

**IBN HALDUN UNIVERSITY
ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS INSTITUTE**

PH.D. THESIS

**The Construction of a Theory of Civilization Through the
Works of al-Māwardī**

Fadi K.S. Zatari

Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Tahsin Görgün

İSTANBUL, 2021

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**By
Fadi K.S. Zatari**

**A thesis submitted to the Alliance of Civilizations Institute in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in Civilization Studies**

Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Tahsin Görgün

İSTANBUL, 2021

APPROVAL PAGE

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Civilization Studies.

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Date of Submission

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26.07.2021

ACADEMIC HONESTY ATTESTATION

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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ABSTRACT

The Construction of a Theory of Civilization Through the Works of al-Māwardī

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The bulk of this dissertation on the 11th-century Muslim scholar Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī (974 - 1058) focuses mainly on his book “*Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*.” Most studies on al-Māwardī have concentrated on either his political or legal contributions while less attention has been given to al-Māwardī’s other works. This dissertation aims primarily to cover this gap through an attempt to construct a theory of civilization. In such an attempt, the thesis will utilize his works to reach a new model that answers significant questions, namely those of how we comprehend civilization in contemporary times. The study proposes a profound and comprehensive outline of al-Māwardī’s thoughts on how civilization is formed. It consists of two parts, each containing three chapters. The first part, entitled “Essential Foundations of al-Māwardī’s Theory of Civilization,” includes three major concepts: reason, *ilm* (system of knowledge), and religion. These three notions are analyzed in relation to civilization's construction. My main argument is that civilization cannot be established without a central role for these concepts. The second part, entitled “Implementation Aspects of al-Māwardī’s Theory of Civilization,” consists of three chapters. The first considers the structures of the social world and the individual’s role in society. Al-Māwardī insists that people’s well-being and welfare depends on individual discipline and collective structures. The second chapter focuses essentially on personal discipline. My argument is that civilization cannot be established without personal discipline. The last chapter is on informal institutional theory; my central argument is that al-Māwardī aims to develop informal institutions to maintain social stability. Such a

notion is analyzed mainly through a civilizational methodology that compares al-Māwardī with other thinkers and philosophers. The research also benefited from Taha Abdurrahman’s methodology of reading, understanding, and presenting classical texts, which he calls “the complementarity methodology” (*al-manhajīyah al-takāmūliyah*). The arrangements in this study are primarily structured based on the structures of “*Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*”. This dissertation asserts that al-Māwardī offers a comprehensive and profound descriptive framework for establishing and maintaining a civilization, which is still relevant in contemporary times.

Keywords: al-Māwardī, civilization, reason, *‘ilm*, religion, informal institutions, and social world.

ÖZ

El-Mâverdü'nin Eserleri Aracılığıyla Bir Medeniyet Teorisi İnşası

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11. yüzyıl Müslüman alimi olan Ebû el-Hasan El-Mâverdü (974-1058) hakkındaki bu tezin büyük kısmı onun, “adab al-dunyâ wa’al’âdîn” adlı kitabına odaklanmıştır. Al-Mâwardî hakkında yapılan çalışmaların çoğunluğu onun siyasi veya hukuki çalışmalarına odaklanmışken, diğer eserlerine daha az ilgi gösterilmiştir. Öncelikle bu araştırma bir medeniyet teorisi inşa etme girişimi ile böyle bir boşluğu kapatmayı amaçlamaktadır. Böylelikle tez, modern zamanlarda medeniyeti nasıl anladığımıza dair onun bazı önemli eserlerini kullanacaktır. Çalışma, Medeniyet Çerçevesi oluşturmak için, el-Mâverdü'nin düşüncelerinin derin ve kapsamlı bir taslağını sunmaktadır. İki kısım ve her biri üç bölüm içeren çalışmanın ilk bölümü “el-Mâverdü'nin Medeniyet Teorisinin Esas Temelleri” başlıklı ve üç ana kavram içermektedir: akıl, ilim ve din. Bu üç kavram medeniyetin inşası ile ilişkili olarak analiz edilmiştir. Ana argümanım söz konusu üç kavram olmaksızın medeniyet inşasının mümkün olamayacağıdır. “El-Mâverdü'nin Medeniyet Teorisinin Uygulama Yönleri” başlıklı ikinci bölüm üç kısımdan oluşmaktadır. Birinci kısım sosyal dünyanın yapısını ve bireyin toplumdaki rolünü ele almaktadır. El-Mâverdü, insanların iyiliği ve refahının bireysel disiplin ve kolektif yapılar gerektirdiği konusunda ısrar etmektedir. İkinci kısım esas olarak kişisel disipline odaklanmaktadır. Buradaki iddiam, kişisel disiplin olmaksızın bir medeniyetin varlığından söz edilemez.”. Son kısım, resmi olmayan kurumlar üzerinedir; El-Mâverdü'nin toplumdaki istikrarı sürdürmek için resmi olmayan kurumları geliştirmeyi hedeflemesi, ana argümanımdır. Böyle bir fikir, esasen, El-Mâverdü'yi diğer düşünürler ve filozoflar ile karşılaştıran bir medeniyet metodolojisi aracılığıyla

analiz edilmiştir. Ayrıca, bu çalışma, Taha Abdurrahman'ın "tamamlayıcılık metodolojisi" (al-manhajīyah al-ṭakāmūlīyah) diye adlandırdığı, klasik metinleri okuma, anlama ve sunma metodolojilerinden yararlandı. Bu tezdeki düzenlemeler öncelikle "Kitāb adab al-dunyā wa-al-dīn" yer alan sınıflandırmalardan hareketle yapılandırılmıştır. Bu çalışma, El-Mâverđî'nin bir medeniyeti kurmak için günümüzde halen geçerli olan kapsamlı ve derin, tanımlayıcı bir çerçeve sunduğunu iddia etmektedir

Anahtar Kelimeler: El-Mâverđî, medeniyet, akıl, ilim, din, resmi olmayan kurumlar, ve sosyal dünya.



DEDICATION

To the scholars who think differently for the sake of a better civilization.

To the martyrs of Palestine who sacrificed for the sake of a better civilization.



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I would first like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Tahsin Görgün, for his valuable comments, remarks, and engagement through this Ph.D. thesis's learning process. Professor Görgün not only introduced me to the work of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī's "*Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*," but also encouraged me to write my Ph.D. on it. Therefore, without him and his support, this thesis would be impossible. Furthermore, I would like to thank the participants in my defense committee: Dr. Nagihan Haliloğlu, her comments, and remarks helped me improving my thesis, Prof. Dr. Recep Şentürk, Prof. Dr. Ömer Mahir Alper and Dr. Önder Küçükural. I would also like to thank the faculty members at Alliance of Civilizations Institute, especially Prof. Dr. Alparslan Açıkgenç, Dr. Ercüment Asil and Dr. Vahdettin Işık. Moreover, I would like to acknowledge Prof. Dr. Sami Al-Arian for his constant encouragement while writing my thesis.

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Fadi Zadari

Istanbul, 2021

Figures

- I. The first part of this study's structure, “The Essential Foundations of al-Māwardī’s Theory of Civilization.”
- II. The second part of this study's structure, “The implementation Aspects of Al-Māwardī’s Theory of Civilization.”
- III. The structure and components of “*Iṣlāḥ al-dunyā*,” or Constitutive Elements of the Social World.
- IV. The structures and components of “*Adab Riyāḍah wa-Istiṣlāḥ*” or Personal Discipline and Institutions.
- V. The structures and components of al-Māwardī’s Informal Institution Theory.
- VI. The internal and external structures of *al-Murūah*.

Table of Contents

APPROVAL PAGE.....	ii
ACADEMIC HONESTY ATTESTATION.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	vi
DEDICATION	viii
Acknowledgements	ix
Figures	x
INTRODUCTION.....	1
Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī.....	2
Defining Civilization.....	5
Aims of the Study	6
Methodology	8
The structures of the study	14
PART I: ESSENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF AL-MĀWARDĪ'S THEORY OF CIVILIZATION	23
CHAPTER ONE.....	24
REASON	24
1.1. Introduction	24
1.1. The concept of reason and its different categories.....	26
1.2. Al-Muḥāsibī's Concept of Reason	30
1.3. Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā's conception of reason.....	32
1.4. Strong passion as an antithesis to reason	38
1.5. Reason as an Original Pillar of Civilizational Theory	47
1.6. Nafs, reason, and deeds	50
1.7. Conclusion.....	54
CHAPTER TWO.....	57
‘ILM	57
2.1. Introduction	57
2.2. The essence of ‘ilm and its affiliation to virtue	59
2.3. How does ‘ilm emerge?	67
2.4. Ādāb and ‘ilm: an indispensable combination	73
2.5. ‘ilm and civilization	79
2.6. Conclusion.....	87
CHAPTER THREE.....	90
RELIGION	90
3.1. Introduction	90
3.2. Religion	92
3.3. Religion as persuasion and intimidation	99
3.4. Religion's role in Constructing Civilization	102
3.5. Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice	107

CHAPTER FOUR.....	114
CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENTS OF THE SOCIAL WORLD.....	114
4.1. Introduction	114
4.1.1. Adherence to a normative base	118
4.1.2. Functional political system	121
4.1.3. Comprehensive justice	127
4.1.4. General security	133
4.1.5. General economic prosperity	135
4.1.6. Deep Optimism.....	137
4.2. Personal Reformation: Three Rules	142
4.2.1. The first rule: An obedient personality	143
4.2.2. The Second Rule: General Social Integration	145
4.2.3. The Third Rule: Sufficient Substance	152
4.3. Conclusion.....	154
CHAPTER FIVE.....	157
PERSONAL DISCIPLINE AND INSTITUTIONS	157
5.1. Introduction.....	157
5.1. Avoiding arrogance and self-admiration	161
5.2. The characteristic ethical traits	164
5.3. Ḥayā'	168
5.4. Forbearance and anger.....	172
5.5. Sincerity and lying	176
5.6. Malicious envy and rivalry	179
5.7. Conclusion.....	181
CHAPTER SIX	184
INFORMAL INSTITUTION THEORY	184
6.1. Introduction	184
6.2. Theoretical Framework: Institutional Theory.....	186
6.3. Utterance and silence.....	193
6.4. Patience and sorrow.....	196
6.4. Consultation.....	199
6.5. Confidentiality	202
6.6. Mocking and laughing	204
6.7. Optimism and pessimism	206
6.8. Al-Murū'ah (sense of chivalry)	208
6.9. Various forms of ādābs.....	215
CONCLUSION.....	220
BIBLIOGRAPHY	227
GLOSSARY OF ARABIC TERMS	237
Curriculum Vitae	241

Introduction

Consider a post-apocalyptic scenario in which all the world's knowledge, scientific laboratories, instruments, and libraries have disappeared due to natural disasters and man's profligacy. In this world, schools and universities no longer engage in or teach proper scientific pedagogy, the use of necessary scientific tools has become foreign to all, and only a fragmented proportion of individuals are attempting to restore this lost part of human civilization. To do so, all they have at their disposal are articles and books with missing and incomplete information, making the task akin to building a puzzle (and figure out what it represents) with only a fraction of the pieces available. Even worse, they are all using a lost vocabulary with lavish words with meanings and genealogies they do not know. For Alasdair MacIntyre (MacIntyre 2007: 1- 2), morality's position in contemporary times is identical to this hypothetical situation.

This imaginary world depicted by MacIntyre reveals, to some extent, the fact that one of the critical issues facing humanity in the post-modern era is a deficiency or even absence of knowledge of ethics. This deficiency of ethics is not only in theory but also in practice, affecting both individual and collective relationships in society and the civilizational outcomes. Correspondingly, one of the central causes for the decline of previous civilizations was the decline of their knowledge and ethical systems, first in theory and subsequently in practice.

Therefore, it is necessary to study the essential moral structures upon which Muslim societies built. From that, we can develop a more profound theory of civilization – one that contains deep considerations of its ethical system, on which a civilization can fundamentally be established. Based on this claim, I argue in this study that civilization cannot exist without a moral system, personal discipline, and institutions, which regulate the relationships within a civilization and its association with other societies. Without a system of ethics, personal discipline, and institutions, there is no feeling of commitment and awareness of the value of being human.

Even more, law, arts, material developments, and literature as manifestations of civilization ought to be established on a well-defined system of ethics and knowledge, personal discipline, and institutions. This states that a civilization is not constructed and enforced by laws, ordinances, and conventions alone. Instead, a civilization is based principally on the awareness of being committed and accountable. This is the core of every system of ethics and the principle on which this study stands. Ethics and personal discipline, then, are not only the central character of every civilization, but also the preconditions for its existence. In other words, without a system of ethics, personal discipline, and institutions, it is impossible for a civilization to be established or survive sustainably throughout millennia.

Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī

Many academic resources have described al-Māwardī's scholarship, personality, and political, academic, and juridical professions. For instance, in his book "The Political Thought of Abu al-Hassan Al-Mawardi," Baghdadi not only expounded on al-Māwardī's life, positions, scholarships, but also described the historical background to al-Māwardī's thought and circumstance. (al-Bagdadi 1981: 1- 54). Moreover, in his book on al-Māwardī, entitled "Lehranalytische Betrachtung bei Abū 'l-Ḥasan al-Māwardī (974- 1058): Oberster Richter des 4./ 10. Jahrhunderts im islamischen Kalifat der Abbasiden; sein Leben und seine Gedankenwelt,, Alboğa spent more than a hundred pages on al-Māwardī's life, publications, positions (Alboğa 2014: 1- 129). Likewise, in the new edition of "Minhāj al-Yaqīn: Sharḥ Ādāb al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn," the editor Mohammed al-Azzazi elaborates on al-Māwardī's life, teachers and students, contributions, political contexts and methodology (Khān'zādah 2019: 3- 22). Accordingly, in the next two pages, I will be very briefly elaborate on al-Māwardī.

The full name of al-Māwardī, known in Latin as Alboacen, was Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥabīb al-Baṣrī (364- 450H/ 974- 1058). He was one of the most famous Shafi' jurists in the 11th century, the first Muslim political theorist and a scholar of ethics. Mustafa Çağrıçı argues that it is conceivable to argue that

al-Māwardī was the leading figure among all scholars and intellectuals in the classical period of Islam (Çağrıçı 2010: 29). Al-Māwardī was born in Başra, and received his education there and later in Bagħdād. He served as a Qādī, or judge, in Bagħdād and several other cities and stayed in Bagħdād for teaching and writing. Also, al-Māwardī was appointed by the ‘Abbāsīd caliph al-Qādir Bi’llāh (381- 422/ 991- 1031) to play a significant diplomatic role under his rule and later again under the ‘Abbāsīd caliph al-Ḳā’im Bi-Amr Allāh (422- 467/ 1031- 1075) to manage the relationships with the Seljuks as well as the Būyids. Meanwhile, al-Māwardī obtained the position of Chief Judge of the Highest Court, which was one of the highest positions in the ‘Abbāsīd era (c.f. Netton 2013: 398).

It is essential to mention that al-Māwardī was in charge of the judiciary in many cities. He was the chief judge in several towns such as Nişabur in present-day Iran. For his very profound and comprehensive knowledge in *Fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), al-Māwardī was entitled the position of “Chief Judge,” a very distinguished and prestigious entitlement. Furthermore, he was a brilliant politician, and sultans and princes always valued his opinions. He was also very resilient in advocating against vices and evil, even if done by rulers. Similarly, his personality has been described as "venerable," "courteous," "patient," and "courageous" (Khān’zādah 2019: 6- 7). Based on classical Arabic resources, Cengiz Kallek enumerates some of al-Māwardī’s characteristics such as “gentle,” “humble,” “sincere,” and "sober-minded" (Kallek 2004: 222). In almost every Arabic edition of al-Māwardī’s books, the editors describe him in a very lofty manner.

Al-Māwardī was a very productive and creative scholar; however, there is very little research and books available about his life and work in English, German, or even Arabic. Even more, no work tries to read al-Māwardī from the perspective of a theory of civilization as this work attempts. Comparing the popularity of al-Māwardī’s works with al-Fārābī (d. 339/ 950) or Ibn Sīnā (370- 429/ 980- 1037), it is evident that their books saw much more translation into English, German and many other languages. Besides, there are many books, academic articles, and studies written about al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, especially about their philosophy and political theories. This study demonstrates that although al-Māwardī was a distinguished scholar, diplomat, and a chief judge in the ‘Abbāsīd Caliphate, as this study shows,

he did not receive enough attention not only in the Arabic language but also in the major Western languages¹.

It is worth noting that al-Māwardī wrote his books at a time when the newly rising Seljuks were coming to power in the ‘Abbāsīd heartland. Meanwhile, the ‘Abbāsīd caliph in Bagħdād started to weaken and was not able to control neither the Seljuks nor the non-Sunni Buyid dynasty. Thus, the caliph, al-Ḳā’im Bi-Amr Allāh, requested al-Māwardī to write a manuscript on politics to be informed about how to deal with these new rising groups, which he considered as a threat. In response to the caliph’s wishes, al-Māwardī wrote *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah* between the years 1045 and 1058. In this book, al-Māwardī defines Islamic governance’s ordinances, which remain relevant even today (c.f. Black 2011: 86).

Therefore, contemporary scholars, such as the historian Marshal Hodgson, state that: “He (al-Māwardī) was especially concerned to formulate, in terms of the *Shari’ah*, the condition under which caliphate authority could be delegated to subordinates, and tried to bring order and legal legitimacy into such delegation - which seemed likely to prove continually necessary” (Hodgson 1977: Vol. II. 55). Hodgson draws attention to the conditions under which al-Māwardī was writing and the significance of his works not only at his own time, but also in contemporary times. Hodgson’s argument here is related to al-Māwardī’s well-known book *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah* and not to “*Kitāb adab al-dunyā wa-al-dīn*.”

However, based on “*Kitāb adab al-dunyā wa-al-dīn*,” I argue that al-Māwardī has a unique contribution to how to institute a civilization for two reasons. On the one hand, he offers a thorough and rigorous descriptive perspective, which makes his theory relevant. On the other hand, although al-Māwardī wrote this book almost a

¹ In the Ottoman Empire, several translations of “*Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*” were made into the Ottoman language. Also, in the late Ottoman Empire (1910), the only high-quality commentary on the book was “*Minhāj al-Yaqīn: Sharḥ Ādāb al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*” by Ottoman scholar Uways Wafā Khān’zādah. Furthermore, there have been many translations of *Kitāb adab al-dunyā wa-al-dīn*. For instance, *Edebü’-d-dīn ve’-d-dünyâ Tercümesi* was translated into Ottoman language by Bergamalı Cevdet in 1910. It papered later in Turkish as “*Maddi ve manevi yüce hedefler*,” prepared by Yaşar Çalışkan. Moreover, Selahaddin Kip and Abidin Sönmez translated it in 1978. Also, Ali Akın translated it in 1979 (Kallek 2004: 227).

millennium ago, his theory does not advocate for the superiority of any specific race in his thought, compared to most western scholars in Civilization Studies. Consider François Guizot and his claims that there is inherent supremacy within the French people to possess civilization. I also argue that al-Māwardī's view is not limited to a specific geographic region, as is the case with Jacob Burckhardt, who argues that Italy's geographical position in the Mediterranean makes the Italians more effective than other peoples. For such reasons, it is safe to argue that al-Māwardī has a universal and humanistic oriented approach in understanding civilization.

Defining Civilization

As I am aiming in this study to construct a theory of civilization based on al-Māwardī's thoughts, it is worth starting by elaborating on definition of civilization. In this study, civilization means an organized society based on the notion of *ādāb* (i.e., refinement, social graces, and decorum) and cooperation among humans and not on the idea of clash and conflict. Furthermore, within the framework of civilization, there are various political, social, and economic commitments. On the one hand, this encompasses "*Iṣlāḥ al-dunyā*," what I translated as "constitutive elements of the social world."² That includes six elements; adherence to a normative base (i.e., *dīn muttaba*), a functional political system, comprehensive justice, general security, general economic prosperity, and optimism for the future. These constitutive elements of the social world necessitate commitments, collective effort, and thorough and rigorous cooperation. On the other hand, there are numberless personal disciplines that every individual should consider in every aspect of their behavior and manners. This is to state that the core of civilization in this study is not materialism but rather discipline, good behavior, commitments, and manners.

In this study, I argue that, civilization is associated with both the notion of being ethical in behavior and manners and being rational since, there should be no contradiction between reason and morality. Furthermore, as we shall see later in chapter one, civilization is not only defined by the political, economic, and social

² For justifying the translation, see chapter IV.

system it encompasses, but is also articulated by other fundamental elements such as reason, institutions, and personal discipline. In this sense, I argue that different understandings of ethics, personal discipline, and institutions lead to other models of civilization and, consequently, influence its manifestations. It is worth mentioning that al-Māwardī's vision of civilization does not advocate for a specific race, religion, region, or language to show their supremacy. Strictly speaking, this study thus rejects describing a civilization as a way of distinguishing the Self from the Other. Instead, I argue that a civilization ought to offer insights into how individual and collective ethics can develop into a better and more just society, in which humankind can live freely and peacefully.

Aims of the Study

This study aims to construct a theory of civilization through the works of al-Māwardī, to propose a new pattern that answers the question of how we are to reconstruct and rejuvenate a civilization in contemporary times. This study aims to outline a more profound comprehension of al-Māwardī's thoughts to form a theory of civilization. I argue that al-Māwardī's view of civilization has universal features, i.e., it has many components and notions that can be beneficial on the universal level in analysing and understanding civilizations. Needless to say, every nation and country has its religion, culture, tradition, etc., still many elements suggested by al-Māwardī are universally applicable, such as the idea of social integration and social cohesion as civilization cannot be stable without these essential elements. Thus, this study's central question is: What is al-Māwardī's model for understanding civilization? How does it function, decline, and rise, and can it be reformed again?

Furthermore, this research aims to analyze al-Māwardī's thought and philosophy as a comprehensive model of understanding and examining how civilization rises and falls and how civilization could be maintained. Therefore, this study seeks to answer the following questions; according to al-Māwardī, what are the main elements and concepts to construct a civilization? What are the possible practical factors and

concepts that can influence the civilizing and “decivilizing”³ processes on personal and collective levels? Moreover, how can we, in the contemporary moment, benefit from al-Māwardī’s theory of civilization?

As I will demonstrate, this study's significance aims to prove that there are contributions in this field of study that emerged prior to Western ones. Furthermore, almost all academic studies, which studied al-Māwardī’s thoughts, focused mostly on one of his book ‘*al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*, and overlooked the rest of his works, particularly ‘*Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*.⁴ However, this study seeks to draw a theory of civilization based specifically on “*Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*” (al-Māwardī’s other contributions will nonetheless be taken into consideration). Moreover, al-Māwardī lived in the late ‘Abbāsīd period, where the Caliphate’s territories experienced an elevated level of pluralism, cultural diversity, and egalitarianism. This study can thus offer a classical perspective for a pattern of the civilizing process⁵.

This Ph.D. dissertation aims to reveal several aspects which genuinely reflect the significance of al-Māwardī’s contributions in our contemporary era, in particular his book, *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*. This book is still understudied in comparison to al-Māwardī’s other works such as *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*. Accordingly, my central argument in this study is that based on al-Māwardī’s contributions, specifically *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*, I argue, an original theory of civilization can be constructed. Even though morality is essential for al-Māwardī still, this proposed theory is not merely a moral theory of civilization, instead it contains also descriptive and realistic elements.

³ The term “Decivilizing processes” was coined by Norbert Elias, which indicate that the civilizing processes of a civilization goes in the reverse direction. I used the term here to indicate simply the antithesis of civilizing process and advancement.

⁴ Unlike, almost all of the studies on al-Māwardī’s political and social thought, which consider *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*, the main contribution of al-Māwardī, this study, however, considers ‘*Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*, the most significant contribution of al-Māwardī.

⁵ This study borrowed the concept “civilizing process” from Norbert Elias, which means here the process in which the individual as well as the collective improve their ethics, actions and manners.

Methodology

Since this study deals with classical writings, particularly with *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*, there should be a well-defined methodology of reading, understanding, and representing classical text(s) in contemporary times within the field of Civilization Studies. I argue that there are many mistakes that scholars make in reading classical works. One of these mistakes is to read a text partially and without a deep, comprehensive understanding of the whole text, its context, its methodology, the structure of its logic, and its language level, among other things. For instance, Taha Abdurrahman warns against what he calls a ‘prejudiced methodology’ – when researchers select some aspects intentionally and ignore others in analyzing specific ideas and concepts.

Taha Abdurrahman’s methodology of reading, understanding as well as presenting classical texts, educates us on reading early texts, such as *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*, offers many insights that allow us to have a profound and more comprehensive understanding of such as writings. Also, Abdurrahman’s methodology warns of many mistakes can be made in conducting research dealing with classical texts. For Abdurahman, there are two main methodological faults in reading classical texts, which this study attempts to entirely avoid. On the one hand, using an abstract methodology – without considering any spiritual aspect – in reading a classical text leads to excluding some parts of a text with the excuse of not being “rational enough”. This means that the reader of a classical text focuses and interprets selected part(s) without considering the rest of the book (s). The consequences of this methodological fault is that cuts the classical work’s links and distorts the structure of its logic, and misrepresents it.

The article “Conditions for a Good World: The Concept of Comprehensive Justice by Abū al-Hasan al-Māwardī,” written by Abbas Poya, can be an example in this regard. Even though Poya’s article is the only scholarly work in the English language, which focuses solely on the concept of justice in ‘*Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*,’ however, the author interprets al-Māwardī’s point in this concern. To explain this more, Abbas Poya claims that al-Māwardī discusses justice merely as a

“*dunyawi*” issue - i.e., isolated from religion - (Poya 2018: 41). He puts it in this way “{...} he (al-Māwardī) views justice as a profane question {...}” (ibid. 55).

However, reading al-Māwardī shows the opposite of this view. For al-Māwardī comprehensive justice is a profane question for a functional social system and justice, and performing it is a means that leads to success in Hereafter. However, Poya’s article deals with al-Māwardī’s notion of justice as if it has nothing to do with religion or hereafter. In other words, it is inconsistent to dissociate the religious motivation for performing justice from al-Māwardī’s point of view. To assert the relationships of religion with justice, it is worth mentioning that in his article “Ahlāk ve Siyasetin Belirleyici İlkesi Olarak Adâlet: Mâverdî Merkezli Okuma,” Fatih Aydın reaffirms that the concept of justice in the tradition of Islamic thought has been enriched with religious content. Muslims’ interpretation of justice based on its framework in the Quran and Sunnah thus, justice turned into a political concept unique to Islamic societies (Aydın 2020: 1083). Therefore, it is safe to argue that to al-Māwardī, it is impossible to separate justice from religion.

On the other hand, Abdurahman warns of using “politicalized ideology” as an instrument in criticizing a classical text, focusing only on the book’s political aspect. According to Abdurahman's methodology, this is problematic since classical texts are usually built on spiritual and ethical structures, which can be beneficial as a source of motivation and inspiration for all times. Thus, classical texts are not only built on a political or materialistic approach, which can change from time to time and place to place (c.f. Abdurahman 2012: 23 - 28). The same can be argued for al-Māwardī’s work(s), i.e., it was remarkably formed on spiritual and ethical structures. Strictly speaking, this study avoids considering al-Māwardī’s contributions from a “politicalized ideology,” representing his thoughts and arguments in the most convenient ways to his original ideas and views.

To give an example of a “politicalized” reading of al-Māwardī, Said Bensaid al-Alaoui’s book is a case in point. Even though his book, "*Dawlat al Khilafah: Dirasah fi'l Tafkir al Siyasi 'ind al-Māwardī*," is an excellent work on al-Māwardī’s book *Al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*. However, al-Alaoui believes that all of al-Māwardī’s contributions center around the theory of the Caliphate. He even considers the theory

of Caliphate as the core of al-Māwardī's thought. Besides that, al-Alaoui claims that all judgments issued by al-Māwardī are related to Caliphate (al-Alaoui 2010: 218- 24). Remarkably, this is an exaggerated politicization of al-Māwardī's thoughts and contributions. Considering the entirety of al-Māwardī's contributions to center around the theory of the Caliphate is partial reading and politicalizes al-Māwardī's books. For instance, his Quranic exegesis, *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān: al-Nukat wa-al-'Uyūn* (6 volumes) by al-Māwardī is undeniably not centered around the theory of the Caliphate. The same argument is valid for *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*.

To give another example of an academic work dealing with al-Māwardī in this regard, Fehmi Jadaane's book is a case in point. In his book "*Usus al-taqaddum 'inda mufakkirī al-Islām fī al-ālam al-Arabi al-ḥadīth*" ('The Foundations of Progress among Islamic Thinkers in the Modern Arab World'), Jadaane devotes twenty pages to discussing and analyzing *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*. Nevertheless, Jadaane claims that al-Māwardī built his theory of reason based on a Mu'tazilī⁶ principles (c.f. Fehmi Jadaane 2014: 71). It is safe to say that Jadaane's claim based on partially and selective reading of al-Māwardī, since an extensive reading of al-Māwardī shows the opposite, in particular the third chapter of al-Māwardī's book *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn* demonstrates that he was not associated with the Mu'tazilah school⁷. Since *al-Mu'tazilah* is high-ranking reason over religion. However, as I will show al-Māwardī's understanding of reason is not identical to *al-Mu'tazilah*'s thought.

This dissertation benefits from Abdurrahman's methodology, which he names "the complementarity methodology" (*al-manhajīyah al-takāmulīyah*). This methodology not only offers very detailed structures for reassessing classical contributions (or what he names the heritage), but also suggests a comprehensive approach to

⁶ *Al-Mu'tazilah* is an Islamic school of speculative theology, which originated a different Islamic understanding of rationality and reason. The school exalted the role of reason and favored it over other resources such as religion.

⁷ This will be justified more in the third chapter. Also, for discussion on refuting that al-Māwardī was from al-Mu'tazilah see (Kallek 2003: 180- 1) and (Kallek 2004: 222- 4).

investigate it while being aware of the classics' interdisciplinary nature. This is to state that this dissertation will benefit from Abdurrahman's complementarity methodology from his book "*Tajdīd al-Manhaj fī Taqwīm al-Turāth*" (Renovation of the Method in Assessing the Heritage). The advantage of this methodology is that it assists us to analyze and understand al-Māwardī's contributions, in particular, "*Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn*", to represent it in a comprehensive and structured way as a theory of civilization.

Again, to elaborate more on how this study profits from Abdurrahman's methodology and his general rules of approaching classical works, another example will be given. Abdurrahman associates in his methodology between theory and practice in investigating classical text(s). On the theoretical level, one ought to avoid prejudices and unconstructive prevailing views about classical works. For instance, in the case of al-Māwardī, some studies, as shown above, consider him as a Mu'tazilah scholar. However, a comprehensive reading of al-Māwardī's books demonstrate otherwise. So in reconsidering al-Māwardī's works, this study avoids any prejudices and or prevailing views about him and his works without in-depth investigation. On the practical level, Abdurrahman warns about separating between *ilm* and action, and emphasizes the correlative and inseparable relationships between *ilm* and action in mostly all of the classical works. Strictly speaking, this study acknowledges that al-Māwardī's theory has practical applications and is not just abstract theorizations.

Another aspect of Abdurrahman's methodology is that it assumes that to understand a classical scholar, the researcher should consider all his contributions related to the studied issues.⁸ Even if some of al-Māwardī's books are not discussed and cited in this study, there was an extensive reading of all his available works to deeply understand his thought, context, and why he wrote his contributions and to which audiences. Therefore, the importance of al-Māwardī's theory of civilization, as this study demonstrates, lies in that it is from a scholar who possesses practical

⁸ This study is aware of the significance of "*al-Hāwī al-Kabīr*", however, this work is not cited since its topics are mainly related to Islamic jurisprudence and Islamic studies. For a precis summary of "*al-Hāwī al-Kabīr*", see (Alboğa 2014: 96- 101).

experiences and was active in diplomacy and politics on behalf of two ‘Abbāsīd caliphates. He was also a widely-recognized legal figure who held the prestigious position of chief judge and authored notable scholarly works.⁹

One more point to elaborate on the methodology I used in this study is that in many classical works, the author often delivers meaning through their arrangement and order of topics. To give an example from *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn*, in which al-Māwardī prioritized certain concepts and arguments by mentioning them first. As a practical example, al-Māwardī starts his *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn* by shedding light primarily on the concept of “reason” in order to indicate the centrality and preference of reason over concepts such as “*ilm*” (knowledge) which are mentioned later. Indeed, I will argue in this study that *ilm* is itself the outcome of reason.

To explain this in detail, in the introduction of *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn*, al-Māwardī clarifies his methodology. He addresses the significance of his book’s topic, saying, “the greatest of all matters in magnitude and significance, and it’s most widespread in advantage and favor, is what with which the religion and *al-dunyā* (worldly life) are straightened. And with which the righteousness of the Hereafter and the *al-dunyā* is arranged. Insomuch as it is by the uprightness of religion that ‘*Ibādāt*’ - i.e., acts of devotion - come to be proper and it is with the righteousness of *al-dunyā* that happiness is reached” (al-Māwardī 2012: 6). So, when religion and *al-dunyā* are straightened, well-being and happiness are accomplished in the worldly life and the Hereafter.

Subsequently, al-Māwardī expounds that he will approach these topics and related issues to them briefly, conciseness, unequivocally, and with simplicity. Al-Māwardī

⁹ Al-Māwardī wrote numerous books, which can be categorized as the following:

1. Religious books; “*Tafsīr al-Qur’ān (al-Nukat wa-al-’uyūn)*” (6 volumes), “*al-Hāwī al-Kabīr*” (more than 20 volumes about al-Shāfi’s legal school of law) and “*A’lām al-nubūwah*”.
2. Political and social sciences works; “*al-Aḥkām al-Sultāniyyah*” (a famous book for the western scholars as a manuscript of the administrative and political rules. “*Naṣīḥat al-Mulūk*”, “*Tas’hīl al-Nazar wa-Ta’jīl al-Zafar*” and “*Adab al-Wazīr*”.
3. Ethics and moral books; ; “*Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*” and “*Adab al-Qāḍī*”.
4. Arabic literature; “*Kitāb al-Amthāl wa-al-ḥikam*” and again “*Kitāb adab al-dunyā wa-al-dīn*”.

has consistent principles in constructing the logic of his arguments. First, he cites from the holy Quran as well as hadiths. Second, he references the opinions and positions of the Prophet's companions. Third, he mentions the thought and judgments of the 'Ulamā' (e.g., highly educated Muslim scholars). Fourthly, he quotes the sayings of wise people (i.e., philosophers). Lastly, he uses verses of poets to conclude the topic. Al-Māwardī justifies doing this by quoting Ali Ibn Abi Talib, who articulates, "The reason might be boredom. Thus, you ought to offer your reason unique pieces of wisdom". (ibid. 6). Meaning, the objective of varied citations is to keep the reader's engagement and attention. The reader enjoys a variation of style, and becomes bored from the same discursive style, according to al-Māwardī (ibid. 6).

The question arises here, why did al-Māwardī structure his book in this specific manner? Also, is there any logic behind that? I argue that al-Māwardī has reasons why he designed his book in the way he did. Indeed, he starts with reason because it is the fundamental element to gain and increase knowledge (the topic of the second chapter) and understand the core of religion (the third chapter). Then he elaborates on "the constitutive elements of the social world." After that, he moves to "personal discipline and institutions." This is because for al-Māwardī, the constitution of a social world is essential as it is the circumstance in which individuals and institutions can be improved and flourished. In other words, al-Māwardī designed his book like a pyramid shape. Reason, knowledge, and religion are the primary elements where individuals discipline themselves to cooperate in constructing their social world and institutions.

This is to argue that it is imperative to comprehend the structures of *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn* and why it was arranged in this particular manner. For instance, if a person tries to understand al-Māwardī's conception of religion without primarily understanding his concept of reason, it will most likely lead to a misunderstanding of al-Māwardī's main arguments in this concern. Likewise, suppose a person attempts to understand al-Māwardī's notions of personal discipline without initially understanding his conceptions of reason, knowledge, and religion. In that case, that also leads to misinterpretation of al-Māwardī's contributions and arguments.

Therefore, it is vital to give attention to the structures of *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn* to understand it in the best possible way.

Correspondingly, this study aims to maintain as much as possible of al-Māwardī's arrangements and structures from *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn* to not misunderstand the logic of his structure, nor misrepresent his ideas and arguments. For this reason, the arrangements in this study are mostly arranged and structured based on the structures of al-Māwardī's book, *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn*.

The structures of the study

This study consists of two parts; each has three chapters. In the first part of this study, three concepts – reason, *‘ilm*¹⁰, and religion – will be analyzed in relation to civilization's construction. I argue that different understandings of reason, *‘ilm*, and religion in concern to civilization lead to different forms of civilizations. Firstly, it is essential to answer the following normative questions: What is the function of reason, and how does al-Māwardī perceive it in relation to civilization's construction and decay? Furthermore, what is *‘ilm*, and what is the relationship between it and constructing a civilization? Also, what is the relationship between religion and civilization? Strictly speaking, these concepts, reason, *‘ilm*, and religion are the three abstract concepts which constitute what this study calls the essential foundations of al-Māwardī's theory of civilization, as demonstrated in Figure I.

¹⁰ It is worth mention that some Arabic concepts are highly complicated to be translated into English language. For this reason, this study keep some concepts in their original Arabic language. The Arabic term *‘ilm* could indicate different meanings in English such as, “knowledge”, “science”, “system of knowledge” or even “discipline”. For the sake of unity in this study, I will be using “system of knowledge” as a translation to al-Māwardī's expression *‘ilm*.




Figure 1 explains the structure of the first part of this study, "The essential foundations of al-Māwardī's theory of civilization," including three chapters.

The first part of this study, entitled "Essential Foundations of al-Māwardī's Theory of Civilization," covers the essential foundations of al-Māwardī's Theory of Civilization. I argue that al-Māwardī's theory of civilization has the main theoretical concepts, reason, *ilm*, and religion, which are the three pillars that make up the base for instituting any civilization. Therefore, the central argument in the first part of this study has three dimensions.

First, I argue that civilization cannot be established without the centrality of reason since human deeds and actions can only be arranged and organized based on the reason's faculties and capacities. This will be expanded in the first chapter.

Second, I argue that a civilization cannot be instituted without an existing system of knowledge, as the absence of a system of knowledge means (and leads to) disorder and confusion, which is the opposite of civilization. This will be considered in the second chapter of this study.

Third, I argue that it is impossible to construct a civilization without religion's centrality. Not only because only religion can offer normative and humane answers to normative system-oriented questions, as I will demonstrate later, but also because social bonds and solidarity can only

be established based on religion.¹¹ This will be illuminated in the third chapter.

Furthermore, I argue that in his book, *Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn*, al-Māwardī conceptualizes a broad-minded dimension in the way he defines and attaches meanings to these three mentioned above concepts. Also, he describes the direct and indirect roles these concepts play in constructing civilization. However, from al-Māwardī's point of view, reason ought to be tied strongly to normative ethics and deeds as well as to revelation.¹² Meaning, for him, reason ought to be always associated with good deeds, and humans should be evaluated based on morality and ethics and not only on reason¹³. Moreover, civilization cannot be instituted without an organized and profound system of knowledge. In this study, I argue that the absence of a system of knowledge and ignorance leads to confusion and disorder, which is the opposite of civilization. Thus, this study aims to re-evaluate the concept of the system of knowledge (*ilm*) and its relationship to civilization, and then subsequently to normative and moral deeds.

Furthermore, the system of knowledge (*i.e.*, *ilm*) and religion complement each other since religion can be a normative source and even regulate the system of knowledge in society. This is for the reason that not all theoretical matters are ethically permissible to apply practically. This is to argue that though *ilm* can raise endless questions in general, normative oriented questions demand support from religion. Therefore, I maintain that religion intertwines with the system of knowledge because religion inspires and encourages *ilm* to be spread and improved on the individual and collective levels. Religion assists on the normative level to answer normative questions.

¹¹ Needless to say, that al-Māwardī did attribute only a functional role to religion.

¹² This topic will be clarified in the first chapter.

¹³ This will be explained in detail in the first chapter.

The second part of this study, entitled “Implementation Aspects of al-Māwardī’s Theory of Civilization,” consists of three chapters. Chapter One contains two parts. The first part will assess what this study calls “the constitutive elements of the social world,”¹⁴ which includes six elements: adherence to a normative base, a functional political system, comprehensive justice, general security, general economic prosperity, and optimism.¹⁵ The second part will consider three rules, which are fundamental for any individual in society to discipline and self-restrain his personality to be socially integrated. They are an obedient personality, social integration and a sufficient wealth or income. Chapter Two will consider what this study calls “Personal Discipline and Institutions,” which contains different kinds of personal disciplines that every person should consider, whether in his manners or in dealing with others. These concepts emphasize the individual disciplines foundational for Civilizational Studies, and offer methods for improving ethics in the future. Chapter Three focuses on what this study calls al-Māwardī’s informal institution theory to increase and maintain social solidarity, cohesion, and society’s stability. Figure II illuminates the arrangement of Part II of this study.

It worth elaborating here on the concept of *al-dunyā*, which is driven from ‘*dânā*.’ The conception of *al-dunyā* has numerous connotations. Firstly, it signifies that the worldly life has nearly been brought to its end. Second, *al-dunyā* indicates a meaning of inferiority in comparison to the hereafter. Specifically, *al-dunyā* is inferior to the Hereafter since the former is impermanent, and the latter is permanent. Third,

¹⁴ Al-Māwardī calls it in Arabic “Iṣlāḥ al-dunyā”, see chapter IV for the reasons why I translated “Iṣlāḥ al-dunyā” as “The constitutive elements of social world”.

¹⁵ All these components are necessary basics in al-Māwardī’s theory of civilization, and accomplishing them is a collective responsibility and commitments. However, a lack of one or more of them reflects the weakness of the civilization, as this study demonstrates. Also, composing these six principles and rules together to propose a particular order is a unique and central effort that distinguishes al-Māwardī’s civilizational vision and makes his contribution very essential for many late social thinkers and philosophers, including among others, Ibn Khaldūn, the founder of the science of civilization. For example, al-Nāhī rightly argues that “It is not a surprise, that we find in Al-Māwardī’s thought, particularly in his book *Kitāb adab al-dunyā wa-al-dīn* features and roots, which reflect an original social philosophy. For instance, he (al-Māwardī) starts from where Ibn Khaldūn after generations and centuries concluded” (al-N’ahi 1994: 83). Needless to say, that this does not underestimate in anyway the significant contribution of Ibn Khaldūn in Civilization Studies, rather it pays attention to previous scholar to Ibn Khaldūn

al-dunyā implies being the first in parallel to *al-Ākhirah* (i.e., the next ultimate life). Fourth, it indicates the sense of innobility and vice (al-Iṣfahānī 2010a: page). Thus, *al-dunyā* denotes that it is not only finite, but also that departing from it is inevitable. Due to this fact, the individual ought to learn how to live in it appropriately. Al-Māwardī cites a philosopher, who articulates that “Look at the *al-dunyā* with the eye of a disciplined person and do not consider it with the eye of a yearning lover” (al-Māwardī 2012: 177). As this study shows, al-Māwardī proposes unique structures to achieve happiness and well-being in *al-dunyā* as well as *al-Ākhirah*.




Figure II explains the structure of the second part of this study, which contains three chapters.

I argue that for al-Māwardī, the differences and dissimilarities among peoples are fundamental reasons and sources for humanity to band together, aid each other, and cooperate. However, if these dissimilarities and differences vanish in society, then individuals would not need each other, which is an indication of the inevitable decline from al-Māwardī’s perspective (al-Māwardī 2012: 214). Based on this argument, one can go one step ahead of al-Māwardī to argue that differences and dissimilarities among civilizations are also a reason and source for them to engage confidently and cooperate.

Accordingly, Chapter Four of this study argues that engagement and cooperation among people necessitate prearrangements. For this reason, al-Māwardī insists that people's well-being and welfare necessities individual discipline and collective structures. The constitutive elements of the social world, for al-Māwardī, are based, as mentioned above, on six principles and rules, which aim fundamentally to bring the society into social unity, cohesion, and more stability. It is worth mentioning that these rules and principles proposed by al-Māwardī, which include virtually every aspect of human civilization, are based on the guidance of reason and rationality (c.f. al-Māwardī 2012: 210). To put this differently, forming a civilizational structure based on these six elements can generate cooperation and healthy relationships among individuals and maintain and secure them.

Chapter Five of this study argues that personal discipline and institutions are the indispensable conditions for instituting a civilization and maintaining it. This leads to the question, what are the contents of these individual disciplines, according to al-Māwardī? What is the relationship between what this study calls "The constitutive elements of the social world" and personal discipline? Before tackling this issue, it is worth mentioning that al-Māwardī distinguishes between two categories of individual disciplines. On the one hand, this includes what he calls "*Adab Riyāḍah wa-Istiṣlāḥ*", which is personal discipline. For al-Māwardī, these disciplines continuously can be increased through practice, and they are established mainly on rationality. On the other hand, these categories include what al-Māwardī calls "*Adab Muwāḍi'ah wa-Istiṣlāḥ*," or what this study calls "Informal Institution Theory" that has come into existence through society's customs and habits.

Every civilization establishes itself on particular philosophical structures and (informal) institutions. The one proposed by al-Māwardī has not only a normative orientation, but is also built on the notion of commitments, personal discipline, and institutions, in which individuals progress and increase their normative deeds and actions based on self-commitments and self-discipline. Therefore, the following chapter aims to re-evaluate al-Māwardī's contribution regarding which components of his proposed structures of personal discipline and institutions can be beneficial in our contemporary age.

“The constitutive elements of the social world” is undoubtedly the context in which the personal disciplines, as well as the institution, can be practiced and accomplished. Furthermore, “*ta’dīb*”¹⁶ as an individual discipline has a central place in al-Māwardī’s thought and philosophy. For instance, he dedicated almost more than half of his book ‘*Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn*’ merely to personal discipline as well as the question of how to improve them. This demonstrates the significance of personal discipline in al-Māwardī’s thought. In other words, the more vital individual disciplines are, the firmer and more well-founded civilization will be.

I argue that from al-Māwardī’s perspective, human nature consists of diverse qualities and attributes. Indeed, some of them are good, and others are not. Due to this, an individual ought to keep always working on amending his attributes, ethics, and self-discipline, in a kind of constant process which al-Māwardī called “*ta’dīb*.” Moreover, individuals should not be satisfied with several good attributes already existing in their characteristics, as if an individual is not always in the “*ta’dīb*” process toward better personal discipline and qualities and manners, he will lose even his good attributes. It is worth mentioning that for al-Māwardī, good attributes and personal disciplines have several sources. On the one hand, most good ethics are gained through experiences. On the other hand, good ethics are favored by habits and customs, which again vary from one society to another (al-Māwardī 2012: 365).

One way to gain “*ta’dīb*” for al-Māwardī’, is through parents, whose actions and words demonstrate to their children how to behave based on a defined ethical system and personal discipline. This occurs through the family’s “*ta’dīb*,” a process that facilitates the child to accommodate and absorb good manners and behavior and increases their sociability. Here, an early start to teaching the child is a crucial factor, since teaching a child at an early age allows him to absorb *ādāb* and good self-discipline in the future more easily. However, there are other significant means of gaining personal discipline, which has two aspects:

¹⁶ “*Ta’dīb*” can be translated literally as “civility”, “socializing” and “disciplining and act of politeness”. However, in this context “*ta’dīb*” indicates a normative disciplining process of self, in which individual works continuously to ameliorate his or her good ethics and self-discipline towards the better.

Firstly, *Adab Riyāḍah wa-Istiṣlāḥ*, this study calls it “personal discipline and institutions,” which is based on religion, intellectual faculties, and rationality, which no rational being would doubt its validity and faultiness according to al-Māwardī. The deduction of this kind of *ādāb* is grounded not only on rational justifications, but also on the evidence of these rational justifications' soundness.¹⁷ This kind of *ādāb* as a self-discipline has six components: Avoiding arrogance and self-admiration, behaving according to one's ethical characteristic, having *Ḥayā'* (shame), being forbearing and avoiding anger, being sincere and not deceiving, and finally avoiding *ḥasad* (malicious envy). I argue that these kinds of personal disciplines can directly and indirectly empower and advance the society on individual and collective levels. This will be expanded in detail in chapter five.

Secondly, *Adab Muwāḍi'ah wa-Istiṣlāḥ* forms the structures of an informal institution theory. It is grounded on the imitation of what sober-minded people have practiced and convened. It includes their manners, which have been received with favor by cultivated people who behave in good manners. However, this kind of *ādāb*, as an informal institution theory, does not only necessarily have inferred justifications, but also agreements on its preferences are not associated with the evidence. According to this kind of *ādāb*, abandoning what are known as conventional behaviors or customs and habits in society is wrong unless there are justifications for abandoning them. For al-Māwardī, this category of *ādāb* has the following components; utterances and silence, being patient and avoiding sorrow, consultation, having confidentiality, seriousness and being serious, encouraging optimism, having *al-Murū'ah* and lastly, different recommended miscellaneous forms of etiquettes and *Ādāb*. The last chapter of this study will elaborate on these issues.

¹⁷ Definitely, most good attributes cannot be established without the centrality of reason and rationality as a monitor, since reason is the groundwork, which assists and plays a central role in the process of “*ta'dīb*”. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily indicate that personal discipline and attributes are only based on reason; if this were the case, there would be no need for religion *per se* or even Prophethood. al-Māwardī tried to prove this through quoting the saying of Prophet Muhammad, stating that “I was sent to consummate the best of ethics” (ibid. 365), which according to al-Māwardī reveals that there were good ethics even before Muhammad. Meaning, Prophet Muhammad was sent to complete main “*Adab Riyāḍah wa-Istiṣlāḥ*” as one of his religious duties.

Eventually, it is significant to mention that all these concepts, notions, and ideas proposed by al-Māwardī are not detached exposition and arguments. Instead, they support each other and build a comprehensive and profound understanding of civilization. Ignoring or neglecting his concepts and notions in this regard might lead to a distortion of an appropriate understanding of his theory of civilization. This is why this study tries to take all of his concepts and notions into consideration.





Part I: Essential Foundations of al-Māwardī's Theory of
Civilization

Chapter One

Reason

1.1. Introduction

In *Kitāb adab al-dunyā wa-al-dīn* al-Māwardī draws his first thesis and declares that for every virtue (*faḍīlah*) there is an essence, and for every *ādāb*, there is a source, and both are compiled in reason. Strictly speaking, reason is the origin of virtue and a significant source of *ādāb*. Furthermore, reason is the foundation to understand religion¹⁸ and the pillar in instituting and being successful in what he calls the “worldly life.”¹⁹ Lastly, through reason, civilization is planned and ordered, and different hearts, desires, and intentions are integrated (al-Māwardī 2012: 11). This demonstrates reason’s primary role in establishing worldly life.

By crediting reason as the origin of the virtue (*faḍīlah*) as well as a significant source of the *ādāb*, al-Māwardī noticeably delineates the foundations for his thought and the way he understands human behaviour. As this chapter shows, al-Māwardī believes in that reason plays a significant role for realizing what he calls a successful worldly life. However, this does not mean that al-Māwardī ignores or neglects religion's role in this concern, as the third chapter of this study demonstrates that religion also plays an essential role in his thought. To understand religion appropriately, people ought to depend on the faculty of reason and reasoning. Due to this fact, al-Māwardī starts some of his main books²⁰ by expounding the conception of reason.

Whether reason alone can define *al-ḥusn* (positive ethical traits) from *al-qabīḥ* (the unethical traits) or religion solely can delineate *al-ḥusn* from *al-qabīḥ*. Reason is not

¹⁸ In this study, ‘the religion’ means Islam, however, if the word was undefined than it may mean any other religion.

¹⁹ Al-Māwardī’s concept of “worldly life” is to be understood as a synonymous to civilization in the contemporary time.

²⁰ For instance, in his *Kitāb adab al-dunyā wa-al-dīn* as well as in the *A'lām al-Nubuwwa*.

capable of describing it alone. In other words, “what is rationally good?” and “what is religiously good?” I argue that al-Māwardī states his position on these issues clearly from the beginning and did not take an extreme view favoring reason over religion or vice versa. Meaning, he neither depends only on reason, nor only on religion. I argue that for him, as the first part of this study shows, both reason and religion have a foundational element in reaching a successfully worldly life. Depending on only one of them will have negative consequences for both individuals and society.

To give an example of how reason and religion complement each other, on the collective level, al-Māwardī brings the issue of whether having a competent authority and being loyal to it is prescribed by reason or by religion. For him, both religion and reason combined necessitate people to form a competent political system. Still, both reason and religion instruct people to be loyal to it since this protects society from chaos and disorder.²¹ Needless to say, both reason and religion encourage having order and stability. Thus, holding a competent authority and being loyal to it is necessitated by both reason and religion, with no contradiction between the two in this matter.

