipulated that all measures should be taken to encourage Jewish immigration to Palestine on a large scale, in order to settle the immigrants in the land through extensive housing and intensive agriculture. Also refer any dispute that may occur between the two parties to the British Government for arbitration (Qasimia, 2014).

The Faisal-Weizmann Agreement was preceded by several meetings with Prince Faisal with the aim of gaining support for the goals of the Zionist movement. Based on that, Weizmann delivered a speech in Jaffa on May 8, 1918, in which he asserted that the Jews only want a homeland in which to settle, have rights and duties, and live in peace in the canton of Palestine, which accommodates many people to live in. However, Weizmann's attempts failed to gain support for their goals. There were strong reactions from the national movements in Palestine (Hayajneh, 2011).

2.2.4. The 1949 Armistice Agreements

In 1949, after the Palestine war, a set of Armistice agreements were officially signed between Israel and its neighbouring countries, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Iraq, also known as the Green Line. The aim was to end the official hostilities of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, and to define Armistice lines between the Israeli and Jordanian forces. Regarding Lebanon, the Armistice agreement was signed between Israel and Lebanon on March 23, 1949, and based on exclusively military considerations, the Armistice line was drawn along the international borders between Lebanon and Mandatory Palestine. Israel also withdrew its forces from 13 villages in the Lebanese territories it occupied during the war with Jordan (United, 2020).

On the twenty-fourth of February 1949, the Israeli-Egyptian Armistice agreement was signed in Rhodes. It was agreed that the Armistice demarcation line should not be

interpreted in any way as a political or territorial border, and it was demarcated without prejudice to the rights, claims and positions of either party to the armistice. Concerning the "Final Settlement of the Question of Palestine". It was agreed that the Armistice demarcation line would be drawn mostly along the international border of 1922 between Egypt and Mandatory Palestine, except near the Mediterranean, where Egypt remained in control of a strip of land along the coast, which became known as the Gaza Strip. The besieged Egyptian forces in the Fallujah enclave were allowed to return to Egypt with their weapons, and the area was handed over to Israeli military control (Alsaafin, 2021).

The Armistice Agreements of 1949 included the signing with Jordan, specifically on April 3, 1949, and the terms of the agreement were as follows; none of the provisions of this Agreement shall prejudice the rights, demands and positions of either party in the final peaceful settlement of the Palestinian issue, which are the provisions of this Agreement that are imposed exclusively by military considerations. Jordanian forces remained in most of their positions, especially East Jerusalem, which included the Old City. Jordan withdrew its forces from its outposts that overlook the Sharon Plain. In return, Israel agreed to allow Jordanian forces to seize positions previously controlled by Iraqi forces (brannon, 2006).

2.2.5. Geneva Conference 1973

The Geneva Conference in 1973 was one of the steps aimed at resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and trying to establish peace. The conference was opened on December 21, 1973, under the supervision of the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the presence of the foreign ministers of Egypt, Jordan and Israel. Syria did not attend. The conference was postponed and was not held again. Israel was reluctant to participate in multi-party conferences that might exert pressure to withdraw from the occupied territories and take other steps against it. Disengagement agreements were signed in 1974 to end the war between Israel and Egypt and between Israel and Syria (United Nations, 2009).

Although no agreement was reached in Geneva, this effort was not in vain. Following the Israeli elections, the military disengagement between Israel and Egypt was signed

on January 18, 1974, and the disengagement between Israel and Syria was signed on May 31. After the failure of attempts to revive the conference, the Sinai Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt was officially signed in Geneva on September 4, 1975, as part of the Geneva Conference process. This agreement states that disputes between Egypt and Israel should not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means (Halayqa, 2022).

The Geneva conference touched upon the Palestinian problem, and the Egyptians, Americans, Jordanians and Soviets expressed their hope for a kind of international agreement on the Palestinian problem in which the Palestinians would represent certain persons in international affairs. Egypt was supporting the PLO to represent the Palestinians, and the Syrians insisted that if the PLO was not present at the Geneva conference, then Syria would not, either. Israel and the United States opposed the official recognition of the PLO at the Geneva Conference because the PLO Charter did not recognize Israel's right to exist (United Nations, 2009).

2.2.6. Camp David Accords 1978: The Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty 1979

The visit of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem in October 1977 was the event that changed the pattern of Arab-Israeli relations. This step caused Egypt to split from the Arab alliance against the Jewish state, and the treaty aroused widespread official and popular anger in the Arab countries. Egypt and Israel signed the "Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty" on March 26, 1979, in a ceremony that included the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, under the supervision of US President Jimmy Carter. The treaty included the normalization of relations and security arrangements, the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and the end of the war (syildirim, 2004).

The Camp David Treaty between Egypt and Israel was signed in 1978, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed in 1979. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed the Camp David Accords on September 17, 1978, after 12 days of secret negotiations at Camp David and 14 months of diplomatic efforts between Egypt, Israel and the United States aimed at searching for a peace agreement. Upon taking office on January 20, 1977, President Jimmy

Carter moved to revive the Middle East peace process. On November 9, 1977, Sadat announced his intention to go to Jerusalem and speak before the Knesset. The first step led to completing the second framework by signing the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979 to agree on the basic conditions governing the normalization process (Jaghloush, 2015).

Among the results of this agreement is Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai after 12 years of occupation, and its return to Egyptian sovereignty. The agreement stipulated that the permanent borders between Egypt and Israel are the recognized international borders between Egypt and Palestine during the British Mandate without prejudice to the status of the Gaza Strip, and an agreement of nine clauses obligating the two parties not to issue any of them. An act of aggression or incitement against the other party in security coordination with the joint border areas if they are limited in armament and are subject to international control by the United Nations. The agreement also granted the right to Israeli ships and goods heading to and from Israel to free passage through the Suez Canal and its entrances in the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea (rkishli, 2020).

2.2.7. Madrid Conference of 1991

On November 15, 1988, the Palestinian National Council, meeting in Algeria, adopted a resolution accepting the principle of a two-state solution to settle the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Palestine Liberation Organization fulfilled one of the most important and oldest American preconditions for its recognition. The Palestinian leadership in exile recognized Israel's right to exist - in December 1988 - and announced its denunciation of all forms of terrorism, and its unconditional acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. October 30, 1991, The Madrid peace talks in the Middle East began under the auspices of the US Secretary of State, James Baker, and the Soviet Union. The Madrid talks were based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and based on the land-for-peace formula. It was an attempt by the international community to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process through negotiations, involving Israel and the Palestinians as well as Arab countries, including Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria (Palestinapedia, 2015).

Although the United States provided guarantees to protect the interests of each party, Israel insisted that bilateral negotiations not begin in Madrid for fear of a front between the Palestinians and Arab delegations and suggested that the negotiations take place alternately in Israel and a concerned Arab capital. The US administration proposed a "compromise" to hold a new round in Washington in December, and between that date and August 1993, 11 rounds of bilateral negotiations were held in Washington without any results. In the fall of 1992, George W. Bush lost the US presidential election, which was won by his opponent, the Democratic Party candidate, Bill Clinton, and the Madrid path effectively ended. In Israel, Shamir lost the elections to Yitzhak Rabin. Later, the Israelis established secret contacts with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat (Passia, 2017).

Post-Madrid negotiations failed to produce the desired peace agreements. Yet, it opened great prospects for the comprehensive peace process between Israel and the Arab countries. It gave Israel a place in the world and established relations with many countries in the world. The 1991 Madrid conference was an introduction and a cover for the direction of the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization to secret and undeclared agreements. The issue of the right of return was marginalized, although it was one of the main issues raised in the negotiations. The Madrid conference also caused a major rift in the political positions of the Palestinian forces and caused the exodus of key members of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The Oslo Accord was one of the outcomes of the bilateral negotiations emanating from the Madrid Conference, as it constituted the legitimate justification that brought the Palestinian side together with the Israelis at one table for the first time since the Israeli occupation of Arab lands (Al-Ahmad, 2021).

2.2.8. Oslo Accords 1993

The Oslo Accords of 1993 emerged from the secret agreements concluded between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel after the 1991 Madrid Conference failed to reach a solution. A peace agreement was signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in Washington on September 13, 1993. It was called the Oslo

Accords, in reference to the Norwegian city of Oslo, which witnessed secret talks to reach these agreements. It was a Palestinian-Israeli agreement and was the beginning of the road to a unilateral solution that carries the danger of Palestinian separation from Arab coordination and Arab security in general. The agreement also did not include a single point stating the end of the occupation or the end of its existence (Shafiq, 2003).

The accord included a Declaration of Principles on Transitional Self-Government Arrangements through a Peace Agreement signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in the American city of Washington, DC, on September 13, 1993, in the presence of former US President Bill Clinton. The agreement stipulates that Israel withdraw from lands in the West Bank and Gaza Strip within five years, in stages, the first of which is Jericho and Gaza, which constitute 1.5% of the land of Palestine. Israel recognized the right of the Palestinians to establish self-rule on the lands from which Israel withdraws in the West Bank and Gaza as self-rule for the Palestinians and not an independent, sovereign state. Israel is responsible for maintaining the security of the autonomous region from any external aggression and for establishing a police force to maintain security in the territories under the Palestinian Authority (Shlaim, 2016).

The Oslo Accords included the agreement of each side to accept the other as a partner, as the Palestine Liberation Organization recognized the State of Israel. Israel recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as “the only representative of the Palestinian people”. The agreement stipulated that these negotiations would cover the remaining issues, including Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations, and cooperation. Neither the Oslo Accords or the Declaration of Principles were a peace treaty, but they were a means to establish interim governance arrangements, and a framework to facilitate subsequent negotiations for a final treaty in late 1999. The Oslo Accords was supposed to only last for five years. However, no agreement for a final treaty was ever reached. The Oslo agreement is the best thing that happened to the Israeli settlers and the Israeli settlement enterprise (Shafiq, 2003).

The Palestinian position was divided towards the Oslo Accords. Fatah, which represented the Palestinians in the negotiations, accepted the Declaration of Principles, while Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Palestine Liberation Front objected because their internal systems refuse to recognize Israel's right to exist in Palestine. Moreover, Hamas considered the Oslo Accord invalid, describing it as “ominous,” as it gave the occupation the right to “rape 78% of the land of historic Palestine.” (Shlaim, 2016).

2.2.9. Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty

The Jordanian Israeli Peace Treaty, or what is known as the Wadi Araba Treaty, is a peace treaty signed between Jordan and Israel on the border separating the two countries passing through Wadi Araba on October 26, 1994. This treaty normalized the relations between the two countries to end the disputes between them. With the signing of this treaty, Jordan became the second Arab country after Egypt and the third Arab party after Egypt to normalise its relations with Israel. The Palestine Liberation Organization normalized its relations with Israel afterwards. The treaty stipulates that its objective is to achieve a just and comprehensive peace between the two countries, based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, within secure and recognized borders, and to achieve the desired peace (Zahran, 2022).

The Parties recognize the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of each other. They recognize the right of each to live in peace and within secure borders. Cooperation between the two countries in good-neighbourly relations and cooperation between them to ensure lasting security, and they will refrain from the threat and use of force and will resolve all disputes between them by peaceful means. They respect and recognize the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of each State in the area (Abdullah, 2020).

On October 26, 1994, the historic peace treaty was signed during a ceremony in Jordan's Araba Valley, north of Eilat and near the Israeli Jordanian border. Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Abd al-Salam al-Majali signed the treaty. The Jordanian delegations were able, during the peace negotiations with Israel, to recover their rights that were violated by Israel, such as water rights, and Jordan has regained official sovereignty over the areas of Al-Baqoura and Al-Ghamr, and some areas were exchanged between the two sides, such as the exchange of five square kilometres south

of the Dead Sea near the Potash Project Palestine, which was occupied by Israel in 1948. In addition to Jordan's formalization through peace negotiations of its international borders, breaking the siege that resulted during the Gulf War, and writing off the American debts that had accumulated on Jordan over the years (Zahran, 2022).

2.2.10. Camp David 2000 Summit

The 2000 Camp David Summit, held at Camp David between US President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat between July 11 and 25, 2000, was an attempt to negotiate a "final status settlement" of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but was unsuccessful. Ehud Barak, the Israeli Prime Minister, was not willing to offer any merit related to the issue of sovereignty over Jerusalem during the summit. He started weak in front of his government coalition, which tended to bring him down, after showing softness towards the issues of the final solution (Hanieh, 2001).

The first American position was based on the old Israeli idea of dividing Jerusalem into three areas: the first is called the centre and includes what is inside the wall in the old city of Jerusalem, and the second includes the circle and is represented in the neighbourhoods near the old city located one kilometre away, and the third is called the periphery, which is the Arab areas within The Jerusalem municipality is similar to the areas of "Shuafat, Beit Hanania and Al-Isawiya", in which the Israelis offer expanded autonomy in the periphery area, while full Israeli sovereignty remains over the centre and the circle, with the Palestinians being granted what is called functional sovereignty only, in addition to a corridor of the Temple Mount "Al-Aqsa Mosque . Also, the negotiations at Camp David did not set clear main lines on specific issues. The United States failed to set red lines for the success of this summit at Camp David (BRIEFING, 2018).

The Palestinians reject this proposal because it does not achieve Full Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem and the Old City, and this is the basis of the conflict, it also isolates the Palestinian population from the centre of Jerusalem, which is what Israel aims to achieve by emptying the centre or the heart of the city, and thus the Jews will have a majority in East Jerusalem. In the end, the Camp David summit in 2000

failed, and the problem of Jerusalem was the basis for the failure of the negotiations, in addition to the insistence of the Israeli side to obtain Palestinian approval to end the conflict between them. Also, the Camp David summit left aside all international decisions and was based on “American-Israeli” proposals and principles (Hanieh, 2001).

2.2.11. Abraham Accords 2020

The Abrahamic Accords is a term applied to a group of peace agreements concluded between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain and Israel under the auspices of the United States during the rule of US President Donald Trump, , Bahrain's Foreign Minister Dr. Abdul Latif bin Rashid Al Zayani, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan signed the Ibrahim Accords on Tuesday, September 15., 2020, on the South Lawn of the White House. This agreement and other bilateral normalization agreements between Israel and its new Gulf partners were the beginning of a new era in the Middle East. The UAE's new partnership with Israel allowed Sudan and Morocco to normalize relations with Israel and join the Abraham Accords (Ghazi, 2020).

The Abraham Accords is based on planning a new course for the region, which depends on the close Arab-Israeli consensus with the signatory Arab countries regarding the strategic issues and economic opportunities. in comparison between the Abraham Accords and the Camp David Accords 1978 or the peace agreements with Egypt 1979 even the peace accord signed between Jordan and Israel 1994 there is no similarities between them because the old peace treaties aimed to completing the unfinished business of armed conflict both treaties were agreements between governments seeking to close the chapter of the military conflict and wars with Israel (David, 2020).

The peace agreement of the three countries achieves strategic demands, as the United States of America believes that an agreement of two important allies on joint cooperation will serve its interests to establish a regional alliance in the region and confront the hostile forces, especially Iran, and thus the United States can focus its efforts on containing the Chinese influence in Southeast Asia and the Russian

influence in Eastern Europe. Israel also succeeded in signing a peace agreement without the need to appease the Palestinians (Ghazi, 2020).

