

IBN HALDUN UNIVERSITY
ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATION INSTITUTE
DEPARTMENT OF CIVILIZATION STUDIES

MASTER'S THESIS

REVOLUTION AND HEGEMONY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND
THE STATE IN TUNISIA (2010-2019)




SALİH DOĞAN

NOVEMBER 2019

ONAY SAYFASI

Bu tez tarafımızca okunmuş olup kapsam ve nitelik açısından, Medeniyet Araştırmaları alanında Yüksek Lisans Derecesini alabilmek için yeterli olduğuna karar verilmiştir.

Tez Jürisi Üyeleri:

	KANAATİ	İMZA
(Unvanı Adı ve Soyadı)		
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Önder KÜÇÜKURAL (Tez Danışmanı)	<u>Kabul</u>	<u></u>
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Heba Raouf EZZAT	<u>Kabul</u>	<u></u>
Doç. Dr. Alev ERKİLET	<u>Kabul</u>	<u></u>

Bu tezin İbn Haldun Üniversitesi Medeniyetler İttifakı Enstitüsü tarafından konulan tüm standartlara uygun şekilde yazıldığı teyit edilmiştir.

Tarih

Mühür/İmza

AKADEMİK DÜRÜSTLÜK BEYANI

Bu çalışmada yer alan tüm bilgilerin akademik kurallara ve etik ilkelere uygun olarak toplanıp sunulduğunu, söz konusu kurallar ve ilkelerin zorunlu kıldığı çerçevede, çalışmada özgün olmayan tüm bilgi ve belgelere, alıntılama standartlarına uygun olarak referans verilmiş olduğunu beyan ederim.

Adı Soyadı: SALİH DOĞAN

İmza

A handwritten signature in blue ink, consisting of a long horizontal stroke followed by a circular flourish.

ABSTRACT

REVOLUTION AND HEGEMONY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE IN TUNISIA (2010-2019)

DOĞAN, SALİH

M.A. in Civilization Studies

Thesis Advisor: Dr. Önder Küçükural

November 2019, 96 Pages

The popular uprisings in late 2010 in Tunisia resulted in political and social changes across the country as well as in the region. While the uprisings in other countries ended up with chaos, civil war and military coup, in Tunisia, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's 23 years-long authoritarian rule was removed and through democratic elections the new constitution was adopted by the assembly. In this process, Tunisia was considered as the only successful country in terms of democratic transition in the democratization literature. It is argued that the Tunisian success was because of the existence of a robust civil society. By contending this claim, this thesis explains the post-revolutionary period in Tunisia in the light of Gramsci's civil society theory. Civil society, in Gramscian sense, is considered as sum of ideological, intellectual and cultural apparatuses producing consent for the hegemony of the ruling class of the state. In this context, the thesis argues that in post-Ben Ali period the idea of *tunisianite* which signifies the Tunisian national identity and the Bourguibist modernity acted as the apparatuses preventing the revolutionary break with the past and maintaining hegemony of the ruling class which ruled the country since its independence.

Keywords: Civil Society; Gramsci; Hegemony; Revolution; Tunisia

ÖZ

DEVİRİM VE HEGEMONYA: TUNUSTA SİVİL TOPLUM VE DEVLET (2010-2019)

DOĞAN, SALİH

Medeniyet Araştırmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Önder Küçükural

Kasım 2019, 96 Sayfa

Tunus'ta 2010 sonunda ortaya çıkan halk ayaklanması ülke ve bölge çapında siyasal ve toplumsal sonuçlar doğurmuştur. Ayaklanmalar diğer bölge ülkelerinde kaos, iç savaş ve askeri darbe ile sonuçlanırken, Tunus'ta 23 yıldır ülkeyi otoriter yöntemlerle yöneten Zeynel Abidin Bin Ali devrilmiş ve sonrasında demokratik seçimler gerçekleştirilerek yeni anayasa meclis tarafından kabul edilmiştir. Bu süreçte Tunus, demokratikleşme literatüründeki demokratik geçiş bağlamında tek başarılı ülke olarak görülmüştür. Tunus'un güçlü bir sivil topluma sahip olduğu ve bu sayede başarılı bir demokratikleşme süreci gerçekleştirebildiği değerlendirilmiştir. Bu tez, bu değerlendirmeye karşı çıkararak Tunus'taki devrim sonrası süreci Gramsci'nin sivil toplum teorisiyle açıklamaktadır. Buna göre, sivil toplum devletin bir parçası olarak egemen sınıfın hegemonyası lehine rıza üreten ideolojik, entelektüel ve kültürel aygıtların toplamı olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bu bağlamda tez, Bin Ali sonrası süreçte Tunus ulusal kimliğini ifade eden *tunisianite* düşüncesi ve Burgibacı modernleşme anlayışının devrimsel kopuşu engelleme ve bağımsızlıktan beri ülkeyi yöneten egemen sınıfın hegemonyasını sürdürme işlevi gördüğü savunulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Devrim; Gramsci; Hegemonya; Sivil Toplum; Tunus

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would first like to thank my professors Dr Önder Küçükural, Dr Heba Raouf Ezzat and Assoc. Prof. Dr Alev Erkilet for their invaluable guidance, enlightening comments and feedback. Beyond this study, I have learnt many from them for my academic life as well as personal.

I would also like to present my gratitude to my family for their tolerance and patience even though I could not devote enough time to them in the process of writing this thesis.

Last but not least, I would like to express special thanks to my friends who had always encouraged me throughout the writing process. Without their support, I could not complete this study.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vii
LIST OF TABLES.....	ix
LIST OF FIGURES.....	x
ABBREVIATIONS.....	xi
INTRODUCTION.....	1
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEOROTICAL APPROACH.....	7
CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY.....	18
1.1. History of a Contentious Term: Civil Society.....	18
1.2. Gramscian Civil Society.....	22
1.2.1. Seperation Between the Instances and Levels.....	24
1.2.2. Civil Society and Hegemony.....	25
1.2.3. Civil Society and State.....	27
1.2.4 Organic Crisis.....	30
1.3. Civil Society Against the State as Precondition of Democratization.....	31
CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF TUNISIA.....	36
2.1. Tunisia Under the French Protectorate.....	36
2.2. Independence and Bourguiba Period (1956-1987).....	39
2.3. Ben Ali Period (1987-2011).....	43
2.4. Dynamics of the “Jasmine Revolution”.....	46
2.5. Politics in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia.....	48

CHAPTER 3: THE IDEA OF TUNISIANITE AND THE BOURGUIBIST DISCOURSE ON MODERNITY	63
3.1. From the Revolutionary Demands to Identity Issues.....	63
3.2. Consensus Shifting to a ‘‘Rotten Compromise’’	65
3.3. The Idea of Tunisianite	71
3.4. The Bourguibist Discourse on Modernity.....	75
CONCLUSION	80
LIST OF REFERENCES	88
ÖZGEÇMİŞ	97

LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Table 2.1. Results of the National Constituent Assembly Elections in 2011	50
Table 2.2. Results of the 2014 Legislative Elections	53
Table 2.3. Results of the 2014 Presidential Elections	54
Table 2.4. Results of the 2019 Presidential Elections	60
Table 2.5. Results of the 2019 Legislative Elections	61

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
Figure 1.1. New NGO & Civic Associations Registration, by Year	9
Figure 2.1. Governments and Cabinet Reshuffles in Eight Years	59

ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party
ATTF	The Tunisian Association for Financial Transparency
CNPR	The National Council for the Protection of the Revolution
CPR	Congress for the Republic Party
ISIE	Superior Independent Instance for the Elections
ISIL	The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
LTDH	The Tunisian Human Rights League
MTI	The Islamic Tendency Movement
NCA	The National Constituent Assembly
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
ONAT	The National Bar Association
OTIM	The Tunisian Observatory of the Independence of the Judiciary
PSC	The Personal Status Code
RCD	The Democratic Constitutional Party
UGTT	The Tunisian General Labor Union

INTRODUCTION

With neither previous political experience and affiliation nor much funding, a law professor, Kais Saied, won the runoff election on October 13 and became the new president of Tunisia by distancing much of the old guard and powerful parties. His victory is being perceived as a fresh start to the politics of the country, weighing mostly on his pro-equality and anti-corruption stance which allowed him to gain the support of the youth. The question begs itself, is it a counter-revolution to a counter-revolution? Undoubtedly, this is not a question with an easy answer. Indeed, a debate on what has happened in Tunisia since beginning of the 2011 uprising is taking place to date, in which the argument is over whether what is happening today is a clear break away from the past or a restoration which maintains former structures. With international attention on the country, much literature has emerged analyzing the trajectory of the country after the uprising. This said however, it is not clear whether the existing literature considers Tunisia's own dynamics sufficiently in explaining the developments in a comprehensive way.

The self-immolation of street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, to protest the regime because of socio-economic reasons lighted the fuse of a regionwide uprising wave aiming at overthrowing the dictatorships which remained standing for decades in the Arab world. Tunisia attracted the attention in respect of that it was the birthplace of the uprisings. A greater attention, however, came after the perceived short-term failures of the uprisings in other countries such as Syria, Yemen and Libya and Egypt. With this in consideration, Tunisia was celebrated as the only successful country which was able to achieve a proper transition from the authoritarian regime to democracy.

Behind this celebration was the civil society of the country. To explain the miraculous success of Tunisia, it has been argued that the country was able to succeed in a peaceful, nonviolent and easy transition to democracy by the means of a robust civil society underpinning a set of critical developments such as the alleviation of violence, accruing of free and fair elections, broad political participation and establishment of a

new constitution. Such an approach is based on a liberal viewpoint and democratization theories which regard civil society as counterpart of the state which countervail its power and hence guarantor of freedoms and democratic values.

In this thesis, I will argue that the aforementioned approach to the role of Tunisian civil society in the post-revolutionary process is reductive and insufficient to crystalize the kind of civil society existing in Tunisia, and its subsequent function in the process. As such, if the concept of civil society is reduced to a sum of NGOs and counterpart of the state, it is neglected in another aspect of the concept serving as a part of the state for manufacturing consent in favor of the hegemony of the ruling class. Therefore, this thesis problematizes whether the transitional period in Tunisia should be explained through democratization theories which argue that civil society is a precondition and driving force of the democratization, or whether it should be viewed by the Gramscian civil society theory which considers civil society as hegemony apparatuses of the state. This thesis adopts the latter and analyzes the situation of Tunisian civil society in the post-revolutionary period by means of concepts such as hegemony based on consent, domination based on coercion, passive revolution, restoration of the state and neutralization of dissent which were used in a distinctive framework by Antonio Gramsci in his consideration of civil society. In this context, this thesis will seek answers to the following questions: Has the authoritarian regime in Tunisia completely changed after the revolution? Is what Tunisia has experienced a revolution or a restoration of the state? In the post-revolutionary process, has civil society in Tunisia acted as a guarantor of freedoms and democratic values by countervailing the state power or a cover which obscures continuing sides of resilient authoritarian regime?

Through seeking answers to the questions, continuity and change will be analysed in the post-revolutionary in Tunisia, by taking into consideration the political and historical background of the country on the one hand, in an attempt to deconstruct the specific role civil society played throughout the process. In this regard, given a civil society, as adopted in this thesis in reference to Gramscian conceptualization, manufacturing consent for the hegemony of ruling class as a part of the state, which is composed of a complicated compound of cultural, intellectual and ideological apparatuses for the hegemonic struggle, this thesis aims to clarify that the role of civil society in Tunisia during the democratization process is to obfuscate continuation of

the former power structures in the authoritarian regime (in the meaning of hegemony of the old elites, unequal relations and unfair distribution of power and resources) and even to generate an obstacle to a potential emancipatory struggle through a revolutionary contestation, in despite of a set of developments which seem to correspond to a clear break from the past such as free and fair elections, establishment of a new constitution and the alleviation of violence.

The aim of this thesis is not to argue that the authoritarian regime in Tunisia remained completely same after the revolution, rather to illustrate a framework revealing the continuities in the post-revolutionary process through the examination of return of the idea of the *tunisianite*, which marks the Tunisian national identity and the Bourguibist discourse on modernity. In this context, it is evaluated how these two phenomena acted in the post-revolutionary period as apparatuses creating consent for the hegemony of the ruling class, by referring to increasing terror attacks, return of the police state, continuing social protests and a shift from revolutionary demands to issues concerning identity.

After the revolutionary movement in late 2010 and early 2011, Tunisia has continued to witness increasing massive civil protests, in fact it has been documented that the number of civil protests appeared in 2016 was much more than the number of protests that took place during the revolution. Furthermore, 2018 saw many strikes and civil protests across the streets of Tunisian cities, most of which were based on socio-economic demands and social justice. However, for the most part, security forces resorted to violence to suppress the protests. The situation and function of the police is one of the main challenges to the revolutionary process; in fact, police and security forces have been seemingly insulated from the reform and particularly police unions, which have striven to interfere with the reform process by showing reason of necessity of effective war on terrorism (Walsh, 2019). The Police Protection law in 2017 strengthened securitization discourse and paved the way for police abuse (“In Tunisia’s State of Emergency,” 2017).

Accordingly, police violence, impunity and a heightened sense of insecurity in the country remain as main concerns obstructing the change in the revolutionary process. Given the absence of civilian oversight over security forces and the state of emergency

in force since 2015, exemption of the police from criminal liability is a substantial challenge to freedom of speech and movement, right to assembly and social protest, further may lead to the increase of arbitrary arrests and torture by the security forces. Moreover, with the prevailing trend protecting security forces, any objection to police impunity is potentially considered an act of terrorism and subsequent threat to national security (Grewal, 2018: 3-4).

Nevertheless, when compared to other countries which experienced popular uprisings, to better understand the Tunisian case one needs to go beyond the concrete oppression tools such as police violence and arbitrary detentions aiming to pacify revolutionary attempts. In Egypt, for example, counter-revolution occurred through a military coup in 2013 after two years of the revolution. But in Tunisia, because of proper relation between civil society and the state, counter-revolutionary attempts came into existence by persuasive pacific means rather than coercive, in other words intellectual, ideological and cultural hegemonic apparatuses. In this thesis it is argued that notions of *tunisianite* signifying the Tunisian national identity and Bourguibist modernity are most prominent among these hegemonic apparatuses.

In this regard, the outstanding concepts such as consensus, compromise and national unity have importance to reveal how these apparatuses functioned in the post-revolutionary process. In this process, two converse interpretations on the revolution appeared: first viewing the revolution as a certain rupture from the past, and the second considering it as an episode of violence, demanding for reform of the state. While the latter gained wide currency for the official political discourse, especially after the 2014 elections, concepts such as consensus and national unity acted as a counter-revolutionary attempt aiming to pacify the revolutionary violence and reestablishing the state's prestige (*haybat ad-dawla*), by delegitimizing political dissent and criminalizing civil protests. This was evident in the Carthage agreement in 2016 in which the main political and social actors agreed on the postponement of divisive issues and foregrounding of stability, security and unity (Marzouki & Meddeb, 2016: 123-24).

In this context, the idea of the *tunisianite*, which presents a collective consciousness marking the Tunisian specificity based on moderation and reform, was useful to

prevent the space for political debate and to consolidate the hegemony of the ruling class. As a unifying force bridging the gap between polarized parts of the society, the idea of the *tunisianite* has a patriotic content emphasizing on the Tunisian specificity historically as well as identity. In this sense, Tunisian national identity is inevitably defined by ideas of realism, moderation and repudiation of any kind of extremism (Zemni, 2017: 141). When also considered, the use of *tunisianite* by both Bourguiba and Ben Ali in order to consolidate the resilience of their authoritarian rules and thus delegitimize any objection as well as pacify a likely societal violence against the regime, it is evident that resuscitation of *tunisianite* in the post-revolutionary Tunisia signifies a hegemonic project determining the acceptable in the Tunisian politics in line with former structures (Mullin and Rouabah, 2016: 173).

On the other hand, like the idea of *tunisianite*, the figure of Bourguiba and his idea of modernity signify an era of struggle over power and identity. This is mainly because Bourguibist discourse on modernity presents a specific national imaginary and has the capacity to impose a commonsense idea and dominant values in the meaning of organization of consent of the masses. In that sense, it presents a hegemonic project providing a national sentiment which ignores social positions and class cleavages. The Bourguibist hegemonic discourse on modernity still continues its existence in the post-revolutionary period. It was evident, especially after the 2014 elections, in the victory of the secularist Nidaa Tounes which describes itself as the heirs of Bourguiba. The Islamist Ennahda, which came in second in the elections, decided to join the coalition led by the Nidaa Tounes in the name of consensual democracy and national unity. However, in such political landscape, the Bourguibist hegemonic modernity remained untouched as notions of consensus inevitably echoe Bourguiba's idea of "compromise" and "national pact" of Ben Ali (Zederman, 2016: 188-191).

This thesis is organised as follows. The first chapter discusses the concept of civil society including its historical background, Gramscian civil society and the understanding of civil society in the democratization literature. In the second chapter, the case study of Tunisia is introduced and its political history starting from the modernization attempts in the first half of the 19th century up until today is examined. The next chapter reveals how the idea of *tunisianite* and the Bourguibist modernity have been utilized as hegemonic tools of the ruling elites in the post-revolutionary

period of Tunisia. Finally, the conclusion reiterates the arguments of the thesis and provides a brief analysis of the 2019 elections *visa vis* the relation between revolution and hegemony.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEOROTICAL APPROACH

It is considerably understandable, when considering Middle East “exceptionalism”, which presumes that Middle Eastern societies cannot be democratized because they do not have a civil society due to cultural, sociological and economic structures, that the Arab uprisings sparked in late 2010 in Tunisia has become central point of global attention. Was Middle East exceptionalism falling down? After some time, as the uprisings in Arab countries took a bloody turn and became increasingly less likely to succeed, the question lost its popularity. However, such discussions have potently gone on through Tunisia, which is perceived as the cradle of the Arab uprisings, seen as the only country which came through in uncertain revolutionary process, and thus revealed a new exceptionalism: Tunisian exceptionalism. This new exceptionalism is based on an argument saying that Tunisia managed to achieve a successful transition from authoritarian regime to democracy and so it is in turn due to having a robust civil society.

In the Arab world, Tunisia is uniquely seen in a well position to expand the domain of civil society and suppress despotic actions of the state, because of little ethnic and religious fragmentation (98 percent of the population are Arab Sunni Muslim), no powerful military, relatively well-educated middle class and a “quasi-liberal” strategy of development. Therefore, associational life between the individual and the state has always been very active in Tunisia in comparison to the other Arab countries. The Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) is, for example, one of the first unions in the region, as the Tunisian Human Rights League (LDTH) is also considered the first human rights league formed in the Arab world. However, despite the state apparently encouraging the development of civil society, because non-party associations (unions, interest groups and professional associations) were useful for mobilization, it was remained determined in controlling this realm so as to prevent any possible contestation against state authority. This was evident in the relation between Bourguiba and the UGTT. In so far as the UGTT showed signs of powerful opposition, whose power comes from its contributions to the struggle for independence, Bourguiba

moved to repress it through oppressive laws regulating civil associations and legalistic maneuvers (Bellin, 1995: 124-141).

After the 2011 uprising which toppled the Ben Ali regime, new laws of association increased the radius of action for civic associations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). They are now free from state pressure and oppressive legal obstacles. With the abolishment of frustrating registration requirements, the number of associations and NGOs has increased dramatically, and were encouraged to participate in processes of government's policy and legislation (Deane, 2013: 12). The number of registered NGOs which was 221 in 2010 increased almost tenfold to 2092 in 2011. In the following years new NGOs continued to be formed. They worked on various issues from electoral observation to education, human rights and transparency (Klaas & Dirsus, 2018: 5).

Alongside classical civil organizations such as the UGTT, the LTDH, the National Bar Association (ONAT) and the Tunisian Union for Industry, Commerce and Handicrafts (UTICA), the newly-established organizations have become prominent in the post-2011 uprising process with their contributions to the formation of democratic institutions. Among them, Mourakiboun (Observers) and the Tunisian Association for the Integrity and Democracy of Elections (ATIDE), which contribute to ensure that electoral operations take place thoroughly; I Watch works on ensuring transparency and fighting corruption; al-Bawsala (Barometer) monitors works of the Assembly and provides public oversight over municipal activities; the Tunisian Observatory of the Independence of the Judiciary (OTIM) works on the observation of judicial processes; and the Tunisian Association for Financial Transparency (ATTF) makes an effort to ensure transparency. Aside these organizations there are many more contributing to the democratization process, especially within institutional domains (Kéfi, 2015: 239). Such efforts by these civic associations and NGOs in Tunisia came into prominence and are subject of analyses in the post-revolutionary period.




Figure 1.1. New NGO & Civic Associations Registration, by Year (Klaas & Dirsus, 2018: 15)

Given the trajectory of Tunisian transition from the authoritarian regime after the revolution, it is clearly argued that a range of developments have become effective in strengthening democratization of the country. As Eva Bellin points out, there have been diverse factors which fostered Tunisia's progression toward democracy since the ousting of Ben Ali. The most significant ones of them, for her, are an apolitical and professional stance of the Tunisian army, an elite commitment to democracy, inclusiveness, dialogue and opportune results of the first elections in the country, not allowing a single party to get majority. Besides, Bellin considers the civil society of the country another factor that has bolstered the democratization process. She argues that civil society has played two critical roles in the process; first, it checks the government's activities in an attempt to prevent any anti-democratic or illiberal attempts by playing watchdog; and second, provides an opportunity for dialogue and compromise across the parties from distinct camps when the political landscape in the country bogged down (Bellin, 2013: 2-4).

Jason William Boose argues that democracy in Middle Eastern countries can be achieved only through a presence of an active civil society as a necessity for democratization. In this sense, he asserts, in his work in which he compares post-revolutionary processes in Libya and Tunisia, that while Libya has become

unsuccessful in achieving a democratic transition due to its lack of civil society, Tunisia has succeeded in a proper democratization due to having a robust civil society. For him, as a result, Tunisian civil society which plays a crucial role for a good governance, has been driving force of the democratic transition in the country (Boose, 2012: 310-314).