On the individual level, for al-Māwardī deceiving people is an unethical act that contains every potential feature of evil and is the core for every fault. It has destructive consequences on society, such as increasing hostility and aversion among the people. Therefore, al-Māwardī views both reason and religion as encouraging honesty as this leads to better cohesion in society. Meaning, both reason and religion encourages having an ethical and normative base. Thus, “what is rationally good?” and “what is religiously good” do not contradict each other for him. However, as al-Māwardī’s contribution shows, he favors reason over religion since it is only by reason that humans can appropriately understand religion.

In this chapter, I will elaborate on different note on worthy Muslim thinkers preceding al-Māwardī; such as Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/ 857) and Ibn Abi ’l-Dunyā (207- 281/ 823- 894), as well as scholars that succeeded him, namely

²¹ This example will be explained more in the fourth chapter in this study.

al-Rāghib Al-Iṣfahānī and Ibn K̄haldūn. This will facilitate a deeper understanding of al-Māwardī's perception of reason, which is related to the theory of civilization that I am trying to construct. The selection of these philosophers and social theorists, in particular, lies in their considerable and significant contributions in this concern.

1.1. The concept of reason and its different categories

From al-Māwardī's perspective, reason has a very extended and wide-ranging connotation. I will expound on several aspects of his perception of reason so that an all-encompassing concept will be presented in this chapter. Firstly, for him, reason is about the ability to distinguish between *ḥaq* (right) and *bāṭal* (false); *ṣaḥīḥ* (sound) and *fāsid* (unsound); and *mumkin* (imaginable) and *mumtani'* (impossible) (al-Māwardī 1994: 33). Secondly, reason is about knowing and grasping concealed and complex matters, which individuals cannot reach except through *istidlāl* (inference) and *naẓar* (deep thinking), meaning recognizing things as they are in actuality (ibid. 37). Thirdly, reason is about restraint, or what I call the virtue of restraint, which is a main characteristic of reason, according to al-Māwardī. Constraint indicates restraining from unethical and immoral conduct. Al-Māwardī states that '*Aql*' was so-called because it hinders (or holding) a person from committing inappropriate things (al-Māwardī 2012: 15). Fourthly, reason is strongly related to experience since the more experience a person has, the wiser he can become (al-Māwardī 2012b: 147- 8). Lastly, reason manifests itself in behaving decently, so it is about distinguishing between right and wrong, truthful, and falseness. Instead, it is about applying the right ethics and avoiding unethical behavior and manners (al-Māwardī 2012: 27). Strictly speaking, for al-Māwardī, good behavior while avoiding wrong and indecent acts and deeds are part of being rational. Accordingly, when a person possess all of these aspects, then he can be called '*āqil*' from al-Māwardī's point of view.

Moreover, al-Māwardī states precisely and in a straightforward manner that "Reason is conducive to proof. However, it is not a proof [in itself] because reason is the foundation of all the known proofs and indications and things indicated." (al-Māwardī 1994: 33). He further argues that all kinds of knowledge are driven by

reason, which is why reason should be called the “mother of all knowledge” (ibid. 33). Accordingly, reason is not entirely by itself either action or ability. Instead, reason, like the five senses, is an instrument that can gather evidence. Again, this shows how for al-Māwardī reason is merely an instrument to reach proofs and knowledge. Furthermore, for al-Māwardī, there are two types of reason, or more precisely, two stages of the intellectual process (al-Māwardī 2012: 12- 7):

Firstly, there is the stage of natural reason “*al-‘Aql al-gharīzī*,” the form of reason that human beings inherit from their parents. That is to say, it is determined through inheritance. al-Māwardī emphasizes that “innate reason” if we may call it that, is not to be measured or understood to mean that some nations have inherent intellectual superiority over others. Moreover, al-Māwardī emphasizes that there are two types of intellectual categories or two intellectual states. As a process, this leads to the understanding that natural reason is equal on the social level, which means that no specific social class has superiority over other classes. Raḍwān al-Sayyid asserts that al-Māwardī’s classification of reason as both natural and acquired not only refutes the notion of stratified born individuals and elites, but also insists on the equality of humankind’s nature (al-Sayyid 2012: 53).

Al-Māwardī’s first stage of reason is to be comparable to al-Muḥāsibī’s first level of reason, which is reason as a natural aspect of the human.²² An individual can distinguish through this natural reason between the good and evil in his worldly life. If an individual has this ability, he should know that God granted him his natural reason. Moreover, the evidence for someone being ‘*āqil*’ (a sane person)²³ is that his behavior and deeds should illustrate his consciousness of good and evil. Consequently, if an individual possesses this type or level of reason, he is responsible before God for his deeds and behavior (al-Muḥāsibī 1971: 202- 3).

²² al-Muḥāsibī calls it “*Inna al-‘Aql Gharīzī*”.

²³ This study does not translate the word “*āqil*” as a rational being since the term “rationality” is a loaded term within the Western philosophy. Instead, this study prefers to translate it as ‘*a sane person*’ to keep the meaning clearer.

To answer whether the natural reason is restricted or not, al-Māwardī believes that the natural reason is limited and cannot be improved on or enriched. Similar to al-Muḥāsibī, al-Māwardī states that when a human being has this type of reason, he becomes a sane person. That is, through this natural reason, human beings are distinguished from other living beings. Likewise, Ibn Khaldūn argues that man is distinguished from the rest of God’s creation in his ability to reason. *Aql al-gharīzī*, which was introduced by al-Māwardī, can be extended and enriched through what he calls “*al-ilmu bi al mudrakat al-darurya*,”²⁴ which has two sources:

Sensory Senses: this reflects the humans’ capacity and faculty of the five “sensory senses,” hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, and seeing. If an individual recognizes reality around him through one or more of these senses, he will possess a specific knowledge according to al-Māwardī. However, if an individual has lost one or more of these senses, it does not mean that he has lesser intellectual abilities.

What about a blind person who cannot distinguish diverse colors or even a mirage in a desert that makes a healthy person think there is water where there is none. It is just a mirage, and the assumed knowledge is most probably wrong. This means that we cannot ultimately depend on the sensory senses. Nevertheless, this does not mean that everything we perceive through the sensory senses is false. Sensory senses convey information, and it cannot be judged based on the truth or falseness of any received knowledge. Reason only can play the role of evaluating the received data. How can we be sure about the knowledge that we perceive through our “sensory senses”? In other words, to what extent can we depend on our “sensory senses” in reaching real knowledge?

It is important to remember that our sensory senses are just an instrument, helping us to reach knowledge. Everything we realize through them will be judged by reason and reasoning. That is why “sensory senses” is the only source of gaining knowledge. Accordingly, not everything we perceive through our sensory senses is correct not only because our minds can be deceived, as the case with a mirage in a desert, but also the sensory senses can be mistaken. Therefore, everything we

²⁴ It is a treatise on dictation as a method of transmitting manuscripts and knowledge.

perceive through sensory senses should be then filtered through reason, which will either approve it or refute it.

A priori knowledge²⁵: an example of this is knowing that it is impossible for two contradictory objects to coexist, such as night and day or white and black. For al-Māwardī, this kind of knowledge cannot be detached from a sane person. Consequently, a rational person knows that five is less than seven. Moreover, al-Māwardī argues that if a person has the abilities and faculties to gain what he calls “*al-Ilimu bi al mudrakat al-darurya*” through these two means – the sensory senses as well as the a priori knowledge together – it means that he is an entirely sane person (al-Māwardī 2012: 15).

It is important to remember that the sensory senses are essential in having a priori knowledge because of how we realize the difference between night and day, black and white, etc. needless to say that we know that something is black and something is white through the sense of sight. Due to this fact, it is safe to assume that a priori knowledge depends on the sensory senses. As is the case with sensory senses, prior knowledge depends on reason and reasoning to be proven or refuted. Based on this, sensory senses and prior knowledge are sources to reach “*mudrakat al-daruryaa*” from al-Māwardī’s perspective. And these are the materials where we can build and extend our knowledge.

After a person has knowledge through what al-Māwardī calls “*al-Ilimu bi al-Mudrakat al--darurya*,” then the next level or stage is the acquired reason: the outcome and result of the natural reason. The aims of acquired reason are to reach “bright profound knowledge,” “soundness of behavior,” and “correct thought.” (ibid. 16). An individual can reach this stage of reason through various means, such as experiences,²⁶ learning, education, consulting, and training (ibid. 16- 19). For that

²⁵ In al-Māwardī’ words “*mā kāna mubtada’ fī al-nufūs*”.

²⁶ Associating the concept of experience with the concept of reason is very common in earlier Muslims Thought and philosophy, for instance, Ibn Abi ‘I-Dunyā says that reason is a core, one strengthen and support it through experiences, also he says that the Arab used to say “*the Reason is the experiences*” (Ibn Abi ‘I-Dunyā: 1988: 42- 3). This clearly shows the centrality of experience in reason.

reason, acquired reason has no limit, and as long as one uses it frequently, it advances and improves. Before elaborating more on al-Māwardī's acquired reason, I will explore first both Al-Muḥāsibī as well as Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā's conceptions of reason – For their essential contributions in regard – then I will continue with al-Māwardī.

1.2. Al-Muḥāsibī's Concept of Reason

Al-Muḥāsibī wrote one of the earliest contributions on reason entitled “*The Essence of Reason and its Meaning and Positions.*” Al-Muḥāsibī distinguishes three different meanings for a reason. Firstly, reason as *gharīzī*, which is an instinct or character that God created in human beings. Through this level of reason, people know God, what benefits them and harms them in worldly life. A person is rational if his actions and deeds reflect that he knows what benefits, hurts him, so he behaves accordingly. (al-Muḥāsibī 1971: 201- 2). For al-Muḥāsibī, people are born with this level of reason, and knowledge comes from it (ibid. 205).

Secondly, reason as understanding²⁷, which indicates the proper understanding of worldly life. Through it, human beings reach a more profound understanding of the meaning of existing external phenomena through the five senses. When an individual reaches this level of understanding through his reason, he can comprehend the nature of existing phenomena only in their external expressions. For him, both believer or nonbeliever, an ethical or unethical person, can have this level of reason. (al-Muḥāsibī 1971: 208).

Lastly, al-Muḥāsibī describes reason as *baṣīrah* (spiritual insight).²⁸ This level of human reason is to comprehend the inner meaning, religious value and ethical aspects of existing phenomena. This level of reason, which is higher and more profound than al-Muḥāsibī's two types mentioned above, leads to a magnification of

²⁷ Al-Muḥāsibī uses “*Inna al-'Aql fahm*”, which can be approximately translated as “acuteness and sharpness of thought.”

²⁸ Al-Muḥāsibī uses “*Inna al-'Aql baṣīrah*”.

good and evil. Resulting from the fear of punishment in the Hereafter, this level or type of reason makes people more motivated to enjoy what is right while at the same time avoiding what is wrong. Therefore, this level of reason directly influences one's deeds, behaviors, and actions, moving the role of reason in human life from theoretical to practical. However, al-Muḥāsibī did not explain how an individual can develop these two reasoning abilities and facilities (al-Muḥāsibī 1971: 210). He further argues that '*Aql baṣīrah* is equivalent to knowledge, especially the knowledge about God and His Attributes (ibid. 210).

Despite the fact all people are equal in the first level of reason – for al-Muḥāsibī reason as *baṣīrah* is not equally distributed among people and especially concerning knowing God, people are varied. He argues that we can call a person entirely reasonable in their relationship to God if that person builds his relationship with God based on three principles: firstly, he fears God and follows His commands. Secondly, he has strong faith in Him and what God states. Thirdly, he has in-depth knowledge about God's religion. (al-Muḥāsibī 1971: 220). In other words, fear of God, knowing His attributes, and in-depth knowledge about His religion make people deal and act in an ethical manner. However, some destructive human features limit this level of reason. For instance, al-Muḥāsibī believes that self-admiration and imitating others without reasoning make people blind to God's nature and His message (ibid. 213). Moreover, it frequently appears in al-Muḥāsibī's texts that being reasonable or having reason means one ought to follow God's commands. In other words, for al-Muḥāsibī, if a person does not follow God's instructions, then that person is not rational even if he has the first level of reason – i.e., '*Aql al-gharīzī* (al-Muḥāsibī 1971: 213).

It is essential to mention that al-Muḥāsibī articulates that when God created reason, He said to it "{...} I swear By My honor and majesty, by my might and authority over my creations I have created no creature more honorable than you, nor more beloved to me than you. I created nothing in a higher position than you. Through you, I shall be known, worshiped, and acknowledged. Through you, I shall bestow and reward, and what is against you shall be punished." (ibid. 122). This statement reflects reason's central role in al-Muḥāsibī's thought in this concern. Remarkably, nothing has more value and honor than reason for the benefit that it brings and the

harm it prevents. Therefore, reason and reasoning are essential in reaching happiness and success in the worldly life and the Hereafter. Reason's significance manifests in its primary role in inspiring people's behavior and actions constructively. Due to this fact, al-Muḥāsibī argues that through reason, people not only will be humble in their conduct but also have mercy and patience in dealing with others, as well as having decent discipline (al-Muḥāsibī 1971: 222). This is all to say that reason plays a critical role in making people deal and behave in better ways, essential in building a society. After elaborating on al-Muḥāsibī's conception of reason, I will now turn to Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā's conception of reason.

1.3. Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā's conception of reason

Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā was a scholar who preceded al-Māwardī and made a significant contribution to the concept of reason. He wrote a book on reason entitled "Kitāb al-'Aql wa-fadluhu" (i.e., The Book of Reason and its Virtue). He collected one hundred and ten quotations and narrations on the concept of reason from diverse perspectives from earlier Islamic and Arabic traditions. These citations include many issues, such as the definition of reason and its significance, the conflicting relationship between it and passion, how a rational person ought to behave, why reason is foundational for having a religion, etc. For Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā, there are two forms of reason: the innate reason²⁹ and the practical reason³⁰. The former distinguishes humankind over the animal, and the latter is the knowledge and experiences gained through innate reason. When these two types of reasons combine in a person, he will be a decent person. Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā insists that practical reason cannot be separated from innate reason. Because practical reason is the outcome of innate reason; however, innate reason can be separated from practical reason (Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā 1988: 50). Remarkably, this is similar to al-Māwardī when he argues that acquired reason cannot be divided from natural reason.

²⁹ Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā uses 'Aql Nahiza.

³⁰ 'Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā uses Aql Tajarub.

Al-Māwardī argues that acquired reason is inseparable from natural reason since the former is an outcome and a developed stage of the latter. However, if humans attempt to disassociate natural reason from acquired reason, they will have neither virtue, nor good deeds (al-Māwardī 2012: 28). That is to say that human beings' good deeds and normative behaviors are based on a combination of natural reason and the acquired reason since the stages following normative ethics and good deeds. It can be argued that for al-Māwardī establishing a civilization is entirely based on acquired reason, meaning that the construction of civilization is based on an advanced stage of reason in which humankind acts and deals based on normative ethics.

So, what is the relationship between being rational and behaving normatively? The meaning of ‘*Aql*’ (i.e., reason), is derived from “‘*aqla l-al-nāqah*,” meaning “the camel’s binding cord.” Thus, reason, it can be said, prevents humankind from acting on its primal desires, just as the binding cord prevents the camel from escaping. Therefore, if a person’s reason prevents him from doing what he should not do (i.e., behaving normatively), then he is a sane person, or “‘*aqlānī*” (al-Māwardī 2012: 15). Connecting reason to normativity is not only limited to al-Māwardī. Many other scholars present the same notion. For instance, the same Arabic expression ‘tie the camel’ is found in al-Iṣfahānī’s book. However, al-Iṣfahānī adds that reason is to be perceived as a means of preventing humans from performing bad deeds and actions. (c.f. al-Iṣfahānī 2010: 137). Meaning, al-Iṣfahānī also connects reason with behaving normatively (i.e., the performance of good actions and avoiding bad actions).

Ibn Abi ’l-Dunyā considers reason to have restrictions. He reports a quotation from Ibn Abi al-Zanad, which states that “A sane person should not scrutinize everything through his reason’s competences, same as how he should not hit everything with his sword” (Ibn Abi ’l-Dunyā 1988: 46). Ibn Abi ’l-Dunyā demonstrates the existential boundaries of reason’s abilities and faculties. However, there is a clear lacking of detail on where these limitations lie. One can understand these limitations of reason as having a sort of double meaning. On the one hand, there is the boundary of improving reasoning and thinking capacities, and on the other hand, there is a restriction of reasoning abilities. However, both cases stand in evident opposition to al-Māwardī’s position on reason, who considers reason to be able to extend and improve.

Al-Māwardī expounds on how to develop the capacities and facilities of reason. He argues that acquired reason can be advanced in two ways. On the one hand, frequent use of it leads to more and more experiences. Experiences, according to al-Māwardī, include every event and or an incident that influences human beings psychologically and intellectually (c.f. al-Nāhī 1994: 221). On the other hand, a strong awareness and concentrated attention vary from one individual to another.

Al-Māwardī gives examples of how some individuals have a more vital awareness to answer and react intelligently by telling the story of ‘Abd Allāh b. al-Zubayr. As a child, Ibn al-Zubayr was once playing with his friends on the street as Omar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb came walking towards them. All of the other children fled in fear except Ibn al-Zubayr. Umar asked him why he did not run away, to which he replied, “Neither have I committed wrong, nor is the street too narrow. So why should I run away?” Ibn al-Zubayr did not only defend himself but also showed no reason to run away, which, according to al-Māwardī, demonstrates a high level of awareness and attention of detail and context of one’s surroundings. (al-Māwardī 2012: 19). This story reveals the importance of having a strong attention and consciousness to answer and react quickly but correctly.

Without a doubt, the concept of acquired reason indicates an accumulative process, which is continuously improving on the condition that one acquires additional experiences to advance it utilizing a strong awareness and concentrated attention. The notion of experience on this subject includes self-experience or personal practices and others’ experiences, meaning acquired reason from al-Māwardī’s perspective. Put differently, the more an individual increases his acquired reason, the more he strengthens his normative ethical and moral behaviors and deeds. That leads to a more solid civilization or what al-Māwardī termed as “*a successful worldly life*” as a life grounded on normative ethics.

Ibn Abi ’l-Dunyā reports that, “The best thing that people can get in the worldly life is reason {...} (Ibn Abi ’l-Dunyā 1988: 40). This quote reflects his high estimation of reason. It is not wealth or power that is the best thing that a person can have, but rather reason, through which a man knows his benefits and interests. Further, it is not surprising to see Ibn Abi ’l-Dunyā reporting the same statement presented above by

al-Muḥāsibī about God’s speech with reason. He also states that “{...} I created nothing in a higher position than you. Through you I shall be known, worshiped and acknowledged {...}” (Ibn Abi ’l-Dunyā 1988: 39- 40). This again reflects reason’s high position for Ibn Abi ’l-Dunyā.

So, why is reason so important for Ibn Abi ’l-Dunyā? We can suggest several answers to this question. Firstly, he sees a strong correlation between good deeds and reason. On the one hand, these citations are to be mentioned: Ibn Abi al-Dunya reports about the relationships between reason and *khayr* (goodness) and *sharr* (evil). He quotes that “distinguishing *khayr* from *sharr* is not proof of being rational, rather the rational person is the one who knows *khayr* and follows it and knows *sharr* and avoids it” (Ibn Abi ’l-Dunyā 1988: 59). On the other hand, he reports the Prophet Muhammad's saying, stating that “People perform *khayr* based on the quality of their reasons” (ibid. 37). This is to say what is noteworthy about reason lies in its constructive implementations and consequence in society.

The paradoxical relationships between reason and *hawá* and its consequence on individual and society were questions of primary importance not only to al-Māwardī but also preceding scholars, such as Ibn Abi ’l-Dunyā, who also considers this topic. For instance, he states that we are told that “{...} Every individual ought to have two internal judges. One is an adviser, and the second is a deceiver. The adviser is reason, and the deceiver is the *hawá*; they contradict, and the inclination towards one of them ruins the other” (as cited in Ibn Abi ’l-Dunyā 1988: 69- 70).

One of the citations reveals Ibn Abi ’l-Dunyā’s definition of reason and its relation to *hawá*. He reports that an old man was asked, “What is reason?,” and answered, “When your patience overcomes your ignorance and *hawá*” (ibid: 51). This citation demonstrates that assessing reason is based on behavior and actions. Even though Ibn Abi ’l-Dunyā indicates the paradoxical relationship between reason and *hawá*, he still does not explain how reason can overtake *hawá*, or vice versa. Furthermore, his ideas were limited to the individual level and did not elaborate on the reason – *Hawá*’s relationship at the collective level.

Like al-Muḥāsibī, Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā attaches the concept of reason to religion. Throughout his book, his ambition and objective are to confirm the notion that the more an individual practices Islam, the more he is a sane person (Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā 1988: 28- 9). Furthermore, he stresses various values to signify the concept of reason. For instance, he cites Sadaka al-Dimashki, who puts it in the following way:

A sane person should not believe in a notion before he debates and measures it with his highly intellectual brothers {...} meeting two reasons on considering an idea is more successfully than only one reason (ibid. 45- 6).

Ibn Abi al-Dunya perceives revelation as a normative source that enriches reason's capacities. For instance, al-Shūrā for him – i.e., consultation and collective discussions and debates, allows for reaching the most rewarding ideas. This quotation hence helps us think that the more there is engagement on the societal level in decision-making, the more likely people will behave better since they will feel that they are part of their system. Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā endorses that reason is the foundational element for having religion. He quotes Ibn Jurayj, who articulates that “A person's foundation is his reason; however, a person without reason has no religion” (ibid. 69).

The founder of the “Science of Civilization” who has been influenced by al-Māwardī and his perception of reason, Ibn Khaldūn argues that instituting a civilization is based on a different kind of reason, which he calls practical reason. Unlike al-Māwardī, Ibn Khaldūn distinguished between three levels of human reason which distinguish us from animals. These three levels are (Ibn Khaldūn 1981: 1007- 9)³¹:

Firstly, discerning reason: this is humans' ability to make differentiations that exist in either a natural or arbitrary order, based mostly on empirical perception. This form of reason gives one the power to categorize observed phenomena and differentiate between them. Discerning reason also helps humankind obtain and develop beneficial things and gain a livelihood. Meanwhile, it helps avoid those things which are harmful to

³¹ Although this study uses the Arabic version of Ibn Khaldūn's *Muqaddimah*, still it benefits from the English translation by Franz Rosenthal.

humans. The outcome of the knowledge that we gain through this reason is based on our senses.

Secondly, practical reason: this is one level deeper than discerning reason. Individuals can obtain this kind of reason through experience, particularly social experiences (al-Jābirī 2014: 70). This type of reason provides humans with thoughts and diverse notions of necessary etiquettes about behavior, such as dealing with fellow persons or understanding how to lead them. Furthermore, the knowledge of etiquette and action is a social process mostly related to social life since man is a social being.

Lastly, abstract reason: this the deepest level of thinking, through which humans gain knowledge or hypothetical understandings beyond their senses of perception. Combining both perceptions and apperceptions will help human beings reach a new kind of knowledge – a hypothetical knowledge – absent the need for any practical activities. Ibn Khaldūn adds when this kind of thought process is accomplished, one has a pure and whole intelligence and has reached the final degree of thinking or the highest intellectual state. “Pure reason” for him indicates the meaning of human reality, as it is the function that distinguishes human beings in comparison to other creatures.

Comparable to what al-Māwardī called “acquired reason,” Durkheim considers that man is civilized because he can build aspects of his life based on previous knowledge, language, experience, and laws. Durkheim puts it this way: “We speak a language we have not created; we use tools we have not invented, we invoke rights we have not instituted; each generation inherits a treasure trove of knowledge it did not amass itself. We own these various benefits of civilization to society, and if we do not generally perceive their source, at least we know they are not of our making. Yet this is what makes man distinct among all creatures; for man is man only because he is civilized” (Durkheim 2008: 159). For Durkheim, humans' capacity to build on previous experiences and knowledge is merit, distinguishing them as

civilized. Again, acquired reason has no limit in accumulating knowledge and science and distinguishes human beings over other creatures.

So, the question here is, can we benefit from al-Māwardī's thought in clarifying both Ibn Khaldūn as well as Durkheim in this regard? If yes, then how? I argue that we can benefit from al-Māwardī's ideas to enhance our understanding of both mentioned scholars. For instance, as I just stated that for Ibn Khaldūn, the second level of reason is the practical reason based on social experience. This kind of reason is related to etiquette and humans' behaviors. Al-Māwardī connects the idea of experience with good ethics and associates it with habits and customs. Even more for al-Māwardī, most of *Adab is* gained through experiences (al-Māwardī 2012: 365). In other words, understanding al-Māwardī's relationships between reason and experiences facilitates a deeper understanding of Ibn Khaldūn's second level of reason.

Furthermore, as revealed before, for Durkheim, human's capacity to utilize preceding experiences and knowledge is a value that distinguishes individuals as civilized. Again, for al-Māwardī, preceding experience is strongly associated with reason, and through practices and experiences, one can improve his reason's competence (al-Māwardī 2012: 16). Nevertheless, associating experience with reason is very common in earlier Muslim Thought. For instance, Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā says that reason is a core; one strengthens and supports it through experiences. Also, he says that the Arab used to say "*Reason is the experiences*" (Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā: 1988: 42- 3). This is to say that understanding al-Māwardī's conception of reason, its relationships to experience can help even in achieving a better understanding of scholars such as Ibn Khaldūn and Durkheim.

1.4. Strong passion as an antithesis to reason

"Lust", "passion," or – physical "desire" are all potential English translations of the Arabic expression *hawá*. Yet, the literary meaning of *hawá* is "to suddenly fall or to collapse." *Hawá* is the opposite of reason from al-Māwardī's point of view, which means inclination and strong passion often towards evil desires. It is essential to mention that al-Māwardī elaborates on the similarities and dissimilarities between

hawá (e.g., strong passion) and *al-shahwa* (i.e., physical desires). For him, both have common cause and effect in committing evil deeds and actions. Nevertheless, *hawá* is associated only with “corrupted” opinions, belief, and religious doctrine (Khān'zādah 2019: 129). Conversely, *al-shahwa* is associated with physical desires. Furthermore, *hawá* is more specific and *al-shahwa* more general. Therefore, *al-shahwa* is the outcome and result of *hawá* (Al-Māwardī 2012: 42- 3).

Originally the concept of *hawá* is a Quranic terminology that appears in several parts of the Holy Quran. Al-Iṣfahānī has one unique contribution, that expounds on Quranic terminologies. In “*Al-Mufradāt fi Gharīb al-Qur'ān*,” al-Iṣfahānī defines *hawá* as leaning the Self to desire and passion. It was called *hawá* - fall and collapse – because it leads the follower of it to pitfall and downfall in both worldly life and Hereafter. Based on the Quranic understanding of the term, he argues that there is a different *hawá* for every individual and that *hawá* is infinite for everyone. However, the end destination of following *hawá* is always confusion and deprivation (al-Iṣfahānī 2010a: 524- 5). In other words, *hawá* has unlimited means and ways, but all of them lead to the same result, which is confusion and corruption.

So, why does al-Māwardī perceive *hawá* as a contrast to reason? That is because *hawá* is seen as preventing and hindering man's ability to deal, behave, and act decently and virtuously. Furthermore, strong passion or *hawá* generates the nastiest manners and ethics of human actions and behaviors – it is the source of evil. In addition to that, *hawá* facilitates men's countless means to act in corrupt ways (al-Māwardī 2012: 33). Hence, it is not surprising at all to say that following *hawá* on the individual or collective level indicates the decline and decay of the individual or even a whole society.

Likewise, Khān'zādah emphasizes in his commentary on “*Kitāb ādāb al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*” that following *hawá* instead of reason leads to calamity in the worldly life and Hellfire in the Hereafter. Nevertheless, Khān'zādah goes further and elaborates on *hawá*'s meaning by stating that the self tends to act and to behave in a contradiction to the *shari'a* (Khān'zādah 2019: 106). It is interesting to observe that whereas for al-Māwardī *hawá* essentially contradicts reason, for Khān'zādah *hawá* contradicts mainly *shari'a*.

In his book “*Kitāb al-Dharī'ah ilā Makārim al-Sharī'ah*,” al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī explains how reason and *hawá* function concerning decision-making and consequences. He states that reason recognizes and selects the more appropriate and optimal effects, even if one faces hardship. On the contrary, *hawá* avoids exertion as well, and it does not consider harmful effects. Accordingly, al-Iṣfahānī asserts that through the competence of reason, one recognizes not only what is beneficial and destructive, but also his duties and responsibilities. However, *hawá* blinds people to harmful consequences as well as to their duties and responsibilities (al-Iṣfahānī 2010b: 92- 3). This is to say that through al-Iṣfahānī, we can understand in a better way why al-Māwardī sees *hawá* as contradicting reason. In other words, *hawá* affects decision-making as it blinds people from considering the consequences of their decisions and actions.

Moreover, in his book “*Dhamm al-Hawā*,” Ibn al-Jawzī emphasizes that *hawá* pushes people to desire without letting them think about negative consequences in the future. He acknowledges that *hawá* leads people to focus on the current desire and passion, even if that leads to delayed pain and harm. Ibn al-Jawzī goes further and contends that reason prevents people from having desires and passions that lead to pain and regret. Consequently, one ought to train and habituate himself to make his reason control his actions and deeds (Ibn al-Jawzī 1998: 36). Later scholars also reasserted the same point on the conflicting relationship between reason and *Hawá*.

For al-Māwardī, reason grows and expands as long as reason is dominating *hawá* (al-Māwardī 2012: 16). Strictly speaking, al-Māwardī perceives *hawá* as a hindrance for the reason to keep increasing and growing. Thus, he strongly emphasizes that reason and *hawá* are permanently conflicting with each other. Al-Māwardī cites several scholars and philosophers as well as the Prophet Muhammad to support this point of view. For instance, he quotes Wahb b. Munabbih, who articulates, “*Hawá* and reason wrestle in the heart, so whichever prevails will have the upper hand {on the personality}.” (al-Māwardī 2012b: 164- 5). Besides, al-Māwardī reports that it was said, “whoever subjugates his *hawá*, he will become strengthened and furthered.” (al-Māwardī 2012b: 148). Meaning, one must have the goal, not to make reason a slave of *hawá*, wherein reason nevertheless must be its commander.

It is important to keep in mind that al-Māwardī's argument in this concern is to demonstrate the conflicting relationships between reason and *hawá* and to describe the consequences of this conflicting association and answer the question, what it means when one of them (reason and *hawá*) dominates the other. Al-Māwardī makes associations between reason and virtue as well as *hawá* and vices. For instance, he believes that both reason and *hawá* are struggling to take over the Self. Accordingly, if reason prevails over the Self, then the person will perform virtues. However, if *Hawá* dominates the Self, the person will do vices (al-Māwardī 2012b: 164). Elaborating on the contradictory relationships between reason and *hawá* and its consequence on individual and society was a question of primary importance not only to al-Māwardī but also preceding scholars, such as Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā.

The conflicting relationship between reason and *hawá* is also discussed in texts which precede al-Māwardī's work. For instance, in the book of Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā, we are told that “{...} Every individual ought to have two internal judges. One is an adviser, and the second is a deceiver. The adviser is the reason, and the deceiver is the *Hawá*; they contradict, and the inclination towards one of them ruins the other” (as cited in Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā 1988: 69- 70). Even though Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā indicates how reason and *hawá* contradict, he still does not explain how reason can take over *hawá*, or vice versa. Furthermore, his ideas were limited to the individual level and did not elaborate on the reason – *Hawá's* relationship at the collective level. Unlike Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā, al-Māwardī gives details on how the actions and deeds perform from a philosophical perspective. He elaborates that “acts of will”³² (al-Māwardī 2012b: 146- 8) can be generated from three motives:

Firstly, reason, which determines with high certainty what is *ṣawāb* - correct, exact, and right - and what is *khaṭa'* - wrong and incorrect. Reason has a stable autonomous and firm independence to decide and judge.

Secondly, reasoning, which gives correct and right thoughts superiority over wrong and incorrect thoughts, depends on reason. Consequently,

³² In Arabic “*Af'āl al-irādah*”. This means any kind of actions, deeds and behave that humans perform willingly, apart from whether it is good or bad.

reason, through the process of reasoning and thinking, is the fundamental source of virtues.

Thirdly, *hawá*, as mentioned above, is the opposite of reason and the source of evil and immorality. Thus, an individual ought to endeavor and work hard to eliminate any proportion of *Hawá* when acting deliberately upon their will.

That is all to state that there is a struggle inside human beings between two motives. On the one hand, there is a struggle between reason and reasoning, which leads human beings on the individual and the collective levels to virtuous behavior, betterment, and amelioration (i.e., *Iṣlāḥ*). On the other hand, these two are opposed to *Hawá*, which leads humans to evil and corruption (e.g., *ifsad*). The more reason and reasoning dominates *hawá*, the more society's behavior and action is ameliorated and bettered. However, the more *Hawá* predominates over reason or reasoning, the more degeneration occurs on individual and collective levels.

Al-Māwardī goes one step further to elaborate on the contradictory relationships between reason and *Hawá* on the societal level. He brings the idea of *ifsad* – an after-effect of following *Hawá* – as opposed to *iṣlāḥ* – the consequence of the following reason. It is crucial to keep in mind that for al-Māwardī, the process of *iṣlāḥ* starts from the Self; meanwhile, people have also collective *iṣlāḥ* commitments, as this study shows in Chapter Four. Accordingly, an individual first of all makes *iṣlāḥ* of himself, and then he can contribute to the *iṣlāḥ* of his society (c.f. al-Māwardī 2012b: 238- 9). There is no doubt that reason is the principal element leading to *iṣlāḥ*. Nonetheless, *hawá* is the main element leading to *ifsad*.

This is to argue that when reason prevails, then *iṣlāḥ*, growth, expansion, and development are expected not only at the individual, but also the societal level. Nevertheless, when *Hawá* is dominant in a society, the destination is *ifsad*, i.e., societal decline and collapse. Thus, *iṣlāḥ* and *ifsad* on the individual and societal levels are the potential outcomes of these conflicting relationship between reason and *hawá*. That is to say that the contradictory relationship between reason and *hawá* is

not an abstract relation. Instead, it directly reflects either beneficially or destructively on a society's state.

Similarly, al-Māwardī states that “Reason is an assistant {in performing virtues} while *hawá* is an aggressor. Each of them {reason and *Hawá*} attract the self, and it is drawn towards what assented it. Accordingly, if the Self has virtues, the person performs *iṣlāḥ al-akhlāq*. Nevertheless, if the self has viciousness, the person performs *ifsad al-akhlāq*. Since reason brings *‘ilm* that guides to *khayr* (goodness). Meanwhile, *shahwa* is a characteristic of animal behavior that directs to *shar* (evil).” (al-Māwardī 2012b: 163). For this reason, al-Māwardī goes further and recommends that “release the self when it follows reason and constrict the self when it inclines to *Hawá*. The outcome of doing so is that the self will assist in *iṣlāḥ* and resist *ifsad*. Based on this, reason is sufficient assistance and supporter {for the self}”. (ibid. 163). That demonstrates how al-Māwardī attributes *iṣlāḥ* to reason and *ifsad* to *Hawá* (or *shahwa*).

The question arises here what is the association between *nafs*³³ and *hawá*. There is a need to clarify the meaning of *nafs*. The expression *nafs* was repeated many times in al-Māwardī's works; still, he did not illustrate its meaning. Nevertheless, in his commentary on *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn*, Üveys Vefa Khān'zādah illuminates that there are four different levels of *nafs*. Firstly: *al-Ammāriah*, (commands one to perform evil), which is the self that completely inclines to bodily desire, passion, and lust; it is the source of evil and nasty behaviors. This level of *nafs* is undoubtedly prone to evil. Secondly: *al-Lawwāma* (self-reproaching *nafs*), which is the *nafs* that illuminated by good knowledge, however, once it follows reason and once it disobeys. Still, this kind of *nafs* regrets and blames itself for committing evil deeds. Thirdly: *al-Mulhamah* (the inspired *nafs*), which is inspired by God to be humble and generous, and have knowledge and contentment. Thus, this kind of *nafs* is the source of good qualities such as patience, endurance, and appreciation. Fourthly: *al-Muṭma'inniah* (the *nafs* that has reached inner peace), this is the level where the *nafs* performs decent ethics meanwhile abandons its dispraised

³³ *Nafs* can be translated into English as “own-self”, “soul” and “self”.

qualities. Indeed, this is the highest ethical level that a *nafs* can reach (Khān'zādah 2019: 113).

Thus, there is a relationship between *nafs* and *hawá*, since if a personality is dominated by one of the first-mentioned two types of *nafs*, it inclines easily to follow *hawá* and *shahwa*. Thus, it leans to *ifsad*. However, if a personality is dominated by the third or fourth kinds of *nafs*, then *hawá* will be significantly constrained and it will therefore incline to *iṣlāḥ*. Accordingly, when al-Māwardī says, “release the self when it follows reason and constrict the self when it inclines to *Hawá*.” This indicates the former self either the *nafs al-malhamah* or *al-Muṭma'inniah*. But the latter *nafs* means *al-Ammāriah* or *al-Lawwāmayyah*. This means the reader ought to be aware of the different types of *nafs* in al-Māwardī's works.

Although reason, as well as reasoning, are the grounds of virtues and the primary source of social well-being, for al-Māwardī, *Hawá*, is generally predominant and prevalent among humanity (c.f. Khān'zādah 1910: 37). Thus, *Hawá* – if reason's abilities and facilities do not restrict it – leads not only to an individual but to societal declination. For these explanations, al-Māwardī declares that reason is made to be the observer and internal combatant against *Hawá*. Likewise, reason observes the heedlessness and the ignorance of *Hawá*. Finally, reason fights *Hawá*'s inclinations and defends against *Hawá*'s clever tricks which seek to deceive humans (al-Māwardī 2012: 36).

Based on this, it is safe to argue that for al-Māwardī reason is the core of any amendment and its advancement on both the individual and the societal levels, while *Hawá* is one of the leading causes for decline and stagnation. Normatively speaking, since laymen typically follow and are influenced by more “reasonable” or “elite peoples,” the rulers, leaders, and other elites have a higher degree of responsibility to eliminate and control *Hawá* in society (c.f. Al-Māwardī 2007. Vol. 4. 62). For al-Māwardī, if the ruler follows desires that lead his people to corruption, then these desires lead the ruler himself to wickedness and unrighteous behavior and deeds (al-Māwardī 2012b 241- 2). In other words, society is accomplished based on

reasonableness and reason, so the ruling elites have more ethical obligations and commitments in this regard.³⁴

Based on this argument, *Hawá* predominates reason and how reason can hinder and stop *Hawá* from being predominant and prevalent among people can be posed. In contrast to society's improvement and betterment, the decline and decay is an accumulative process, in which *Hawá* controls reason and reasoning. Thus, *Hawá* controls peoples' manners and behavior in two aspects:

Firstly: *Hawá* becomes strong by repeating impermissible physical behaviors, where desires seize both the body and reason. In this case, reason will be weak and ineffective in its ability to combat *Hawá*, even though reason knows such desires are nasty. The solution to this dilemma is contingent upon several factors. In one sense, it depends on reason's facilities and abilities to contemplate the ultimate destination of *Hawá*, which leads to "intense harm," "abhorrent impact," "abundance of misdeeds," and "accumulation of unrighteousness". On the other hand, al-Māwardī recommends a solution, which he terms "the encouragement and intimidation."³⁵ An individual seeks to behave appropriately, based on intellectual and religious inspirations, meanwhile avoids (because of fearing the consequences) the final destination of *Hawá* (c.f. al-Māwardī: 2012: 36- 8).

Likewise, al-Māwardī expands on the importance of restraining as well as curbing *Hawá* by quoting al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, who articulates that "The greatest *Jihād* is the *Jihād* against *Hawá*" (ibid. 38). This means that the internal struggle encountering one's desires has superiority over any other external struggle, and it is the place from where individuals should start. This is to argue that everyone ought to start from himself and by himself.

³⁴ This topic will be discussed in more details in part II, chapter one.

³⁵ Encouragement means thinking about the positive things, which will happen after the actions and deeds. Intimidation means the fear of the negative consequences of these deeds and actions (c.f. Khān'zādah: 1910: 39).

Secondly: the cause that leads *Hawá* to control reason is when individuals hide their *Hawá* due to pressure and coercion. Oppression over people confuses reason of the reality and essence of actions and deeds. That is, oppression over people leads to assuming that the ugly is good and harming is valuable. This is for two explanations. On the one hand, the compulsive natural tendencies or inclinations of someone to various physical desires means the individual cannot recognize things' virtual reality. Thus, the individual is restricted to perceive the ugliness in things; he tends to it, even when an individual identifies ugliness as if it was noble and good. On the other hand, seeking the easiest and comfortable approach to distinguish issues based on the rule that what is comfortable is better to follow and what is difficult is to be despised. (al-Māwardī 2012: 38- 9).

However, in one of his later³⁶ books on politics and ethics, al-Māwardī's focus was mainly on the collective level and not merely on the individual. To elaborate more on this issue, in *Tas'hīl al-naẓar*, al-Māwardī extraordinarily associates the instituting and declining of civilization³⁷ with the concepts of reason and *hawá*, respectively. He argues that instituting a civilization is when reason is superior to desires, and desires serve the reason. Conversely, the period of decivilizing and declining is when the desires are superior to reason and serves desires (c.f. al-Māwardī 2012b: 252).

In other words, there are two intertwining aspects of the relationship between reason and *Hawá*, one is the private or the individual level, and the second is the public or the societal level and both should be taken into consideration. However, a close reading of al-Māwardī indicates clearly that the highest stage in the amelioration of individual and collective deeds and actions is based entirely on reason and reasoning, which reflect in their normative ethics and manners. Meanwhile, degeneration is when *hawá* is in control of individual and collective deeds and actions. It goes without saying that al-Māwardī's discussion on reason and its antithesis of *hawá*,

³⁶ Raḡwān al-Sayyid (2012: 102) claims that *Kitāb adab al-dunyā wa-al-dīn* was written in H.420 however, *Tas'hīl al-naẓar* was written in H.432.

³⁷ Al-Māwardī used the concept of state (in Arabic *al-Dawlah*) as a unit of study, which has no national boundaries like the modern notion of nation state. Therefore, we can easily use civilization instead since civilization in this study is be understood as a unit of study of society or and societies.

demonstrates his profound thought and awareness of a fundamental issue in this concern.

1.5. Reason as an Original Pillar of Civilizational Theory

In this study, civilization is comprehended as an organized society or societies based substantially on reason's faculties and talents. Thus, in this chapter, and based on al-Māwardī's contribution, I argue that reason is the primary pillar of a civilization that generates knowledge that is the fruitful outcome of people's reason. Still, reason is also the critical element to understand and comprehend religion, the third essential foundation of al-Māwardī's civilization theory.

When one looks closely at the concept of "establishing a successful worldly life" in the contributions of Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā and al-Māwardī (and other earlier social theorists' and philosophers'), the concept of civilization can undoubtedly be understood as synonymous. The mentioned citation from Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā indicates the significance and centrality of reason in every step of instituting a successful worldly life. Although he associates the concept of reason with establishing a good life directly, he, however, did not explain in detail how reason should function and operate as a catalyst in instituting a successful worldly life.

In one of his other contributions, al-Māwardī shows further that reason is not only a foundation of ethics and *ādāb*, but indeed the highest and the first foundation. He argues that there are categories of principles for all virtues, the prime and original virtue is the reason, and the last is justice. All virtues emerge and generate from reason and reason manages and orders these virtues (al-Māwardī 2012b: 134). Based on this, I argue that from al-Māwardī's point of view, nothing is superior over reason, whether as virtues, principles, or methods to reach virtues and *ādāb*. To al-Māwardī, reason and intelligence are considered acceptable as long as the actions and deeds are oriented, enabling normative ethics.

It is safe to argue that al-Māwardī perceives the significance of reason according to the *Hadith* which states: "For everything, there is a pillar and the pillar of the man's

deeds is his reason”³⁸ (cited in al-Māwardī 2012: 11). This is not only for the reason that al-Māwardī cites this *Hadith* in his book, but also, he indeed sees reason as the pillar of the man’s deeds and virtues (al-Māwardī 2012b: 134). This is because a person, through reason, can know the reality of things so that one can distinguish and choose between evils, noble deeds, and the right actions.

Similar to al-Māwardī is al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, who perceives the objectives of humankind to fulfill and to accomplish three particular functions and missions (al-Iṣfahānī 2010: 82- 3): Firstly, ‘*Imārat al-arḍ*’³⁹, i.e., constructing a civilization on the earth, which according to al-Iṣfahānī is mentioned in the Quran (11:61)⁴⁰. Accordingly, an individual should obtain his livelihood from the earth, which he constructs not only for himself, but also for others. Thus, a person makes his efforts individually, but his ultimate aim is to bring goodness not only for himself, but also his society. Secondly, worshipping⁴¹ God as specified in the Noble Quran (51:56)⁴², i.e., an individual should obey God’s commands and avoid His prohibitions. Thirdly, humanity’s vicegerency, which is stated in the Quran (7:129).⁴³ This entails submission to God in accordance with one’s ability by applying the noble qualities of

³⁸ My own transition into English.

³⁹ It is obvious that al-Iṣfahānī’s terminology of ‘*Imārat al-arḍ*’ is a very narrow and limited to specific aspects, such as land’s cultivation and breeding animals, compared to the contemporary meaning of constructing a civilization. Historically, al-Iṣfahānī’s theoretical contribution and ideas of ‘*Umrān*’ are prior to Ibn Khaldūn, however, Ibn Khaldūn’s contribution focus on both practical and theoretical aspects intensively and expansively. Also compare constructing civilization with Guizot in particular the first lecture (Guizot 1997: 28).

⁴⁰ “He brought you forth from the earth and hath made you husband it”, translation into English by M. M. Pickthall. However, this translation of the term ‘*Imārat al-arḍ*’ into English “made you husband it” is very narrow and limited connotation to only one basic aspect of ‘*Imarat al-Arad*’, which could also include many other aspects such as technology and urbanism.

⁴¹ This is not limited to religious rites such as prayers, but it could include any possible actions and deeds, with the intentions of proximity the God, such as fasting the month of Ramāddahn, in which one increase the social solidarity with poor people.

⁴² “I created the jinn and humankind only that they might worship Me.” Translation into English by M. M. Pickthall.

⁴³ “{...} and make you viceroys in the earth, that He may see how ye behave”. Translate into English by M.M. Pickthall.

the Divine Law, which are wisdom, justice, forbearance, benevolence, and graciousness. The objective of these noble qualities of the Law is to gain Paradise and proximity to God.

The question, then, is what is the relationship between instituting a civilization – or precisely what al-Iṣfahānī called ‘*Imārat al-Ard*’ – as the main objective of God’s creation, and the concept of reason? While answering this question, al-Iṣfahānī associates the concept of reason with the concept of Prophethood, as both are forms of guidance for humanity to institute a civilization. Al-Iṣfahānī goes further and argues that God sent to His creations two types of messengers: on the one hand, the esoteric (in Arabic *Bāṭin*) Messenger⁴⁴ which is the reason, and which has various functions such as thinking, analyzing, comparing and distinguishing things from each other. On the other hand, the exoteric (in Arabic *Zāhir*) messenger which are the prophets of God. One can only benefit from the exoteric Messenger if one profits from the esoteric one; (i.e., the reason). For the esoteric messenger apprehends the claim of the exoteric messenger. Were it not for the reason, then the decisive argument, utilizing the Prophet’s words, would not affect (al-Iṣfahānī 2010: 157- 8).

Additionally, al-Iṣfahānī goes to state that “Reason is a leader, and religion is its supporter; if there was no reason, the religion would not be maintained. Likewise, if religion does not exist, reason will go astray.” (al-Iṣfahānī 2010: 157). Al-Iṣfahānī thus considers that establishing a civilization exceeds worshiping God and the mission of vicegerency, as civilization is the environment and circumstance, in which man can then practice his beliefs and apply the mission of vicegerency. Furthermore, he gives a superior function to reason to be God’s first esoteric messenger. Nevertheless, he does not indicate that there would be in any case a separation between reason and revelation. On the contrary, they only operate together (c.f. *ibid.* 157). Based on these ideas proposed by al-Iṣfahānī, it is safe to assume that he was influenced by al-Māwardī’s thought on the relationship between reason and civilization.

⁴⁴ The word messenger in this context (esoteric messenger) is not be understand as a physical messenger, it means high level of capacities, abilities and the talents which a person possesses, as a method of guidance to the God.

A later philosopher than al-Māwardī, Ibn Khaldūn, believes that there are three degrees of reason that result from human's ability to think: discerning reason, practical reason and abstract reason. However, Ibn Khaldūn argues that instituting a civilization is based on the practical reason and not on speculative reason, since practical reason discovers the essence of things, and perceives the categorizations of the cases and their reasons. Furthermore, practical reason can recognize the order and system that exists among things, either by nature or through an arbitrary arrangement according to Ibn Khaldūn (Ibn Khaldūn 1981: 1010- 11). For all the philosophers and thinkers mentioned above, there cannot be any civilization without human reason. Strictly speaking, reason is to be considered one of civilization's essential foundations.

1.6.Nafs, reason, and deeds

For al-Māwardī, the *nafs* is formed from characters and qualities that necessitate a constant refinement as well as discipline. Therefore, if a person neglects to improve and amend his characters and manners by empowering reason, his ethics and deeds will be destructively affected (Al-Māwardī 2012: 365). This is to state that there is no absolute good or evil *nafs*. Instead, individuals ought to work persistently on ameliorating their characters and qualities. This is one of the reasons why al-Māwardī writes a whole chapter - chapter five in *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn* - to improve the behaves and deeds of every individual in society, indicating that human nature can be amended or degenerated based on how individuals discipline themselves.

Accordingly, the *nafs* is the principal element to be improved and disciplined. This will be reflected in the deeds and actions of people. For al-Māwardī, an esteemed *nafs* is the *nafs* that not only continually accepts amelioration and betterment, but also seeks and prefers virtue always until the good deeds and characters become internalized part of the *nafs* (al-Māwardī 2012: 504). Good deeds are based on reason and reasoning. This is to state that attributes of *nafs* and reason are to be reflected in people's actions and behaviors in society.

Again, deeds ought to be decided based on reason, reasoning, and nafs to assist destructively or positively in this concern. Furthermore, individual and collective deeds are essential elements to define civilization since they reflect individuals' behaviors and actions. Either people's acts are moral, good, or immoral and evil. So, people's deeds reveal the level of their civilization. Therefore, I argue that it is significant to answer the question, what is the actual relationship between reason and deeds and behavior? Al-Māwardī argues that cunning and malicious actions should be characterized as disgraceful and blameworthy because the person who practices these characters uses his reason for evil ends. However, he states that if an individual uses his reason in goodness, he will be respected and have a good reputation (al-Māwardī 2012a: 27).

Undeniably, the connection between reason and good deeds is reflected in the actual meanings of the concept of '*Aql*'. For instance, linguists have argued that for the word '*Aql*' there are three different meanings. Firstly, '*Aql*' connotes the retention and consolidation of intellectual matters.⁴⁵ Secondly, '*Aql*' indicates the linking and connectivity between ideas and acts.⁴⁶ Lastly, '*Aql*' distinguishes between goodness and corruption in both worldly and spiritual affairs and allows for disciplining oneself and acting accordingly.⁴⁷ From these three different meanings of reason, we can conclude that all the definitions mentioned above revolve principally around humankind's ability to distinguish between good and bad. In addition to that, these diverse connotations indicate to act and to operate on the societal and individual levels according to that good deeds. (c.f. Ahmadi 2015: 16- 7). This is to argue that there ought not to be a separation between reason and deeds; on the contrary, deeds ought to be decided based on reason and reasoning.

What is good, and what is evil from al-Māwardī's perspective? And how can reason distinguish between them? On the one hand, reason {in itself} disproves and

⁴⁵ In Arabic "*Al-imsāk wa-al- al-istimsāk.*"

⁴⁶ In Arabic "*Al-'aqd wa-al-rabt.*"

⁴⁷ In Arabic "*Tamyīz al-Ṣalāḥ man al-Fasād fī al-Ḥayāh al-māddīyah wa-al-ma'nawīyah wa ḍabt al-nafs Ḥabsah 'alá dhālik.*"

contradicts all kinds of *munkir* (evil action, or wrongdoing). On the other hand, reason recognizes all types of *Ma'rūf* (good deeds and kindness). (Al-Māwardī 2007. Vol. 2. 379). However, *Hawá* can dominate a personality, so a person's reason will be distracted and confused about what is right and evil, or what causes damages and what brings benefit.

Consequently, that person's reason will perceive ugliness – wrongly – as beauty and the damages – mistakenly – as advantages. (Al-Māwardī 2012: 39). Even though al-Māwardī believes reason per se can recognize both evil and good – even without religion as a moral compass – indicates that the reason is substantially a leading element that can help humans reach good ethics and avoid evil actions. Yet, at the end of his chapter on the reason, al-Māwardī emphasizes the role of God and asks, “Could there be any refuge for us other than God's forgiveness?” (ibid. 53). That is, al-Māwardī includes God's will as a cause for success in distinguishing the good and the bad from each other and following the good and avoiding the evil.

Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā presents another equivalent notion which connects reason and deeds by arguing that one should not evaluate a man's reason conferring to his speech and words, but through his behavior and actions (Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā 1988: 42). Action reflects the quality of reason. Again, within the framework of al-Māwardī's theory of civilization, the reason is not to be evaluated based on intelligence and high qualities and thinking and understanding abilities. Still, it should be assessed based on good and bad behavior, deeds, and actions. Moreover, al-Māwardī places reason in a leading position for humans to deal with good moral conduct. He argues that one cannot perform good ethical behavior if one has no reason (mainly, acquired reason). In other words, al-Māwardī brings to light that the acquired reason is the foundation and source of *ādāb* and not vice versa.

Likewise, for al-Māwardī (al-Māwardī 2012: 414) as well as Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā (Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā 1988: 51), reason is associated with good deeds and decent behaviors. Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā (c.f. 1971: 226) emphasizes the relationship between reason and good deeds. He states that a sane person is not a person who knows good and evil, but someone who knows the good and applies this knowledge while rejecting the bad

(ibid. 51). Thus, in his opinion, reason cannot be seen as separate from noble behaviors and good deeds and actions, the same conclusion of al-Muḥāsibī.

A later scholar than al-Māwardī, al-Iṣfahānī answers the same question, proposed above, by insisting on the relationship between reason and avoiding evil deeds and argues that “{...} Reason prevents a human being from sinning {...} reason is perceived as a means of restraining humans from pursuing bad deeds {...}.” (Al-Iṣfahānī 2010: 137). Here, reason is not merely the ability to think and understand, distinguishing between the good and the bad, but also about behaving and acting ethically. I argue that this could be understood on both the collective and individual levels and that reason is even one central feature that distinguishes humankind over animals. For instance, Ibn Khaldūn argues that God favors human beings over animals because of their actions and behavior, which is a particular function of reason, particularly in the experimental reason. For Ibn Khaldūn, this reflects in the Qur’an’s revelation (2:30),⁴⁸ where God preferred and appointed the human beings as His successor (Ibn Khaldūn 1981: 1010- 11).

However, within the theory of civilization, this correlation between reason and good deeds is still debatable. For instance, Norbert Elias does not agree that reason influences behavior and acts. For him (Elias 1997a: 244- 7), there is no possibility to understand good and bad behavior from an intellectual perspective, nor is it possible to connect the idea of bad and good behavior with reason and rationality. Even Elias claims that there are many reasons and criteria for why people do something or avoid doing something. For example, concepts such as ‘*Civilité*’ (ibid. 245) and ‘*Embarrassing*’ (ibid. 246) are used to evaluate whether something is good or bad in someone’s behavior and deeds. Similarly, another way to determine good and evil is to take a model of what the higher social classes are practicing (c.f. ibid. 245). For Elias, good and bad behavior is, in this sense, socially constructed, in particular, by the higher social stratum. Thus, Elias’s understanding of the relationship between reason and good deeds neglects any role for divine revelation.

⁴⁸ “And when thy Lord said unto the angels: Lo! I am about to place a viceroy in the earth”, translated into English by M.M. Pickthall.

As I argue in this study, reason, and religion are both sources of goodness and norms from al-Māwardī's perspective. Nevertheless, the depth of al-Māwardī's discourse on the significance of reason does not indicate that reason is superior to religious normative and ethical principles. On the contrary, al-Māwardī puts it in this way: “{...} Reason is to be followed in matters which are not prevented by *al-Shar‘* (the Sharia, religious law); meanwhile *al-Shar‘* is to be followed in issues which are not excluded by reason. This is based on the assumption that on the one hand, the Sharia does not put orders in issues unacceptable by reason, on the other hand, reason should not be followed in issues banned by al-Shar‘” (al-Māwardī 2012: 139- 40).

It is essential to consider that al-Māwardī perceives that both reason and religion are criteria for how people ought to behave and act. Indeed, these criteria prevent evil conduct while encouraging good conduct on the individual and collective levels. Therefore, both reason and religion should complement each other to propose an ethical framework for a civilization, according to al-Māwardī. Strictly speaking, there should be no discrepancy between reason and religious principles. Instead, they should complement each other to propose a framework for civilization, which again established good deed and behavior. This is to state that for al-Māwardī, both reason and religious revelation are motivated, and are the source of acting and behaving ethically. This is again to emphasize how the conception of reason influences people to behave and act.

1.7. Conclusion

Based on al-Māwardī's contribution, this study emphasizes the multiple layers as well as an extended definition of his conception of reason, which ought to contain all of the following features: For al-Māwardī, reason is mirrored directly in the human's behaviors and actions through performing virtuous acts. Thus, for him, the more rationality exists in society on an individual and societal level, the more ethical principles and norms will be spread. Furthermore, reason and religion ought to be perceived as one solid unit, and if one of them weakens, the other will be negatively affected. This is because one cannot understand religion and put it into practice without intellectual faculties. Moreover, the use of reason will not lead one astray

even if revelation is not entirely integrated. Hence, reason and revelation are two methods leading to a mutually complementary human to good deed and behavior.

Acquired reason contains all available experiences and knowledge of humankind⁴⁹. Consequently, there will be no amelioration or betterment if previous experiences have been ignored and removed from the thinking and reasoning process. In other words, the acquired reason evaluates human beings' experiences from different approaches to understand it from all possible aspects. Accordingly, not only everything necessitates the reason, and reason necessitates every available experience, but experiences also increase the individual's abilities for correct thought (c.f. al-Māwardī 2012: 47- 56).

In addition to that, reason should always be associated with good and lead to good deeds and actions (al-Māwardī 2012: 414). That is why for al-Māwardī, a sane person is one whose speech is right, true and proper, and whose deeds and behavior are praiseworthy. However, if an individual commits evil acts, he is not considered a sane person even if he is very intelligent (ibid. 26- 7). Humans are to be evaluated based on morality and ethics and not only on intelligence since an intelligent person could perform very unethical deeds and actions.

Finally, a deep understanding of social, cultural, and political circumstances is necessary meanwhile profound apprehending of Islamic instructions relating to it. For instance, al-Māwardī established his decisions and rules based on two pillars: on the one hand, the comprehension of knowledge of *shari'a*, which seeks the vast benefit of humanity in establishing the rule of goodness. On the other hand, the understanding of current circumstances includes many aspects such as society and rulers' practical habits, and the role of reason and logical methods to reach demonstrative evidence in conclusions (Laythī 2015: 61).

It is crucial to take into account this concern, a critical question proposed by al-Māwardī. He asks, "who is more proper to be the ruler – the brave candidate or the knowledgeable candidate?" Al-Māwardī answers this by arguing that it depends on

⁴⁹ This will be explained in details in the next chapter.

the time's necessities and the social-political circumstances. (ibid. 63- 4) Thus, if a society, for instance, is facing wars, conflicts, and difficulties, superiority should be to the brave candidate. However, if society lives in peace and welfare, the ruler should have more knowledge. This example explained the significance of having a deep understanding of society's social, cultural, and political circumstances. In other words, this is to argue that social, cultural, and political affairs should always be taken into consideration in reasoning and the decision-making process as a locus where reason operates.

In this chapter, I laid out the layers and reaffirmed the crucial features of al-Māwardī's concept of reason. I have also identified the following characteristics of reason based on my understating of al-Māwardī's. Firstly, the pillar of building a society and improving both individual and societal is reason. Secondly, reason and religion ought to be perceived as one solid unit. Thirdly, reason should always be associated with good and lead to good deeds and actions. Lastly, the acquired reason contains all available experiences of humankind. There can be no growth for a civilization without considering previous experiences. If people ignored and removed their earlier experiences from the thinking and reasoning process, this will weaken their civilization.

ʿIlm is the acquired reason, which indicates according to al-Māwardī both *tadwīn* and *taṣnīf* – i.e., writing down, composition and authorship. What does that mean? What is the importance of al-'aql al-Muktasab for *ʿilm* as well as improving *ʿilm*? And what is the significance of *tadwīn* and *taṣnīf* concerning *ʿilm*? This is the topic of the next chapter.

Chapter Two

‘ilm

2.1. Introduction

Even though the term *‘ilm* was not distinctly well-defined by al-Māwardī, it is still safe to say that when he uses the term *‘ilm*, he means all possible types of *‘ilm*, such as natural science, medicine, social science, etc. Thus, the Arabic term *‘ilm* could indicate different meanings in English, such as “knowledge,” “science,” “system of knowledge,” or even “discipline.” For the sake of unity in this study, I will be using “system of knowledge” as a translation to al-Māwardī’s expression *‘ilm*. This is because the “system of knowledge” contains within it science, knowledge, and discipline. Needless to say, a system of knowledge, science, and discipline play significant roles as triple constituents in instituting any civilization. In this chapter, I argue that *‘ilm* should be considered the second essential foundation of al-Māwardī’s civilization theory, which distinguishes and forms civilization from its commencement. Therefore, an insufficient understanding of *‘ilm* directly affects civilization's essence, and it might lead to its decline.

Prominently, Rosenthal explains in his contribution to the conception of knowledge in Islam – the centrality of *‘ilm* and its direct relationship to Muslim civilization. He states that:

For *‘ilm* is one of those concepts that have dominated Islam and given Muslim civilization its distinctive shape and complexion. There is no other concept that has been operative as a determinant of Muslim civilization in all its aspects to the same extent as *ilm*. This holds good even for the most powerful among the terms of Muslim religious life such as, for instance, *tawhīd* “recognition of the oneness of God,” *ad-dīn* “the true religion”, and many others that are used constantly and emphatically. None of them equals *ilm* in depth of meaning and wide incidence of use. (Rosenthal 2007: 2)

In this chapter, I will elaborate on how *‘ilm* is the outcome of reason, especially of the acquired reason. The significance of this issue is when acquired reason improves and advances in a society, it will be reflected in the quality and level of *‘ilm* in that society. Strictly speaking, *‘ilm* can neither exist, nor continue into the future without acquired reason. Additionally, *‘ilm* extends and increases the capability and potentiality of acquired reason. That is to argue that acquired reason is the groundwork, where *‘ilm* establishes itself. Without understanding the centrality of acquired reason in this concern, there will be no proper understanding of *‘ilm*.

I argue that *ādāb* is a fundamental component for *‘ilm* and its maintenance and continuation. Questions, such what is the relationships between *‘ilm* and *ādāb*? What is the difference between them? Also, when we are talking about *ādāb* in concern to *‘ilm*, what does that mean? These are questions to be answered in this chapter. These are essential questions for the reason that absence of ‘normative good ethics’⁵⁰ – *ādāb* – in *‘ilm* or the process of acquisition of *‘ilm* leads directly to many negative consequences, such as confusion and lacking certainty, as this chapter shows. For instance, misunderstanding of what is right and wrong? In other words, *ādāb* serves as a moral standard in *‘ilm*. Thus, it can be argued that lack of *ādāb* in *‘ilm* gives rise to injustice, impoliteness, and chaos in societies, which are harmful elements that might lead to a decline and decay on the individual and collective level. That is also to argue that *‘ilm* without *ādāb* could make *‘ilm* an instrument of destruction not only to the self,⁵¹ but also to other civilizations.

Subsequently, it is crucial to reevaluate the structure of what al-Māwardī calls “*ādāb al-‘ilm*”⁵² within the theoretical framework of civilization to stress the role of *ādāb* in processes of acquiring *‘ilm*, which constructively reflects on the conduct of individuals. Reassessing these relationships between *ādāb* and *‘ilm* contributes to the comprehension of how *‘ilm* ought to be organized, and how the ethics of *‘ilm* constitutes a virtuous civilization. It should be pointed out here that *ādāb* considers

⁵⁰ “Normative good ethics” is equivalent to the Arabic concept of *ādāb*.

⁵¹ ‘The selves’ here mean not only the individual’s self but also the collective ‘selves’ within one civilization.

⁵² In English, the normative ethics of and in *‘ilm*.

being a method and means in developing and maintaining *‘ilm*. Besides, *ādāb* is shaping and forming the relationships between individuals in society, especially the scholars and students, as this chapter shows.

In view of this centrality of the “system of knowledge” – i.e., *‘ilm* – in civilization in general and in Islam, the question arises as what impetuses and motivations lead civilizations to attach importance to *‘ilm*. This study reevaluates the conception of *‘ilm* and its virtue and nobility in earlier and later social theoretical and philosophical contributions. Simultaneously, the status and prestige of *al-‘Ulamā’* (e.g., scholars) and students of *‘ilm* within societies will be taken into consideration. My central argument in this chapter is that civilization as a structured and organized society necessitates a system of knowledge, or what al- Māwardī calls *‘ilm*.

2.2. The essence of *‘ilm* and its affiliation to virtue

It could be argued that there are two categories of *‘ilm*. On the one hand, there is worldly knowledge, or what Rosenthal names as “human knowledge,” or “secular human knowledge” (Rosenthal 2007: 31). This kind of *‘ilm* is related to the material construction of civilization. On the other hand, there is revealed knowledge, or what Rosenthal also calls “divine knowledge” and “religious knowledge” (ibid. 28- 32). This kind of *‘ilm* is concerned with shaping and refining individuals and collectives internally based on the best normative ethics and *ādāb*. Nevertheless, al-Māwardī never makes a well-defined distinction in this regard.

Unlike other concepts in his *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn* such as reason, al-Māwardī did not define the concept of *‘ilm* accurately. Instead, he considers many themes, which can be included in his conception of *‘ilm*. In the beginning, it is worth mention that al-Māwardī differentiates indirectly between religious and non-religious *‘ilm*. For instance, he argues that the best *‘ilm* is the “religious *‘ilm*,” which also indicates that there is a non-religious *‘ilm*. He even mentions some scientific disciplines such as “mathematics” and “linguistics” (al-Māwardī 2012: 52- 5). It is challenging to decide when he uses the word *‘ilm* whether he means the religious or non-religious *‘ilm*.

Furthermore, al-Māwardī suggests an extended code of moral or *ādāb*, that the student and the teacher should take into consideration in the process of acquiring *‘ilm* and in their interactions with each other. Al-Māwardī distinguishes between *‘ilm* and *ādāb*. While the former expresses the acquired reason, the latter addresses how to transmit *‘ilm* and educate the new generations and how people deal with each other in society. It goes without saying that for al-Māwardī the code of moral and *ādāb* cannot be separated from *‘ilm* itself, since *ādāb* is not only the methods and means to maintain and cultivate *‘ilm*, but that *ādāb* is also a fundamental method in transmitting *‘ilm* from one generation to other.

Besides, both reason and *‘ilm* have no boundaries of growth. Accordingly, *‘ilm* is a process, which never ends since it has no limit. Additionally, the more a person has *‘ilm*, the more his reason grows. It is important to remember that *‘ilm* also encourages us to use our reason and to improve it. Another vital component in al-Māwardī’s conception of *‘ilm* is that *‘ilm* ought always to be useful and lead to beneficial outcomes. For him, *‘ilm* is not only about success and happiness - in his own words it leads to *Iṣlāh* - in worldly life. Also, *‘ilm* also ought to lead to success and happiness in Hereafter. That is why *‘ilm*’s objective is not limited to the worldly life but containing the Hereafter. Lastly, to mention also that *‘ilm* and reason are correlated, part of the reason is acquired, and *‘ilm* is also acquired; however, the acquired *‘ilm* originates from the acquired reason.

It is important to recall that the differentiation of “worldly *‘ilm*’ and ‘religious *‘ilm*’ goes back to many earlier contributors of Islamic thought, such as al-Māwardī, Ibn Khaldūn, and others. For instance, al-Iṣfahānī argues that these two different kinds of *‘ilm*, which he names as ‘worldly knowledge’ and ‘knowledge of the Hereafter,’ and each leads to a different destination. Al-Iṣfahānī puts it in this way “{...} It is impossible for someone who takes the path to the East to find something that exists in the West only; and for someone who takes the path to the West to find something that exists in the East only. Likewise, it is impossible for someone who takes the path of worldly knowledge to gain knowledge of the Hereafter” (al-Iṣfahānī 2010: 136).

This is to state that there are two different sources and consequences for these two mentioned categories of *‘ilm*. However, al-Iṣfahānī does not indicate that one ought

to only concentrate on one of them and ignore the other. On the contrary, one has to associate these different kinds of *'ilm* together because missing one of them destroys and weakens the other.

As I will show, all branches of knowledge are essential from al-Māwardī's point of view. This is since if society focuses only on the 'worldly *'ilm*,' there is no possibility or potential for them to improve their civilization's spiritual aspect. That could lead them to confusion and uncertainty of what is related to ethics and the spiritual domain, for the reason that only *'ilm* related to religion has the potential to provide answers for ethical and spiritual questions. Nevertheless, suppose a society concentrates merely on the *'ilm* pertaining to religion. In that case, it leads to an absence or lack of science and technology, which are also significant elements in instituting a stable civilization. As such, it is essential to point out that the lack of any field of study in *'ilm* leads and facilitates decay. As a result, all possible areas of *'ilm* ought to be taking into consideration.

Fields of study complement each other; a question arises at this point; which one has supremacy over the other? In other words, how can we classify these different kinds of *'ilm* ontologically? Al-Māwardī develops order and categorization of *'ilm*, in which the superiority of *'ilm* related to religion, for the reason that it suggests a framework of how the social relationships should be established based on normative ethics and commitments (al-Māwardī 2012: 52). Furthermore, ignorance in *'ilm*, which is related to religion, causes injustice and confusion since ethical and moral oriented questions might not find answers.

Similar to al-Māwardī, al-Iṣfahānī also prefers the 'religious *'ilm*' over all other fields of *'ilm* for its outcomes and for its infinite aspect. As an illustration for this view, al-Iṣfahānī compares 'religious *'ilm*' – or what he calls *'ilm al-Dīn* – with medicine. He argues that the aim of *'ilm al-Dīn* is to gain a peaceful eternal life in the Hereafter, whereas medicine's objective is to have a healthy body in this temporary worldly life. Therefore, *'ilm al-Dīn* has superiority due to its eternal purpose and infinite and higher target (al-Iṣfahānī 2010: 171). However, this superiority does not in any way the significance of the rest of *'ilm*'s fields; rather, it just puts them in a categorical order.

Moreover, the ‘religious *‘ilm*’ – like reason – is a primary source motivating individuals and collectives to accomplish and practice good ethical values. Thus, it can be argued that *‘ilm* related to religion has superiority over worldly *‘ilm*. Since the former is the source of normative ethics and leads people to behave virtuously. While the latter – as the following aspect of *‘ilm* and subordinate to the first – can then be constructed. It is worth mentioning that reason and all fields of *‘ilm*’ help human beings survive. In other words, man and or society cannot survive without *‘ilm*’ and this the reason for maintaining that *‘ilm*’ is a foundational element in civilization.

Similar to al-Māwardī, Émile Durkheim believes that scientific thought originates from religion (Durkheim 2008: 62). However, for Durkheim, science is the perfection of religion. For this reason, he argues that religion should disappear with the advancement of science. Durkheim puts it in this way: “{...} scientific thought is merely a more perfect form of religious thought. It seems natural, then, that religion should progressively fade as science becomes more adept at completing its task”. (ibid. 324). Meaning, for Durkheim, religion’s role should decrease as science advances. However, this leads to a moral crisis that science alone cannot answer.

Consequently, for al-Māwardī *‘ilm* is a virtuous and noble means to construct a stable and cohesive life or even a civilization. Furthermore, *‘ilm* is a constructive element for both the spiritual and the physical aspects of civilization. It is crucial to bear in mind that al-Māwardī asserts that “Be aware that the whole field of *‘ilm* is virtuous and honorable, and for each part of it there is a particular virtue” (al-Māwardī 2012: 50), which means, all fields of *‘ilm*, whether related to religion or not, are essential elements in surviving and constructing a civilization. Due to this fact, *‘ilm* is a substantial element for civilization, namely for its consequential virtues that directly impact everyone's social life in society.

As clarified above, all fields of *‘ilm* are essential for society. However, al-Māwardī reminds us that some people will neglect or disregard some areas of *‘ilm*. This exactly is why he warns of the danger of such a destructive assumption. For al-Māwardī, a person who does not see *‘ilm* in its comprehensive meaning– or disregards one part of it – simply due to their ignorance of the actual meaning and essence of *‘ilm* (ibid. 49). Further, he asserts that knowing all fields of *‘ilm* is out of

the question. Al-Māwardī quotes that “A philosopher was questioned, who knows all of the knowledge(s)? The philosopher responded; the entire people” (ibid. 50). Meaning, no individual is – or even could – be omniscient, as *‘ilm* is never only possessed by a particular individual. Furthermore, it is essential to point out that there is no central authority or personality to claim a monopoly of *‘ilm* from al-Māwardī’s perspective.

‘Ilm has an elementary position within civilization. This is because people cannot organize and arrange their society and their social, economic, political, and legal life without a system of knowledge. This is because a system of knowledge rationalizes people how to behave, discipline themselves, and deal with each other. For instance, this is to be mirrored in Rosenthal's statement on Muslim civilization, when he argues that *‘ilm* is a synonym for Islam (Rosenthal 2007: 2 and 97). For instance, *Kitāb al-‘ilm* by al-Bukhārī argues that knowledge ought to be a fundamental element for Muslims by demonstrating how the subject of knowledge was influential in the Prophet Muhammad’s “mission and true faith” (ibid. 78).

The virtue of *‘ilm* presented by al-Māwardī reflects the general view towards knowledge in Muslim civilization. This explains why significant numbers of people in Muslim society used to involve themselves in learning and teaching activities. The question then becomes, what are the motives that lead a society to appreciate the values and virtues of *‘ilm* in this manner? It is important to note that al-Māwardī sheds light on the relationship between *‘ilm* and virtues and illuminates the meaning of acquiring *‘ilm*. He articulates that: “Be aware that *‘ilm* is the most honored subject matter to be demanded by the seeker, and it is the greatest request where a student puts his effort, and it is the most advantageous to be gained and possessed by the gainer because its possessor’s nobility and honor continuously increase, and the virtue of *‘ilm* grows by its seeker” (al-Māwardī 2012: 47). Al-Māwardī addresses here all fields of *‘ilm* without any exception. This is to state that *‘ilm* was attached to nobilities and virtues in Muslim civilization and become one of its most dominant concepts. Consequently, *‘ilm* ought to have a leading position in civilization not only as a means to institute the best normative ethics and civilization per se, but also *‘ilm* ought to be an objective noble virtue.

It can be argued that *'ilm* resembles the role of spirit in the body, which enables a civilization to function. Likewise, *'ilm* enlightens its society and enables people toward improvement and amendment. I argue that a system of knowledge is an indispensable instrument for civilization to start to exist and continue improving. Similarly, *'ilm* has a unique virtue as a means and an end, since it is the fundamental element of instituting and shaping civilization's internal and external aspects. This is similar to a certain extent to the conclusion of Rosenthal, who studied the concept of knowledge in Islam and argued rightly that “Nothing, in short, has greater basic value for society than knowledge” (Rosenthal 2007: 333).

In contrast to the concept of *'ilm* as a virtue, I inspect the idea of ignorance⁵³, which indicates viciousness and evil. Furthermore, ignorance is perceived as the death that mirrors the collapse, injustice, confusion, and decline of a society. Based on a close reading of al-Māwardī, it is safe to say that *jahl* (i.e., ignorance) indicates the absence of a system of knowledge. Thus, the question arises of how to associate between “knowing” and “being.” Al-Māwardī does not answer such a question straightforwardly. Nevertheless, he quotes Arabic poetry, which indicates a connection in this respect:

Death comes to the ignorant before they actually die,
Their bodies are tombs before they are buried in graves.
If a man is not alive through *'ilm*, then he is dead,
He enjoys no resurrection till the Day of Resurrection. (cited in al-Māwardī 2012: 50)

It is pertinent to note how al-Māwardī relates ignorance to death and the tomb. In other words, *'ilm* gives life to people, and *jahl* is a source of death and absence. This is because civilization is organized based on a system of knowledge. Through it, people know how to behave appropriately on the individual and societal level. However, if there is a lack of *'ilm* in society, this society cannot be maintained. This

⁵³ Notice that while the term *jahilya* (the time of ignorance) is used to describe the pre-Islamic period, it also morphologically related to *jahl*, the opposite of *'ilm*, indicating the absence of the revealed *'ilm* in pre-Islamic times.

is again clearly reflected by al-Māwardī, when he cites al-Ahnaf Ben Qays, who says, “A foolish person can be protected from everything except himself” (ibid. 31).

Similarly, al-Iṣfahānī demonstrates that the Noble Quran describes *‘ilm* as light. At the same time, it defines the opposite of *‘ilm*, i.e., ignorance as darkness⁵⁴. Likewise, the Quran did not only refer to *‘ilm* as a “spirit,”⁵⁵ but also called *‘ilm* “life” while it calls ignorance “death” (6:122)⁵⁶ (al-Iṣfahānī 2010: 128). This again shows how with ignorance, there can be neither safety nor well-being. However, *‘ilm* brings well-being and security to society.

Ignorant society or even individuals would not value the virtue of *‘ilm* as an enlightening element of civilization or as its spirit of life. This is clear in al-Māwardī’s elaboration on how discovering the virtue of *‘ilm* necessitates the embodiment of *‘ilm*, and without *‘ilm*, it is almost impossible to recognize its virtues:

Only those ignorant people who would not recognize who sage and scholars are, for the reason that the virtue of *‘ilm* perceives by *‘ilm*, so the one who has *‘ilm* is more aware of its virtue since *‘ilm*’s virtues would not be recognized without *‘ilm* per se. Since ignorance lacks the system of knowledge, which recognizes its virtue, the people became ignorant of its virtue. Even more, they regarded the people of *‘ilm* as despicable, and they assume that their character tends to possess from goods and wealth have priority over *‘ilm*. (al-Māwardī 2012: 49)

It is important to note that *‘ilm* has supremacy over various significant concepts in al-Māwardī’s civilization theory for its virtues. For instance, *‘ilm* is superior to power since power itself necessitates a system of knowledge to be constructed. This supremacy of *‘ilm* is to be found in countless earlier contributions, for example, cited

⁵⁴ For instance, see Quran (2: 257).

⁵⁵ For instance, see Quran (42: 52).

⁵⁶ “Is he who was dead and We have raised him unto life, and set for him a light wherein he walketh among men, as him whose similitude is in utter darkness whence he cannot emerge? {...}” translated into English by M. M. Pickthall.

in al-Sam‘ānī, who narrates that: “{...} the affairs of religion and the worldly life are constructed on two foundations: the sword and pen, and the sword is under the authority of pen” (al-Sam‘ānī 1993: 568). Indeed, the notion of “sword” here is to be understood as a metaphor for power. At the same time, the concept of “pen” indicates *‘ilm*. In other words, *‘ilm* leads to power, either internal power, which contains normative ethics, faith, and certainties, or external power⁵⁷, which includes technology and equipment that facilitates the construction of external civilization.

Furthermore, the virtue of *‘ilm* is clearly to be noticed in comparison to many other concepts, such as the concept of wealth. To illuminate this more, Al-Māwardī gives priority to the virtues of *‘ilm* over wealth, in which he quotes Ali ibn Abi Talib, who says that “*‘ilm* is better than wealth, *‘ilm* guards you, while you have to guard wealth, *‘ilm* is ruler while wealth is ruled over it. The guardians of wealth are dead; however, scholars of *‘ilm* last as long as time” (cited in al-Māwardī 2012: 59).

Remarkably, this excerpt summarizes al-Māwardī’s position on the virtue of *‘ilm* as well as indicating *‘ilm*’s fundamental role on both the individual and collective levels. This citation brings up questions such as why *‘ilm* is better than wealth and how can *‘ilm* guard us? How is *‘ilm* a ruler? And why do scholars of *‘ilm* last as long as time? It is safe to argue that without *‘ilm*, one can neither increase his wealth, nor maintain it. Secondly, *‘ilm* can guard us by teaching us to how to act ethically in society. Meaning, when an individual has *‘ilm*, he can distinguish between ethical and unethical deeds and actions and act correspondingly.

Nevertheless, having wealth without *‘ilm* does not guarantee our ethical behavior in society. Thirdly, *‘ilm* is a ruler because governing and leading necessities *‘ilm* and one cannot rule justly and appropriately without a system of knowledge. Lastly, for both - Ali ibn Abi Talib and al-Māwardī, scholars of *‘ilm* leave humanity a permanent legacy, and they are always remembered for their valuable *‘ilm*. That all reflects the value of *‘ilm* over wealth.

⁵⁷ ‘External power’ in this study does not indicate weapons such as nuclear weapons etc. since these are elements of destruction and not of constructing a civilization. which is the opposite of the objective of this study.

Another worth of *‘ilm* presents by al-Māwardī is that *‘ilm* and reason are causes of happiness and fortune, even with lack of wealth and difficulties of life. However, ignorance and stupidity are causes of deprivation and retreat, even with the affluence of wealth because happiness is not connected to wealth, but is related to *‘ilm* (al-Māwardī 2012: 66). It could be asked why al-Māwardī would suppose that *‘ilm* is a source of happiness and fortune? For him, *iṣlāḥ* on the individual and collective levels in worldly life and Hereafter is based on *‘ilm*.⁵⁸ Thus, happiness is accomplished through *iṣlāḥ*, which is based on *‘ilm*. In other words, without *‘ilm*, there is no possibility for *iṣlāḥ*, and without *iṣlāḥ*, there is no happiness. This is why al-Māwardī quotes a philosopher, who says, “The origin of *‘ilm* is desire, and that results in happiness {...}” (ibid. 70). Meaning, happiness is a product and result of *‘ilm*. This again supports the same argument mentioned above, which indicates the significance of *‘ilm* in civilization. It fits together with virtue as a significant element in constructing and shaping civilization.

It must be pointed out that *‘ilm* and the acquisition of *‘ilm* are based fundamentally on the acquired reason. This is why only humans can have *‘ilm* in comparison to animals since they are distinguished with reason. As I showed in the previous chapter, for al-Māwardī reason enriches and extends through experiences and learning. Thus, the more reason a person has, the more *‘ilm* he will have and vice versa. In other words, there is a very interactive relationship between reason and *‘ilm*, because *‘ilm* establishes itself on reason and without reason and reasoning, certainly *‘ilm* can neither be maintained and transmitted to a new generation, nor be applied in any society.

2.3. How does *‘ilm* emerge?

Remarkably, al-Māwardī did not systematically and precisely deal with the topic of how *‘ilm* emerges in society or civilization. However, based on his conception of *‘ilm*, there can be several observations from two distinctive aspects: the theoretical dimension and the formal dimension. Al-Māwardī stresses the virtue and significance of *‘ilm* as a critical element leading to success and happiness in the

⁵⁸ This argument will be explained in details in the next chapters.

worldly life and the Hereafter. It is important to remember that al-Māwardī gives particular values and virtues to every single field of *‘ilm*. He even considers a person who denies any branch of *‘ilm* as an ignorant person. Al-Māwardī’s intention of highlighting the virtues and significance of *‘ilm* in this theoretical level is to increase and extend the appreciation of *‘ilm* in society, so more people would get involved in obtaining *‘ilm*.

Furthermore, as a part of the theoretical dimension, al-Māwardī elaborates on understanding educational materials and manuscripts. For instance, he proposes three significant reasons: an obstacle to a sharp and accurate interpretation of words. Firstly, a defect in words that express meaning. Secondly, defect in the meaning itself. Thirdly, a defect in the listener himself (al-Māwardī 2012: 78- 9). Remarkably, this information can be beneficial to both the teacher as well as the student. Besides, al-Māwardī goes further and expounds on eight reasons that can be an obstacle to an accurate reading, leading to misreading a text (ibid. 96- 8). It is safe to argue that al-Māwardī suggests very beneficial structures of problems that both the student and teacher can face while dealing with educational materials and manuscripts. Additionally, he recommends solutions for misreading educational materials and manuscripts and the causes of misinterpretation so that students and teachers can overcome such problems. This is all to be considered as a theoretical dimension.

In the formal dimension, al-Māwardī considers two principal components. On the one hand, there is the process from the student’s side in how to obtain *‘ilm* and his responsibility in dealing with his teacher(s) and applying this *‘ilm*. On the other hand, there is the framework of teaching *‘ilm* from the teachers’ side, his commitments to the student(s), and the application of *‘ilm*. It is safe to argue that, according to al-Māwardī, the interaction and relationship between the teacher and the student – as components of the process of acquiring *‘ilm* – is formed based on *ādāb*. Before delving more into the details related to students and teachers, the two components of *‘ilm*’s formal dimension, it is noteworthy that there are also principles that both teachers and students ought to take into consideration in the process of acquiring *‘ilm*. For instance, al-Māwardī warns both teachers and students from having immoral intentions in acquiring *‘ilm*, for example, having insincerity or aiming to acquire *‘ilm* to be able to debate other(s). These attributes can lead to

social fragmentation since people will depart from an individual who has insincerity, and people will contempt the one who debates with them. Thus, a decent intention is essential for both students and teachers, since a decent intention can enhance social cohesion and eliminate fragmentation in a society (al-Māwardī 2012: 67- 8).

Both students and teachers should avoid pride and self-admiration in *‘ilm* or due to knowing part(s) of *‘ilm* (ibid. 114). This is because the people of *‘ilm* ought to present a decent model of behavior in a society. Strictly speaking, if everybody in society is obliged to not be arrogant, or show duplicity and other immoral attributes, then the people of *‘ilm* – both students and teachers – are more obligated to avoid such evil characteristics due to their role models in society. Since *‘ilm* undeniably has no limits, both students and teachers should never be satisfied with the amount of their *‘ilm*. Rather they ought to frequently keep growing their *‘ilm* (ibid. 119). This reflects how for al-Māwardī acquiring *‘ilm* ought to be a never- ending process for students and teachers and everyone in society.

The teacher has an elementary role in the process of acquiring *‘ilm*. For al-Māwardī, a student ought to place his teacher at a high level of veneration, as a teacher is not only teaching and educating his students, but is also transferring to them his own experiences, ideas, values, and virtues throughout the acquisition of *‘ilm*. This is to demonstrate that the student-teacher relationship is very interactive and cooperative. Accordingly, the teacher ought to have many attributes in this process. Firstly, the teacher should practice the *‘ilm* that he is teaching to students (al-Māwardī 2012: 212). Secondly, he should be humble and avoid any pride and self-admiration (ibid. 131). Third, he should have mercy, especially in dealing with students (ibid. 134- 5). Fourth, he should encourage and mitigate his students to acquire more and more *‘ilm* (ibid. 135). Fifthly, the teacher should not prevent any student from developing his *‘ilm* (ibid. 135). Sixthly, he should say, “I do not know” when he does not know an answer to a question (ibid. 117- 8). Lastly, teachers have more responsibility - than uneducated people - towards their society to advance and popularize *‘ilm* and eliminate or reduce ignorance (ibid. 126- 7).

The student is also an essential constituent in the process of acquiring *‘ilm*. Therefore, al-Māwardī proposes several principles for students to follow in their

interactions with teachers and the whole process of acquiring *‘ilm*. For instance, the student should not imitate his teacher without proper understanding and proof (al-Māwardī 2012 109- 10). Furthermore, the student ought to follow all his teachers’ virtues and decent attributes (ibid. 106). Even more, al-Māwardī offers advice for students on how to ask the right questions, as good questions remove confusion and misconceptions in acquiring *‘ilm* (ibid. 110- 11). These kinds of advice demonstrate how for al-Māwardī vision is based on constant interactions between the student and the teacher in the process of gaining *‘ilm*, so the relationship between them stays active. It is built on healthy argumentation, not on blind imitation and confusion.

It is important to remember that for students, having these virtues should direct them to more self-discipline and self-correction. The individual development in personality, manners, and behavior leads to society's development since every individual is a significant part of society. Therefore, al-Māwardī wants to strengthen students' virtues, and accordingly, this betterment will transfer to the whole society, since students are the potential future leaders and scholars. In other words, al-Māwardī wishes for principled and disciplined students, who can establish their arguments and beliefs on proofs and not just imitation for the reason that for him *‘ilm* ought to be based entirely on reason, explanations, and morality.

While analyzing al-Māwardī’s views on how *‘ilm* emerges and formalizes in society, it is safe to argue that his objectives from all of these mentioned theoretical and formal levels are not only to maintain the stability of acquiring *‘ilm* in society, but also to institutionalize the process of acquiring *‘ilm*. He intends to formalize the relationships and interactions between teacher and student. Remarkably, this reflects the significance of *‘ilm* as well as educational institutions in his thought. It is worth noting that for al-Māwardī, both students and teachers ought to apply virtuous attributes in their interactions with each other (i.e., within the educational institutions), and virtues and ethical principles should be implemented in every aspect of the individuals’ daily life in society. This is to state that applying these above-mentioned virtues and regulations is not restricted to the relationships and interactions between the teacher and the student, but also extends to society.

The question arises here, is it enough to view all these *adab* as mentioned above only as moral advice? It is safe to argue that for al-Māwardī, *adab* is more than merely moral advice. For the reason that *adab* is a method that helps us systematically maintain, enhance, and transmit *‘ilm* from person to person and from society to another. Again, *adab* regulates the relationships and interaction between teachers and students and organizes the whole processes of *Taṣnīf* and *Tadwīn* (i.e., writing down and documentation of knowledge). This is why *adab* is to be considered more than just moral advice.

Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn presents not only a wide-ranging code of moral and ethical advice for teachers and students, but also indirectly suggests how *‘ilm* emerges in society and how an educational process can be formalized and institutionalized. Furthermore, al-Māwardī’s book systematically advocates for countless ethical principles for both the teacher and the student to enhance educational establishments. It is essential to keep in mind that al-Māwardī realizes these moral pieces of advice and codes throughout his teaching and learning experience. Reports are arguing that al-Māwardī had his own *Madrasah* as well as many students – for instance, one of his most famous students is al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, (Alboğa 2014: 60- 1). This is to state that this recommended *adab* and advice by al-Māwardī is not merely utopian or abstract; instead, it is very applicable. They are still crucial nowadays in the process of acquiring *‘ilm*.

Answering the question, how does *‘ilm* emerge in society? This leads me to address the subject of writing down and documenting *‘ilm*. known as “*Tadwīn* and *taṣnīf*”, which are the methods of documenting and recording *‘ilm*. Unquestionably, *Tadwīn*, and *taṣnīf* are essential in preserving and maintaining *‘ilm*. Needless to say, that *‘ilm* indicates all fields of study from *fiqh* to natural sciences and medicine, etc. In his enormous contribution, “*Geschichte des Arabischen Schrifttums*,” Fuat Sezgin demonstrates how *tadwīn* and *taṣnīf* are unique in the Muslim civilization. As an illustration, he clarifies in detail how the development of the *hadith* literature took place in the following phases:

1. “Kitābat al-ḥadīth”: the recording of the hadith in the time of the Prophet’s companions and the earliest generations of Muslims followed them. This recording is documented in small booklets.
2. “Tadwīn al-ḥadīth”: the collection of the scattered records.
3. “*Tasnīf al-hadit*”: arranging the hadith according to content-based chapters (Sezgin 1967: 55).

This illuminates how *Tasnīf* and *tadwīn* as methods of documentation and recording are essential tools to understand how *‘ilm* emerges within Muslim civilization. Furthermore, for Sezgin, this system of transmitting *‘ilm* is unique in Muslim civilization. He claims that “*taḥammul al-‘ilm*”- (the way *‘ilm* is transmitted) distinguishes the Islamic civilization without analogy in other civilizations. He elaborates that “*taḥammul al-‘ilm*” is generally divided into eight genera and is described as the following:

1. “*Samā’*”: The student or listener hears the traditions that are recited by heart or from the teacher’s book.
2. “*Qirā’a*”: The student or someone else recites one or more *ḥadīth* from the book or by heart to the teacher. The teacher listens and compares what is being presented with his copy or what he knows by heart.
3. *Iḡāza*: the teacher or an authorized narrator permits an individual to narrate a particular text or more. The *iḡāza* could be general when the teacher says, “I allow you to transmit everything I narrated to you.”
4. *Munāwala*: The teacher gives his original book or a copy to his student. The former says to the latter, “This is my book (or this is my narration), and I give you the permission to hand it over”. The teacher leaves it to his student forever, or he might ask him to make a copy and return it.
5. *Kitāba* or *Mukātaba*: The teacher makes a copy from his book or his narrations or asks his students to make a copy from it.
6. The teacher passes on a book or a tradition with a remark that the student has the right to deliver it, and he leaves it open to the student whether others may also transmit it.
7. *Waṣīya*: before his death or before a journey, the teacher grants his student the right to have his book(s) to hand it down.

8. *Wiḡāda*: using a manuscript or a ḥadīth, whether contemporary or not. It is gained by someone who has the handwriting of the last narrator.

This all shows the establishment of a system of knowledge and the different approaches to transmit and maintain *‘ilm* within Muslim civilization. This reflects the value of *Tasnīf* and *Tadwīn* as an essential component in the emerging, preserving, and spreading of *‘ilm*. In all of these eight genera described by Sezgin, the relationship between teachers and students is shaped by *adab*. The idea of “*tagyid al-‘ilm*” (writing down and documentation of knowledge) presented by al-Māwardī contains both *Tasnīf* and *Tadwīn*. Unquestionably, al-Māwardī reaffirms the significance of “*tagyid al-‘ilm*” as a method to maintain and preserve *‘ilm* (al-Māwardī 2012: 89). It is important to mention that the idea of “*tagyid al-‘ilm*,” known as *Tasnīf* and *Tadwīn*, was known even before al-Māwardī. Fuat Sezgin observes that “*tagyid al-‘ilm*” was practiced even in the Umayyad period (Sezgin 1967:90). To conclude, addressing the issue of how *‘ilm* emerges in a society necessitates a profound understanding of what al-Māwardī calls “*tagyid al-‘ilm*” since, by *tagyid*, the system of knowledge will not only be preserved but also disseminated and circulated.

2.4. *Ādāb* and *‘ilm*: an indispensable combination

Ādāb and *‘ilm* were often paired with each other, especially by the classical Muslim political philosophers and social theorists such as al-Māwardī, al-Ghazālī, and many others. However, according to Rosenthal, in the *ādāb-‘ilm* pair, *ādāb* is noticeably the broader concept of the two, as it includes matters of normative ethics, sound principles of morals, behavior, and custom in addition to those of learning (Rosenthal 2007: 252). This is to argue that *ādāb* deals with diverse questions such as what is beneficial or useless *‘ilm*? What are the objectives of acquiring *‘ilm*? The critical question that arises here is which one of the two is superior to the other? –Answering this question helps us to have a profound understanding of *‘ilm*’s components, which is reflected in the manifestation of its civilization. It is essential to point out that the role of *ādāb* in *‘ilm* was first actualized in the Prophet Muhammad’s words and

actions. For instance, he ordered that people ought to keep quiet and pay attention to the speaker till the end of the talk. Furthermore, he commanded that no one could claim that he knows best since this has to be left only to God (ibid. 81).

While *‘ilm* is the sum of what is known, *Ādāb* should be considered a method and means for reasonable communication in learning and teaching. Further, *Ādāb* is an essential tool in preserving and developing *‘ilm*. Al-Māwardī considers *ādāb* and *‘ilm* as an inseparable combination. However, I argue that *ādāb* is the more fundamental of the two for al-Māwardī, since *ādāb* is the base on which *‘ilm* can be formed and organized. This explains al-Māwardī’s stronger focus – particularly in his contribution *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn* – on the *ādāb* of *‘ilm* then *‘ilm* per se. For instance, he discusses the *ādāb* of scholars and students, namely, how they ought to behave and act on different occasions (al-Māwardī 2012: 125). A further example made by al-Māwardī is his elaboration on the *ādāb* of a relationship between scholar and his students, and how scholars ought to motivate their students to seek beneficial *‘ilm* (ibid. 134- 5). Thus, I argue that *ādāb* in these contexts is the framework and the structure in which *‘ilm* ought to be formed, circulated, and transmitted. Therefore, due to its central role in shaping and developing the process and acquiring *‘ilm*, *ādāb* has priority in learning.

Nonetheless, why should we consider *ādāb* as the framework and the structure in this concern? And, why is *ādāb* essential for *‘ilm* to be formed and circulated in society? *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn* inspires several aspects for answering such questions. I will elaborate on some examples to clarify and expand this argument. This study argues that *ādāb* facilitates individuals’ discipline and personal refinements. To name some instances, adhering to the principles of *ādāb* necessitates a lack of arrogance or self-admiration, as such socially destructive attributes hinder the student from acquiring *‘ilm*. So, if an individual is arrogant and self-admiring, he is satisfied with his *‘ilm*. Accordingly, he will not be willing to learn further; he might not appreciate the people of *‘ilm* since his arrogance and self-admiration narrow his perspective. In the following, I will analyze the relationship between *ādāb* and *‘ilm* and their impact on the individual and collective levels.

An arrogant or self-admiring individual, who feels superior over others, limits his ability to value scholars and his colleagues in the process of learning; his ego will be the glass through he sees and evaluates people and the world around him. Therefore, if arrogance or self-admiration became prevalent in any society, it will prevent people from gaining and appreciating *‘ilm*. Based on this, it is safe to argue that *ādāb* ought to precede learning so that it will pave the way for people to be able to gain *‘ilm*. Otherwise, there could be no willingness and enthusiasm for acquiring further *‘ilm*.

Accordingly, *ādāb* is very fundamental for the formation and circulation of *‘ilm*. If there is no *ādāb* in the formation and circulation of *‘ilm*, this can lead to many unconstructive consequences on the individual and societal levels. For instance, one of the crucial *ādāb*, as this study demonstrates, is being sincere and honest. If there is no sincerity in the formation of *‘ilm*, this can lead students and scholars to deceive each other. Meaning, if the people of *‘ilm* do not adhere to the principals of *ādāb*, this leads them to use *‘ilm* for narrow personal interests without considering others. If the people of *‘ilm* are corrupted, that will lead to limitless corruption in society since the people of *‘ilm* should be considered role models in their society. Therefore, *ādāb* refined human beings and the way they deal and interact in society. Based on this, *ādāb* is very important not only as a precondition for the emergence of proper *‘ilm*, but also *ādāb* ought to be the base on which *‘ilm* is circulated and transmitted in society. To sum up this point, the relationship between *‘ilm* and *ādāb* is deeply interlinked in its individualistic and societal dimensions.

The centrality of the concept of *ādāb* leads many classical scholars to dedicate specific books solely to the subject matter of *ādāb* in *‘ilm*. For instance, Al-Sam‘ānī in his contribution on the “*Adab al-implā’ wa’listimplā’*” explains wide-ranging kinds of *ādāb*, which students and scholars ought to practice in the course of seeking, acquiring and teaching *‘ilm*. In his work, al-Sam‘ānī focuses on the internal and external aspects of scholars and students, such as the *ādāb* they should have in the class and the question of how to behave politely and respectfully in the presence of teachers. His work reflects the importance of *ādāb* in *‘ilm* and how *ādāb* is an essential element for social existence. Moreover, in one of his quotations, al-Sam‘ānī refers to *Abū Zakariyyā al-Anbārī*, who states that “*‘ilm* without *ādāb* is like fire without firewood, and *ādāb* without *‘ilm* is like a spirit without a body.” (al-Sam‘ānī

1993: 93). This is a unique quote which very succinctly depicts the relationship between *‘ilm* and *ādāb* and how the absence of one affects the other. This quotation demonstrates not only the centrality of *ādāb* as a constituent feature in *‘ilm*, but also indicates that *ādāb* enables *‘ilm*. If *‘ilm* stands for spirit, this makes *ādāb* the body that animates it. This shows the strong interlocking relationship between the concept of *ādāb* and *‘ilm*.

The centrality of *ādāb* in the process of acquiring *‘ilm* leads to the question of what will happen if *ādāb* has lost its role or disappeared in the process of acquiring *‘ilm*? Meaning, what are the consequences of losing *ādāb* in *‘ilm*? A contemporary scholar answers this question precisely. Muhammad Naquib al-Attas argues that the loss of *ādāb* within the process of *‘ilm* implies a failure of justice, which leads to confusion in *‘ilm*. As a result, this injustice and confusion enable bad leaders to arise and flourish, which leads to even more injustice and confusion. For al-Attas, a deficiency in the concepts of *ādāb* and *‘ilm* causes and induces a social crisis. In other words, he argues that the general dilemma in contemporary times consists of the following elements: Firstly, confusion and error in *‘ilm*. Secondly, the loss of *ādāb* in society. Thirdly, these two reasons lead to unqualified leaders who can take over the power and who, in reality, lack moral, intellectual, and spiritual standards (c.f. al-Attas 1993: 106).

For al-Māwardī, the consciousness and awareness of *ādāb* preceded good conduct on the individual and social levels, since no *‘ilm* can be organized and introduced before the implementation of *ādāb*. Based on this argumentation, it is safe to argue that *ādāb* ought to be continuously and entirely attached to the process of acquiring *‘ilm*. In other words, I say that for al-Māwardī *ādāb* is a means to every virtue, within which also *‘ilm* can be originated, circulated and advanced.

The significance of *ādāb* in acquiring *‘ilm* leads some scholars such as al-Attas to insist that the process of acquiring knowledge without *ādāb* should not even be named ‘*education*’ for the reason that an individual acquiring knowledge ought to possess a moral purpose that enables this knowledge. Furthermore, for al-Attas, wisdom results from knowledge, whereas knowledge is founded on self-discipline and virtuous and right actions. These processes would be embodied according to

al-Attas in the Arabic term *ādāb* (c.f. al-Attas 1995: 16). Put differently, the loss of *ādāb* in society while pursuing the acquisition of *‘ilm* gives rise to injustice, and a constant corruption of *‘ilm* itself. Due to these facts, I argue that a proper amalgamation of *ādāb* and *‘ilm* is an urgent need in a virtuous civilization, and without a potent combination of *ādāb* and *‘ilm* there will be injustice, confusion, and corruption, which leads doubtlessly to weakening and stagnation.

Once more, to elaborate on how *ādāb* is attached to *‘ilm*, an example from *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn* will be mentioned which is related to *ādāb al-‘ulamā*⁵⁹. Al-Māwardī argues that *‘ulamā*’ should have *ādāb* such as being humble and avoiding self-admiration. The reason for selecting these particular qualities is, according to al-Māwardī, the consequence of humbleness leading to affection, whereas self-admiration leads a person to alienate himself. Also, for al-Māwardī self-admiration is an unacceptable trait which appears ugly in every person, and even hideous when it is a personal trait of *‘ulamā*’. This is for the reason that society considers *‘ulamā*’ role models to follow (al-Māwardī 2012: 113).

Furthermore, al-Māwardī explains the cause of arrogance and self-admiration. One main reason could be that *‘ulamā*’ look down at people who have less *‘ilm* than them, so they start to feel that they would possess an exceptional amount of *‘ilm*. The solution to this problem is that *‘ulamā*’ ought to compare themselves always to more knowledgeable scholars. In other words, *al-‘ulamā*’ should not be satisfied with the *‘ilm* they possess but instead always strive for more knowledge, especially since *‘ilm* is unlimited and one can never be done learning. Moreover, to emphasize how self-admiration and arrogance are risky features that could face not only the student of *‘ilm*, but also all *‘ulamā*’, al-Māwardī expounds a very personal story to insist on this point:

I once wrote a book on transactions and sales. In it, I included everything I learned from the literature on this topic. I exerted great effort from

⁵⁹ The term *‘ulamā*’ means in this regards highly educated individuals, who have the abilities and competency to involve in reestablishing creative abstractions, which based on their civilizational contexts and their resource of *‘ilm*. Beside its interdisciplinary approaches these abstractions take the concepts of space and time always into consideration in their abstracting.

myself and my mind until its last edited manuscript was completed. I almost admired my own work and believed that nobody else knew more than I on this topic. While I was teaching, two Bedouins approached me with a question about a sales contract they had enacted in the desert. The agreement was based on a condition that touched on four different problems. I did not know how to answer any of them. So, I was left pondering on my own state and theirs.

They said: Don't you answer what we asked although you are supposedly the most esteemed scholar on this issue. I replied: No. They expressed their astonishment. They left and went to a scholar, who was maybe less advanced {in this topic} than any of my students. When the Bedouins asked him, he was able to reply summarily and in a convincing manner. They left satisfied with his answers and praising his knowledge. I was puzzled, considering the situation that befell all of us. Afterward, I could not advance in my expertise in sales and transactions {because of my self-admiration}. From this incident emerged a strong rebuke and warning for myself. It was a warning against my vanity and conceit. This, however, reduced my inflated sense of self-admiration and arrogance. (Al-Māwardī 2012: 115- 6)

By telling his own story, al-Māwardī indicates that the seekers of *'ilm*, as well as *'ulamā'*, have to consider what he calls "*ādāb al-'ulamā'*" in every aspect of their interaction with *'ilm* and other *'ulamā'*. Accordingly, everyone should be aware of the temptation of arrogance, self-admiration and seeking fame. Again, al-Māwardī's objective is to highlight that *ādāb al-'ulamā'*, such as being humble leads to social integration and vital binds in society. Nevertheless, the lack and absence of *ādāb al-'ulamā'* leads society to alienation and social disintegration. This is to say that *ādāb* regulates the whole process of acquiring *'ilm*.