The signatories to the Abraham Agreement were able to strangle the Iranian sphere, and Israel sought to research for an ally in the face of the Iranian threat; the Israeli Emirati hostility to Iran is not new. Both countries worked for a long time to prevent Iranian hegemony over the Gulf and the Middle East at the beginning of their informal relationship. Especially in light of the withdrawal of US forces from parts of the Middle East, which led to the development of relations between them. Among the clauses that were marketed for the agreement is that it serves the Palestinian cause, but this propaganda was not realistic, because the agreement would aggravate the situation further (Al-Masadi, 2020).

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Tel Aviv was able to break the Arab consensus on King Abdullah's peace initiative and impose more isolation on the Palestinians, Mohammed bin Zayed was able, through signing the Abraham Agreement with Israel, to secure strong support and a regional ally in case the United States did not abide by its security obligations. When the three parties signed the Abraham Agreement, Donald Trump said that five or six other countries might join similar peace agreements with Israel. He did not specify the countries, but he spoke of a new dawn in the Middle East (Ghazi, 2020).

The seventh clause in the Abraham agreement calls for launching a strategic agenda for the Middle East to expand diplomatic and trade relations, and other forms of regional cooperation. This item is an explicit approval of the deal of the century in the new Middle East, and the American strategy is based on liquidating the Palestinian cause, and involving Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon in bearing responsibility for the lives of Palestinian refugees and agreeing to exchange lands according to what the Deal of the Century proposed (Al-Masadi, 2020).

Abraham's agreement included that the countries that signed the agreement treat themselves as friendly countries and allow Muslims around the world to pray in the Al-Aqsa Mosque. As for the Palestinian issue, the Emirati and Bahraini foreign ministers, during the signing ceremony of the agreement at the White House, were keen to mention the two-state solution, but the text of the two agreements did not fully

refer to this issue. At the front of the second page of the UAE-Israel treaty, it was sufficient to emphasize finding a peaceful solution to the Palestinian conflict. But the UAE Foreign Minister, Abdullah bin Zayed, indicated in his speech before the signing, and said to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, “Thank you for choosing peace and stopping the annexation of Palestinian lands.” (Ghazi, 2020).

Emphasis was placed on Israel's position in the region within the drafting of the terms of the agreement. The UAE agreement includes a paragraph about how Arabs and Jews "descend from the same ancestor, Abraham" and are both indigenous to the Middle East. This formulation clearly refutes the old claims in the Arab world that Zionism is alien to the region. To try to get closer and normalize with the Arab peoples, not just the rulers. The Israeli and Emirati side were keen to focus on interfaith understanding and religious tolerance. As the treaty itself notes, “The Parties undertake to promote mutual understanding, respect and a culture of peace between their societies” . (Makovsky, 2020)

CHAPTER III

ISRAELI AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES

3.1. Israel's Use of the Media as Propagative Tool through Digital Diplomacy

3.1.1. Israel's Use of the Media in Propaganda

In recent years, several Israeli radio, satellite and Arabic-language media websites have also spread. The Israeli media has many tools, including social networking platforms. The Facebook site that is filled with Arabic-speaking Israel pages, The account of the Israeli army spokesman, Avichai Adraei, is a tool of digital diplomacy and followed by more than 2 million users. Israel harnesses many of its financial and political equipment to impose its ideologies on Arab society and to win Arab public opinion to accept its political and military behaviour. The propaganda system uses all its tools to polish its image at times and to gain legitimacy at other times (Erekat A. A., 2021).

Israel seeks to integrate the media into foreign and military policy in light of Western support in the media, politically, financially and militarily. Israel is trying to influence Arab society and impose its policy on the world so that it can face all forms of resistance. Israel tends to use different types of propaganda techniques to protect itself from any international accusations. Israel also puts pressure on Western politicians and major media. In order to tell the story that Israel wants to serve its strategy and goals in its propaganda style, Israel relied on the use of positive expressions such as the use of the word freedom, equality, democracy and civilization to draw a different picture and circulate it among the public and Among the propaganda methods used by Israel is to show sympathy for the murders committed by its soldiers. then they reformulate the issue of killing civilians by promoting Israel that it is defending itself by publishing false information (Qaddoura, 2017).

Israeli propaganda focuses on using certain terms to serve its ideologies, such as the term “the Arab-Israeli conflict” instead of the term “the Palestinian cause” to convince

the world that there are two conflicting parties who have the same right. Thus, the current Israeli political media “propaganda” is part linked to ancient and modern Jewish-Zionist history, as it is one of the foundations of building the global Zionist national project based on building and establishing “Greater Israel” or “Historic Israel”, by relying on that huge amount from newspapers, periodicals, satellite media channels, research centres, propaganda and many other modern media, especially social media platforms and the exploitation of digital diplomacy, social media has begun to play an important role in anti-Palestinian propaganda as part of the organized efforts in the Israeli Public Affairs Department (tasnimnews, 2015).

The Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs and Information is intensifying its efforts through media channels, websites, newspapers, and social media platforms. The Global Coalition for Israel (GC4I), a conglomerate set up with the help of Jewish organizations, is to develop a research application for surfers on support for Israel. There is also the Interdisciplinary Centre for Initiative and Leadership (ICYL), Jewish Student Fellowship Organizations (AEPi), the World Federation of Jewish Students (WUJS), also the student organization Hillel, and the Jewish Chabad movement and Israeli propaganda organizations. These organizations aim to monitor the public mood and analyse information to improve the image of Tel Aviv in general and Arab opinion (Darwish, 2018).

Israel has been interested in social media and has mobilized all modern technologies to reach the largest sectors in Arab societies to make a positive impact. Digital diplomacy is an important foreign policy tool for Israel, especially after the number of Internet users reached about 3 billion people at least. Israel exploited this to achieve influence, power and. Israel used digital diplomacy as a complement to the Haspara strategy, which aims to clarify Israel's strategy and confront the anti-press and attempts to delegitimize it, In addition to justifying its actions and drawing the methods of Israeli propaganda in general and ways of addressing issues and events through all means of propaganda and the media to set the necessary standards for the Israeli discourse (Abdel-Sabour, Digital diplomacy as a tool in foreign policy, 2021).

Israel made a great effort to change its policy on social media platforms after signing the Abraham Accords in order to get closer to Arab youth. The Arabic-speaking Israeli

pages began sharing publications about the importance of normalization and news related to the positive effects of normalization on the countries that signed these agreements. Attracting Arab youth is a very important goal for Israel because it does not want to repeat the scenes of the cold peace, as happened with Jordan and Egypt. The Israeli government attracts media cadres from all countries of the world, especially America and Europe, to work within the media teams and go directly to the masses to gain public opinion and disseminate A picture of peace, democracy, and coexistence for Israel (Areej Hakroush, 2022).

In its propaganda, the Israeli media relies on questioning the counter-narratives. On July 1, 2002, the Israeli government decided to use government websites as media tools via the electronic network and instructed managers working in ministries to enter media materials on their ministries' websites, bearing contents that contribute to explaining Israeli policy. Linking it to the websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency of the Government, and the contents are published in several languages, including Hebrew, Arabic and English, to achieve its political goals.

The media deliberately adopts several different and contradictory accounts of one incident, in order to put the recipient among dozens of question marks (Amer, 2018).

One of the main propaganda methods adopted by Israel is the method of repetition of the same details and the infusion of publications related to Arab issues to make an impact and change the stereotyped image of Israel and replace it with terms such as the state of tolerance, coexistence of religions and democracy, and portraying the Israeli society that it does not suffer from any internal disturbances. To complete the chain of spread, after the 2020 agreements, Israel opened branches for its Arabic-speaking channels in Morocco and Dubai and other countries. These channels received a turnout from Arab youth of various nationalities, some response may appear through the comments that documented the response of some young people to what Israel publishes And the Arab youth are comparing their countries with Israel, especially after the Arab Spring revolutions (Areej Hakroush, 2022).

3.1.2. Israel and Framing the Media Messages

a. Framing Theory

The framing theory is based on the fact that media events and contents do not have a specific goal unless they are placed in an organization, context and media frameworks. Those frameworks are responsible for organizing words, texts, meanings, experiences, and social values (kirat, 2015).

Framing is a mechanism that uses part of the text or content to put it in a different context and amplify the event and then analyse its details and put the solution at the end, Framing is a purposeful process by the communicator when he reorganizes the message so that it falls into the category of people's perceptions and their persuasive influences to achieve specific goals. Framing depends on highlighting certain aspects of reality and isolating others to create a systematic effect on how recipients understand news related to an event. Framing includes selection and highlighting to reinforce a particular problem and exclude information and other aspects of the topic (Wahed, 2020).

b. Israel and Framing the Media Messages

In its discourse directed to the Arabs and the Palestinians, Israel relies on economic frameworks such as economic advantages, benefits, and future economic projects that it intends to establish with the countries with which it has signed normalization agreements. Besides, it followed frameworks of human interest such as highlighting human and emotional stories and showing sympathy for the issues and concerns of the Arab world. The speech also relied on the ethical framework by helping the elderly, children, women and the sick. The Israeli media uses the social responsibility framework to blame the victim for confiscation of rights or theft of land. For example, the use of threats to get Palestinians to stop supporting any action against the occupying power. Otherwise, this may endanger their economic and humanitarian situation, kill their children, or cause the demolition of their homes and confiscation of their property (Awais, 2022).

For Israel to gain sympathy or response from any party, it focuses on dealing with news and discussing issues from angles that support its strategies or complement its policies. Israeli media content reflects opposite trends in addressing issues. On the one hand, there is a tendency towards embracing force, deterrence, security doctrine, military supremacy, and scepticism of resistance. At the same time there are calls for coexistence, peace, religious and cultural interaction, common issues between language and religion, and for the public to interact and express their opinions to raise their perceptions or even provoke them towards related issues. Even photographing Israeli soldiers in military uniforms helping the elderly and the sick people is also a propaganda tool to abort the stereotypical image of the occupier (Areej Hakroush, 2022).

The Israeli government has paid great attention to social media platforms. There are official groups dedicated to publishing content that carries certain ideologies that these governments wish to carefully communicate to the public. Israel used Facebook to deliver messages to the Palestinian public. And the Arab public in general. It tries to beautify its image by choosing the content it shares. The official Israeli Facebook pages play on the human side by addressing the cultural aspects and trying to express their pride in their military strength and their ability to strike the enemy and confront the Palestinian resistance. Such attempts may lead young people to believe that there is no solution to the struggle, but rather coexistence. Israel aims to abort the convictions of the Arab public to obtain gains (Awais, 2022).

Since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Israeli media has adopted basic principles in its coverage of events and its dissemination of news. It relied on highlighting the human touch in terms of mentioning the names of Jewish fathers and children, which humanizes what it calls the Palestinian "terrorism" that Israel faces every day. The Israeli media spokesmen have resorted to asking more unanswerable rhetorical questions as part of their media efforts to mislead public opinion. The Israeli media tend to use selective terms and expressions, such as presenting Israel and the Israelis as victims to the world, and the use of these terms tends to show Israeli superiority and superiority in various fields, especially technological, military and security. To thwart the resistance and abort the struggle (studies, 2018).

3.1.3. Israel and Digital Diplomacy

Digital diplomacy is one of the elements of soft power that Israel uses to promote its values and ideas. Israel ranks eighth in the world in the field of digital diplomacy. Israel has nearly 800 websites and digital and social channels on the Internet, and about 50 websites in different languages, in addition to nearly 80 websites affiliated with diplomatic representation offices in Israel. different countries. Israel has focused its efforts on developing digital diplomacy for several goals, including combating criticism of Tel Aviv for its brutal practices, killing civilians and damaging property as well, to overcome the results of the Arab-Israeli conflict. And to confront the boycott movements that managed to achieve positive results in European circles (Abdel-Sabour, Digital diplomacy as a tool in foreign policy, 2021).

Israeli digital diplomacy depends not only on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also on the Israeli occupation army, which recruits hundreds of activists on social media, who are responsible for communicating with the Arab youth through several accounts, said that communication is not done arbitrarily, but very professionally, the Israeli entity decided to establish a branch of digital diplomacy as the revolutions began in Tunisia and Egypt, where the social media accounts of Israeli ministry spokespersons were significantly activated. One of the most important examples that confirms Israel's systematic exploitation of digital diplomacy is the deal to sell the “Bitar Yerushalayim” football club, which is known for its insults to Islam, insults to the Messenger of God, may God’s prayers and peace be upon him, and his hatred of Arabs, a deal that dissipated within a few weeks and it was published that it was hiding opportunistic people who want to launder their money (Abd-Elkader, 2021).

Israel continued to use digital diplomacy with a high level of professionalism to polish its image and gain legitimacy and support for its existence and policy. Israel tries to justify its use of force by portraying itself as being persecuted... Through digital diplomacy, Israel aimed to present itself to the world in a positive way. It promotes itself as a democracy targeted by terrorist groups. Israel has used digital diplomacy as a complement to its strategy known as “Haspara”, or Public diplomacy aimed at clarifying the government's ideologies and strengthening Tel Aviv's position in Confronting the anti-press and attempts to delegitimize it in various countries of the

world, and to justify its actions. In addition to defining the way in which issues are addressed through the media, intellectuals, and social media networks, setting the necessary standards for the appropriate political discourse, as well as delegitimizing opponents and critics (Abdel-Sabour, Digital diplomacy as a tool in foreign policy, 2021).

Also, the visits of the youth of normalization, which did not receive any welcome or emotion in the Israeli street, but rather some harassment by the Arabs of the interior and the filming of clips in the means of communication mocking and cursing the typographers. Also, the only Emirati student who was sent to study nursing at the University of Haifa, Sumaya Al-Muhairi, and her news collapsed, so it was found that she spends her time with a few Israeli students and is completely isolated from the independent and free university life. All this was with the aim of attracting more Arab youth to the Israeli society by spreading this news on social media platforms (Abd-Elkader, 2021).

Israel tried to attract the Arab youth after the previous peace agreements. Israel was not able to normalize with the Arab youth. Therefore, Israel deliberately influenced through digital diplomacy, specifically from social media platforms through Facebook and Twitter. Hence, Israel realized that using social media is the best way to influence Arab public opinion (Abdel-Sabour, Digital diplomacy as a tool in foreign policy, 2021).

The Israeli media managed to penetrate the Palestinian and Arab mind and reach many social media users around the world, and the social networking pages of Israeli officials follow hundreds of thousands of Palestinian and Arab followers. The numbers are surprising, as they are considered large compared to the general Arab mood, which calls for boycott and non-normalization with Israel. To solidify the concepts, it is relied on changing names and terminology to impose de facto politics on social media platforms. Judaization is an important target of the Arabic-speaking Israeli propaganda. Several pages on social networking sites were dedicated to following up on the actions of the Israeli sovereign authorities in Arabic (Khalifa, 2017).

Digital disinformation has added more complexity to digital diplomacy strategies. The intentional use of false information to deceive, mislead, or obfuscate is an intentional act of “a political tool to manipulate politics to serve specific goals.” Digital disinformation seeks to undermine political stability toward the intended country of these practices. One of the negative aspects of digital technology is the role it plays in the spread of “fake news” with political consequences on a global level. The rapid spread of information in the social media space may incite political crises. One of the disadvantages of digital diplomacy is the inability of workers to use it and not employ it properly, and it is considered an area for piracy and counterfeiting (Hopkins, 2018).