In a similar way, Isabel Schafer states that Tunisian civil society has clearly been active during all phases of the transition by underlining that it has as far as possible made political pressure as in Casbah 1 and Casbah 2, in addition to presenting available proposals for political and constitutional process within the framework of the National Dialogue. For Schafer, Tunisian civil society has facilitated a successful transition to democracy by organizing peaceful rallies, creating opportunities for political dialogue and preventing the rise of violence (Schafer, 2015: 28-30).

On Tunisian transition, one of the most critical factors is consensus politics, which is mentioned frequently in terms of democratic consolidation. When considered frail conditions in the transitional period and socio-economic challenges, consensus politics was seen as necessary in order to overcome the threats to political acquisitions of the revolution. In this sense, according to Solomon, it is significant, for the well-being of Tunisian transition, that Rashid Ghannouchi preferred to adopt a politically pragmatic way, instead of insisting on remaining in power and forcing an Islamist vision on secular parties of the population. The political preference of the main Islamist party in the country prevented any exclusive attempt to establish a political structure, by facilitating an inclusive democracy based on consensus politics (Solomon, 2014).

For Mansouri and Armillei, there is a close relation between the success of consensus politics and civil society in the country. They argue that in the Tunisian transition period the proactive role of civil society prevented any likely political crisis and chaos that would jeopardize consensus politics, which led to the creation of a new constitution, free and fair elections and compromise between the main political parties of the country. As such, Tunisia was able to, the authors say by referring to the concept “Tunisian exceptionalism”, create a success story in the matter of generating a “consolidated democracy” (Mansouri & Armillei, 2016: 165-71).

Given the most visible divide in Tunisia is between the secularists and religious sections of the society, the relations of these parties to each other is unavoidably determinant for the transitional process. Alfred Stepan says that for a successful democratic transition Tunisia needs to achieve two types of toleration, which he calls “the twin tolerations”. The first one is the toleration of religious citizens towards the state, which requires them to adopt democratic values in public life, not religious claims. The second toleration is that of the state towards religious citizens, which necessitates that officials allow them to express their views and to participate in civil society and politics, so long as to not violate the rights and law of other citizens. For Stepan, Tunisia has potential to generate the twin toleration because of not only events after the revolution but also developments in last decade before the beginning of the uprisings, such as meetings between Islamists and secularists which were about state-society relations (Stepan, 2012: 89-101).

Nevertheless, Islamist extremism is seen as one of the main challenges to the transition, which is accused of assassinating two popular leftist activists Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi. For Zoubir, a possible collapse of democratic transition because of Islamist extremism was prevented by the pressure asserted by Tunisian civil society and trade unions (Zoubir, 2015: 10-14).

Alexander Peter Martin argues, in his work which analyzes agents of change in post-revolutionary Tunisia, that activities of Tunisian civil society were determinant for political and social change in the transitional period. For Martin, Tunisian civil society has played the political watchdog role which can be seen in activities of civil society organizations such as al-Bawsala in monitoring the constitution making process, I-Watch in preventing corruption and strengthening transparency and Mourakiboun (observers) in observing the electoral processes. Besides, civil society organizations have, as Martin says, played a critical role in social change and acted as a school teaching democratic values by referring to activities of groups such as Young Independent Democrats and Sawty (my voice) in encouraging political participation of the citizens and that of M’nemty (my dream) in promoting racial equality (Martin, 2015: 22-24).

Rida Kefi also underlines the vital role Tunisian civil society has played in the transitional process. According to him, civil society organizations have decisively acted as constructors in achieving democratic transition in all domains from the establishment of the constitution and electoral process to infrastructure, health and culture on the one hand, but also to saving the country from civil war caused by political assassinations and terrorist attacks in 2013, on the other. In this sense, he argues that the National Dialogue formed by civil society organizations has vitally brought together irreconcilable parts, i.e. Islamists and secularists, on to the negotiation table. In this process, as Netterstrom put it, vanguard role has been played by the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) which has facilitated both the revolutionary movement and subsequent transition to democracy, despite its absorption by the Ben Ali regime (Kefi, 2015: 1-4).

On the other hand, the tolerance is one of the concepts which are frequently resorted in order to analyze the Tunisian transition to democracy. Shelley Deane states, in the study in which she reviewed the role of Tunisian civil society defined by her “as all voluntary associations that exist below the level of state but above the family”, that through the tolerance culture in Tunisia civil society was able to achieve to bridge the gap between diverse parties of the society around the aim of opposition to the regime by eliminating divisive factors. She also argues that it was a “spirit of solidarity” revealing the social capital which formed the basis of the revolution and subsequent successfully ongoing democratic transition (Deane, 2015: 12-15).

Another aspect of Tunisian civil society is its relations to international organizations and civil society organizations. Jan-Erik Refle says that civil society organizations of Tunisia have very strong links with that of other countries, international organizations and also with United Nations (UN) bodies being interested in especially human rights. For him, the relationship between them is based on financial issues, in other words the foundations abroad and international donors provide Tunisian civil society organizations with funds and logistic support in an attempt to enforce democratic transition in the country (Refle, 2016: 5-18). While Refle brings the issue of independency for Tunisian civil society up for discussion on the one hand, Nadia Cherif argues that some organizations are getting hard to attract funds and financial support based upon project proposals that are able to contribute to the democratization.

However, what is interesting us here is that there is an international attention to Tunisian civil society in order to support the democratic transition in the country (Cherif, 2017: 2-6).

On the other hand, international celebration of Tunisian democratic transition has also appeared through prestigious awards from international circles to Tunisian political actors or civil society organizations. In this context, in 2012 Chatham House Prize was given to Rachid Ghannouchi, leader of Ennahda Movement, and Moncef Marzouki, the former president of the Tunisian League for Human Rights. The emphasis of this award was on their efforts for contribution to compromise and consensus politics underpinning successful democratic transition. Likewise, when Tunisia was ranked “country of the year” by The Economist in 2014 it was pointed out political institutional developments through democratization such as accruing of free and fair elections, broad participation in politics and establishment of new constitution.

In addition, Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet composed of four biggest civil society organizations of the country won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015. According to the announcement made by the Norwegian Nobel Committee the Quartet won the prize “for its decisive contribution to the building of a pluralistic democracy in Tunisia in the wake of the Jasmine Revolution of 2011”. In the announcement considering Tunisia unique and remarkable success story, it has also been emphasized on that “transition in Tunisia shows that civil society institutions and organizations can play a crucial role in the country’s democratization and that such process can lead to free elections and peaceful transfer of power” (“The Nobel Peace Prize 2015,” 2015). Given the international importance of the Nobel Peace Prize, awarding of the Quartet gives a clue about kind of approach by the international circles to the transition in Tunisia and understanding of civil society’s role in the process.

On the other side, there are also more critical approaches, compared to the literature above, analyzing post-revolution transition in Tunisia. These approaches mostly point out the complexity of the transition processes and dynamics on the ground rather than assessments considering Tunisia successful in democratization or arguing the completely return of previous authoritarian regime. Keskes and Martin argue that both assessments of failure and success in democratization of the country is based on

Western-centric hegemonic consideration of democracy and modernity. Accordingly, this binary narrative relies on two distinct understandings of orientalism: classic orientalism that sees the Arab and Islamic societies as inferior to the West and incompatible with democracy and liberal civilizing orientalism asserting ‘essential sameness’ between the West representing temporary apex of democracy and the Middle East societies. Instead, the authors posit the notion of ‘change and continuity’ for a deeper analysis of the Tunisian transition (Keskes & Martin, 2018: 16-20).

They also underline, by giving reference to Skocpol’s theory of social revolution, what Tunisia has experienced in 2011 was not a social revolution as a clear break from the past but a political revolution due to durability of social and economic structures. Therefore, as the authors put it, the process of Tunisian transition includes factors of both change in political institutional areas from and continuity in social and economic structures with structures of authoritarian regime prior to the revolution (Keskes & Martin, 2018: 15).

Given the political and institutional transformations in the post-revolutionary process in Tunisia, it is not sufficient to consider the starting of revolutionary movement and even toppling of the dictator as appearance of a certain change, because it is clear that Tunisian transition has authoritarian continuity alongside of democratic change. As Rivetti put out, it is “‘problematic to look at the uprisings solely relying on ‘change’ as the dominant perspective because we can always detect a certain amount of continuity in the political, social and economic relations of societies having witnessed massive upheavals.” In Tunisian transition, it is explicitly seen there has been two determinant factors representing the change and continuity paradigm, the rupture from institutions of the previous authoritarian regime and the robust resistance of old regime’s elites to a clean break from the past (Rivetti, 2014: 1-3).

When considered developments before the democratically first elections of the country, dismantlement of the critical constituents of the authoritarian regime such as RCD and legally acceptance of Islamist Ennahda movement as a political party have instigated the change on the one hand, the appointment of Beji Kaid Essebsi, who took charge in cabinets of Ben Ali and Bourguiba and thus seen as a symbol figure of the old regime, as head of third interim government has fueled suspicions in breaking from

the old regime. In this sense, Paciello highlights that “the old oligarchy still permeates the state apparatus, occupying key positions” in critical institutions and structures such as “the administration, the Interior Ministry, the media and the judiciary.” Therefore, democratic transition in Tunisia must be, as Paciello put it, analyzed through the question of “whether or not, and to what extent, it will be able and willing to dismantle the previous power structure” (Paciello, 2011: 11-12).

In a similar vein, Marzouki and Meddeb adopt a critical approach to the celebration of Tunisian democratic transition as a success story. The authors argue that “the current fascination with Tunisia’s democratic achievement, echoing the blind celebration of the so-called Tunisian economic miracle during the Ben Ali era, require critical analysis” while criticizing the liberal assumptions (Marzouki & Meddeb, 2015).

On the other hand, Marzouki and Meddeb argue that there emerged two interpretations of the revolution; the one seeing it as a clear break from the past and the other considering the uprisings an episode of violence calling for the reform of the state. For them, the latter, which has saliently gained certain currency in official political discourse especially after 2014, is very determinant for the way of transition. By putting forward some concepts such as *tunisianite*, consensus and compromise, they determine that “2011 uprisings gave birth to a ‘conservative revolution’ and to a democracy that is partly governed by forces of restoration.” Moreover, Tunisian transition includes elements struggling to maintain the old power relations and also, as the authors indicate, inclinations delegitimizing any political opposition and criminalizing social protests, which disenable the idea of dissent, contestation and pluralism underpinning democracy (Marzouki & Meddeb, 2016: 123-25).

Besides, consensus and compromise politics, even if used in order to celebrate democratic transition of the country, is not clear whether it led to a new political landscape based on transparency, pluralism and political participation. In this regard, Boubekeur determines that the transition period in Tunisia appears as a bargained competition type of “pacted transition.” According to this analysis, consensus between Islamists of Ennahda and secularists in Nidaa Tounes containing remnants of the former regime forms a framework in which the two sides consolidate their political positions as a hegemonic power. Accordingly, as Boubekeur noted, bargained

competition between the parts have precisely put an end to the former authoritarian regime based upon single-party hegemony, “but it has retained a system of dominance and blocked access to politics for many actors outside the politically relevant elite circles, which controls the resources of power and influences in shaping political orders, rather than institutionalizing transparency and effective oversight of the country’s institutions.” (Boubekeur, 2015: 4-18).

As seen in the literature given above on the transition period in Tunisia, although the existence of some critical approaches, its remarkable part consists of evaluations which view the transition in Tunisia as successful in the way of democratization. These evaluations are obviously based on Western-centric notions of democratization and modernization. Being compatible with these notions, the remarkable part of existing literature argues that Tunisia is the only success story of democratization in the region because of its robust and proactive civil society.

According to the literature in question, civil society predominantly represents a realm apart from the state, against its oppressions and countervail its power, and thus forms precondition of democratization by underpinning democratic values such as freedoms, equality and civic engagement. The literature undoubtedly explains a range of developments in Tunisian transition to a certain extent. However, these developments consist of only political institutional changes such as accruing of free and fair elections, establishing of a new constitution and consensus between different parties which is used in order to point out a rapture from the past and clear change after the revolution. Accordingly, this approach considering Tunisia the only successful country in democratic transition fails to satisfy in elucidating the resilient parts of social, economic and political power structures of the old regime which remain after the revolution.

In this thesis, for a more comprehensive and deeper grasp, the transition period in post-revolution Tunisia and the role of civil society within the process will be analyzed through the concepts of hegemony, domination, passive revolution, organic crisis, restoration of the state and neutralization of dissent building Gramsci’s distinctive conception of civil society. By doing so, hegemonic struggle of the ruling class in the transition process after the revolution will be revealed, which is based on cultural,

intellectual and ideological apparatuses whose structures are significantly complicated and camouflaged. For this, the idea of *tunisianite* and the Bourguibist discourse on modernity will be analyzed in order to show how they have acted as hegemonic apparatuses of the ruling elites in the post-revolutionary period in Tunisia.

CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY

This chapter will focus on the historical evolution of the term civil society within the context of how the term has been understood by various theorists under different historical conditions. Firstly, from Aristotle to the enlightenment thinkers pre-modern era will be examined. In this era, there is no separation between civil society and the state. Later on, approaches of Hegel, Marx and de Tocqueville to civil society, which consider it separate from the state, will be evaluated. Subsequently, Gramscian civil society will be analyzed in terms of its relevant concepts such as structure, superstructure, integral state, hegemony based on consent, domination based on coercion and organic crisis. Finally, civil society in democratic transition will be examined, where it is viewed as a precondition and driving force of democratization and also as the counterpart of the state since reinvention of the concept after the 1980s and the end of the Cold War.

1.1. History of a Contentious Term: Civil Society

The concept of civil society is considerably a contentious term. It can be traced back to the Greek word *koinonia politikè* used by Aristotle, which means political community. He describes it as the existence of social domains in which people from different status meet. Aristotle's *koinonia politikè* mainly refers to a sphere, in accordance with the polis and its citizenship, in which men (rarely women) are able to achieve their full moral status which means the aim of life (Anjum, 2010: 148). He does not discern the society distinct from the state, and thus his political community represents a homogenous, integrated, organized and single structure (Cengiz et al. 2005, 223). According to his definition, civil society means a community governed by laws which are formed independently from individual interests and aims to achieve common good (Karadağ, 2003:48; Özer, 2008:87).

In parallel with the Greek use of the term, Cicero in the Roman Republic defines civil society as an assemblage associated by a common acknowledgment of right and by a

community of interests, which includes groups, institutions and individuals who organize their activities in such a way as to create a balance among them. In other words, it refers to a civilized political community. Although *koinonia politikè* is, for some scholars (like Dominique Colas and Govert J. Buijs), very different from current use of the term civil society, it was used as *societas civilis* during the Renaissance, and translated in English as civil society (Anjum, 149).

In the 16th and 17th centuries with the unitary states replacing the feudal units in Europe, even though the term civil society has undergone a change in comparison to that in Ancient Greek, it has kept on being understood as a domain which is synonymous with state or political community. In this context, the concepts of ‘state of nature’ and ‘social contract’ are crucial to clarify how the concept was evaluated by thinkers of that time. It was Thomas Hobbes who defined civil society as a domain in which there is the state but not the state of nature. For Hobbes, there was no distinction between the state and civil society. Since civil society’s binding cement was the anxiety of anarchy (Ehrenberg, 1999: 72-75). John Lock also saw civil society as an alternative to the state of nature (anarchy). For him, civil society is a legal political order and a remedy for the individual vulnerability to external violence. He equates civil society with the state (Ehrenberg, 1999: 85-86). In the Hobbesian and Lockean conception, as a result, civil society refers to a society governed by rules based on the equal protection of law and a sphere in which all members of society were subject to the law, in other words, a social contract which was derived from the agreement among individuals of the society (Kaldor, 2003: 584).

In the late 18th century (the Enlightenment era), the term civil society, with the advent of centralized state forms and new mercantilist and industrial societies, started to have a favourable meaning. What civil society correspond, at that time, was a society containing within itself peace, freedom, tolerance, and thus, no repression by an authoritarian and absolutist state. In this sense, Montesquieu saw civil society as a site in which the absolute power of the monarch is opened up for discussion. Similarly, Kant defined civil society as a domain restraining the absolute power of ruler, which is beyond the political order and outside the authority of the state. Therefore, at that time with the emergence of highly centralized and bureaucratic modern forms of state, the concept of civil society was understood as a critique against absolutism or

monarchy. When considered with socio-economic conditions of 18th and 19th century in Europe, one of the main concerns was the antagonistic structure of relationship between individual's interests and public good. For the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers Ferguson and Smith, the remedy of this dichotomy could be found in the civil society, but it was differently explained by other theorists (Anjum, 150).

Adam Ferguson, who intensely highlighted the idea of progress of civilization, conceived of civil society as an autonomous sphere, a self-regulatory and self-governing society in opposition to the state. For him, "the history of civil society is a history of progress in political, military and legal institutions, social structure, arts, sciences, manners, population, literature, production, consumption, wealth, and liberty." (Hill, 2010: 1). In other respects, another Enlightenment thinker Adam Smith saw civil society as a realm in which economic relations and social processes occur. According to him, in addition, civil society means a civilized society, which has its own rules, and also is a self-correcting sphere; thus, the state does not need to intervene in its running. In the conception of Smith, civil society is a sphere of economic activities and separate from the state. Hence development of the market economy underlies the idea of civil society (Ehrenberg, 1999: 89-92). What should be pointed out here is that there is a close relation between such an approach to the term civil society and emergence and development of capitalism and market economy at that time.

A landmark for the history of civil society was Hegel's approach to the concept, who first drew a distinction between the state and civil society (Kaldor 2003, 584). He describes civil society as an intermediary realm between the state and family in the ethical life which consists of these three moments. According to Hegel, the system of needs obliges people to get in contact with each other to satisfy their needs, and thus the atmosphere of mutual trust in family yields to the feeling of insecurity and fear in civil society. Accordingly, civil society in Hegel is a sphere of discrepancy, private benefits and conflict (Seligman, 1995: 48-50). Therefore, the state, highest moment of the ethical life of Hegel, must intervene in the contending and conflicting elements of civil society in order to convert them to a syntheses and harmony (Ehrenberg, 1999: 128-29).

This Hegelian analysis arguing that the state determines the other societal moments is criticized by Marx who uses the term civil society as a synonym of bourgeois capitalist society. For Marx, civil society is a domain taking shape according to class division, and also in which the exploitation of surplus value takes place (Ehrenberg, 1999: 132-35). Hence, he sees civil society as a sphere of the relations of production, and thus it is, in his conception, equated with the economic structure in a polity. By this way, he inserts civil society in the infrastructure as opposed to the superstructure. In this context, for him, the state does not condition civil society, but civil society conditions the state. In addition, Marx argues, contrary to Hegel's understanding of universal state, that the state is not a universal ultimate moment, but an apparatus serving for the interests of dominant class which develop in civil society (Seligman, 1995: 52-57).

On the other hand, one of the most remarkable approaches to civil society in 19th century belongs to Alexis de Tocqueville who is frequently given reference by contemporary works discussing the significant role of civil society in democratization. De Tocqueville struck by the weakness of the state in the United States during the 19th century, civil society signifies a realm of mediatory associations between the individual and the state, operating outside the sphere of government and market. For him, these associations have importance in terms of the frustration of any democratic decay and despotic attempts. Hence, such a civil society represents a counterweight to the state power and market forces, by marking non-governmental and non-market organizational culture. This analysis of de Tocqueville found an echo during anti-regime mobilizations in the Eastern Europe and Latin America against totalitarian governments in 1980s (Ehrenberg, 1999: 161-65).

In the following part, Antonio Gramsci's understanding of civil society will be analyzed, which has importance, at least as much as de Tocqueville's, in the contemporary discussions of state-society relations. As the post-revolutionary process in Tunisia will be assessed in the light of the Gramscian civil society, his conception of civil society and its elements such as hegemony, domination, structure and superstructure, neutralization of dissent and organic crisis will be provided.

1.2. Gramscian Civil Society

Although roots of Gramsci's thoughts on civil society is perceived to be in line with Hegelian-Marxist tradition he presents a unique approach by adopting a distinct understanding and specific way of thinking from both that of Hegel and Marx. Gramsci, who aims to tackle and reinterpret the contradictory and complicated dynamics of modern capitalistic system, uses the state-civil society dichotomy in order to clarify the 'hegemonic' essentials of class domination in the capitalist social formations. He formulates, accordingly, the relationship between the state, political society and civil society in the form of that the state (integral state, according to his own version) equates political society plus civil society. In the wake of this formulation, a double inversion is in question; first he conceives civil society as a superstructural moment (while in Marx it is structural) and then discern civil society distinct from the political society which is another moment in the superstructure. In doing so, he brings a specific explanation on the state-civil society dichotomy by separating his conception of civil society from Hegel's and also that of Marx.

In this analysis of Gramsci, civil society is no longer a space of human affairs which is contained by industry and trade constructions of a certain historical era, and also in which the individuals perform a fight based on their self-interests. It now refers, for Gramsci, to a superstructural moment in which hegemonic appearance regenerating the class domination is revealed. This epistemological disengagement means that Gramsci adopted a distinct theoretical framework from Hegel and Marx who describe the concept of civil society as a pattern of economic relations, organizations and corporations. To put it in different way, Gramsci conceives civil society a space of class relations in which ideological and cultural activities carried out by the private organizations outside the formal organization of the state are determinant (Buci-Glucksmann 1980, 70). On the other side, the state another element of the dichotomy, according to Gramscian conception, is a significant moment of historical block which constitutes the organic integrity of structure and superstructure. The state is, in this conception, not understood as a neutral public power mechanism which is obligated to provide coherence between conflicting different groups in social formations (Buci-Glucksmann 1980, 93).