2.5. *ilm* and civilization

One of the main objectives of *ilm* is to organize, facilitate, and coordinate people's daily life, as it enables people to arrange and plan their everyday life. It is safe to argue that without *ilm*, civilization would hold neither organizations, nor stable establishments, rather chaos and disorder. Even more, the lack of *ilm* on both individual and societal levels means confusion and perplexity. I argue that al-Māwardī's recommendation of ethics, as mentioned above and the code of moral in the process of *ilm*, is primarily to influence and constructively educate students, who are the core element in advancing and developing their civilization in the future. So, al-Māwardī wishes for more stability and organization in people's daily life. This is because *ilm* is a central element in enlightening society since it is related to organizing and facilitating their daily lives. Thus, although human beings are different in their objectives, intentions, needs, and desires, both reason and *ilm* can bond them strongly together.

It must be pointed out that *ilm* is a fundamental pillar in civilization. Several points should be mentioned here to clarify this point. Firstly, through *ilm* many social, political, and economic difficulties and crises can be solved, such as illiteracy, lack of good governance, and poverty. Secondly, social and economic growth is profoundly interlinked with *ilm*. Thus, there can be no economic and social growth and development without the essential role of *ilm*. Thirdly, as a Shafi jurist, al-Māwardī knew very well that in the advent of Islam, people were not asked to pray and make the pilgrimage, etc. instead, the first part of the Quran started with "read" because based on *ilm* people can then act and behave appropriately. Thus, one can judge how much a society has developed depending on *ilm*'s place in society.

Educational establishments are significant in enhancing civilization since through educational establishments, *ilm* can be disseminated, enriched, and implemented in society. Thanks to educational establishments and institutions, people receive education about their duties and rights; this is important in organizing social interactions and relationships. Knowledge of duties and rights leads to social justice, solidarity, and equality, since if people in a society do not know their rights and

duties, it leads to injustice and chaos due to the lack of structures and the knowledge of how individuals ought to deal and interact with each other. Thus, *‘ilm* can play a critical role in improving and stabilizing society.

‘Ilm helps the individual and collective to have clear structures of how to organize their daily lives. This is to emphasize that the relationship between *‘ilm* and civilization is continuous and organic. It is difficult to imagine a civilization without educational establishments. Subsequently, without *‘ilm*, for the reason that through *‘ilm*, the individual and collective improve the way they think and ameliorate themselves and their conduct. As the opposite of *‘ilm*, ignorance is the source of the decline and decay on both individual and societal levels, as ignorance indicates confusion, deficiency, and instability, all of which are components leading to weakening and deterioration. This is to say that civilization cannot improve on both the individual and collective levels without *‘ilm*.

Thus, I argue that *‘ilm* pushes forward the advancement and improvement of civilization on the individual and collective levels. Lack of *‘ilm* or a distorted conception of *‘ilm* within a civilization leads to a society’s decay and stagnation. Al-Māwardī illustrates the role *‘ilm* plays in increasing the quality and degree of individuals; he reports that

In the case you belong to the elite, you learn and gain *‘ilm* that proves to be superior and greater to you, meanwhile in the case you are from the middle class, then the acquisition of *‘ilm* brings you to be in a commanding position and leadership. Finally, in the case you belong to the lower classes, then learning and acquisition of *‘ilm* makes you managing to live (al-Māwardī 2012: 48).

This means that, on the level of social stratification, *‘ilm* can raise individuals and the collective to higher levels of social status, independently from which social class the individual or the collective belongs to at the beginning of the process. Furthermore, al-Māwardī (ibid. 48) illustrates the role of *‘ilm* in civilization also from the standpoint of a lifespan, by describing how the acquisition of *‘ilm* during childhood and adolescence leads to the amelioration and correction of one’s character. Meanwhile, acquiring *‘ilm* during seniority contributes to specific preferences over

others, correcting wrong behaviors and actions, and correcting and evaluating passions and strong desires. This is to argue that the more *‘ilm* is significant and prevalent in a civilization, the more that civilization will be well-founded and improved.

Remarkably, al-Māwardī did not systematically and directly answer how individual development through the process of gaining *‘ilm* might lead to the gradual development of a whole society. But it can be said that a close reading reveals some points to be mentioned in this regard. First of all, there should be what can be called a developmental model, which means a political, social, or economic model that people in society are inspired by and encouraged to imitate.

For instance, al-Māwardī, on the individual level, perceives the Prophet Muhammad as the role model. Thus, he wrote a few chapters in his book *a'lām al-Nubuwwa* on the morality, personality, and behavior of the Prophet Muhammad. On a societal level, he considers the Rightly-Guided Caliphates as a collective developmental pattern. This is to be noticed in his work *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*. This is to state that elaborating on individual and collective development required a pattern, which inspires people to follow as a decent example. Accordingly, in every aspect of life, a developmental pattern facilitates and guides people toward what they perceive as a better stage of development and refinement.

Furthermore, development is in constant movement. Meaning, there is no endpoint where a person or a society can claim to have reached the zenith of development. The development process indicates diverse stages of development. Indeed, for al-Māwardī it is impossible to track such stages; however, al-Māwardī claims that humans can rise above the angels if they follow their reason, but can decline lower than animals if they follow their physical desires (c.f. al-Māwardī 2012: 38). Meaning, there is no limitation for improvement - especially the personal characters – or deterioration.

It is worth mentioning that development is strongly associated with social relationships and interaction. This would indicate that a person's refinement and development should be reflected on the societal level through social interaction and institutions. It is important to stress that development in this study does not mean

mere material improvement; instead, it is more related to the refinement of human behavior and action, particularly *ādāb*. For this reason, I did not use the word “progress” since it assumes constant progress.

An individual's development does not guarantee collective development, even though an individual's improvement could increase the collective's ability to coexist in a cooperative system and improve social cohesion, integration, and solidarity. This is why al-Māwardī, as the second part of this study demonstrates, expounds on “Constitutive Elements of the Social World,” “Personal Discipline and Institutions,” as well as “Informal Institution Theory.” His intention and objective are to design an appropriate environment and social context, where individual development contributes to the development of the collective. That happens through a system and institution, where there will be coordination and arrangement of the individuals’ effort, which can be reflected in society's development through social interaction and cooperation.

Reason emphasizes development on both the individual and collective levels. Religion, too, encourages and recommends people to refine and improve themselves. Similarly, *‘ilm* contributes to development on both individual and societal levels; for instance, by proposing social interaction and ethical principles of commitment, such as being tolerant and avoiding anger. Such attributes create the environment and social context for social development. Therefore, it can be argued that development is established on rationality and reason, and encouraged by religion. Lastly, *‘ilm* contributes to defining how development and refinement can be implemented in society.

Ibn Khaldūn is one of the very early social theorists who connects the concept of *‘ilm* with that of civilization in a very structured manner. Ibn Khaldūn argues that *‘ilm* increases and decrease in both the quantitative and qualitative senses based on how advance or stagnation of the level of civilization (Ibn Khaldūn 1981: 1024). In other words, when a civilization has a high level of advancement, it indicates a high quality and quantity of *‘ilm*. However, when a civilization is in a state of decline, then *‘ilm* will also be stagnate. Thus, individuals in developed cities have more possibilities to focus on *‘ilm*. For this reason, Ibn Khaldūn (ibid. 1024- 25) argues that in Córdoba, Baghdād, Baṣra, Kūfa, and al-Qayrawān there was a great degree of

civilization and, as a result, the diverse fields of *'ilm* increased and prevailed in these cities. However, just as civilization declined in these cities, as mentioned above, *'ilm* was immediately destructively affected and proceeded to decay until the center of knowledge was relocated to newly civilized and developed cities.

In his well-known study on the history of civilization in England, Henry Buckle reaches a similar conclusion, which demonstrates that the significance of *'ilm* in instituting any civilization is a prevalent idea both among non-Western and Western thinkers. He argues that all civilizations are grounded on knowledge⁶⁰ (Buckle 1869: 268). By the same token, Buckle articulates rightly that “Civilization, is the fruit of knowledge” (ibid. 336).

Furthermore, for him, civilized people depend on three elements, which are all based on, or associated with, the concept of knowledge. He states obviously that “{...} in a great and comprehensive view, the changes in every civilized people are, in their aggregate, dependent solely on three things: first, on the amount of knowledge possessed by their ablest men; secondly, on the direction which that knowledge takes, that is to say, the sort of subjects to which it refers: thirdly, and above all, on the extent to which the knowledge is diffused, and the freedom with which it pervades all classes of society”. (ibid. 224- 5) It is important to recall that within a theory of civilization, it is essential to shed light not only on the amount of *'ilm* but also on the references of *'ilm* and its pervasion in society on the individual and collective levels,

From a terminological perspective, even defining civilization – on theoretical and practical levels – ought to be associated directly with *'ilm* due to its centrality in the matter. However, few contemporary scholars seem to be aware of this. An example is Norbert Elias, who combines these two concepts firmly together. For Elias, the definition of civilization is based, to a certain extent, on science. From his perspective, civilization refers to a wide variety of facts, and a number of these facts are associated with knowledge. For instance, for him, “the level of technology” and

⁶⁰ Needless to say, that Buckle has a narrow vision of knowledge, since he is only concern with one aspect of knowledge, which is the empirical or physical knowledge, whereas he totally neglects religious *'ilm*'.

“the development of scientific knowledge” are two crucial constitutive parts of any civilization (Elias 2000: 5- 6). Nevertheless, Elias’ focus was mainly on the sciences (i.e., the material aspect of civilization), and therefore seems to be intentionally neglecting any knowledge related to religion.

I argue that civilization’s affiliation with *‘ilm* is elementary for al-Māwardī. *‘ilm* is a precondition for civilization’s construction. Rosenthal presented the same argument; however, differently articulated. He stated that “{...} knowledge is at the root of every advance in human society {...}” (Rosenthal 2007: 336). For *‘ilm* to flourish, there is a necessity for the circumstance, which encompasses and accepts, *‘ilm* as a means, for instituting a civilization and as a great virtue for the individual and society. In other words, a society of *‘ilm* indicates a high quality of civilization. This is also clearly to be perceived in a quotation narrated by ‘Alī b. Abī Tālib, in which he categorizes people based on their affiliation to *‘ilm*. He states: “Be a scholar or student, or a listener – of *‘ilm*, or a lover – of *‘ilm* – and do not be foolish so you can protect yourself from defeat” (cited in al-Māwardī 2012: 63). Accordingly, a great majority of individuals in a society ought to be, in one way or another, affiliated with *‘ilm*.

It is essential to point out that *‘ilm* has no boundaries for al-Māwardī. To illuminate this, he cites a philosopher who states that “Whoever delves profoundly to gain *‘ilm* is like a swimmer in the sea, who neither sees its ground, nor can he recognize its length or even its breadth.” (al-Māwardī 2012: 51) Distinctively, this indicates that *‘ilm* has no limits, and a human being cannot gain all branches of *‘ilm*. Given this, one should prioritize which branches of *‘ilm* are to be learned at the beginning. In other words, humans have to focus more on what can be called “indispensable *‘ilm*,” and after gaining it, one can extend from that as a starting point.

It is impossible to acquire all branches of *‘ilm* from al-Māwardī’s point of view. Therefore, it is essential to pay attention to the most imperative ones. For al-Māwardī, *‘ilm* related to religion which has a priority over the other branches, and it is the most commendable *‘ilm*. Since it is based on religious *‘ilm*, people will be guided to the right path, and by being ignorant in religious *‘ilm*, people will be ill-advised in everything else (al-Māwardī 2012: 52). Another significant reason in

this regard is that al-Māwardī considers religious *‘ilm* as the origin and the reason of *salāh* (i.e., righteousness) and happiness in both the worldly life and Hereafter. However, other fields of *‘ilm* cannot realize both *salāh* and happiness at the same time, as is the case with religious *‘ilm*. Thus, for al-Māwardī, religious *‘ilm* has unquestionably superiority over other branches of *‘ilm*.

Al-Māwardī suggests two categories of acquiring *‘ilm* based on its obligations. On the one hand, there is the *‘ilm* that can be characterized as an “individual obligation”⁶¹, that every person must know, such as performing acts of devotion, dealing appropriately with people, etc. On the other hand, there are also “collective obligations” or “sufficient obligations,”⁶² which forms of *‘ilm* that are obligatory for at least a sufficient amount of people to obtain. When that happens, the rest of society is not obligated to learn them. However, if nobody gains these kinds of *‘ilm*, everyone in society is obligated and responsible for their acquisition. For instance, if a sufficient number of people studied medicine in a society, then the rest of that society is not obligated to do so. Otherwise, everyone will be responsible for the lack of enough professionals in medicine. This is to argue that, as *‘ilm* is one of the main pillars of civilization, and the more the collective is engaged in obtaining *‘ilm*, the better it is for their civilization's stability and strength.

Knowing oneself, one's rights and duties is the basis of human behavior in any society. One must start by knowing himself because a person who does not know his rights and obligations will probably not know and realize his fellows' rights and duties. Undeniably, knowing neither one's rights and duties, nor one's fellow's rights and obligations leads to disorder and chaos in the whole society. Therefore, it is safe to argue that a constant process of seeking *‘ilm* is an essential element for every person in a stable civilization since organizing societal relationships in the right manner is based on appropriate *‘ilm*.

To assert the notion of the obligation of seeking *‘ilm*, al-Māwardī cites the prophet Muhammad's saying that “Seeking *‘ilm* is an obligation upon every Muslim.”

⁶¹ Al-Māwardī calls it “*farḍ al-'ayn*”.

⁶² Al-Māwardī calls it “*farḍ al-kifāya*”.

Al-Māwardī suggests two interpretations of this maxim: Firstly, one ought to know all things which cannot possibly be ignored regarding religious observances and acts of devotion. Secondly, when a society neglects a field of study or a specific discipline, then learning (that missing *‘ilm*) becomes an obligation on everyone until a group of people fulfil this duty (al-Māwardī 2012: 52). This demonstrates how every field of study is indispensable to be taken into consideration, according to al-Māwardī. This also reflects the idea that every member of society has an obligation related to *‘ilm*.

It is significant to point out that *‘ilm*'s impact for al-Māwardī is not restricted only to the worldly life, but also the Hereafter. He firmly believes that *‘ilm* can change people's personalities and characters constructively because people behave, act, and interact with others based on *‘ilm*. Even though al-Māwardī discusses both religious and non-religious *‘ilm*, still, a close reading of his works shows that his conception of *‘ilm* is more related to religious *‘ilm* than non-religious *‘ilm*. This could be because religious *‘ilm* in al-Māwardī's view leads to success in both the worldly life and the Hereafter. For instance, this can be observed in how he presents religious *‘ilm* as the right guidance for people. Meanwhile, when people are ignorant about religious *‘ilm*, they will be deprived since their religious observances and acts of devotion will be performed incorrectly (al-Māwardī 2012: 52).

Moreover, *‘ilm* not only organizes social, economic, and political relationships between individuals in a society, but also regulates relationships between rulers and the ruled. It is safe to argue that for al-Māwardī, when *‘ilm* is the foundation of interactions between the rulers and the ruled, it will benefit both. For instance, he states that “*‘ilm* is a preservation of the sovereigns because it prevents them from injustice and makes them tolerant. Additionally, *‘ilm* will deter them from destruction. Likewise, it makes them feel sympathy for their subjects. Therefore, they must know the value of *‘ilm* as well as finding out the {proper} *‘ulamā*” (al-Māwardī 2012: 58). This clearly shows how for al-Māwardī *‘ilm* can positively impact every aspect of daily life and social interactions. For these reasons, *‘ilm* is not a mere abstract and theoretical concept, rather, *‘ilm* influences every aspect of a society, not only the relationships between individuals but also between the rulers and the ruled.

I argue in this study that civilization is not static. On the contrary, it is continuously in motion, whether toward improvement or degeneration. Likewise, *‘ilm*, which consists of an accumulative process, is in growth or decline. Therefore, developments of *‘ilm* indicate society’s advancement and development and vice versa. Thus, al-Māwardī always encourages a sustainable acquisition of *‘ilm* and at every possible age (al-Māwardī 2012: 118) and every social or political level (ibid. 60).

Furthermore, al-Māwardī indicates that even if an individual became a well-regarded scholar, he should continue acquiring *‘ilm* to protect himself from any kind of burden and falsity. He is ever requested to answer questions (ibid. 118) because *‘ilm* lies and allocates the foundation for civilizational growth. On the other hand, ignorance causes stagnation. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that civilization to some measure is no more than the sum of the effects of the dissemination and improvement of its *‘ilm*.

For these critical qualities of *‘ilm* in constructing and shaping civilization, *‘ulamā*’ (e.g., Muslim scholar) continuously emphasized *‘ilm*’s positive role in maintaining and safeguarding the society and its social orders. Rosenthal puts it this way: “Muslim authors showed a decided preference for stressing the positive role of knowledge in society. Negative factors were played down and ultimately rejected, but they were not entirely disregarded. The indispensability of knowledge for any human societal organization is obvious. {...} the triumph of “knowledge” could lead to the most viable of social orders.” (Rosenthal 1970: 298). This is to state that *‘ilm* facilitates stability, social orders, and coherence, by which civilization can continue to grow.

2.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I elaborated on al-Māwardī’s conception of *‘ilm*, as well as its relationship with *ādāb*. I furthermore analyzed the relationships between *‘ilm* and civilization. I once more assert *‘ilm*’s central role in forming the individual and the collective's personality constructively and manner. Every civilization has a different

perception and conception of *‘ilm* since its civilizational contexts vary. Additionally, each civilization has its particular civilizational context, meaning that acquiring *‘ilm* and how it is perceived also varies depending on its sources. It is essential to recall how *‘ilm* is organized directly and indirectly influences its civilization's construction, pushing it towards development and improvement or decline and decay.

Al-Māwardī explains how *‘ulūm* (plural of *‘ilm*) have introductions, which lead to their conclusions and methodology. This contributes to reaching what he calls the *‘authentic truth.*’ Therefore, a student of *‘ilm* is obligated to start with its introductory subjects, and after becoming proficient in them, one can then move forward towards higher steps of *‘ilm*. Moreover, in his commentary on *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*, Üveys Vefa Khān’zādah emphasizes that for al-Māwardī, an individual should start first with *‘ilm*’ related to religion. After that, a student can continue to gain other disciplines such as physics, medicine, etc. (Khān’zādah: 1910: 71- 2). As the next chapter shows, religion shapes individual personalities based on the best normative ethics and morals.

I argued that *‘ilm* is a prerequisite to human’s actions, deeds, and behaviors. Furthermore, *‘ilm* is considered to produce all types of acts and behaviors, mainly when it is accessible as systematic components, and provides answers to many complex questions. Thus, *‘ilm*’s significance for civilization lies in how it structures and influences the individual and collective within a civilization, in which they act and deal in specific ethical manners. This is also to argue that we cannot imagine a civilization without the centrality of *‘ilm* since *‘ilm* suggests answers to the most challenging ethical questions. This again helps in influencing and shaping individuals to behave and act in specific proper manners.

Based on a close reading of al-Māwardī’s contributions, I endeavored to answer a critical question about how *‘ilm* emerges in society. I demonstrated that al-Māwardī did not answer this question systematically, however, I attempted to explain how he proposes many ideas related to the *ādāb* in the process of gaining *‘ilm*, which undeniably contributes to the manifestation of *‘ilm* in society. For instance, writing down and documenting *‘ilm* is a central issue in this regard. Al-Māwardī clearly

emphasizes the importance of “*tagyid al-‘ilm*” (also known as *Tasnif* and *Tadwīn*) as a method not only to maintain ‘*ilm*, but also circulate and advance it.

It is crucial to bear in mind that the ‘*ulamā*’ have a leading responsibility in advancing and protecting ‘*ilm*, given that they know the previous accumulative experiences in-depth, and the contemporary ‘*ilm* in their civilization. They also have the competency to deal with abstractions and theorize based on ‘*ilm* and previous accumulated experiences. Berger and Luckmann put it in this way: “Only very limited group of people in any society engages in theorizing, in the business of ‘idea,’ and the construction of *Weltanschauung*. But everyone in society participates in its ‘knowledge’ in one way or another” (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 26- 7). Based on this argument, the ethical commitments of ‘*ulamā*’ are very great,⁶³ since their theoretical interpretation of the world can influence everyone in their society to a certain extent. Thus, according to al-Māwardī, the formation of ‘*ilm*’ is almost a top to bottom process and not a bottom-up one, for the reason that it necessitates a profound conception and perception of ‘*ilm*, which is not accessible to ordinary people.

The amount of certainty in ‘*ilm* in itself is reflects in the acceptance and adaptation of ‘*ilm*’ and how much it influences and stimulates individuals. Strictly speaking, the level of confidence plays a leading role in the ‘*ilm*’, pushing individuals and the collective towards improving themselves. As the next chapter shows, religion represents itself as an authentic truth with very high certainty, which leads and pushes individuals to act and behave with confidence based on particular standards and principles. Again, that is to say, the amount of certainty varies based on the civilizational context and source of ‘*ilm*, in addition to the fact that ‘*ilm*’ proposes a detailed pattern of understanding social reality. This detailed pattern helps individuals to perceive the complexity of the world’s structures in a comprehensible outlook. Individuals start to act and behave based on this understanding of social reality.

⁶³ The influence and responsibility of ‘*al-‘ulamā*’ in society is very great in particular to construction of *Weltanschauung*. For such as reason the Prophet Mohmand was asked “which people are evil?” he answered “the ‘*al-‘ulamā*’ if they became corrupt” (al-Māwardī 2012: 128). Since the corruption of ‘*al-‘ulamā*’ leads to the corruption of the society.

Chapter Three

Religion

3.1. Introduction

Al-Māwardī uses the expression *dīn* to indicate different meanings. For instance, in “*Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn*,” especially in chapter III, he uses the word *dīn* as a synonym for Islam. Likewise, he clarifies in his exegesis of the Quran that the word *dīn* means “Islam” (al-Māwardī 2007. Vol. 5. 114). Besides, for him, from the original word ‘Islam,’ two meanings could be derived: On one hand, *al-Salām* as well as *al-Salāmah* meaning peace and safety because, for him, religion brings peace and safety to people, since it is thanks to religion that people can establish their life order. On the other hand, *al-taslīm*, i.e., submission to the will of God and obedience to His commands. (Al-Māwardī 2007. Vol. 1. 132). To al-Māwardī, this is the general perception of the *dīn* throughout his books. Nevertheless, he uses the word *dīn*, or and ‘*dīn muttaba*,’⁶⁴ in a different way, namely normative base. For him, ‘*dīn muttaba*’ is like the foundational religion of any society, state, and civilization. This meaning is to be explicitly observed in his book “*Tas’hīl al-Nāzar wa-Ta’jīl al-zafar*” as well as in chapter IV in *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn*,

For the sake of clarification, when I use the term *dīn* or religion in this chapter - as al-Māwardī uses here, it is in the context of the first meaning, which means religion as a synonym to the religion of Islam. To al-Māwardī, religion is from God’s grace and means generosity on human beings because it benefits them in both the worldly life and the Hereafter. According to al-Māwardī, there is nothing more significant than religion because it leads to success and benefits in life and the Hereafter. Thus, al-Māwardī goes further and argues that God intends to privilege people by making religion obligatory on them (al-Māwardī 2012: 139). This to say that when al-Māwardī uses religion in this chapter, he means Islam and not an ideology as it might be the case in other references of his contributions. This is because religion

⁶⁴ In the next chapter, this term will be discussed in details.

assists to have success in this life and the Hereafter. However, a normative base might bring success in the worldly life, but not necessarily in the Hereafter.

This chapter's main argument is to demonstrate that religion is a pillar for establishing any civilization. A civilization cannot possibly be established and maintained without a central role for religion. Religion is central for any civilization since it has the capacity to suggest norms, standards, and moral principles not only on the collective, but also on the individual level. These norms and ethical codes are necessary for instituting and maintaining the life-world order. It is essential to reconsider related concepts proposed by al-Māwardī, such as *ispat* (affirmation) and *nefy* (negation). Religion recommends and orders people to perform things, meaning it (*ispat*) approves specific things to exist in society, which becomes duties and requirements. However, religion prohibits particular things, which indicates it ought not to exist (i.e., *nefy*). Religion and reason complement each other in this regard. It can be assumed that for al-Māwardī, not only the affirmation of religion and reason are to be harmonized, but also the negation of religion and reason are also coherent.

Another concept to be scrutinized in this chapter is “*al-Targhīb wa al-tarhīb*” - persuasion and intimidation- which plays a crucial role in shaping individuals’ personality. On the contrary, “*al-Amr bi-al-ma’rūf wa-al-nahī ‘an al-Munkar*”, as it will be shown, has a collective impact on society. I argue that *al-Amr bi-al-ma’rūf* is associated with creating and maintaining an order of life. Strictly speaking, the order of life can be persistent with implementing the notion of “*al-Amr bi-al-ma’rūf*.” The concept of “*al-Amr bi-al-ma’rūf*” means more than “good” in a moral sense. It is not a matter of “public morality” in the narrow sense. Instead, “*al-Amr bi-al-ma’rūf*” is a life order. Accordingly, essential questions to be answered here are how the life order can be constructed and how religion or Islam does that.

Not everyone in society implements the ‘promotion of virtue and prevention of Vice’ so, what does that mean in relation to establishing a life order? For example, what does it mean to abandon a “*farḍ*” (a compulsory deed) in this regard? Or to observe immorality in society and not try to change it? What will happen if this is abandoned? Based on al-Māwardī’s conception of religion and through such

examples, I will try to show how religion contributes to constructing a life order. Thus, the question arises here, why do people not always implement “*al-Amr bi-al-ma‘rūf*”? I argue that al-Māwardī suggests a thoughtful analysis in this regard. Also, I will attempt to analyze the relationship between people’s intentions and their deeds as an essential part of the moral dimension of the life order. Generally speaking, for al-Māwardī, a person does an action because that action is good, or following others, or leaves or abandon it altogether to please people. This issue will be reconsidered in this part. Finally, it is necessary to analyze the notion of death and the Hereafter as the horizon which constitutes the meaning of a Muslim's life, who lives looking and working for the Hereafter without leaving this worldly life. In other words, one should aim for success in the Hereafter, meanwhile contributing to the stability and improvement of the life order without abandoning any of them.

3.2. Religion

While the Arabic concept *dīn*⁶⁵ is often translated into English as religion, there is, however, a difference between these two concepts. For instance, etymologically, the Arabic concept *dīn* derives from verbal roots that have various connotations. Two special meanings related to the construction of civilization are to be mentioned in this study. On the one hand, there is “*to owe*,” which indicates that humans are indebted and bound by their Creator's duty. On the other hand, there is “*to be subjected*,” which means that humankind has various ethical commitments and obligations, which pave the way for them to deal and act in particular manners (al-Iṣfahānī 2010a: 181). The etymological meanings of the Arabic term reflect the deep meaning of *dīn* and make it very difficult to be translated simply to religion.

Likewise, in his study, on tradition and modernity in Muslim civilization and the West, Salvatore elaborates on the difference between *dīn* and religion. He says that “The Islamic keyword ‘*din*,’ usually considered the closest equivalent to ‘religion,’ is more complex and diffuse and less functionally streamlined than its Latin counterpart. Instead of designating a functional bond between men and gods

⁶⁵ Despite this study prefers using *dīn* instead of religion, still, the concept religion will be used since it is easier for the reader to follow.

beneficial to the health of the state, '*din*' indicates the somewhat open partnership between man and God and the potentially constructive moral tension emanating from it. Starting from this basic meaning, '*din*' also encompasses other layers of signification, one of which denotes the way to be followed for human beings to reach God {...}" (Salvatore 2009: 13).

As shown above, when al-Māwardī uses *din*, he indicates Islam. In defining al-Māwardī's conception of religion, Bekir Alboğa rightly argues that al-Māwardī's understanding of religion has an ethical nature and that rational considerations and justification characterize al-Māwardī's definition of religion. Moreover, Alboğa elaborates that rationality and rational explanation are presented throughout al-Māwardī's analysis of religion. Therefore, al-Māwardī built his definition of religion on reason and rationality and that there is a harmonious relationship between religion and reason (Alboğa 2014: 360- 3). Besides, the Arabic concept *dīn* indicates specific duties and commitments. It is crucial to bear in mind that obligations are fundamental elements of a civilization. Furthermore, *dīn* suggests the existence of structures, which an individual has to consider in every single part of his actions and behavior. al-Attas, a contemporary thinker, like Isfahani associates these two meanings of *dīn* together:

The verb *dāna*, which derives from *dīn* conveys the meaning of being indebted, including various other meanings connected with debts, some of them contraries. In the state in which one finds oneself being in debt [...], it follows that one subjects oneself, in the sense of *yielding* and obeying, to law and ordinances governing debts and also, in a way, to the creditor, who is likewise designated as a *dā'in*. (Al-Attas 1993: 52)

However, "to be obligated" or "to be subjected" does not indicate a limitation of human's will and prospects.⁶⁶ On the contrary, according to al-Māwardī, religion is intended to be for the advantage and benefit of human beings, and it reflects human

⁶⁶ Compare this with Guizot's (Guizot 1997: 123) statement that "For religion to accomplish what they attempt, they must make themselves acceptable to liberty itself; it is needful that man should submit, but he must do so voluntarily and freely, and must preserve his liberty in the very heart of his submission. This is the double problem which religions are called upon to solve."

preference over other creations (al-Māwardī 2012: 139- 40). Strictly speaking, religion is God's grace on humankind, and God aims to privilege people by making religion mandatory for them (ibid. 139). Again, religion brings benefits and success for people in the worldly life concerning proper building order and in the Hereafter. So, the question arises here why is religion a grace towards human beings?

Religion has a normative message and provides conclusive arguments, which elaborate on truth and falsehood; the permissible and impermissible; the consequences of deeds: punishment or reward. Indeed, the answers to such complicated questions are based not only on the reason's abilities per se, but also on associating reason with religion since reason is continuously shifting in its positions. Therefore, this combination of both reason and religion offers original means and perspectives not only for understanding the Self, but also others. This is to confirm why religion is a God's grace from al-Māwardī's point of view.

Besides, religion is grace on humanity because, as in al-Māwardī's expression, it brings "happiness in the two abodes, this life, and the Hereafter." To give some practical illustrations, al-Fārūqī views religion as bringing many benefits, such as happiness in life. Through religion, people become aware that their life has a meaning and is not in vain, which beneficially influences people's thinking, manners and their social relations. (al-Fārūqī 1992: 15). Also, Islamic society must not be restricted itself to a specific nation, race, tribe, or group (ibid. 96), which means under Islam, there is no racism or discrimination between man and his fellow man (ibid. 98). Such elements advocated by religion make religion a grace on humanity since it reflects constructively on their manners and social relationships.

The question that arises here, what is religion's structure from Al-Māwardī's point of view? This question can be answered based on a close reading of al-Māwardī's works, in particular *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*. Al-Māwardī shows that religion contains distinctive principles and values, such as the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice, persuasion, and intimidation,⁶⁷ which can shape and influence individuals' deeds and behaviors in a constructive manner (c.f. al-Māwardī

⁶⁷ These terms will be all explained over the next pages.

2012: 142). For that reason, religion ought not to be understood as a narrow concept, which is restricted only to specific rituals, meaning religion should not be understood only as rules and principles that demonstrate how to perform worship and related issues.

On the contrary, religion has to be perceived as distinctive principles, values, and moral standards, which regulate the life-world order, as I will show in the next part of this thesis. For instance, through its recommended principles and moral standards, religion can influence one's personality by giving personal reasons to behave and act based on responsibilities and commitments. Al-Māwardī's contribution in this regard suggests that religion has structures, which have three levels of duties and commitments:

The First level: *'itiqād* (i.e., belief.) Al-Māwardī uses the Arabic concept *'itiqād*, which means a deterministic judgment that corresponds to reality, or the reality that corresponds to it (Khān'zādah 2019: 375). *'Itiqād* inspires and encourages individuals to maintain their commitments. This belief has two sides. On the one hand, the affirmative aspect (*isbat*) entails, for instance, the acknowledgment of God's oneness and the belief that God sent prophets and apostles to humankind to guide and teach them. On the other hand, the negating aspect (*naḥy*) means negating any kind of terrible characters relating to God or His Prophets, negating that God has a companion or son, and rejecting that God needs anything or anyone.

These are the individual's private beliefs, which are between human beings and God. Furthermore, the commitment to these kinds of beliefs (affirmative and negating aspects) are the first things that God obligated upon a person of sound sense from al-Māwardī's point of view. Khān'zādah comments why these are the first things for an individual to believe in; he reaffirms that a person will not be subjected to perform or not perform something without knowing the Sovereign and the Preventer (ibid. 380). That means people will deal in specific manners when they have *'itiqād*. This level of *'itiqād* is the foundational element that affects all of the individual's actions and conducts. This is for the reason that deeds and actions are to be constructed as consequences of these beliefs. Thus, it is safe to argue that this type of

belief inspires people to have hope and confidence to act and deal in particular manners based on these notions.

Both the affirmative and negating beliefs draw common grounds of faith for individuals in society and create more potential for them to understand each other. Besides, it reflects what ought to be or ought not to be in society. Strictly speaking, affirmative issues ought to exist in society. So, when religion orders people to believe in something, it means religion wants these things to exist in society. However, when religion negates something, it should not exist in society. This kind of belief assists in answering questions with confidence and clarity. For such reason, the political theorist and psychoanalyst Erich Fromm explains the positive role of having a belief on society. However, he warns that the absence of belief leads human beings to become sterile, hopeless, and terrified to the core of their being (Fromm 2005: 61).

The second level: ethical conduct, is related to individuals' performance and action. There are three types of actions in this level: firstly, duties associated with the body, i.e., efforts based only on the physical abilities and capacities of the body, praying, and fasting are a case in point for the first type of commitment. Secondly: duties that are related to wealth or capital, such as money. An illustration for this is giving charity, i.e., efforts based only on a donation, such as bestowing charity for orphans or needy people. The last type of these duties is the actions that combines both the physical and financial exertion. For instance, the pilgrimage to Mecca for Muslims necessitates the physical body's efforts through the hardship of travel and, at the same time, the funding for the journey. This is to argue that deeds also have different levels and categories in their application and their degree of superiority and nobility.

So why this diversity of orders? The reason for al-Māwardī is not only to facilitate people performing these actions and deeds, but also it opens for them more possibilities in conducting decent actions and deeds. For example, suppose a person cannot perform fasting in Ramadan (as social solidarity with poor people). In that case, he can give charity to poor people, so he will be accomplishing the aim of fasting by conducting charity, which aims to have solidarity with poor and needy people. In other words, if a person cannot perform a moral action for a specific

reason (being sick and not be able to fast in Ramadan), then he has vast alternatives. Meaning, religion offers diverse commitments and orders to ethical actions.

The third level: prohibitions and restraints, which are three classifications: The first kind relates to the ‘concept of life’ and maintaining ‘the body's quality,’ such as the prohibition of killing or the prohibition of eating toxic foods and intoxicants for the possible harms it will bring to the body. This level bans anything that leads to death or could destructively influence the quality of life. The second kind strengthens social harmony and improves friendship among people. This kind of prohibition and restraint aims to construct and encourage human solidarity and the improvement of humans’ relationships by, for example, prohibiting hatred, rage, and injustice. Finally, the last kind of these restraints is concerned with protecting humans’ lineage from any impurity. This clarifies the prevention of fornication, which aims to protect the construction of families’ lineage to keep the family in cohesion and maintain society's stability.

Al-Māwardī exposes in details the overall structures of religion. He concludes by emphasizing that there is wisdom and blessing in what God permitted, commanded as well as forbade (al-Māwardī 2012: 143). Strictly speaking, “the blessing of God” helps humankind organize their order of life and societal relationships. Again, these three levels of these mentioned ethical conduct, duties, and commitments reflect religion's essence from al-Māwardī’s perspective. However, ethical behaviors are the foundation of the deeds and actions that reflect religion’s true meaning. For this reason, it is safe to assume that religion is more than just acts of worship. Instead, religion is about what to believe and what not to believe; it is about how to behave – with yourself and others - and how not to behave; it is also suggests restraints and justification for all of the above.

Indeed, these three levels of duties and commitments are not meant for al-Māwardī to limit and hinder human beings; rather, these commitments function as an instrument for organizing and regulating individuals' role within a social unit. For instance, the first-mentioned level of *‘itiqād* serves to draw a common ground for belief in society. The second level serves to open the possibilities of conducting various decent actions and deeds. However, the last level preserves the Self and

others from harm and increases social solidarity. So, the significance of religion in this sense is not only in its role to guide people's intentions and deeds, but also how it regulates their relationships. This means that religion can shape and influence every aspect of human acts, manners, and behavior based on the commitments, duties, and constraints it encourages.

So, when religion is applied in people's lives, religion becomes like an intellectual framework that regulates and disciplines individuals in a society. This argument will be clarified more in the next pages, for instance, regarding the conceptions of 'persuasion and intimidation' and how these concepts impact people's behavior. For al-Māwardī, religion can increase the awareness of the significance in dealing and acting morally in society. Religion can motivate people to conduct particular deeds. for example, giving charity to poor and needy people. Al-Māwardī states that "when hope and wish fade and need grows intense, hatred takes place and hostile envy increases, and leads towards isolation of the poor from the rich till that leads towards severe unconstructive competition for grabbing wealth by both {...}" (al-Māwardī: 2012: 147).

Accordingly, the objective of *zakāt* is to ensure the well-being of the entire society since everyone benefits from its consequences. This again verifies how religion can create motivations and inspirations, which can be reflected directly in the way people organize and arrange their daily life. Another example, for al-Māwardī religion orders people to help each other in righteousness as well as commands them not to commit transgressions, he cites from Quran "help you one another unto righteousness and pious duty." (al-Māwardī 2012: 295). This is to say that religion has effects not only on the individual level, but can also impact society.

Thus, when a person is honest, behaving decently as religion orders him, that might relieve the Self from depression, hatred, envy, and pessimism. Religion grants the individual inner peace that makes him tolerant towards others. It guides them to good deeds and actions and keeps one from acting unethically. Undeniably, applying these virtues facilitates life, particularly the social interactions and relationships in society. Besides, religion has a crucial role in organizing society since it deters people from committing immoral and evil actions (such as the prohibitions and restraints mentioned in the third level). This is why al-Māwardī views religion as inspiring and

encouraging people to promote virtues and prevent evil. Nevertheless, how can religion influence individuals' personalities, especially in the sense of persuasion and intimidation?

3.3. Religion as persuasion and intimidation⁶⁸

After elaborating on the concept of religion, it is essential to understand what stimulates individuals to deal and behave in specific ways in society. Indeed, answering this question allows us to better understand the intentions behind doing good and shunning wrong within the context of civilization. Al-Māwardī proposes, in this regard, two concepts that support solving this question; persuasion and intimidation. On the one hand, the former "*al-Targhīb*" motivates and encourages the individual to have obedience and submission to certain moral principles, commitments, and duties. This has internal aspects guiding a person to act in specific ways (even in the absence of any human authority to observe and control him.)⁶⁹ On the other hand, the latter "*al-tarhīb*" is based on the notion of deterrence that leads individuals to avoid behaving unethically by explaining the consequences of immoral deeds and behavior. Thus, it can be called normative external instructions⁷⁰ (c.f. al-Māwardī 2012: 140).

⁶⁸ In Arabic "*al-Targhīb wa al-tarhīb*", the former can be also translated as "promise of reward in this life or the hereafter" and the latter as "a threat of punishment, of suffering and ill" (Al-Fārūqī 1992: 236).

⁶⁹ The Quran as a main source of the religion of Islam repeats this kind of persuasion to motivate people to deal and behave in the best manners. For instance, verse (2: 25) "And give glad tidings (O Muhammad) unto those who believe and do good works; that theirs are Gardens underneath which rivers flow; as often as they are regaled with food of the fruit {...}". Translated into English by M. M. Pickthall. This part combines between believe and doing good works, based on individual motivated to be award.

⁷⁰ For instance, verse (4: 14) "And whoso disobeyeth Allah and His messenger and transgresseth His limits, He will make him enter Fire, where he will dwell for ever; his will be a shameful doom". Translated into English by M. M. Pickthall.

For al-Iṣfahānī, “*al-tarhīb*” does not mean being scared as a man can be scared, for instance, of a lion. Instead, “*al-tarhīb*” indicates what makes an individual stop performing unethical acts. Therefore, in his view, the individual who performs immoralities has no *al-tarhīb*. (al-Iṣfahānī 2010b: 234). However, “*Al-Targhīb*” is having desires in wanting something, which motivates the individual to perform particular behaviors to reach a wished objective ((al-Iṣfahānī 2010a: 204). It is safe to argue that “*al-Targhīb*” and “*al-Tarhīb*” might motivate individuals to behave and deal in particular manners and deter them from acting and behaving unethically. Strictly speaking, these two conceptions have impulses, restrictions, and motivations that influence individuals. It is important to point out that both of these concepts - persuasion and intimidation- are formed not only on religious principles, commitments, and duties but also rationality.

Al-Fārūqī, in his book “Al Tawḥīd: its implication for thought and life,” elaborates on the concepts of *al-Targhīb*” as well as “*al-Tarhīb* and its relationships to deeds and conducts. Al-Fārūqī states, “Every page of the Qur’an contains either an element of *targīb* (a promise of reward in this life or the hereafter) for the good conduct, the good deeds or works of man, or an element of *tarhīb* (a threat of punishment, of suffering and of, ill) for misconduct, the works of evil. This continues a tradition of morality as old as man. Islam only paints its scenarios more vividly and strikingly than they were ever described before” (Al-Fārūqī 1992: 35).

The significance of persuasion and intimidation for individuals is that humans need to have inner encouragements and motivations⁷¹, which originate from specific ambitions such as obtaining rewards, whether in the worldly life or Hereafter (or in both). These ambitions motivate the way individuals act and behave based on normativity as well as morality. Simultaneously, individuals ought to have inner deterrents, which originate from the fear of penalties and punishments, whether in the worldly life or in the Hereafter, which causes them to shun acting and behaving unethically. I argue that this balanced relationship of seeking rewards and avoiding

⁷¹ Encouragements and motivations are not limited to materialistic aspect but it can entail psychological also.

punishments can motivate and encourage individuals to be entirely responsible in every action and behavior they perform.

In Christianity, however, only the concept of persuasion exists, while the concept of intimidation is absent, according to Guizot as he claims in his study on the history of civilization in Europe. He states that “{...} Christianity was established by persuasion alone, by simply moral means; it was never, from the time of its birth, armed with force. In the early ages, it conquered by the Word alone, and it only conquered souls {...} (Guizot 1997: 187). Moreover, Guizot goes further and explains the church’s role in influencing individuals without possessing physical power; “{...} Her origin, purely moral and merely by means of persuasion, was found impressed in her condition. She has much influence, but she had no power {...}” (ibid. 187- 8).

On the one hand, al-Māwardī’s concept of persuasion indicates internal wishes, which motivate individuals internally to conduct specific actions. That seems to be very similar to the Christian conception mentioned above by Guizot. On the other hand, al-Māwardī’s second concept, intimidation, indicates a threat of punishment and fear, which similarly drive individuals to do or not do particular deeds or behave in a specific manner. However, according to al-Māwardī’s perception, these two concepts are always related to personality and individual nature. Thus, if an individual is brave, the idea of intimidation can influence him more. However, if a person is pious, persuasion can affect him more (al-Māwardī 2012: 152). Thus, these concepts function depending on individuals’ personalities and characters. These concepts might also influence individuals simultaneously.

After a historical inquiry of what he calls “the civilizing process” in several European countries from 800 AD to 1900 AD, Norbert Elias reached almost the same conclusion as al-Māwardī, arguing that there are two concepts which directly and indirectly influence the course of the civilizing process. Elias names these the “inner fear” and the “outer fear.” These concepts play a significant role in constructing civilization or what he explicitly terms the civilizing process. Unlike al-Māwardī, Elias sees that the increase of inner fear was proportional to the decrease of external anxiety (Elias 2000: 420- 1).

In other words, for Elias, the civilizing process moved in modern times to a more civilized stage, in which inner fear was stronger than the outer one. In the past, physical violence was used to directly influence and lead people to behave in specific ways. However, in modern times, inner fear became dominant in the civilizing process. It is worth mentioning that there is no society or even civilization where there is no fear, whether from external powers or inner fears and anxieties. These two concepts are thus inseparable for Elias in the civilizing process. In the meantime, they can be experienced in different ways depending on the civilizational context in question (ibid. 421).

This is to state that religion, as proposed by al-Māwardī, offers an organized theoretical and practical framework containing diverse norms, commitments, and responsibilities. Individuals have to consider them in every aspect of their behavior and deeds. Thus, the two mentioned concepts, persuasion, and intimidation, motivate individuals to have efficient, practical norms that facilitate them to have normative ethics in their deeds. To conclude, a balanced relationship between these concepts leads individuals to act based on normative principles and commitments to take full responsibility for their actions and behavior. Lastly, I want to emphasize that both persuasion and intimidation can influence people on an individual level in society, unlike the concepts of “*al-ma‘rūf* and *al-Munkar*,” which can affect people on the collective level, I will show in the next pages.

3.4. Religion’s role in Constructing Civilization

Two factors can impact human’s behavior and deeds. On the one hand, there are external physical constraints, or what Norbert Elias calls as “*Fremdzwänge*,”⁷² in which an individual or a group of people can practice physical violence or use power to force others act and behave in specific ways. On the other hand, there is also internal spiritual constraints, producing spiritual discipline and self-control or what

⁷² In English “foreign constraints”.

Elias calls “*Selbstzwänge*.”⁷³ However, I argue that Elias fails to associate any of these two concepts with the notion of religion, which plays a central role in this regard. Even his concept *Selbstzwänge* is merely an advanced and developed stage of what he calls the *Fremdzwänge* (Elias 1997, vol. II: 354- 5).

In this section, I argue that unlike Elias, internal constraints have more effects on an individual's personality than external constraints since deeds and actions are merely manifestations of internal constraints. Moreover, for al-Māwardī, behavior and actions are constructed internally based on spirituality, intention, and self-decision. Therefore, this study argues that religion can play the role of internal and external constraints, which might influence both the individual and collective. In other words, internal and external constraints might lead the individual and collective to deal based on the best norms and moral principles. As individuals' inner spiritual discipline, religion aims to reach normative ethical objectives through just methods and means, meaning, religion as an internal spiritual organizer of society is limited to purposes of norms and commitments. Religion associates these norms and commitments with suitable means since a normative objective ought to have normative means and vice versa. As norms and ethical obligations are the core of religion, al-Māwardī illuminates religion's constructive role in civilization and how it influences and constructively shapes human behavior:

{...} Religion makes inward thoughts better, and it prevents from committing sins. Furthermore, religion motivates doing justice and being good. Similarly, it encourages *al-ulfah* and social harmony, and these are rules and principles, which without it, the realm {civilization} cannot be instituted. Moreover, people will not do the right deeds and behaviours without religion. (al-Māwardī 2012b: 247)

It is interesting to note in this citation how religion can ameliorate humans' conduct and personalities and how for al-Māwardī, humans will not perform right deeds without religion. Arises from such facts, al-Fārūqī likewise reaffirms that the

⁷³ In English “Self-constraints”, however, since Norbert Elias ignores the role of religion throughout his theory of civilization, that makes his term “*Selbstzwänge*” limited to internal constraints, which is unoccupied of any kind of spirituality.

question “what ought man to do?”, meaning how to deal with others and how to live can only be answered through the religion of Islam (al-Fārūqī 1992: 65). Al-Māwardī goes further and demonstrates that having a religion is not only for the individual’s benefit, but also the collective since religion can play the role of reunifying people as well as bringing social coherence and harmony. He puts it this way:

{...} Thus, it is in the people’s interest to have religion, which can lead them to be in reunification and agreement, also through religion the antagonisms among people vanish, and their covetousness and disagreements impedes. Consequently, their intentions will be good and their loyalty will be maintained. (al-Māwardī 2012b: 248).

Unlike al-Māwardī, who explains how religion encourages individuals to act justly and deal with others based on normative ethics, Durkheim focuses more on the individual's internal feelings. He states that “The worshiper who has communed with his god is not only a man who sees new truths that the unbeliever does not know; he is a man who is *capable* of more. He feels more strength in himself, either to cope with difficulties of existence or to defeat them. He is raised above human miseries because he is raised above his condition as a man; he believes he is saved from evil, in whatever form he conceives of evil.” (Durkheim 2008: 311). He goes further and argues that “The man who has obeyed his god, and therefore believes he is on his side, approaches the world with confidence and feeling of accumulated energy” (Durkheim 2008: 157). These positive effects of religion on individuals' internal feelings construct stronger individuals within society, in which people are more motivated and encouraged to act justly and ethically.

For al-Māwardī, the supremacy of religious ethics over ethics and morals in general can be established purely on rational grounds. This is because ethics and morals, which are based only on the reason’s abilities, have an almost subjective reasoning process, are self-interested, and continuously shifting. This instability and subjectivity can destructively influence behavior and actions (c.f. al-Māwardī 2012: 54). This is to argue that religion oriented towards normative ethics has well-founded, humanistic, and more stable sources and motivations, which are more fixed. Strictly speaking, religion has an internal spiritual means of organizing the

individual and collective. Meanwhile, religion influences and motivates us to act with commitments in normative ethical manners.

It is crucial here to mention that religion might have a destructive aspect on society. For instance, it can be used and misused by some people, especially political authority. Therefore, al-Māwardī warns from some destructive aspects of religion on society, which can lead to mutual hostility. This is not only within one religion, meaning different sects within a religion will conflict with each other, but also among religions in general (Alboğa 2014: 378). Thus, it is safe to say that it is not correct for al-Māwardī that religion leads only to social integrity and solidarity, instead it might in some cases lead to conflicts. Comparably, Arnold Toynbee, who is known for his comprehensive and insightful study of history and human civilizations, refutes the position that religion plays the role of social cancer or that religion is responsible for the state's decline (Toynbee vol. II. 1987: 76). On the contrary, – identical to al-Māwardī but from a historical perspective – Toynbee argues that all civilizations have had religious backgrounds, which shows that no civilization in the future can be established without religion. Toynbee proved this historically by stating that:

If we cast our eye over the civilizations that were still alive in A.D. 1952, we shall see that every one of them had in its background some universal church through which it was affiliated to a civilization of an older generation. The Western and Orthodox Christian civilizations were affiliated through the Christian Church to the Hellenic civilization; the Far Eastern civilization was affiliated through the Mahāyāna to the Sinic civilization; the Hindu civilization through Hinduism to the Indic; the Iranian and Arabic through Islam to the Syriac. All these civilizations had churches for their chrysalises {...} (ibid. 82).

Comparable to Toynbee, many modern philosophers and social theorists acknowledged religion's significance in civilization's establishment and continuation. For instance, Malik Bennabi argues precisely that the life cycle of civilization starts when the notion of religion emerges, meanwhile, a civilization declines when the notion of religion vanishes (Bennabi 2014: 78). In other words,

Bennabi emphasizes the necessity or even pre-conditional relationship between religion and any civilization's construction.

Other similar opinions, however, emerge from within Western Civilization. Francois Guizot, who also strongly stresses theology's role and the church's significance in Europe, argues that the church "{...} exercised a very great influence upon the moral and intellectual orders in modern Europe, upon public ideas, sentiments, and manners." Even more, he argues that the theological spirit is "{...} the blood which ran in the veins of the European World {...}" (Guizot 1997: 121). This means that for both Guizot and – in particular – Bennabi, a civilization cannot emerge without a religion. However, neither of them answered how religion leads and facilitates the construction of civilization.

Thus, to demonstrate more the role of religion in the construction of civilization, this chapter explains the concept, which shows clearly how certain religious concepts can influence and inspire the process of constructing a civilization. I argue that al-Māwardī's notion of 'Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice' plays a significant role in encouraging virtue and preventing vice, especially on the collective level. This is to note that the selection of this specific concept is due to its vast influences on the collective, reflected clearly in constructing a civilization. However, this does not mean that only religion has this concept. On the contrary, religion possesses plenty of ideas that can play different roles in constructing civilization, concepts such as *al-ulfah*⁷⁴ (e.g., social integration) help and facilitate individuals to refine their manners and motivates them to deal and behave based on the best ethics and morals.

Therefore, it is safe to argue that religion is one of the mainsprings and the cornerstones of civilization. Put differently, civilization's construction is centered to a certain extent on the perception and interpretation of religion's role and centrality in society. Since religion suggests countless normative ethical definitions, principles, and criteria, which are capable of influencing individuals' behavior, actions, and

⁷⁴ This concept will be discussed in details in the next chapter.

deeds, I will show over the next pages how 'Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice' is a case in point in this concern.