3.1.4. Israel’s Use of Arabic-Language Based Pages to Affect the Arab Audience

Israel immensely intensified its presence on social media after the signing of the Abraham Accords, in hope of reaching the Arab people, which according to Israel will only come in this way. The Israeli pages on social networking sites began to be created intensively, especially on Twitter, at the beginning of 2013. Some of the pages and accounts were there and were reactivated. It was remarkable that there was a change in the writing style which can be explained by a change of the administrators of these pages in 2013. Israel adopted a section in the Israeli Foreign Ministry that it called “The Mi’raj Hasbarah or the justification system. This system aims to justify any military or intelligence action that Israel takes in the occupied interior, the occupied West Bank, or the besieged Gaza Strip, or what Israel called “behind the enemy lines”, meaning the Arab and Islamic countries, explained that the main goal of this justification system is not to repeat the developments which took place in the cold peace era between Jordan and Egypt with Israel. The so-called “cyber-soldiers” for this mission are people with regular and public profiles written primarily in Arabic and Hebrew (Mohamed Abd-Elkadir, 2021).

The Israeli pages on social media are personal pages with Jewish people who speak fluent Arabic and have contacts with the Gulf States, which have signed normalization agreements, The Rabbis Alliance page is one of the important pages for Israel. There is an army of young people who joined the Israeli project that was built in the past to serve the normalization project by promoting Israel and explaining details that do not exist in the first place. The issue of changing the orientation on social media is a tool

that they have taken advantage of, and which formed a basis with the countries that are signatories to the normalization agreements. The base was built from personalities present there who spread pleasant talk about Israel, with the aim of eliminating all negative messages through tourism and visiting places where Israeli society gathers and spreading talks of Israel as a country of peace (Bisharat S., 2022).

Social media or Israeli websites are not the only media tools that Israel relies on, there are other media platforms in Arabic, whether radio or television, the voice of Israel radio, which is one of the first Arabic-speaking Israeli media, founded at the beginning of 2001 as well as i24 it was launched in 2013, and is considered one of the most recent Israeli Arabic-speaking media. The Israeli media broadcasts its contents in Arabic for the security interest of Israel because achieving security is a priority for Tel Aviv, one of the tasks carried out by the Israeli Arabic speaking media is to republish what some Arab media broadcast in praise of Israel and its policy, as the only democratic state in the middle east, and that it is the ideal that Arabs should emulate (vision, 2016).

Since the start of the Arab Spring revolutions, Israel has been trying in all directions to abort the impact of these revolutions for fear of increasing awareness of the determinants of the political scene or the downfall of the regimes that support it in the Arab countries. Therefore, Israel moved on diplomatic and media level to insert itself in the Arab communities even as a follow-up and political participation through the media, Israel has tried to convince the west of its role as a major ally especially after a number of Arab countries became allies of Israel, in contrast to west, whose role in relation to Israel declined (Khawaldeh, 2015).

Israeli pages in Arabic pose a danger to social networking sites where these pages were able to reach various the age, educational and intellectual levels of the Arab public, these pages enjoy an average level of follow-up. However, the more the Arab public is exposed to the Israeli pages in the Arabic language; Less support for acting against these pages. One of the most dangerous points that Israel exploits is “negative interaction with publications.” Despite the predominance of negative interaction over positive interaction, Israel seeks to interact with Arab peoples with its pages through social media.

Regardless of the nature and direction of this interaction, it is important that there be interaction with Israeli publications. Those in charge of the Israeli pages in the Arabic language are interested in showing negative comments and not deleting them so that communication and interaction can continue without interruption. Israel considers positive interaction as a goal that it seeks to reach in the coming years as part of its long-term strategies (Mohamed O. A., 2020).

In 2012 ,a year after the Arab spring revolutions ,the Hebrew Walla website wrote about the persistence of shortcomings in the national information system ,dedicating a special section to describing the failure and deterioration of information in Arabic regarding the volume of Arabic broadcasts on tv and MKs describing Israel as weak in broadcasting world oriented to the middle east ,they began to make plans to integrate Tel Aviv into Arab societies in an effort to speak its language and use the means it accessed (Khawaldeh, 2015).

Distortion of facts is one of the most important goals of the Israeli propaganda used on Israeli websites and pages directed in the Arabic language. It was followed by beautifying the image of Israel and then relying on the method of repetition as an important tool in the Israeli propaganda because Israel uses repetition to remind the world public opinion that the occupying power is fighting and persecuting martyr operations in the city of Jerusalem and that it is in self defence. And for Israel to consolidate its strategy among the Arab public, it used the method of distraction within its propaganda plans to distract the observer from the correct information to attract him to a specific framework of the event. Israel also uses the method of justification to defend itself regarding the crimes it commits to beautify its image in front of public opinion (W.E.Harara, 2018).

Israel's attempts to penetrate the Arab world were present even before the emergence of the internet. Specifically, after its independence document in 1948, an entity devoid of any cultural or religious identity or extension and this multiplied the situation after the triple aggression. Israel formed a committee known as “Supporting Broadcasting in Arabic” where experts in Arabic and media were hired. Furthermore, the “Voice of Israel Radio” was launched in Arabic. The aim of using these mechanisms at that time is to communicate with the Arab world and the people of the region. Therefore, the emergence of the Internet was a strategic move for Israel, which prompted it to form

ingenious teams in using social media platforms to persuade the Arabs to accept Israel. Gaining popular acceptance is the first goal of the Israeli research teams (trtarabi, 2021).

3.1.4.1. StandWithUs in Arabic

Stand with us (@swuArabic) is a Zionist organization founded in 2001 with the aim of raising awareness about Israel and spreading everything related to the Israeli interior and the Middle East. It is followed by more than four hundred thousand of people (Standwithus, 2001).

Israel says Stand with Us in Arabic is an international, nonpartisan Israeli educational organization that inspires and educates people of all ages and backgrounds, challenges misinformation, and fights anti-Semitism. Founded in 2001 and headquartered in Los Angeles, it has programs on five continents with branches and offices throughout the United States, in Israel, the United Kingdom, Canada and Brazil. StandWithUs empowers and energizes students and communities through leadership training and educational programs on hundreds of colleges, high school, and middle school campuses. StandWithUs informs through social media, print and digital materials, films, weekly newsletters, and missions to Israel (avichayadraee, n.d.).



Figure 3.1. StandWithUs Arabic Facebook Page

3.1.4.2. Israel in Arabic Page

The Israel page in Arabic is the source of information about the State of Israel in the Arabic language. It was established in January 2011 and is followed by more than 3 million people. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs created this page to market Israeli ideas and to document the internal and external activities of the Israeli government. By following the interactions on what is being published (Arabic I. i., 2011).

It becomes clear the state of controversy between the people in charge of the page and the Arab youth. The organizers of this page are also interested in activating the method of courtship with the Arab masses by publishing information on Arab issues or political matters and in some cases publishing videos about famous artists and influential figures with the aim of provoking Arab youth and prompting them to respond to these publications. By following up and analysing the publications, it becomes clear that videos were filmed to congratulate Muslims on the holidays and on Friday, unlike the publications that highlight the similarities in some points between the Islamic religion and the Israeli Jews, which the page organizers seek to share. A more open Middle East is a term that has emerged significantly in publications, especially after the Abraham Accords, and the page's organizers were keen to publish publications expressing the welcome of the passage of the first Israeli plane in Saudi airspace (akhbarelyom, 2019).

Analysing the publications also shows the interests of coexistence and pluralism in Israeli society. The page organizers are keen to portray citizens of all nationalities and describe the general situation as peaceful coexistence. Freedom of worship - coexistence and pluralism - societal openness - multiculturalism are terms that Israel focused on in its attempt to get closer to Arabs and Muslims in order to establish a positive image of Tel Aviv. Also, clear attempts to attract Arab youth by portraying Israeli society as the solution to wealth and the dream of travel and coexistence. Through this page, Israel focuses on publishing its achievements in all fields, whether medical, educational, cultural and other, and focuses on exaggerating everything related to the meetings that bring together Israeli officials with Arab officials (Wasel, mc-doualiya, 2020).



Figure 3.2. Israel in Arabic Facebook Page

3.1.4.3. The Jews of Iraq

The Iraqi Jews page on Twitter is dedicated to following up on the affairs of the Jews in Iraq and broadcasting all their activities. It was followed by 70,000 followers. They are based in Turkey and affect the region of Iraq; It was established in 2018. It is interested in sharing publications on the Jews of Iraq, Iraqi cuisine, political and cultural issues, in addition to supporting sick cases of children to collect donations and other calls to spread the term interfaith coexistence (@Jewirk, 2018).



Figure 3.3. Jews of Iraq Twitter Page

3.1.4.4. Israel in the Gulf

The page of Israel in the Gulf on the Twitter platform, which is the official account of the virtual embassy of Israel in the Gulf states, was created to promote dialogue with the peoples of the Gulf countries, followed by more than one hundred thousand followers. Tel Aviv and the countries that have signed normalization agreements, especially their mutual visits (IsraelintheGulf, 2013).



Figure 3.4. Israel in the Gulf Twitter Page

3.1.4.5. Israel in Dubai

The Israel page in Dubai on Twitter is the official account of the Consulate General of the State of Israel in Dubai , followed by nearly 232 . It was established after the inauguration of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Israel, which is located in Tel Aviv and was established in 2021. Interested in monitoring all activities, partnerships and meetings between the UAE and Israel (IsraelDubai, 2021).



Figure 3.5. Israel in Dubai Twitter Page

3.1.4.6. Israel in Bahrain

The Israel page in Bahrain is the official account of the Israeli embassy in the Kingdom of Bahrain, followed by 4,893 Followers and founded in October 2020. The account is interested in publishing everything related to the Israeli-Bahraini relations after the signing of the Abraham Accords, economic deals, political agreements, cultural and medical events, in addition to introducing the Jewish holidays and sharing them with followers (@IsraelinBahrain, 2020).



Figure 3.6. Israel in Bahrain Twitter Page

3.1.4.7. Sharakago Partnership

After the Ibrahim agreements between Israel, the Emirates and Bahrain, these countries were interested in expanding the scope of cooperation and friendship.

Sharakah, which means "partnership", a website dedicated to publishing and documenting all the foundations of partnership between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain through a youth destination in a clearer sense, was established by young leaders from Israel and the Gulf to transform the vision of peace between peoples into a reality and transfer normalization from the path of governments to the public.

This site leads interfaith delegations of young Israelis to the Gulf, which includes Israeli Muslims, Druze, Christians, and Jews, and brings delegations of Emirati and Bahraini influencers to Israel to engage with Israeli society and broaden the trajectory of activities throughout the Middle East (sharaka, 2020).




Figure 3.7. Sharaka. Website Screenshot



Figure 3.8. Sharakango Twitter Page

3.1.4.8. Peace Accords

The Peace Agreements page on Twitter was created to strengthen and extend relations and ties between Israel and the signatory countries to the Abraham Agreements in May of 2021. It is followed by more than four thousand followers. It is interested in spreading Israel's gains from signing the Abraham Agreements, its role in the Arab

region, and the gains of the Gulf states. Also, through normalization and documenting the celebrations commemorating the signing of the Abraham Accords and other joint activities between Israel and the countries that have normalized relations with it (Peace_Accords, 2021).



Figure 3.9. Abraham Accords Peace Institute Twitter Page

CHAPTER IV

LITERATURE REVIEW

4.1. Aspects of the Study

The study focuses on the problem by using previous studies and reports related to the subject and the various fields. The aim is to give a better understanding of the problem with a focus on several aspects...

4.1.1. The Impact of the Abraham Accords on the Arab System

The study of (Al-Shishi, 2021) about the impact of the Abraham Accords on the Arab regional system, the researcher used the inductive analysis method focused on analysing the variables that resulted before and after the Arab Spring revolutions. In addition to the arrival of the US administration in January 2017, which worked to devote its efforts to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which was represented in the Abraham Accords, which in turn worked to encourage the idea of normalization for other countries.

The study concluded that the waves of normalization that resulted from the Abraham Accords reflect a state of Israeli rebellion at a time when Israel expressly declares its rejection of the terms of the Arab settlement, and its insistence that the Trump agreement be the only basis for any future Palestinian settlement. The Abraham Accords resulted in more Israeli intransigence towards the Palestinian issue. The Arab regime has officially entered an unprecedented phase that threatens its disintegration and complete collapse, and pushes it towards its transformation from a “national” system to a mere “regional”.

Another study about Abraham Accords shaping a new Middle East focused on the geopolitical repercussions of the Abraham Accords to shape a new era for the Middle East and North Africa region. The researcher used a qualitative methodology to obtain

information Rich and varied on the impact of the Abraham Accords on the Middle East (TOHME, 2022).

This study concluded that Abraham's agreements ended a long religious history of hostility between Israel and the Arab countries, also, focused on how to strengthen the Arabs, the foreign policy of countries to achieve gains in various sectors, the results examined to what extent The agreements are changing the regional geopolitical map of the Middle East.

The study added that the agreement is not pioneering, and Its influence is greatly exaggerated. Also, America no longer desires to be present in the Middle East any more than that.

The study (Oscar, 2022) focuses on the Abraham Accords and the Iranian nuclear agreement on the other hand, and compares the plans Former US Presidents Trump and Obama in the investigation of security and cooperation in the Middle East. It also focuses on what is related to their efforts in resolving disputes and attempts in achieving stability in the region and examining the effects and repercussions of the Abraham Agreements on the region and their impact on Middle Eastern power dynamics, the researcher used the qualitative literature review as a basic methodology for collecting and interpreting the information .

The study concluded that the Abraham Accords affected the Middle East in three main areas: economy, diplomacy, and security. The study found that it was the economic benefits and economic deals of the Arab countries that signed the agreement that prompted them to normalize with Israel. Israel and the signatory countries to the Abraham Accords sought to go towards a warm peace that depends on the exchange of cultures and benefits and the dissemination of peace among peoples. Trump and Obama Both sought to reduce the US military presence in the Middle East, both did efforts to build peace and stability in the Middle East.

Norlen's study focused on the motives of Israel and the United States United Arab Emirates - to sign the Abraham Accords 2020 (Norlen, 2020). It also examined the great shift in political geography after this signature detailing the internal and external

policy reasons that prompted the two parties to sit at the table. The researcher adopted the inductive analytical method. The study concluded that The Abraham Agreement is the first real foreign policy achievement of Donald Trump. Geopolitically, the deal strengthens the anti-Iranian alliance in the region, increasing pressure on Tehran. The Abraham Accords that were signed initially by the UAE and Israel and later extended to Bahrain was the reason that prompted other Arab countries to negotiate with Israel for normalization even at the expense of neglecting many key Palestinian issues, the first of which is turning a blind eye to the Palestinian cause and giving Israel the green light for more violations against the Palestinian people.

Butt's study focuses on the issue of strategic organization in the Middle East after the Abraham Accords (Butt, 2022). And the repercussions of cooperation between Israel and the signatories to the 2020 agreement. Examining the strategic benefits of Israel after Abraham's signing. This study falls into descriptive research. The study concluded that the cooperation between the two signatories indicates that the strategic reorganization within the region will continue to strengthen. There is a negative impact of the Abraham Accords on the security situation in the Gulf. It outweighs the gains made through the signing of the Abraham Accords. Although Israel and the Gulf parties signed the terms of the agreement, Israel did not abide by it in view of the ongoing confrontations between Israel and Palestine and the failure to make a difference during the conflicts.