When considered from this point of view, theoretical framework of Gramscian conception of the state-civil society dichotomy presents a complex and complicated structure. The concept of civil society, in this complicated form, corresponds to a domain in which hegemony based on consent is manufactured for the benefit of ruling class, while the political community to a domain of concrete domination based on coercion. This determination is clearly seen in famous section of *the Notebooks*:

What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural 'levels': the one that can be called 'civil society', that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private', and that of 'political society' or 'the State'. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of 'hegemony' which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of 'direct domination' or command exercised through the State and 'juridical' government (Gramsci 1999, 145).

In consideration of this passage, the concept of civil society in *the Notebooks* predicates a domain of "private" organizations such as cultural associations, religious institutions and political parties which are located outside the production process in the structure and also beyond formal and public devices of the state. In this sense, this analysis attributing oppression, coercion and domination to the state or the political community, on the contrary, persuasion and hegemony to civil society, shows the distinctive feature of Gramsci's approach (Martin 1998, 69).

As it is seen in the passage above, Gramscian civil society is clearly located in the superstructure of historical block. Because, when considered the reproduction of relations of domination in the capitalist societies, civil society, for Gramsci, contains ideological and cultural aspects of hegemony apparatuses, outside the space of the state which is mostly described with the coercion and oppression functions. As stressed by Louis Althusser in discussions of "ideological state apparatuses" by benefiting from Gramsci, hegemonic apparatus displays activity in reproduction of the class domination (Texier 1979, 63). Hegemonic supremacy, which can be associated with the production of consent by itself, requires to be taken in consideration ideological and cultural forms of the conscious, as distinct from domination based on coercion, which is another form of the class domination. In this regard, ideological and cultural forms of civil society (art, literature, media, education), by comparison with tangibility of the state, presents a structure which is not possible to be grasped with ease (Texier

1979, 65). Therefore, civil society, in which hegemonic activities in ideological and cultural forms appear, is the arena of reproduction of relationships between main classes which constitute determinant agents of the historical block (Hunt 1986, 210; Portelli 1982, 76).

1.2.1. Separation Between the Instances and Levels

In Gramsci's conception, the separation between the moments (political community, civil society, state and economy) is a methodological (analytical) separation. In practical reality, they cannot be separated with absolute lines; even are intertwined with each other. Thus, this functional division must be evaluated within a framework of dialectic unity in which consent and coercion is used alternately, and also real roles of the organizations are much more unclear and complicated than they look. Accordingly, it cannot be said that there is a social system in which hegemony is manufactured by the way of only consent; nor a political regime in which ruling class can constitute its domination merely through coercion. In this direction, the system in which the consent is sufficient is "pure utopia, since based on the premise that all men are really equal and hence equally rational and moral, i.e. capable of accepting the law spontaneously, freely, and not through coercion, as imposed by another class, as something external to consciousness" (Gramsci 1999, 533). When it comes to the domination based on coercion only, it can solely be temporary and points out a depression of the historical block in which the dominant class sustains itself by favor of power because of losing capability of the ideological ruling (Portelli 1982, 28-29).

When evaluating Gramsci's thoughts on civil society in a methodological way, form of establishment of relationship must be taken into consideration between the structure and superstructure which are constitutive instances of societal formation. Some thinkers argue that Gramsci puts the superstructure in a privileged place and thus separates himself in certain points from Marx's conceptual analysis. However, Gramsci rejects economic determinism which degrades the events in the superstructure moment to the level of image or phenomenon. He does not accept to put structure or superstructure in a privileged position against each other. According to him, the relationship between two constitutive instances of societal formation must be grasped in an organic unity, which implies a dialectical relationship. Because, in practical reality the separation between the elements of instances in historical block is out of

question and they are intertwined with each other in a complicated way. Hence, the analysis of a historical block cannot be made on the basis of isolation of the instances from each other. Accordingly, there is a “necessary reciprocity” between the levels and instances of the historical block. Gramsci also explains this reciprocity as a dialectical process (Merrigton, 1999: 356-359). This dialectical process is, in addition, determinant in terms of theorizing the dichotomy of civil society and political society. As a result, Gramsci defines the relationship between civil society and political society, which he located as two constitutive instances of superstructure, as dichotomic not antinomic.

1.2.2. Civil Society and Hegemony

The concept of hegemony has a central place in Gramsci’s idea of civil society. Although many different views were submitted about what he has meant by hegemony, it is clear that Gramsci tries to enlighten the social power relations and concrete forms of existence of these relations in capitalist societies. In establishment of domination of ruling class, it is used both concrete physical power and also ideological, cultural and intellectual apparatuses. Hegemony, in this sense, is the key concept in cultural and ideological studies of Gramsci. What he tries to understand is how an elite minority is able to dominate the majority, the rest of society, and also why the majority gives consent to be dominated and governed by this minority. How an elite minority managed to have a control over all society without resort to force? For Gramsci, answer of this question must be sought in the concept of hegemony (Crehan, 2002: 146).

When considered the concept of hegemony as a whole in the way of thinking of Gramsci, it has a determinant importance in terms of the permanency of several components in a given social formation in a way based on the consent. In this regard, hegemony as a kind of social controlling can be defined as a capability of ruling classes to maintain their domination over the dominated classes which is based on the consent. Accordingly, Gramsci means by the concept of hegemony a process of a cultural and intellectual leadership. In this kind of leadership, subaltern or dominated groups defer to the supremacy of dominant class although they are not coerced and forced with the concrete suppression tools. Hegemony, hence, point out a sociopolitical situation which Gramsci names it ‘a moment’ where there is a cooperation between the

superstructure and the structure. In other words, the dominant culture and ideology of the ruling classes are promoted by the way of class divisions and also economic and political practices. In hegemony, there is a certain form of life and way of thinking which is dominant and this dominant pattern spreads and penetrates to all society in order to impose social norms, experiences and relations, values and political practices (Sassoon 1982).

According to Gramscian explanation of the concept of civil society, it is not a sphere of freedom but hegemony. And hegemony depends on not coercion but consent, which is, however, not about free-will but manufactured by various types of tools (Buttigieg, 1995: 7). Therefore, civil society is the most important tool of hegemony. In other words, civil society is an arena in which the ruling class enlarges and consolidates its domination over all part of the society by nonviolent and non-coercive means. In this sense, the relationship between hegemony and civil society can be thought this way: civil society as an ideology of the ruling class contains all ideological, cultural and intellectual lines from science to art beyond economy and law. Moreover, in a way to render all social classes dependent on the ruling class, it infiltrates into all social layers as a world view and uses philosophy, religion, common sense and folklore. Gramsci includes in ideological structure that carries out ideological administration of the society not only organizations whose mission is to spread the ideology but also all social communication instruments and tools which provide to influence the public opinion. Consequently, this ideological structure propagates the ideology of ruling class through various communication instruments such as theater, cinema, radio, television, publishing houses, newspapers, libraries, schools, religious, scientific and cultural institutions, and even architecture, layout and names of the streets (Portelli, 1982: 14-23).

The domination constructed by the ruling classes through this great number of tools shows that hegemony is a non-coercive power and has a flexible, implicit, complex and camouflaged structure which is hard-to-understand. Hegemony, in this way, provides an influential safeguarded position for the dominant class against possible frontal attack from the dominated classes. Therefore, the gaining of a hegemonic position in the space of civil society is much more significant for the dominant classes than the gaining control over the coercive apparatuses of the government. Much as the

latter provides for the dominant classes an opportunity to impose their wish by force, if it is sole source of their power, it is not useful to maintain their dominant position and even makes them defenseless against some external concrete pressures like coup d'état. But hegemony, on the contrary, guarantees the ruling classes against the outcomes of such threats toward their dominant positions. Nevertheless, more secure position for the ruling class is to acquire both the concrete domination apparatuses of the political society and hegemony in civil society. Gramsci describes this situation as leadership in the cultural sphere (Buttigieg, 1995: 30-31).

1.2.3. Civil Society and State

Although the trace of Gramscian idea is seen in thoughts of Hegel and Marx, he clearly separates his views on state-civil society dichotomy from them. Marx determines state and civil society as opposed to each other by changing the Hegelian approach which describes civil society as all pre-state life and the promotion of economic relations. In addition, according to Marxist view state -political order- is the dependent component of the dichotomy, but civil society -area of economic relations- is the determinant one. Accordingly, in this approach civil society is in the structure (base) and also the structure determines the super-structure. However, in contrast to this approach Gramsci implements a double inversion; he firstly puts civil society to the super-structure and secondly places it as opposed to state in the super-structure. In this sense, Gramsci stresses the priority of ideological superstructure to economic structure, and also the priority of civil society (consent) to political society (coercion). Much as both of them see civil society in a significant place to grasp the capitalist relations and reproduction of them, for Gramsci the super-structure represents the determinant factor in historical development process (Bobbio, 1979). Further, Gramsci criticizes also liberal understanding of state-civil society dichotomy which explains the relationship between these two factors by way of antinomy and presents the state as a structure which fulfills the requirements of civil society. For him this understanding is a myth helping hide the real characteristics of state power (Buci-Glucksmann, 1980: 70).

Herein, it is seen that Gramscian conception on state-civil society dichotomy goes forward through three theoretical model which are related to each other. In the first model which separates the components of dichotomy as opposed poles, civil society constitutes hegemony moment in which ideological activities appear; but state

constitutes domination moment which provides to keep subaltern classes under control (Gramsci, 1971: 12). Nevertheless, Gramsci particularly emphasizes that the differentiation between state and civil society is only methodological in concrete reality (Gramsci, 1971: 159). “In the second model Gramsci reincorporates two components of the dichotomy. Accordingly, state is no longer outside of civil society; rather, it involves civil society. For it should be remarked that the general notion of State includes elements which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say that State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion)” (Gramsci, 1971: 263). This quotation, by evincing the function of state in hegemonic processes, demonstrates that Gramsci discusses couplets which he used while developing his own theory such as force and consent; coercion and persuasion; domination and hegemony; state and civil society in the context of a dialectical reasoning. This second model has an importance in the point of that it indicates that hegemony cannot be limited with mere civil society; conversely, state displays activity as a hegemony apparatus (Carnoy, 1984: 73).

In the third model developed in *the Notebooks* he established an identical relationship between state and civil society by advancing the unity presented in the second model. Gramsci reincorporates two components of the dichotomy which he separated in first model in the methodological level, and asserts that “in concrete reality, civil society and state are one and the same” (1971: 160). The identical relationship built in this model can be inferred that state cannot be reduced to a level which merely corresponds to political society. In this context, Gramsci determines the complex situation of state and its function in hegemony processes. He says in *the Notebooks* “The state is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules” (Gramsci, 1971: 244). In this point, state and civil society unite in a complex way to establish a bigger unity; state, including governmental and private apparatuses, is same as social formation itself. As Althusser used in ‘ideological state apparatuses’ as a definition: All ideological and political super-structures such as family, trade-unions, reformist political parties and private media are state apparatuses by definition, or in other words hegemonic apparatuses (Carnoy, 1984: 74).

As it is seen, in the formation process of hegemony economic dynamics, political institutions, political society, state and civil society act in an engaged way; they are intertwined with each other within a complex structure. Cihan Tuğal presents, in his model in which he overhauled Gramsci, the relationship between these moments. According to his model, civil society articulates daily life, societal space and economic relations to each other; on the other hand, political society articulates civil society, by seeping into it, to the state. For Tuğal, hegemony executes its judgment by articulating economy, society and state to each other. As for being implemented this dynamic hegemonic process it needs civil society as well as political society. Civil society, in this sense, includes recorded organisms such as schools, libraries, dormitories, associations, public houses and media organizations, and also unrecorded ones such as district communities, religious associations, coffeehouse and mosque communities. These recorded and unrecorded entities regulate daily life, social space and economic relations. On the other hand, political society which is located between the state and civil society consists of organizations such as political parties, parliaments, municipalities, political movements and charismatic leaders. These organizations constitute domination patterns and edge on the people by injecting visions and practices of political unity. It can be said that, in this regard, political society is an upper regulatory, that is to say being regulated regulations of social living spaces (Tuğal, 2011: 47-48). Nevertheless, to grasp the hegemonic process better it needs to scrutinize working of political and civil society moments.

Political society contains mechanisms such as political leadership, authority structures and envisagement of political unity. Political leadership bands together those who share same way of thinking and common interests. Accordingly, this leadership presents an entire expression of all aspects of societal life. On the other hand, the identicalness with national and local authorities manufactures the consent for inequality and domination, and so determines the progress of hegemonic process. Lastly, the leadership which carries out the commitment of political unity gains the power to be able to reproduce inequality patterns. Therefore, the construction of political unity is the key mission of political society; because most of the people renounce their personal interests for the sake of unity (Tuğal, 2011: 39-42).

The other moment of super-structure civil society regulates daily life, societal space and economic relations and also articulates them to each other. Tuğal highlights that activities of daily living are critical in the formation of hegemonic process although it is ignored in general. He says, by giving reference to Bourdieu, that daily routines and practices are infused into people as collective tendency through socialization which is under the influence of intelligentsia, political corporations and politicians. Moreover, this socialization makes the status differences, class inequalities and power balances by manufacturing consent for inequality and domination by the way of injection of certain patterns of behavior, paces of life, matter of time and space, classification forms and rituals. On the other hand, the location of daily life in the societal space must be grasped in terms of the production of the consent, because the power relations are dug in the space. Moreover, subjecting a social group to another finds its practical reflection in the space. Architecture and layout of streets and districts, strategic locations of buildings, public gardens, places of worship and other symbolic places; all these fittings speak the language of the power. In addition to daily life and societal space, economic relations have a critical importance in the hegemonic process. For the reproduction of inequality and domination relations and also its sustainability, the subordinate classes must have pecuniary advantages in favor of current order and hence it is compulsory to make a compromise for the dominant classes accordingly (Tuğal, 2011: 43-46).

1.2.4 Organic Crisis

Organic crisis is a crisis of hegemony and has a meaning beyond an economic or political crisis. Buci-Glucksmann (1974: 75) states that in the revolutionary dialectic of Gramsci any theory of hegemony cannot exist without hegemonic crisis (organic crisis). This is very reasonable, resulting from that Gramsci gives a significant role to the super-structure (bourgeois hegemony) in his analysis of formation of hegemonic process in a capitalist order, the collapse of this order is also based on its crisis, namely that of hegemony. In this sense, such a crisis indicates fundamental contradictions in the hegemonic order and the leading class cannot deliver solution for these contradictions. Accordingly, the leading class loses its ideological and cultural supremacy and no longer leads but only rules (Filippini, 2017: 99). Gramsci explains this situation in *the Notebooks* clearly by referring to as the ‘crisis of authority’ or ‘crisis of hegemony’:

If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer 'leading' but only 'dominant', exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the great masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe previously, etc. The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear." (Gramsci, 1971: 25-26).

Much as Marx considers the state as coercive apparatus of the bourgeois, for Gramsci it is also implementer of legitimization of bourgeois culture, ideology and its social necessities. For instance, while Marx finds adequate ever-increasing exploitation of labor for consciousness of a resistance against the order, Gramsci regards it as only one of the ingredients creating this consciousness. For him, which is more critical is collapse of the ability of state which protects and enlarges the bourgeois hegemony. In this context, Gramsci explains this situation with example of "the trench-systems of modern warfare". According to this example, superstructures of civil society resembles the trench systems: In war after a fell shelling it is thought that the complete defense system of enemy was collapsed, in reality, however, what was destroyed is only "the outer perimeter" and then the defense line is still operative (Gramsci, 1971: 235). With such a way of analysis Gramsci developed a concept, "war of position", against "war of maneuver" which means frontal attack. These two types of war are expression of what kind of a relation there is between the state and civil society in a country. For him, in developed Western countries there is a proper relation between the state and civil society and it should be evaluated by way of war of position. "In the East the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks: more or less numerous from one State to the next, it goes without saying—but this precisely necessitated an accurate reconnaissance of each individual country." (Gramsci, 1971: 238).

1.3. Civil Society Against the State as Precondition of Democratization

After Gramsci, civil society discussions which has, so to say, retired for a time became in vogue again in 1980's because of the developments in Eastern Europe and Latin America. The social movements that played a critical role in the toppling of totalitarian and militarist dictator regimes in their countries were evaluated in terms of reinvention

of civil society. In both of these two regions the social movements opposing their regimes was thinking that ‘from above’ strategy does not work as seen in Hungary and Czechoslovakia examples, and thus they have resorted the way of ‘from below’ in which the requisite is to change the society. In this sense, their strategies were based on ‘withdrawal from the state’ and then on creating ‘islands of civic engagement’ which corresponds to a way like non-political or anti-politics. In addition to this, links with international community and activist groups and also appealing to international authorities had a significant role in the emergence and working of this strategy. In other words, under favor of international links and authorities such as the support of North American and West European human rights groups, the human rights legislation and Helsinki agreement, a political sphere was able to be created by these opposing groups in the two regions. Ultimately, it was a new understanding of civil society which predicates an autonomous space against state, and also this new understanding was effective on current civil society discussions (Kaldor, 2003: 586-88).

With the end of the Cold War which signifies the victory of US’s democracy and also the collapse of the Soviet communism, civil society became one of the main ideas of 1990s. To think of this together with the experiences of peoples in Latin America and Eastern Europe, civil society started being considered something in company with democracy, even its driving force. To such an understanding of civil society it had a power to reduce despotism of the state, but a socialist totalitarian state. Moreover, civil society was regarded as sine qua non for political, social and economic improvements, because it would contribute to associational life, civic engagement, political participation and free market which are indispensable for democracy and capitalism. However, civil society was viewed as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and used interchangeably with NGOs. When thought in this way, it can be inferred that civil society is the precondition of democracy and NGOs are imperative for democratization. In addition to this, as Putnam put it, civil society as a social capital represents “features of social life- networks, norms and trust- that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives.” (Newton, 1999: 12). In this neoliberal interpretation of the term which considers it counterpart to the state (and also the market), civil society is composed of a “set of diverse non-governmental institutions, which is strong enough to counterbalance the state... whilst not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major

interests, can, nevertheless, prevent the state from dominating and atomizing the rest of society.” (Gellner, 1995: 32). When viewed from this aspect, the definition of civil society adopted by the World Bank is also remarkable:

The term civil society to refer to the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations (Mundial, 2006).

On the other hand, civil society which has such a definition is seen as precondition and driving force of a democratization process. Scholte argues that civil society is composed of charitable establishment, endowments, academic institutions, professional organizations, human rights activists, religious associations, think tanks, environmentalist movements and youth associations. For him, such a civil society limits the state power in transition to democracy. In addition, civil society plays a critical role, he argues, in reinforcing the relationship between the state and individual, because a strong relation between them is imperative for a strong democracy. Moreover, civil society in this sense provides a basis for civic engagement which is essential for democracy (Scholte, 2002: 281-304). O’Donnell and Schmitter also consider civil society critical in democratization. With this, they argue that consolidation of democracy is more significant rather than transition to democracy (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 20).

Larry Diamond argues that civil society plays two roles in democratization: first is to further a transition from an authoritarian regime to electoral democracy, and second is to ensure the consolidation of democracy (Diamond, 1997: 6). On the other hand, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba highlights that the most important factor in relation between civil society and democracy is civic culture. In a same way, Putnam defines civil society in a broader sense beyond the political and social organizations and in terms of representing sentiment of the society. On that sense, voluntary agencies of civil society act as democracy schools by providing for their members with social gains and civic awareness. Hence, in early period of a democratic transition, civil society

with its anti-corruption, surveillant and pro-democracy institutions prevents return of the authoritarian regime. For democratization and then consolidation of democracy, civil society associated with interest groups, human rights organizations and professional unions compromises a basis for a political reform (Martin, 2016: 32). Stepan and Linz also argues that a robust and proactive civil society is essential for the democratic consolidation. Because, such a civil society ensures the rule of law and constitutional order within the political society, rather than to create a political society (Stepan & Linz, 1996: 7-13).

As it is seen the literature above, civil society is considered as a precondition and driving force of democratization and consolidation of democracy. Accordingly, it limits the state power, prevents return of the authoritarian regime and consolidates democracy by guaranteeing freedoms and democratic values. Nevertheless, there are different contemporary approaches, because it has a politically-loaded meaning which is used by various parties with different references. While the opponents of communism views civil society as the primary protector of freedom and democracy in a way to countervail the state and to weaken totalitarian regimes, for representatives of the left it signifies a postmodern project which reduces the importance of class and hides the capitalist exploitation and oppression. On the other hand, the opponents of Western imperialism regard civil society as a new form of imperialist plan of West, that is ‘democratization’, toward developing and undeveloped countries (Bellin, 1995: 120-21). Above all, today civil society is represented as solution for every grievance like almost a magic wand, particularly in social and political spheres. In this sense, Neera Chandhoke argues, by stressing that civil society has become a ‘hurrah word’, that the idea regarding civil society as an alternative or counterpart to the state and the market is malevolent, since this idea contributes to the bypass of the Third World states’ sovereignties. For her, additionally, today civil society and the state are uncoupled, but we cannot think civil society is independent from and especially counterpart of the state, because even its indispensable conditions are determined by the state itself (Chandhoke, 2007: 608).

Consequently, as it is clearly understood, contemporary receptions of the term civil society, in particular after the end of the Cold War, are markedly based on a liberal understanding, though there are some others who adopt its total opposite. This

understanding considers civil society counterpart of the state and also protector of freedom and democracy; within this framework civil society is regarded as NGOs. However, this liberal understanding, at the same time, paves the way for problematizing power relationship between civil society and the state in terms of “modern forms of power”. In the meaning used by Michel Foucault modern power has a complex structure which is productive rather than prohibitive. Such a power, according to Foucault, is “local, continuous, productive, capillary, and exhaustive” and consists of “procedures, practices, objects of inquiry, institutional sites, and, above all, forms of social and political constraint” which are significantly different from its previous forms (Fraser, 1981: 276).