3.5. Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice

To elaborate more on religion and how it influences people's daily lives and facilitates civilization's construction, it is worth considering al-Māwardī's conception of 'Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice.'⁷⁵ To al-Māwardī, a malicious person who is dominated by their *hawá* cannot practice virtue, as their desires make them inattentive to recall their ethical restraints. Furthermore, not performing 'Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice' could lead to society's moral decline as immorality would become prevailing and normal. Accordingly, if people do not care to promote virtue and prevent vice, injustice and oppression become common in society. Due to this fact, al-Māwardī emphasizes in general the compulsory nature of 'Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice.' Moreover, he proposes two imaginable circumstances of how people could perform evil actions and wrongdoing in society and, accordingly, how 'Promotion of Virtue' ought to be implemented individually and collectively.

The first imaginable circumstance is when an evil action is performed by individuals, who are disconnected, scattered, weak, not presentative, and have neither party nor any kind of association, which means the individuals are doing the evil act without collective organization and prearrangement. For al-Māwardī, there is a consensus of opinion in this situation that promoting virtue and preventing vice is compulsory on anyone who witnesses any kind of wrongdoing and who has the capability and strength to promote virtue and prevent vice. However, disagreement on the compulsion of 'promoting virtue and preventing vice' in this regard is based on reason or religion.

Al-Māwardī clarifies that two groups respond to whether it is reason or by religion that necessitates 'promoting virtue and preventing vice' in this mentioned circumstance. On the one hand, some theologians were of the opinion that its

⁷⁵ Al-Māwardī uses "*al-Amr bi-al-ma'rūf wa-al-nahī 'an al-munkar*" (al-Māwardī 2012: 152).

performance is compulsory by reason. They argue that since by reason, an individual ought to avoid what is immoral and evil, then it is also by reason that one ought to hinder others from doing that because this will enhance the elimination of evil in society. These theologians based their argument on a *hadith*, which states, “Some people boarded a ship and every person of them sat in a certain place, and then a person from them made a hole in his place with an axis. They question him: What are you doing? He says: “This is my place and I can do what with it what I wish.” However, they did not prevent him from doing that, and the consequence was that both he and they perished.” (al-Māwardī: 2012 153- 4). Meaning, if people do not promote virtue and prevent vice, then everyone in society will be destructively affected.

On the other hand, another group argues that this matter is governed by religion and not by reason. They maintain that if reason promotes the prevention of doing evil acts and prevents others from doing wrongdoing, it would be obligatory on God to do the same. Meaning, God would not allow anyone to perform evil actions, and this is not the case. For this, it is obligatory and governed by religion and not by reason. Of course, reason can confirm this compulsion, but nevertheless, for them, it is the religion that orders humans to perform 'Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice' and not reason.

The second imaginable circumstance is when evil action and wrongdoing are performed by a group of people who are united, structured, and have social solidarity among themselves, who have an association or party, in which they perform evil actions collectively. In addition to that, they are advocating publicly for their wrong actions and wrongdoings. In this case, there are four different opinions on how individuals must deal with them.

The first group argues that one ought not to object to this group, and is preferable for an individual to stay clear of such immoral people and actions. Thus, one should neither reject their evil act nor deny it. By doing so, one will protect himself from any harm from them. The second group is from the Shiites, who are waiting for their Mahdī. They argue that one ought not to renounce, nor defy the collective evil actions and wrongdoings. For them, an individual ought to wait until Mahdī appears.

Mahdī himself will undertake the responsibility of denouncing the evil acts in society, and subsequently, people ought to support him in his efforts against evil. The third group is from Mu'tazila, who argue that it is not allowed for people to repudiate evil action unless they assemble around a just leader. However, when an appropriate leader appears, then they ought to renounce evil action with him. The fourth group is mostly theologians, who argue that denouncing evil act is obligatory. Yet, for them there is one condition for this obligation: the necessity of 'Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice' being performed by qualified and competent helpers and advocators. Nevertheless, suppose there are no qualified supporters for 'Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice.' In that case, individuals should not engage in condemning evil action since the condemner - especially if he is weak – could be killed by those whose actions he is trying to criticize, and reason does not accept this.

From analyzing al-Māwardī's idea of 'Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice,' different points are mentioned in this concern. First, there is a substantial correlation between religion and daily life, remarkably, maintaining and enhancing morality and preventing evil action in society. Second, morality in civilization is not an individual matter, so individuals cannot perform everything they wish. On the contrary, people ought to promote virtue to prevent evil action. Besides that, they ought to undertake their responsibility to support and promote morality and prevent wrong actions. Third, al-Māwardī did not reject or deny any of the opinion(s) mentioned above.

Thus, he wants to leave the idea of obligation to people to decide based on their time, place, strength, and particularity. Therefore, if a circumstance allows a person to perform 'Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice,' he ought to do that. Otherwise, if there is a risk of harming himself or other people, one ought not do so. Lastly, the consequence of not promoting virtue and preventing immorality can negatively influence society. Thus, everyone who has the power and potential to enhance morality should take his obligation seriously in this regard. This is to argue that 'Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice' creates and maintains society's life order.

It is safe to argue that not promoting virtue and preventing vice might lead to the breakdown of the social ties and integration, which binds individuals in society. As vice becomes widespread, virtue will not be encouraged, and as such, norms will disappear. Durkheim's notion of "anomie" reflects this dismantling of the living societal bonds and norms in society (Marks 1974: 358), which is a state of prevalent social derangement, which brings instability, chaos and social disintegration. Indeed, Durkheim's suggestions to overcome anomie, such as "attachment to social groups" and "spirit of discipline," show a highly moralistic nature. For him, these elements are nothing more or less than the opposite of "egoism" and "anomie" (ibid. 329). This is to state that anomie is prevalent when there is a lack of concern over promoting virtue and preventing vice, ensuring instability, chaos and weak social integration. Consequently, the idea of 'Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice' is more than a public morality; it is a manner to preserve and maintain society.

Indeed, one cannot talk about 'Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice' if the intention is not decent. For this reason, I would like to emphasize the moral dimension of the relationship between people's intentions and their deeds. A person might act because that action is good in itself. However, he might also leave or abandon it to please people. For al-Māwardī, intention plays a central role in the human's actions. That why for him, a person should think profoundly before proceeding to perform any action. So, if the consequence of intended actions is commendable, he should go ahead and perform that action. However, if the intended action's consequences lead to failure, evil, and exposing himself to danger, one should avoid it. Al-Māwardī cites the Prophet Muhammad stating: "If you are about to act in a matter, meditate upon its consequences. If it well, then proceed and if it is evil, then refrain from doing it." (al-Māwardī 2012: 561- 2). Thus, intention is an essential element in human's actions.

The intention is a primary precondition for actions. Similar to al-Māwardī, al-Fārūqī highlights intention's fundamental role of as a precondition to deeds. He states, "Indeed, Islam demands the fulfillment of the requirements of the ethic of intent as a preliminary prerequisite for entering into fulfillment of those of the ethic of action. By so doing, Islam prevents its ethic from becoming one of the consequences, or utilitarianism, however, noble the ring". (al-Fārūqī 1992: 33).

Further al-Māwardī warns of insincerity and hypocrisy as the opposite of good intention. For him, insincerity is an ugly act, which leads to nasty punishment even it might lead people to mock the insincere person (al-Māwardī 2012:170). Therefore, al-Māwardī considers justice in this concern as balancing between the intention and the exposed intention. Thus, a person has benevolence when his actual intention is better than his revealed intention. However, a person is indecent and malevolent when his revealed intention looks better than his real intention (ibid. 169). Indeed, anyone who wants to perform the right action without considering potential bad consequences is acting recklessly. Accordingly, one ought to have good intentions by also considering the future side-effects.

Finally, it is very significant to examine the concept of *al-Ākhirah* (i.e., the Hereafter) in relation to life world order. For a Muslim, death and the Hereafter are to be considered as the horizon that constitutes the meaning of life; a person lives by looking towards the Hereafter without leaving or neglecting this life-world order. Al-Māwardī cites the Prophet Muhammad, who was asked “who is the wisest person?,” to which he responded “He who remembers death, and is the most prepared for it. These are the wisest people, who thought little of the honor of this world and did not dread the Hereafter.” (cited in al-Māwardī 2012: 191). Thus, death ought to motivate individuals to have more morality and responsibility in their actions and deeds. Another citation by the Prophet, presented by al-Māwardī, gives more details on death, the Hereafter, and the consequences of human actions.

Oh, people, there is an end to your life, so take heed and be aware of your end. Guiding principles have been set for you, so stand by them. A genuine believer stands between two fears: the fear of the past period of his life with which he does not know how God will deal with him, and the period which is yet to come and which he does not know how God judges it. Therefore, let every person make provisions for himself by good deeds in life in this world for the Hereafter. The world has been created for you, and you have been created for the Hereafter. I swear by God by Whose Hand I was created, that there is no atonement after

death, and that there is no abode after life in this world other than Paradise or Hell. (cited in al-Māwardī 2012: 197).

This citation emphasizes many points; obviously, it affirms that there is life after death and death does not mean annihilation, but rather a transformation from this life to the Hereafter. Also, it shows a logic in which the virtuous will be rewarded with benevolence and the evil with malevolence. However, this belief's rejection might indicate that humankind considers himself to not be responsible for his actions and deeds. Meaning, no consequence follows from his actions and deeds, making human beings feel unaccountable. Accordingly, Muslims live in this life responsibly without disregarding it, but aim all the while to gain Paradise in Hereafter. This leads people to behave morally and consider the consequences of their actions and deeds. Strictly speaking, the concept of Hereafter has a deep relationship with daily human lives and implementing morality.

There are many benefits to believing in the last day. In his book “Islamic Civilization: Its Foundational Beliefs and Principles,” Mawdūdī counts several benefits of believing in the Hereafter. For him, believing in the Hereafter constitutes a rational motivation for acting morally and avoiding immorality. The implementation of virtue does not depend upon any authoritarian system or physical forces; instead, it is internal strength. Due to this fact, belief in the last day implants a clear conscience in humankind (Mawdūdī 2013: 233). However, for Mawdūdī, denying this belief affects humanity destructively in many aspects. This leads people to believe that they are “ungoverned,” “absolutely powerful,” and they are “not responsible to any higher authority” (ibid. 221). Furthermore, the whole moral and daily life of people will be affected: they become “haughty,” “narrow-minded,” “deceitful,” “mean,” and “selfish” (ibid. 225). Thus, believing in the Hereafter affects human beings' practical morality and daily life and makes them more responsible in their actions.



Part II The Implementation Aspects of al-Māwardī's Theory of
Civilization

Chapter Four

Constitutive Elements of the Social World

4.1. Introduction

This chapter contains two parts. The first deals with the societal or state structure. The second deals with individuals' role in the social structure and how an individual can be incorporated into society. As this chapter demonstrates, both parts complement and necessitate each other. I argue that al-Māwardī presents a comprehensive and profound framework, which is applicable and relevant in contemporary times. He offers a systematic multidimensional format of how a society or state functions and how individuals can be integrated. Needless to say, al-Māwardī's framework is not merely a normative one. Instead, he descriptively explains essential elements of how a society can be constructed and function.

Al-Māwardī uses '*Iṣlāḥ al-dunyā*' (i.e., Constitutive Elements of the Social World.) The concept of *al-dunyā* is driven from '*dānā*.' *Al-dunyā* has numerous connotations. Firstly, it signifies that worldly life has been brought nearly to its end. Secondly, *al-dunyā* indicates the meaning of inferiority. Specifically, *al-dunyā* is inferior to the Hereafter since the former is impermanent, and the latter permanent. Thirdly, *al-dunyā* implies being the first in parallel to *al-Ākhirah* (i.e., the next ultimate life). Fourthly, it indicates the sense of a lack of nobility and vice (al-Iṣfahānī 2010a: 179).

Thus, *al-dunyā* denotes that it is not everlasting, and departing from it is inevitable. Due to this fact, the individual ought to learn how to live in it appropriately as well as how to be appropriately integrated into society. Al-Māwardī cites a philosopher, who articulates that "Look at the *al-dunyā* with the eye of a disciplined person and do not consider it with the eye of a yearning lover" (al-Māwardī 2012: 177). As this study shows, al-Māwardī proposes unique structures to achieve individual and collective happiness and well-being through *Iṣlāḥ al-dunyā* and *Iṣlāḥ al-Fard*.

The first section in this chapter examines what al-Māwardī’s calls “*Iṣlāḥ al-dunyā*,” or Constitutive Elements of the Social World. *Iṣlāḥ al-dunyā* consists of six components: “*dīn muttaba*” (i.e., adherence to a normative base), a functional political system, comprehensive justice, general security, general economic prosperity, and optimism for the future. Figure III illuminates the arrangement and components of “*Iṣlāḥ al-dunyā*.”




Figure III explains the structure and components of “*Iṣlāḥ al-dunyā*” or Constitutive Elements of the Social World.

These six elements, as this chapter demonstrates, are based on both individual and collective commitments. Commitments distinguish human beings over all other creatures. However, there are different levels of commitment. On the one hand, there is individual commitment, in which the individual is responsible not only for his actions and deeds, but also for their consequences. Indeed, personal commitments are the cornerstone of duties since whoever cannot be committed and responsible for himself cannot be responsible for others.

The second section in this chapter assesses three rules proposed by al-Māwardī, which are fundamental for any person in society to discipline and restrain his personality. These rules are ‘*Nafs Mutī’a*,’ ‘an obedient personality, *Uḥfah jamiah* general social integration, and *mada kaḥfiya*, a sufficient wealth or income. These rules facilitate individuals’ integration and make them more efficient and engaged in society. This chapter’s core argument is that al-Māwardī’s objective from considering these particular social structures and individual elements is to increase social integration and well-being in society.

However, when individuals cannot discipline themselves, they will not be able to discipline others. It is essential to bear in mind that the notion of commitment embodies discipline and applying ethics, and without commitments, discipline and ethics cannot be accomplished and realized. On the other hand, there is the collective commitment, in which the collective take responsibility in their society to empower, maintain, and increase stability, social solidarity, and cohesion. As this study demonstrates, these elements consist of diverse themes, such as politics, economics, and psychology, as the case with having optimism for the future.

As constitutive elements of the social world, both individual and collective commitments are indispensable in establishing human civilization. I argue that if people apply only personal commitments without paying attention to collective structures, it will lead to a decline and weakening of their society. However, if the individual does not consider his duties, the result will be a corruption of ethics and carelessness. This is also to argue that if individuals in a society do not act based on ethical commitments, it will have destructive consequences in weakening social solidarity and cohesion. There will be no ability to maintain overall social, economic, and political stability.

*Iḥlāḥ al-dunyā*⁷⁶ is a central concept in *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn* and can be comprehended in various ways. On the one hand, ‘*Iḥlāḥ*’ can be understood as collective ethical instructions since it draws not only instruction for a theory of

⁷⁶ The terminology of ‘human civilization’, ‘society’ and ‘*ijtimā*’ have been terms without clarity until Ibn Khaldūn illuminated them in his *Muḥaddimah*. Though, the meanings of these words were compiled in the term ‘*dunyā*’ (c.f. al-Nāḥī 1994: 89).

civilization, but also the Arabic term *Iṣlāḥ* is associated with the performance of good deeds and ethics. On the other hand, it can be translated as normative collective commitments because it suggests normative obligations to be fulfilled and accomplished. It is worth mentioning that the idea of '*Iṣlāḥ*' is indeed to constitute a particular social world and reality. Thus, *Iṣlāḥ al-dunyā* is a framework and structure whereby an individual disciplines himself in society.

Other scholars perceived al-Māwardī's terminology '*Iṣlāḥ al-dunyā*' in a different way. For instance, al-Nāhī names these six rules and ethical principles as a "Reformist Constitution." Moreover, he argues that the characters of these rules and moral regulations combine the principles and values of what al-Nāhī calls a constitutional reformation and amendment. It also reflects humanity's hope and ambition in an optimal constitutional life, which is based on harmony and solidarity among people. Thus, for al-Nāhī, al-Māwardī contributes to drawing an original "constitutional theory," which paves the way later for this field of study more broadly (al-Nāhī 1994: 143- 4).

However, this study prefers to use "constitutive elements of the social world" as an equivalent for the Arabic term *Iṣlāḥ al-dunyā*, for two reasons. On the one hand, the six principles and rules recommended by al-Māwardī are based on collective effort and constitutive elements, which aim to constitute a particular social reality in society. These constitutive elements are the context whereby individuals can be part of society. On the other hand, perceiving these rules and principles only as a "Reformist Constitution" as al-Nāhī demonstrated, limits and narrows al-Māwardī's contributions mainly to the field of legal studies, which again leads to misinterpreting and misrepresenting al-Māwardī's interdisciplinary vision of civilization.

Part I

4.1.1. Adherence to a normative base⁷⁷

Al-Mawardi uses the term *dīn* in the third chapter of his book, *adab al-dunyā wa- a--dīn*, as a synonym for Islam. However, *dīn muttaba* in this chapter does not essentially carry the same connotation as in the previous chapter. Despite the fact, “*dīn muttaba*” literally means an “adhered to religion,” nevertheless, al-Māwardī most probably did not always indicate Islam in this concern. Instead, he means normative base. For this reason, this study uses the more wide-ranging term of “adherence to a normative base.” There can be no political system, state, or even a civilization without an established and predominant foundational normative base. There can be a state or political system without religion, but not without a *dīn muttaba*. Of course, whether we are discussing *dīn muttaba* as a normative base or as religion, the groundwork where *dīn muttaba* is established is human reason, from al-Mawardi’s point of view. Otherwise, people will not accept *dīn muttaba* if it is irrational or not based on rationality. It would also be impossible for *dīn muttaba* to continue in the future without being constructed on reason and rationality.

Moreover, a normative base should be in harmony with *‘ilm*, since paying attention to *‘ilm*, educational establishments, and institutions can enhance and amend the normative base. Indeed, educational establishments are vital for maintaining the social world. Otherwise, the decline of *‘ilm* and its institutions will have destructive consequences for the whole of the social world, social relationships, and interactions. Thus, *‘ilm* is the primary groundwork for a normative base. The lack of *‘ilm* in a *dīn muttaba* would result in ambiguity and uncertainty about what role people should play in society. Needless to say, ambiguity and uncertainty cause confusion in society, leading to instability of the whole social world. Therefore, it is safe to argue that reason and *‘ilm* are fundamental elements for the construction and preservation of any *dīn muttaba*.

⁷⁷ In Arabic “*dīn muttaba*”, compare it with *din*, as presented the third chapter.

I argue that al-Māwardī's objective of adherence to a normative base is devoted to the collective and increasing social integration. For this reason, collectively adhering to a *dīn muttaba* can play a significant role in advancing collective normative ethics, social cohesion, and feelings of accountability and self-responsibility. For instance, adherence to normative base facilitates the collective to overcome and regulate *hawá* (i.e., evil passions) and leads the collective to act ethically even in the absence of external physical control and authority.

In the German language, the concept of "Sittlichkeit" is comparable to al-Māwardī's notion of *dīn muttaba*. Sittlichkeit can be translated as 'ethical life' (Hegel 2003: 491). As Hegel presented, Sittlichkeit indicates something like 'customary morality,' he also used it as "a rational system of social institutions (ibid. xii). Furthermore, it means the individual's moral attitude toward the people he lives with and belongs to. Similar to *dīn muttaba*, Sittlichkeit plays the role of harmonizing and uniting people together in society (ibid. 404).

I showed in the previous chapter that religion is the cornerstone and source of all civilization. Without religion, civilization cannot be constructed.⁷⁸ This has been proven even in different fields of study. For instance, after studying the world's civilizations, the historian Arnold Toynbee concluded that each civilization had churches for their chrysalises (Toynbee vol.2, 1987: 82). However, the question here is whether a *dīn muttaba* can play a positive or negative role in building the constitutive elements of the social world. The answer proposed by al-Māwardī is clear: adherence to a normative base plays a very positive role in society on the individual and collective levels. However, suppose *dīn muttaba* was misused or abused for narrow personal and national interests. In that case, it can become a hindrance to society's construction and maintenance. Moreover, disputes between different normative bases can also damage the relationships between different societies.

Again, for al-Māwardī, *dīn muttaba* is the fundamental element that leads to stability and safety on the collective level since every individual has principles and norms that

⁷⁸ The concept of religion and its roles in civilizations was discussed in details in the chapter three.

regulate his own life and personality and relation to others. To al-Māwardī, it has been established that religion derives from a vital principle of having collective ethics and order in society. Simultaneously, adherence to *dīn* is the single element – in comparison with the following five rules and regulations – for accomplishing and reaching *ṣalāḥ al-ākhirah*⁷⁹. Thus, it is necessary for al-Māwardī to retain and maintain *dīn muttaba* due to its incredible significance in this life and Hereafter⁸⁰.

Al-Māwardī considers *dīn muttaba* as a precondition for establishing society and civilization. A normative base unites individuals in a social setting, creates social solidarity among them, and gives them a collective character and identity. Mawdūdī argues that “When a large number of people influenced by *īmān* are able to form a common national character, then by way of the influence of this character there comes about a homogeneity in their action. As a result of this, a very special and distinct civilization comes into existence. In this way, the elements of a belief system that shape and strengthen the national character have an immense role in the establishment of every civilization” (Mawdūdī 2013: 76).

For al-Māwardī, maintaining a normative base in society is one of the fundamental commitments of any competent authority. The absence of a normative base is a strong indication of civilization's decline since a normative base is the cradle and source of ethics and moral principles in a society, whether collectively or individually. It is worth mentioning that the application of religious and ethical rules and regulations is not to be comprehended only within one's civilization. Instead, they are noble ethics and morals to be applied with the self and others, whether they belong to the same civilization or not. In other words, I argue that for al-Māwardī normative base is to be applied equally with the self and with others. Lastly, it is very

⁷⁹ “*Ṣalāḥ al-Ākhirah*” is a very loaded term in Islamic Thought and philosophy. It indicates the welfare of Hereafter, which is a stage that can be reached based on good intention in conducting good deeds and actions. The connection between “*ṣalāḥ al-dunyā*” and “*ṣalāḥ al-ākhirah*” that there will be no “*ṣalāḥ al-ākhirah*” before performing firstly “*ṣalāḥ al-dunyā*”.

⁸⁰ Mawdūdī also elaborates on the significance of believing in Hereafter and its consequence on ethics, and warns of negative consequences of rejecting it. He states that “{...} rejection of this dogma means that human beings consider themselves to be irresponsible and unaccountable creatures who plan the agendas of their lives on the basis of the premise that they are not answerable for their actions in this life in another, a second life, and that no outcome, good and bad, will follow from their actions in this life.” (Mawdūdī 2013: 219).

significant to emphasize the ultimate associations between al-Māwardī's conceptions of 'dīn muttaba' and dīn as it was expounded in the previous chapter in this study.

4.1.2. Functional political system

Even though al-Māwardī uses "*Sulṭān Qāhir*," which literally indicates "a competent ruler," this study translates it to "an effective political system," or "a functional political system" since the missions and tasks, which al-Māwardī already mentioned, are the commitments of the entire political authority or state and not just the commitments of one single individual ruler⁸¹. Therefore, "*Sulṭān Qāhir*," is not an individual title. Instead, it indicates 'a position' in the social system or the social world. It is safe to argue that without a functional political system, stability and *Iṣlāḥ* will not be achieved.

It is worth mentioning that an effective political system and leadership exist to avoid chaos. Al-Māwardī dedicates his indispensable book, "*al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*," to the issue of the competent authority as well as the Imamate. Of course, for al-Māwardī, a functional political system must be established legitimately and justly. In twenty chapters, he reviews issues interconnected to this subject. In the first chapter, Al-Māwardī asks whether it is reason or religion that obligates the establishment of competent authority. Al-Māwardī explains that two groups are answering this question.

The first group states that it is obligatory by the reason to have authority, as without support and loyalty to authority and leadership, there will be disorder, disputes, and brutal behavior in society. As such, this group thinks all men of sound reason would submit to a competent authority to prevent mutual injustice and the breaking of social ties. Therefore, for this group, reason is sufficient means to accept the

⁸¹ It is worth mentioning that some scholars consider "*Sulṭān Qāhir*," as individual leader and not as a position as this study assumes. For instance, in his article entitled "Māverdi'nin edebüd-dünyâ ve'd-dīn adli eserinde dünya düzeninin İslahı için zorunlu gördüğü kaideler üzerine bir değerlendirme" Özkan Kerimoğlu believes that "*Sulṭān Qāhir*" is an individual person (Özkan 2021: 114-8). Other scholars perceive "*Sulṭān Qāhir*," as "effective state" (c.f. Çağrıçı 2014: 85).

necessity of constructing a competent authority and being loyal to it. However, the second group argues that this obligation is prescribed by religion and not by reason, as religion commands people to submit to authority and be loyal to it. The second group built their argument on a Quranic verse, which asserts: “Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority amongst you” (cited in al-Māwardī 2006: 16). Based on al-Māwardī’s discussion, it is safe to say that both reason and religion obligate people to form a functional political system or authority and instruct them to be loyal to it. Besides, there is no inconsistency here between religion and reason’s dual obligating having authority and being dedicated to it.

‘Ilm is a fundamental element for a functional political system, as it defines the structures of interactions and relationships among people. Additionally, based on *‘ilm*, the political, social, and economic system can be well-represented in society. Any kind of weakness in *‘ilm* also indicates a deficiency of authority since educational institutions stabilize and enhance a functional political system, for instance, by taking into account the recommendations of the experts in every field. In other words, *‘ilm* can improve and strengthen a functional political system to better manage the social world's affairs.

In al-Māwardī’s point of view, it is a character trait of human beings that brings them to feel contention, competition, and a desire to subdue opponents, particularly in the absence of a normative base or religion. However, this does not indicate that human beings are by nature immoral or evil. As mentioned previously, a normative base plays the role of remedying lousy character traits. Nevertheless, if a normative base is weak in society or only a minority of society’s members are associated with a normative religion, a functional political system can still help maintain individuals’ ethical commitments and direct them to deal with each other based on normative principles. Put differently, a functional political system can standardize different individuals’ desires and unite dissimilar minds and combine them in an ethical, social bond. According to al-Māwardī, there are merely four elements that can deter injustice and wrongdoings in society.

Firstly, a deterrent reason, entailing that humans restrict themselves autonomously based on their intelligent thinking and rationality.

Secondly, a restrictive religion when humans adhere to a normative religion regulating manners and behavior based on good morals.

Thirdly, a deterrent authority which can regulate and order individuals' actions and deeds, which is the topic of this part.

Finally, we must consider the inability and weakness of people, whether physically or materially.

Indeed, the first and second elements are the strongest for al-Māwardī since they influence and guide humankind internally. However, for al-Māwardī, reason and a normative base can be weakened through human desires and *Hawá*⁸². Nonetheless, al-Māwardī maintains that a functional political system is the most effective and efficient factor not only in eradicating injustice, but also in uniting individuals together in the scenario where religion and reason are weakened and declining in society (al-Māwardī 2012: 218). Thus, a functional political system is the second constitutive element of the social world from al-Māwardī's perspective.

Predominantly, for al-Māwardī, a functional political system or even state has to carry out essentially seven functions and ethical commitments to maintain and advance order, stability, and social coherence in society (al-Māwardī 2012: 221- 2):

Firstly, safeguarding and maintaining the religion or the normative base by encouraging its application and avoiding its abandonment⁸³. The emphasis on preserving religion or normative base is due to its ethical and moral constructive advantages and consequences since the normative base or religion's decline indicates the decline of ethics and social

⁸² The concept of *Hawá* is discussed in the first chapter.

⁸³ It is worth mention that this does not mean any kind of compulsion and enforcement against the will of people. For instance, in the case of Islam Quran (2. 256) states this clearly: "There is no compulsion in religion". Translated into English by M.M. Pickthall. Furthermore, safeguarding and maintaining the religion does not indicates only the religion of majority, but it should be understood as freedom of choice of religion.

solidarity.⁸⁴ The political system or state achieves this mission through the state's institutions and foundations. For instance, through compulsory education in schools.

Secondly, protecting the estate of civilization on the individual and collective levels, and physically protecting and securing people from enemies (i.e., protecting and securing humankind and the land they live on). Moreover, this includes protecting human beings' spiritual aspects, which provides for many qualities, such as maintaining their sovereignty and freedom. This protection consists of any threats, whether from inside or outside.

Thirdly, constructing cities, towns, and refining of roads and pathways among these cities and towns. The objective is to improve and develop people's living standards, bring people to know one another, and strengthen their ethical, social solidarity.⁸⁵ I argue that cities' and towns' construction is not the objective per se; instead, it is an instrument to enhance and increase social integrity and sociability among humankind. In the present time, this includes communications and transportation to improve people's well-being.

Fourthly, it is necessary to administer the public wealth justly and fairly based on ethical and moral principles and rules. This occurs when a functional political system manages public wealth based on justice and equality and encourages individuals to act correspondingly. However, if the authority does not take justice and equality into consideration as a normative base in its administrative affairs, it harms individuals'

⁸⁴ Mawdūdī elaborates on the relationship between decline of religion and how that leads to decline of its civilization. He puts in in this way “The process of a civilization gaining independence from its religious foundations ultimately leads to moral decay and destructions.” (Mawdūdī 2013: 76).

⁸⁵ The notion of bringing people to know each other was indeed inspired by Quran. For instance, compare this with the following part, which states that “O mankind! Lo! We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another. Lo! the noblest of you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct. Lo! Allah is Knower, Aware.” (49: 13). Translated from Arabic into English by M.M. Pickthall.

confidence in the political system. There is no doubt that damage to trust in authority leads people to not submit to the authority; it also creates legitimacy and chaos.

Fifthly, judging and arbitrating equally among people without any kind of discrimination and differentiation. One significant reason for judging and arbitrating based on equality without prejudice is that the authority is considered a role model in society. If the authority is corrupt, then the individual's ethics could decline in the future as a consequence. This contains not only the legal disputes between individuals but also between the state's institutions and individuals.

Sixthly, accomplishing legal penalties based on equality without exaggerating or slacking. Since exaggeration is a sign of toughness and slackness is a symbol of carelessness, both are unethical and unfair political system characters.

Lastly, electing and choosing trustworthy, responsible, and sincere individuals for administering and monitoring civil affairs. It is clear that for al-Māwardī, selecting an individual to be in charge of a functional political system is based on normative standards such as trustworthiness, sincerity, and decent commitments⁸⁶. Meaning the right person should work at the right place in the state.

I argue that even though al-Māwardī elaborates on these seven different tasks and commitments of a functional political system, they are still general principles and rules. Again, these collective duties and obligations should not be understood merely as the duties of a single leader or individual ruler. On the contrary, they should be perceived as the duties and responsibilities of the whole authority to be competent. Strictly speaking, some of these tasks belong to the legislative power, others to the

⁸⁶ Ibn Taymiyya states that selecting the most meritorious person for every position ought to be according to its particular requirements, doing this after completely diligence reflects the right responsibility and fulfilment of the truthfulness (c.f. Ibn Taymiyya 2005: 20).

executive power, et cetera. Therefore, with certainty, I argue that these mentioned tasks and missions can only be accomplished and achieved by the collective efforts of a functional political system.

In his article “Ahlâk ve Siyasetin Belirleyici İlkesi Olarak Adâlet: Mâverdî Merkezli Okuma” Fatih Aydın emphasizes that al-Mâwardî is aware of the responsibilities of administrators, who work in the political institutions. One of the administrators’ essential duties should be to make everyone in society equal before the law without making any distinction between strong and weak, noble and ordinary. For instance, the head of the state must obey Allah’s command, prevent oppression and persecution in society and act justly even in situations that develop against him (Aydın 2020: 1086- 7).

It is worth notice that in the time of al-Mâwardî, there were two different existing authorities; on the one hand, the ‘Abbāsīd Caliphate, which was well into its decline, and on the other hand, the Buyids, who began to take over new territories from the ‘Abbāsīd Caliphate and elsewhere. Al-Mâwardî knew these two conflicting establishments very well as he was one of the leading figures trying to create a peace agreement between them for several years. This is to state that al-Mâwardî was not an isolated social theorist when he wrote on a competent authority's role and missions. Meaning, these two authorities in al-Mâwardî’s perspective exist as a reality, which is why he puts his efforts to maintain them and keep the peace between them without denying any of their legitimacy. Conversely, Ibn Khaldūn perceives and presents authority from a different perspective because he witnessed the collapse and rise of many states. Thus, Ibn Khaldūn emphasizes more on the question of how states collapse and rise, rather than focusing only on reforming authority and society, as al-Mâwardî did.⁸⁷

Sulaymān argues that a functional political system is an indication of how al-Mâwardî’s thoughts are very well-established and, indeed, conscious of the social and political circumstances at his time. The system of the Caliphate system to lose

⁸⁷ It is important to understand the social and political circumstances of the scholars, since different circumstances create different focus in thinking and philosophy, however, one should not limit the reading of the philosophy and social thought only to its contexts.

political and social influence and became restricted only to religious affairs. Therefore, according to Sulaymān, al-Māwardī wanted to emphasize the role of a functional political system to establish and consolidate social and political life, since if the authority collapses, that will be followed by the collapse of religious ideals and ethical principles (Sulaymān 2001: 212- 3). Although Sulaymān’s analysis might be considered acceptable, one should not restrict al-Māwardī to a specific context either in time or space. Since al-Māwardī himself, throughout his contributions, did not give any examples from his time and region because he wanted to present universal principles for a comprehensive civilizational framework.

Thus, al-Māwardī underlines that the more the individual has influence, prestige, or power in society, the more he has social, political, and economic commitments and duties before his people since his position as a leader depends principally on trusteeship and responsibility. Al-Māwardī goes further and argues that trusteeship is a sacred responsibility. For this reason, the leader of a community should be the utmost concerned and careful in every aspect of his actions and behaviors (c.f. al-Māwardī 2013: 246- 7). Again, this is not to say that the leader is the only person responsible in his society. Instead, this demonstrates that the more individuals gain authority and influence, the more they have commitments and duties to promote virtue and prevent vice.

4.1.3. Comprehensive justice⁸⁸

Comprehensive justice is indispensable for the functioning of society and the political system. This study differentiates between two kinds of justice. On the one hand, justice as a social morality related to personal and social relations: such as fairness to self and other people. On the other hand, justice as legal justice system that deals with issues related to courts, administration, institutions, etc. Although al-Māwardī’s conception of justice includes both qualities, his concentration is overwhelmingly towards the first due to his focus on personality traits. This is obvious, for instance, in his definition of justice. For him, the notion of justice is

⁸⁸ In Arabic “*Adl shāmīl*”.

driven from “*Al-Tawassuṭ wa-l I’tidāl*,” i.e., taking the middle position or mediating. For example, good character traits are found in the middle. Modesty is between arrogance and cynicism. Generosity is between miserliness and extravagance; patience is between anger and carelessness, and so forth. Therefore, al-Māwardī perceives justice as an ethical quality that balances between exaggeration and dereliction (al-Māwardī 2012: 229). Still, the implementation of his concept of justice as both a system and social relations.

Furthermore, I argue that justice as social virtue and a legal quality leads the collective to have more *ulfah*⁸⁹ (i.e., social integration). Applying comprehensive⁹⁰ justice in society teaches people to submit and respect authority's leadership. Furthermore, through a comprehensive system of justice, the world will be filled with prosperity. The outcome of having comprehensive justice in society has benefits, according to al-Māwardī, such as the flourishing of wealth, an increase in birthrates, and the stabilization of authority. However, for al-Māwardī, injustice demolishes not only civilizations, but also corrupts human consciousness. This is because injustice has no boundaries, nor does it end with a specific target. Every new injustice contributes to a new type of destruction and corruption within humankind's consciousness (ibid. 224- 5).

Based on this, I argue that al-Māwardī views comprehensive justice as one of the leading principles for civilization, without it, order and stability are impossible on both the individual and collective level. Therefore, humankind ought to start performing justice with the self firstly and only then with others. Al-Māwardī categorized levels of justice and defined how to accomplish and apply these on the collective level. Still, the starting point of adhering to justice is, for him, the self. The levels of justice, according to his categorization, are the following:

⁸⁹ The concept of *al-ulfah* will be discussed in the next section.

⁹⁰ It is worth noting that al-Māwardī used the word “comprehensive justice”, which absolutely includes everyone and it is not limited to specific group of people based on ethnicity or religious affiliation.

1. **Self-justice:** being just with oneself: This is the fundamental type of justice because whoever commits an injustice against himself is more likely to commit injustice against others. Furthermore, individuals can accomplish self-justice by performing good deeds and preventing themselves from committing evil acts and actions. Essentially, one becomes just with himself through observing and controlling his or her personality in two aspects: On the one hand, maintaining a balance between deeds and actions and on the other hand, not being thoughtless, because when an individual neglects his duties and is thoughtless, this indicates oppression of the self.

Al-Māwardī's concepts of self-justice and self-injustice were circulated to many philosophers and social theorists. For instance, al-Iṣfahānī elaborates the same notion of self-justice and injustice by articulating that an "Unjust person will not be unjust to others until he firstly commits an injustice against himself, since the intention to commit injustice indicates an original injustice to the self. Therefore, an unjust person starts by performing injustice against the Self. Likewise, the one, who is just with other(s), starts by performing self-justice since he investigates and intends to do justice." (al-Iṣfahānī 2010: 253- 4). This demonstrates how al-Māwardī was once again indeed influential on later social theorists and philosophers.

2. **Being just with the other.** This is the collective level of applying justice in society, which includes three categories of how individuals deal and act with others justly:

Firstly: Being just with people who are lower in social class than oneself and subordinate to him. If a leading person does not take four manners or principles into consideration in dealing with his people, it will lead to disputes and disagreements, a step that precedes corruption and conflict. Al-Māwardī quotes a Sasanian king who stated that "If a king stops being just, the consequence is that people stop obeying him" (al-Māwardī 2012: 227). Meaning, maintaining a post depends not only on having power but also on being just. The significance of justice leads to the question, how can a leader practice justice? Al-Māwardī suggests four general principles, which should be considered when a leader performs justice with his people: Being

gentle with people and following comfortable means with them, eliminating all kinds of difficulties in the life of the people under one's rule, the ruling should not be through violence and oppression, justice should be the means of governing.

These general principles, which noticeably reveal al-Māwardī's advanced level of political and social thought, help a leader keep his people's support and maintain social solidarity, stability, and cohesion. For instance, when a leader acts based on these mentioned ethical principles of justice, people will have more social solidarity. This is to say that these four moral recommendations are not only for the leaders to maintain their posts. These recommendations have a collective impact by increasing social cohesion.

Secondly: Being just with people above one's social status, for instance, nations with their leaders, or even any group with their leader(s). Practicing this category of collective justice has three moral principles for al-Māwardī: first, obeying the leader(s) with sincerity, which leads to a better association and social solidarity. Moreover, al-Māwardī elaborates that "obedience" is based on rationality and ethical principles and means, meaning that, nobody should blindly obey a leader without rational justifications.⁹¹ Second, supporting the leader, particularly in difficulties and crises, which eliminates weakness in society. Again, supporting leaders in difficulty does not depend on nationalism or ethnicity. On the contrary, it depends on justice and truth, which the leader should be accomplishing. Lastly, being sincere in loyalty to the leader(s) leads to a noticeable elimination of mistrust among people. This is also an internal quality, and when it is applied collectively in a society, it constructively impacts social relationships and social solidarity and cohesion.

Thirdly: Being just with people from an equal social and political class. This is through three different means and principles: Avoiding arrogance in

⁹¹ It is worth noting that Al-Māwardī in his famous book "*al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*" states that when a leader violating justice, this is a reason for the people so stop considering him as their leader. This shows again the centrality of notion of justice as ethical and legal quality in the leadership. (c.f. 2006: 42)

dealing with others aims to create and increase *al-ulfah* and social cohesiveness in society. Avoiding blaming and complaining about others. the consequence is that sympathy will increase in society among individuals from the same classes. The last is to harm nobody, which generates not only confidence in others but also peace and security in society.

The importance of practicing justice acknowledges that corruption, decay, and destruction of the globe are consequences of injustice. Therefore, nothing can be more beneficial and fruitful for society than applying comprehensive and collective justice. At the same time, nothing can be more harmful and damaging than injustice and oppression. Strictly speaking, I argue in this section that justice and injustice are to be associated directly with the construction and deconstruction of civilization. Furthermore, al-Iṣfahānī presents another perspective on the relationship between justice and the concept of humankind, in which he argues that when people stop dealing with each other based on justice, it strips them of their noble human qualities, and consequently leaves them completely degenerated and vanished (al-Iṣfahānī 2010: 254).

Even though al-Māwardī offers an intellectually applicable contribution of categorized levels of justice, his definition of the concept of justice in all of his contributions lacks specificity. However, al-Māwardī's idea of justice has various features. He considers justice from social and religious aspects. He also evaluates it from political and philosophical aspects, which means that for al-Māwardī, justice is a moral virtue and legal quality.

It can be assumed that Ibn Khaldūn was influenced by al-Māwardī, when he presents a similar argument on the relationship between justice and constructing civilization, in which Ibn Khaldūn precisely states that “injustice ruins civilization” (Ibn Khaldūn 1981: 741). However, Ibn Khaldūn extends al-Māwardī's concept of justice. Even though Ibn Khaldūn's understanding of justice is not like Al-Māwardī,⁹² this is to

⁹² For instance, Ibn Khaldūn states that “Injustice should not be understood to imply only confiscation of money or other property from the owners, without compensation and without cause. It is commonly understood in that way, but it is something more general than that. Whoever takes someone's property, or uses him, or imposes upon him a duty not required by the religious law, does

reaffirm that Ibn Khaldūn’s unique understanding of justice and injustice has been inspired by al-Māwardī. For instance, al-Māwardī associated justice with the economy – as the next part shows – and how good economy and welfare are outcomes of justice. However, if there is injustice, there will be destructive consequences on the economy and well-being.

There is no doubt that justice or what al-Māwardī calls “comprehensive justice” is established on reason and rationality since a sane person would be just and deal and interact justly with others. Comparably, religion also motivates and encourages people to be just and perform justice in every aspect of their lives. Furthermore, it is safe to argue that comprehensive justice is grounded on *‘ilm*, given that a lack of *‘ilm* means there is difficulty and ambiguity about how to be just and judge justly. In other words, justice is established on reason and rationality, encouraged by religion or a normative base, and *‘ilm* is significant in this concern to reach the right judgments. This is to argue that reason, religion, and *‘ilm* are the three foundational elements for the performance and proper practice of comprehensive justice in any society.

To conclude, justice is multidimensional and not performed from only one side. For instance, it is not to be expected only from the state’s institutions or rulers. Instead, justice starts with the self. Every individual in society has specific roles to perform, based on his position and with whom he deals so that comprehensive justice can be accomplished on the societal level. Again, the consequences of applying comprehensive justice are many, such as: accomplishing security, economic prosperity, and optimism; these three issues are the next elements proposed by al-Māwardī, which are maintained and grounded on justice.

an injustice to that particular person. People who collect unjustified taxes commit an injustice. Those who infringe upon property commit an injustice. Those who take away property commit an injustice. Those who deny people their rights commit an injustice. Those who, in general, take property by force, commit an injustice. It is the dynasty that suffers from all these acts, inasmuch as civilization, which is the substance of the dynasty, is ruined people have lost all incentive.” (Rosenthal 2015: 240).

4.1.4. General security⁹³

There are three levels of security to be mentioned here that all belong to general security. Firstly, security as a system, which contains the state's internal and external security. Secondly, social security, which indicates security in the social interactions and relationships between individuals in society. Lastly, personal security, or what it can be called 'existential security.' Faith (īmān), as discussed in the third chapter, increases the individual security and confidence indicated by the third meaning. It is safe to argue that without general security, there will be neither *Iṣlāḥ al-dunyā*, nor will the individual have comfort and well-being.

General security, which contains all the levels mentioned earlier, is a direct outcome and consequence of the mentioned comprehensive system of justice. Meaning, performing comprehensive justice in all aspects as a justice system, social justice, and personal justice, generates wide-ranging security. Meanwhile, insecurity and fear are the consequences of committing injustice and oppression. For al-Māwardī, general security indicates a social world in which everyone lives in security and confidence without fear. In contrast, fear and insecurity vanish even for the weak and poor people. It is important to note that, according to him, general security includes all possible kinds of security, which has not only physical security but also psychological security (al-Māwardī 2012: 230).

Moreover, it is essential to point out that according to al-Māwardī there are many benefits and consequences from accomplishing general security in society. For instance, peace of mind increases productivity and expands motivation on the individual and collective levels (ibid. 230). Nevertheless, fear and insecurity restrict human moral behavior and actions, and may hinder people from thinking appropriately. For al-Māwardī, general security encompasses every individual in a society where there is no discrimination among people based on religious affiliation, ethnicity, or anything else.

Due to his focus on the ethical quality and not legal issues in constructing civilization, al-Māwardī did not elaborate deeply into the discussion of how a functional political system should execute and accomplish general security within its

⁹³ In Arabic "*al-amn al-‘āmm*"

boundaries from a legal perspective. This is for the reason that, for al-Māwardī, a society primarily ought to be established on ethical qualities, such as justice, good ethics, et cetera. When these moral qualities are applied in society, only then will there be less necessity for legal procedures.

The importance of having general security in society is for sustaining and strengthening the social order and institutions. General security includes every possible aspect of al-Māwardī's version of the Social World. Furthermore, general security prepares the grounds for consolidating normative ethics and values and increasing social solidarity, stability, and coherence among peoples. However, general security can be at risk if the authority does not provide the individual with a sense of social integration and feeling of belonging to society. Strictly speaking, I argue that general security assures and maintains the order's structures in civilization and sustains and safeguards the ethical and moral structure.

Undoubtedly, one of the main objectives of religion is self-preservation from any kind of danger and insecurity. For al-Māwardī, religion offers and brings security in the Social World and the Hereafter. This is because religion is like self-policing or self-discipline, restricting people from committing crimes and evil actions against each other. As mentioned above, a normative base can positively influence individuals' behavior and action since they deal and act with each other decently even when there is no physical authority to watch over them. This means an individual might not kill another person, nor commit a crime since he knows that even if there is no witness against his crime, he will be punished in the Hereafter. The feeling of what can be called postponed punishment can restrict unethical actions in society that may otherwise lead to insecurity. This is to argue that the absence of a normative base indicates the lack of restriction on evil acts.

Similarly, reason and *'ilm* are fundamental elements for general security in society. Since men of sound reason would unquestionably favor general security over insecurity and instability, it goes without saying that insecurity and instability obstruct any civilization from improving and expanding. Also, reason facilitates people to prioritize their needs. Hence, a sane person would know very well that security is a priority and precondition for any further advancement on both the

individual and societal level. Therefore, reason encourages people to have general security and avoid insecurity. *‘Ilm* can also play a significant role in improving general security. For instance, educational institutions and establishments can play a substantial role in reaching and creating general security.

4.1.5. General economic prosperity⁹⁴

General economic prosperity is a status of well-being and welfare in which individuals benefit and share in the public good and work continuously and collectively to improve it. Moreover, the benefits of general economic prosperity and well-being in society are the elimination or at least weakening of hate, greed, and unconstructive competition among people. Simultaneously, general economic prosperity leads to “better communication,” “sympathy,” and “cohesion among individuals.” For al-Māwardī, these three advantages of general economic prosperity – facilitate better communication, sympathy, and coherence among the people – are a primary step in constructing the Social World since general economic prosperity extends social cohesion (al-Māwardī 2012: 232).

It is safe to argue that according to al-Māwardī, well-being and welfare entails two sides: On the one hand, abundance and richness of resources and materials, meaning an abundance of capital and wealth, which can be called nowadays ‘surplus production.’ On the other hand, plenty of gains and rewards are perhaps determined by the first. In addition to that, the economic relationship is a central element here: such as marketing and trade. These elements together make up the economic system. Nonetheless, for him, the abundance and richness of resources result from justice and are grounded on justice. Undoubtedly, the abundance of gains results from general security (ibid. 233- 4).

Although al-Māwardī was interested throughout his contribution to propose ethical principles, he was still aware of the significance of general economic prosperity in society as an element to sustain and empower social structures since the economy

⁹⁴ In Arabic “*khisb dār*”

has direct and indirect influences on the individual and collective (Sulaymān 2001: 215). Moreover, even though al-Māwardī reveals the significance and outcomes of what he called “general economic prosperity,” his arguments in these regards mostly demonstrate the positive and negative consequences of general economic prosperity on both the social and the political levels. That is to say, he did not elaborate on economic concerns per se, but more their political and social consequences. One of the reasons is that economics as a field of study or science had no recognized merit during his time compared to this field in the contemporary era⁹⁵.

Nonetheless, even if economics was not considered an independent science or a field of study at the time, al-Māwardī still proposed several economic principles. For instance, al-Māwardī views economics as generally drawing upon ethics and *ādāb*. Such a factor led al-Māwardī to advocate the significance of performing *zakāt*⁹⁶ in society. For him, giving *zakāt* is to express sympathy and support for poor and needy people, and also assists people to eliminate animosity and not break their social relationships. That is to say, *zakāt* empowers *al-ulfah* among people. Moreover, al-Māwardī believes *zakāt* offers a model of training the Self to practice decent qualities such as generosity, sympathy and to avoid any kind of miserliness (al-Māwardī 2012: 146- 7).

It should be stated that Cengiz Kallek reminds us that al-Māwardī does not find it appropriate for the state to participate in the economy as a party. Thus, al-Māwardī did not approve of ministers and high-level state officials engaging in economic activities. This indicates that al-Māwardī respected private property rights and free enterprise since if ministers and officials are involved in economic activities, it leads

⁹⁵ This is true until Ibn Khaldūn’s contributions, who considered the economic need the base of all society. Robert Irwin explains the significance of Ibn Khaldūn and how he was a pioneer in concern to economics at his time, putting it in this way: “{...} he (Ibn Khaldūn) wrote extensively about economic matters particularly in chapter 4 and 5 of the Muqaddima, and he was original and almost unique among medieval Arab writers in doing so. {...} The importance of economic factors featured prominently in the Muqaddimah, for economic need was at the basis of all society. {...} Civilization will depend on people coming together and producing more food than they need to consume themselves.” (Irwin 2018: 143).

⁹⁶ A wealth tax and charity to be given for needy people, which is considered as one of the five pillars of Islam.

to unfair competition, disrupts the order, breaks the subjects' work determination, and neglects public affairs (Kallek 2003:183).

It is safe to argue that religion or a normative base can play a significant role in creating and maintaining economic equality and social relationships. Moreover, religion intends to eliminate human greed that leads to an increase in the gap between the wealthy and deprived. Performing *zakāt* is a case in point, as it stabilizes society and increases equality and fairness between the rich and the poor. This is to say that religion does not control economics but instead arranges and coordinates it to create greater equality and general economic prosperity for every person in society. Furthermore, *‘ilm* is also an essential element in maintaining general economic prosperity in society. *‘ilm* and educational institutions enhance and improve economics and prosperity, since it helps create structures and the systemization of equal economics. Religion and *‘ilm* are the ground on which economic prosperity can be created and maintained. It is essential to point out that creating economic equality increases security and gives more hope and prospects for people to work in the future.

4.1.6. Deep Optimism⁹⁷

A deep sense of optimism⁹⁸ is a general atmosphere of optimism in approaching the future. For al-Māwardī, deep optimism is a kindness and mercy of the Creator for humanity⁹⁹, since a deep sense of optimism leads people to construct a civilization for themselves and future generations. It is hope for the future that drives society to work hard for the extended future. Nevertheless, suppose humankind has only little hope or restricted prospects. In that case, people will merely care about the day they

⁹⁷ In Arabic “*amal fāsīḥ*”

⁹⁸ It is worth mention that al-Māwardī distinguishes between two concepts “*Amal*” and “*amānī*” the first being planned and achievable hope and prospect, which it was illuminated above. However, the second “*amānī*” is neither planned, nor realizable. Thus, one should avoid “*amānī*” and concentrate on planned hope “*amal*” (Al-Māwardī 2012: 235).

⁹⁹ It is worth mention that this notion was influenced by the Prophet Muhammad, who states that “hope is a mercy of God for peoples {...}” (c.f. al-Māwardī 2012: 234).

are living in. The individual will not consider the future's varying potentials, which indicates society's decline and destruction. In other words, for al-Māwardī, without optimism and hope for the future, the social world would be in absolute degeneration since nobody would care about future generations (al-Māwardī 2012: 234). Undeniably, this is an original argument by al-Māwardī, who associates deep optimism and hope for the future with instituting a civilization.