4.1.2. Israel's Use of Social Media to Attract Arabs Directly

The study dealt with analysing the Israeli propaganda discourse through social networking sites, highlighting the role of the spokesperson for the Israeli army in Israeli propaganda, revealing the propaganda methods used by Israel to reach its goals, and identifying the types of Israeli propaganda affecting the social media. This study falls into descriptive research, the researcher relied on the discourse analysis form (Sobeih, 2020).

The study concluded that Israeli propaganda does not target only the Palestinian Arab observer, but rather has followers from the Israeli home front and supported by the local Israeli newspapers, In the field of digital diplomacy, the methods of Israeli

propaganda varied, but most of them were the method of emotional excitement, the method of repetition, persecution, and suspicion of the other. Israel relied in its use of propaganda on basic matters, including destroying the morale of the Arab people, especially the resistance and focusing on its use of weak weapons in exchange for exaggerating the operations of the Israeli army.

Another paper (Bassam, 2019) dealt with Zionist propaganda through social networking sites. The researcher used the descriptive approach with the aim of understanding and analysing the phenomenon and collecting data (Bassam, 2019). The study dealt with the analysis of Zionist propaganda by collecting information about the historical roots of the Zionist movement, its propaganda methods, and to discuss the analysis of Israeli pages, on top of which is the page of Avichai Adraee, the official spokesman of the IDF. The study concluded the Zionist propaganda uses social media seriously and effectively to create a new state of normalization with the Arab peoples targeted by the new propaganda path, portraying the occupation soldiers as ordinary people who want peace, which is an important idea for the Zionist propaganda that seeks to pass it effectively, portraying the Israeli army or as being Offers help. for the elderly. These images are one of the propaganda mechanisms to influence the Israeli image among Arabs.

Another study looked through the Israel propagandist Discourse in digital media towards Arab public in the middle east, The researcher used the analytical framework to answer the questions and hypotheses by applying the quantitative content analysis methodology to reach accurate results (SAID, 2020). The study dealt with monitoring the types of propaganda and the mechanisms used and analysing the Israeli propaganda discourse model directed to the Arab people via Facebook and interactive media and the reasons for this trend.

The study concluded Technological development increases the chances of manipulating consciousness by confusing the real meaning with the one to be disseminated by fragmenting the information. Also, traditional armies are no longer necessary to make an impact, but electronic armies through modern media are stronger in influence to reach the goal. The study added that those in charge of the Israeli digital pages target the Arab public through the Arabic-speaking electronic pages to draw a

positive mental picture of Israel and to break the psychological barrier with the Arab public to coexist with the existence of Israel.

Khawaldeh's study on the other hand dealt with the impact of the developments of the Arab revolutions on political and security behaviour and the analysis of their colonial behaviour, using both decision-making and systems analysis approaches (Abdul Salam Khawaldeh, 2015). The researcher used the analytical approach to the nature of the Israeli perception of the Arab public and focused on Israel role who was aware of the importance of social media and was able to take advantage of it to serve its ideologies and to break all the red lines in its struggle with the Arab world.

The study concluded that Israel has cost a very heavy price while facing the Arab revolutions on more than one level. Internally, its problems have multiplied in terms of persuading its citizens to achieve security in the rejectionist environment advanced by the Palestinian resistance, in addition to the price associated with its attempt to achieve gains in political and economic normalization at the regional level.

4.1.3. Digital Diplomacy and Israeli Arab Pages

A study done by Hazar Ismail (Ismail, 2022) aims to identify the role of digital diplomacy in improving Israel's image internationally. The researcher used the inductive approach to reach more accurate information, the study concluded that digital diplomacy is effectively relied upon by Israel to improve Tel Aviv's image internationally (Ismail, 2022). Israel's reliance on the Arabic language in its media discourse is one of the most important tools it uses within the digital diplomacy unit. The study added that Israel focused on digital diplomacy using technological developments and the appointment of employees for digital diplomacy. The Israeli discourse focused on humanizing the occupying state and the Israeli soldiers, to remove the stereotype. Those in charge of the communication process in the Israeli digital diplomacy channels are fluent in their mastery of several languages. Through digital diplomacy, Israel is still trying to emerge as a democracy, to gain more acceptance among its neighbours.

Another paper (Bayati, 2021) dealt with reading the details and analysis of public diplomacy as one of the most important elements of soft power that countries use to promote their values and ideas and how digital diplomacy was used to overcome external political problems through the use of platforms to communicate with the target audience directly. The researcher used the inductive analytical method to reveal the details Examining the parts of the conceptual framework of Israeli digital diplomacy.

The study concluded that Israeli digital diplomacy is based on a strategic base. The normal Emirati and Bahraini relations with Israel provided Israel miles, so it did not have to offer gains to the Palestinians. Moreover, the study added that Public digital diplomacy is enabled by integrating networking technology such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube in the professional tools for diplomats to serve their goals, according to the results, the possibilities of Saudi Israeli normalization will remain a reality.

Another paper (Emily Sorkin, 2021) dealt with an explanation of the timing of the normalization of Emirati relations with Israel and the analysis of the Abraham Accords as a basic case for understanding the policy of normalization In general, an analysis of mechanisms that led to the development of relations. The study touched on determining the importance of normalization as a strategy for resolving conflicts, while highlighting the differences between Israel's treaties with Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE. The researcher used the inductive analytical method.

The study concluded that the Israeli government provides significant financial, technological, and human capabilities to its Arabic websites, including Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. The Arabic speaking Israel page is the one of the most popular and most viewed pages, followed by more than 3 million. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses its Arabic pages to promote its technology and scientific development.

The study (Aseda, 2022) dealt with the explanation of the Israeli digital diplomacy through its official pages in the Arabic language and to go directly to the Arab peoples to present an image that serves Israel and supports its strategies. The study dealt with the Israeli effort in promoting the unity of the Abrahamic religions and attempts to distort facts and falsify information through the exploitation of social media platforms

and spread through them. The researcher used the media survey method and the content analysis tool, both quantitative and qualitative, for the publications of the official Israeli pages. The study concluded that the official Israeli pages are keen on diversifying the publications presented to the Arab public, with a briefness in the number of words in the publication. Political issues top the most prominent content that Tel Aviv is interested in publishing and sharing with the Arab public, The Presidency of the Israeli Government is coordinating between the tributaries of its digital system Hasbara to serve the Israeli political ideology.

A study (Mohamed O. A., 2020) dealt with analysing the patterns of exposure of the Arab public to Israeli pages in the Arabic language on social networking sites and examining the impact on the target Arab audience of these pages. And measuring the extent of positive and negative interaction on the publications of these pages. The researcher used a deliberate application of an electronic questionnaire form on 300 samples Research from fourteen Arab countries. The study concluded that the respondents had a low level of interaction with Israeli pages in general and higher levels of negative interaction than positive interaction. The study added that the Israeli pages on social networking sites pose a danger to the target audience, and achieving peace between Arabs and Israel is the most important goal of Israel in its long-term plan.

Awais' study (Awais, 2022) dealt with the analysis of four Israeli pages in Arabic "Avichay Adraee," "the coordinator," "offer Gendelman", and "Israel Speaks Arabic,"" which are directed at the Palestinians in particular, and the Arabs in the Middle East in general, to reveal the methods used in Israeli propaganda to attract Arabs and influence them positively. The researcher followed the data analysis method and used the quantitative approach to get accurate answers. The study concluded the importance and effectiveness of social media platforms in communicating messages. Therefore, the Israeli government gave great attention to these platforms and assigned electronic groups the task of publishing content that carries a specific ideology to deliver it to the Arab audience carefully. Also, the official Israeli Facebook Arabic pages, address the humanitarian aspect and depicting soldiers in their military uniforms, aiding the elderly and children to abort the stereotypical image of the

occupier in the minds of Arabs Israel deliberately convinces the Arabs that coexistence is the solution to all conflicts.

4.1.4. Israeli Digital Normalization

Zwilling's study (Zwilling, 2021) focuses on the attitudes of social media users in the Gulf countries towards normalization with the State of Israel and whether Israel was able to succeed through its use of digital normalization to attract Arab audiences. The researcher relied on a qualitative basis that analyses attitudes among social media Calculations in the Gulf states. Also, quantitative research conducted on data extracted from Twitter accounts that were used to assess the situation of normalization or non-normalization in various specializations with the State of Israel.

The study concluded that Israel is adopting a new cultural discourse emanating from social networking sites directed to the Gulf countries that has an impact on public opinion throughout the region. Also, almost 80% of the comments Against normalization with Israel. And that accounts with negative attitudes towards normalization gained more likes. Saudi Arabia ranked among the six countries most open to normalization.

The study (Dishy, 2017) analysed the digital culture of the IDF and how Israeli recruits participate on social media. It examines the effects of portable information and communication technology on Israeli collective memory, identity, and public space, and focuses on social media participation among young Israeli recruits through the expansion of popular discourses about participatory Israeli media.

The researcher used the analytical framework to access accurate information, the study concluded that digital communication is an essential aspect of conscription in the IDF. Also, through information and communication technology, soldiers are imbued with the ability to obscure violence against the Palestinian population. Digital communication shows that militarization saturates all physical and digital spaces in Israel. At the same time, digital media platforms and social media platforms provide Israeli youth with the ability to spark renegotiations with Israeli society about their

collective grievances. The use of digital communication in the IDF allows for the deployment of unified strategies.

The study (Abdel-Sabour, 2021) analysed the Israeli use of digital diplomacy and how to use it to influence foreign policy, especially after Israel occupied the eighth place in the world in the field of digital diplomacy. The researcher used the analytical method to reach a more accurate understanding of the Israeli discourse directed to the Arabs through digital diplomacy.

The study concluded that there is complementarity in the discourse published by the pages. And the Israeli accounts, and do not contain any contradiction, to improve Israel's image. The main objective of Israel's employment of digital diplomacy is to Changing impressions of it as an occupier state and appearing as an advanced democratic state, economically and technologically, at the level of education, health, and others, in addition to legitimizing its operations and policies, and distorting its opponents Hamas and Iran in particular. Israel seeks to open a space for dialogue with Arab youth through its pages and accounts directed to Arabs to create a state of interaction.

The study (Muttalib, 2021) monitoring the Israeli persuasion methods used to achieve normalization in the Arab region and examining the level of interaction of social media users with the contents of normalization issues. The researcher used the analytical study on a research sample of 145 people through the survey method and the content analysis tool.

The study concluded that with the diversity of persuasive methods that were relied on by the Israeli pages directed in the Arabic language. Those in charge of Israeli digital diplomacy were keen on linking text and images to achieve greater interaction. Visual effects are among the most influential and persuasive tools. These pages provided arguments and evidence to convince the public of the importance of normalization and its manifestations Adopting a justification strategy to win over the interactions on the social media platforms.

4.1.5. Arab Social Media in the Face of Israel's Plans and Content

The study (Aal, Digital diplomacy and its place in Palestinian foreign policy, 2018) focused on the performance of Palestinian digital diplomacy in confronting the Israeli occupation. Examining the criteria on which Palestinian digital diplomacy is based and identifying the reasons for its decline according to the 2016 Digital Diplomacy Report, the researcher relied on the combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies. The survey tool was used in the study. The study concluded that the Palestinian digital diplomacy lacks keeping pace with the latest technological developments. However, the legalization is aware of the developments, but the practitioners of Palestinian diplomacy. They lack the scientific and practical knowledge of digital diplomacy. Palestinian digital diplomacy lacks the elements of creativity and suspense in the content presented to the public on Palestinian digital platforms.

The study (Jaraba, 2015) focuses on the achievements of the global movement to boycott Israel to confront Israel and its ability to influence Israel's decisions. The extent of the movement's ability to cause turmoil in the investment market. Discussing the movement's goals, strategy, and achievements. And the Israeli reaction to its growing presence.

The study concluded that the role of the BDS movement is growing in the world, and the Israeli authorities began to fear losing its place in the world. In front of the increasing media coverage that the movement enjoys from powerful and influential media The study also added that the Israeli measures could not stop the expansion of the boycott of Israel movement. However, the influence of the movement inside the Palestinian interior is still fragile. The movement has so far failed to turn into a popular movement In the occupied territories in 1967.

The paper (Prompichai, 2018) focuses on digital activity from the perspective of the Palestinian resistance through social media and focuses on the occupation's plans to abort this activity after Israel was subjected to international condemnation due to its continuous crimes. The study focused on the efforts of the boycott movements to influence public opinion.

The paper concluded that the Israeli authorities have developed policies aimed at imposing censorship on Palestinian political activity through social media on the grounds that it incites violence, and then use “incitement” as a legal reason for arresting political opponents. Social media has united and torn the Palestinian people at the same time. It facilitated international condemnation of the Israeli occupation but fuelled violence and sectarian strife.

4.2. The Study’s Distinguishing Factors from Other Studies

The researcher used the previous studies as a methodological basis to reach integrated and accurate results. This study is considered complementary to what the previous studies concluded. Through this study, the researcher sought to examine the extent to which Israel changed its policy on social media, specifically after the Abraham 2020 agreements, to suit the state of multi-field normalization with the signatory countries to the agreements to attract Arab audience. The study also sought to identify the most important mechanisms used to make an impact on Arab audience and the interaction through them resulted in what Israel publishes from different contents and the attempt to reveal through the methodology used about the extent to which Israel has reached in influencing the segments of Arab audience.

CHAPTER V

ISRAELI SOCIAL MEDIA USAGE AFTER ABRAHAM ACCORDS TO INFLUENCE ARAB AUDIENCE

5.1. Methodological Framework of the Study

5.1.1. Problem Statement

Israel was trying to position itself among the Arab regimes and improve its strategic position in the Middle East. Great efforts were made to complete normalization agreements with Arab countries. Israel justified this step by saying that it wants to reduce Iranian influence in the region. It promoted through its electronic and media platforms that Israel's main goal is to form an alliance to counter Iranian influence. So, it went towards completing the Ibrahim Agreements, known as peace agreements with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and others. from Arab countries. These agreements constituted an important political achievement for Israel, through which it reaped gains on all political and economic levels, passing through its attempt to complete popular normalization with the societies of these countries. This is a far-reaching Israeli goal (Emily Sorkin, 2021).

Intimidation by Iranian expansion in the region was the first Israeli step to gain Arab support to complete the Ibrahim agreements. Relations have undergone a radical change after President Barack Obama signed the nuclear agreement with Iran in 2015 and lifted sanctions on Tehran in 2016. Suddenly, Iran made more money, and increased funding for its militias. In Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, where this expansion of their regional influence posed a clear threat to Israel and Iran's regional adversaries.

After Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential elections, Israel succeeded in signing the US-brokered Ibrahim Agreement, and a normalization agreement with the UAE and Bahrain, and then other Arab countries joined in. Although the Saudis have

not yet signed a normalization treaty with Tel Aviv, they are very enthusiastic about this anti-Iranian Gulf-Israeli alliance (Vohra, 2021).