Therefore, question of what the state is has a critical importance in order to grasp formation and limits of its power. In his article seeking for an answer to this question, David Runciman (2007) argues that the state is fictional and also composed of an envisagement concerning human beings and things beyond its tangibly perceivable appearance which simply correspond to sum of institutions, buildings, governments, officials, documents and agreements. For him, this envisagement acts as a veil, which hides the real process including, for example, domination, inequality, exploitation and class conflict. Likewise, also Timothy Mitchel (1988) points out tacit, extensive and perpetual power forms of the state alongside of its formal institutions. Accordingly, it will be misleading to argue that civil society which is viewed as sum of NGOs are counterpart of the state so as to restrict its power.

CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF TUNISIA

Tunisia is a country at the heart of the Mediterranean. Located in one of the narrowest points of the Mediterranean Sea, this country bridges the Europe and the North Africa. Throughout its history, Tunisia's unique location has granted it a geostrategic importance which in turn made it an objective for great powers of the region throughout history. Phoenicians, the Romans, European Vandal's, the Byzantine, Muslim Arabs, the Ottomans and the French have ruled Tunisia at peak times of their power until 1956, when the French domination in the country ended and Tunisia gained its independence.

This chapter will elaborate on the complex history of Tunisia to better unravel the research topic, as the dynamics of the process since the "Jasmine Revolution" are deeply embedded in the history of this society. Firstly, a background on the history of Tunisia until the independence in 1956 will be given, with a special attention on the process after the modernization attempts began. Later on, the epoch after the independence will be examined in two parts named by the period's presidents; Habib Bourguiba (1957-1987) and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (1987-2011). On the continuing part, dynamics of the "Jasmine Revolution" will be examined. Next, politics of the post-revolutionary Tunisia will be explained. Finally, most important issues laying ahead of Tunisia will be touched upon.

2.1. Tunisia Under the French Protectorate

In Tunisia which has always had a key location in the North Africa, nation building process started in first half of the 19th century. After the occupation of Algeria, its western neighbor, by France in 1830, the Ottoman Empire has revoked the autonomy of Libyan Tripoli to rule the territory from Istanbul. In this process, Tunisia remained in between two great powers: The Ottoman rule in the east and the French Algeria in the west. Under such circumstances, the Tunisian authorities felt obliged to begin a modernization program to prevent any possible foreign intervention. This

modernization attempt can as well be named the first “nation building” attempt in Tunisia (Rinehart, 1986: 25-26).

In this era Tunisia built a modern army and navy, reformed the administration, changed the tax system, abolished slavery and piracy. All these reforms were made with the advisory of European, especially French advisers who were brought to help Tunisian modernization. Thus, all these attempts underlie to the Europe that Tunisia was modernizing itself and that it didn't need a foreign intervention (Rinehart, 1986: 27-28).

However, the Tunisian economy went bankrupt in 1869, and British, French and Italian representatives took over country's economic administration to secure their loans. The European, especially French domination in Tunisia was strengthening every day and it was the British opposition that held France to fully take over the Tunisia. Finally, 1878, Congress of Berlin France took the British approval to occupy Tunisia. In 1881, France occupied Tunisia claiming that there was intrusion from Tunisia to French Algeria (Rinehart, 1986: 30).

French rule in Tunisia differed in some ways than the French rule in neighboring Algeria. Unlike Algeria, Tunisia became a protectorate of France by a bilateral treaty (Bardo Treaty) rather than a direct conquest. However, this did not mean that France was not ruling the country. A French resident general was appointed to Tunisia as representative of France and in practice, he held the supreme authority (Barbour et al., 2019).

The influence of Western World raised in Tunisia with the French Rule. Similar to the Young Turks, a Young Tunisians movement commenced in early 1890's. This European educated group defended modernization, more role for Tunisian's in the administration of the country and also proto-nationalist ideas. However, this activism was fiercely unwelcomed by the France and repressive measures were implemented to prevent spread of such ideas and movements (Rinehart, 1986: 39).

After the World War I Destour Party (symbolizing the Constitution of 1861) was formed. The Party demanded reforms such as equal rights with the Europeans from

the Bey and the French. Although the Bey was sympathetic to the Destour's demands, the French repressed the Bey and the Party. Also, leader of the Destour was arrested. However, minor reforms were implemented to pacify the nationalist movement (Rinehart, 1986: 40-41).

In 1934 Lawyer Habib Bourguiba formed the Neo-Destour claiming to spread the ideas of the movement to the masses. France's repression attempts further popularized the Neo-Destour and soon the party surpassed the Destour and the old leadership. In 1938 Bourguiba and other leaders of the movement were arrested, and the party was closed by the French. After the start of the World War II, Bourguiba and the Destour leadership was transferred to France from Tunisia (Barbour et al., 2019).

Parallel to changes in World politics after the World War II and growing pressure from the Arab World, France made some concessions to the Neo-Destour movement in Tunisia. In 1951 Secretary General of the Neo-Destour Salah Ben Youssef became a member of the Tunisian cabinet and Bourguiba returned to the country (Rinehart, 1986: 48).

As the new government pushed for more autonomy from the France, the French once again turned back to repressive measures. Many of the ministers were arrested and Bourguiba was exiled from the country. Contrary to previous times, this time the Tunisian movement appealed to violence. A guerrilla fight began in the mountainous regions of the country against the French rule (Rinehart, 1986: 48-49). However, as Bourguiba and the movement pushed for full independence, the French had to consent the independence demands. On March 20, 1956 France granted full autonomy to Tunisia by cancelling the 1881 Bardo Treaty (Rinehart, 1986: 49-50).

The colonization/protectorate period has also affected the demographics of Tunisia. While in 1881, before the French occupation there were only 10 thousand Italians and 4 thousand French which habited in Tunisia, especially in the mining areas thus number raised significantly with the French rule. By 1901 the number of the Europeans in the country raised to 130 thousand (Rinehart, 1986: 38). In the capital there were 55 thousand Europeans, 80 thousand Muslims and 39 thousand Jews. Jews had migrated from Andalusia during the Reconquista (Perkins, 2014: 58). By 1956 the European

community in the country totaled up to 341 thousand making almost 10% of the country's population of 4 million at that time (Rinehart, 1986: 88).

2.2. Independence and Bourguiba Period (1956-1987)

Shortly after Tunisia gained its independence in 1956 a National Front was formed by mostly Neo-Destour. In the Constituent Assembly election, the Front gained 84% of the votes and Bourguiba was elected as the president of the Assembly. In 1957 the assembly abolished the monarchy and determined the republican system as the new regime of Tunisia. Bourguiba became the new president (Rinehart, 1986: 51). Unlike a proper democracy Bourguiba took the executive and legislative monarchical powers of the Bey until the new constitution of the country was prepared by the Constituent Assembly. After that point Bourguiba started to cast himself as the founding father of the nation taking a role as a teacher and disciplinarian of the citizens (Perkins, 2014: 135-36).

After 1955 Bourguiba's and ally Salah Ben Youssef's ways departed. Youssef had a more leftist approach and continued the guerrilla resistance movement of 1955 after the revolution. Since the newly independent country did not have a proper army to end the resistance Bourguiba appealed to the French army to crush the resistance., With the help of French the resistance movement was toppled three months after the independence and Youssef escaped to Germany, where he was assassinated in 1961 (Rinehart, 1986: 50-51). During this time a court similar to Turkey's 1920's İstiklal Mahkemeleri (Independence Courts) a High Court was established for the trial of the Youssefists and the people who collaborated with the French during the colonial era. Later on, the High Court, became one of the tools that had led to maximization of Bourguiba's powers turning him to an unquestionable leader (Perkins, 2014: 136-37).

Although Bourguiba and the Neo-Destour Party has a secular path long before the independence was gained, nevertheless they never opposed the traditional Islamic value that had been the strongest code that shaped the Tunisian society. However, the conservative religious leaders were not invited to the formation process of the newly independent state. After Bourguiba strengthened his position at the top of the state he then began to implement a series of secular reforms (Rinehart, 1986: 51).

In the new era the traditional values that had its roots in the Islamic identity of the Tunisian society were disregarded and treated as obsolete. These traditional values did not have a place in the new path of Tunisia. Which was presented as a country on path of Westernization and modernization (Rinehart, 1986: 51-52). In some ways the Tunisia's new modernization process had many similarities to Turkey's, who ruled Tunisia for centuries prior to 1881, modernization process under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in the 1920's and 1930's (Perkins, 2014: 140). Religious courts were abolished, and a new secular law system was introduced in the country. These new laws were especially in the area of civil law. They introduced new marriage law presenting an age limit for the marriage and giving the women to right to start a divorce process. Later on, abortion and birth control were also legalized in the country. Registration of births and deaths, and adaptation of a surname were also made required by law in this new period (Rinehart, 1986: 52).

The secularization and Western Modernization process brought a huge popularity to the Bourguiba rule in the international arena. Especially after Bourguiba alienated Tunisia with the Western World during the Cold War. In this era Tunisian secularization and modernization process was presented as a role model for the newly independent former colonies in the Africa. This process also gave the Bourguiba rule to ignore the democratization process of the country and also suppress the domestic audience. Especially the Islamic movement was heavily affected during this process from these repressive measures as they did not have any popularity in the Western World (Perkins, 2014: 145).

In 1960 the secularization and the Western Modernization process went as far as putting a fight against fasting which is one of the five fundamental requirements of Islam. However, these extreme measures received little support even among the party. Even in some areas of the country Bourguiba words against fasting and Ramadan led to riots (Perkins, 2014: 145-46).

On the economic front the Bourguiba regime was not able to make significant progress. During the 1950s the country tried liberal economic models to strengthen the economy. As they failed, the country transformed on to the planned economy. A new Destorian Socialism was presented with the reforms of Ahmed Ben Salah, the vice president. In

1969 widespread violent demonstrations took place in the country against socialist measures. These protests were held by landholders and peasants were opposed to collectivization and confiscation of lands. Hence these developments lead to the end of the socialist experience (Rinehart, 1986: 55-59).

In the 1970s Tunisia followed a liberal path in economics once again. However, this change did not help the country to improve on the economic front. Economic liberalization brought a heavy social cost to the society with the continues crisis. Moreover, states grip on the society augmented day by day (Rinehart, 1986: 65). There were no signs of a transition to democracy. In 1975 the Chamber of Deputies granted presidency for life to Habib Bourguiba. All these developments lead to a growing discontent in the society especially after the 1975 (Barbour et al., 2019). By 1978 the discontent in country raised as the economic situation worsened. This year the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) organized the first general strike in Tunisian history. The regime scared of any political unrest that would threaten their authoritarian rule responded harshly to the strike. On January 26 the situation worsened as the regime forces attacked the protesters. At least 150 people died during the clashes between regime forces and the protestors. This scale of violence never had happened in Tunisia since the country gained its independence in 1956 (Rinehart, 1986: 86).

In 1981 Bourguiba appointed Muhammed Mzali as prime minister. Mzali was a moderate and liberal name. This raised the hopes of a liberalization in the political arena. On November 1981 the country held its first multi-party elections. However apart from the governing party only one party was legalized and permitted the enter the election. The National Front formed by the Destour and the trade unions gained 95% of the votes and the opposition party only gained 3%.

In 1983 the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank demanded certain reforms from the Tunisian government to continue support. One of these reforms was lifting the subsidies on bread and semolina which were the main part of Tunisian people's diet. This led to mass protests in the country later known as the Bread riots. Even Bourguiba's car was stoned by the angry protestor in one instance. Once again

as in the Black Thursday incident the police and the army entered into the scene and violently suppressed the protestors.

On the other hand, an opposition movement by the Islamists fostered during this era. An organization called the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) was formed by Rashid Ghannouchi in 1981. The new organization which threatened the values that the regime had been trying to implement in the Tunisian society for decades. MTI quickly became a target for the regime. Ghannouchi and other prominent figures were imprisoned with charges of defaming the president for life Bourguiba (Perkins, 2014: 171). By 1984 the regime believed that the MTI was the unseen power behind the protests and discontent towards the government. Even the army was used in the purges against the Islamic movements (Barbour et al., 2019).

In 1985 the opposition boycotted the elections leaving the regime empty handed in their discourse towards opening up and a multi-party system. This was mainly because the opposition did not have any chance to make a meaningful success in the elections because separation of powers which was the guarantor of free elections was absent as seen in the 1981 election (Perkins, 2014: 175-76). By 1987 MTI was still not given a status of a legal political party but the movement continued to raise its popularity in the Tunisian society. Regime trying to put a stop to the Islamic movement started a purge against the MTI leadership. They were accused of plotting to overthrow the government. Later on, they were also accused of bombs explosions in touristic areas. Ghannouchi and the leadership was sentenced to death. Although Bourguiba supported the death sentence his prime minister General Zine el Abidine Ben Ali opposed the death sentence. According to Ben Ali the executions would lead to a wide unrest in the country and further popularized the country (Perkins, 2014: 177-78).

As Bourguiba insisted on the death sentence, Ben Ali who had gained considerable control over the state mechanism took a rule that declared Bourguiba unfit for presidency due to physical deterioration. While Bourguiba was taken to Monastir where he continued his retirement life until his death in 2000, on November 7, 1987 Ben Ali became the second president of Tunisia (Perkins, 2014: 148-79).

During the Bourguiba period the demographics of Tunisia changed as most of the European settlers left the country. By 1966 the European population dropped to 32 thousand a 90% decrease compared to the 341 thousand in 1956 (Perkins, 2014: 86). The Jewish population of the country also disappeared due to immigration to Israel, Europe and America (Perkins, 2014: 80).

2.3. Ben Ali Period (1987-2011)

Habib Bourguiba's fall with a "medical coup" helped to ease the tensions in the country. Bourguiba with his unstable mental health had been a burden to not only his opponents but also his followers namely the Destour Party. Therefore, Ben Ali's claim of power was not strongly opposed by any circle in the country.

Ben Ali started his presidency with certain reforms. He did not only become the president of Tunisia but also became the leader of the party. One of the first moves of Ben Ali was to change the name of the Destour to Democratic Constitutional Party (RCD). This was a move to signal that a new phase in the history of the country has started. Even Bourguiba's close associates had been marginalized by the new administration. All these developments led to hopes that these changes would be followed by liberalization, democratization and pluralization on the political arena (Perkins, 2014: 188). In this new period the political prisoners were also freed. And the exiled and self-exiled figures of the Tunisian society were also called to come back home. Even the MTI felt the ease of the state pressure. Rashid Ghannouchi and other members of the movement, who were almost executed a shot while ago, were also given a green light (Perkins, 2014: 189).

The new Ben Ali regime's relation with the MTI went further. Ben Ali answered to some of the MTI demands such as naming Islam as the religion of state, broadcasting azan from state radio and television, and legalizing a student organization associated with the MTI were some of these symbolic changes. To strengthen his authority over the religious part of the society Ben Ali even made a pilgrimage to Mecca (Perkins, 2014: 193).

In this period, 1988, the MTI was one of the invitees with a broad spectrum, the workers, the seculars, and the leaders of the civil society to pen a National Pact that

lighted the post-Bourguiba period in Tunisia. The pact acknowledged the importance of Islamic and Arab culture in Tunisia. This was an unthinkable statement a few years ago in the Bourguiba period as he even attempted to remove the fasting in Ramadan and advocated a hardline secularism and Western modernization. However, Ben Ali's steps of reconciliation did not go as far as changing the secular structure of the state. Although Islam was recognized as the religion of the state, the secular structure was preserved such as the laws (Perkins, 2014: 194). In this period the MTI changed its name to Ennahda Party. However, it was still not recognized a legal political party by the Tunisian state (Barbour et al., 2019).

The National Pact not only brought a reconciliation attempt with the religious part of the society but also the entire opposition. The Pact accepted the shortcomings of the past administration and aimed the guarantee of basic freedoms, respect for the human rights, and pluralism (Perkins, 2014: 194). Many political parties were legalized in this period and a new attempt of multi-party system was made. However, this did not lead to real democratization and pluralism. In 1989 elections, Ben Ali gained 99% of the votes and the RCD won all the seats in the parliament (Barbour et al., 2019). Unfortunately, the results of the elections resembled an autocratic dictatorship rather than a pluralist and democratic society. These results lead to a boycott of the 1990 local elections by the political parties.

The failure of these elections showed that the Ben Ali regime's admiration of liberties, pluralism and other concepts of modern democracy was nothing more than a make-up work. As seen by the election results the regime controlled the political spectrum not giving any space to opposition in the process. The biased electoral system always favored the ruling elite and there was not really an objection position. Lastly, the opposition failed to stand united against the ruling Ben Ali regime. The opposition was highly divided, hence easing the regimes work of divide and rule (Bellin, 1995: 134).

The regimes return to autocratic rule severely affected the Islamist movement. The movements rising popularity made it a target. Scared of the success of Islamist movements in the elections of 1990 in the neighboring Algeria, the Ben Ali regime started a crackdown against the Islamic movement Ennahda Party. The movement was

declared illegal and nearly 25 thousand of its members were put into prisons (Barbour et al., 2019).

The Ben Ali regime had a success in the economic arena during the first half of the 1990s. There was a 4% steady economic growth and the newly established National Solidarity Fund (FSN) which aimed to help 1100 least developed region of Tunisia to tackle the poverty further popularized the regime. During these years, Ben Ali had gained the support Bourguiba had at the peak of his powerful days (Perkins, 2014: 201-2).

The regime in a move to solidify its un-opposed position in power started a crackdown on the secular opposition. Now the seculars had joined the Islamist in the prisons of Tunisia. This crackdown, similar to the one made to the Ennahda few years ago symbolized the regime's desire to rule the Tunisia without dispute and that it would not share power through democratic process. Even though there were opposition parties represented in the parliament they were nothing more than the regimes puppet parties for show off of pluralism (Perkins, 2014: 203-5).

In February 2000 for the first time after the Bread riots great scale anti-government demonstrations began in the south of the country. These demonstrations began in the cities of Jebeniana, Zarsiz and el-Hamma. They later spread to Sfax, the second largest city of Tunisia and also to some accounts the outskirts of the capital. The unemployed youth and the high school students were the backbone of these riots and although regime stated that they only continued for few hours the demonstrations actually continued for days (Lawless, 2004: 1077).

During the first decade of the 21st century the autocratic rule of Ben Ali and the RCD continued in Tunisia. However, in 2008, a significant event was important to show the publics discontent of the regime. Once again, the regime felt threatened by the biggest social mobilization since the Bread riots.

Gafsa region of Tunisia close to the Algerian border had significant mine reserves. The region had high unemployment rates and a government plan to open the mines brought hope to the region. However rather than employing the local workers the government

employed people close to the governing elite. The employment process was important as it showed the level of corruption and bribery among the state structure of Tunisia. The regions people with the support of UGTT, Tunisia's main labor organization, went to the streets. For six months large scale demonstrations were held in Gafsa. The newly rising social media was also used to mobilize people. Yet the government's response the Gafsa was harsh. To end this civil resistance the government used harsh measures. The demonstration that survived for six months were only suppressed when the government forces used gunfire to suppress people (Daragahi, 2011).

2.4. Dynamics of the “Jasmine Revolution”

On December 17, 2010 a young graduate street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in front of the municipality building in Sidi Bouzid of Tunisia, a small city in interior side of the country. Much as this action has lighted the fuse of the mighty uprisings in the country and subsequently in the region, Bouazizi was only one of scores of people who commit suicide to protest the regime in Tunisia. Bouazizi's self-immolation was the tenth one occurred within the year of 2010.

The reasons behind such actions were socio-economic grievances and thus they resonated among those who are disadvantaged, marginalized and disenfranchised by the regime from economic, social and political opportunities. Moreover, humiliation and unresponsive attitudes of the regime's officials towards those disenfranchised people exacerbated the uprisings in terms of large turnout and determination in subverting the regime.

On the other hand, the people suffering from the economic grievances and inequalities had already been in a rage because of publications of Wikileaks cables which disclose embezzlement and lavish lifestyle of Ben Ali and his family. Indeed, the corrupt relations of Ben Ali were implicitly being known by most of the Tunisian people, but Wikileaks cables facilitated the middle class to have an attitude against the regime. When viewed from this aspect, the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi and its resonating with large part of the people was blasting point of an energy having accumulated for decades.

The revolt in the Gafsa mining basin in January 5, 2008 was one of the most significant turning points on the way to the uprisings started in December 2010. In the revolt started in city of Redayef the protesters have remonstrated against corrupt recruitment practices by the officials and demanded employment and regional economic recovery. However, the protestors have been met by severe treatment of the regime. Two young protestors were killed by the security forces and more than 200 were arrested. Even if the Gafsa revolt was suppressed for that time, when considered in terms of the 2011 uprisings, it has revealed a sense of collective struggle in a leaderless revolution.

Kaboub, along with the Gafsa revolt, points out two other revolts in terms of the nationwide rage against the regime. One of them is the “October 18 Movement for Rights and Freedoms”, formed in 2005 with the participation of people from several social parts, remonstrating against “Anti-terrorism Law” which enables the regime to suppress the opposition. The other is the demonstrations in city of Ben Guerdane in August 9, 2010, protesting against a new tax in crossing by car the border with Libya. The demonstrations in which the protesters clashed with the security forces the UGTT has played mediator role, but although the arrested protesters were released without charge tax levy remained in force. These mass protests against the regime are, in a sense, symptoms of the 2011 uprisings in Tunisia (Kaboub 2013; 7-8)

Differently the others in the past, the triumph of the 2011 uprisings in a degree to overthrow a dictator in rule for a 23-year period relies on several reasons. The most critical ones of them are economic grievances, common use of internet and especially social media and the army’s refusal to help Ben Ali to suppress the uprising. Tunisian economy sounding the alarm from 2000s was getting worse because of both Ben Ali and his family’s corrupt economic activities and the global economic crisis in 2008. On the eve of the uprisings in 2011, while the unemployment rate among the graduate youth reached the level of 40-45% on the one hand, the gap between poor and rich circles within the Tunisian society enlarged in a way to reveal regionally unbalanced economic progress (Angrist 2013; 548).