Furthermore, optimism stimulates and encourages individuals to seek to own what their ages will absorb and what exceeds their ages. Again, optimism and prospect lead people to construct homes, cities, and civilizations, accommodating the existing generation and the following generations (ibid. 234). A very similar argument was presented by Albert Schweitzer, who not only associates the idea of constructing a civilization with optimism for the future, but also considers optimism and ethical impulse as those two pillars, which can cause the collapse and construction of civilization:

The building is damaged or falls in because the optimist element or the ethical, or both, give way like a weak foundation. No amount of inquiry will give any other reason for the change. All imaginable ideas and convictions of that character spring from optimism and ethical impulse. If these two pillars are strong enough, we need have no fears about the building. (Schweitzer 1987: 58- 9)

Concerning deep optimism and prospect, another similar concept was proposed by al-Māwardī later on, which he calls *al-Fa'l*, and it can be translated as 'looking on the bright side of future,' i.e., being positive and optimistic about the future. The objective of al-Māwardī's argument here is that when people look on the bright side of the future, it empowers them to be determined and hard-working, and contribute to the Social World's collective successes. Moreover, one should consider the future's best potential prospects. Meanwhile, one ought to eliminate negative thoughts from his mind and heart (al-Māwardī 2012: 500). This is to argue that al-Māwardī seeks to highlight the significance of being optimistic, enthusiastic, and hopeful. At the same time, he tries to eliminate any kind of unconstructive thoughts since that may lead to pessimism and laziness, which also lead to decay for both the individual and

collective. This is to state that al-Māwardī pays close attention to individuals' psychological aspects as a constituent, which echoes civilization's advancements.

Albert Schweitzer, as it was mentioned above, was one of the few philosophers who also, like al-Māwardī, associated the notion of being optimistic with instituting a civilization, and he repeated this idea throughout his book several times. For instance, he states that:

The history of the Western philosophy is the history of struggle for an optimistic outlook on life. If in antiquity and in modern times the peoples of Europa have managed to produce a civilization, it is because the optimistic world-view was dominant in their thought, and held the pessimistic permanently in subjection, although it was not able to suppress it altogether. (Schweitzer 1987: 95)

Undeniably, originally the Western and particularly the Christian civilization faced difficulty with its pessimistic attitude towards existing life. Therefore, one of the ambitions of earlier philosophers in the West was to remove the pessimistic aspect of their civilization and replace it with an optimistic approach. Schweitzer once again realizes this critical challenge and its consequences on the Western civilization. For him moving from pessimism towards optimism was a decisive occasion in modern time:

The early Christian conception of the Kingdom of God, which was born of pessimism and, thanks to Augustine, prevailed through the Middle Ages, is rendered impotent, and its place is taken by conception which is the offspring of modern optimism. This new orientation of the Christian world-view, which is accomplished by a slow and often interrupted process of change between the fifteenth century and the end of the eighteenth, is the decisive spiritual event of the modern age. During this period Christianity takes no account of what is happening to itself. It believes that it is remaining unaltered, whereas in reality, by this change from pessimism to optimism, it is surrendering its original character. (Schweitzer 1987: 143)

Nevertheless, Mawdūdī is another contemporary scholar who, similar to al-Māwardī, acknowledges the strong relationship between religiosity and optimism. Furthermore, Mawdūdī reaffirms this fact by stating that: “{...} For the believer, *īmān* is an everlasting storehouse of hope from which he continues to receive an unbroken supply of heart-rejuvenating energy and soul-enriching satisfaction {...}. It is on that basis that the believer is always brimming with abundant hope.” (Mawdūdī 2013: 212).

It is important to note that considering deep optimism and its consequences in society reveals that al-Māwardī emphasized “*tatāli al-ajyā*,” or continuity of generation in social life, so that every generation constructs civilization not only for themselves, but for future generations as well. Still, every generation commences from the stage where the last generation reached to complete the civilizational construction. Furthermore, al-Māwardī distinguishes between two kinds of society, on the one hand, “a chaotic society,” where there is no existence for hope and, on the other hand, “an organized society” marked by social structures, hope, and organizations (c.f. Sulaymān 2001: 216).

I argue that one of the objectives of having deep hope and optimism as a general trend in civilization is to construct a solid collective feeling of social belonging, coherence, and stability, in which every individual is motivated to play his role for a better future within the collective. However, suppose the general trend in civilization is pessimism, desperation, and hopelessness. In that case, it leads individuals doubtlessly to being unproductive and unenthusiastic, not only in their own thought but also their actions and deeds. In other words, without deep hope and optimism for the future, there is no possibility for a firm civilization to be constructed, due to the lack of trust and confidence in any better future.

Indeed, religion encourages and inspires people to work hard, sincerely, and seriously to reach happiness and welfare in this worldly life and succeed in the Hereafter. Accordingly, it is safe to argue that religion plays a significant role in increasing people's hopes and prospects, from al-Māwardī's perspective. However, unlike all of the above-mentioned five Constitutive Elements of the Social World, a lack of *ilm* could sometimes end up increasing hope and prospects in society.

Knowing about what will happen in the future could make people less serious about improving themselves and their civilization. For instance, if a person knows that he will become sick and die as a young person, he will most probably not care or even think about obtaining a university degree or building a house for a future family, and so on. In other words, not knowing what will happen in the future can lead to several constructive efforts, which makes people work hard to build their homes, institutions, civilization, et cetera.



Part II

4.2. Personal Reformation: Three Rules

Humans are social beings. Man cannot survive and live without society, making their existence dependent on society. Likewise, society cannot exist without individuals since society consists of individuals' cooperation. Individuals build and construct a society to survive because man is an imperfect creature who cannot satisfy his needs alone. It is inconceivable to assume that al-Māwardī emphasizes society over individuals or vice versa. Instead, al-Māwardī proposes a very balanced relationship between society and individuals. For him, every individual is a substantial part of the whole, and every person must be preserved. Thus, this section will explain the fundamental question: Through which means do individuals participate in society. i.e., in what ways does an individual socialize in society?

This section complements and empowers "Constitutive Elements of the Social World." Besides the six mentioned elements, al-Māwardī dedicates a second section in the fourth chapter on what he calls personal reformation. Since an individual cannot live or even survive alone, the three proposed rules by al-Māwardī in this part deal with essential elements for an individual to bind himself to society, this could also be thought of as socialization. To al-Māwardī, there are three rules, which lead an individual to be ameliorated in the social world. He calls these components "imperative rules" (al-Māwardī 2012: 236) that indicate instructions to permit, order or forbid individuals to conduct and behave in specific manners in society.

The question arises here, what was al-Māwardī's purpose behind elaborating first on "Constitutive Elements of the Social World," before clarifying how to integrate individuals into society? A convincing answer could be found in Berger and Luckmann. They articulate "{...} social order precedes any individual organismic development" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 69). Furthermore, they argue correctly "the self cannot be adequately understood apart from the particular social context in which they were shaped" (ibid. 68). Thus, it is safe to argue that al-Māwardī first

wants to manufacture a social order and then clarify how an individual can be attached to it.¹⁰⁰

After elaborating on ‘Constitutive Elements of the Social World,’ it is essential to focus more on the individual aspect in building a society. There are three essential rules for a person to discipline and restrain his personality. Firstly, *nafs muti’a*, an obedient personality, empowers an individual to follow the path of virtue and righteousness, meanwhile refining him from any kind of transgression and wrongdoing. Secondly, *Ulfah Jamiah*, general social integration, enables individuals' hearts to be integrated into society, and through it, people are protected from harm and evil. Lastly, *mada kaifiya*, a sufficient wealth or income, sustains individual basic needs, so the burden of life stress will be released. This is to argue that it would be difficult for an individual to be integrated into society or reform his character without these three main rules.

4.2.1. The first rule: An obedient personality

Nafs muti’a indicates having the competence and tendency to perform good deeds based on reason and religion. Meanwhile, the individual abandons evil conduct through controlling *hawá*. An obedient personality can perform self-restraint and discipline, which indicates a possession and mastery of one’s self. Nevertheless, if a person cannot control and discipline himself, the *nafs* seizes his personality. Al-Māwardī appropriately argues that whoever cannot control his *nafs*, it will control him (al-Māwardī 2012: 236). To al-Māwardī, the obedience of the self is realized either through self-guidance or self-submission.

On the one hand, self-guidance offers instructions on how (not) to behave. It means scrutinizing and considering the authentic essence of matters, recognizing the right as right, and correspondingly approving and performing it while realizing wrong to be wrong and disapproving of it. Self-guidance is accomplished when the self is protected from *hawá*¹⁰¹ (i.e., desires). In other words, self-guidance is when a person

¹⁰⁰ This argument will be elaborated in detail in the next chapters.

¹⁰¹ The concept of *hawá* was explained in the first chapter.

uses his reason and rationality and deters his *hawá*, he, accordingly, behaves ethically. On the other hand, self-submission means for an individual to command his *nafs* to perform what is right; it would submit immediately and obey the guidelines. As such, it would refrain from evil when the *nafs* is ordered to do so. Thus, when desires and lust do not control the personality, an individual will again realize dominance over the *nafs* and discipline himself.

In his commentary on “*Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn*,” Khān'zādah reminds us that self-submission is implemented through religious justifications and clarifications or the assistance of reasons (Khān'zādah 2019. Vol. 2. 98). Reason restricts and determines individuals' behavior. As expounded in the first chapter, reason is derived from “*‘aqla l-al-nāqah*,” i.e., “the camel’s binding cord,” a metaphor for how reason prevents an individual from acting unethically, just as the binding cord prevents the camel from escaping.

Al-Māwardī maintains that the self has a code of discipline and ethics, enhancing self-guidance and self-submission. Adherence to ethics, discipline, and self-control achieves individual benefits and interests and empowers the individual's role and engagements in society. Al-Māwardī points out that he already devoted a specific chapter (the fifth chapter) in his book “*Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn*” to this particular topic. For instance, he elucidates personal discipline such as sincerity, avoiding arrogance, anger, and self-admiration, as well as being tolerant. This study will scrutinize personal discipline in the following chapter.

Similar to al-Māwardī, al-Iṣfahānī, offers three means for what he calls purifying the *nafs*. Firstly, learning improves and reforms the faculty of thought, making individuals capable of distinguishing right from wrong. Secondly, curbing the lusts and desires leads individuals to have generosity and beneficence. Lastly, disciplining the *nafs* until it submits to reason leads individuals to have forbearance and courage. Improving these three elements together will accomplish justice and nobility, according to al-Iṣfahānī. However, neglecting one of them will lead an individual to either commit injustice or be oppressed (al-Iṣfahānī 2010b: 88- 9). Like *nafs muti’a*, purifying the *nafs* means mending the personal qualities so individuals deal and behave decently and based on that will be integrated appropriately in society.

This is to argue that every individual must discipline himself and know his self-restraints. Therefore, if an individual denies self-restraint in society, it makes him an asocial being. Al-Māwardī justifies essential elements in this part - also in Chapter Five - to guarantee and preserve the individual as a part of the whole. However, how will each individual be part of the whole while preserving his individuality and freedom? Primarily, this happens when an individual has an obedient personality, is socially integrated, and, lastly, has sufficient wealth or income. It is worth mentioning that Cengiz Kallek reaffirms the significance of having a *nafs muti'a* for both the rulers and the ruled people as those who cannot govern themselves cannot master others (Kallek 2004: 234).

4.2.2. The Second Rule: General Social Integration

Without boundaries in human behaviors and conduct, there cannot be stable social relationships and integration. Consequently, it is a fundamental matter for every single individual to learn how to be integrated into society. *Al-ulfah* essentially means to be an integrated part of the whole. Nevertheless, how can this be performed and through which means? For al-Māwardī, man is vulnerable and envied for what he possesses. However, when an individual has *ulfa* (i.e., being friendly and befriended,) he defeats his opponents and envious persons and will be safe from hostility and envy. Strictly speaking, one objective of *ulfa* is to safeguard individuals and maintain social solidarity and unity. Accordingly, through being friendly and befriended, man will be integrated into society and protected from servility.

Berger and Luckmann articulate that “The individual, however, is not born a member of society. He is born with a predisposition towards sociality, and he becomes a member of society.” (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 149). The questions arise, was al-Māwardī aware of social integration?! Besides, how would he perceive the idea of individuals socialization? Indeed, for al-Māwardī, man is a social being, meaning humans need each other to create a society, live and survive in it. Al-Māwardī elaborates on what he calls *al-ulfah jamiah*, indicating how to integrate individuals into society. It is safe to argue that *al-ulfah jamiah* is the ultimate objective and the basis of *Iṣlāḥ al-dunyā* as proposed by al-Māwardī. Thus, understanding

al-Māwardī's concept of *al-ulfah* is central to a comprehensive understanding of *Iṣlāḥ al-Dunyā*.

The concept of *al-ulfah* (i.e., socialization individuals into society or even better “social integration) has various connotations. Firstly, it indicates joining hearts together within a society, reflecting inner qualities that help soften the manners and conduct on both individual and collective levels. Secondly, *al-ulfah* advocates mutual social solidarity and cooperation, merging the individual into affiliation with the collective in a social unity based on mutual love (c.f. al-Iṣfahānī 2010: 30). Thirdly, *al-ulfah* plays the role of impeding people from breaking their associations and social integration and from being hostile to one another (al-Māwardī 2012: 237-8).

The first two aspects of *al-ulfah* have a constructive side, in which *al-ulfah* inspires and encourages individuals' socialization based on normative ethical principles and commitments, which are reflected in their deeds and behavior. However, the last aspect deters malicious and unethical actions from being performed. Thus, this balancing act between the promotion of social integrity, solidarity, and the impediment of evil deeds and behavior drives individuals to deal in particular manners within the collective. For al-Māwardī, this is an essential aspect of social integration.

As a practical example of the role of *al-ulfah* in Muslim civilization, al-Māwardī illuminates how tribes and clans of Arabia before the advent of Islam were in constant conflict and hostility to each other. A case in point to mention is the hostile relations between the tribes of *al-Aws* and *al-Khazraj*. However, when these two tribes converted to Islam, they became firmly attached to the principle of fraternity, and hostile relations between them entirely vanished. Even more, through *al-ulfah*, they started to have mutual social solidarity and protected each other from any kind of aggressiveness and injustice, from inside and outside of their society (al-Māwardī 2012: 239).

It is safe to argue that there are reasons for social integration to emerge in any society. Thus, without particular elements and resources, social integration is

impossible. However, what are these reasons and resources that integrate individuals into society? For al-Māwardī, there are five reasons which cause and empower social integration among people in society. Of course, the more reasons that exist together, the stronger the social integration will be.

Firstly, religion, which is the most effective means to empower *al-ulfah* in society, makes people protect each other and hinders the breaking of social relations. For al-Māwardī, religion prevents social disintegration as well as mutual hostility. For instance, al-Māwardī cited a Hadith by the Prophet Muhammad, stating that “Do not cut off one another, nor desert one another, nor hate one another, nor envy one another {...} it is prohibited for the Muslim to shun his brother for more than three (days)” (al-Māwardī 2012: 238- 9).

It is worth mentioning that for al-Māwardī, religion produces the essential foundation of *al-ulfah*,¹⁰² which brings people into social unity and cohesion, inspiring individuals to maintain their cooperation and social integration. Another point to show the association between the concept of *al-ulfah* and religion is that Prophets themselves are the incarnation of *al-ulfah*. The Prophet Muhammad's role in uniting al-Aws and al-Khazraj as I mentioned above, is one example. However, it should be pointed out that religion can split individuals into many sects and groups, and can itself be one of the main reasons for social disintegration (ibid. 240).

Secondly, lineage brings affinity and sympathy between relatives, leading to mutual support and unity, preventing rift and sedition. Likewise, lineage prevents the oppression of foreign strangers and external exploitation (al-Māwardī 2012: 240). Despite the significance of lineage and the benefits it brings to social relations, it can, however, be a disintegrating element. To explain how this could happen, al-Māwardī divides lineage into three components. Each category has its specific status from benevolence and association and the possible reasons for estrangement and hostility.

¹⁰² Obviously, al-Māwardī was directly inspired by the Quran (3: 104) “{...} remember Allah's favour unto you: How ye were enemies and He made friendship between your hearts so that ye became as brothers by His grace {...}”. The verb “*Ala’fa*” was translated into English by M. M. Pickthall as “He made friendship between your hearts”.

First, procreators include the parents and grandparents. The relations with their children and grandchildren are outlined based on compassion, caution, and affection. The associations develop with time and can change with the changing circumstances. Still, typically, social solidarity and cohesion define this category. (al-Māwardī 2012: 242- 3). Second, offspring, which consists of both children and grandchildren. The relationship between procreators and offspring has two courses: kindness and high esteem toward parents or alienation and disaffection. Lastly, relatives and kin support protecting the family and preventing the occurrence of both injustice and obscurity. If relations between relatives are protected by affection, sympathy, and kindness, it will be bolstered and empowered. Nevertheless, relations between relatives can be dominated by envy and rivalry, then the associations between relatives become enmity and kinship alienation (ibid. 245- 6).

Thirdly, marriages, which form new contacts based upon choice and preference, unite people in social bonds. Al-Māwardī mentions that it was an Arab convention to encourage stranger tribes to make allies through marriage, so that the former enemy would become a supporter and a hostile person a loyal friend. Due to marriage's importance in establishing social integration, al-Māwardī mentions five reasons and motivations for marriage: wealth, beauty, piety, unity, and chastity. He comments that if the marriage is inspired by religion and piety of the woman, that would be the most permanent bond (compared to the other motives) since adhering to religion indicates performing good deeds and avoiding committing errors in social relationships (ibid. 250).

Fourthly, the establishment of brotherhood stems from mutual affection and is acquired through sincerity and loyalty, leading to mutual protection and association (al-Māwardī 2012: 259). Establishing brotherhood is an invisible element but a very effective form of social integration and socialization. Al-Māwardī distinguishes two causes for seeking brotherhood. On the one hand, friendships are acquired by mutual agreement as a result of compulsion. On the other hand, friendships are developed as a result of choice and purpose.

Furthermore, there are seven causes for brotherhood to be formed. First, common basis, when common grounds are substantial between individuals, then their

brotherhood would also be resilient. But if the common grounds are slight, the brotherhood would be weak except if there is another element to strengthen the association. Second, association, the reason for the relationship between individuals is due to their agreement. Yet, disagreement between two people leads to discord. Third, closeness, results from feeling content with a person. Fourth, cordiality produces from sincerity. Fifth, affection results from confidence. Sixth, love results from admiration. Seventh, glorification, with the last and highest level being adoration. These eight levels are like a hierarchy; one moves from the first and can reach the last level but only by achieving the previous steps.

Lastly, different kinds of kindness bring people's hearts closer to each other, inducing compassion and love. Al-Māwardī distinguishes two types of kindness: generosity and benevolence. The former indicates donating money for a good cause without expecting any reward. This empowers and maintains social relationships through aiding the poor and needy people. The latter kind of kindness has two types. On the one hand, there is the type of kindness expressed in words through gentle and pleasant speech. On the other hand is kindness expressed in deeds and actions, such as assisting people suffering from disasters and helping needy people (al-Māwardī 2012: 295- 323).

Ibn Khaldūn uses the concept “*Aṣabīyah*,” which is comparable to *al-ulfah* in some aspects. *Aṣabīyah* is in English an equivalent to social solidarity. This leads to the question, what is the difference between these two concepts? *Al-ulfah* contributes to normative ethical, social unity, i.e., it has mainly a positive aspect in integrating the individual into society. Nevertheless, *Aṣabīyah* could have both positive and negative motivations and aspects. Ibn Khaldūn argues that multiple-*aṣabīyahs* can weaken the state (or the civilization),¹⁰³ for the reason that every social group attempts to oppose others, based on different interests, desires, and wishes. Based on this, society's unity will be indeed difficult to accomplish (Ibn Khaldūn 1981, Vol. II. 536). As mentioned above, for Māwardī, religion empowers social integration, yet disputes within a religion or between religions lead to social disintegration. Similar to Māwardī, Ibn Khaldūn also views religion as uniting all of the different *aṣabīyahs*

¹⁰³ This study prefers to use civilization for many reasons, such as that civilization is not limited to a particular ethnicity, as the case with modern concept of state.

in one, for the reason that religion can eradicate all of the evil characters on both individual and collective level. At the same time, religion can propose a united direction for behavior (c.f. *ibid.* 527).

Similar to *al-ulfah* and *‘Aṣabīyah*, Toynbee distinguishes between what he, on the one hand, calls the love of fellow countrymen, which is embodied in nationalism or “the solidarity of a state” and is similar to *‘Aṣabīyah*. On the other hand, he also theorizes “the love of humanity,” which is identical to *al-ulfah*. For Toynbee, the former is a primitive instinct; however, the latter is to be reached through God, which indicates the role Toynbee gives to religion in civilization. Toynbee puts it this way:

{...} one loves one’s fellow countrymen because one hates foreigners.
{...} we still feel a natural love for our relations and our neighbors, whereas love of Humanity is a cultivated taste. We reach the former direct, the latter only a second hand, for it is through God alone that Religion leads Man to love the Human Race {...} (Toynbee 1987, Vol. II. 106).

This is to say that Toynbee appreciates God's role and religion in embedding love among peoples based not on nationality and state solidarity, but humanity. Put differently, love in humanity or for humanity can only be grounded on religion. Even still, Toynbee's idea of “love of Humanity” appears like al-Māwardī’s concept of *al-ulfah*. However, Toynbee’s notion in this regard is grounded on nationalism and the idea that one loves his compatriots because he hates foreigners. Nevertheless, for al-Māwardī, this is not the case since al-Māwardī builds his understanding on a humane ground and not nationalism.¹⁰⁴ This is to state that al-Māwardī has a more normative and ethical approach to civilization.

Al-ulfah is a target and an ambition to reach in itself and a powerful instrument to keep social integration and coherence strong within society. This why al-Māwardī views *al-ulfah* as a pillar whereby the Constitutive Elements of the Social World can be instituted in society. The centrality of *al-ulfah* is that a man cannot survive in

¹⁰⁴ Needless to say, that in al-Māwardī’s time, the idea of nationalism was not established.

isolation. Neither can he establish what al-Māwardī calls the Social World. Thus, individuals should be active in society by increasing their engagement, social integration, and relations. Similar to al-Māwardī, Berger and Luckmann assert that socialization cannot be performed with isolated individuals. They state, “Just as it is impossible for man to develop as man in isolation, so it is impossible for man in isolation to produce a human environment” (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 69). Thus, man creates the social world through his engagement, and *al-ulfah* is critical in this regard. This is to argue that *al-ulfah* and constructing the social world are inextricably intertwined.

Again al-Māwardī’s Constitutive Elements of the Social World is the context where *al-ulfah* takes place and flourishes. Society, nonetheless, must have a structure in order to facilitate the integration of individuals. Berger and Luckmann also emphasize the social structure’s significance for socialization. They state that “Socialization always takes place in the context of a specific social structure. Not only its contents but also its measure of ‘success’ have social-structural conditions and social-structural consequences.” (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 183).

Al-ulfah is a process, which is never completed, so individuals should continually endeavor to empower the social world. Berger and Luckmann illustrated that “Socialization is never total and never finished” (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 157). Yet, what happens when *al-ulfah* or socialization declines? When *al-ulfah* as a process does not advance, the risk is that society will be split and disintegrated. That is why for Berger and Luckmann, unsuccessful socialization leads to ‘individualism’ (ibid.190). The social world will not be established without *al-ulfah*, as there is neither general justice, security, nor a functional political system and general economic prosperity. These are all significant elements in establishing a social world, grounded on collective efforts. The lack of *al-ulfah* means none of these elements can be accomplished.

4.2.3. The Third Rule: Sufficient Substance

There is wisdom behind the diversities in resources and varieties of profits in acquiring substance and wealth. This is for the reason that diversity and variety will be a motive for cooperation and coalition, as if everyone gains their livelihood from the same work, no one will need anyone else. Thus, there will be no reason for union and association. Individuals are in need of each other, and therefore, they must cooperate to survive and continue their life (al-Māwardī 2012: 333- 4). This is to be understood on the individual as well as societal levels. Al-Māwardī contends that man necessities *mada kafiya* (i.e., sufficient wealth or income) to sustain his life, and without it, man could not survive. If an individual has no sufficient substance and a shortage of basic needs such as food, he becomes feeble and unhappy.

Not depending on oneself in seeking sufficiency and income, an individual becomes dependent upon others, and that makes him feel humiliated and feeble because man must preserve himself through food and clothing. It should be noted that al-Māwardī identifies three conditions for seeking income. Firstly, the revenue should come from acceptable and righteous means and not from religiously prohibited sources. Secondly, the individual should seek the best resources that will not humiliate or dishonour them. Lastly, they should spend their income with good management and appraisal, since a small amount of wealth managed well would be more beneficial than a tremendous amount of wealth with mismanagement and misappraisal (al-Māwardī 2012: 518- 9).

Al-Māwardī distinguishes between *al-mada* and *al-kasb*¹⁰⁵. The former is the result of owning independent and developing assets, combining growing plants and breeding animals (ibid. 335). The latter is accomplished by making the substance available by actions leading to the satisfaction of need. Furthermore, *kasab* is a source and means of substance. It is safe to argue that *kasab* is a fundamental element for the individual to survive in society. This has two sides, working in trade as well as craft.

¹⁰⁵ It is worth mentioning that the al-Māwardī uses the concept of *al-kasb* (acquiring) many times. Of course, reason is *muktasab*; knowledge, as well as religion, are also acquired.

The sources and means of substance are four branches: agricultural development, animal reproduction, trades, and crafts (ibid. 336). Crafts can be divided into: crafts of an intellectual profession (*Geistige Arbeit*), crafts of manual or physical work, and crafts that combine intellectual and manual labor (ibid. 339). For al-Māwardī, the noblest crafts are the crafts of reason (intellectual profession). The basest is the crafts of physical work because it results from reason, and the latter directs and determinates physical work (ibid. 340).

The capabilities of every person determine which position is proper for him. It should be pointed out that human beings are by nature proficient and talented in performing crafts according to al-Māwardī (al-Māwardī 2012: 339). Moreover, crafts here must be comprehended comprehensively, and they should not be considered from a narrow and perspective. It is essential to mention that al-Māwardī distinguishes three types of attitudes people have towards seeking wealth and livelihood.

Firstly, an individual seeks what is sufficient for his basic requirements and needs without attempting to gain more than his needs or fail to obtain his requirements (al-Māwardī 2012: 341).

Secondly, an individual falls short of seeking sufficiently; such an individual will suffer heavy burden and misery (ibid. 344).

Thirdly, an individual is not convinced of sufficiency and aims to increase wealth. This could be for four reasons. First, his desires are unlimited, so he tries to seek more desires, so he wants more wealth to satisfy himself; this is very blameworthy (ibid. 347). Second, to spend it as a charity, perform good deeds, and relieve people in distress. This is praiseworthy (ibid. 348). Third, to seek wealth as an inheritance to his children in the future; this is very blameworthy (ibid. 352). Fourth, to collect wealth and seek even more for the pleasure of saving wealth. This is the worse type of all mentioned (ibid. 354).

It is safe to argue that al-Māwardī wants to illustrate that the means and sources of acquiring substance and wealth are various. Sufficient substance is an instrument to survive, flourish, and perform good deeds. However, if wealth becomes an aim in itself, such as saving for the sake of wealth, this is very blameworthy and harmful for individuals and society. Through describing all of these details, al-Māwardī reasserts that an individual ameliorates, amends his behavior and conduct in the social world when he has sufficient substance, which helps him in this regard. Otherwise, a lack of basic needs confuses and complicates the mission of social integration and engaging in society. Needless to say, this part complements the fifth element, “General economic prosperity,” mentioned above. However, this part focuses merely on the individual aspect.

4.3. Conclusion

I have tried to prove that these six constitutive elements of the social world, proposed by al-Māwardī, are based on the commitment to increase and empower social integration. They can be established and sustained through collective efforts. The more individuals are engaged and taking these commitments seriously, the more robust and stable, and persistent their social world. Furthermore, *dīn muttaba* is not merely an individualistic or private issue since applying it in a society certainly demands collective efforts. The same argument goes for a functional political system and applying comprehensive justice, which can be constructed only through collective efforts, starting from the self. However, general security, general economic prosperity, and deep optimism are collective commitments. They are also the consequences of applying the first three elements, i.e., *dīn muttaba*, a functional political system, and comprehensive justice.

The more the six elements, as preconditions to the construction of a particular social world, are firmly established in a society, the more its stability and continuity perpetuate. However, al-Māwardī points out a realistic fact that it is impossible to have an entirely perfect worldly life and impossible for all of these mentioned aspects to be accomplished thoroughly, as life is grounded on continuous shifting, vanishing, and desolating factors. Therefore, civilization can be partially

dysfunctional and disturbed in accordance with deficiencies in these mentioned rules (al-Māwardī 2012: 235). Meaning, al-Māwardī recommends how an order might be preferably well-established and function; however, he is aware that instituting an ideal civilization is not an easy mission. This point makes al-Māwardī a genuine social theorist and not a mere utopian.

These constitutive elements of the social world are neither speculative ideas, nor purely philosophical contemplations. On the contrary, these six rules reflect al-Māwardī's personal experiences and the political, economic, and social circumstances in which he lived. Thus, without these six constitutive elements of the social world, a society or a civilization cannot be well established and organized. These elements can maintain internal social cohesion and integration. Their significance lies in their regulation of individual and collective behavior (Sulaymān 2001: 217).

In considering al-Māwardī's six constitutive elements of the social world and their roles in instituting a civilization, one concludes that there is no particular constituent in constructing a civilization. Instead, there are various constituents and elements, and all of them are interdependent and interconnected. For instance, the absence or weakness of justice in society generates fear and insecurity among individuals, which leads to less hope and regress of economic prosperity in a society. In other words, I argue that al-Māwardī's interdisciplinary backgrounds and experiences lead him to propose a comprehensive as well as very profound version of civilization.

In the second section, I reconsidered three rules proposed by al-Māwardī to discipline and self-restraint individuals within a society. The objective of these rules is to reform and discipline the individual in society. They are an obedient personality, general social integration, and sufficient wealth or income. These rules assist individuals' social integration. It is crucial to bear in mind that in al-Māwardī's view one of civilization's significant objectives is to keep and increase the stability and harmony in the political and economic institutions and the social order.

As I will show in the next chapter, al-Māwardī suggests further individual ethical instructions to improve and ameliorate individuals' ethics. Again, individual and collective commitments intertwine if an individual is righteous. However, if the collective system is corrupted, then one will not be secure from corruption and insecurity. Likewise, if an individual is corrupted but is living in a decent system, he will also not enjoy its pleasures because of his internal corruption and disorderliness. This proposes a balanced relationship between the individual and collective to reach happiness, well-being, and success; otherwise, the decline of one directly impacts the other one destructively (al-Māwardī 2012: 214).

For al-Māwardī, all of these six constitutive elements share a common objective and motivation: to consolidate *al-ulfah* and strengthen society's cohesion. For instance, one of the purposes and functions of comprehensive justice is to generate what al-Māwardī calls *al-ulfah*, a kind of social integration that binds individuals together in society. The same argument goes for accomplishing general security, which is meant to create stable social solidarity and coherence. Nevertheless, optimism for the future leads to another kind of solidarity. This solidarity is between the current generation and future generations since deep hope for the future motivates individuals to construct cities and homes for themselves and future generations, as al-Māwardī argues. To conclude, if there is *iṣlāḥ* in society, it must maintain and improve, and if there is *ifsad*, it should reform it.

Chapter Five

Personal Discipline and Institutions

5.1. Introduction

For al-Māwardī, the individual is a significant and indispensable constituent in society. It is safe to argue that he refuses to build a society without fundamentally focusing on individual discipline. In this chapter, I argue that the “constitutive elements of the social world,” as elaborated in the previous chapter, is the context in which self-discipline and personal commitments can be practiced and accomplished. Moreover, I argue that for al-Māwardī, “*Adab Riyāḍah wa-Istiṣlāḥ*” is a personal commitment and self-discipline, which paves the way for establishing stable institutions in society. Therefore, “*Adab Riyāḍah wa-Istiṣlāḥ*” is to be translated as “Personal Discipline and Institutions.” Personal Discipline and Institutions has six main components: avoiding arrogance and self-admiration, behaving according to characteristic ethical traits, having *Ḥayāʾ* (shame), forbearance and avoiding anger, sincerity and not lying, and avoiding *ḥasad* (malicious envy). Figure IV explains the structures and components of “*Adab Riyāḍah wa-Istiṣlāḥ*,” which is the topic of this chapter.

Every civilization establishes itself on a different Personal Discipline and individual commitment. The one proposed here by al-Māwardī contains a detailed pattern of how personal discipline can improve and maintain. Moreover, al-Māwardī draws his suggested personal discipline on the idea of personal commitments, in which the individual can continuously progress and increase his self-discipline and commitments. Thus, it is essential to bear in mind that for al-Māwardī, these personal disciplines can be constantly improved on through practice and repetition.




Figure IV explains the structures and components of “*Adab Riyāḍah wa-Istiṣlāḥ*” or personal discipline and institutions.

Even though al-Māwardī concentrates on the individual in “*Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn*,” I nevertheless observe that his focus on individualism also intends to improve and advance the collective. Inevitably, by aiming to improve and advance individuals in society, it can be assumed that the society itself will also improve continuously. The reason for this is that whenever individuals are committed and behave and socially interact in decent and ethical manners and avoid reprehensible attributes such as arrogance and self-admiration, then society will be in a better situation. This is because individuals will be more loyal, devoted to their society, creative, efficient, and socially integrated. Thus, while maintaining and developing individuality, the whole society will be strengthened and empowered.

Accordingly, al-Māwardī, especially in his “*Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn*,” reflects regarding the societal level by focusing on the individual. In addition to that, his book describes how to involve and integrate individuals in society. It is

impossible to preserve and improve any society, state, or even civilization without considering the individual. Therefore, it is safe to argue that to construct a civilization, there ought to be no destruction or negligence of the individual. For instance, as one of the concepts in this chapter, it will be demonstrated how one ought to be tolerant, avoid anger, and be sincere. Such attributes help develop the individuals, and it paves the way for the individual to be integrated and committed to the collective.

It is safe to assume that for al-Māwardī, social interaction between individuals shapes and forms their society's character. Thus, this chapter's focus is predominantly on individuals' discipline and character for their fundamental role in determining and defining the quality of society. To secure and maintain society's prosperity: individuals and multiple other factors affecting them have to be considered, such as their living conditions, the order, and the state in which they live, as individuals' living conditions can strongly affect them and their behaviors. Stated differently, if the living conditions of individuals are corrupt and chaotic, that will be mirrored destructively in individuals' qualities and manners. However, if individuals' living conditions are decent and virtuous, this facilitates a framework for more social cohesion and integrity among them.

It is important to note that “*ta’ dīb*”¹⁰⁶ as a personal discipline has a prominent place in al-Māwardī’s thought. I argue that from al-Māwardī’s perspective, human nature consists of diverse qualities and attributes; some of them are good, and others are not. Due to this fact, an individual ought to keep constantly working on amending his characteristics, ethics, and self-discipline, in a kind of constant process which al-Māwardī called “*ta’ dīb*.” One should not be satisfied with several good attributes already existing in one’s characteristics, as if an individual is not always in “*ta’ dīb*” toward better ethics, discipline, and developing his attributes and manners, he will start to lose even the good qualities he possesses. (al-Māwardī 2012: 365)

¹⁰⁶ It can be translated literally as “civility, disciplining and act of politeness”. However, in this context “*ta’ dīb*” indicates an ethical disciplining process of self, in which individual works continuously to develop his or her good ethics and self-discipline towards a better stage.

Al-Māwardī dedicates almost more than half of his book “*Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*” merely to individual normative ethics, self-discipline, and the question of how to improve them. This demonstrates the significance of personal discipline in al-Māwardī’s thought. I argue that for al-Māwardī, the more robust individual ethics and self-disciplines are, the more reliable and firm civilization will be. Therefore, this part of the study attempts to consider al-Māwardī’s contribution regarding the questions: What are the structures of al-Māwardī’s Personal Discipline and Institutions? Which components of his proposed structures of self-discipline and commitments can be beneficial in the contemporary time as a vital for constructing institution(s)? Additionally, what is the objective(s) and intention(s) of al-Māwardī’s “Personal Discipline and Institutions?”

Adab Riyāḍah wa-Istiṣlāḥ is based on religion, intellectual faculties, and rationality, which no rational being would doubt its validity and faultiness according to al-Māwardī. This kind of *ādāb* is grounded not only on rational justifications, but also on the evidence of these rational justifications’ soundness. Most good attributes cannot be established without the centrality of reason as a monitor since reason is the groundwork which assists and plays the central role in the process of “*ta’dīb*.” Nevertheless, this does not necessarily indicate that good ethics and attributes are only based on reason, since if this were the case, there would be no need for religion or Prophethood. Al-Māwardī tried to prove this through quoting the saying of Prophet Muhammad, stating that “I was sent to conclude the best of ethics” (ibid. 365). This, according to al-Māwardī, reveals that there were good ethics even before the Prophet Muhammad, meaning, for that one of the Prophet’s main duties he was sent to complete was “*Adab Riyāḍah wa-Istiṣlāḥ*.”

In this chapter, I maintain that one of al-Māwardī’s objectives from Personal Discipline is to pave the way for establishing and enhancing institutions. For this reason, it is essential to illuminate the meaning of the term institution. This chapter distinguishes two types of institutions.¹⁰⁷ On the one hand, formal institutions are governmental institutions with sets of rules implemented and enforced by the state. An example of this type of institution is courts and legislatures. On the other hand,

¹⁰⁷ The next chapter will discuss the different types of institutions.

informal institutions define the customs, manners, and behavior of certain people in society. By institutions, this study means the latter type of institutions, which contains a specific pattern of action, norms, and self-discipline. The significance of informal institutions is that they shape and impact even formal institutions' formulation. The following two chapters demonstrate that informal institutions are the substructure for society's continuity and stability. A fundamental change in society starts firstly through the change of personal discipline as well as institutions.

5.1. Avoiding arrogance and self-admiration

Arrogance and self-admiration are attributes that strip a person's virtues, and give rise to vices and immoralities in society. In the case that these attributes have a dominant influence over an individual, he will neither accept "*ta'dīb*," nor give attention to people's advice since an arrogant person considers himself in a higher position than others. He neither listens, nor pays attention to others' advice, while a self-admiring person perceives his virtue to be higher than it really is believing that there is no need for any kind of "*ta'dīb*." However, before expanding on these two concepts, what are the differences between these two attributes exactly? Other questions in this regard are, what are the reasons for a person's arrogance and self-admiration? What are the consequences of both arrogance and self-admiration in a society? Lastly, based on al-Māwardī's contribution, how can arrogance and self-admiration be cured? Arrogance, self-admiration, and all concepts that will be considered can also be reflected directly in institutions' practice and performance.

The difference between arrogance¹⁰⁸ and self-admiration¹⁰⁹ is that arrogance manifests itself when an individual believes that his social position is higher than it is in reality. In comparison, self-admiration manifests itself when an individual considers his virtues better than they are in actuality. Both these attributes reflect an overestimation and exaggeration in seeing the self and personal features. The

¹⁰⁸ In Arabic, *al-kibr*.

¹⁰⁹ In Arabic, *'Ujb*.

negative consequences of these two attributes are twofold. On the one hand, arrogance produces hatred from others towards the arrogant person for his arrogant manner and behavior. It also distracts individuals from having *al-ulfah*¹¹⁰ and increases aversion among people (c.f. al-Māwardī 2012: 373). On the other hand, self-admiration not only eliminates the beauties of a person's good qualities, but also emphasizes destructive and immoral attributes, and leads to denunciation and fragmentation. Hence, self-admiration hinders a person from having and practicing virtues (ibid. 275).

Al-Māwardī proposes three conditions that lead an individual to be arrogant.

Firstly, high-handedness and mischief, because the individual starts to believe that nobody has the power to stop him in any way.

Secondly, substantial authority and influence over others lead him to think that he can do whatever he wishes.

Thirdly, a lack of competent friends and decent companions who can correct him or offer honest advice (al-Māwardī 2012: 377).

Meanwhile, for al-Māwardī, self-admiration emerges out of two reasons, of which the first is constant glorification from close friends. The second one is the habit of exaggeration and insincere praise from people. Al-Māwardī claims that human beings like receiving compliments and are inclined to listen to praise from others. Therefore, for him, an individual ought to be aware of the dangerous aspects of praise and veneration and prevent himself from believing in these words of praise and glorification (ibid. 379). This is to argue that constant hypocritical compliments from others make an individual overthink his virtues. He consequently sees his virtues in a higher position than they are in reality.

Equally, it could be that receiving praises and compliments from others corrupt an individual and later on leads him to start praising himself, which again reflects an

¹¹⁰ The concept of *al-ulfah* (social integration) was explained previously.

advanced stage of arrogance. The individual praises himself either because he thinks people are not sufficiently aware of his virtues or forget to appreciate him sufficiently. This can be to deceive people and hide his unethical attributes. Thus, through the reiteration of praising the self, people believe that he is speaking truthfully about himself. It could also be the case that an individual is inclined to and enjoys listening to praise about himself. For al-Māwardī, apart from what is the actual primary cause behind arrogance, this reveals not only pure ignorance but also a discreditable deficiency of individual ethics (al-Māwardī 2012: 380).

Al-Māwardī describes how arrogance and self-admiration negatively influence the individual himself and society. He recommends solutions that an individual should consider to avoid arrogance and self-admiration. For him, an individual ought to reevaluate how and from what he was created, as this reminds and encourages him to stay humble (al-Māwardī 2012: 376). Furthermore, an individual ought to seek guidance in finding honest companions and friends who can help purify the heart and mind. Decent and honest companions and friends, from al-Māwardī's view, are like a mirror as they show one the unethical attributions that one's own self is not even aware of. Hence, an individual becomes more conscious to correct his manners and actions. Thus, when an individual eliminates the causes of arrogance and self-admiration, he replaces arrogance with humbleness and modesty, in which he recognizes his position as it is. Likewise, an individual replaces self-admiration with sociability. The latter is the main reason humankind is inclined to social solidarity and deters from hatred (ibid. 381).

A self-admiring or arrogant individual is most probably extremely satisfied with his personality and characters, so he neither realizes his immoral attributes nor will change and refine them. Due to this fact, it is safe to argue that arrogance and self-admiration restrict people from refining and improving their virtuous characters, which reflect directly and negatively on the way people interact in society. Another possible outcome of arrogance and self-admiration is that people will be unconcerned in listening to an arrogant or self-admiring individual because they increase distance and alienation in society. Strictly speaking, arrogance and self-admiration has a destructive impact on people's daily lives and damage social interaction and relationships in society. This is to argue that arrogance and self-

admiration creates alienation and estrangement among people in society. Therefore, such attributes ought to be eliminated or reduced as much as possible.

A close reading of al-Māwardī demonstrates that his emphasis on eliminating every possible aspect of arrogance and self-admiration as the foremost traits in this concern is because the arrogant and self-admired individual frequently desires to overpower and dominate others. Even though an arrogant individual exaggerates estimating his position in society, he still desires to overpower others, which is the opposite of positive engagement in social solidarity based on equality. In a strict sense, an arrogant or self-admiring individual is considered a threat to social cohesion and integrity.

Consequently, avoiding arrogance and self-admiration, from al-Māwardī's perspective, are fundamental principles in any institution. This is because these wicked attributes desire to exercise – illegitimate – hegemony over others in society. This is to say that eliminating arrogance and self-admiration means more social cohesion and harmony instead of authoritarian systems and despotism. Al-Māwardī's selection of arrogance and self-admiration to be the first attributes to elaborate on is due to their centrality for personal discipline. In the case that a person is arrogant and admires himself, he will not be able to discipline himself and behave ethically as his arrogance and self-admiration make him blind to realize his moral weakness.

Moreover, as a jurist, al-Māwardī knows that the first sin was pride and arrogance by Satan. He also knows that the Prophet Muhammad said that “No one will enter Paradise who has pride in his heart equal to the weight of a grain of mustard seed {...}.” All of these reasons motivate al-Māwardī to start from this topic. Even though arrogance and self-admiration are personal characteristics, their consequences can still destructively impact society.

5.2. The characteristic ethical traits

I argue that understanding the meaning of ethical traits is essential in civilization studies, likewise it is the reason behind its constant motion and changes. In this part of the chapter, my objective is to answer the questions; what is the meaning of what

al-Māwardī calls *ḥusn al-khulq*, i.e., “the characteristic ethical traits?” And what are the potential causes that lead an individual to lose or to change his *ḥusn al-khulq*? To have a comprehensive understanding of *ḥusn al-khulq*, it is crucial to answer the question, what are the solutions that al-Māwardī offers to maintain and improve the characteristic ethical traits on the individual level? What happens when a person changes negatively or loses his *ḥusn al-khulq*, and what would be the consequences not only for the individual himself, but also for society? In other words, how can the absence or weakness of *ḥusn al-khulq* influence social solidarity and cohesion?

Ḥusn al-khulq means dealing and acting in a social environment decently and without violence. According to al-Māwardī, *Ḥusn al-khulq* consists of distinctive components such as benevolent character traits, kind nature, social inclination, and friendly expression and politeness in articulating the self. Furthermore, al-Māwardī brings the notion of justice in this concern again to argue that *ḥusn al-khulq* has certain limits and appropriate timing to be applied. Thus, if an individual exceeds the limit of these characteristic ethical traits, i.e., performing these distinctive moral traits in a wrong place or exaggerated manner, then it might become a kind of humiliation.¹¹¹ Likewise, if an individual abstains from performing *ḥusn al-khulq* in its appropriate position and context, it becomes hypocrisy. Therefore, if a person possesses these attributions, e.g., humiliation and hypocrisy, he will neither get justified sincere affection and respect from people, nor appreciative influences (c.f. al-Māwardī 2012: 385). This is to argue that a close reading of al-Māwardī demonstrates that his emphasis on these characteristic ethical traits is in principle meant to produce resilient social solidarity and cohesion among individuals and have a community established mainly on *ḥusn al-khulq*.

Furthermore, there are many reasons why a person may change from having characteristic ethical traits to having what al-Māwardī calls “*sū’ al-khulq*,” i.e., unethical distinctive features or evil character traits. Strictly speaking, there are different causes, which lead to the declination of *ḥusn al-khulq*. Al-Māwardī suggests seven general reasons and one particular reason:

¹¹¹ For instance, humbleness is in the middle between arrogance and being humiliate, so if an individual exceeds the limit of being humble this leads him to be humiliated.

1. Governorship¹¹² indicates authority and influence through an exalted position, for instance, in a political or economic function. This can reveal the essence of an individual's characteristic ethical traits, as a prestigious position can make an individual feel that he possesses power and change his *ḥusn al-khulq* to *sū' al-khulq*. For example, he might start denying his allies, family, close friends, and so on. Possible reasons for that are either the individual's depraved personality or a lack of patience and forbearance.
2. Being stripped from authority¹¹³ or a governmental position in the state. This could lead to *sū' al-khulq* due either to feelings of sadness in losing the position or impatience when accepting the experience of being stripped from authority. This can negatively impact an individual's ethics.
3. Wealth can cause a decline in an individual's ethics and individual manners. This is because the individual believes that he can acquire whatever he wishes through his wealth, and ethics per se or ethical manners do not play any role in this respect. Thus, for al-Māwardī, becoming wealthy can divulge the actual substance of an individual's character.
4. Bankruptcy and poverty also could change the good ethics of an individual for two possible explanations. On the one hand, an individual might be too prideful and arrogant to submit to others. On the other hand, an individual might feel overwhelmed with sorrow due to the loss of wealth and richness.

¹¹² In Arabic "*al-wilāyah*".

¹¹³ In Arabic "*Al-'Azl*", which indicates in this context a kind of punishment.

5. Enormous concern and anxiety confuse the reason in its ability to concentrate on *husn al-khulq*. Likewise, worry and anxiety disturb the heart and mind, preventing the individual from patience.
6. Diseases, which change not only the shape of the body, but can also change an individual's characters and manners. Individual ethics can be affected negatively and weakened since an individual can come to a point where he can no longer bear any struggle. He would lose his patience and persistence in behaving based on proper manners and ethics.
7. Growing old, the consequences of which are the weakening of the body and an individual's ethics and behavior. This is to say that just as growing old makes the body weak, it can also make an individual impatient, so, he might deal indecently in his social environment.

For al-Māwardī, these are seven common causes, which can generate and lead to *sū' al-khulq* (al-Māwardī 2012: 385- 9). Of these, the most essential are the first and fifth reasons. For the first, certainly having a vital position can make people feel that they do not need others, and based on this, they will start to behave unethically and with arrogance. Likewise, the fifth reason is when people have too much concern and anxiety about the present and the future, leading them to become less patient and intolerant in dealing and behaving with others.

Still, for al-Māwardī, there is one additional reason that causes a particular consequence of *sū' al-khulq*, hate. What is unique about this is that hate emerges out of self-will. Unlike the other previous seven reasons, an individual chooses to hate, which are not decided upon by an individual himself. A further outcome of hate is that the hater keeps people away from him. The consequence of his hostility affects the hater and leads to corruption of his ethics and manners since people will always avoid him. Strictly speaking, according to al-Māwardī, if *sū' al-khulq* exists, it occurs evidently for a specific reason. Therefore, to eliminate *sū' al-khulq*, an individual should primarily eliminate its cause(s).

Al-Māwardī covers a wide range of justifications, explaining why an individual changes his ethics and manners from good to evil. This is for the individual to be very aware of all of these aspects, whether in evaluating his behavior and actions or how he interacts with other people. Furthermore, when an individual is conscious of these various aspects, he will better understand others' behaviors. For instance, if an individual interacts with an older adult who is impatient and uptight, he will tolerate him since he is aware of the possible negative aspects of growing old. Strictly speaking, al-Māwardī's aim here is to instruct and educate the individual to have more sympathy and solidarity in interacting with others, so that society can be more consistent and stable. This is to argue that *ḥusn al-khulq* binds and fastens people firmly together. Therefore, *ḥusn al-khulq* ought to be included in any institution's structures and formality so that people will have more social integrity and permanency in their relationships.

It can be safely said that the objective of performing *ḥusn al-khulq* is that individuals start spontaneously acting and dealing with each other based on the principles of *ḥusn al-khulq*. For instance, having a friendly expression, politeness in articulating the self, and having social inclination; all of these features of *ḥusn al-khulq* make people deal and behave based on decency and kindness. Due to this, al-Māwardī reminds us that *ḥusn al-khulq* creates forgiveness among people, reduces hostility in society, eases difficulties, and softens hearts in rage. The more *ḥusn al-khulq* is prevalent in a society, the more forbearance, forgiveness, and social cohesion will be reflected in individuals' social interactions and relationships. Therefore, performing *ḥusn al-khulq* on the individual and collective level directly influences and benefits individuals in their daily lives and their social interactions and relationships.

5.3. Ḥayā'

I argue that *ḥayā'* (i.e., shame) plays a central role in the process of constructing a civilization. Furthermore, *ḥayā'* from al-Māwardī's point of view indicates and reflects virtues in social relationships. However, a person who does not behave or interact with other people based on *ḥayā'* manifests wickedness and evil character

traits. Moreover, he believes that *ḥayā'* derives from faith and trust in God¹¹⁴ (al-Māwardī 2012: 390). Furthermore, I claim that the significance of *ḥayā'* in constructing a civilization is not limited only to stimulating individuals to be better person, but it also encourages individuals to reject evil, unethical deeds and behaviors.

There is a strong relationship between *ḥayā'* and trustworthiness and reliability. The reason is that the individual who has no *ḥayā'* can betray, cheat, or deceive others because *ḥayā'* is like an internal constraint that prevents individuals from committing evil and wrong deeds and actions. *Ḥayā'* might lead people to follow the right principles and avoid evil since one will feel shame for doing bad things in front of other people. This is to state that *ḥayā'* as a virtuous quality constructively impacts not only individuals' daily life, but also the whole of society. Thus, having *ḥayā'* increases and improves many other related virtuous attributes such as trustfulness, trustworthiness, and adherence to good and opposition to destructive character traits. Strictly speaking, *ḥayā'* directly influences people's daily lives and the way they establish their social relationships.

Therefore, *ḥayā'* possesses the power to deter individuals from performing prohibited acts and ignoring their ethical commitments. *Ḥayā'* can furthermore encourage individuals to interact with others based on determined normative ethical principles. This is to state that *ḥayā'* functions as an internal guiding force of actions and behavior since it is an internal stimulus which influences, directly and indirectly, individual's actions and deeds. Nonetheless, the absence of *ḥayā'* in a society leads to exceeding the supposed boundary of religion and reason, where *hawá'*¹¹⁵ rules over them (c.f. *ibid.* 391- 2).

An institution and state authority should not control and monopolize all aspects of its residents' social, political, and economic life. Consequently, the role of a religious concept such as *ḥayā'* is to assist the individual to exercise self-discipline and

¹¹⁴ Al-Māwardī's argumentation that "*ḥayā'* derives from faith and trust in God" is clearly inspired by the Prophet Muhammad saying that "*Ḥayā'* is a part of Iman". (c.f. al-Māwardī 2012: 390).