Israel harnesses its material and political capabilities, especially its human resources, to build its views in its ongoing struggle with the Arabs and to impose its strategy on the Arab environment. As the storming of the Arab community through social media was one of the most important goals that Israel sought for decades, as Israel aims to form public opinion through its narrative and impose its vision to accept its political and military behaviour on the ground, Israel is implementing plans to get closer to the Arab public and impose itself among its segments through an extensive and intertwined propaganda system that carries with it various methods, tools and forms to direct public opinion in the direction of its policies and concepts. Rather, it carries different bases for influencing the identity of the Arab public (Ahmed, 2021)

Israel used soft power, digital normalization, to attract the Arab public. Pay attention to professionals from Editors, reporters, translators, graphic designers, The Israeli pages, and accounts in the Arabic language achieve great interaction from the masses. Israel's main goals are to erase the stereotyped image of occupation from the Arab mind and the emergence of the democratic state. The previous Israeli pages and accounts are witnessing a great interaction at the level of follow-up, or comments and posts. Even the methods of responding to negative comments have an agreed strategy. Israeli digital diplomacy is working on influencing Arab awareness by using innovative and carefully studied methods, on the other hand, there is weakness or absence of counter strategies from the confrontation countries In the Arab-Israeli conflict (sabour, 2021).

5.1.2. Hypothesis of the Study

H0: Israel affected the Arab audience through its usage of social media after the Abraham Accords.

H1: Israel didn't affect the Arab audience through its usage of social media after the Abraham Accords.

5.1.3. Research Question

This study will analyse the political changes that Israel followed on social media platforms after the Abraham Accords to influence the Arab public by answering these questions.

Main question: How Israel used social media after the signing of Abraham Accords to affect the Arab audience?

Sub questions: what is the media mechanism Israel used after signing Abraham Accords to affect the Arab audience?

Why Israel used that mechanism?

What are the media tools Israel focused after signing the Abraham Accords to affect the Arab audience?

What are the implications of this media mechanism on the Arab audience?

5.1.4. Importance of the Study

After the signing of the Abraham Accords 2020, an intensification of the Israeli presence on social media platforms was observed in a targeted and deliberate manner to attract the Arab public. Israeli pages in Arabic have become a major factor in Israeli politics. Every Arab country has a page that takes care of its affairs and shares content. Publications between political issues, culture, art, health, education and deals with countries with which normalization agreements have been concluded in 2020, and sometimes even touching on religion., Israel also conducts normalization campaigns of another kind using young content makers to polish Israel's image in exchange for money and fame. On social media. This is what prompted the researcher to use research tools to find out about these changes in Israeli policy and the extent of their ability to make an impact on the Arab public.

5.1.5. Objectives of the Study

This study aims to analyse the tools that Israel used to change its policy on social media after the signing of the Ibrahim Agreements 2020 in line with its stated goals, which it explicitly demonstrated through its publications, which is to attract Arab youth. The impact of these changes on the identity of Arab youth or their political and cultural

concepts and measuring the extent of the Arab youth's interaction with the Israeli attempts at populist normalization.

5.1.6. Limitations of the Study

After the signing of the Abraham Accords, the equation changed in terms of the Israeli presence on social media platforms and clearly targeting Arabs, specifically from August 2020. The study focused on the changing of Israeli policies on social media after the Abraham Accords to influence the Arab public from the perspective of media professionals over the period from August 2020 to the last of 2021 to measure the changes and effects during this period.

5.1.7. Concepts in the Study

The study in its construction relied on several terms that led the researcher to research and analysis to reach accurate and integrated models, including Abraham Accords - digital diplomacy – social media platforms.

5.1.7.1. Abraham Accords

It is a set of peace agreements concluded between Israel and Arab countries under American auspices. The name was used for the first time in a joint statement by Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States on August 13, 2020, and then became the term that refers to the peace agreements signed between Israel and the Emirates and between Israel and the two seas. The agreements were attributed to Abraham, who was nicknamed the “Bab of the Prophets,” a messenger in both the Jewish and Islamic religions (Singer, 2021).

5.1.7.2. Digital Diplomacy

One of the new forms that came as a result of the development of communication and information technology, and it is complementary to traditional diplomacy. It depends on the use of digital technology and social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and other platforms. Countries communicate with the masses in an inexpensive way.

A modern communication process aimed at creating an environmental Empowerment of foreign policy. Perhaps the influence or imposition of strategies by a country on a particular audience. It is the process of taking advantage of the massive flow of information to improve policy development (Bouashiba, 2019).

5.1.7.3. Social Media Platforms

It is a set of interactive internet application that facility creation curation and sharing of content from any place. the prevalence of social media affects and is affected by numerous realms of personal and public life including identity, interpersonal relationships and political economy and other sectors. Social media represents a great leap for unlimited communication. It is a set of applications that build on ideological foundations and allow the creation and exchange of content. It is a trend used by several countries to impose certain ideologies or impose policies that serve their interests (L.Davis, 2016).

5.1.8. Methodological Framework and Data Collection Techniques

In this study the researcher relied on the use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches for analysis and link the opinions of the sample perspective of journalists and mediapersons used with the analyses of specialists in order to reach a clear result and to explain the subject of the study in an integrated manner to analyses the changing of the Israeli polices on social media after the Abraham Accords to affect the Arab audience Israel used to influence Arab youth after the Abraham Accords and whether Israel succeeded in reaching the goal or not.

5.1.9. Validity

Validity in scientific research refers to ensuring the validity of the measurement tool to see that it measures the purpose for which it was designed, as it enables the researcher to determine whether the differences between the respondents are due to the characteristics between them or to independent variables. The fact that validity in scientific research relates to the tool's findings and the researcher's interpretation of them rather than the tool itself is one of its characteristics. This is so that this tool,

which considers honesty as both a tool of relative ability, as well as the characteristic of honesty, can be linked to a variety of indicators of validity, based on the multiple goals for its use and the types of choices that can be made.

One qualitative attribute of the questionnaire exam is validity. For the sake of clarity and presentation of a coherent research questionnaire, a total review covering all research structures was carried out thoroughly by academic reviewers, and the questionnaire was submitted to a number of professors and reviewers at the Department of Political Science at Ibn Haldun University, Istanbul, to verify the validity of its questions and get an expert opinion. This involved rephrasing some sentences and making the necessary adjustments. The questionnaire was then presented to Prof. Hakki Öcal, the advisor of the study, and it was approved after his observation.

5.1.10. Reliability

The reliability of the questionnaire tested (test-re-test) is here the study scale was applied to pilot study from outside of the study sample from the journalists, with a time difference between the two times of (14) days and the calculation of the Pearson correlation coefficient, where it was found that the value of the reliability coefficient of the repetition reliability was of (0.900), and the value of this stability coefficient is acceptable for the purposes of the current study.

5.2. Quantitative and Qualitative Methods

5.2.1. Quantitative Method

a. Questionnaire

This study deals with the assessment of attitudes, opinions, and information. Initially, a survey was conducted on a sample of media professionals through an electronic opinion poll to collect data from media workers to determine the position of this sample on the Israeli changes on social media after the Abraham Accords. Regarding following up and interacting or not interacting with these Israeli policies and

examining the Israeli mechanisms used to attract Arab youth and analysing the most prevalent content to reach the goal, this survey includes careful design and implementation of each component of the research process. The researcher designed a survey tool that was applied to the research sample. The purpose of the survey tool was to collect data about attitudes and opinions about the changes that occurred in the Israeli interaction with social media after the Abraham Accords and their impact on the Arab youth sector to understand the mechanisms used to attract them and whether Israel has actually succeeded in reaching larger segments of societies Arabic. The researcher chose the study sample from the media (102).

b. Data Analysis Techniques

The aim of this study is to answer the questions of the study and the hypotheses that were formulated to examine the changes in Israel's policies on social networking sites after the signing of the Abraham Accords and their impact on attracting Arab youth, to reach the most important mechanisms that Israel used to be able to attract Arab youth, and to examine the most prevalent content to gain the interaction of the Arab public.

Towards this end, the following statistical methods and tests were used in data analysis:

1. The percentages describing the responses of the study sample.
2. Descriptive statistical methods: to clarify the respondents' response to the study.

5.2.2. Qualitative Method: Intensive Interviews

The second part of the study methodology includes the interviews conducted by the researcher with specialists to reach accurate results by analysing the subject from all aspects. The researcher conducted four interviews after specifying the exact questions related to the research topic

The first interview was conducted with the Palestinian journalist Abdel Qader Mohamed (freelance working) which was held in December 2021 via the Internet

(WhatsApp application). The interview dealt with several axes, most notably about Israeli pages in Arabic. The researcher asked the following question: Was it a preliminary Israeli plan for normalization? The researcher also asked other questions related to the mechanisms that Israel used to intensify its content on social media platforms. How did the Abraham Accords affect the Arab social and political scene? Are there clear differences between Israeli-Egyptian normalization and the Israeli Jordanian and the Abraham Accords? Has Israel succeeded in attracting the Arab youth or forming an Arab army to support it on social media?

The second online interview was with Saeed Bisharat who is a researcher specializing in Israeli affairs and director of the Al-Hodhud Centre for Israeli Studies, who the researcher contacted through e-mail on March 11, 2022. The researcher raised questions regarding the Israeli authorities' responsibility for the content of Arab-Israeli accounts on social media platforms and whether Israel actually changed its policy on social media after the Abraham Accords and the hidden goals behind the use of digital diplomacy to spread its goals. The question was raised whether Israel succeeded in this scheme or not. The researcher also touched upon the goals that Israel seeks behind the promotion of the Abraham Accords through social media on all its platforms and in all countries of the world.

The third interview was held with Hossam Alghamry (face-to-face interview) who is a journalist and screenwriter, at El-Shark TV channel in Turkey, which was held in April 2022. The researcher raised questions about the form of the mechanisms that Israel used to influence the Arab youth, the relationship of the economic situation and the environment in which young people supported with Israel grew up, its relationship to their approach, the evaluation of the Israeli steps after the Abraham Accords and its attempt to attract the ranks of the Arab youth and the reasons for Tel Aviv's insertion into the Arab community.

The fourth interview was a face-to-face interview with the Palestinian journalist Areej Hakroosh who was working at I24 TV news channel held in October 2022. The interviewee talked about the mechanisms of the Israeli political change on social media platforms to attract Arabs, and touched on the Israeli media behaviour in the Arab youth mobilization for television channels, and referred to the method of

propaganda repetition that Israel relies on to consolidate its strategy and try to spread the terms of coexistence and tolerance, and that it is a country of religions to receive positive interactions from the youth. She also indicated that Israel seeks, through its Arabic pages, to obtain interaction regardless of what this interaction is.

CHAPTER VI

RESULTS

6.1. Demographic Characteristics

Table 6.1. Demographic Characteristics for the Gender

Gender		Frequency	Percentage
Male		72	70.6
Female		30	29.4
Total		102	100.0

Table (6.1) showed that the participants were from both genders, the males were (70.6%) from the participants and the females were (29.4%) from them, this indicates that the journalists' males concern with the political affairs more than females related to the changing Israeli policies on social media after the Abraham Accords to affect the Arab audience and figure (6.1) show that.




Figure 6.1. Gender of Participants

Table 6.2. Demographic Characteristics for the Age

Age	Frequency	Percentage
19 - 22	1	1.0
23 - 29	15	14.7
30 - 39	45	44.1
40- 49	31	30.4
50 and above	10	9.8
Total	102	100.0

Table (6.2) showed that the ages of journalist's participants were from 19 to above than 50 years; 1% from the participants age were from 19 – 22 years, 14.7% from the participants were from 23 – 29 years and 44.1% from them were between 30 – 39 years. The category of 40 – 49 years is represented by 30.4%, and finally the age category of 50 and above were 9.8%. This indicates that the most of the journalist participants belonged to the “most aware” group about the processing that Israeli will do to affect the Arab audience, as seen in figure 6.2.




Figure 6.2. Age of Participants

Table 6.3. Demographic Characteristics for the Position at the Media

Position at the media	Frequency	Percentage
TV or radio presenter	26	25.5
News editor	7	6.9
program editor	13	12.7
Journalist	19	18.6
Reporter	3	2.9
Director	7	6.9
Writer (Tv-newspaper)	3	2.9
digital media specialist	9	8.8
Author (media)	8	7.8
Press representative	1	1.0
Media researcher	6	5.9
Total	102	100.0

Table 6.3 showed that the positions at the media for the participants were varied, (25.5%) from them were as a TV or radio presenters, the News editors were (6.9%) from sample of the study and the program editors were (12.7) from them.

The Journalists were (18.6) from the participants, the reporters were (2.9%) and the directors were (6.9%) from them, while the writers were (2.9%) from the distribution of the study sample.

On the other hand, the participants in the digital media specialist section were (8.8%) from the distribution, the Authors were (7.8%), (1%) were from the press representatives and the media researchers were (5.9%) from the participants, that leading to most of the participants in many positions were concerns with the changing Israeli policies on social media after the Abraham Accords to affect the Arab audience as shown in figure (6.3) below.




Figure 6.3. Position at the Media

Table 6.4. Demographic Characteristics for the Participants Work Experience

Work experience	Frequency	Percentage
Less than 5 years	17	16.7
6 – 10 years	35	34.3
11 -15 years	23	22.5
Above than 15 years	27	26.5
Total	102	100.0

Table 6.4 showed that the work experiences for the participants were varied. 16.7% were from less than 5 years, 34.3 from the participants have 6-10 years' experience, 22.5% from the have a 11 – 15 years' experience in the work and 26.5% from the participants have a work experience above than 15 years as shown in figure 6.4.

This indicates that the most of the participants have a good experience in their work, and this experience is completely sufficient to understand the actions taken by Israel policies on social media after the Abraham Accords to affect the Arab audience and figure 6.4 shows that.




Figure 6.4. Work Experience

Table 6.5. Demographic Characteristics for the Language of the Institution

Language of Institution	Frequency	Percentage
Arabic	72	70.6
English	18	17.6
Turkish	12	11.8
Total	102	100.0

The result in table (6.5) showed that the most of participants working in the institutions using Arabic language were (70.6%), (17.6%) from them working in the institutions using English language and less participants were from the institutions using Turkish language with percent of (11.8%) as shown in figure (6.5) below.

That explains that most participants were from the Arabic institutions, which they are of Arab nationalities and they are interested in the Palestinian cause, and they are fully aware of what Israel aim politicly on social media after the Abraham Accords to affect the Arab audience.




Figure 6.5. Language of the Institution

Table 6.6. Demographic Characteristics for the Type of the Media Institutions

Type of the media institutions	Frequency	Percentage	
Arab region	80	78.4	
Non-Arab region	22	21.6	
Total	102	100.0	

Following the results as above, the type of the media institutions was from Arab region with percent of (78.4%) and for Non-Arab region with percent of (21.6%), and figure (6.6) show that.

Inevitably, the participating Arab region institutions will take care of the issues that concern Palestine and the intentions that the State of Israel hides through social networking sites and their activation.




Figure 6.6. Type of the Media Institution

Table 6.7. Demographic Characteristics for the Nationality for the Journalists

Journalists Nationality	Frequency	Percentage
American	3	2.9
British	1	1.0
Egyptian	77	75.5
Iraqi	1	1.0
Moroccan	1	1.0
Pakistan	1	1.0
Palestinian	2	2.0
Sudanese	2	2.0
Syrian	3	2.9
Turkish	11	10.8
Total	102	100.0

The results showed that most of participants of the journalists were from Egyptian nationality with percent of (75.5%) and then the participants distribution with many percentages as equal for (American, British, Iraqi, Moroccan, Pakistani, Palestinian, Sudanese, Syrian, and Turkish), which leading to show that the most participants from Arabic Nationality, and they are concern directly with subject of the study related to

changing Israeli policies on social media after the Abraham Accords to affect the Arab audience perspective of journalists and Mediapersons and figure (6.7) show that.