While the existing negative economic conditions were facilitating the unfolding of the uprisings, the widespread usage of social media provided the protestors with a channel to communicate and rally in a coordinated manner. In the country in which the internet

usage rate is relatively high by the region's standards, social media contributed to thrive the collective sense of the protesters and to the enlargement of the uprisings. Besides, refusal of the army to back the Ben Ali regime registered that the uprisings could no longer be suppressed and also that he could not remain in power (Schreder and Redissi 2011; 11-13).

For Angrist, these events and phenomena were effective in unfolding and triumph of the revolution, but do not explain the whole story. He argues that there were three other reasons behind achieving of the uprisings. First one is, along with the army's rejection to back the Ben Ali regime, refusal of civilian constituencies "to stand with and for the status quo by not demonstrating or by counter demonstrating in support of the regime." Second, Islamist moderation and secularist-Islamist rapprochement within the Tunisian opposition since 2000s paved the way for collaboration during the revolutionary period. Third, actions of the UGTT has instigated the protests and contributed to its spread to a nationwide scale. In consequences of these factors, Tunisian uprisings in 2011 has reached a point the regime could not suppress and thus precipitated the departure of Ben Ali. After almost a month from the self-immolation of Mohammad Bouazizi, Ben Ali who had ruled Tunisia for 23 years as a dictator secretly fled to Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011 (Angrist 2013; 549-50)

2.5. Politics in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia

In his last days, although Ben Ali has pledged to hold parliamentary elections in six months, to dismiss the government and to put some reforms on the agenda, he could not placate the tensions of demonstrators in the streets. With the intention of return and suppress the uprising, on January 14, 2011 he fled the country. It was first in the region to overthrow an Arab dictator and thus "the news of the Ben Ali's departure was met with a mixture of euphoria and apprehension." (Perkins 2014; 229). Right after the revolution the hope of Tunisians was very high. In a such atmosphere, hundreds of political parties, media outlets and civil associations were founded and legalized. Many dissident politicians, activists and opinion leaders exiled by the Ben Ali regime such as Rachid Ghannouchi and Moncef Marzouki have returned to the country.

After the fall of Ben Ali, Mohamed Ghannouchi who has been in charge as prime minister from RCD since 1999 formed a new government as an independent prime minister, while Fouad Mebazaa the president of chamber of deputies became acting president of the country. However, tension in the street did not decreased. In February, Mohamed Ghannouchi appointed 19 of 24 new governors known as the RCD members, and hereupon popular protests erupted demanding resignation of the prime minister and formal dissolution of the RCD. On 27 February Ghannouchi retired from office and Beji Kaid Essebsi was charged with formation of a new interim government (Schafer 2015; 11).

These transition governments' primary task was to prepare the country to the elections for the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) in compliance with objectives of the revolution. In this direction, a range of commissions were established. Among of them is Committee for political reform created by Mohamed Ghannouchi right after the departure of Ben Ali which consists of legal experts aiming at reforming the constitution. Another one is the National Council for the Protection of the Revolution (CNPR) formed in February by opponent groups including human rights organizations, the Islamists, UGTT and the Lawyers Bar Association. The most crucial one is creation of the High Authority for the realization of the objectives of the revolution, for political reforms and democratic transition formed as a combination of the previous two commissions (Schafer 2015; 12).

The High Authority was charged with the organization of prospective elections. In this sense, the electoral law was prepared and a Superior Independent Instance for the Elections (ISIE) was created by the High Authority. The most heated debate on the elections was related to fear of probability that any single party would monopolize the power toward an authoritarian consolidation. In this regard, a prominent concern was about that the Islamist Ennahda would come to power without the support of a coalition partner and thus threaten the secular structure of the country. Even this concern manifested itself within the High Authority itself. When the question appeared, who will lead the High Authority dominated by secular leftist circles, Ennahda nominate its candidates for the Electoral Committee but these were overruled by the secular majority. In essence, this debate between the Islamists and secularists was very efficient not just in here but also in all phases of the transition period (Zemni 2014; 8).

In a broad sense, the formation of the High Authority by the government can be seen as a mark for a rupture from the past. However, it was a result of increasing instability in the country and stress coming from the revolutionary street. In this context, Sami Zemni argues that “with the creation of the High Authority, the government opened the way for a more pronounced break with the past, but, at the same time, tried to control this process by bringing the revolutionary legitimacy of mass mobilization from the streets into the more controllable environment of commissions and dialogue platforms.” (Zemni 2014; 6-7). For Zemni, even if it had significant achievements such as the electoral law and creation of the ISIE, the high authority contributed to the control of the government and bypass of those in the street, especially the youth, participating actively in the revolution (Zemni 2014; 10).

Table 2. 1. Results of the National Constituent Assembly Elections in 2011(The Carter Center, 2011: 54)

Political Party	Number of Seats	Percentage
Ennahda	89	41
Congress for the Republic (CPR)	29	13.4
Popular Petition	26	12
Ettakatol	20	9.2
Democratic Progressive Party (PDP)	16	7.4
The Initiative (Al Moubadara)	5	2.3
Democratic Modernist Pole (PDM)	5	2.3
Afek Tounes	4	1.8
Al Badil Althawri	3	1.4
Democratic Socialist Movement	2	0.9
Movement of the People	2	0.9
16 independent lists	1 each	0.5
Total	217	

The National Constituent Assembly

The first democratically free and fair election of Tunisia took place on 23 October 2011 after about ten months from the beginning of the revolution. In results of the

election organized by the Independent Election Committee (ISIE), two facts showed up surprising those waiting for the results. First is the low turnout of the voters with the percentage of 51% of the registered voters. The second surprise is that Ennahda won the elections predominantly with 37% of the votes, although it could not get the majority in the parliament with 89 deputies.

But the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) had a diversity and dynamic structure. It made first meeting on 22 November and in December Moncef Marzouki was elected as interim president. Marzouki appointed Hamadi Jebali from Ennahda as prime minister of the country. Subsequently new coalition government was formed led by the Islamist Ennahda with other two secularist parties, Congress for the Republic (in French acronym CPR) of Marzouki and Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties (known also as Ettakatol), which is also called Troika government.

The main aim of the NCA was to draft a new constitution, and at the same time to conduct administrative affairs. The importance of drafting the constitution, with already debates on its characteristics, Ennahda-led government caused the exacerbation of conflict between the Islamists and secular groups. Ennahda was accused of hiding its real intention, in other words to demolish the secular modernist structures and thus to Islamize the country. In addition, it was faced with accusations such as corruption and clientelism. Much as Ennahda was open to negotiations, it could not frustrate the increasing of the tension. That is why two leftist dissident activists were assassinated in 2013, Chokri Belaïd in February and Mohamed Brahmi in July. On the assassinations, an organization named the Leagues for the Protection of the Revolution was deemed responsible, which is claimed that it consists of the Islamists and is instigated by Ennahda.

In the face of the pressure from both grassroots and the assembly, Ennahda made a compromise and voluntarily withdrew from the power. A technocrat government was formed by Mehdi Jomaa, former Minister of Industry, who is independent. This government remained in charge until the end of 2014 when the new parliament was elected.

On escalation of conflict, many civil initiatives were taken by groups from labor unions, human rights organizations and professional associations in order to contribute to subside the crisis. In this direction, Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet was established in the summer of 2013 by the four biggest civil society organizations of the country. Among of them were the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (UTICA), the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH) and the Tunisian Order of Lawyers. The main aim of the National Dialogue was to gather the all parties around the table and to ensure the overcome disputes threatening the transition period. The activities of the National Dialogue were effective in withdrawing of Ennahda from the power and thus in calming down the political tension.

Nevertheless, despite all these difficulties and crises the NCA faced, it could be achieved to make political institutional reforms. It was the establishment of some instances regarding the judicial independence, prevention of the torture and fighting against corruption. These are Committee for the Supervision of Judiciary Justice, National Association of Torture Prevention and National Association Against Corruption.

Adoption of the New Constitution

One of the most crucial stages of the transition period after the revolution was establishment of the new constitution. It was adopted on 27 January 2014 with the affirmative votes by 200 of 217 NCA members in favor of the constitution which guarantees the fundamental rights and freedoms, human rights, freedom of belief, gender equality and also the right to a proper environment.

However, highly charged debates took place in the making process on every article of the constitution, which happened between the Islamist and secularist parties. The main issues in these debates were the civil character of the state, source of the law, the equality between men and women and the importance attributed to Islam in the constitution.

Ennahda was initially eager in being accepted sharia as source of the law, described the relation between men and women as “complementary” not “equal” and

emphasized Islam in the constitution. But secular parties reacted against these demands, and because of both high political tension in the country and unfavorable events in Egypt Ennahda backed down from its demands. As a result, even if it was mentioned in the constitution that religion of the state is Islam, the sharia was not accepted as source of the law.

While one of the main concerns debated in making process of the constitution was on maintaining the secular modernity, another significant one was on establishment of a new state structure not allowing any attempt to authoritarian consolidation because of the painful experiences in the past. Therefore, in the constitution while authority of the president was decreased, authority of the parliament and prime minister was strengthened in order to share the power to prevent a probable autocratic consolidation. In addition, it was decided establishment of a new constitutional court which is responsible for checking the constitutional right of future legislative forms and preserving the division of powers.

Table 2.2. Results of the 2014 Legislative Elections (National Democratic Institute, 2014: 53)

Political Party	Number of Seats	Percentage
Nidaa Tounes	86	37.56
Ennahda	69	27.79
Free Patriotic Union (UPL)	16	4.02
Popular Front	15	3.66
Afek Tounes	8	3.02
Congress for the Republic (CPR)	4	2.14
Democratic Current	3	1.93
People's Movement	3	1.34
Al Moubadara	3	1.32
Current of Love	2	1.2
Others	8	8.99
Total	217	

Legislative and Presidential Elections in 2014

After the 2014 legislative elections, a different scene appeared in comparison to the National Constituent Assembly. Nidaa Tounes, which was established by Beji Kaid Essebsi in a line adopting Bourguibist secular modernity, won the elections with 86 deputies. Ennahda came in second with 69 deputies although lost power compared to the 2011 elections. The small partners of the Troika coalition government CPR of Moncef Marzouki and Ettakatol seriously declined. According to analysts, their power loss was due to disappointment of their secular party grassroots in partnership with the Islamist Ennahda. Accordingly, this can be seen as an indicator of level of political tension led by Islamist-secular division.

Table 2.3. Results of the 2014 Presidential Elections (National Democratic Institute, 2014: 54-55)

Candidate	Political Party	First Round (%)	Second Round (%)
Beji Caid Essebsi	Nidaa Tounes	39.46	55.68
Moncef Marzouki	CPR	33.43	44.32
Hamma Hammami	Popular Front	7.82	
Hachmi Hamdi	Current of Love	5.75	
Slim Riahi	UPL	5.55	
Kamel Morjane	Al Moubadara	1.27	
Ahmed Nejib Chebbi	Al Joumhour	1.04	
Others		5.68	

On the other hand, after about a month from the legislative elections Beji Kaid Essebsi got the first place in the presidential elections. Moncef Marzouki, supported also by Ennahda that did not field candidate, came in second. In the runoff Essebsi became the first president of the country who was elected in a democratically free and fair elections. Essebsi, who has taken charge many times in cabinets of both Bourguiba and Ben Ali, presented himself as inheritor of Bourguiba and even built his election campaign on Bourguibism by replicating his gestures. Besides, Essebsi's party Nidaa Tounes includes former RCD members and Destourians who follow the secular

modernist way of Bourguiba. In a sense, these results of the elections had symptoms of “soft restoration” for the transition period after the revolution.

The Main Issues Determining the Process

In Tunisia which has a quite homogeneity demographically in terms of ethnicity, religion and sect, the conflict between the Islamists and secularists was the most prominent point of tension not only after the revolution but also in former autocratic period of the country. This conflict became determinant in processes after the revolution such as formation of the National Constituent Assembly, organization of the elections and establishment of the new constitution. However, there is another aspect of this conflict which is related to the alleged link between radical Islamism (mainly Salafist groups such as Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia affiliated to al-Qaida) and terrorism. After the political assassinations of two leftist activists and subsequently turmoil because of harsh police response to the protests, the tension has already increased in the country. Besides, terrorist attacks were carried out by the radical Islamist groups against the security forces and thereupon Salafist organization Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia was listed as a terrorist organization.

The more critical terrorist threat was appeared in 2015 being witnessed two bloody terrorist attacks, Bardo National Museum attack on 18 March resulted in 22 deaths and Sousse attacks to a tourist resort on 26 June in which 38 people has died. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) claimed responsibility for the attacks. Subsequently, the President Beji Kaid Essebsi declared a state of emergency on 24 November after a suicide bombing attack in capital city of Tunis on the same day against a bus carrying presidential guards resulted in 12 deaths of them and also claimed by ISIL.

The attacks affected the country in many respects. Especially Bardo and Sousse attacks to the touristic place deepened the economic grievances in the country whose economy has depended on the tourism and already suffered from political and security crises. On the other hand, the state of emergency declared after the terrorist attacks threatened the transition period because of its potential to violation of rights in a particular period in which the country tried to achieve a transition from the authoritarian regime. In addition, it had political consequences threatening the relatively nonviolent and

peaceful political environment of the country by increasing the tension between the Islamists and secular groups.

With the claim to consolidate nascent democratization of the country and to fight against terrorism, Chartage Document was signed 13 July 2016 by political parties including Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes and organizations such as UGTT and UTICA. The document proposed the foundation of a national unity government.

On the other hand, one of the most prominent actors affected by the insecure environment as a result of the terrorist attacks was the Islamist Ennahda. Increasing the tension between the Islamists and secularists created pressure on Ennahda and forced it to reconsider its political stance and religious claims stemming from its origin. Because, while Ennahda had to eliminate secular suspicion regarding its alleged Islamization project of the society despite its participation in secular Nidaa Tounes-led coalition government on the one hand, it had to remove the Salafist critiques accusing it of conforming with the secular order by moving away from Islam on the other hand. Therefore, transition of Ennahda from political Islam to Muslim democracy needs to be read in this context.

Ennahda's ideological transformation was declared in its 10th congress in the May of 2016 which proposed a separation between political and religious activities of the movement. In an electronic vote before the congress, 93,5 percentage of Ennahda delegates voted in favor of separating the parties political and religious activities. Accordingly, it was announced in the congress that Ennahda is now a party of Muslim democrats not of political Islamists.

On the ditching political Islam, the leader of Ennahda Rachid Ghannouchi, in his article published in journal of Foreign Affairs, emphasized that the Islamic values still continue to guide their activities, but they “no longer consider the old ideological debates about the Islamization or secularization of the society to be necessary” because the state no longer enforces the society to be secular by repression tools and “Tunisians are less concerned about the role of religion than about building a governance system that is democratic and inclusive and that meets their aspirations for a better life” (Ghannouchi, 2016; 59).

Ghannouchi also underlined that Ennahda should now be seen not as an Islamist movement but as a party of Muslim democrats. For him, accordingly, they as Ennahda movement “seek to create solutions to day-to-day problems that Tunisians face rather than preach about the hereafter” (Ghannouchi, 2016; 64).

It also needs to bear in mind that Ennahda, instead of any other Arab Islamist group, takes Justice and Development Party (in Turkish acronym AKP) of Turkey as a model, which has a claim of conservative democracy for its political position rather than the Islamist (Marks 2017, 104). Rachid Ghannouchi rejected the comparisons during his return to the country from exile between him and Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran and highlighted that he compared his views to those of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the founding leader of AKP.

On the other hand, insecure environment stemming from multiple terrorist attacks and suicide bombings has induced the appearance of the securitization discourse. In the context of securitization, while the achievements after the revolution have been curtailed, it has been increased the radius of action of the security forces for the sake of public order and national security. Accordingly, the fight against terrorism and Islamist extremism has become the focus of discussions of police violence, impunity and absence of criminal liability (Günay and Somnavilla 2019; 2-4).

Police unions have strongly taken role in the process in an attempt to lobby for the restrictive anti-terror law and forced the government to pass a police protection law providing the impunity for the police. In this context, one of the most important examples of the police impunity and absence of criminal liability was the attempt of two police union to disrupt the trial of their five colleagues accused of the torture in a court in city of Ben Arous on 26 February 2018. (Grewal 2018; 4-5) These attempts should be inferred in terms of an intention to suspend the rights and to quell social protests and demonstrations assessed to be a threat to public order and national security (Günay and Somnavilla 2019; 7).

Generally speaking, on the post-revolutionary process, although the security forces protecting the Ben Ali regime have partly been dissolved, they have remained resilient. In this process, the main aim of the police unions was to insulate the police from the

reform regarding accountability, criminal liability and civilian oversight on the police. Because, according to their argumentation, the country was facing multiple terrorist attacks threatening the national security and thus it needs to be applied an effective war on terror strategy. As such, the police should, they argue, be given broader authority for a successful war on terror. Therefore, in this situation any objection to police impunity and absence of criminal liability or any demand for trial of police officers who committed an illegal act could be seen as a support for terrorism on the strength of the securitization discourse (Valsh, 2019).

Although the 2014 Constitution designated an apolitical position of the security forces, did not give a sufficient guaranty for the civilian oversight and check on the police. On the other side, Western donors and partners did not criticize the political scene in Tunisia emanating from the securitization discourse, on the contrary supported the anti-terrorism policies and undemocratic measures of the Tunisian government. Besides, Western partners such as European Union and the US enhanced their military aids to the country. The refugee crisis and the raise in the number of terrorist attacks claimed by the Islamist groups across the world in 2015 became effective in adoption of the support by Western partners (Günay and Somavilla 2019; 2).

Finally, after the revolution Tunisia suffered from serious economic problems. The political crises and security concerns too consumed the energy which needed to spend for the economic recovery. Accordingly, the main concern of the Tunisian society is still economic issues due to the inability of the governments for the elimination of socio-economic grievances. Therefore, many Tunisians maintained to pour into streets at every turn after the 2011 uprisings. Only in January 2016, 124 social protests were held, and this was the highest number from 2011, the revolutionary period. The main motivation of these protests was the socio-economic grievances emanating from the high rate of unemployment, economically disenfranchisement, high cost of living and corruption (Vatthauer and Weipert-Fenner 2017; 9-15).

In addition to that, in an already predicament economically, on 13 September 2017 the Tunisian parliament adopted a law, the Administrative Reconciliation Law, which provide impunity for civil servants who are involved in corruption and embezzlement during the Ben Ali regime and further opportunity of return for them to former

positions of power. Beji Kaid Essebsi declared that it was intended to improve the investment climate because the reconciliation goes for only who returned the stolen money which would be used for the national development projects. However, it did not work, and the law was considered a threat to ongoing and future investigations of the corruption and an ill effect on those who will take responsibility for criminal actions (Human Rights Watch 2017; 1-3).

Legislative and Presidential Elections in 2019

Tunisia is still ruled by a national unity government formed in process of the Carthage Agreement in Summer of 2016, including two biggest parties the secular Nidaa Tounes and the Islamist Ennahda, with the participation of other small parties and non-governmental actors. However, the government could not achieve redress socio-economic grievances and escalating discontent of the Tunisian people. Problems such as youth unemployment and corruption increasingly continued since beginning of the 2011 uprising and led to new riots. In the year of 2018, a tense protest erupted in January against new budget law bringing new taxes on the commodities (Blaise, 2018), civil servants went on strike in November to protest mounting inflation and government’s refusal to rise wages (“General strike in Tunisia against government cuts,” 2018) and a young journalist Abderrezak Zorgui set himself on fire in December to denounce unemployment and economic conditions. Zorgui was one of 300 people who died because of self-immolation since Mohamed Bouazizi’s act (“Journalist Dies In Self-Immolation, Prompting Protests In Tunisia,” 2018).




Figure 2.1. Governments and Cabinet Reshuffles in Eight Years (Yerkes & Yahmed 2019: 1)

On the other hand, new political balances appeared in the Tunisian parliament. Youssef Chahed who has carried on the task of prime ministry from the Nidaa Tounes since 2016 conflicted with his party because of effectiveness of Hafedh Essebsi, son of the president Beji Kaid Essebsi, within the party. In this process, a new bloc named National Coalition was established to support the prime minister Chahed, and then turned into a political party Tahya Tounes (Long Live Tunisia) led by Youssef Chahed. From a similar reason, Mohsen Marzouk had left the Nidaa Tounes and formed a new party Machrouu Tounes (Project Tunisia) in 2016. With the last split, winner of the 2014 elections with 86 seats the Nidaa Tounes regressed to third place in the parliament, as Ennahda became the biggest party and the National Coalition bloc took the second place. This situation signaled power struggle before the presidential and parliamentary elections in Autumn of 2019 (“Tunisian President Beji Caid Essebsi’s Nidaa Tounes party splits again,” 2019).

Table 2.4. Results of the 2019 Presidential Elections (ISIE, 2019)

Candidate	Political Party	First Round (%)	Second Round (%)
Kais Saied	Independent	18.40	72.71
Nabil Karoui	Heart of Tunisia	15.58	27.29
Abdelfettah Mourou	Ennahda	12.88	
Abdelkrim Zbidi	Independent	10.73	
Youssef Chahed	Tahya Tounes	7.38	
Safi Said	Independent	7.11	
Lotfi Mraïhi	People’s Movement	6.56	
Seifeddine Makhlouf	Dignity Coalition	4.37	
Abir Moussi	Free Destourian Party	4.02	
Mohamed Abbou	Democratic Current	3.63	
Moncef Marzouki	Movement Party	2.97	
Mehdi Jooma	Tunisian Alternative	1.82	
Others		4.55	

After death of the president Beji Kaid Essebsi in office, the presidential elections, initially planned for November 17 and 24, were brought forward, because new

president should take office within 90 days after death of a president. Therefore, the elections were held on September 15, but none of contestants could receive a majority and hence the runoff election was held on October 13 between the top two candidates. In the elections in which many political veterans including former prime ministers and presidents competed, as a law professor non-partisan Kais Saied surprisingly took the first place with 18,4%, a media mogul Nabil Karoui as candidate of Heart of Tunisia party came in second with 15,58% of votes. Saied won the runoff election with overwhelming majority by receiving 72,71% of votes. According to analysts, his victory is due to huge support from the youth (“Retired academic wins Tunisia election,” 2019).