¹¹⁵ Compare this with the concept of *hawá'* in the first chapter.

self-restraint. The state does not have to supervise separately every individual's deeds and behavior. Individuals fulfill their ethical commitments autonomously based on their moral motivations and obligations to God, fellow humans, nature, and oneself. This does not necessarily mean that religion ought to facilitate and serve a state to fulfill its functions. On the contrary, for al-Māwardī, the state ought to promote religion to be accomplished and regulated on the highest level of normative ethics and morals of both individuals and the collective (c.f. al-Māwardī 2012: 250). In the strict sense, religious concepts support social cohesion and solidarity by attaching individuals in an ethical, social unit to empower them in constructing their civilization.

From al-Māwardī's point of view, *ḥayā'* can be observed on three distinctive levels in an individual's actions and behavior (c.f. al-Māwardī 2012: 392- 5):

Firstly, having *ḥayā'* from God means normative ethical duties and commitments related to performing His commands and, at the same time shunning His restrictions and injunctions. This level of *ḥayā'* generates from a well-founded religiosity and a sound faith. Also, the internal structured system of belief establishes itself on this level of *ḥayā'*. Thus, if this level of *ḥayā'* declines, the entire structure of faith collapses internally¹¹⁶.

Secondly, having *ḥayā'* from people indicates interacting virtuously and in the best possible ethics with others and abstaining from every single harming action, whether it is behavioral or verbal. Thus, this level of *ḥayā'* mirrors the character traits of nobilities, according to al-Māwardī.

Thirdly, having *ḥayā'* from oneself is a kind of self-discipline and self-restraint in which an individual's behavior is based totally on normative ethics and virtues, even if the individual is alone without company. This level of *ḥayā'* originates from the virtue of heart and the soundness of inward thought and faith.

¹¹⁶ Doubtlessly that al-Māwardī based his argument in this concern on the prophet *ḥadīth*, which states that "*Ḥayā'* is the system of faith {...}" (as cited in al-Māwardī 2012: 394).

These unique levels of *ḥayā'* reflect again how the individual is vital in building and maintaining society and the diversity of individuals' relationships. Yet, one missing aspect of al-Māwardī's concept of *ḥayā'* is nature. Therefore, this study suggests that abstaining from every kind of harm is not only understood as limited towards the self and humanity, but it also includes nature as a fourth object of *ḥayā'*, i.e., full responsibilities towards nature. The result of completing these mentioned categories of *ḥayā'* means that the individual succeeds in possessing a higher level of qualities, nobilities, and normative ethics, and considers ethical commitments in his actions and behavior (c.f. al-Māwardī 2012: 392- 5).

Norbert Elias is famous within civilization studies for his contribution, which is based to a substantial extent on his analysis of the concept of shame in civilizations. I argue that although the idea of shame plays a significant role in his theory of "the civilizing process," still, Elias does not connect his concept of shame with any kind of religious motivation or background. Elias perceives that rationalizing a society and the civilizing process are connected firmly to feelings of shame and explains that shame comes from the fact that the individual feels doing something that conflicts with those persons' beliefs to whom the individual is bound in one form or another. Moreover, this feeling of shame facilitates and influences individuals to control themselves internally. This means that the feeling of shame is an internal conflict, in which one sees himself as inferior to others, where he fears losing the love and respect of the people to whom he is attached. Simultaneously, shame is attached to the fear of social degradation and the idea that others have superiority over oneself (Elias 1997: 409). This is to demonstrate how Elias entirely ignores religion's role in his theory of civilization.

Based on this argument presented by Norbert Elias, the feeling of shame is connected to others, whether they are from the same social class or a higher one. This leads to the question; how will individuals behave in the absence of others? To put it differently, assuming that others do not observe an individual, will he behave and act without shame? Conclusively, feeling shame could be internalized even in others' absence, which becomes a kind of routine. However, according to Elias, deeds, actions, and behavior are associated only with human beings, whereas God has no function in this regard. This is to argue that the concept of shame presented by Elias

is only on one level in comparison to the notion of *ḥayā'*, as was demonstrated by al-Māwardī, namely on the second level of *ḥayā'*.

Elias's narrow concept of *ḥayā'* could be developed to reach the third level, in the case that behavior and deeds are internalized in an individual's personality. Although Elias's concept of shame is still very limited to almost one level in comparison to al-Māwardī's extended conception of *ḥayā'*, Elias correctly notes the direct significance of shame concerning sociohistorical advancements in society. He articulates that "{...} in the same sociohistorical period in which rationalization made perceptible advances, an advance in the shame and repugnance threshold is also to be observed." (Elias 1997: 416)

To conclude, *ḥayā'* is undoubtedly a religious conception, which has a religious motivation and source, facilitating the incarnation of normative ethics, personal discipline, and personal commitments on both the individual and collective level. I argue that *ḥayā'*, in its various levels, can facilitate the civilizing process in society. In contrast, the absence of *ḥayā'* leads to a decivilizing process. In short, this means that the absence of *ḥayā'* brings societal fragmentation. Based on this argument, *ḥayā'* should be the main principle in personal discipline. It is important to note that al-Māwardī's intention in advocating for *ḥayā'* in society is to increase the social cohesion and solidarity among people since people will deal and act decently even if there is no one else there to observe them.

5.4. Forbearance and anger

I argue that if forbearance is absent in any society, society's integrity, cohesion, and stability will suffer negatively. Therefore, the significance of forbearance and eliminating anger in any society lies in implementing these ideas on both collective and individual levels. In elaborating on the concepts of forbearance¹¹⁷ and anger¹¹⁸,

¹¹⁷ Al-Māwardī uses the Arabic concept *ḥulm*.

¹¹⁸ Al-Māwardī uses the Arabic concept *al-ghaḍab*.

al-Māwardī starts by emphasizing the originality and noteworthiness of these two concepts. At the beginning of his writing, he quotes from a Quran verse which states: “Be tolerant, and command what is right, and leave alone all those who choose to remain ignorant.” (as cited in al-Māwardī 2012: 396). Al-Māwardī wants to prove that these two attributions have religious foundations and inspirations. Nevertheless, the question arises, what are the meanings of forbearance and anger?

For al-Māwardī, *ḥulm* is one of the most honorable principles, which is associated with intelligent persons. The outcomes of *ḥulm* are that it leads to the individual’s moral soundness, happiness, and acknowledgment of his applied ethics and decent behavior. Moreover, the essence of *ḥulm* is the capability to discipline the self, particularly in the heat of anger and irritation. Thus, disciplining the self is attainable through diverse reasons and motivations (ibid. 397). There are ten reasons and incentives, proposed by al-Māwardī, that can lead an individual to have *ḥulm* in interacting and cooperating with others. These are the following:

1. Mercy toward ignorant people is a benevolent act that corresponds to the individual’s kindness.
2. Having power based on nobility. Although an individual can react if he was insulted or attacked, he does not use this power since nobility is superior to revenge. Interacting in this way, according to al-Māwardī, comes from patience and self-confidence.¹¹⁹
3. Rising above insults, which comes from honor and a high-aspiration to have more virtue than the one insulting.
4. Not underestimating the insulter and his aggressiveness, which can come from arrogance and self-admiration.

¹¹⁹ Al-Māwardī was inspired by this point by a saying from the Prophet Muhammad who states that “If you have more power than your enemy, make forgiveness and forbearance a way of being thankful of being capable of defeating him” (as cited in al-Māwardī 2012: 400).

5. Feeling shame and embarrassment to respond to insults to avoid receiving a new, potentially lousy reaction from the insulter. This is motivated by self-maintenance and preserving a sense of honor and not due to fear of the insulter.
6. Having more virtues in interacting with insults and insulters. This is motivated by maintaining sociability and social cohesion among people and by generosity and kindness of character.
7. Putting an end to the insults and their causes, based on determination and self-confidence.
8. Fear of punishment for replying to an insult, which could stem either out of weakness of personality or because the situation necessitates refraining from a response since the person insulting you is a dangerous person and has more power to exact revenge.
9. Having previous trusteeship, patronage, and inviolable relationships with people. For instance, if the person insulting you was an old friend. This is motivated by true loyalty and the wish to maintain a good promise from the past.
10. Acting dishonestly to gain advantages and waiting for an appropriate opportunity to exact revenge. This emerges from meanness and not from ethics.

Indeed, these are very insightful and well-thought reasons and motivations that can lead a person to have *ḥulm* in interacting with others. For al-Māwardī, these are motives and causes that lead individuals to have diverse kinds of *ḥulm* in interacting with others. Doubtlessly, some of these reasons are motivated by religion, nobility, and virtues, however, others are not. Thus, for him, even though *ḥulm* per se is a virtue, it is still more appropriate for an individual to perform *ḥulm* based on the best ethical means and motivations than on self-interest because ethical objectives necessitate ethical means and vice versa. Al-Māwardī gives an example that not

responding to insults and insulters out of nobility is more virtuous than not responding based on meanness or fear of punishment from the insulter (al-Māwardī 2012: 404- 5).

It is safe to assume that forbearance and avoiding anger is a very substantial element in maintaining stability in social interactions and relationships. Furthermore, forbearance's presence in society increases efficiency, feelings of peace, and positive relations among individuals. This is to argue that forbearance and avoiding anger straightforwardly benefits people's daily lives and social interaction structures. However, the main issue with anger is that when an individual is enraged, reason and rationality cannot direct his deeds, behavior, and character. An enraged person might commit more dangerous or unethical acts since his reason is not dictating his actions and behaviors. Unquestionably, when an individual is angry, he might cause damage and harm – psychological and physical – to himself and the people he is dealing with them. Consequently, it is safe to say that the more forbearance there is among people in a society, the more social solidarity and stability they will have. Likewise, the more they avoid anger, the more reason and rationality will be guiding their deeds and behaviors.

Nevertheless, this is not to state that an individual should never become angry at all. On the contrary, there are occasions where a person should become angry, for instance, in the case he witnesses injustice and unfairness. Consequently, if there are justified ethical reasons, such as witnessing oppression and persecution, a person must become angry. Otherwise, he loses many moral attributions such as self-respect and a sense of honor. Not being angry on such occasions also indicates self-humiliation and disgrace (ibid. 405). However, losing self-discipline and becoming angry without a justified reason is a negative character trait.

Furthermore, there are different methods for decreasing and controlling anger, which help a person maintain their *ḥulm* as an original attribution of their personality and personal discipline. For instance, an individual should reconsider the consequences of anger, such as regret, sorrow, blame, and revenge. Additionally, al-Māwardī suggests that controlling anger leads others to have respect and love for the forbearing person, and he can discipline himself better. Therefore, instead of

becoming angry and making people avoid him and causing his behavior to appear repugnant to others, an individual brings more social solidarity and cohesion into his society when he eliminates unnecessary anger.

Another possible method is that when an individual considers the rewards of forgiveness and forbearance that could help him force himself to control his anger to obtain the award and avoid blame and punishment (al-Māwardī 2012: 408- 11). Al-Māwardī aims, through the solidification of *ḥulm* and elimination of *al-ghaḍab*, to institute strong social cohesion and solidarity. This is to argue that al-Māwardī stresses forbearance as a principle because it ought to exist in any society since there will be no social cohesion and persistence without forbearance.

5.5.Sincerity and lying

The absence of sincerity on individual and societal levels leads to the destruction of confidence and trustworthiness in people and institutions. Likewise, lying causes instability and loss of confidence in institutions. For al-Māwardī, lying and deceiving encompasses every possible aspect of evil, and is the basis for every fault. This is not only for its damaging consequences on society, but also for its immoral future effects, as deceiving produces gossip, gossip creates aversion, and aversion leads to hostility. This means that deceiving eventually leads to hostility among individuals in society.

Furthermore, there is neither comfortable existence of life, nor safety for both individual and the collective in the time of hostility (al-Māwardī 2012: 413). Still, what are the meanings of sincerity and lying according to al-Māwardī? Sincerity is merely “reporting about an object as it is in fact.” On the contrary, lying is “reporting about an object not in accordance to what it is in actuality” (ibid. 413).

Furthermore, there are motivations and causes for both sincerity and lying. For al-Māwardī, the motives for sincerity are necessitated by reason and approved by religion. Therefore, lying is unacceptable by reason, and religion also deters it. Likewise, sincerity is an essential and indispensable characteristic of a human being

by religious and rational justifications. For these reasons, al-Māwardī does not consider lying to be an innate character trait of humankind (ibid. 413). Moreover, he argues that there are four reasons why an individual should be sincere and avoid any kind of lying or deceiving (al-Māwardī 2012: 414- 5), which are the following:

Firstly, rationality encourages good attributes such as sincerity and prevents evil characteristics such as lying and deceiving.

Secondly, religion obligates sincerity and discourages lying. This because religion should not allow what rationality prohibits. Still, religion has one additional point than reason in this concern: religion prevents lying even if lying brings benefits. However, reason avoids what does not bring benefit. This means that religion has a deeper ethical justification and command in this regard than reason.

Third, *al-Murū'ah*¹²⁰ (i.e., the sense of honor) has an internally oriented ethic and personal discipline, leading people to avoid lying and motivating them while at the same time being sincere.

Fourth, humans possess the desire to receive praise and hold a respectable reputation in terms of sincerity because sincerity is a fine attribute that individuals would like to be associated with.

Furthermore, al-Māwardī illuminates that the causes of lying are diverse. Through lying, individuals desire to accomplish benefits or eliminate possible harm. For al-Māwardī, deception is unethical, unacceptable, and cannot be deemed positive since ugly cannot be pretty, and evil cannot become benevolent.¹²¹ Individuals wish to say something attractive and to give cheerful speech to obtain people's attention, and so they may lie. For al-Māwardī, this is worse than the first reason since it is

¹²⁰ The concept of *al-Murū'ah* will be explained in details in the next chapter.

¹²¹ Al-Māwardī uses a hadith by the Prophet Muhammad in this regard, which states that "inquire and follow the sincerity, even if you see in it destruction, still safety is in sincerity, also avoid lying, even if you see in it the safety, since in lying is the real destruction" (as cited in al-Māwardī 2012: 416).

driven by selfishness and a depraved intention. Some people might also lie as revenge against an enemy, so an individual lies by describing an enemy with immoral attributes, which are also false. Besides, for al-Māwardī, such a reason for lying is worse than the two motives mentioned above since it contains an unethical purpose and exposes a person to lying. Finally, by lying frequently, it becomes habitual and part of the personality. Thus, an individual can be a liar and a deceiver without even being conscious of it. Indeed, this presents an advanced level of deception, which is more dangerous for the liar himself and society as a whole (al-Māwardī 2012: 415- 7).

The discussion above demonstrates how sincerity can play a significant role in a society because it leads and produces more social cohesion, sociability, trust, and social solidarity. Therefore, as an ethical principle, sincerity ought to be presented in the formulation of any institution. On the contrary, lying is an evil character trait that corrupts the individual himself and society. Moreover, one can go one step further and argue that these attributions can also play a significant role in the relationships among civilizations, whether it is to maintain and empower social solidarity through sincerity or create hate, aversion, and hostility by lying and deceiving.

It is worth mentioning that sincerity is related to every aspect of organizing human life and empowers and improves mutual trust. Furthermore, it is self-evident that mutual trust leads to more confidence in social interactions, and relationships and confidence increase society's stability. Otherwise, lying and deception increase mutual distrust among people. Based on this, it is safe to say that when an individual deceives others, he harms his reputation and relationships and contributes to destructive consequences on the collective level.

This is to highlight that sincerity brings many constructive outcomes in society. On the individual level, a sincere person will have more confidence in himself than a deceptive individual. The sincere person knows his words are actual and will have no suspicion, which means he will have more confidence in himself and the way he is interacting and cooperating with people. Also, a sincere person will be worthy of praise, and people will be content in dealing and interacting with him. Nevertheless, a lying individual will be avoided, and people will distrust him. Strictly speaking,

being sincere is a critical element that benefits society's social interactions and relationships. Consequently, sincerity is a quality that effectively and beneficially influences people's daily lives and how they arrange their social relationships.

5.6. Malicious envy and rivalry

What are the differences between *al-ḥasad* and *al-munāfasah*? On the one hand, *ḥasad* can be translated as malicious envy, and the essence of *ḥasad* is desiring to have specific things that others already have and wishing for them to lose those things. *al-Ḥasad* then is a corrupt desire. On the other hand, *al-munāfasah*, which can be translated as a constructive rivalry, means desiring and trying to have such virtues and ethical character traits that other virtuous and good individuals have, without wishing harm on anyone. Thus, *al-munāfasah* according to al-Māwardī is a virtue that leads the individual not only to gain more virtues and ethics by following the example of virtuous peoples, but also does not include any evil intentions toward others, as is the case with *al-ḥasad* (al-Māwardī 2012: 426).

Al-Māwardī suggests three causes of malicious envy or *ḥasad*. The foremost cause is an envy that is mixed with hate. Still, this is not pervasive malicious envy since the individual does not hate everyone. Furthermore, when the envied individual has virtues and something praiseworthy, which the envier cannot realize himself, the envier becomes jealous and desires what others have while not obtaining it. Lastly, when the envier lacks ethics, he attempts to prevent others from gaining good ethics. For al-Māwardī, such an envious person will have neither a comfortable life nor could he be satisfied, since if the envious has power, he will take revenge, and if he is weak, he will be in a feeling of deep sorrow. That is, no matter what, he will always be discontent (al-Māwardī 2012: 426- 7).

This indicates that *al-ḥasad* is a very harmful character trait, which harms the body and the mind of the ill-wisher. *al-Ḥasad* also corrupts one's religion because the individual will not be satisfied with what has been given to him. If he also wishes evil for others, this brings enormous discomforts and sadness to the individual, which decreases his social solidarity with others (c.f. al-Māwardī 2012: 424- 6).

The negative outcome of malicious envy is destructive not only for the envious individual, but also for society. Furthermore, malicious envy is interrelated with injustice because an envious individual wishes for people to lose their valuable things, which is a kind of injustice toward others. In addition to that, *hasad* indicates dissatisfaction with what one has, so an envious individual will neither be satisfied, nor content with what he has, nor will he be content with what others have. This can lead the envious individual to be unproductive, depressed, and have negative attitudes toward himself and others. Thus, *al-ḥasad* is an unconstructive attribute that can harm people's daily lives and the way they organize their social interactions and relationships.

al-Ḥasad is a spiritual and psychological problem. Therefore, it is significant to ask how an individual can heal it. Religion proposes normative ethics and personal discipline, which softens an individual's personality and helps the individual remove any decadent character traits by constantly disciplining oneself until the ethical characteristics replace the decadent ones. Furthermore, reason plays a role in considering *al-ḥasad* and its consequences as unethical since reason facilitates and encourages the individual to avoid *al-ḥasad*. A determined will further enables the individual to have a more pleasant and comfortable life. Another method to heal *al-ḥasad* is to consider its potential damage in the future, which produces hate and alienation in the envious person. Thus, by ameliorating this immoral character trait, the individual becomes better engaged in society, benefiting from it himself and benefiting other people as well.

These are several potential elements of how an individual can heal the problem of *al-ḥasad*. However, if the individual fails to eliminate this evil character and replace it with noble ethics, there will be destructive effects on the individual and society. For instance, *al-ḥasad* causes illnesses, as the envious person's regrets and sorrows do not end. Additionally, it reduces the envious one's social status and decreases his moral position because people turn against him and estrange him. Furthermore, people feel hatred towards the envious one until the moment when he will not find any supporter. Consequently, the envious person will become known for his hostility and be identified as a hated person. Lastly, the envious person gains sins for not

considering God's given destiny as justice and thinking that God's grace and kindness are given to people who do not deserve it (al-Māwardī 2012: 430- 1).

This is to argue that eliminating *al-ḥasad* in a society is as essential as personal discipline and self-commitments. This elimination requires a gradual and constant effort from every member of society. For al-Māwardī, this process is again determined by both religion and reason. Since eliminating *al-ḥasad* benefits the individual and the collective, it also removes negativity and hostility toward others, making an individual more constructively engaged in society. However, *al-munāfasah* is an ethical character and means that a person seeks to have more virtues like other virtuous and noble people and does not wish any harm to others. In other words, I argue that eliminating *al-ḥasad* facilitates social cohesion and social solidarity and increases sociability. The more *al-munāfasah* is applied in a society, the more virtues and noble ethics can be observed.

5.7. Conclusion

As I showed "*Adab Riyāḍah wa-Istiṣlāḥ*," which I translated as "Personal Discipline and Institutions," is based on rationality. Reason obligates people to follow these kinds of personal discipline. To al-Māwardī, if a person has reason, his reason will command him to implement these instructions. For instance, a rational person would avoid arrogance, self-admiration, and *al-ḥasad*. Meanwhile, he will be tolerant and behave and deal decently in society. "*Adab Riyāḍah wa-Istiṣlāḥ*" brings benefit not only for the individual, but for the whole society. Thus, reason ought to accept "*Adab Riyāḍah wa-Istiṣlāḥ*" elaborated above, since a rational person realizes the right as right and correspondingly approves of it and performs it while recognizing wrong as wrong and avoids it.

"*Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn*" directs and suggests to the individual how to behave and act in a stipulated framework. As I showed, al-Māwardī's proposed framework is fundamentally based on ethics in this chapter. For him, ethics contain qualities of community-building forces to promote social cohesion and unity. Reason's role here is controlling and restraining the passions and evil desires.

Furthermore, reason guides individuals to be integrated parts of their society. i.e., reason and rationality facilitate individuals' formulation to be loyal and effective parts of their community. Thus, it is not surprising that for al-Māwardī, reason is the essential instrument influencing individuals to be an integrated part of their society. Strictly speaking, reason is the main motive and cause for individuals to be integrated and active in society. Likewise, for al-Māwardī, religion and *'ilm* motivate and encourage individuals to be incorporated into part of their community since human beings are social by nature and need others to survive, build a community, civilization, and advance their life.

Tilman Nagel reminds us that for al-Māwardī, the personality should not be refined and advanced only for its own sake, instead of forming and shaping the individual to become a better community member. For instance, an individual should eliminate arrogance and self-admiration from his character and behavior. Such immoral qualities are what first and foremost disturbs interpersonal relationships in society. This is to say that a fault in an individual's personality affects not only the person himself, but rather it can impact the whole society (Nagel 1981: 387). For al-Māwardī, the individual's character ought to be nurtured and raised to become a relevant part of society. (ibid. 395). Demonstrated by this fact, al-Māwardī's attention was essentially on individuals even though his objective is to improve and maintain the collective.

Nagel emphasizes rightly that for al-Māwardī, there is a precondition for establishing a society: each person ought to struggle initially against his egotistical characteristics and unethical manners to eliminate all selfish and nasty qualities. This will consequently lead and assist in forming a cohesive society (Nagel 1981: 396). There was no doubt that such innovative thoughts make al-Māwardī one of the first Muslim thinkers to elaborate on society, the individual-collective interactions and how to build a society. For such reasons, Tilman Nagel observes that al-Māwardī is the first Sunni scholar. To him, we owe the first comprehensive description and presentation of how the Muslim community can be formed (ibid. 395). The Islamic community includes non-Muslims, and the community operates on ethical rules and required guidelines of Islam. Such a community does not require members to be Muslims.

After expounding on all of these personal attributes, it significant to ask how a society maintains and improves such essential qualities. In the next chapter, I will demonstrate how al-Māwardī elaborates on how the abovementioned attributes and discipline can be preserved in a society. He proposes what he calls “*Adab Muwāḍi‘ah wa Istiṣlāḥ*,” which includes social structures, shared social values and self-discipline in order to institute a steady informal institution(s), paying attention to both individual and collective roles in society.



Chapter Six

Informal Institution Theory

6.1. Introduction

This chapter argues that a stable civilization depends on permanent and stable informal institutions since informal institutions direct norms, manners, and self-enforcing behaviors. People in a society deal and act based on these norms and ethics, even if there is not any official sanctions or authority to implement and enforce these rules. Furthermore, I argue that a society's stability and persistence depends on having functional informal institutions, which can regulate its people's behavior and social values. This is to say that a stable society is centered on stable informal institutions. By informal institutions, this study means shared social values and norms, customs, and manners of certain people in a particular society based on expected and accepted patterns of behavior, norms, and self-discipline.¹²²

Al-Māwardī's informal institution theory is proposed in the last part of his *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*. Al-Māwardī entitled this part “*Adab Muwāḍi‘ah wa Istiṣlāḥ*,” in which he suggests social structures, routines, shared social values, and self-discipline, to institute a steady informal institution, considering both the individual and collective. The main argument in this chapter is that al-Māwardī aims to pave the way to establish institutions that maintain stability in society, and enable it to have stronger solidarity and cohesion so that social life can be more secure, peaceful, and stable.

This chapter draws a theoretical framework on informal institution theory to locate al-Māwardī's contribution within institutional theory literature. It aims to answer several related questions. What is an informal institution? What are the types of informal institutions and why are they essential? How do informal institutions

¹²² Compare this with the definition suggested by Eesley et al. “informal institutions are generally understood as the beliefs, values, and norms that establish what are socially accepted and expected patterns of behavior within a group” (Eesley et al 2018: 394).

emerge in a civilization, how do they function and change social reality, social behaviors, and how social conventions can be sustained? These theoretical questions can be answered based on al-Māwardī’s contributions and by delving into the works of scholars such as John Searle, Hans-Joachim Lauth, Douglass North William Scott, and David Lewis. Their theorizations will enrich the discussion in this concern. They are chosen for their unique contributions to this particular topic. Their theoretical approaches help us to understand al-Māwardī’s informal institution theory structurally and present it appropriately.

As this chapter demonstrates, al-Māwardī’s “*adab Muwāḍi‘ah wa Istiṣlāḥ*,” or informal institution theory contains eight components; These include the following topics: utterance and silence (language), patience and sorrow, consultation, confidentiality, mocking and excessive laughing, optimism, and pessimism, *al-murū‘ah* (sense of honor), and lastly, various forms of *ādāb*. Figure V clarifies al-Māwardī’s informal institution theory's structures, which is the topic of this chapter.




Figure V explains the structures and components of al-Māwardī’s informal institutional theory.

al-Māwardī views these principles as based totally on social conventions and rationality (al-Māwardī 2013: 433). Unlike in the previous chapters of his *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*, this explains why in this chapter he does not refer much to Islamic resources, such as the Quran and the Hadith. Nevertheless, this does not mean that these eight components are entirely isolated from religion, as several of them are somehow associated with religious values (for example, being patient). Instead, this is to argue that these concepts and notions in this chapter can have universal implementations.

6.2. Theoretical Framework: Institutional Theory

It is essential to clarify what institutional theory is to locate al-Māwardī's contribution to this concern. William Richard Scott, a specialist in institutional theory, expounds on Institutional Theory's meaning and objective. He states that "Institutional theory attends to the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure. It considers the processes by which structures, including schemas, rules, norms, and routines, become established as authoritative guidelines for social behavior. It inquires into how these elements are created, diffused, adopted, and adapted over space and time; and how they fall into decline and disuse" (Scott 2005: 460). This theoretical definition helps us to obtain a better understanding of al-Māwardī's contributions to this respect.

In his book "Institutional theory in political science: The new institutionalism," B. Guy Peters maintains that there should be a common core when we are outlining institutions. I will elaborate on this to extend the meaning of institutions. Firstly, there should be what Peters calls "a structural feature of the society." The structure could be formal such as a legislature, or informal, such as a set of shared norms and values. Secondly, there should be some form of permanency and stability. Peters states that "Individuals may decide to meet for coffee one afternoon. That could be very pleasant, but it would not be an institution. If they decide to meet every Thursday afternoon at the same time and place, that would begin to take on the features of an institution." Thirdly, institutions should be able to influence people's behavior and action. Peters argues that "an institution should in some way constrain

the behavior of its members. Again, the constraints may be formal or they may be informal, but they must be constraints if there is to be an institution in place”. Lastly, there should be a sense of shared values amongst the institution’s adherents (Peters 1999: 18- 9).

So, what is the difference between informal and formal institutions, and how are they defined within institutional theory literature? “Formal institutions are rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and enforced through channels widely accepted as official. This includes state institutions (courts, legislatures, bureaucracies) and state-enforced rules (constitutions, laws, regulations)”. Nevertheless, informal institutions are “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727).

Informal and formal institutions are significant and can bring benefits to society. Informal rules can enhance society's performance and stability when formal institutions are ineffective, insufficient, and weak (Helmke and Levitsky 2006: 8). Douglass North explains how institutions facilitate and guide human interaction and behavior. He states, “Institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life. They are a guide to human interaction, so that when we wish to greet friends on the street, drive an automobile, buy oranges, borrow money, form a business, bury our dead, or whatever, we know (or can learn easily) how to perform these tasks” (North 1990: 3- 4). Furthermore, formal and informal institutions empower society’s stability and improve social life (Scott 2005: 464).

It is essential to bear in mind that al-Māwardī lived in an unstable social and political environment, in which the ‘Abbāsīd Caliphate had started to decline and was not capable of governing neither the Seljuks, nor the Shia Buyid dynasty. Therefore, for al-Māwardī, forming an informal institution supports regulating, persisting, and organizing the social, economic, and political relationships in society. Informal institutions enhance certainty in society (Lauth 2000: 25). This is because informal institutions can stabilize and facilitate social life and open boundless potentials and opportunities, which would be impossible without informal institutional structures and social conventions. This chapter shows that al-Māwardī’s informal institution

theory suggests regulative and constitutive rules and obligations, so people in a society can behave and act correspondingly.¹²³

Therefore, al-Māwardī pays a great deal of attention to these shared values and norms in society. Informal institutions stabilize society's order and increase social cohesion, persistence, and stability of society. This study shows this argument is reflected in every element that al-Māwardī suggested in “*Adab Muwāḍi‘ah wa Istiṣlāḥ*.” Throughout his proposed elements and notions, al-Māwardī has the question in mind of how to enhance and empower the stability, human interaction, and maintenance of his society's permanency. For him, the manifestation of informal institutions can include social customs and norms in economic, political, social behavior, etc. It is important to note that a deeper understanding of these norms, the motivation for human behavior, and its shared values, facilitate a better understanding of a society and its political, economic, and social systems.

Nonetheless, informal institutions are new to many fields of study. To the best of my knowledge, there is no existing literature on civilization and informal institutions. This is also the case in many other fields. For instance, Helmke and Levitsky observe that studying informal institutions in political science is a new phenomenon (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 725). Furthermore, they articulate that “Indeed, much current literature assures that actors’ incentives and expectations are shaped primarily, if not exclusively, by formal rules. Such a narrow focus can be problematic for it risks missing much of what drives political behavior and can hinder efforts to explain important phenomena” (ibid. 725- 6). Therefore, focusing only on formal institutions and neglecting the informal is problematic. This critique is not limited to political behavior. North also warns of focusing only on formal rules. He argues that “Looking only at the formal rules themselves, therefore, gives us an inadequate and frequently misleading notion about the relationship between formal constraints and performance” (North 1990: 53).

¹²³ This is similar to John Searle, who states that “Institutional structures enable us to do all sorts of things that we could not do without those structures; but this enabling function can be performed only if it is, at least in part, constituted by a deontic system, a system of desire-independent reasons for action” (Searle 2010: 141). See also (ibid. 69).

In his book *adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn*, al-Māwardī was not concerned with formal institutions. Nevertheless, this study does not undervalue the centrality of formal institutions. On the contrary, individuals in any society deal and act through both formal and informal institutions. They both guarantee the efficiency and continuity of society. However, al-Māwardī, as this study demonstrates, concentrates only on informal institutions, for the reason that informal institutions are a substantial substructure even of formal institutions.¹²⁴ Still, it is essential to elaborate on the different types of informal institutions. Hans-Joachim Lauth distinguishes three types of informal institutions. He states

{...} formal and informal institutions can have different relationships to each other. It is possible to distinguish between three types of relationships: the complementary type, in which they co-exist side by side and mutually reinforce and support each other; secondly, the substitutive type, in which either formal or informal institutions are effective in the sense of being functionally equivalent to each other; finally, the conflicting type, when the two systems of rules are incompatible. (Lauth 2000: 25).

Based on Hans-Joachim Lauth's work, Helmke and Levitsky expand the types of informal institutions to four.

First: complementary informal institutions, which complement and fill the shortcomings in the formal institutions. This type enhances and strengthens formal institutions.

¹²⁴ Compare this with "Informal institutions are particularly influential because, rather than being imposed on individuals by policymakers, informal institutions are taken-for-granted social and cultural norms that are embedded in continuing social relationships. Informal institutions take time to form initially from dyadic relationships that become accepted as social realities and thus it takes significant time to change them as shared beliefs must change, even when formal institutions change." (Eesley et al 2018: 396). And "Because informal institutions are formed over time through a process of social interactions, they are likely to have effects that are difficult to change through formal institutions alone leading to relative permanence {...}" (Ibid. 397).

Second: accommodating informal institutions. "These informal institutions create incentives to behave in ways that alter the substantive effects of formal rules, but without directly violating them." This type also enhances and improves the stability of formal institutions.

Third: competing informal institutions, which is when informal and formal institutions conflict. When the actor follows one, then he violates the other and vice versa.

Fourth: substitutive informal institutions, which accomplish what formal institutions fail to achieve. This informal institution appears when the state's structures are weak and fragile (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 728- 30).

Al-Māwardī does not directly address these four types of informal institutions. However, a close reading of *Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn* demonstrates that he does in fact elaborate on all of these types. First, in terms of complementary informal institutions, al-Māwardī sees optimism as essential for social value. However, this value is usually unwritten in a formal institution. As it will be explained, being an optimist positively affects social interactions. Put differently, this informal rule enables formal institutions to function better. Second, accommodating informal institutions, a case in point is the notion of consultation (*shūrā*). As it will be clarified, consultation enhances and improves social interaction's stability, decision-making and empowers formal institutions. Third, al-Māwardī will discuss competing informal institutions under such characteristics as mocking others and excessive laughing. We will see that al-Māwardī warns from mocking others and excessive laughing, since that might lead the actor to violate formal institutions. Fourth, substitutive informal institutions, for instance, being patient, as formal institutions might fail to make people patient. Nonetheless, informal institutions as an inner motive and social value encourage individuals to be patient.

Al-Māwardī's understanding of "*Adab Muwāḍi'ah wa Istiṣlāḥ* (informal institutions) is that they have a functional role in empowering and enhancing social interactions, stability, and solidarity. They fill in the gaps where formal institutions have no power or influence. Informal institutions have complementary functions and roles in solving

problems for issues not solved in formal institutions. Strictly speaking, by focusing on informal institutions, al-Māwardī wants to advocate for a more productive, effective, and stable social life and interactions.

The social values suggested by al-Māwardī in this chapter are grounded on social conventions and rationality (al-Māwardī 2013: 433). As a fundamental constituent of any informal institution, forming a social convention is a cumulative process that needs tremendous time and effort and necessitates a habitualization of these norms on the individual and collective levels to convert them into an institution. For instance, this was explained by Berger and Luckmann, who state that “{...} processes of habitualization precede any institutionalization {...}” (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 71). Meaning, an institution emerges after there is repetition and a reciprocal type of habitualized actions by agents. (ibid. 72).

Additionally, there are two things to consider in the formation and application of an informal institution theory. On the one hand, there is a necessity for a massive application of it by a majority of actors. On the other hand, it is not a prerequisite that many people participate in the formulation of an institution. As David Lewis argues, “In the case only a few people play an active part in initiating the new convention; the rest are a responsive audience.” (Lewis 2002: 86).

Besides, Lewis demonstrates how the source of a convention is not so important, as he states that “Conventions are like fires: under favorable conditions, a sufficient concentration of heat spreads and perpetuates itself. The nature of the fire does not depend on the original source of heat. Matches may be our best fire starters, but that is no reason to think of fires started otherwise as any the less fires.” (ibid. 88). Though the source for forming a convention is often unknown, factors such as habit, etiquettes, and other methods play a role. Therefore, in this chapter, I argue that al-Māwardī presents general social values, rules, and norms for social conventions, which can be seen as a fundamental step for forming informal institutions.

It is worth mentioning that there are infinite potential variabilities for humankind’s improvement in every society. If all possibilities are open without any restrictions, it will cause absolute chaos and lack of stability and, consequently, risk society's

persistence and resilience. Formal and informal institutions' function is to restrict these limitless possibilities, whereas informal institutions arrange and organize people's behavior and manners in society. In other words, constraints are fundamental in daily social interaction. North justifies the need for constraints, he states that “In all societies from the most primitive to the most advanced, people impose constraints upon themselves to give a structure to their relations with others. Under conditions of limited information and limited computational ability, constraints reduce the costs of human interaction as compared to a world of no institutions. However, it is much easier to describe and be precise about the formal rules that societies devise than to describe and be precise about the informal ways by which human beings have structured human interaction (North 1990: 36).

So, the question arises as to how formal and informal institutions function. Hans-Joachim Lauth answers this by stating, “Whilst formal institutions are guaranteed by state agencies and their disapproval is sanctioned by that state, informal institutions are based solely on the fact of their existence and of their effectiveness. The power of sanction involved with them is linked largely to social mechanisms of exclusion, or is based quite simply on the condition that its non-utilization minimizes the chances of gaining access to goods and services. Informal institutions are equally known and recognizable publicly; however, they are not laid down in writing” (Lauth 2000: 24).

Likewise, Helmke and Levitsky remind us how informal institutions are enforced in society. They observe that “Unlike formal enforcement mechanisms (police, courts), informal sanctioning mechanisms are often subtle, hidden, and even illegal. They may range from hostile remarks, gossip, ostracism, and other displays of social disapproval to extrajudicial violence” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 733). Therefore, it is safe to argue that informal institutions play an essential role in regulating social interactions, behavior, and norms through their “sanctioning mechanisms.” This is to say that real change in society starts by understanding and changing its informal institutions.

6.3. Utterance and silence

Without language, there could be no (formal) institution(s), and without (formal) institution(s), there can be neither stability, nor social integrity and cohesion. Utterance and silence are essential means of communication since humans live in a web of human relationships. Likewise, the manner of using language and its vocabulary coordinates human life and gives it meaningful objects in any society since language provides us with the essential objectification and order, in which we make sense of our everyday life. As argued by Berger and Luckman, language is fundamental to grasp the social reality of everyday life. (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 35- 6).

Language was an essential part of al-Māwardī's understanding of how a person ought to be aware that words reveal what is in an individual's conscience as they articulate his inward thoughts. Moreover, words cannot be taken back after they are uttered. Therefore, a sane man ought to be careful of any possible fault in his words by controlling and decreasing the language he uses (al-Māwardī 2012: 433). Based on this argument, the question arises: what are the criteria that a person ought to take into consideration in his speech?

There are four rules for the elements of rhetoric that an individual should consider to have faultless and sound discourse, according to al-Māwardī. First, the rhetoric's objective must be necessary for the speech, either bringing benefit to others or getting rid of mischief and damage. Otherwise, talking without necessity is superfluous. Secondly, it must pay attention to the context. The speaker ought to take the proper time and place into account since correct speech in an incorrect context brings no benefit, and can even bring harm. Third, the speaker should be concise in his speech. Lastly, an individual should take care of his word choice, and make sure every word in his discourse is the proper one. For al-Māwardī, language is one of the humans' distinguished characteristics, which reflects his inward thoughts and demonstrates his reason (c.f. al-Māwardī 2012: 434- 42).

Al-Māwardī articulated language's significance and functionality not only for its role in establishing (informal) institutional reality, but also because civilization

themselves are constructed on language(s). Likewise, this argument is distinctly articulated in the works of John Searle. Like al-Māwardī, Searle also believes that “{...} all of institutional reality is created by linguistic representation” (Searle 2010: 14). Searle even goes further and states that “all of human civilization, is created by speech acts that have the same logical form as Declarations.” (ibid. 12- 3). For Searle, there are five potential sorts of illocutionary speech acts, which he labeled: “Assertives, (which we use to tell how things are, for example, statements and assertions), Directives (which we use to tell people to do things, for example, orders and commands), Commissives (which we use to commit ourselves to doing things, for example, promises and vows), Expressives (which we use to express our feelings and attitudes, for example, apologies and thanks), and Declarations (which we use to make something the case by declaring it to be the case, for example, declaring war and adjourning a meeting).” (Searle 2010: 16).

In all of these sorts of “illocutionary speech acts,” as Searle calls it, there are several etiquettes of utterance, and ignoring them leads to losing discourse’s excellence and eradicating its beauty. It also distracts people from the benefit of the ethical contents in the discourse, so people will not pay attention to the speaker. Another aspect of these etiquettes is not exaggerating in praising people and not overemphasizing in avoiding praising them. Because exaggerating in praising comes from humiliation and a lack of dispraise can be a kind of revenge. Noticeably, both of these characteristics lead to a negative consequence, even if correct (al-Māwardī 2012: 445- 6).

For al-Māwardī, even if a person faces a situation of panic and anxiety, one ought not to exaggerate in threatening even his enemy. Similarly, one should not promise someone based on personal desires since an individual might fulfill his promises and threats later on. In other words, one ought to minimize his promises except when he is very confident he will fulfill them. Thus, whoever allows himself to make threats and commitments easily, then his threat might be broken simply, and his promise will not be executed. It is from the etiquette of utterances that if an individual articulates something, he must fulfill and prove it with his actions and deeds, as while articulating something is optional, fulfilling a promise is obligatory.

Al-Māwardī puts it in these words, “It is better to act without speaking, than not to achieve what one spoke about” (al-Māwardī 2012: 447).

This shows how for al-Māwardī, promises (as a means of communication and commitment) are based on the promiser's free will and consciousness; otherwise, there ought not be any promise. Similar to al-Māwardī, Searle maintains the same position, in which he states that “making and keeping promises requires consciousness and a sense of freedom on the part of the promise-making and promise-keeping agent” (Searle 2010: 136). In other words, the idea of promises, or what al-Māwardī perceives as part of the etiquette of utterances, is to increase confidence and ethical commitments among individuals. Subsequently, social reality will be based on social harmony and cohesion among individuals since confidence will prevail in social relationships.

Another example of this etiquette of utterances is the language’s tone, which should be considered based on the discourse's purpose. For instance, if a discourse is related to encouraging and motivating people, then the tone should be kind. However, if the discourse is about pressuring or threatening, then the language's tone should be different. An inappropriate tone in both cases would lead to the opposite of the discourse's aim (al-Māwardī 2012: 447- 8). Finally, I should mention the rule of avoiding colloquial language and vernacular proverbs, a point reserved for elites and leaders. This is to state that for al-Māwardī, every social class has a distinctive level of language, so the elites and leaders, for instance, should avoid colloquial and vernacular proverbs. The way language, tone, and maxims are used to influence social reality and reflect the character's persistence and motivations. They also reveal individuals’ positions and statuses in society; therefore, the elite should use a higher level of ethical language than the public (ibid. 450- 1).

It is essential to point out that al-Māwardī pays attention to language, structure, and the ways they are used. Accordingly, I argue that this is because language, its structures, and how we articulate ourselves play a principal role in structuring and forming any informal institution, be it political, social, or economic. Additionally, through language, social integrity and cohesion can be better facilitated and obtained. Lastly, as al-Māwardī suggested, a better understanding among people prevails in

society through careful and precise language use. To conclude, al-Māwardī considers language, because it is the framework in which human communication and interaction occur.

6.4. Patience and sorrow

I argue that patience is one of the founding principles in constructing an institution or an establishment. The reason for this is that without patience, people will not be able to bear the difficulties and challenges that they might face in planning or even constructing institutions or establishments. Additionally, patience is interrelated with the future since people will not advance their institutions without it. It is worth mentioning that patience means persisting in the truth and insisting on acting and dealing in the right and appropriate ways. This is to say that if there is no persistence and insistence on the truth and what is right, then there will be no compromise, agreement, and convention among individuals to build institutions. Thus, patience is indispensable in every aspect of building institutions in particular and civilization in general. All possible difficulties in daily life, pains, wrongs, and injustice, cannot stop the person who has the patience to continue persisting and insisting on standing determinedly for justice, truth and correctness. Fortitude and patience will be reflected in every aspect of the individual's daily life and will be organized on the individual and societal levels.

Moreover, I argue that there could be no competence to endure, bear, or tolerate difficulty in social relationships without patience. Having patience, as this part demonstrates, restricts bad reactions and behavior in social relationships. Likewise, patience reflects a high quality of self-discipline as well as self-self-restraint. This is to argue that there will be a noticeable social dissolution and disintegration without patience in social life. Furthermore, the existence of sorrow on both collective and individual levels causes laxity, pessimism, and negativity, all of these attributes destructively impact social cohesion and stability in society. Therefore, it is necessary to elaborate both on patience and sorrow concerning forming informal institutions.

It is important to recall that religion can inspire and encourage a person to be patient in different circumstances and complications. Also, being patient and enduring difficulties is a sign of good fortune and happiness since patience is crucial while encountering difficulties. This is for the reason that religion commands and calls people always to be patient, making them considered by religion as essential virtues in al-Māwardī's opinion. Being patient is not only about being able to bear physical exertion, but also emotionally, spiritually, and psychologically taxing circumstances. The latter form of patience is more vital than the former (al-Māwardī 2012: 452- 3).

There are different forms and features of patience, each of which is worthy of praise from al-Māwardī's point of view:

Firstly, religious patience indicates obeying what God ordered and what He prohibited. This patience facilitates obedience¹²⁵ to God's commands and for religion to be established in society. The incentive for this patience comes from being afraid of punishment or God.

Secondly, there is patience imposed by an unexpected incident, for instance, difficulties facing an individual. In this case, being patient is encouraged by the religion, as it benefits the individual since it will be followed by spiritual comfort. For al-Māwardī, if the individual does not have this kind of patience, he will be distressed and in constant sadness, having a negative impact on social reality.

Thirdly, patience regarding the past, i.e., in things intended by the individual but was not realized (for instance, if an individual desired to have something but aged and is not in the position to have it anymore). He ought to have the patience that he did not accomplish what he wanted in the past.

¹²⁵ Obedience is not only limited to *'ibādāt'* – i.e. acts of devotion –, rather it includes every ethical aspect of human actions and deeds.

Fourthly, being patient regarding the future, for example, regarding issues that an individual is afraid might occur. Meaning, an individual ought not to have concerns for things that did not happen yet, as this helps him stay pleased and constructive in the present.

Fifthly, being patient regarding affairs that one is planning intensely to pursue. This eliminates confusion and clarifies the essence of truth. For al-Māwardī, this is embedded in Prophet Muhammed's saying that "Patience is Enlightenment."

Lastly, being patient over a misfortune. This facilitates realizing divergent views and perspectives of the future; otherwise, one will have a limited and narrow perspective of the future. Nevertheless, there are various reasons for impatience, such as continually recalling befallen misfortunes and difficulties, sadness and deep sorrow for what has been gone or lost, frequent complaining, hopelessness, and being frustrated in obtaining what one desires.

These forms and features of patience, as mentioned earlier, remarkably, indicate that al-Māwardī has a very comprehensive concept of patience. Furthermore, patience is a significant element for al-Māwardī, for the reason that it enables the individual to be more optimistic and eliminate from his mind all kinds of pessimism and negativity. However, being impatient facilitates suffering from depression and stress, having more sorrow and sadness, which means being less socially-integrated. Al-Māwardī aims to eliminate such destructive features (depression, anxieties, grief, and sadness). Still, being patient indicates more contentment with difficult circumstances and resilient self-esteem. Therefore, patience enhances a constructive character, in which the individual is more energetic and bound to society.

It is worth noting that patience is a social value that can be learned and realized through constant practice until it becomes internally habitualized and an integral part of one's personality and self-discipline. Therefore, one cannot understand any society without understanding the different categories of human behavior and its informal institutional structures. For instance, patience explains the internal aspects

and the intentionality of people in a specific civilization. It also reflects on human behaviors and manners. This is why John Searle states that “{...} to understand society, you have to understand collective human behavior”. (Searle 2010: 36).

It is essential to point out that the negative consequences of impatience on the individual and the institutional levels are many, such as being oppressive and unjust to others. Nevertheless, I argue that having patience leads to persistence and perseverance in social life. Thus, the consequence of having patience is to forbear others. This is to say that patience empowers personal abilities and the capacity to bear difficulties for the sake of social cohesion and the stability. For these reasons, al-Māwardī considers patience as an element in his “*adab Muwāḍi‘ah wa Istiṣlāḥ*” (i.e., informal institution theory).

Patience mirrors a social value of self-discipline and self-restraint. It draws the constrictions of the behavior and manners of individuals in society in many aspects. For these reasons, patience, as a social value and norm, affects even formal institutions. Helmke and Levitsky emphasize how informal institutions shape their formal counterparts. They state that, “Informal institutions also shape formal institutional outcomes in a less visible way: by creating or strengthening incentives to comply with formal rules. In other words, they may do the enabling and constraining that is widely attributed to formal institutions” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 726). For its significant impact on society, patience is a fundamental component in al-Māwardī’s informal institution.

6.4. Consultation¹²⁶

Consultation optimizes the best reachable decision and position on the individual and collective level, and improves and facilitates decision-making. Moreover, consultation ensures having different perspectives on the issue(s) under consideration. It is important to note that for al-Māwardī, it is from the wisdom of every prudent person not to decide on any significant matter without previously

¹²⁶ In Arabic “*shūrā*”.

consulting with those, who have esteemed, sound, and sincere opinions first (al-Māwardī 2012: 573).

It is worth mentioning that consultation eliminates tyranny and arbitrariness in society since one person cannot rule and decide alone. Likewise, consultation protects the institution(s) from arrogant and authoritarian individuals who do not take others' opinions and positions into consideration in decision making. This is to argue that consultation creates and develops excellent trust among people and their institution(s). Based on these facts, I maintain that consulting is essential in advancing and developing institutional persistence and social stability.

The Quran states that “Consult them in their affairs.”¹²⁷ Based on this verse, al-Māwardī argues that even the Prophet Muhammed was requested to consult and discuss decisions with his community, so he and his companions could collectively reach the best decision on the issues for which consultation was sought. I argue that consultation's objective is to bring people together in social integration and cohesion and make them feel part of the decision-making process to increase their collective loyalty. This is another reason why the Prophet Muhammed stated, “Consultation is a fortress against regret, and immunity against blame.” (as cited in al-Māwardī 2012: 473). Strictly speaking, consultation benefits the individual and society. It can lead to a stronger feeling of solidarity and social cohesion. It brings alternative perspectives and views on the consulting topics since individuals with diverse perspectives debate the issue. Hence, the variety of interpretations and alternative solutions will assist in reaching a better decision.

However, one might ask, can an individual consult just anyone, or are there criteria regarding who should be consulted? Indeed, for al-Māwardī, a person ought not to consult just anybody, but rather consult someone who fulfills various necessary attributes and qualities.

First, the person should have sound reason and previous experience on the issue at hand, since experience clarifies insight and perception. Second, the person should be reliable and pious since these two attributes are the source of righteousness and

¹²⁷ Quran: 3:159.

success. Remarkably in this concern, al-Māwardī once again gives priority to reason over piousness. Third, the person should be sincere and affectionate as only then can he prove the correct opinion and clarify his thoughts on the topic at hand. Fourth, the person should have sound and deep thought about the subject he is being consulted on and should not be affected by anxiety or occupied with worries and concerns. Otherwise, he would have neither a sound and in-depth view, nor correct judgment. Lastly, the person should not have a personal interest in the issue he is being consulted over since personal benefits and interests can affect the individual's opinion to incline to partiality (al -Māwardī 2012: 474f).

Remarkably, these are very inclusive and insightful conditions and qualifications in this regard. Al-Māwardī demonstrates that if an individual possesses the attributes mentioned above, then he is qualified to be consulted to give advice and perspectives on the consulting issue. Nonetheless, an individual has no reason not to ask such a qualified individual(s) for consultation. A person should consult others because one ought not to depend only on his own opinion, thinking it is the only correct possibility. According to al-Māwardī, consulting a person who has no personal interest or benefit in a topic can bring forth a sounder view, closer to the virtuous, and such a person's thought is more enlightened since the suggested advice is free from inclination and passion (al-Māwardī 2012: 477).

It is crucial to bear in mind that an individual ought not to perceive himself as weak in judgment or as possessing a corrupted opinion if he needs to consult others. This is because, in reality, a person consults to benefit in good and avoid wrong, and this is a social value performed by a sane person who seeks the truth and avoids any kinds of mistakes. Therefore, one ought to consult qualified people with the qualities mentioned earlier in important issues (al-Māwardī 2012: 478- 9).

It is worth mentioning that al-Māwardī uses a symbolic example to explain that one should not underestimate the value of a pearl because of the place where it was discovered, or because an ignoble or decadent person found it. Analogically, a sound opinion is like wisdom that one is missing, so one ought to pick it wherever it can be found, apart from where the idea came from (ibid. 481). This is all to argue that social solidarity and cohesion is the main intention in al-Māwardī's informal

institution theory, which necessitates dependence on consultations and deliberations. The more people participate in discussion, decision-making, and reflection, the sounder opinions will be.

Helmke and Levitsky elaborate on several scopes on how informal rules might influence formal institutions. They articulate that “Informal rules shape formal institutional outcomes in areas such as legislative politics, judicial politics, party organization, campaign finance, regime change, federalism, public administration, and state building” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 726). Doubtless, that consultation is a case in point here; it is one of the social values that can influence a wide range of issues. For such reasons, al-Māwardī includes it in his informal institution theory.