Figure 6.7. Nationality for the Journalists

Results:

The study used frequency and percentages to show changing Israeli policies on social media after Abraham Accords to affect the Arab audience.

Table 6.8. Did Israel Strengthen Its Media Sector After Signing the Abraham Accords

Did Israel strengthen its media sector after signing the Abraham Accords	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	70	68.6
No	14	13.7
Not More	18	17.6
Total	102	100.0

As evident from Table 6.8 above, 68.6% of the participants felt that Israel strengthened its media sector after signing the Abraham Accords and some of participants showed that Israel did not strengthen its media sector after signing the

Abraham Accords with percent of 13.7% where 17.6% of them expressed that that Israel did not strengthen its media sector after signing the Abraham Accords, as shown in following figure 6.8. This indicates the level of caution and censorship carried out by journalists towards many of the issues that are published on Israeli social media.




Figure 6.8. Did Israel Strengthen Its Media Sector After Signing the Abraham Accords

Table 6.9. Did Israel Try to Attract Arab Youth After Signing the Abraham Agreement to Expand the Circle of Normalization?

Did Israel try to attract Arab youth after signing the Abraham agreement to expand the circle of normalization?	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	80	78.4
No	6	5.9
Sometimes	16	15.7
Total	102	100.0

78.4% journalists confirmed that Israel tried to attract Arab youth after signing the Abraham Accords to expand the circle of normalization and 5.9% journalists said that Israel did not try to attract Arab youth after signing the Abraham Accords to expand the circle of normalization, where 15.7% of the participants said that Israel sometime

try to attract Arab youth after signing the Abraham agreement to expand the circle of normalization and figure 6.9 shows that.

Here, the journalists hint at the seriousness of the Abraham Agreement, which is trying to turn the Arab youth to its side, as this topic has many changes that may occur on the youth and their beliefs, their pillars, and their attitudes toward Israel.




Figure 6.9. Did Israel Try to Attract Arab Youth After Signing the Abraham Agreement to Expand the Circle of Normalization?

Table 6.10. Has Israel Changed Its Social Media Policy After Signing the Abraham Accords 2020?

Has Israel changed its social media policy after signing the Abraham Accords 2020?	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	59	57.8
No	18	17.6
I don't know	25	24.5
Total	102	100.0

On the same subject, the journalists showed that Israel changed its social media policy after signing the Abraham Accords 2020 57.8%, and 17.6% from the participants denied that, and (24.5% didn't know about this subject and the following figure illustrated that.

This may be the result of the Israeli attempts to improve the mental image of the Arab public about the State of Israel and its nature, trying to direct the Arab public to its interests and in its favour. And here journalists follow it closely, and they know what it is. behind these changes.




Figure 6.10. Has Israel Changed Its Social Media Policy After Signing the Abraham Accords 2020?

Table 6.11. In Your Opinion, Has Israel's Interest Emerged After the Signing of the Abraham Agreement in Arabic Content and Arab Culture?

In your opinion, Has Israel's interest emerged after the signing of the Abraham agreement in Arabic content and Arab culture ?	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	81	79.4
No	21	20.6
Total	102	100.0

The results showed that most of journalists said that Has Israel's interest emerged after the signing of the Abraham agreement in Arabic content and Arab culture and they are (79.4% from the participants, while (20.6% from them said that Israel not interested with that, and figure (6.11) shows that.

This may be due to Israel's desire to get acquainted with Arab culture, as Israel may be working to broadcast some messages that invade Arab culture indirectly.




Figure 6.11. Has Israel's Interest Emerged After the Signing of the Abraham Agreement in Arabic Content and Arab Culture?

Table 6.12. What Tools Did Israel Use on Social Media Platforms After Signing the Abraham Agreement to Influence Arab Youth?

What tools did Israel use on social media platforms after signing the Abraham agreement to influence Arab youth?	Frequency	Percentage
Digital diplomacy	14	13.7
Share common content	6	5.9
Israel pages in Arabic	45	44.1
Attract Arab Youth to work in the content industry	12	11.8
other	10	9.8
All of the above	15	14.7
Total	102	100.0

From table 6.12 the journalists confirmed that Israel was using many tools on social media platforms after signing the Abraham Accords to influence Arab youth, represented with digital diplomacy 13.7%. 5.9% of the respondents saw that sharing common content was the tool that Israel used on social media, while 44.1% was believed that it was by Israel pages in Arabic.

The attract Arab youth to work in the content industry tool using with percent of 11.8% and the other tools was of 9.8%, and the participants said that Israel uses all tools with percent of 14.7% and figure 6.12 shows that.




Figure 6.12. The Tools That Israel Used on Social Media Platforms After Signing the Abraham Agreement to Influence Arab Youth?

Table 6.13. Do You Think That Israel Has Intensified Its Presence on Social Media Networks Targeting the Arab Users Through Its Pages After Abraham?

Do you think that Israel has intensified its presence on social media networks targeting the Arab users through its pages after Abraham?	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	80	78.4
No	7	6.9
I don't know	15	14.7
Total	102	100.0

The results in table 6.13. showed that the journalist as a participants showed that most of them think that Israel has intensified its presence on social media networks targeting the Arab users through its pages after Abraham and 6.9% from them do not think that, in which that 14.7% from the participants don't know about this subject and figure 6.13 show that.




Figure 6.13. Do You Think That Israel Has Intensified Its Presence on Social Media Networks Targeting the Arab Users Through Its Pages After Abraham?

Table 6.14. What Is the Most Content Offered on Israeli Social Media Platforms Directed at Arabs?

What is the most content offered on Israeli social media platforms directed at Arabs?	Frequency	Percentage
Political content	24	23.5
Culture content	17	16.7
Social content	36	35.3
Religious content	5	4.9
Economy content	3	2.9
Common issues	17	16.7
Total	102	100.0

From table as above, the results showed that the most content offered on Israeli social media platforms directed at Arabs was social content with percent of 35.3%, then the political content with percent of 23.5% and the culture content was of 16.7%, the religious content was of 4.9% on the social media platforms and the economy content was of 2.9%, and finally the common issues content was of 16.7% on Israeli social media platforms directed at Arabs and figure 6.14 show that.




Figure 6.14. What Is the Most Content Offered on Israeli Social Media Platforms Directed at Arabs?

Table 6.15. Statements

	<i>Statements</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>	<i>Importance Level</i>
1	After Abraham Accords 2020, Israel increased its messages framing of the news and events directed to the Arabs	3.92	0.90	High
2	Many interactions by Arab youth were noticed on the Israeli Arabic pages or platforms belonging to Israel after Abraham Accords	3.25	0.93	Medium

It's clear from Table 6.15 that the mean of statement "After Abraham Accords 2020, Israel increased its messages framing of the news and events directed to the Arabs" was 3.92 out of 5.00 with standard deviation of 0.90 which is a high level.

And the statement "Many interactions by Arab youth was noticed on the Israeli Arabic pages or any platform belong to Israel after Abraham" obtained mean of 3.25 with standard deviation of "0.93 which is of a medium level.

Relative importance, assigned due to:

Class Interval = $\frac{\text{Maximum Class} - \text{Minimum Class}}{\text{Number of Level}}$

Number of Level

$$\text{Class Interval} = \frac{5 - 1}{3} = \frac{4}{3} = 1.33$$

- The Low degree from 1.00- 2.33
- The Medium degree from 2.34 – 3.67
- The High degree from 3.68 – 5.00




Figure 6.15. Level of the Statements

Table 6.16. Do You Think That Israel Has the Ability to Affect Large Segment of Arab Youth Through Social Media Networks?

Do you think that Israel has the ability to affect large segment of Arab youth through social media networks?	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	46	45.1
No	43	42.2
I don't Know	13	12.7
Total	102	100.0

The results showed that the Journalists think with percent of 45.1% that Israel has the ability to affect large segment of Arab youth through social media networks and 42.2% from they didn't think that, and 12.7% from the participants don't know about if Israel has the ability to affect large segment of Arab youth through social media networks or no and figure 6.16 show that.




Figure 6.16. Do You Think That Israel Has the Ability to Affect Large Segment of Arab Youth Through Social Media Networks?

Table 6.17. Why Israel Tends to Use Social Media and Arabic Pages?

Why Israel tends to use social media and Arabic pages?	Frequency	Percentage
To falsify the historical facts	14	13.7
to impose its strategy on the Arabs	11	10.8
to polish its image towards the countries of the world	13	12.7
All of the above	64	62.7
Total	102	100.0

The journalists showed that Israel tends to use social media and Arabic pages to falsify historical facts with percentage of 13.7% from the respondents, to impose its strategy on the Arabs with percent of 10.8% and to polish its image towards the countries of the world with percent of 12.7% and all of the above with percent of 62.7% from the respondents as shown in figure 6.17.




Figure 6.17. Why Israel Tend to Use Social Media and Arabic Pages?

Table 6.18. Did the Abraham Accords Affect the Arab and Regional Scene?

Did the Abraham Accords affect the Arab and regional scene?	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	58	56.9
No	9	8.8
Maybe	25	24.5
Not more	10	9.8
Total	102	100.0

Table 6.18 showed that 56.9% from the Journalists said that the Abraham Accords affect the Arab and regional scene and 8.8% from them said no, while the participants said maybe the Abraham Accords affect the Arab and regional scene with percent of 24.5% and not more with percent of 9.8% from the journalists as shown in figure 6.18 below.




Figure 6.18. Did the Abraham Accords Affect the Arab and Regional Scene?

CHAPTER VII

DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATION

7.1. Discussion

In this section, results from the researcher's survey will be discussed. Results are shown from figures 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6,-and 6.7.

1- Showed that males are more interested in political events than females according to the study .The largest proportion of the answers included in the questionnaire was of those aged between 30-39, connoting the most experienced in following up on the course of politics and the most aware. As for the majors, the percentages were close, and this is evidence that most media majors have an interest in the Israeli issue and the problems of normalization.

As for work experience, this indicates that the most of the participants have a good experience in their work. This experience is completely sufficient to understand the actions taken by Israel policies on social media after the Abraham Accords to affect the Arab audience. Moreover, most of the participants were from Arab institutions, which they are Arab nationals and they are interested in the Palestinian cause, and they are fully aware of what Israel aim politically on social media after the Abraham Accords to affect.

2-Israel strengthen its media sector after signing the Abraham Accords. Figure (6.8 showed that 68.6% from the study symbol agreed that Israel. tended to strengthen and support its media sector in line with the stage of normalization that took place between several Arab countries, which began in August 2020. Through an interview conducted by the researcher (Bisharat S., 2022) added that Israel has supported its media sector more, and perhaps it is remarkable after the signing of the Abraham Accords, because it knows that despite the normalization of governments, the popular environment still considers it an enemy and that the Palestinians constitute a stifling force that stands in

the way of achieving the plans of popular normalization as it wants, so that it is trying through its media sector to open. The opportunity to convince the Arab public that opening new relations with the Arab world will constitute an important path for all parties.

3-Israel tried to attract Arab audience after signing the Abraham Accords to expand the circle of normalization. figure 6. 9 showed that the 78.4% from the study symbol agreed that Israel used everything it could to attract the Arab public after the Abraham Accords, especially after it tended to intensify its presence on all social media platforms to create a more effective influence.

Hossam Al-Ghamry (2022), within the interview, added that Israel has tried to attract Arab youth in various ways, and social media platforms may have been the most effective Israeli way to implement this goal through campaigns launched by it directed at Arab and Islamic countries, especially Arab youth in the Gulf. Of course, Israel relies in its electronic campaigns on a group of Israeli symbols, especially “social media influencers” through their rapprochement attempt with the Arab audience. There are Muslim soldiers in the Israeli army who share videos and leaflets that they live freely and can express their religious rituals freely. Or send congratulatory messages and leaflets to Muslims to congratulate their Islamic holidays and occasions. Israel uses soft power or soft diplomacy to attract the Arab public to its surroundings.

4-Israel changed its social media policy after signing the Abraham Accords 2020, figure (6. 10 showed that 57.8 % from the study symbol agreed that Israel changed social media policy to achieve goals related to popular normalization in order to change the Arab mental towards Israel and to direct the Arab audience towards their interest.

Mohamed Abd-Elkadir (Mohamed Abd-Elkadir, 2021) through the interview confirmed that Israel changed its approach on social media platforms. This was evident in the involvement of Israeli activists' personal lives and their presentation on social media in its various usual angles to highlight that the Israeli is a simple citizen who is jealous of his homeland. But the most prominent change in Israeli policies on social media appears in the use of terms which are different. In the past, Israel was keen to

name the Arabs of the interior or the Arabs of Israel, it used to say “a rotten Arab”. In the last two years, however, it has begun to say the Palestinians or the Arabs of Israel. Even the name of the issue is no longer the Arab-Israeli issue, but rather the Palestinian-Israeli issue.

Saeed Bisharat (Bisharat S., 2022) adds that the issue of changing the orientation on social media is a tool that Israel has exploited well and formed its basis with the countries that signed the normalization agreements. The base was built from personalities who are present and have weight in Israel. They invested in spreading nice talk about Israel, with the aim of eliminating all negative messages through tourism and visiting places where Israeli society gathers and spreading talk about Israel as a state of peace and coexistence of religions and that it is only trying to defend itself and it affirms its quest for peace in the Middle East.

5-Israel interest emerged after the signing of the Abraham Accords in Arabic content and Arab culture. Figure 6. 11 showed that 79.4 % from the study symbol agree with this point, that Israel’s interest emerged after signing the Abraham Accords in Arabic content (Areej Hakroush, 2022) within the interview confirmed that Israel focused on Arab culture by paying attention to Islamic holidays and caring for Arab cuisine in particular. Rather, it attributed to itself Arab and Palestinian dishes and claimed that Arab dishes were famous as Israeli cuisine and compared the Israeli and Arab cuisine. After normalization, Israel opened branches for its Arabic-speaking channels in a number of Arab countries, especially Dubai. Israel exploits the political and social conditions of the Arab countries to show itself that it is the most stable and most developed destination and does not suffer from any conflicts.

6- Israeli pages in Arabic is most important tool that Israel used to influence the Arab audience. Figure (6. 12 showed that 44.1% from the study symbol think that Israel was interested in the Arab pages, but rather relied on them mainly for rapprochement with the Arab public and to change the stereotyped image of Israel in the minds of the Arabs, and to preserve the issue of repetition of publications that enhance the repercussions of peace on peoples before governments.

Mohamed Abd-Elkadir (2021), according to monitor of the Israeli pages, these pages on social networking sites began to be created intensively, especially on Twitter, that

speak Arabic at the beginning of 2013. Some of the pages and accounts were there and were reactivated. According to the change in the writing style, the administrators of these pages were renewed in the same year 2013.

Saeed Bisharat (Bisharat S., 2022) said there are several Israeli pages in Arabic on social networking sites, Twitter platform, that target the Arab Gulf. Several Israeli pages were created on Twitter to serve the normalization project. Most Israeli officials have personal pages with Jewish names who speak fluent Arabic and have contacts with the Gulf countries, that signed the recent normalization agreements 2020. The Rabbi's Alliance page is one of the most important examples of these pages.