Table 2.5. Results of the 2019 Legislative Elections (ISIE, 2019)

Political Party	Number of Seats	Percentage
Ennahda	52	19.63
Heart of Tunisia	38	14.55
Free Destourian Party	17	6.63
Democratic Current	22	6.42
Dignity Coalition	21	5.94
People’s Movment	15	4.53
Tahya Tounes	14	4.08
Republican People’s Movement	3	2.10
Tunisian Alternative	3	1.61
Afek Tounes	2	1.54
Nidaa Tounes	3	1.51
Machrouu Tounes	4	1.43
Others	23	30.03
Total	217	

In the parliamentary elections held in October 6, while Ennahda won a majority with 52 seats, the Heart of Tunisia party of Nabil Karoui came in second with 38 deputies. They were followed by the Democratic Current with 22, People’s Movement with 16 and Tahya Tounes with 14. The remaining 75 seats were won by the other parties (“Ennahda wins Tunisian parliamentary election,” 2019). In this table of results, there

is no option but coalition government. Although the majority party has right to form the government according to the constitution and laws, it seems that such a deeply fragmented parliament does not allow for domination of a party. On the other hand, the parliament elected Ennahda's Rachid Ghannouchi as its president with support of the Heart of Tunisia party ("Tunisia parliament elects Ennahda's Rachid Ghannouchi as speaker," 2019).

For the political analysts, results of the elections showed that the voters desired to punish the parties which dominated the post-revolutionary political space and used a punitive vote through the ballot box. While it is Ennahda which was least affected by the punitive vote and came in first place although it lost some seats, the elections brought forth new parties which had no presence before. When compared with the previous elections in 2011 and 2014, the 2019 elections have importance for the future of Tunisia. In the first elections after the 2011 uprising, anti-regime parties won the elections, while the political landscape shifted, and figures of the old regime appeared in the 2014 elections. As it seems, in the 2019 elections the political landscape has shifted once more ("Tunisia after legislative and parliamentary elections," 2019).

CHAPTER 3: THE IDEA OF TUNISIANITE AND THE BOURGUIBIST DISCOURSE ON MODERNITY

This chapter will elaborate on the transition process after “the Jasmine Revolution” in which, although a set of political institutional reforms took place, the noncoercive apparatuses were operated to prevent a revolutionary break with the past and also to maintain the former power relations for the sake of hegemony of the ruling class. Therefore, how *tunisianite* and Bourguibist modernity acted as hegemonic apparatuses in the process will be examined. In this context, firstly two shifts which comprise a basis for the operation of the hegemonic apparatuses mentioned will be scrutinized. One of them is the shift from the revolutionary demands to identity issues and the other is from pluralist consensus in the NCA to a “rotten compromise” between the secularist Nidaa Tounes and the Islamist Ennahda after the 2014 elections. Subsequently, how the idea of unisianite and the Bourguibist discourse on modernity acted as noncoercive hegemonic apparatuses will be analyzed.

3.1. From the Revolutionary Demands to Identity Issues

While the uprisings started in late 2010 in the interior regions of Tunisia these regional demonstrations swiftly transformed to a nationwide revolt. The country witnessed the emergence of the people composed of social groups from different classes and backgrounds. The main motivation of the people was to overthrow their dictator Ben Ali who ruled the country for 23 years as well as his authoritarian regime. In this process, the people emerged as a unifying actor consisted of distinct social groups which have come together around the notions, as can be seen in the slogans of the 2011 revolution, of dignity, freedom, social justice and equality (Jerad, 2013).

In fact, such an anti-Ben Ali union started to gradually rise, in which the dissidents from different backgrounds came to agreement in Tunisian opposition against the regime since the beginning of 2000s. In that sense, the 2011 national revolt ignited by the action of Bouazizi’s self-immolation revealed the people as a unitary actor, beyond the mentioned rapprochement between different opponent political parties, consisting

of the workers, middle class, marginalized groups, civil servants and even some part of the upper class. Accordingly, this unitary actor was able to topple Ben Ali. However, it has gradually dispersed and divided after the departure of Ben Ali as to constitute or create a new political structure in the country.

The people as a sum of the revolutionary groups who stood as one against the regime in its complete rejection of the status quo started being fragmented because of the tensions in the uncertain space of the post-Ben Ali period. These tensions appeared in the conflict between the legitimacies of the established government with its institutions and the revolutionary street, and also between the different groups within the people. The latter was based on the conflicting approaches to the notions of justice, freedom and equality on one hand, the conflicting future expectations for the country emanating from their longstanding opposite world views on the other. As a result, this division within the people signaled the shifting from the revolutionary demands for change to the issues concerning identities. It was evident in the isolation of the revolutionary groups, especially the youth, from the process (Yerkes, 2017).

The more prominent point in which this shifting became visible was the demonstrations in the capital city of Tunis. In the Kasbah square, in which the Prime Minister holds office, a pluralist body including the union members, activists, Islamists and youth from the interior regions of the country protested to demand for radical revolutionary advance towards the eradication of the regime completely and thus the establishment of a new political order. However, in al-Menzah a middle-class neighborhood in the city of Tunis the protests were organized which called for the return to normalcy and the protesters demanded for a clear leadership for the country because they saw the political crisis that appeared after Ben Ali as a threat to the Tunisian nation. While the former pointed out a pluralism and heterogeneity coming together around the revolutionary demands such as the resignation of ministers of the former regime and the elections for a constituent assembly, the latter put forward the idea of patriotism as a component of the Tunisian national identity that refers to the concept of *tunisianite* (Saidani, 2012: 54).

On the other hand, a possible victory of Islamist Ennahda in the elections of the constituent assembly caused a fear among secularists including ruling elites who steered the

country since the independence. Therefore, urban organized, mostly secular, actors dissociated themselves from the more radical revolutionary demands for change. In the High Authority (for the realization of the objectives of the revolution, for political reforms and democratic transition) formed as a composition of the government-led Political Reform Committee and the opposition-led National Committee, secular, progressive and leftist members strove for limiting the sovereignty of the National Constituent Assembly which will be formed. In this regard, they stipulated a republican pact for all political processing so as to maintain the secular and modernist structures of the country (Zemni, 2016: 138).

On the other hand, as the social mobilizations shifted to identity issues, political debates started being controlled by the main political parties and elites. Therefore, some part of the people who poured into streets to overthrow Ben Ali felt themselves isolated from the political discussions and some others especially youth from disenfranchised and marginalized segments of the society were attracted by the Salafi organizations. A cleavage, hence, appeared between formal politics and revolutionary ideals. These excluded groups criticized elitist character of the ongoing process. As Iyad Ben Achour, president of the High Authority, summed up this cleavage, “the results show there is an essential difference between the people of the revolution and the people of the elections.” (Powell, 2012).

3.2. Consensus Shifting to a “Rotten Compromise”

Very early on post-Ben Ali period in Tunisia, one of the most critical contested issues was the conflict between legitimacy of seated political institutions and legitimacy of the revolutionary street. While the former was the concern about any possible collapse of the state structure, the latter persistently demanded for the dissolution of the former regime structures (mostly referred to RCD, the ruling party under Ben Ali) and so the establishment of a new political order based on the revolutionary notions such as dignity, freedom and social justice. In this sense, the most debated point was related to the exclusion of officials and members of the former regime (who served to the RCD rule) from the new political space. Hence, the question of what kind of a relation between the post-revolutionary political actors there should be was a central question. But more importantly the question of the approaches of the former regime agents who have still a potential to surface on political scene.

After the 2011 October elections resulted in victory of the Islamists, in the National Constituent Assembly an Ennahda-led coalition was formed, a Troika government, with two other secular partners CPR and Ettakatol. Ennahda had initially promised a consensual power sharing between the Islamists and secular parties, and so the competencies were proportionally distributed among partners of the Troika government; prime ministry to Hamadi Jebali (Ennahda), presidency to Moncef Marzouki (CPR) and the NCA presidency to Ben Jaafar (Ettakatol) (Boubekeur 2015, 8).

Nevertheless, Ennahda adopted a scary way in terms of both realization of the revolutionary aims and approach to the state of the former regime agents, because of its traumatic experience in 1990s by the regime under Ben Ali. For example, although his known close relation to the Ben Ali regime and whose resignation from the Ministry of Interior in the interim government after the revolution was demanded, Ennahda appointed Habib Essid as security affairs consultant to the Jebali cabinet. Similarly, Chedly Ayari who was appointed in critical positions in the former regime governments was appointed as general manager of the Central Bank (Boubekeur 2015, 9).

Although such uneasy decisions in terms of the revolutionary demands, the NCA was able to form a pluralist political sphere focusing on the solutions of socio-economic grievances and judiciary problems. Its structure was suitable for a pluralist politics and antagonist debates to establish a future in the country in accordance with the revolutionary demands such as freedom, social justice, equality and economic dignity. In addition, although the state of emergency was in force at that time, it was hardly ever used by the political actors in order to repress the demands and social protests by using the security concerns of the state to preserve the stability. Agonistic discussions took place in the NCA between deputies from very broad political spectrum, which were much critical for future of the country, such as the state of religion, the type of government, the freedom of faith and equality between men and women. In the process, especially drafting the new constitution, Ennahda made concessions to reach a compromise. Along with the bad experience of the movement during 1990s under the former regime, military coup in July 2013 in Egypt which removed Mohamed

Morsi from the power and started oppression over the Muslim Brotherhood had a huge effect on this strategy Ennahda adopted (Marzouki 2015, 6-7).

Even if Ennahda followed a chary way criticized by its rank and files and other revolutionary groups, it could not get free from being accused by the secularist milieus of having a hidden agenda on Islamization of the country. In this process, the tension increased in politics especially between the Islamist and secular blocks. With the polarization because of the increasing tension, Nidaa Tounes, established in 2012 by Beji Kaid Essebsi who took charge in cabinets in the authoritarian regime era, imposed itself as a main political force in the country. The party appeared as a composition of secular democrats, leftists, former UGTT members and the former regime actors and adopted an anti-Islamist approach. After the two assassinations of leftist opponent politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi, a protest campaign “Errahil” (Departure), resembling to the Tamarrud campaign against Morsi in Egypt, was organized in Summer 2013, demanding for the dissolution of the NCA, resignation of the Troika government as well as discharge of governors and officials appointed by Ennahda. While this intensified the pressure over Ennahda-led government, Nidaa-led opposition found an opportunity to consolidate its front as a savior, “playing Ben Ali’s traditional repertoires national unity and in particular Tunisian identity.” Hence, the representatives of the former authoritarian regime returned to the political space in the opposition ranks (Boubekeur 2015, 10-11).

With the refusal of Ennahda to withdraw from the power, the crisis deepened and then 60 deputies from the Nidaa-led opposition block withdrew from the NCA to protest the Ennahda’s refusal. Hence, the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet took initiative to gather the all parts together around a table in order to find a solution to save the country from the verge of a possible civil war. In the meantime, Ghannouchi and Essebsi met in a close meeting in Paris in August 2013. Eventually, Ennahda which adopted a risk avoidance strategy because of traumatic memory and the events in Egypt mentioned above, accepted the conditions imposed in the national sessions led by the Quartet. In late 2013, Ennahda withdrew from the power voluntarily and a technocrat government was formed by nonpartisan Mehdi Jomaa. Subsequently, the new constitution was accepted with an overwhelming majority of the NCA in January 2014.

What is important to note here is that under these extraordinary circumstances such a compromise on the constitution prevented the emergence of a new political space based on pluralism. The polarization between the Islamist and anti-Islamist camps absorbed the political diversity spontaneously appeared after the revolution allowing to focus on more social and economic grievances rather than on ideological and identity issues. On the other hand, legislative reform could not be achieved terms of the revolutionary aims. The most important example of this inefficiency is the continuity of 1978 state of emergency law and the penal code which threatens the pluralism and many civil liberties such as freedom of speech. (Marzouki 2015, 9-10).

In addition, another question was the transitional justice which remained as a matter of debate from the start. It was a clear failure in preventing return of the former RCD actors to the public space and also in prosecution of them. On the other hand, a transitional justice would need a more holistic process aiming at redressing both material and discursive legacies of the former authoritarian regime. In this regard, one of the critical failure points was the redistribution of the wealth and power, not only between the classes but also the regions, which means in Tunisian context the south disenfranchised by the former regime from economic and political rights against the prosperous north (Mullin and Rouabah 2014).

In parallel with the shift from the revolutionary socio-economic demands to the identity issues mentioned in previous section, the consensual politics including pluralism started transforming into a “rotten compromise” shaped by ideological and identity conflicts and hence downplaying the economically regional disparity, societal grievances and requests of justice and freedom. In addition to this shifting, such a deterioration in the transition process can be understood through the division between the old regime and the revolutionary opposition including people from different classes, regions and ideologies in early post-revolutionary period gave way to a division between the Islamist and secularist blocs (Boubekeur 2015, 7).

After the 2014 legislative and presidential elections, this “rotten compromise” intensified through the alliance between the secular Nidaa Tounes, winner party with 86 deputies, and the Islamist Ennahda which came in second with 69 deputies. The

election campaign of Nidaa Tounes and Essebsi was based on the notions of providing the national security, reestablishing the Tunisian national identity, reinstating prestige of the state and reasserting the state authority ruined by the Ennahda-led government within the NCA. Especially Bourguibist discourse used in political propaganda was important in terms of discerning the signals of intent to a “restoration of the state” on behalf of the *ancient regime*. On the other hand, Ennahda also adopted partly security and national identity discourses in its own election campaign. These discourses based on security, national identity and national unity were reminiscent not of authentic consensual politics achieved since 2011 but of those used by Ben Ali through “the national pact” in 1988 strengthening the authoritarian resilience rather than political pluralism (McCarthy 2019, 7). As a result of this shifting, “notions of national unity, stability and consensus took precedence over ideas of dissent, contestation and pluralism” (Marzouki and Meddeb 2016, 124-25).

In this process, the proliferation of terrorist attacks in 2015 provided a basis for intensification of such attempts to reintegrate the power relations and structures of the former regime on the one hand, strengthened Nidaa Tounes’s hand against Ennahda to force it to support the securitization policies underpinning these relations and structures of the former regime. Ghannouchi highlighted, in his speech in May 2016 congress of Ennahda, that the state is a ship of all Tunisians without exception, and it is not true to challenge it and to weaken its power. In fact, this was not just a rhetoric. Since Ennahda deputies voted in favor of a new anti-terrorism law although many human rights organizations called attention to its more repressive content than Ben Ali’s old law (McCarthy 2019, 9).

Moreover, in the Carthage agreement Ennahda accepted its commitment to “draining the springs of terrorist financing” which is reminiscent of the campaign in late 1980s to exterminate social and cultural bases of Ennahda. Although the terrorist threat started decreasing in 2016, Ennahda maintained its adoption to the security discourse. Accordingly, Ennahda seemed to consent with the former regime elites and continuity with the past for the sake of inclusion in the institution-building process by enjoying opportunities of the revolution. On the other hand, Ennahda, Nidaa Tounes and other participant parties and organizations in the Carthage negotiations unanimously decided to postpone the divisive issues such as economic reform and transitional justice, and

so to give priority to preservation of the stability, national unity and security. Iyad Ben Achour, president of the High Authority, although he had argued for consensus before, criticized this compromise by pointing to postponing crises could create bigger crises in the future. As a result, as the agreement annihilated the vigorous agonistic debates within the NCA because of its insistence on the imperativeness of national unity, this rotten compromise sidelined the revolutionary demands of the 2011 uprisings such as redress of the socio-economic grievances and realization of social and transitional justice (McCarthy 2019, 8).

With the shifts from revolution to identity and from pluralist consensus to rotten compromise, the main objective of post 2014 official political discourse was to lessen the conflict and violence, stemming from the 2011 uprisings to change the regime, through conciliating tools. Hence, the main tendency of this political discourse fostered by Nidaa-Ennahda coalition was to marginalize any opponent approach over the power and meaning, to delegitimize political dissent and to criminalize social protest. In this regard, this tendency was evident in the fetwa published by the mufti, who has the highest religious authority in the country, saying that social protests are religiously haram on account of the fact that they damage the country and retard the economic recovery (Marzouki and Meddeb 2016, 124).

In this attempt there is a contradiction. Because, as mentioned before, a great majority of social protests organized after the 2011 uprisings were based on the socio-economic demands and thus the protesters already demanded for a redress of the economic woes. With this, the political protagonists, as explained above, replaced the identity issues with the socio-economic demands. Therefore, this was one of the pacific means used by the dominant class in order to create a consent from large part of the society at the level of faith and sentiment and also prevent any pressure from the public. Although some politicians contested this attempt, it was very weak when considered the harsh response of the security forces to the protesters and denunciatory statements of the President Beji Kaid Essebsi about the protests. He condemned the social demonstrations demanding for transparency and accountability in the use of public funds by showing reason that they made the country fertile for terrorism (Marzouki 2015).

In addition, politicization of terrorism was clearly abused by the security forces, which are the most conspicuous symbol of maintainability of the former authoritarian regime's oppression and corruption, in order to isolate themselves from a clear change after the revolution. In that sense, it was argued that the police should be exempt from the reform on the plea of necessity of an active war on terrorism and reassertion of the national security. Accordingly, the police unions organized protests against the trial of their colleagues accused of torture during the 2011 uprisings. However, this attempt to provide impunity for the police threatened the civil liberties achieved in the revolutionary period. Any objection to the police impunity was, however, accused of supporting terrorism.

3.3. The Idea of Tunisianite

Praised as an only success story of the Arab uprisings in 2011, Tunisia was able to succeed in forming democratic institutions so as to alleviate social divisions. With the organization of free and fair elections and the adoption of a new constitution, the country seemed to achieve a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. However, the Tunisian transition witnessed a struggle over the power and definitions of Tunisian national identity between those who participated in the uprisings to overthrow the authoritarian regime completely and the ruling elite that ruled the country since the independence. In this struggle, the idea of *tunisianite* became a hegemonic apparatus of the ruling elite, determining the boundaries towards what kind of a transition, and to a what extent, can be put into practice.

With the shift from the revolutionary socio-economic demands to the issues concerning identity and also from the consensus fostering the political pluralism after the 2011 elections to a "rotten compromise" between former adversary parties based on national security and state prestige in post 2014, material and discursive legacies of the former regime was able to find an easy way to consolidate its power in order to control the power vacuum emerged after the departure of Ben Ali. In the post-Ben Ali period, the engendering of a conflict-ridden society caused the emergence of a polarization based on contending societal projects for future of the country. Further, with the assassinations of two secular politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi the Tunisian transition was exposed to a danger of derailing (Zemni, 2017: 140).

In the midst of the rising political and social schism and increasing anxiety about the national security crisis, the idea of *tunisianite* gradually emerged as a unifying factor bridging the gap between the polarized sections of the society. Since the main emphasis was on the necessity of national unity and consensus in the political debates. However, the idea of *tunisianite* served as exclusivist apparatus for those who do not subscribe to its definition of Tunisian identity. The idea mainly has a patriotic content emphasizing on the Tunisian specificity historically as well as identity. In this sense, the Tunisian identity is inevitably defined by the ideas of realism, repudiation of any kind of extremism and moderation (Zemni, 2017: 141). As the former president Beji Caid Essebsi remarks, *tunisianite* points out that Tunisia does not recognize itself:

[I]n any political, ideological or religious extremism, just like it rejects class struggle or proletarian dictatorship and rejects tribal or social fragmentation. The tunisianité is a culture of moderation, of realism and consensus. We draw from Islam the idea of ‘nation of the middle’ which seeks to bring together and unify and favors persuasion rather to coercion. Tunisianité rests on the principle of national unity, natural solidarity and voluntary cohesion of all the nation’s social layers. It rejects all dogmatisms and cultivates the spirit of tolerance and the sense of relativity (cited in Zemni, 2016: 142).

When considered the use of *tunisianite* by both Bourguiba and Ben Ali in order to consolidate the resilience of their authoritarian rules and thus to delegitimize any objection as well as to pacify a likely societal violence against the regime, it is evident that the idea of *tunisianite* has a hegemonic power determining the acceptable in the Tunisian politics (Mullin and Rouabah, 2016: 173). The dominant class needs not only a domination based on coercion over other classes, but also a national narrative in order to reinforce its hegemony, employing inclusion and exclusion mechanisms. In this regard, the idea of *tunisianite* served as a unifying ideology comprise a basis for transformation of national belonging by the dominant class into hegemonic narrative based on national identity (Merone 2014, 2-3).

As the followers of Bourguibian nationalism, with other secular allies, has excluded the Islamists for decades from being determinant in shaping the national ethos by using discourse of modernity and thus labelling them as backward, in the post-revolutionary period the Islamists were included the political system. Moreover, they seemed to consent to hegemony of the idea of *tunisianite*. It was evident in moderate politics of

Ennahda in which, however, by making concessions, it signaled a clear break with the past and struck an uneasy balance with the former regime elites for the sake of inclusion. On the other hand, while the Islamist-leaning middle class is eager to compromise and to overlook the continuities of unequal relations of the past, radical Salafi groups, which found a public space after the uprisings and mainly consisted of the disenfranchised youth from the marginalized regions, strongly insisted on a radical change in post-revolution period (Merone, 2014: 3).

Under such circumstances, the Salafi groups were excluded from the nation-building process and governance in transitional period. The radicalization of these disenfranchised part of the society as well as their exclusion from the economic and political benefits was evidence to understand what has not changed in Tunisia. In this regard, it was a striking example that a Salafist organization Ansar al-Sharia emerged in early post-uprisings was declared as a terrorist organization in 2013 by the Ministry of Interior of Ennahda-led Troika government. It was forbidden to act publicly, and its membership was outlawed. In this illegalization, some practices are reminiscent of those used in Ben Ali era against the Islamists; references to the anti-terrorism law and dissipation of evidences of its involvement in terrorist activities (Merone, 2014: 7).