7-Israel intensified its presence on social media networks targeting the Arab users through its pages after the Abraham accords. Figure (6.13.) showed that 78.4 % think that Israel intensified its presence on social media networks after Abraham Accords.

Mohamed Abd-Elkadir (2021) believes that Israel created a unit within the Israeli Foreign Ministry that it called the "Mi'raj Hasbarah" or the justification system. This system's first task is to justify any military or intelligence action that Israel takes in the occupied interior, the occupied West Bank, or the besieged Gaza Strip, or what Israel called "behind the enemy lines", meaning the Arab and Islamic countries. After the Second Lebanon War of July 2006, Israel responded with extreme violence to civilians in Lebanon with several heinous massacres, and the solidarity of many Europeans and others with the Lebanese, and Israel was forced to consolidate its justifications by imposing control over social media as a kind of permanence justification.

Areej Hakroush (2022) says that the Nas Daily page is also a well-known on social media platforms. The number of followers of this page has reached more than five million followers, many from Arab countries. It is affiliated with the content creator and video blogger Naseer Yassin. He describes himself as the Palestinian-Israeli. Most of the content makers on this platform shed light on improving the image of Israel and highlighting technological and scientific development along with coexistence, in an attempt to provide content in the Arabic language that attracts Arab thought and

changes the stereotypical image of Israel in the Arab mind towards the success of the popular normalization plan.



Figure 7.1. The Page of the Writer of Promotional Content for Israel
(Naseer Yassin)

8-The most offered content on Israeli social media platforms directed at Arabs is the social content. Figure (6.14. showed that 35.3% from the study symbol think that social content is the most prevalent content on the Arabic Israeli pages. While. 23.5% believe that the political content is the most prevalent, especially after the signing of the Abraham Accords and the publication of everything related to meetings, conferences and deals between Israel and the countries that signed the normalization agreements 2020.

9- Areej Hakroush believes that Israel has increased its messaged framing of the news and events directed to Arab audience (Areej Hakroush, 2022). Through the interview she added that with the increasing intensification of Israeli content on social media, there has been a positive response from a significant proportion of the Arab public, especially after the intensification of creating pages on social media platforms. Israel places the news in a specific framework and by choosing certain angles in its presentation of details by classifying the information and giving meaning through the events and describing the facts in a manner consistent with its goals and strategy. The

framing of its media message appears within the news and publications of the Arab Israel pages through selection and organization and then emphasizing aspects and ignoring others. In its discourse directed to the Arab public, Israel focuses on the principle of selection and prominence in order to give priority to a specific point or angle over another to mobilize public opinion towards it.

Figure 6.15. showed that the level of agreement with this point is high. The largest rate of the sample went towards Israel's deliberate use of media framing in spreading its messages.

Media framing in the Israeli discourse through social media platforms directed to the Arab public aims to form a false awareness by withholding information and changing the course of events or the issue and encouraging ignorance of details to work against the interest of everyone who tries to condemn Israel in an attempt to soften criticism of Israel and create an image that is different from reality. Therefore, the Israeli discourse can frame the reality and fill the awareness of consumers with the content and misunderstanding that contribute to spreading the Israeli strategy in its entirety. The selection came as the most prominent mechanisms and framing tools that the Israeli media relied on, even in its coverage of events (Ghassan Ibrahim Ahmad Harb, 2021).

Erving Goffman described the media framework is a specific construction of expectations that the media uses to make people more aware of social situations at a time. The media framework tries to make a comparison between what people perceive in their daily lives and building and forming the message as the media does. The influence of media frames on the message is not only through deliberately forming the frame, but is achieved by deletion, ignoring and omission, intended and perhaps unintended by the communicator, that is, the framing process affects: the communicator - the text of the message - the audiences of the recipients - the cultural and social framework (Goffman, 1974).

10- The results of the study revealed the reactions of the Arab public towards the Arab Israel pages or on the platforms directed to the Arabs. Where the Israeli pages in the Arabic language received an average level of reactions. through comments on the

posts, both positive and negative, published by these pages, follow-up or even admiration

11-Israel can affect large segment of Arab youth through social media networks. Figure (6.16. showed that 45.1% think that Israel has the ability to affect Arab audience, while 42.2% believe that it did not affect the Arab public.

(Hossam AL-ghamry, 2022) through an interview added that Israel has not succeeded in the way it is promoting in its ability to influence the Arab youth. But a weak segment of the Arab youth is the one that these deceptions involved in and this is due to the environment in which they grew up. Other than that, the youth and the Arab public are steadfast in their principles and are well aware that normalization is incompatible with the solution of the Palestinians' issue.

Also, (Bisharat S., 2022) within interview with Saeed Bisharat (2022), he added that despite all of Israel's attempts to attract the Arab public and use all the enormous human and material capabilities, it has not yet been able to reach its hoped-for goal, nor has it reached the stage of influencing the ideas and convictions of the Arab public, to promote its idea and to impose its strategy. The Arab door in relation to Israel is different because it still views Israel as an enemy. But this does not preclude that Israel is using all mechanisms To win over the Arab youth, Tel Aviv can build an entire army for each of the social media platforms in order to polish the image of Israel and focus on it being a pioneer of peace and coexistence and a state of institutions. Mohamed Abd-Elkadir thinks that Israel aimed to promote the Abraham Accords and create a media frenzy (Mohamed Abd-Elkadir, 2021). It used a few young youths who believe in normalization with Israel to cover the mutual visits between the signatories to the agreements to publish them on social media platforms and to use the faces of young people who support normalization to publish content supportive of Israel. However, the influence on the Arab public in general was very limited, especially after the scandals that followed the agreement, such as money laundering and drug smuggling, and failure in the course of economic relations, as it was unable to mitigate the tension in the Middle East.

12-Israel used social media and Israeli Arabic pages to falsify the historical facts and to impose its strategy on the Arab audience in addition to polish its image towards the countries of the world. Figure (6.17.) showed that 62.7% from the study symbol think that all these reasons are what prompted Israel to use social media platforms and Israel's pages in Arabic to influence and attract the Arab public, and for this goal all material and human capabilities have been established.

Hossam Al-Ghamry (2022) within interview confirmed that, the economic conditions in some Arab societies and the conditions of their inception may lead to the formation of a wrong mental image of Israel. Some fall into the trap of falsifying Israeli facts. It makes some believe that it is a stable and secure country. But the reality says that Israeli society is completely insecure.

Israel is intensifying its presence on social media platforms in a deliberate and not random manner .The heavy presence of Israel did not stop only on social media platforms to win over the Arabs. Instead, Tel Aviv has set up pages to recruit Arab youth and invite them to work in Israel. Like the page of Wanted Workers in Israel - The Egyptians Association in Israel - Citizens and Lovers of Israel, all these factors aim to attract the public by falsifying the facts.

13-Abraham Accords affected the Arab and regional scene. Figure (6.18 showed that 56.9% from the study symbol think that the Abraham Accords It changed the equation in the Arab and regional system.

Mohamed Abd-Elkadir (2021) mentioned that, Before and after the 2020 Abraham Agreement. Voices appeared from countries not neighbouring Israel belonging to groups that benefit from regimes calling for normalization, for example in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and in some areas of Iraq. Therefore, the places where these voices have risen have been where the justification system is invested. As for Jordan, for example, and Egypt,, there was no significant impact...because the Camp David and Wadi Araba agreements could not reach the warm peace, while in Lebanon it is the bloody history and the Lebanese memory of the massacres of Israel there., and that the end justifies the means in every action it has undertaken since its establishment, so the effect was very limited.

7.2. Recommendations

- The necessity of having a strong Arab discourse with the same capacity as the Israeli one so that it can present all the facts without cutting off and not allowing one party only (Israel to influence or polarize the Arab public).
- After the results showed that the level of reactions to the content of the Israeli pages in the Arabic language is average. The Arab public, with all its segments, should not follow the Arab-Israeli pages so as not to cause an increase in the number of followers and then achieve a wider spread of these pages on the various social media platforms.
- Some believe that writing negative comments serves the Palestinian cause. Commenting, regardless of its direction, serves Israel's strategy under the item of Arab interaction with Israeli publications. Therefore, comments on these pages should not be shared.
- It is necessary to activate initiatives on personal pages aimed at correcting the content that is subject to framing or counterfeiting by Israel, whether with regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict or even cultural aspects through all sectors.
- Pay close attention to the new content makers from the Arab youth who are exploited and promoted by Israel and contribute to polishing its image within light content to reach in a flexible way to the Arab follower, as happens with the people Daily page and the Israeli pages in the Arabic language.
- Despite the many campaigns of the anti-normalization boycott of Israel movement, but we need more of these effective organizations and institutions, which in turn will direct generations to the real content and not the fake and to introduce the truth of historical backgrounds
- It is necessary to formulate a strategic vision for digital diplomacy for each Arab country, and it must be placed within the first headings of diplomatic work to present the Arab novel in a good way and keep pace with technology.
- The necessity of benefiting from global experiences in the field of digital diplomacy. Attending international conferences and reviewing research on digital diplomacy work processes, influence methods and presentation mechanisms

- Attention should be paid to qualifying human cadres to deal with the mechanisms of technical work in digital diplomacy by attending specialized courses
- The need to shed light on the danger that lies in the Israeli pages directed at Arabs on social media platforms
- An attempt to learn the Hebrew language and create pages directed to Israel that provide real content with similar possibilities to confront Israeli propaganda methods

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A QUESTIONNAIRE

changing Israeli policies on social media after the Abraham accords to affect the Arab audience :perspective of journalists and media persons

 hadeer.asker@gmail.com (not shared) [Switch accounts](#)



Israeli policies on social media



Position at the media institution

- Tv or radio presenter
- news editor
- programme editor
- journalist
- reporter
- director
- Assistant editor
- writer
- Digital Media Specialist
- Author
- Press representative
- Media researcher

Number of work experience years

- 0-5
- 6-10
- 11-15
- Above 15

Language of the institution

- Arabic
- English
- Turkish
- Other

Types of the media institutions

- Arab region
- None -Arab region

Nationality

Your answer _____

Did the Abraham agreements affect the Arab and regional scene ?

- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Not more

Did Israel strengthen its media sector after signing the Abraham accords?

- Yes
- No
- Not more

Did Israel try to attract Arab youth after signing the Abraham agreement to expand the circle of normalization ?

- Yes
- No
- Sometimes

Has Israel changed its social media policy after signing the Abraham accords 2020?

- Yes
- No
- I dont know

In your opinion ..Has Israel's interest emerged after the signing of the Abraham agreement in Arabic content and Arab culture ?

- Yes
- No

What tools did Israel use on social media platforms after signing the Abraham agreement to influence Arab youth ?

- Digital diplomacy
- Share common content
- Israel pages in arabic
- Attract Arab Youth to work in the content industry
- other
- All of the above

Do you think that Israel has intensified its presence on social media networks targeting the Arab users through its pages after Abraham ?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

What is the most content offered on Israeli social media platforms directed at arabs ?

- Political content
- Culture content
- Social content
- Religious content
- Economy content
- Common issues

After Abraham accords 2020Israel increased its messages framing of the news and events directed to the arabs

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Natural
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Why Israel tend to use social media and Arabic pages ?

- To falsify the historical facts
- to impose its strategy on the arabs
- to polish its image towards the countries of the world
- All of the above

Many interactions by Arab youth was noticed on the Israeli Arabic pages or any platform belong to Israel after Abraham

- Agree
- Natural
- Disagree
- strongly disagree
- Strongly agree

Do you think that Israel has the ability to affect large segment of Arab youth through social media networks ?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

APPENDIX B
INTENSIVE INTERVIEWS TRANSCRIPTS

B.1. Palestinian journalist Abdel -Kadar –Mohammed (freelance)

December 2021 (online through WhatsApp. Answers sent within two days)

1- Question: What about the Israeli pages were created on social media platforms to prepare for normalization?

Answer: According to my monitoring of the Israeli pages, these pages on social networking sites began to be created intensively, especially on Twitter, that speak Arabic at the beginning of 2013. Some of the pages and accounts were there and were reactivated. According to the change in the writing style, the administrators of these pages were renewed in the same year 2013.

If I explained why in 2013 and why the renewal in the content of the pages. I say that Israel adopted a section in the Israeli Foreign Ministry that it called “The Mi’raj Hasbarah or the justification system. This system’s first task is to justify any military or intelligence action that Israel takes in the occupied interior, the occupied West Bank, or the besieged Gaza Strip, or what Israel called "behind the enemy lines", meaning the Arab and Islamic countries.

After the Second Lebanon War “July 2006” and after Israel incurred high military losses, especially the number of deaths, Israel responded with extreme violence to civilians in Lebanon with several heinous massacres, and the solidarity of many Europeans and others with the Lebanese, and Israel was forced to consolidate its justifications by imposing control over social media as a kind of permanence Justification, because if you send an official spokesman every morning and evening to justify any action, you will reduce the value of what he says, so the solution was by influencing the newly born social media at the time.

In 2013, the equation changed for Israel. After Sisi’s coup in Egypt, popular voices condemned the Emirati and Saudi intervention in Egypt, and the Arab street was

divided. This was the opportunity to enter and set up pages run by young Israelis who speak Arabic in several dialects. This group was prepared by several universities. From the Hebrew University of Jerusalem to infiltrate the number of Arab youths on the Emirati-Saudi axis

2- Question: How about the work of this Israeli system?

Answer: system does not deal with modern mechanisms. Inside the 1948 Palestinians, we know these mechanisms because of historically vigorous attempts to integrate us into the multi-national Israeli society, as children and young people in the prime of life are gathered and put in workshops with like-aged Israelis. In these frameworks, the issues are not addressed. The burning topics are for topics of interest to everyone, such as sports, fashion, technology, purchases, consumption, etc. The Arab youth asks, "Then why is my community not assimilated into Israeli society?" Usually, this question is answered by the Arabs of the 48th year after being searched in a humiliating manner at one of the checkpoints by the eyes of the young man who "coexisted with him", but in the case of the non-Palestinian Arab youth, the task of the system is easier. So, the justification system works in this way so that the experience of cold peace with Jordan and Egypt with all other countries of public normalization is not repeated. The cyber-soldiers for this mission are people with regular and public profiles written primarily in Arabic and Hebrew.

One of the most popular of these pages

- 1- Stand with us in Arabic @swuArabic
- 2- @IsraelinArabic Israel in Arabic.com
- 3- The Jews of Iraq (they are based in Turkey and affect the region of Iraq, meaning it includes Kuwait and the neighbours @jewirk
- 4- @israelinthegulf Israel in the Gulf almost 100 thousand followers
- 5- Israel in Dubai @IsraelDubai
- 6- @IsraelinBahrain
- 7- @sharakago partnership
- 8- @Peace_accords

3- Question: Has Israel changed its policy and approach to social media after Abraham Accords?

The major change in orientation was the intrusion of the personal lives of Israeli activists and their presentation on social media in its various usual angles to highlight that the Israeli is not a monster and an occupier, but an ordinary, simple person who is jealous of his homeland like any young man in the world. The most important innovation is in the use of terminology, and this is a very important point. In the past, Israel was keen to call the Arabs of the interior Arabs or the Arabs of Israel, even in insults, “a rotten Arab” and not a Palestinian. The Israeli lexicon is the Arab-Israeli issue, but the Palestinian-Israeli issue. This change in terminology gave the Israeli a reminder to discuss the Arab-Israeli issue with Arab youth under the name Palestinian, separate from the Arab and Islamic issue.

It is worth mentioning here that the internal Israeli media has taken all the Arab regimes as an example to embody any state of injustice or dictatorship, while in these platforms you see activists glorifying these regimes and even celebrating their independence feasts, and Friday became a holy day, so you see activists wishing for a blessed Friday and Shabbat Shalom in one sentence.

4- Question: Regarding the Abraham Accords, why does Israel need to promote the Abraham Accords?

As is approved in the world of marketing, excessive promotion licenses the commodity and the owner of the commodity begins with fierce reactions and is inconsistent with the size of the event, and this is what applies to it "the funeral is hot and the dead mouse".

The system of justification emanating from the Israeli Foreign Ministry wanted to show the Arab and Islamic world that its relationship with the Arab countries is not linked to its relationship with the Palestinians, and this is what Netanyahu tried to promote by saying that for the first time he concluded a peace agreement without any compensation on the Palestinian level, and even Israel went to promote the strength of the relationship between the “developed” countries "economically

Democratic Israeli voices trying to calm this rush towards bloody dictatorial regimes have been suppressed, such as some activists in the “Meretz” party and Peace Now, “Shalom Ashshaf.” We see this objection, for example, today, a year after the Abraham Accords in the issue of gas exploration in the Mediterranean, where it hinders a minister Israeli environment Tamar Zandberg of the Meretz party Implementation of Emirati Israeli cooperative agreements due to environmental pollution that may result from drilling operations. Something that Netanyahu did not follow with his tolerant policies with the Emirates, for example, in the second wave of Corona, he left flights to and from Dubai despite the recommendations of the Ministry of Health to stop Trips The promotion would have attracted investors and created a stir to the extent that the Israeli Foreign Ministry brought in a few print activists, and the visit was covered and published on Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Tik Tok, Telegram, Snapchat and every other available means.

But the surprise came in several forms:

A- The deal to sell the “Bitar Yerushalayim” football club, which is known for its insults to Islam, insults to the Messenger of God, may God’s prayers and peace be upon him, and his hatred of Arabs, a deal that dissipated within a few weeks and it was published that it was hiding opportunistic people who want to launder their money.

B - The visits of the youth of normalization, which did not receive any welcome or emotion in the Israeli street, but rather some harassment by the Arabs of the interior and the filming of clips in the means of communication mocking and cursing the typographers.

C- The only female student who was sent to study nursing at the University of Haifa, and her news broke down, so it became clear that she spends her time with a few Israeli students and is completely isolated from the independent and free university life.

5- Question: How did the Abraham Accords affect the Arab region?

Answer: If we look at the period of promotion before and after the agreement, we will see voices from countries that are not adjacent to Israel and belong to classes that benefit from the regimes calling for normalization, for example in Saudi Arabia and in

some regions of Iraq. Therefore, the places where these voices rose were the exact places in which the justification system is invested.

As for Jordan, for example, and Egypt, where the relationship with Israel has a long history, there was no significant influence. Those who drummed and crowed peace since its inception until today are still doing and have not been able to expand their circle. As for Syria, it is originally divided illogically in my view and scrambled to say the enemy of my enemy is my friend, as for the brake In Lebanon, it is the bloody history and the Lebanese's memory of Israel's massacres there. Beirut is the most aware of Israel's ferocity and bloodiness, and that the end justifies the means in every action it has taken since its establishment (Israel).

As I mentioned, the impact was very limited on the axis of time and disappeared with the scandals that followed the agreement, such as money laundering, drug smuggling, and the failure of the economic relationship that was expected until now.

6- Question: How is normalization different from now? The difference in peace between the case of Egypt and Jordan and the case of the Emirates

Answer: In my opinion, each case of normalization differs from the previous one in terms of causes, results and influencing factors.

On the military front, Israel was forced to make peace with Egypt first to secure a long-term calm from the largest Arab country and to demonstrate its goodwill to the international community.

As for Jordan, the agreement was a goodwill gift for Rabin to go to Oslo and sign the Oslo agreement and transfer the responsibility of the West Bank to the PLO, despite the occupation army not withdrawing from it. With this agreement, Jordan took responsibility for the West Bank. Israel also gained another country that recognizes it. The Jordan agreement was in the interest of both parties, but with Egypt, Israel was under pressure, and the agreement did not take place as it wanted. These perceptions are narrated by Israeli analysts to this day, especially in the books of Mossad and army operations that were allowed to be published.

On the economic level, Israel has not benefited much, as Egypt and Jordan are economically weak countries, except for the issue of Egyptian gas. In fact, Israel suffered economically from the closure of textile factories and their transfer to either Jordan or Egypt due to the low wages of workers and the relative lack of respect for workers' rights in the private sector.

B.2. Saeed Bisharat is a researcher specializing in Israeli affairs and director of the Al-Hodhud Centre for Israeli Studies

In 11 march 2022 through (E-mail ... it takes 2 days to send the answers in points

1- Question: What about the Israeli pages in the Arabic language that were created on social media for normalizing purposes?

Answer: As for the Israeli pages on social networking sites, they are many. Most of them have personal pages with Jewish names who are fluent in Arabic and have contact with the Gulf, which countries have signed normalization agreements. The Rabbis Alliance page is one of the important pages for Israel, There is an army of young people who joined the Israeli project, which was built in the past to serve the normalization project later by promoting about Israel and explaining details that do not exist in the first place. Many Israeli pages were created on Twitter to serve the normalization project. The Twitter platform, in particular, is directed to the Gulf

Also ,Israel has supported its media sector more, and perhaps it is remarkable after the signing of the Abraham Accords, because it knows that despite the normalization of governments, the popular environment still considers it an enemy and that the Palestinians constitute a stifling force that stands in the way of achieving the plans of popular normalization as it wants, so that it is trying through its media sector to open The opportunity to convince the Arab public that opening new relations with the Arab world will constitute an important path for all parties

2- Question: Has Israel succeeded in influencing Arab youth through social media platforms?

Answer: despite all of Israel's attempts to attract the Arab public and use all the enormous human and material capabilities, it has not yet been able to reach its hoped-for goal, nor has it reached the stage of influencing the ideas and convictions of the Arab public. To promote its idea and to impose its strategy. The Arab door in relation to Israel is different because it still views Israel as an enemy. But this does not preclude that Israel is using all mechanisms. To win over the Arab youth, Tel Aviv can build an

entire army for each of the social media platforms to polish the image of Israel and focus on it being a pioneer of peace and coexistence and a state of institutions. Everyone who promotes Israel and polish its image is known to get paid

3- Question: Do you think that Israel's tendency to change on social media platforms to serve the normalization project after the Abraham Accords?

Answer: of course, The issue of changing the orientation on social media is a tool that they have exploited well and formed a basis for with the countries that signed the normalization agreements. The base was built from personalities present there who were invested in spreading sweet talk about Israel, with the aim of eliminating all negative messages through tourism and visiting places where Israeli society gathers and spreading talk about Israel as a country of peace

4- Question: Why did Israel need to promote the Abraham Accords in this way?

Answer: Because Israel knows that the circle that surrounds it considers it an enemy. The situation is getting more difficult, and the Palestinians are forming a suffocating force for it, so it wants to get out of this field. It wants to open the airspace. want to convince the public that it has opened relations with the Arab world. ☺ In my estimation, the Abrahamic agreements will not affect the region in this way because people have become aware. In the end, these agreements are only a service to Israel. An attempt to convince the world that they are acceptable and have support

5- Question: Did you see differences between normalization between Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Israel, and between the 2020 Abraham Accords?

Answer: Normalization with the Emirates is different because Israel's goal in its relationship with the Emirates is relations and money, and this does not prevent the existence of previous relations, but they were not public. But the Camp David and Wadi Araba agreements, their circumstances were different †there was an extended conflict, wars and losses, so Egypt and Jordan had their relationship with Israel considered a cold peace free of any popular acceptance or integration contrary to what happened with the Emirates of the normalization of governments and engagement

Between peoples in different sectors and mutual tourism, so Israel is trying to erase every cold peace in the course of the new normalization relations in order to get rid of the idea of popular rejection of Israel

B.3. Hossam Alghamry journalist and screenwriter at El -shark tv channel in turkey

In April 2022. it was face to face interview ...it takes 2 hours to answer the questions in detail. The interview dealt with wide and important points, and they were used well within the study.

1- Question: How does Israel attract the Arab public, specifically after the Abraham Accords 2020

ANSWER: Israel has tried to attract Arab youth in various ways, and social media platforms may have been the most effective Israeli way to implement this goal through campaigns launched by it directed at Arab and Islamic countries, especially Arab youth in the Gulf. Of course, Israel relies in its electronic campaigns on a group of Israeli symbols, especially Influencers through their attempt to rapprochement with the Arab audience. There are Muslim soldiers in the Israeli army who share videos and leaflets that they live freely and can express their religious rituals freely. Or send congratulatory messages and leaflets to Muslims to congratulate their Islamic holidays and occasions. Israel uses soft power or soft diplomacy to attract the Arab public to its surroundings

2- Question: Has Israel succeeded in influencing the Arab public or changing its convictions?

Answer: The economic conditions in some Arab societies and the conditions of their inception may lead to the formation of a wrong mental image of Israel. Some fall into the trap of falsifying the Israeli facts. It makes some believe that it is a stable and secure country. But the reality says that Israeli society is completely insecure.

Israel is intensifying its presence on social media platforms in a deliberate and not random manner. The heavy presence of Israel did not stop only on social media platforms to win over the Arabs. Instead, Tel Aviv has set up pages to recruit Arab youth and invite them to work in Israel. Like the page of Wanted Workers in Israel - The Egyptians Association in Israel - Citizens and Lovers of Israel. All of these factors aim to attract the public by falsifying the facts

Israel has not succeeded in the way it is promoting in its ability to influence the Arab youth. But a weak segment of the Arab youth is the one that these deceptions involved in and this is due to the environment in which they grew up Other than that, the youth and the Arab public are steadfast in their principles and are well aware that normalization is incompatible with the solution of the Palestinian issue

3- Question: How did Israel change its political orientation on the social media after Abraham to expand the circle of normalization?

Question: Israel changed its policy on social media after the Abraham agreement, and it has important symbols on social media that Tel Aviv uses to export the image of religious coexistence and freely embrace religions and beliefs. Trying to show the image of a multicultural democracy

It also participates in the anniversary of the birth and death of important artistic and cultural symbols by publishing videos and publications to get closer to the Arab audience through social media by all available means.

Israel's plans are far-reaching, but it lifted the curtain on some of the demonstrators by defending the Palestinian cause

B.4. Palestinian journalist Areej Hakroush at (I24 channel

In October 2022 ...face to face interview ...it takes 3 hours to answer question also the interviewee touched on very important points for the study

1- Question: Did Israel use media framing to direct its news and information to the Arab public through its Israeli pages in the Arabic language?

Answer: With the increasing intensification of Israeli content on social media, there has been a positive response from a significant proportion of the Arab public, especially after the intensification of creating pages on social media platforms. Israel places the news in a specific framework and by choosing certain angles in its presentation of details by classifying the information and giving meaning through the events and describing the facts in a manner consistent with its goals and strategy. The framing of its media message appears within the news and publications of the Arab Israel pages through selection and organization And then emphasizing aspects and ignoring others. In its discourse directed to the Arab public, Israel focuses on the principle of selection and prominence to give priority to a specific point or angle over another to mobilize public opinion towards it.

In order for Israel to gain sympathy or response from any party, it focuses on dealing with news and discussing issues from angles that support its strategies or complement its policies. Israeli media content reflects opposite trends in addressing issues. On the one hand, there is a tendency towards embracing force, deterrence, security doctrine, military supremacy, and scepticism of resistance. At the same time there are calls for coexistence, peace, religious and cultural interaction, common issues between language and religion, and for the public to interact and express their opinions to raise their perceptions or even provoke them towards related issues. Even photographing Israeli soldiers in military uniforms offering assistance is also a propaganda tool to abort the stereotypical image of the occupier.

2- Question: How does Israel Attract Arab Audiences Through Its Digital Diplomacy?

Israel focused on Arab culture by paying attention to Islamic holidays and caring for Arab cuisine. Rather, it attributed to itself Arab and Palestinian dishes and claimed that it was the most famous of Israeli cuisine and compared the Israeli and Arab cuisine. After normalization, Israel opened branches for its Arabic-speaking channels in several Arab countries, especially Dubai. Israel exploits the political and social conditions of the Arab countries to show itself that it is the most stable and most developed destination and does not suffer from any conflicts.

Nas Daily page is also a well-known program on social media platforms. The number of followers of this page has reached more than **5 million** followers from all Arab countries. It is affiliated with the content creator and video blogger Naseer Yassin. He describes himself as the Palestinian-Israeli. Most of the content makers on this platform shed light on improving the image of Israel and highlighting the technological and scientific development and coexistence in an attempt to provide content in the Arabic language that attracts Arab thought and changes the stereotypical image of Israel in the Arab mind for the success of the popular normalization plan

3- Question: What are the mechanisms that Israel uses to influence the Arab public?

Answer: Israel focused on Arab culture by paying attention to Islamic holidays and caring for Arab cuisine in particular. Rather, it attributed to itself Arab and Palestinian dishes and claimed that it was the most famous of Israeli cuisine and compared the Israeli and Arab cuisine. After normalization, Israel opened branches for its Arabic-speaking channels in a number of Arab countries, especially Dubai. Israel exploits the political and social conditions of the Arab countries to show itself that it is the most stable and most developed destination and does not suffer from any conflicts.

4- Question: Has Israel changed its policy on social media after signing the Abraham Accords with the aim of attracting Arab youth?

Answer: Israel has changed its policy on social media platforms, and this appears through many Israeli pages in the Arabic language on the social media, for example, the Israeli office located in the Arab world, not only for the Palestinians. Israel often tends to glorify Arab personalities from Arab writers and Palestinian writers. Among the changes Also using the page of Avkhai Adrai, the spokesperson for the Israeli Foreign Ministry, to attract the Arab public. Exploitation of young people who support Israel in polishing its image under the pretext of spreading religious tolerance and pictures and news related to normalization and their presence in Arab countries that they benefited from in the matter of investment and real estate... Israel and those in charge of digital diplomacy also deliberately glorify the economy, scientific research, the security situation and military capabilities to weaken the spirit of struggle among the youth and convince them that peace is the solution.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Personal Information:

Name - Surname: Hadeer ASKER

Education and Training:

2012 BA in Mass Communication, Cairo University, Egypt.

2022 MA in Arts in Radio Television and Cinema, Ibn Haldun University, Turkey

Experiences:

2017- Present

JOBS

Institution: Elsharq Media Broadcast and TV

- News Anchor and Producer

2016-2017

Institution : AlMawsleya TV

- News Presenter and Producer

2013–2016

Institution: Dream TV

- Reporter

2012-2013

- Reporter

FREELANCE

Climax Video Production Company

- Media Production Manager.

MBC Masr – cash or splash competition program

- Editor

Rotana Masrya – ezz elshabab

- Editor

Radio Hurytna

- Radio Presenter

Climax Video Production Company

- Documentary Director