Accordingly considering the regional disparity established under Bourguiba and maintained in Ben Ali era, whose roots are in the modernization period of the country, working in favor of the dominant classes, exclusion of the Salafist disenfranchised groups and inclusion of Ennahda through concessions cemented the hegemony of the ruling elites that ruled the country since the independence. As a result, the idea of *tunisianite* served as a way of exclusion, beyond its unifying form leading to compromise. Salafism, for instance, although its reality in the society and roots in history of the country, was seen as a strange identity that does not belong to the Tunisian national identity, *tunisianite* (Merone 2014, 9). Given its way of inclusion and exclusion, *tunisianite* ideologically cements the historical bloc that controlled the Tunisian politics from the independence and serves as a discourse creating hegemony through pacific means, beyond concrete coercion and oppression. Hence, “it creates consent to the ruling classes and social groups, their leadership in ruling the nation because of their apparent ability to address and resolve societal problems and their

prestige that is intimately linked to the prestige of the State itself (*haybat ad-dawla*)” (Zemni, 2016: 147).

To better grasp the functions of creating consent to hegemony of ruling class in Tunisia, one needs to scrutinize the political crisis emerged in Summer of 2013 in which a wide range of demonstrations took place after the political assassinations, demanding the resignation of the Ennahda-led Troika government which has electoral legitimacy, and subsequently civil initiatives emerged in the works of the UGTT, with other allies in the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, in order to gather all parties together around a table for a compromise. In this process, it is clearly seen that the UGTT functioned on a political, or hegemonic, level (Zemni, 2016: 148).

In the post-Ben Ali period, the Troika government was accused of corroding prestige of the State by bringing into question the ideological cement of the old dominant classes. It has in some way strove for exclusion of the former regime actors and realization of transitional and social justice in line with the revolutionary demands. Moreover, it has attempted to reexamine heritage of oppressive secularism and redefine the relationship between the state, religion and politics (Mullin and Rouabah, 2016: 172-73). In doing so, it has tried to redress the socio-economic cleavages and to include the marginalized parts in the nation-building process. However, hegemony of the former ruling elites was, as mentioned above, build on these cleavages and marginalization based on not just class but also region. As a result, transitional justice remained as superficial not substantial and the former regime’s actors returned to the politics due to the centralization of *tunisianite* through the discourses such as national unity, consensus, reconciliation and moderation. The works of the UGTT and also the Quartet, in this process, has become effective by placing these discourses into the politics. Therefore, “in a Gramscian way, the UGTT; as part of a vocal and active civil society; thus epitomized the double function of civil society as being part of producing hegemony of the ruling classes but, at the same time, also indicating the possibilities of critique” (Zemni, 2016: 147-48).

Consequently, in the 2011 uprisings in Tunisia “the people” emerged as a unifying factor coming from different social classes and groups together around the revolutionary ideals. These ideals were, as is also understood from the slogans chanted

during the uprising, dignity, freedom, equality and socio-economic justice. From this perspective, it was clear that “the people” as a unity was including those who suffered from corruption and repressions of the former regime, and hence excluding hegemony of the former ruling elites. However, as this unity disappeared suddenly after the departure of Ben Ali, a conflict-ridden society led to a polarized political space on the identity issues. After its disappearance, the idea of *tunisianite* was reestablished as a unitary factor which is based on a specific Tunisian national identity, on the one hand imposing a type of citizenship which is moderate and also opponent to any type of radicalism as well as, on the other, expurgating economic and regional disparity, social cleavages and class conflict. Therefore, contrarily to the former, *tunisianite* was including formations which ideologically create consent to hegemony of the ruling class and thus excluding the revolutionary notions aiming at changing the regime completely.

3.4. The Bourguibist Discourse on Modernity

As the idea of *tunisianite* determined the trajectory of the transition period as an ideological apparatus creating consent to hegemony of the ruling elite that ruled the country from the beginning, another hegemonic tool was the reestablishment of the Bourguibist modernity. Bourguiba, the first president of Tunisia, presented himself as father, and even embodiment, of the Tunisian nation. The legitimacy of his hegemony is emanating from his successful struggle for liberation of the country from its colonizer. After the independence, Bourguiba became the first president and made an effort to modernize Tunisia on the basis of secularism, progressivism, nationalism as well as westernizing reforms. He has always been compared with Turkey’s Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who is the creator of a top down modernization in Turkey, including secularist and Western-oriented characteristics (Brown, 2001: 57).

For Bourguiba, modernity meant “the overcoming of both economic and social underdevelopment, which was believed to be the product of backward institutions and social habits such as religious faith.” Hence, in the name of this developmental and progressive modernization, Bourguiba marginalized Islam by restraining it to the private space and loading the public space with secular and Western-oriented practices and institutions. Moreover, this attempt was supported by many secular Tunisians, despite its authoritarian form, and also considered Islamism an impediment to

modernization (Merone, 2014: 4). In this regard, it was critical that the laws compatible with such a modernity replaced the religious jurisdiction, the sharia. The embodiment of the modernization project of Bourguiba, hence, was the Personal Status Code introduced in 1956, on a large scale expanding the women's rights by demolishing religious tradition. In fact, Bourguiba was not antagonist of the religion of Islam, by subordinating Islam to the state, he aimed to obtain "monopoly of religious symbolism in order to maintain his position at the pinnacle of the political system, hence his rapid repression of the newly emerging Islamist political challenge." (McCarty, 2014: 741)

Beyond these strategic policies, Bourguibist narrative on modernity was based on a binary contrast which sets him against Islamism. In this contrast, while Bourguiba represented the modernizer figure, Islamists were the obscurantist and backward. According to this narrative, Islamism naturally was the adversary of modernity, progress and development (Zeghal, 2013: 262). As such, it consolidated a common sense to justify the suppression of the Islamists for the sake of developmental modernity, and hence secularization.

On the other hand, Bourguibist modernity was exhibited as a unifying norm that creates a national unity and cohesion adopted by every member of the Tunisian people without regard to their social status or class, and thus it can be defined as an ideological apparatus to reassert hegemony (Zederman, 2016: 187). On that sense, it was a hegemonic practice to obscure the social cleavage and class struggle refused by Bourguiba despite he recognized the reality of socio-economic injustice and regional disparity. In doing so, he desired to gather the masses together around his modernization project. For this reason, he formed a civil society composing of the national organizations as a mediator between the state and society in order to include the population in a national compromise, not a participant to the project but to mobilize the masses (Zemni, 2016: 148).

When considered the prevalent consensus around the figure of Bourguiba by the actors from the broad range of the politics, it is clearly seen that hegemony of his modernity continues its existence in the post-revolutionary period in Tunisia. The appearance of secular Nidaa Tounes as a main political actor in the process, whose principals are based on Bourguibism and whose leader was close to Bourguiba, proves the power of

hegemonic Bourguibist discourse on modernity. However, the more apparent indicator of its power is in the partial acceptance of the Islamist Ennahda to Bourguibist modernity, although it is a movement which has originally been opponent to it and violently repressed by the former authoritarian regime under both Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Hence its capacity in determining even the policies of its opponents. In this case, the idea of modern Tunisian nation constituted by Bourguiba is imposed as an ideology by default. Therefore, it can be examined that the ruling class reinforces its hegemony through way of civil society, imposing a common sense and dominant values willingly shared by the society as a whole (Zederman, 2016: 183).

Following the departure of Ben Ali, Ennahda placed the concept of consensus on center of its political strategy. Such a consensus was including more pluralist and open characteristics. However, after the 2014 elections Ennahda decided on inclusion in Nidaa Tounes-led coalition for the sake of consensual democracy. But this kind of consensus, legitimized by the necessity of national unity, evoked the discourse of compromise by Bourguiba and the “national pact” of Ben Ali. This continuity is crucial in terms of proving that the hegemony of Bourguibist modernity maintains its power in post-revolutionary period and remained untouched (Zederman, 2016: 190-91).

On the other hand, with the electoral victory of Ennahda in the 2011 elections, secularist camp, represented by Nidaa Tounes afterwards, emphasized on that the only through way of Tunisian democratic transition is the adherence to the Bourguibist modernity and modern achievements of the country. On this basis, while hallmarks such as modernity and progression were employed to identify Bourguiba and his heirs Nidaa Tounes, the words of regression, backwardness and obscurantism were used to describe the Islamists, i.e. Ennahda. This was evident in statement of Ahmed Ounaies of Nidaa Tounes, saying that they as seculars came up against obscurantism of the Islamism, hence Bourguiba was a visionary and he did not allow the Islamists to include in the State or the assembly because they damage the achievements of the Tunisian modernization (Zederman, 2016: 193).

It was reminiscent of the rhetoric used by Bourguiba and then Ben Ali, accusing the Islamist opponents of being impediment of progressive and development

modernization and hence arguing that modernity must be depend on a secularist way. In this way, Nidaa Tounes, with its allies from secular liberals and leftists, was arguing that it was the only protector of the modernity and thus deserving to rule the country. In a same vein, Beji Caid Essebsi had stressed the binary opposition between the Islamist and secularists in his statement in 2013, containing in itself a Bourguibist tone: We are for a modern state of the 21st century. They are for a society that has a religious connotation largely marked by imposing their ideas. We say a modern society needs a secular state where religion doesn't intervene. They want a state with Islamic coloring. We are moving in completely different directions (Essebsi, 2013 cited in McCarthy, 2014: 735).

The figure of Bourguiba and his discourse on modernity became determinant on not only asserting political power but also defining genuine type of the Tunisian national identity which corresponds to the true *tunisianite*. In the framework of this identity struggle, while the true modern *tunisianite* was naturally attributed to the secularists represented by the Nidaa Tounes, non-*tunisianite* was ascribed to the Islamist Ennahda. It was evident in explanation of Mahmoud Ben Romdhane in 2013, who is from the founders of Nidaa Tounes:

Ennahda wishes to erase the past and Tunisians consider that they are governed by occupiers. Ennahda and its leaders are alien to the history and the values of the country. They are destructing the culture and the values of the Tunisian habitus. [...] That is why the distinction between Nidaa Tounes' and Ennahda's project is about a Tunisian model versus an Islamic model. Bourguiba is coming back because he is the one who represents the best Tunisia and his modern Project (cited in Zederman, 2016: 194).

On the other hand, Ennahda's approach to the concept of modernity is distinct from Western-oriented conceptions, it is more based on the Tunisian historical culture and Islamic edifice, interpreting progressive ideas on the basis of Islamic values (Chomiak, 2011: 81). Therefore, Rachid Ghannouchi, the historic leader of Ennahda, accused Bourguiba of having a modernity project betraying the liberation movement of the country and forming a native colonialism based on the practices and ideas the colonizers. In this sense, Ennahda presented its conception as "genuine modernity" while regarding Bourguiba and his heirs Nidaa Tounes as a "pseudo modernity" or a

“fake and backward version of modernity” (Ghannouchi, 2000: 99-106 cited in Zederman, 2016: 197).

It was evident that, beyond the reality of being a modern, modernity is a site of struggle for power and also an apparatus of domination against the other, based on who is the true modern to rule the country. Ennahda’s approach is ambivalent. The alteration of its stance towards the Personal Status Code (PSC) proves its ambivalence. The Tunisian Islamists from the beginning rigorously opposed to the Code because of its incompatibility with the Islamic values. But then, Ennahda’s leaders considered it a part of Islamic heritage, not of Bourguibist modernization project. This evolution is clearly seen in the words of Ghannouchi: “We will not try to change the Code in any way, we see it as compatible with Islamic law. The code was written in the 1950s by Tunisian Muslim scholars like Abdel Aziz Gaid and Tahar Bin Ashour, through *ijtihad* or the reinterpretation of holy texts” (Usher, 2011). In a same vein, another Ennahda leader Abdelfattah Mourou, who harshly objected to the Code in the beginning, explained that:

What Sir Bourguiba has done is not deplorable in its entirety, he tried to bring some advancements for women outside the circles of Islam. While we could have done the same thing within the boundaries of Islam, however. Even before the revolution, we said that the Tunisian PSC fitted in the Muslim tradition. This was the outcome of a long-term reflection, a shift which has started in the 1981 and has continued to 1984 when we went out of prison. It is this approach that has led us to think this way, it’s not opportunism (cited in Zederman, 2016: 198).

CONCLUSION

When the confiscation of his products and derogatory attitudes of the regime officials lead to the self-immolation of street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi on 17 December 2010, triggering a nationwide revolt, it was shocking for many analysts how such popular protest could erupt in a country like Tunisia, which has a highly educated, moderate and relatively wealthy society. Beside the economic indicators proving that the country was going well, not long from the beginning of the uprising, the World Bank published a country brief on Tunisia for the year of 2010, which was subsequently removed, stating that “Tunisia has made remarkable progress on equitable growth, fighting poverty and achieving good social indicators” and also “has consistently scored above its income category in the Middle East and North Africa average on most dimensions of comparative governance ranking and development indexes.” In the statement it was argued that “Tunisia is far ahead in terms of government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption and regulatory quality.” (Kaboub, 2014: 1-2)

Malek Saghiri, who participated in the uprising on the front line, highlights the contradicting state of the country. For the time before the uprising, he says that the reality of Tunisians in the streets of cities, suburbs and internal areas is strongly distinct from the Tunisia presented on the TV channels, reports and official data. For him, the reality of Tunisia is corruption and police oppression (Saghiri, 2014: 23-24). From this perspective, in order to see the real dynamics of the Tunisian uprising, one needs to go beyond official data and indicators. For Tunisians, it was not surprising to revolt against corrupt and oppressive regime. As understood from the slogans chanted during the uprising, they demanded for their dignity, freedom, social justice and equality.

Eventually, the uprising that started on 17 December was able to overthrow the dictator Ben Ali, who fled the country on 14 January 2011. The toppling of Ben Ali resonated with not only the Tunisian people but also with international circles. It became known as “the 14th January Revolution” or “the Jasmine Revolution” by analysts. However, the biggest success is considered by the events after the “revolution” which was

regarded as a successful transition to democracy. With the unfavorable trajectory resulting in public disturbance, civil war or coup d'état in other countries also underwent anti-regime uprisings, Tunisia, so far, appears to be the only successful country in achieving a democratic transition.

In such an approach to the transitional period, the emphasis was on the robust civil society of the country. Accordingly, Tunisia was able to achieve a democratic transition from an authoritarian regime through its strong and proactive civil society. In this context, some institutional developments became prominent, such as the accruing of free and fair elections, broad political participation, consensus between the political parties and the establishing of a new constitution. The most apparent example was that of the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet won the Nobel Peace Prize because of its remarkable contributions to the democratization process of the country. According to this approach, civil society is the precondition of democratization, the guarantor of freedoms and also counterpart of the state countervailing its power.

Although this approach explains the Tunisian transitional period to a certain extent, it fails to clarify the continuing parts of the former regime. Because, this approach mainly focuses on the political institutional changes, but in order to grasp the absorption of the highly potential revolutionary transformation that emerged in 2011; the consolidation of the ruling elite's positions and thus the maintaining of former class power relations, one needs to go beyond the ostensible changes. Therefore, the Jasmine Revolution and developments subsequent to it should be evaluated in terms of the neutralization of mass dissidence, and the annihilation of a revolutionary break from the past. Certainly, such a neutralization and annihilation need a capability. To resort to the Gramscian conception, this ability can be explained through the concept of civil society. In this context, civil society presents the opportunity for a passive revolution which means the restoration of the state or revolution - that is not a revolution.

To pay attention to Malek Saghiri once again, in the text based on his own witnessing and observation during and after the uprisings, he emphasizes that he, and those like him, do not believe that the overthrowing of the dictator resulted in the actual overthrowing of the dictatorship (Saghiri, 2014: 54). His statement proves the necessity for a critical approach to the "Tunisian success story", celebrated by

existing literature and international circles. Because, Tunisia has a civil society in the meaning considered by Gramsci, serving to manufacture a consent to the hegemony of ruling elites that ruled the country since its independence.

In this context, the idea of *tunisianite* which marks the Tunisian national identity and the Bourguibist discourse on modernity were prominent in the transitional process, as the hegemony apparatuses prevents a possible revolutionary change and preserves the former power relations for the benefit of the ruling class. What made this hegemony project possible was the shift, right after the disappearance of Ben Ali, from revolutionary demands to a clear break in more identity-based issues such as patriotism, national identity, unity and security. On the other hand, the shift from the consensus in the National Constituent Assembly formed in 2011 presenting a political pluralism and intention to change the regime more radically to the “rotten compromise”, between the new and old elites, paved way for the realization of this hegemony project.

During the 2011 uprising “the people” emerged as a unifying political actor against the authoritarian regime. It was based on the revolutionary notions of dignity, freedom, socio-economic justice and equality, and hence excluding the hegemony of the ruling elite, and building on the social cleavages, economic and regional disparity. However, after the appearance of a conflict-ridden society led to political and social polarization, the idea of the *tunisianite* replaced ‘the people’ as the unifying factor. *Tunisianite* which means the Tunisian national identity, including patriotic content, was based on a narrative of the Tunisian specificity historically as well as identity. In this sense, the Tunisian identity is inevitably defined by the ideas of realism, repudiation of any kind of extremism and moderation (Zemni, 2017: 141). Given the notions constituting the idea of *tunisianite*, it had a capability to create a common sense of identity on the one hand, and to pacify revolutionary violence and class struggle on the other hand. Hence, while excluding the revolutionary demands for a clear break from the past, it upheld the hegemonic apparatuses maintaining the status quo.

When considering its way of inclusion and exclusion, *tunisianite* ideologically cements the historical bloc that controlled Tunisian politics since its independence and serves as a discourse creating hegemony through pacific means, beyond concrete

coercion and oppression. Hence, “it creates consent to the ruling classes and social groups, their leadership in ruling the nation because of their apparent ability to address and resolve societal problems and their prestige that is intimately linked to the prestige of the State itself (*haybat ad-dawla*)” (Zemni, 2016: 147).

In a similar way, Bourguibist modernity also was very potent in post-revolutionary Tunisia as a hegemonic power. Bourguibist modernity was based on secularism, progressivism and Western-oriented reforms, hence excluding the Islamists because of their alleged inherent opposition these modernist notions. Besides, Bourguibist modernity was a unifying norm creating national unity and cohesion adopted by every member of the Tunisian people without regard to their social status or class. Therefore, it can be defined as an ideological apparatus to reassert hegemony and as well as a hegemonic practice in order to conceal the social cleavage and class struggle derived from socio-economic injustice and regional economic disparity (Zederman, 2016: 187).

In this context, the appearance of the secular party Nidaa Tounes as a main political actor in the post-revolutionary period, adopting Bourguibist principles, manifests the power of hegemonic Bourguibist discourse on modernity. Moreover, the acceptance of the Bourguibist modernity, if not completely at least partly, by the Islamist Ennahda proves that it is still very potent in the transitional period in Tunisia. After the 2014 elections, Ennahda decided on an inclusion with the Nidaa Tounes-led coalition for the sake of consensual democracy. In this case, the idea of consensus put it in the center with concerns of national unity reinforcing the hegemonic Bourguibist discourse on modernity. In this process, Bourguibist modernity remained a site of struggle for legitimacy, and hence used by the parties in order to legitimatise themselves against another. In that sense, it determined the trajectory of the Tunisian transition and further delegitimized any other political and social project which would not subscribe to Bourguibist modernity.

The results of the 2019 parliamentary and presidential elections proved that the Tunisian case is still worth analyzing from different perspectives. The Tunisian voters desired to punish the political veterans who played dominant role in the post-revolutionary period is very clearly highlighted in their vote in favor of change. The

elections brought forth new parties that had no prior presence. Ennahda, despite took its share from the punitive vote, showed that it still promises hope for the revolutionary demands and for the change. In a deeply fragmented parliament, Ennahda's Rachid Ghannouchi was elected as its president. On the other hand, Ennahda maintained its risk avoidance policy that signifies keeping away from the power-grab. This policy should be viewed in terms of the unpleasant experiences during the former authoritarian regime, and lessons from the Egyptian case which resulted in a military coup against Mohamed Morsi, the first democratically elected president of the country.

What was more surprising than the results of the parliamentary elections, was the results of the presidential elections and the landslide victory of independent law professor Kais Saied. Kais Saied, who has an unadorned profile, no political affiliation and not much funding for his campaign. According to Sigma polling institute, around 90 percent of 18-to-25-year-olds voted for Saied. In his statement after the results, he described his victory as a “revolution within the constitutional legitimacy” (“Tunisia presidential election,” 2019). However, it remains very early to understand whether this result reflects a new revolution: a counter-revolution to the counter-revolution. Nonetheless, there are some clues to analyze the Tunisian case when considering the political stance of Saied and his relations throughout the election campaign.

First of all, the victory of Saied represents a new stage for Tunisia because it marks the end of the Bourguibian legacy. While building his election campaign on values of the 2011 revolution, Saied sided against Westernized and corrupt elites in keeping with his anti-establishment platform (“Conservative academic Kais Saied elected president of Tunisia,” 2019). In this sense, his victory can be viewed as a rejection of the establishment by the Tunisian people. In addition, while he considers normalization of ties with the state of Israel as a treason on the one hand, Saied advocates to strengthen ties with Tunisia's Arab and African neighbors.

On the other hand, Saied has socially conservative views which he expresses, such as homosexuality being alien to Tunisian society, advocating the return of the death penalty, and that men and women cannot inherit equally, as per western values. While his conservative views denote the rise of conservatism in Tunisian politics, his anti-corruption and pro-equality manner fueled his popularity among young people,

especially those disenfranchised from the political system, which failed to redress the socio-economic inequalities. His refusal to run a campaign in the run-off election against his then-imprisoned rival on account of the fact that it gives him an unfair advantage symbolized him as an honest leader. His vows to fight corruption and promote social justice, in an atmosphere in which many politicians were involved in corruption, underscored the youth's hope for revolutionary demands of work, freedom and dignity ("Kais Saied," 2019).

Saied's most prominent political project is to strengthen decentralization in governance and to change the voting system, which presents a threat to the existing political elite dominating the post-revolutionary era. According to his project, voters would first elect local councils, those councils would then elect regional representatives, who would finally determine national leaders. In the system proposed by Saied, the representatives are elected according to their performance and character, rather than political party or ideology, and can be reclaimed by their constituents if they fail to address their needs ("The former professor out to remake Tunisian politics," 2019). When considering the socio-economic inequality and regional disparity which has maintained since the independence and could not be resolved in the post-revolutionary period, a system that evokes direct democracy has importance in terms of the revolutionary demands of social justice, equality and dignity.

Given the increasing social tension since 2018, due primarily to corruption, unemployment and economic woes, the current political landscape in Tunisia underscores two main phenomenas. The first, is that Tunisia experienced a counter-revolution especially after the 2014 elections in which figures of the former authoritarian regime returned and the identity issues based on national unity, restoration of the state and national security superceded revolutionary demands for a clear break from the past. Issues such as terrorist attacks, Islamist-secularist polarization and the fear of possible collapse of the state became effective in consolidating this restoration project to pacify the revolution through pacific hegemonic apparatuses. The second, is that Tunisia still seeks a revolutionary change. The current landscape is a result of tension between these two phenomenas.

On the other hand, even if Tunisia presents a distinctive case from the other countries in the region, the elections in Algeria held after a few months from the Tunisian elections is also important to understand the dynamics of the Arab uprisings in the past decade. At the beginning of the uprisings, social protests in Algeria remained weak and could not intensify to change the regime. The main reason behind this situation was the memory of the bloody civil war of the country's recent past. For this reason, leaders used the examples of the Libyan and Syrian civil wars to foreclose any possible social mobilization (England, 2019). Nevertheless, the Algerian people ended up witnessing massive social protests for almost a year to oust the longtime ruler Abdelaziz Bouteflika, which has been widely regarded as a second round of the Arab uprisings.

In April 2019, Algeria's army declared the resignation of president Bouteflika. This was indicative of the real power in the country being held by the military, which is distinctive to the Tunisian case. Almost seven months after the ousting of Bouteflika, the elections were held and former prime minister Abdulmedjid Tebboune became the new president of the country, but the nationwide protests did not stop because of loyalties of all five candidates to the Bouteflika regime and hence the continuation of the old system ("How Algeria's army sacrificed a president to keep power," 2019). The election held in such a critical time was described by the head of Algeria's election authority as beginning of "a new era and a promising stage in the implementation of democracy" (Kennedy, 2019). However, it is not clear whether these developments are concessions to the protesters in order to pacify revolutionary violence or actual real change to the status quo.

When considering the dominant role of the military on the civil government, the Egyptian case also presents a more distinctive landscape than Tunisia. After the toppling of Hosni Mubarak's authoritarian regime in the wake of the January 25 Revolution, Mohamed Morsi became the first democratically elected president of the country in the 2012 elections. As a common strategy used by the ruling classes in all revolutions, the military desired to use the toppling of Mubarak as a concession to pacify the revolutionary movement and to find a moderate way to maintain the regime. However, on the contrary to Tunisia, it did not work. On July 2013, the military

overthrew Morsi as in a coup d'état and ensured the installation of its generals as the new heads of state.

As a result, this comparison proves that unlike the other countries there is a proper relation between civil society and the state in Tunisia, which corresponds to, in Gramsci's word, hegemony protected by the armour of coercion. Such a proper relation signifies that the ruling class in Tunisia possesses ideological, intellectual and cultural apparatuses in order to maintain its hegemony based on consent, not only concret oppression tools providing domination based on coercion.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Angrist, M. P. (2013). Understanding the Success of Mass Civic Protest in Tunisia. *The Middle East Journal*, 67(4), 547–564.
- Anjum, T. (2010). Historical Trajectory of the Development of the Concept of Civil Society in Europe: From Aristotle to Gramsci. *Journal of Political Studies*, 17(2), 147–160.
- Avenue, H. R. W. | 350 F., York, 34th Floor | New, & t 1.212.290.4700, N. 10118-3299 U. |. (2017, October 2). New Reconciliation Law Threatens Tunisia’s Democracy. Retrieved November 28, 2019, from Human Rights Watch website: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/02/new-reconciliation-law-threatens-tunisia-democracy>
- Bellin, E. (1994). Civil Society: Effective Tool of Analysis for Middle East Politics? *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 27(3), 509–510. <https://doi.org/10.2307/420214>
- Bellin, E. (1995). Civil Society in Formation: Tunisia. In A. R. Norton (Ed.), *Civil Society in the Middle East*. Brill.
- Bellin, E. (2012). Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring. *Comparative Politics*, 44(2), 127–149.
- Bellin, E. (2013). *Drivers of Democracy: Lessons from Tunisia*. Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies.
- Blaise, L. (2018, January 9). ‘You Can’t Survive Anymore’: Tunisia Protests Rising Prices and Taxes. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/09/world/africa/tunisia-protests.html>
- Bobbio, N. (1982). Gramsci ve Sivil Toplum Kavramı. In E. Göksel (Ed.), & A. İpek & K. Somer (Trans.), *Gramsci ve Sivil Toplum* (pp. 3–42). Ankara: Savaş Yayınları.
- Boose, J. (2013). Democratization and Civil Society: Libya, Tunisia and the Arab Spring. *International Journal of Social Science and Humanity*, 310–315. <https://doi.org/10.7763/IJSSH.2012.V2.116>
- Boubekeur, A. (2016). Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites in Tunisia: Bargained Competition. *Mediterranean Politics*, 21(1), 107–127. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2015.1081449>

- Boukhars, A. (2015). *The Reckoning: Tunisia's Perilous Path to Democratic Stability*.
- Brown, L. C. (2001). Bourguiba and Bourguibism Revisited: Reflections and Interpretation. *Middle East Journal*, 55(1), 43–57.
- Buttigieg, J. A. (1995). Gramsci on Civil Society. *Boundary 2*, 22(3), 1–32. <https://doi.org/10.2307/303721>
- Cavatorta, F. (2012). Arab Spring: The Awakening of Civil Society. A General Overview—IEMed. Retrieved November 11, 2019, from <https://www.iemed.org/observatori-en/arees-danalisi/documents/anuari/med.2012/arab-spring-the-awakening-of-civil-society.-a-general-overview>
- Cengiz, K., Küçükural, Ö., Tol, U. U., & Akşit, B. (2005). Türkiye ve Ortadoğu'da Sivil Toplum Tartışmaları. In L. Sunar (Ed.), *Sivil Toplum ve Demokrasi* (pp. 213–263). İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları.
- Chandhoke, N. (2007). Civil Society. *Development in Practice*, 17(4/5), 607–614. Retrieved from JSTOR.
- Cherif, N. (2017). Improving Foreign Support to Tunisia's Civil Society. *Center for Applied Policy Research*, 6.
- Chomiak, L. (2011). The Making of a Revolution in Tunisia. *Middle East Law and Governance*, 3, 68–83. <https://doi.org/10.1163/187633711X591431>
- Conservative academic Kais Saied elected president of Tunisia, electoral commission confirms. (2019, October 14). Retrieved December 21, 2019, from France 24 website: <https://www.france24.com/en/20191014-conservative-kais-saied-elected-president-of-tunisia-with-72-71-percent-of-vote>
- Deane, S. (2013). Transforming Tunisia The Role of Civil Society in Tunisia's Transition. *International Alert*, 28.
- Diamond, L. (1997). *Civil Society and the Development of Democracy*. 72.
- England, A. (2019, April 11). In Algeria and Sudan, a second Arab spring is brewing. Retrieved from Financial Times website: <https://www.ft.com/content/f15e999c-5c32-11e9-9dde-7aedca0a081a>
- Ennahda wins Tunisian parliamentary election. (2019, October 10). Retrieved December 19, 2019, from <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/ennahda-wins-tunisian-parliamentary-election/1608089>
- Fraser, N. (1981). Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions. *PRAXIS International*, (3), 272–287.

- Garrison, J. (2006). *World Bank-civil society engagement: Review of fiscal years 2005 and 2006* (No. 51430; pp. 1–124). Retrieved from The World Bank website:
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/pt/802061468164947857/World-Bank-civil-society-engagement-review-of-fiscal-years-2005-and-2006>
- Gellner, E. (1995). The Importance of Being Modular. In J. Hall (Ed.), *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*. Retrieved from
<http://www.la.utexas.edu/users/chenry/civil/2007/Gellner-TC357.pdf>
- General strike in Tunisia against government cuts. (2018, November 23). Retrieved December 14, 2019, from IndustriALL website:
<http://www.industriall-union.org/general-strike-in-tunisia-against-government-cuts>
- Ghannouchi, R. (2016, August 19). *From Political Islam to Muslim Democracy*. Retrieved from
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/tunisia/political-islam-muslim-democracy>
- Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (Reprint, 1989 edition; Q. Hoare & G. N. Smith, Eds.). New York: International Publishers Co.
- Gramsci, A. (1999). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. London: ElecBook.
- Gramsci, A. (2000). *The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935* (D. Forgacs & E. J. Hobsbawm, Eds.). New York: New York University Press.
- Grewal, S. (2018). Time to Rein in Tunisia’s Police Unions. *Project on Middle East Democracy*, 1–10.
- Guellali, A. (2017, July 24). Draft Law Could Return Tunisia to a Police State. Retrieved November 27, 2019, from Human Rights Watch website:
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/24/draft-law-could-return-tunisia-police-state>
- Günay, C., & Somnavilla, F. (2019). Tunisia’s democratization at risk. *Mediterranean Politics*, 1–9.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2019.1631980>
- Hill, L. (2010a). *Civil Society Theory: Ferguson*. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-93996-4_519
- Hill, L. (2010b). *Civil Society Theory: Smith*. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-93996-4_527

- How Algeria's army sacrificed a president to keep power. (2019, April 6). *BBC News*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47821980>
- In Tunisia, Self-immolation Soars as Economy Tanks. (2019, June 24). *Fanack.Com*. Retrieved from <https://fanack.com/tunisia/history-past-to-present/tunisia-self-immolation-soars-as-economy-tanks/>
- In Tunisia's 'State of Emergency', a New Police Protection Law Could Allow More Abuse—With Impunity · Global Voices. (2017, August 17). Retrieved November 12, 2019, from Global Voices website: <https://globalvoices.org/2017/08/17/in-tunisias-state-of-emergency-a-new-police-protection-law-could-allow-more-abuse-with-impunity/>
- Jerad, N. (2013). The Tunisian Revolution: From Universal Slogans for Democracy to the Power of Language. *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication*, 6(2), 232–255. <https://doi.org/10.1163/18739865-00602006>
- Journalist Dies In Self-Immolation, Prompting Protests In Tunisia. (2018, December 30). Retrieved December 14, 2019, from NPR.org website: <https://www.npr.org/2018/12/30/680994443/journalist-dies-in-self-immolation-prompting-protests-in-tunisia>
- Kaboub, F. (2014). The Making of the Tunisian Revolution. *Middle East Development Journal*, 5, 1350003–1. <https://doi.org/10.1142/S179381201350003X>
- Kais Saied: Who is Tunisia's new president? (2019, October 23). Retrieved December 21, 2019, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/kais-saied-tunisia-president-191022150707200.html>
- Kaldor, M. (2003). The Idea of Global Civil Society. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 79(3), 583–593.
- Karadağ, A. (2005). Demokratikleşme ve Sivil Toplum: Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu Örneği. In L. Sunar (Ed.), *Sivil Toplum ve Demokrasi* (pp. 61–87). İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları.
- Kéfi, R. (2015). Tunisia: Civil Society, the Driving Force behind the Democratic Transition. *IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook*, 237–240.
- Kennedy, M. (2019). Algeria Elects A New President In Controversial Election. Retrieved December 22, 2019, from NPR.org website: <https://www.npr.org/2019/12/13/787789940/algeria-elects-a-new-president-in-controversial-election>
- Keskes, H., & Martin, A. (2018). Orientalism and binary discursive representations of Tunisia's democratization: The need for a “continuity and change”

paradigm. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 1–20.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2018.1544481>

- Klaas, B., & Dirsus, M. (2018). *Non-Governmental Organizations, International Organizations, and Civil Society in Tunisia*. NATO OPEN Publications.
- Kumar, K. (1993). Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 44(3), 375–395.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/591808>
- Kumar, K. (2000). On Civil Society: A Further Note On Civil Society. *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv Für Soziologie*, 41(1), 167–180.
- Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. (1996). *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lutterbeck, D. (2011). *Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance*. <https://doi.org/10.5334/bbm>
- Mansouri, F., & Armillei, R. (2016). The Democratic ‘Transition’ in Post-revolution Tunisia: Conditions for successful ‘Consolidation’ and Future Prospects. *R/Evolutions: Global Trends & Regional Issues*, 4, 156–181.
- Martin, A. (2015). *Agents of change civil society in post-revolutionary Tunisia*. 56, 22–29.
- Martin, A. (2016). “Have Tunisian civil society organisations exhibited the civil political culture required to fulfil a democratic function through the post-2011 transition?” (Doctoral, Durham University). Retrieved from <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11923/>
- Marzouki, N. (2015, October 7). Tunisia’s Rotten Compromise. Retrieved from Middle East Research and Information Project website: <https://merip.org/2015/07/tunisias-rotten-compromise/>
- Marzouki, N., & Meddeb, H. (2015, June 11). Tunisia: Democratic Miracle or Mirage? Retrieved November 17, 2019, from Jadaliyya—جدلية website: <https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/32181>
- Marzouki, N., & Meddeb, H. (2016). The Struggle for Meanings and Power in Tunisia after the Revolution. *Middle East Law and Governance*, 8(2–3), 119–130. <https://doi.org/10.1163/18763375-00802001>
- McCarthy, R. (2014). Re-thinking secularism in post-independence Tunisia. *The Journal of North African Studies*, 19(5), 733–750.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2014.917585>

- McCarthy, R. (2019). The politics of consensus: Al-Nahda and the stability of the Tunisian transition. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 55(2), 261–275. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2018.1538969>
- Merone, F. (2014). Enduring Class Struggle in Tunisia: The Fight for Identity beyond Political Islam. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 42, 74–87. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2015.973188>
- Merone, F., & Facci, D. (2015). *The new Islamic middle class and the struggle for hegemony in Tunisia*.
- Mitchell, T. (2001). *Mısır'ın Sömürgeleştirilmesi* (Z. Altok, Trans.). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Mullin, C., & Rouabah, B. (2014, December 22). Requiem for Tunisia's Revolution? Retrieved November 27, 2019, from Jadaliyya—جدلية website: <https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/31596>
- Mullin, C., & Rouabah, B. (2016). Discourses of Power and State Formation: The State of Emergency from Protectorate to Post-uprising Tunisia. *Middle East Law and Governance*, 8(2–3), 151–178. <https://doi.org/10.1163/18763375-00802003>
- Netterstrøm, K. L. (2016). The Tunisian General Labor Union and the Advent of Democracy. *The Middle East Journal*, 70, 383–398. <https://doi.org/10.3751/70.3.12>
- Newton, K. (1999). Social capital and democracy in modern Europe. In M. Maraffi, K. Newton, J. van Deth, & P. Whiteley (Eds.), *Social Capital and European Democracy* (pp. 3–24). Retrieved from <https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/34510/>
- O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. C., & Whitehead, L. (Eds.). (1986). *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (Highlighting edition). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Özer, M. H. (2008). Günümüz İtibariyle Sivil Toplum Kuruluşlarının İktisadi ve Sosyal Fonksiyonları. *Electronic Journal of Social Sciences*, 7(26), 86–97.
- Perkins, K. (2014). *A History of Modern Tunisia* (2 edition). New York City: Cambridge University Press.
- Plaetzer, N. (2014). Civil Society As Domestication: Egypt and Tunisian Uprisings Beyond Liberal Transitology. *Journal of International Affairs*, 68(1), 255–265.
- Portelli, H. (1982). *Gramsci Ve Tarihsel Blok* (K. Somer, Trans.). Ankara: Savaş Yayınları.

- Powell, A. (2012, September 18). A warning from inside Tunisia. Retrieved November 27, 2019, from Harvard Gazette website: <https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2012/09/a-warning-from-inside-tunisia/>
- Refle, J.-E. (2016, April 7). *Tunisian civil society and its international links*.
- Retired academic wins Tunisia election. (2019, October 14). *BBC News*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-50032460>
- Rivetti, P. (2015). Continuity and Change before and after the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco: Regime Reconfiguration and Policymaking in North Africa. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 42(1), 1–11. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2015.973181>
- Runciman, D. (2011). Devlet Kavramı: Kurgusal Olanın Hakimiyeti. In Q. Skinner & B. Stråth (Eds.), & G. Aksay (Trans.), *Devletler ve Yurttaşlar* (pp. 25–37). İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
- Saidani, M. (2012). Revolution and Counterrevolution in Tunisia: The Forty Days That Shook the Country (R. A. Judy, Trans.). *Boundary 2*, 39, 43–54. <https://doi.org/10.2307/23253300>
- Sassoon, A. S. (Ed.). (1982). *Approaches to Gramsci*. London: Writers & Readers.
- Schäfer, I. (2015). The Tunisian Transition: Torn Between Democratic Consolidation and Neo-Conservatism in an Insecure Regional Context. *PapersIEMed/EuroMeSCo Paper*.
- Scholte, J. A. (2002). Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance. *Global Governance*, 8(3), 281–304. Retrieved from JSTOR.
- Schraeder, P. J., & Redissi, H. (2011). The Upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia: Ben Ali's Fall. *Journal of Democracy*, 22(3), 5–19. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2011.0047>
- Seligman, A. B. (1995). *The Idea of Civil Society* (Reprint edition). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sghiri, M. (2014). Şafağa Selam: Acısıyla Tatlısıyla Devrime Tanıklık Etmek (Tunus). In *Devrimleri Yazmak* (pp. 23–57). İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.
- Stepan, A. (2012). Tunisia's Transition and the Twin Tolerations. *Journal of Democracy*, 23, 89–103. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2012.0034>
- Texier, J. (1982). Gramsci, Üstyapılar Teorisyonu. In *Gramsci ve Sivil Toplum* (pp. 45–90). Ankara: Savaş Yayınları.

- The former professor out to remake Tunisian politics. (2019, October 13). *Reuters*. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-election-saied-newsmaker-idUSKBN1WS0Q1>
- Tuğal, C. (2011). *Pasif Devrim: İslami Muhalefetin Düzenle Bütünleşmesi* (F. B. Aydar, Trans.). İstanbul: Koc Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Tunisia after legislative and parliamentary elections: Opportunities and challenges. (2019, October 30). Retrieved December 19, 2019, from <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/centernews/2019/10/tunisia-legislative-parliamentary-elections-opportunities-challenges-191030074330387.html>
- Tunisia parliament elects Ennahdha's Rachid Ghannouchi as speaker. (2019, November 13). Retrieved December 19, 2019, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/tunisia-divided-parliament-set-elect-speaker-191113142939196.html>
- Tunisia presidential election: Kais Saied declared winner. (2019, October 14). Retrieved December 21, 2019, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/tunisia-presidential-election-kais-saied-declared-winner-191014163712569.html>
- Tunisian President Beji Caid Essebsi's Nidaa Tounes party splits again. (2019, April 14). Retrieved December 20, 2019, from The National website: <https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/tunisian-president-beji-caid-essebsi-s-nidaa-tounes-party-splits-again-1.848822>
- Vatthauer, J.-P., & Weipert-Fenner, I. (2017). The Quest for Social Justice in Tunisia. Socioeconomic protest and political democratization post 2011. *PRIF Report*, 143.
- Walsh, A. (2019, March 26). Restarting Police Reform in Tunisia: The Importance of Talking About Everyday Security. Retrieved November 21, 2019, from Middle East Institute website: <https://www.mei.edu/publications/restarting-police-reform-tunisia-importance-talking-about-everyday-security>
- Yerkes, S. (2017). *Where have all the revolutionaries gone?* Retrieved from Brookings Center for Middle East Policy website: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/where-have-all-the-revolutionaries-gone/>
- Yerkes, S., & Ben Yahmed, Z. (2019). *Tunisia's Political System: From Stagnation to Competition*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Zederman, M. (2016). The Hegemonic Bourguibist Discourse on Modernity in Post-revolutionary Tunisia. *Middle East Law and Governance*, 8(2–3), 179–200. <https://doi.org/10.1163/18763375-00802004>

- Zeghal, M. (2013). Competing Ways of Life: Islamism, Secularism, and Public Order in the Tunisian Transition. *Constellations*, 20. <https://doi.org/10.1111/cons.12038>
- Zemni, S. (2013). From socio-economic protest to national revolt: The labor origins of the Tunisian revolution. In N. Gana (Ed.), *The making of the Tunisian revolution: Contexts, architects, prospects* (pp. 127–146). Edinburgh University Press.
- Zemni, S. (2014). The Extraordinary Politics of the Tunisian Revolution: The Process of Constitution Making. *Mediterranean Politics*, 20, 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2013.874108>
- Zemni, S. (2016). From Revolution to Tunisianité: Who is the Tunisian People?: Creating Hegemony through Compromise. *Middle East Law and Governance*, 8(2–3), 131–150. <https://doi.org/10.1163/18763375-00802002>
- Zemni, S. (2017). The Tunisian Revolution: Neoliberalism, Urban Contentious Politics and the Right to the City. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 41(1), 70–83. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12384>
- Zoubir, Y. H. (2015). The democratic transition in Tunisia: A success story in the making. *Conflict Trends*, 2015(1), 10–17.

ÖZGEÇMİŞ

Adı-Soyadı: Salih Dođan

E-mail (1): salih.dogan@ibnhaldun.edu.tr

E-mail (2): sddogansalih@gmail.com

Eđitim:

2008 – 2016: Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler (İngilizce) Lisans Programı,
Marmara Üniversitesi, Türkiye

2016 – 2019: Medeniyet Araştırmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı, İbn Haldun
Üniversitesi, Türkiye