6.5. Confidentiality

I argue that confidentiality drives people to have confidence in each other and cooperate and work positively together. However, an absence of confidentiality means a lack of reliability among people to unite within the structure of their (informal) institution(s). This is to argue that the absence of confidentiality results in social dissolution and increases instability and insecurity in society. Al-Māwardī explains that privacy and keeping secrets are a significant source of success. They are a permanent means to maintain the moral correctness of an individual in society. Therefore, confidentiality is one of the elements of his informal institution theory.

Moreover, al-Māwardī argues that not being a confident person and divulging secrets reflect three unethical social qualities since this contradicts being part of social convention. First of all, it demonstrates a lack of patience, resulting in an individual's inability to keep his and others' secrets. Furthermore, it indicates carelessness and ignorance of the meaning of being a trusted person. Lastly, it reflects conceitedness to the extent of making the mistake of revealing secrets (al-Māwardī 2012: 484- 5). However, it is without a doubt sometimes necessary for a person to reveal certain secrets to a sincere friend(s) to attain advice from an unbiased adviser(s). Thus, an intelligent person chooses wisely a trustworthy person to whom the secret can be revealed. Remarkably, al-Māwardī argues that it is rare to discover people who can

be trusted with secrets, and for him, it is thus easier to trust people with wealth than with secrets (al-Māwardī 2012: 485).

It is important to recall that the secret can be a person's own or that of another person. However, for al-Māwardī, divulging another person's secrets is more indecent and unethical than exposing one's own secret. This is because the former is a betrayal of trust, loyalty, and is a kind of slander of others, which brings disgrace and blame to the individual (ibid. 484).

For this reason, for al-Māwardī, there are ethical attributes and norms for people who can be trusted with secrets. The central feature is to have a sound reason, which prevents an individual from revealing others' secrets. The piety of an ethical person also prevents him from revealing secrets. Besides, the trusted person should have a social association established on affection with the person who wishes to share his secrets. Lastly, the trusted person should be reticent and not talkative. Remarkably, al-Māwardī puts a sound reason as the first attribute in this regard, prioritizing it over even piety and being religious. It is important to note that although al-Māwardī mentions these four distinctive ethical attributions, he maintains that it is difficult to find a person who has all of these qualities (al-Māwardī 2012: 486). Therefore, one ought to be very careful in revealing secrets to others.

al-Māwardī discusses confidentiality as a part of the social convention because the absence and shortcoming of confidentiality in society brings negative consequences. For instance, the weakening of social cohesion among individuals again negatively affects social reality. Likewise, not fulfilling constructive expectations as part of a social convention leads the untrusted person to be resented in his society. This is to state that people also expect others to be confidential. In other words, I argue that adhering to an informal institution and its norms are based on the notion of reciprocal expectations. Lewis, similarly to al-Māwardī, emphasizes the significance of being attached to the norms in society when he states that, "Any convention is, by definition, a norm in which there is some presumption that one ought to conform to. I shall now argue that it is also, by definition, a socially enforced norm: one is expected to conform, and failure to conform tends to evoke unfavorable responses from others". (Lewis 2002: 99)

It is worth mention that al-Māwardī gives importance to confidentiality to maintain social solidarity and integrity between people. Otherwise, if people are not confident and trustworthy in interacting with each other, it disrupts social solidarity. This is to argue that trust and confidence are like a glue, that keeps and maintains (informal) institutions' stability and keeps individuals confident in dealing with their fellows. Otherwise, the absence of confidentiality leads people to expect negative behavior from their fellows and the institutions. Thus, there will indeed be social dissolution and instability in society.

6.6. Mocking and laughing

As Douglass North, states “In our daily interaction with others, whether within the family, in external social relations, or in business activities, the governing structure is overwhelmingly defined by codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and conventions. Underlying these informal constraints are formal rules, but these are seldom the obvious and immediate source of choice in daily interactions” (North 1990: 36). Mocking others and excessive laughing is related to social values and norms of behavior, that a person must be aware of their destructive outcomes on social interactions.

I argue that on both personal as well as on (informal) institutional levels, seriousness is a fundamental principle to regulate and stabilize social relationships. However, mocking and excessive laughing decreases the seriousness and earnestness on both personal and institutional levels. This is to argue that there will be less stability, trust, and confidence in the institution(s) without seriousness. For these and other reasons, as this part shows, al-Māwardī pays attention to this issue. In other words, I argue that without seriousness, not only will social relationship be in danger, but there will also be a lack of institutional persistence in the future.

Based on these facts, whoever exaggerates and habituates oneself to laugh in excessive amounts and does not behave seriously will face undesirable consequences, according to al-Māwardī. Namely, he will either be regarded as incompetent to be considered as an advisor in important issues. It is important to note

that al-Māwardī claims that exaggeration in laughing can harm self-dignity and self-respect, as the individual will not be taken seriously and reliably by his fellows (c.f. al-Māwardī 2012: 495).

Nevertheless, al-Māwardī maintains that if an individual is too severe and does not even smile, people will avoid his companionship, which could again create enmity and social fragmentations between individuals. Individuals, according to al-Māwardī, ought to take the middle way without exaggerating either in their seriousness or their joking (al-Māwardī 2012: 495). Furthermore, al-Māwardī mentioned this issue as a constituent of his informal institution theory because smiling and being cheerful positively affect social cohesion since it can create more sympathy and solidarity among individuals.

It is essential to point out that although there are constructive consequences of joking, such as creating an atmosphere of sociability and friendship and getting rid of boredom (al-Māwardī 2012: 491). Al-Māwardī, however, warns that there are also harmful consequences from excessive joking, mocking others, and not speaking in a serious matter, such as infringing upon people's rights. Another negative aspect can be that such behavior leads to alienation and estrangement of the social relations among individuals. This not only creates a bad reputation for the mocker, in which he loses his prestige and respect of others, but it also harms the person who is subject to the mocking since if he does not object to the mockery, he will feel sorrow. In contrast, if he responds to the mocking, he will lower himself to the same level as the mocker. This is to argue that al-Māwardī views mockery as destroying not only the social convention, but also the structure of relationships in society (ibid. 489).

It is essential to point out that al-Māwardī explored this subject because it is related to being committed to others, whether through social bonds or institution(s). This is to argue that exaggerating in joking and mocking contradicts the idea of commitment to society. It is important to remember that commitment is a central element in al-Māwardī's informal institutional theory. Searle again extends and divides the idea of commitment into two components: "firstly, the notion of an undertaking that is hard to reverse and, second, the notion of an obligation. These typically combine, for example, in the notion of promising. When I make a promise, I make an undertaking

that is not easily reversible” (Searle 2010: 81- 2). This is to state that overdoing it in joking and mocking creates confusion about whether an individual is committed to what he says and promises. Therefore, I argue that considering this point helps empower social cohesion and stability among people in a society.

Al-Māwardī draws a theoretical framework for constraints and regulations on what a person should or should not do. Exaggerated joking and mocking others is not conventional. These constraints do not allow people to perform specific behaviors in particular situations due to their negative outcomes. Accordingly, such constraints are not designed to hinder humanity, rather, they regulate social interactions and relationships. Similarly, North reminds us that “Institutional constraints include both what individuals are prohibited from doing and, sometimes, under what conditions some individuals are permitted to undertake certain activities. As defined here, they therefore are the framework within which human interaction takes place” (North 1990: 4).

6.7. Optimism and pessimism

It is important to recall that optimism is a positive outlook toward the future. For this reason, I argue that optimism drives people to advance and develop the quality of their (informal) institutions and system since optimism motivates and encourages individuals to have persistence and perseverance even under challenging circumstances. This is to argue that optimism increases social integration, confidence, and trust in social relationships and institution(s). On the contrary, pessimism or the lack of optimism causes anxiety, fear, dejection, and unhappiness. It is essential to point out that optimism is a process that requires endurance and patient.

It should not be forgotten that in the pre-Islamic period, whenever they intended to travel or decide something significant, some Arabs would first set a bird free, then observe it. If it flew to the right, they would proceed with their journey or the things they had intended to undertake, however, if the bird flew to the left, they would cancel or at least postpone their travel or arrangements. They believed with certainty

that something as irrelevant to the matter at hand as the flight of a bird could bring them misfortune or fortune. (al-Māwardī 2012: 497- 8). Informal rules affect society and even formal institutions in unexpected ways (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 726). The danger in such superstitions lies in their unexpected damage and restricting of humankind's potentialities in every possible aspect. These limitations destructively affect not only an individual's prospects but the whole institutions in any society.

Furthermore, individuals will not have a complete free will to form institutions if superstitions and myths regulate their behaviors and manners. This is to argue that for al-Māwardī, his informal institutional structures are based on free will and not being subject to superstitions, pessimism, and myths. Similarly, John Searle states that “Without the free will the structures do not have a point {...} participation in the institutional structures had to be capable of motivating the agents who are participating. But the only way that this system can provide the motivations in question by is giving the agents reason for action.” (Searle 2010: 139). In other words, I argue that pessimism negatively impacts agents' motivations to act and behave based on social conventions.

It is important to note that al-Māwardī was aware of superstitions' negative consequences on social reality. For this reason, he maintained that an individual should be conscious that nothing is more harmful to an opinion and corrupting to humans' institutions more than being pessimistic and believing in superstition, since a bird cannot prevent fate or hold back destiny. Al-Māwardī put it this way, “Be aware that there is nothing more harming to public opinion as well as corrupting the administration and management than believing in such things {...}” (al-Māwardī 2012: 496). On the contrary, as mentioned in the previous chapter, having hope and being an optimist strengthens the individual's judgments and motivates the seriousness and supports in accomplishing success (ibid. 500).

Al-Māwardī sees superstition as connected to being pessimistic. To overcome being superstitious and pessimistic, an individual ought to plan well and stay optimistic, hardworking, creative, and productive in society. Otherwise, pessimism again causes stagnation and laziness in a person, and thus he will become inefficient and passive.

Being pessimistic or optimistic impacts society, so individuals pay attention to optimism and pessimism and their consequences in society.

Douglass North clarifies how institutions as “humanly devised constraints” comprise both formal constraints (such as property rights) and informal constraints (such as codes of conduct and taboos), aiming “to create order and reduce uncertainty” (North 1991: 97). Based on this theoretical understanding proposed by North, it is safe to argue that al-Māwardī covers optimism because it is an essential social value to secure and maintain order and stability. He also refutes superstitious and pessimistic as decreasing uncertainty in social, political, economic interactions.

6.8. *Al-Murū’ah* (sense of chivalry)

Al-Murū’ah, a sense of honor or chivalry, reflects the normative aspect of al-Māwardī’s informal institution theory. *Al-Murū’ah* is an evaluative standard and a normative principle that orientates people towards how things ought to be or not, to understand right and wrong behavior. Additionally, I argue that *al-Murū’ah* is about performing matters by the best means and virtues. According to the principle of *al-Murū’ah*, evil deeds and actions should not exist intentionally. Based on this fact, the individual who considers the principles of *al-Murū’ah* in his actions does not deserve blame or critics. Thus, for al-Māwardī, *al-Murū’ah* is a proof of excellence and a sign of generosity, which both beautifies the personality and facilitates chivalry (al-Māwardī 2012: 501).

For an individual to have *al-Murū’ah*, there are two preconditions. On the one hand, individuals need to have high aspirations of applying social values and virtues in practice. It is crucial to bear in mind that having high aspirations motivates the individual to ameliorate his deeds and actions and avoid laziness and dependence on other’s help. On the other hand, an individual should have an honorable personality, which acknowledges and accepts discipline and civility based on ethical codes of conduct (ibid. 503- 5). Thus, when an individual possesses a noble character, he will also continuously aim for virtues and seek moral principles as a means in his actions.

Nevertheless, what happens if a person has a high aspiration of performing ethics but lacks a noble personality, or vice versa? Al-Māwardī answers this question by arguing that in such cases, the individual would face many complications since he lacks the means to apply social norms, and his ignorance undermines his prospects and potentials. This means that he would be like a blind person wishing to learn how to write or a dumb person desiring to be an orator. Such an effort would result in further incapacity and more significant failure. However, if an honorable character of a high aspiration is moral, then the person's virtues and values would be ineffective and worthless since there are no sufficient motivations for them to be applied. Strictly speaking, if an individual remains lazy, he would never realize his ethical wishes, which again demonstrates the significance of having a high aspiration to perform ethics and having an honorable character to be chivalrous by moral means (al-Māwardī 2012: 503f).

From al-Māwardī's perspective, *al-Murū'ah* has a broad meaning. It is challenging for him to consider all of its principles and preconditions which individuals ought to consider as part of social convention to realize *al-Murū'ah*. Therefore, one can just generally enumerate the essential principles in this regard. Nevertheless, there are two levels of these principles and preconditions from al-Māwardī's point of view. On the one hand, the character traits of *al-Murū'ah* within one's self, e.g., what can be called an internal aspect of *al-Murū'ah* and on the other hand, principles and preconditions one uses in interacting and behaving with others in society. i.e. *al-Murū'ah*'s external aspect. Figure VI explains *al-Murū'ah*'s structures (internal and external aspects).




Figure VI clarifies the internal and external structures of *al-Murū'ah*.

For the internal aspect, there are three central principles or preconditions for having *al-Murū'ah* in matters related to the self:

Firstly, continence or decency¹²⁸, which has two forms, is to abstain from what religion prescribed as unethical. For example, it includes controlling the self from performing bodily offenses and restricting the bodily desires such as holding the tongue from slandering others. Likewise, abstaining from committing vices comes in two stages. On the one hand, one has to stop committing injustice,¹²⁹ because injustice negatively affects individuals and society. On the other hand, maintaining the self from betraying someone's trust or even secretly wishing to betray it since losing the trust of other individuals leads to the whole society's degradation and humiliation from al-Māwardī's perspective (al-Māwardī 2012: 507f).

Secondly, integrity¹³⁰, which means, on the one hand, "low desires," leads an individual to be humiliated and rebuked. An individual ought to avoid all kinds of greed. On the other hand, integrity indicates that an individual avoids suspected

¹²⁸ in Arabic *al-'iffah*.

¹²⁹ As it was explained in the previous chapter, justice has different levels, which start from performing self-justice and only then applying justice in interacting with others.

¹³⁰ In Arabic, *al-Nazāhah*.

situations, leading him to be discredited. In other words, whether an accusation against a person is correct or even wrong, it can bring humiliation. Thus, the function of *al-Nazāhah* here is to deter criticism and blame. Furthermore, for al-Māwardī to empower self-integrity, an individual ought to be content with what he possesses and not be envious of others'.

Thirdly, safekeeping¹³¹, i.e., preserving oneself from harm, whereby two aspects need to be accomplished. Mainly, *al-Ṣiyānah* is about seeking self-sufficiency as much as possible and avoiding unnecessary dependence from others, for the reason that when a person depends entirely on others, it can be a type of humiliation. This demonstrates how central self-reliance and self-sufficiency are for al-Māwardī, not only for the collective but also for every individual in society. Still, cooperation¹³² among individuals is indispensable for humanity to be able to survive and advance. Strictly speaking, asking people for unnecessary assistances weakens the qualities of *al-Murū'ah* since an aspect of having *al-Murū'ah* is to be self-reliant. Even though al-Māwardī elaborates on the significance of self-sufficiency in this concern, he still did not associate the idea of self-sufficiency with freedom of decision-making. Meaning, the more a person is self-sufficient, the more he has space to decide, and the more individual depends on others, the less freedom he has in his decisions.

Besides these mentioned three internal aspects of *al-Murū'ah*, there are also three principles or preconditions of *al-Murū'ah*, which an individual ought to have in interacting with others to realize the entire attribute of *al-Murū'ah*.

First: Assistance without expecting compensation¹³³, which can be accomplished through prominence and power. It is a kind of protection of needy and vulnerable people who ask for assistance. Also, *al-Mu'āzarah* indicates helping people who suffer from calamities. From an ethical point of view, this assistance can be classified into two categories. First, dutiful assistance, which includes assisting one's own family as sympathy and mercy for the kinship, assisting friends for a settled

¹³¹ In Arabic, *al-Ṣiyānah*.

¹³² Al-Māwardī calls it in Arabic "*al-ta'awun T'āluf*."

¹³³ In Arabic, *al-mu'āzarah*.

friendliness and a secured covenant, and lastly, assisting neighbors, which is their right. Helping these three types of people is an ethical commitment to carry their burdens and relieve them during calamities. Secondly, the assistance of the rest of the humankind, with whom the individual has neither kinship relationships, nor is he connected to them in any of the three aspects mentioned earlier. In this case, assisting is not a necessity. It is a kind of generosity. Nevertheless, this kind of altruism increases the quality of *al-Murū'ah*. Remarkably, the concept of “assistance,” in its second level (i.e., the assistance of the rest of the humankind) reflects the humanistic and universal aspects of al-Māwardī's thought.

Second: Clemency¹³⁴, that is, relieving others from any discomfort or difficulty by pardoning others' faults and relinquishing issues related to personal rights. For al-Māwardī, relinquishing one's rights as a way of relieving others' discomfort is a great virtue. Interacting with others based on leniency and clemency brings individuals in a resilient social bond and strong social solidarity and integrity, when the individual who has the possibility of helping offers his assistance in relieving other's uneasiness (c.f. al-Māwardī 2012: 541).

It is essential to point out that interacting with others based on leniency and clemency can be related to social interactions and wealth. Strictly speaking, when an individual relieves others' discomfort through leniency and forbearance, it leads the individual to affect others ethically. However, leniency related to wealth has various levels of forgiving. Firstly, forgiving those who took debts because the indebted person suffers destitution. In this case, the act of forgiveness is a kind of solidarity from the one who has wealth with the one who has no wealth. Secondly, being flexible regarding a payment's date or canceling a part of it, as a means of relieving the indebted person for his incapability to repay all the debt in the defined time. Lastly, forgiving the debt in the case the indebted person denies the debt. Although it is not always possible to forgive in issues of wealth, still for al-Māwardī, all of these kinds of forgiveness are a sign of great generosity, eminence, and chivalry, which again reflect the individual's ethical attributions (c.f. al-Māwardī 2012: 543).

¹³⁴ In Arabic, *al-miyāsrah*.

Al-Māwardī distinguishes between the various levels at which a person can be forgiving to others in both issues related to social interactions and in wealth. Even though al-Māwardī was a chief judge, he still did not discuss in *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn* any possible approach involving legal procedures (of any formal institutions) in this regard, or even the possibility of solving the conflict through a mediator. Al-Māwardī believes in shared social norms and ethical behavior as the primary method for establishing and maintaining society. It is worth noting that based on a field study conducted by Robert Ellickson, Douglass North reports how people do not favor approaching formal institutions and legal procedures for solving their disputes. Instead, people trusted informal constraints as effective methods for resolving their disagreements (North 1990: 39). However, al-Māwardī did not deny at all the legal procedures if an informal institution is not functioning in society. Even more, al-Māwardī discussed in his other works, such as in *al-Hawāi al-Khabir* and *al-Aḥkām al-Sultāniyyah*, legal procedures and rules and how they can be implemented in society.

Third: Generosity¹³⁵, which in this concern has two aspects. On the one hand, generosity as a means not only in acknowledging others, but also in bringing different individuals together in social cohesion and solidarity and hence removing enmity among them. For al-Māwardī, a person who does not acknowledge the help of other(s) and escapes from uniting individuals in ethical, social solidarity will be isolated and disdained, which means that he will not be considered as a chivalrous person (al-Māwardī 2012: 544). On the other hand, generosity is a way of protecting oneself from exploiting and misusing people, which can be done in two ways. Firstly, an individual ought to conceal his wealth from greedy people who can slander or attempt to attack him. Accordingly, showing them generosity can help in stopping them. Secondly, an individual ought to find an excuse to offer some of his generosity to people whom he fears. This is also a way of protecting the self from greedy people and those who are attracted to the individual's wealth. (ibid. 545).

Without a doubt, a person ought to be careful about how he practices generosity, especially if he offers generosity to people whom he fears to protect himself from

¹³⁵ In Arabic, *al-ifdāl*.

them. One should be cautious not to become an instrument for other people who wish to have some of his wealth. This complicity regarding having generosity leads al-Māwardī to put two preconditions for a person to be generous to protect oneself from greedy people. On the one hand, one ought to practice generosity secretly, so he will not be a target for foolish people to gain some benefit. On the other hand, for al-Māwardī, generosity ought to show people that an individual gives for the sake of generosity and not for the sake of being insulted or feeling threatened (al-Māwardī 2012: 546).

Indeed, all of these normative aspects of al-Māwardī's informal institutional theory originate mainly from the prerequisite of *al-Murū'ah*, i.e., joint acceptance and commitments, so that it became part of the social convention. For instance, if a needy person is in debt, he expects others to deal with him based on *al-miyāsrah*, clemency, which is a component of *al-Murū'ah*. This is to argue that having mutual acceptance and commitment to the principles of *al-Murū'ah* does not mean that people have to promise to do x in situation y or not to do y in situation x. Margaret Gilbert clarifies how joint commitment works in society, as she states that "I see no reason to deny that people can jointly commit one another by virtue of their readiness to do so, expressed in conditions of common knowledge. In order to do this, they need the concept of joint commitment. That does not mean that they need to have a word for it. Nor need it be easy to extract it from the way in which they explicitly think, talk, and act. Nor need it be easy to explain. It may still inform their thoughts, talk, actions, and interactions." (Gilbert 2014: 226). Accordingly, when all of these notions are normalized and habitualized through joint acceptance and reciprocal commitments, it constitutes al-Māwardī's informal institutional theory.

Al-Murū'ah is a framework in al-Māwardī's informal institution theory, which regulates and optimizes social relationships. Furthermore, *al-Murū'ah*, as shown above, contains several shared social values, ethical concepts and notions such as *al-'iffah*, *al-Nazāhah*, *al-īfdāl*, all of these notions are to increase the norms, manner as well as self-discipline for both the individual and the collective. Subsequently, these norms become a part of the informal institution(s). It is essential to bear in mind that implementing these norms in social life increases and extends social

cohesion and stability. This is to argue that al-Māwardī intention is to increase the strength and institutional persistence through paying attention to *al-Murū'ah*.

Why do people need the aforementioned principles and constraints in their interactions? *Al-Murū'ah* as a social value increases in significance if the formal institutions are deficient, in this case, people do not have the resource and means for formal legal procedures. Thus, the individual might prefer to following such codes of conduct over formal solutions. As Helmke and Levitsky state, “Inventing informal institutions may also be a second-best strategy where formal institutions exist on paper but are ineffective in practice” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 730).

6.9. Various forms of ādābs

Even though al-Māwardī elaborates on an enormous number of shared values and attributions, norms, manners, behaviors, and *ādāb* as this study shows, he still emphasizes that a person ought to be aware not only of the different forms of *ādāb* but also their limits. The reason for this is that *ādāb* varies based on circumstances, habits, customs, social convention, times, and places. Furthermore, since a person cannot account for all of his previous *ādāb*, he ought to do his best to deduce and seek further types of *ādāb*, all of this to maintain high levels of social solidarity and social cohesion. Even more, for al-Māwardī, the structure of language¹³⁶ and its vocabulary vary in relation to ethics and *ādāb* not only from time to time but also from place to place (al-Māwardī 2012: 547).

Furthermore, language structure and vocabulary should be considered parts of the social convention to have a deeper comprehension of *ādāb* and a more constructive influence on individuals' behavior (ibid: c.f. 547). Likewise, David Lewis expounds on the relationship between language and forming a convention; he states that “The

¹³⁶ For Searle one cannot understand the structures of language without understanding social commitments and the circumstances in which communications occurred. He puts it in this way “we will not understand an essential feature of language if we do not see that it necessarily involves social commitments, and that the necessity of these social commitments derives from the social character of communication situation, the conventional character of the devices used, and the intentionality of speaker meaning. It is in this feature that enables language to form the foundation of human society in general” (Searle 2010: 80).

language he is using depends on the conventions he is party to. And these conventions are regularities in behavior, sustained by an interest in coordination and an expectation that others will do their part.” (Lewis 2007: 208).

One of these *ādābs* is the *adab* of eating and drinking. For al-Māwardī, there are two reasons for eating and drinking. Firstly, humans eat and drink as an essential need to maintain the body and soul. Obviously, for al-Māwardī, this is approved by reason and religion. Secondly, people eat and drink for sheer desires, which can have a variety of aspects.

On the one hand, an individual might desire more than what one needs in terms of food and drink. This is not conventional, neither by reason nor by religion, since consuming more than what one needs harms the person and brings him disgrace. On the other hand, an individual might desire to consume diverse kinds of foods, whereby al-Māwardī confirms the necessity of moderateness in this concern. It is crucial to bear in mind that for al-Māwardī, a person should neither exaggerate in eating and drinking because this can lead to the desire controlling the individual’s character. Nor should he prevent himself totally from eating and drinking since eating is a natural human need, and preventing it leads to a lack of energy. This all is to say that there are quantitative and qualitative aspects of this kind of *ādāb*.

An additional example of what al-Māwardī calls various forms of *ādābs* is the *ādāb* of dressing. The need for clothing is essential to protect the body from harm, but it also functions to conceal intimate parts. Moreover, clothes beautify a person’s outer appearance. Beautifying oneself is acceptable by the customs and habits of the local cultures in general. However, if there is squander, then balance in dressing should be considered from two aspects. On the one hand, the appearance and form of clothes should be adapted according to every region's social conventions and customs since every region has its own dressing habits. For instance, as al-Māwardī explains, Eastern people's dressing habits differ from those of the West. This reflects the notion of diversity and how al-Māwardī sees no single dress everyone should wear since people have different culture in different regions based on convention.

On the other hand, the dress should be appropriate in terms of its quality and value. Thus, an individual should wear clothes based on his economic limits and capacity, which is a sign of rationality and a safeguard against criticism (al-Māwardī 2012: 555). Strictly speaking, al-Māwardī argues that if a wealthy man dresses like a poor person, that is to be measured as a sign of humiliation and disgrace. Likewise, if a poor individual dresses like a rich man, that is considered to be a spendthrift. Therefore, one should dress according to one's true potential without exaggerations or miserliness (ibid. 557).

It is essential to point out that what al-Māwardī calls being safeguarded against criticism in a dress is based on conventional dress, depending on the social levels, place, occasion, etc. Based on what Lewis calls "conventional dress for the occasion" (Lewis 2007: 45). David Lewis gives an example of attending a party where everyone is expected to dress conventionally. For Lewis, similar to al-Māwardī, individuals should choose their clothes in conformity to their social circle's convention since dressing alike on specific occasions is in people's common interest of maintaining convention and cohesion. (ibid. 54).

Lewis goes further and distinguishes between two cases: "If each of us wants to dress like the majority and wants everyone else to dress like the majority too, then we achieve a coordination equilibrium when we all dress alike: our regularity is a genuine convention. Suppose, however, that many of us are nasty people who want to dress like the majority but also want to have a differently dressed minority to sneer at. We still achieve a homogeneity when we all dress alike, but it is not a coordinated homogeneity: nobody wishes he himself had dressed otherwise, but the nasty ones wish that a few other people – say, their worst enemies – had dressed otherwise" (ibid. 45- 6). This is to argue that Lewis's explanation clarifies what al-Māwardī calls being safeguarded against conventional dress criticism, so having a conventional dress in a society decreases sneering, and thereby increases social cohesion. In other words, there are general frameworks of such *ādāb* as part of social convention, but there is no agreement on the details.

Another example of these *ādāb* is the *adab* of being accurate in planning. An individual ought to profoundly reconsider every aspect of his actions and deeds so

that if he acted rightly and praiseworthy in the past, he ought to continue such right actions and deeds. However, if an individual's actions and manners can be offensive and indignant, he must avoid and stop such conduct in the future. Furthermore, contemplation should also precede actions and deeds; this meditation's objectives are to act appropriately and stop any possible errors in the future. Likewise, a wise individual also reviews others' affairs, in which he learns from others' mistakes and right actions. It is important to note that al-Māwardī was inspired by Prophet Muhammad, who had said that “Fortunate is the one who learns his lesson from others.” (cited in al-Māwardī 2012: 561). So, if an individual sees right actions and deeds performed by others, he can apply them, and if he considers mistakes, he should avoid them.

Al-Māwardī also proposes the idea of planning,¹³⁷ in which he insists on having a plan not only before starting any action, but also while estimating, evaluating, and adjusting the plan based on its progress and the consequences on the individual himself and on others. Accordingly, in such a case, the result of planning result will have virtuous consequences. Thus, for al-Māwardī, an individual's encouragement and motivation should be compliant with his plans' ethical objectives. Lastly, al-Māwardī concludes *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn* by stating that:

Oh, you intelligent man, be enthusiastic and motivated about your affairs. Be content with your time in which you live, be in peace with contemporary people with whom you live. Also, follow your time's customs and obey who is above you and be merciful with the one below you. Do not isolate yourself from society, so people will not hate you, and do not publicly declare your opposition to them, so they will not antagonize you. This is for the reason that there is no comfortable life for an individual who is hated. And there is no peace for the one who is hostile to others. (al-Māwardī 2012: 563).

¹³⁷ Indeed, regarding planning, al-Māwardī was entirely influenced by the Prophet's saying, as he directly quoted, “If you decided to act in a matter, consider profoundly its consequences. So, if its right, proceed otherwise if it is evil, refrain from it” (al-Māwardī 2012: 662).

Al-Māwardī's objective from conventions is to construct an informal institution theory, which explains the manufacturing of institutions by individuals based predominantly on rationality, while not disregarding the role of religious values. Therefore, for al-Māwardī, an institution should be a product of agreement. However, not all of society's members are expected to be involved in this process, as was explained above.¹³⁸ Taking all of these aspects of social convention that al-Māwardī proposed regarding behaving and dealing with people into consideration means that there are regularities, a coordinated equilibrium and reciprocal expectations of social behavior based on specific normative conventions.

Accordingly, an individual will be more encouraged to apply this convention in his life when there are mutual expectations that everybody in society is to conform to. Lastly, it is significant to emphasize that in al-Māwardī's informal institution theory, there are neither universal conventions, nor universal institutions. This is clear, for instance, when he illuminates the convention regarding dress by stating that dressing habits and conventions of Eastern people differ from those of Westerners. The reason is that al-Māwardī believes in diversity and cooperation so that different nations and regions can complement each other.

¹³⁸ Compare to Lewis "Our convention is the product of our agreement and so – in a way – are all our conforming actions forevermore. But to say we act as we do because we once agreed to would be baldly misleading" (Lewis 2007: 83- 4).

Conclusion

al-Māwardī was a genuine polymath, the chief judge, a social theorist, a diplomat, and a political advisor for two ‘Abbāsīd caliphs – al-Qādir Bi’llāh and al-Qā’im Bi-Amr Allāh – and had a strong record of activism and engagement in reforming his society.¹³⁹ Moreover, al-Māwardī advocates a fundamentally different approach not only to apprehend civilization(s), but also to understand its mechanism and how society can be built on normative ethics and *ādāb*. I argue that this makes al-Māwardī’s contributions unique in the contemporary era, where ethics are not intensely debated within Civilization Studies.

In *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn*, there is no particular chapter on how a civilization or a society declines and collapses. However, there are many – direct and indirect - suggestions in different places in al-Māwardī’s books of how a civilization can collapse. As it was evident in this study, al-Māwardī elaborates on many elements and concepts and fundamental principles in establishing and maintaining any civilization. For instance, it was previously mentioned that al-Māwardī sees justice is a very significant element for building a stable civilization. Due to this, it is safe to argue that injustice is a reason for civilization’s decay.

Another example is competent authority. As mentioned above, a competent political system is an essential component in constructing civilization. Yet if a political system is unqualified and inefficient, this leads to insecurity, economic problems, etc., and all of these are indeed reasons that lead to decline and collapse. Strictly speaking, a thorough reading of al-Māwardī demonstrates many reasons for why civilization can decline.

It is essential to bear in mind that for al-Māwardī, reform and applying ethics do not start in or through political institutions, nor establishments. Instead, it commences with oneself, which then can be extended to other(s). For this reason, al-Māwardī’s

¹³⁹ Al-Māwardī moved from city to city and served two rulers and had great experiences in several prestigious positions. However, there is no information about his private life.

primary focus is on individuals' normative ethics more than on political institutions and establishments since institutions and organizations are the manifestation of human ethics, manners, and not vice versa. In other words, according to al-Māwardī's theory of civilization, an ethical system is the basis of all civilizations. Still, of course, his theory of civilization is more than an ethical contribution.

This explains why al-Māwardī acknowledged that his society's social and political dilemma is principally the lack of normative ethics and discipline on the individual and the collective levels. Considering this fact, his contributions, in particular *Kitāb adab al-dunyā wa-al-dīn*, endeavored to propose a philosophical structure of normative ethics, informal institutional rules based on individual and collective commitments in applying different categories of shared social norms in society. It is worth mention that al-Māwardī's contributions are constructed with two focus points. On the one hand, he attempted to propose solutions for the challenging political and social predicaments in his time. On the other hand, he endeavored to fill a gap within academic circles through a comprehensive and systematic contribution.

This study's objective is neither to introduce al-Māwardī as a modernist or traditionalist, nor to demonstrate how so many of his ideas are prevalent and repeated by Western social theorists in the present time. Rather, the purpose of this study is to have access and a deep understanding of a classical theory of civilization, which preceded even Ibn Khaldūn's theory of civilization. As this study demonstrates, al-Māwardī's theory of civilization is distinguished by its humanistic and universal characteristics, which endeavor to bring better living standards for every individual in the world. I argue that al-Māwardī's work is distinguished from most Western civilization theorists, such as Guizot, Burckhardt, Buckle, Spengler, Huntington, and others, who endeavored to justify and defend specific political agendas, which include colonization, hegemony, and Othering.

Al-Māwardī's theory of civilization is a theory which aims to empower normative ethics in society. Ethics in this regard, as this study demonstrated, play a significant role in constituting and coordinating the social and political relationships within a civilization and among civilizations. In the case that ethics are absent in political and social relationships on both the individual and collective levels in any civilization, it

will lead to a definite decline in society and civilization. Ethics are an essential pillar for civilization to originate and survive and advance in the future. i.e., as far as ethics exist in civilization, civilization stays intact. Still again, ethics is not the only factor in defining civilization. For al-Māwardī, understanding ethics varies from one civilization to another based on three essential foundations: reason, *‘ilm*, and religion.

Remarkably, different civilizations attach distinctive characters and attribute to reason, its limits, its relationships to religion, and rationality. Based on al-Māwardī’s thought, this study proposed several criteria for establishing a framework for civilization theory. For example, justification and rationalization should be associated with and lead to good deeds and actions, meaning the aim, the means, and consequences of any action should be related to moral performance. This is to state that the end does not justify the means. Also, for al-Māwardī, as this study shows, reason and revelation should be perceived as one substantial unity; reason is the groundwork, which assists and plays a central role in the process of “*ta’dīb*” on both individual and collective levels. Lastly, for al-Māwardī, humans are defined as an ethical being and not just as rational beings.

Furthermore, this study exposed that a lack of *‘ilm* in civilization leads and facilitates its decline. There will be confusion of what is wrong and right since rationality or empiricism alone cannot answer such ethically oriented questions. This study considers *‘ilm* to be the second original foundation of al-Māwardī’s theory of civilization. Therefore, any theory of civilization ought to consider *‘ilm*. Otherwise, there will be negative consequences on civilizational improvement. This is to state that for al-Māwardī, *‘ilm* facilitates social order and solidarity, cohesion and stability, by which civilization can continue its growth and advancement. All of this reflects constructively on the actions and behavior of both the individual and the collective.

As this study demonstrated, for several reasons, *dīn* offers a strong ethical system. First, *dīn* proposes universal moral principles such as humility. These ethical principles aim to empower solidarity within humankind based on humanity and not based on race, language, etc. Secondly, *dīn* suggests normative moral instructions, which are not based on reality and empiricism, but are instead based on ethical

norms. Also, *dīn* inspires brotherhood among people, which reflects, for instance, the encouragement of *al-ulfah* among individuals, as this study demonstrated. Lastly and decisively, *dīn* leads individuals to soften their manners and behavior based on normative ethics and *ādāb*, so they become more active in society and more socially integrated into the collective. This is to state that *dīn* empowers civilization and advocates for a stable, ethical system. Therefore, any attempt to be independent from religious foundations leads to society and civilization's destruction and decline as a whole.

Al-Māwardī aims to change the people's minds and hearts, which is why he starts his contribution by focusing on reason, religion, and *ilm*. These are the three essential foundations where ethics, manners, and behavior can be composed. It is worth mentioning that al-Māwardī's civilization theory is a constant process. If civilization is not advancing, it starts to decline. Moreover, one should begin with the self before approaching others. Meaning, that first of all, every individual is responsible for acting decently, and only then does the circle extend to the collective.

As this study exposed, commitments distinguish human beings, and there are different levels of duties on the collective and the individual level. Noticeably, personal commitment is the basis of the notion of commitment, as if an individual cannot be responsible for himself, he cannot be responsible for other(s). Nevertheless, collective commitment is the structure and framework within which the individual can practice his commitments freely, and therefore, collective commitments are also the cornerstone for applying individual commitments. Al-Māwardī proposed six fundamental principles, which this study calls "Constitutive Elements of the Social World": adherence to a normative base, having a functional political system, applying comprehensive justice, maintaining general security and economic prosperity, and lastly, having collective optimism and hope for the future. All these six rules and principles can be instituted and supported merely through collective efforts and commitments. The objective is to increase social solidarity and cohesion among people. So, the more individuals are engaged in these collective ethical responsibilities, the stronger civilization will be.

In al-Māwardī's theory of civilization, as I argue in this study, humankind was created weak and in need of cooperation, and not to clash or wage war against each other. For al-Māwardī, while some animals can manage to live independently, humankind, nevertheless, can only live in collective social policies. Furthermore, he argues that human is by nature in need of his fellows, and this need for others is an indispensable character in humanity. Strictly speaking, it is not merely an option for humankind to cooperate and work together or for each other. Instead, it is an inevitability for humanity to survive (al-Māwardī 2012: 209).

Moreover, there are two types of individual commitments. On the one hand, *Adab Riyāḍah wa-Istiṣlāḥ* or what this study called "Personal Discipline and Institutions," which is based on religious beliefs, rationality, and intellectual faculties. According to al-Māwardī, no rational being can suspect this category of individual commitments. Examples of this are avoiding arrogance and self-admiration, having shame (*ḥayā*'), being forbearing, sincere and not having malicious envy. On the other hand, *Adab Muwāḍi'ah wa-Istiṣlāḥ*, or what this study named "Al-Māwardī's Informal Institution Theory" is centered on the imitation of what sober-minded people have practiced and convened as conventional shared social values. For instance, it includes being patient and not having sorrow, and having a sense of honor (in Arabic *al-Murū'ah*). Both individual ethical commitments are indispensable to have a resilient and well-founded civilization.

How can we benefit from al-Māwardī's theory of civilization in the contemporary era? Doubtless, there are many answers to this question. For instance, there is almost no debate within Civilization Studies on the relationship between applying justice and building a civilization. Understanding the role of justice and its ability to maintain social solidarity is essential in this regard. Otherwise, overlooking the significance and the consequences of justice restricts our competence and ability to analyze and understand how civilization should function. Likewise, there are almost no debates on the relationship between hope, optimism, and civilization, even though hope drives and motivates people to be productive and contribute to society. Al-Māwardī aims throughout his contributions to maintain and empower social solidarity in society. For this reason, he pays attention to normative ethics, which are usually overlooked by social theorists, especially in contemporary times.

To give another example, al-Māwardī exceptionally supports the idea that there is a strong association between having hope in the future or being an optimist and civilization's advancement, owing to the argument that an optimistic person is more productive and creative than a hopeless person. Such substantial concepts and notions are infrequently debated even in contemporary theories of civilization. Therefore, al-Māwardī's theory of civilization can offer beneficial concepts and notions to analyze and understand the civilizations of his time and contemporary civilizations.

Also, al-Māwardī introduced us to social and ethical structures of how a civilization can be organized, constructed, survive, and decline, which again offers us a valuable pattern in evaluating civilizations' development throughout the ages. Similarly, al-Māwardī intends throughout his contributions to empower individual's social integration. For him, this is the main objective to be accomplished by applying the different categories of normative ethics. For instance, he connects the notion of *ḥayā* with social solidarity and argues to show how applying ethics leads to the empowerment of civilization's social structure. This explains why he was interested in ethics as an essence of civilization and not in its manifestations such as political establishment, arts, etc. This is to state that ethics as an essence of his theory of civilization provides the distinctiveness of his theory over other civilization theorists. However, his theory is not only about ethics, although ethics is an important element of his theory.

Several rich classical contributions have focused on individual and societal social norms and values, *ādāb* and how to develop and apply them on a civilizational level, such as the works of al-Iṣfahānī, Ibn Riḍwān, al-Razi, Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī, al-Ghazālī, al-Fārābī, and many others. These contributions could propose alternative normative ethics in the contemporary era, where there are undeniable deficiencies and confusion. Such classical works ought to be revised and re-evaluated within the framework of civilization studies. However, such an academic endeavor necessitates a collective effort. This is to articulate that there are a lot of work to be accomplished in this regard. My hope as the author of this study is to raise awareness of classical works focused on normative ethics, and to make a contribution in this regard by concentrating on al-Māwardī's thought. Lastly, even though al-Māwardī's

contributions are undeniably exceptional and significant in civilizations studies, he is nevertheless just one among many social theorists and philosophers of his time.



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Glossary of Arabic terms

‘Azl:	stripped from authority
Fiqh al-Wāqi’:	deep understanding of current state of affairs
‘Iffah:	continence, decency
Al-dîn:	religion, the religion of Islam
Ādāb al-‘Ilm:	the best normative ethics of and in ‘ilm
Adab Muwāḍi‘ah wa-Istiṣlāḥ:	informal institutional theory
Adab Riyāḍah wa-Istiṣlāḥ:	personal discipline and institutions
Ādāb:	refinement, social graces, decorum, decency, humanizes
Adabi:	moral, ethical, literary
‘Adl shāmīl:	comprehensive justice
Afa’āl al-Irādah:	acts of will
Al-‘Aql al-gharīzī:	Natural reason
Al-‘Aql al-Muktasab:	acquired reason
Al-Ākhirah	Hereafter
Al-Amn al-‘Amm:	general security
Al-Amr bi-al-ma‘rūf wa-al-nahī ‘an al-munkar:	promotion of virtue and prevention of vice
Al-Fa’l:	looking on the bright side of future
Al-Manhajīyah al-Takāmūliyah:	the complementarity methodology
Al-ta’awun t’āluf:	coalition, cooperation
Al-Taslīm:	submission to the will of God
‘Amal fāsiḥ:	deep hope for the future
Amara:	constructing
Aql’:	reason
Bāṭal:	wrong
Bāṭin:	esoteric
Dawlah:	state
Dīn muttaba’:	foundational religion or ideology

Dunyawī:	related to worldly life, mundane
Faḍīlah:	virtue
Farḍ al-‘Ayn:	individual obligation
Farḍ al-Kifāya:	sufficient obligation
Fāsid:	falseness, corrupt
Fiqh:	Islamic jurisprudence
Fiṭrah:	original state of humanity, original disposition
Ghaḍab:	anger
Ḥaḍārah:	civilization
Ḥaqq:	right
Ḥasad:	hostile envy
Hawá:	strong passion towards physical desires
Ḥayā:	shame
Ḥulm:	capability of disciplining the self, patience
Ḥusn al-Khulq:	the ethical characteristic traits
‘Āqil’:	understanding
‘Aql al-Gharīzī:	natural reason
‘Aqla al-Nāqah:	the camel’s binding cord
‘Aqlānī:	a sane person
‘Aṣabīyah:	social cohesion or social solidarity
‘Imārat al-Arḍ:	constructing a civilization on the earth
‘Itiqād:	firm belief
I’bādāt:	acts of devotion
Ifḍāl:	generosity
Ifsad:	evilness, corruption
Imām:	a Muslim leader
Īmān:	faith
Insān:	man
Iṣlāh al-Dunyā:	constitutive elements of the social world
Iṣlāh:	improvement and the act of making something better
Istidlāl:	inference
Jahilya:	pre-Islamic time
Jihād:	striving in the way of God

Khaṭa:	wrong, incorrect
Khayr:	goodness
Khisb dār:	general economic prosperity
Kibr:	arrogance, pride
Mā kāna muḃtada' fī al-nufūs:	a priori knowledge
Mada kafiya:	a sufficient wealth or income
Madīnah:	city
Madrasah:	Islamic oriented school
Maḥkamah:	court
Ma' ruf:	good deeds and kindness
Miyāsrah:	Clemency, relieving others from any
discomfort	
Mu'āzarah:	assistance without expecting compensation
Mumkin:	contingent
Mumtani':	impossible
Munāfasah:	a constructive rivalry
Murū'ah:	the sense of honor, chivalry
Nafs:	soul, self, own-self
Nafs muti'a:	'an obedient personality
Nazāhah:	integrity
Nazar:	deep thinking, reason
Qādī:	a judge
Ruḥ:	spiritual
Ṣaḥīḥ:	truthful
Salām:	peace
Salāmah:	safety
Ṣawāb:	exact, right
Shahwa:	physical desires
Sharr:	evil
Shari'ah:	the Islamic law, the revealed law
Shūrā:	consultation
Ṣiyānah:	safekeeping
Ṣalāḥ al-Ākhirah:	the welfare of Hereafter
Ṣalāḥ al-dunyā	the welfare of worldly life

Ṣalāḥu al-Akhlāq:	virtuous traits
Sū al-Akhlāq:	evil character traits
Sulṭān Qāhir:	competent authority
Tamaddun:	civilization
Targhīb:	persuasion
Tarhīb:	intimidation
Tatāli al-Ajyāl:	consecutive of generation
Tawassuṭ wa-l I'tidāl:	taking the middle position or mediating
Tawhīd:	monotheism
Ta' dīb:	civility, disciplining process of self
'Ujb:	self-admiration
Ulfah:	social integration
Ulfah jamiah:	general social integration
'Ulūm:	plural of 'ilm
Wilāyah:	governorship
Zāhir:	exoteric
Zakat:	an Islamic wealth redistribution system
'Ilm al-Dīn:	religious knowledge
'Ilm al-'Umran:	the science of civilization
'Ilm:	knowledge and or science
'Ulamā:	highly educated scholars
'Umrān:	civilization

Curriculum Vitae

Fadi Zatari

Center for Islam and Global Affairs
İstanbul Sabahattin Zaim University

Education

- 2014 onwards **PhD Candidate:**
Civilization Studies, Alliance of Civilizations Institute,
Istanbul
- 2010-2013 **MA: Political Theory**
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt and Technischen Universität
Darmstadt
- 2009 **Exchange student**
University of Vienna – Austria
- 2007 – 2009 **MA: International Relations**
Birzeit University – Palestine
- 2003 – 2006 **BA: Political Science**
Al-Quds (Jerusalem) University – Palestine

Academic Work and Experience

- 9/2017- onwards **Senior Research Associate**
Center for Islam and Global Affairs (CIGA)İstanbul
Sabahattin Zaim University
- 9/2017- onwards **Lecturer**
Department of Political Science and International Relations
İstanbul Sabahattin Zaim University
- 1/2015 – 08/2017 **Coordinator of the Research Unit**
Barq for Consulting and Future Studies, Istanbul
- 9/2014 – 08/2016 **Academic Assistant**
Alliance of Civilizations Institute, Istanbul

- 03/2013 – 07/2013 **Intern, Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany**
Office of Senator Michael Peter Gross, Berlin – Germany
(International Parliament Scholarship)
- 5/2012 – 08/2013 **Intern, The German Peace Society,
Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft**
Frankfurt am Main/ Mainz
- 05/2012 – 09/2012 **Tutor, Technische Universität Darmstadt – Germany**
Lecture: "Political Perspectives on the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict"
- 9/2008 – 4/2009 **Academic assistant, Birzeit University**
Department of Political Science
Birzeit University – Palestine
- 7/2007– 9/2008 **PR Administrator, Al-Ihsan Society**
Hebron – Palestine

Awards

- 2009 **EU Tempus, Trans-European Mobility Programme for University
Studies**, University of Vienna – Austria
- 2010 **German Academic Exchange Service, DAAD**
Study scholarship for the German language
did deutsch-institut Frankfurt am Main
- 2010-2013 **German Academic Exchange Service, DAAD**
Study Scholarship for Graduate Studies of all Disciplines
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt and Technischen Universität Darmstadt
- 2013 **Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany (Deutscher
Bundestag)**
International Parliament Scholarship
- 2013-2014 **TÜRGEV (Türkiye Gençlik ve Eğitime Hizmet Vakfı)**
Study Scholarship Turkish language
Fatih Sultan Mehmet Vakif University
- 2014-2016 **TÜRGEV (Türkiye Gençlik ve Eğitime Hizmet Vakfı)**
Study Scholarship for Doctoral studies
Alliance of Civilizations Institute

Selected Conference talks

- 2016 **“The concept of reason in al-Mawardi’s thought: as a pillar of Muslim Civilization”** Interdisciplinary Research in Civilization Studies, Alliance of Civilizations Institute. Istanbul.
- 2016 **“Hegemony in the Notion of Jewish State”** 1st International Social Sciences and Muslims Congress, Necmettin Erbakan University. Konya.
- 2015 **“The concept of Adab as coexistence model: Al-Mawardi approach”** G20 Interfaith Summit 2015: “Religion, Harmony and Sustainable Development”. Istanbul
- 2015 **“Time as key element in establishing Islamic Civilization: The Bennabism approach”** International Symposium on Time in Islamic Civilization. International Rumi Centre for the Study of Civilization, Necmettin Erbakan University. Konya.
- 2014 **“Global justice in Al-Farabian and Kantian mould; an enduring basis for a cosmopolitan world?”** Humboldt College: "Building International Networks for Enhancement of Research in Jordan" Princess Sumaya University – Amman
- 2014 **“The Utilization of 'Jihad' and 'Hudna' as Tools of Foreign Policy by Hamas towards Israel”** The 13th METU Conference on IR: “Multiple Paradigms Multiple Worlds” Middle East Technical University, Department of International Relations – Ankara
- 2014 **“Global or local? The concept of Jihad according to al-Qaeda and Hamas”** Fourth World Congress for Middle East Studies" (WOCMES) Middle East Technical University (METU) – Ankara
- 2014 **“The Concept of Enemy in the Hamas Ideology”** Middle Eastern Congress on Politics and Society Sakarya University, Centre for Middle Eastern Studies – Sakarya

Index Journal Articles

- Zatari, Fadi. 2021. “Religion As a Pillar for Establishing a Civilization: Al-Māwardī’s Perspective.” *Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization* 11 (1): 240-57.

Book reviews:

- Zatari, F. (2018) “Ten Myths about Israel (Ilan Pappé)“. *Ortadoğu Etütleri Dergisi*. 9.1. PP. 109 - 113.
- Zatari, F. (2019) “The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (John J. Mearsheimer)”. *Insight Turkey* 21.1 PP. 223 – 225.
- Zatari, F. (2019) “Ibn Khaldun: An Intellectual Biography (Robert Irwin)”. *Insight Turkey*. 21.2 PP. 283-285

Op-ed and commentary:

“Herzl's heritage of Zionism still triggers conflicts”, Daily Sabah, January 16, 2018.
<https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2018/01/17/herzls-heritage-of-zionism-still-triggers-conflicts>

“Support Palestinians, Embrace BDS”, INSAMER February 13, 2018.
http://insamer.com/en/support-palestinians-embrace-bds_1238.html

“Palestinian culture of Sumud”, Daily Sabah, April 3, 2018
<https://www.dailysabah.com/feature/2018/04/04/palestinian-culture-of-sumud>

“Israel: The state of hasbara”, Daily Sabah, May 8, 2018.
<https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2018/05/09/israel-the-state-of-hasbara>

“Israeli academia: A distinctive facade of apartheid,” Daily Sabah, June 10, 2018.
<https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2018/06/11/israeli-academia-a-distinctive-facade-of-apartheid>

“Siyonist hareket: Filistin’deki çatışmaların kaynağı”, INSAMER, July 6, 2018.
http://insamer.com/tr/siyonizm-filistindeki-catismalarin-kaynagi_1551.html

“”Bir Yahudi Devleti Olarak İsrail” Üzerine”, INSAMER, August 3, 2018
http://insamer.com/tr/bir-yahudi-devleti-olarak-israil-uzerine_1578.html

“BDS Hareketi: İsrail’e boykot, Filistin’e destek”, Star Gazetesi, October 6, 2018
<https://www.star.com.tr/acikgorus/bds-hareketi-israile-boykot-filistine-destek-haber-1392689/>

“My Uyghur Friend, Where Are You?”, Muftah, December 14, 2018
<https://muftah.org/my-uyghur-friend-where-are-you/#.XCcOjC2B3BU>

“The Palestinian case in Turkey”
<https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2019/01/15/the-palestinian-case-in-turkey>

Fields of interest

Palestinian Israeli conflict, Theory of Civilization, Ethics and Politics, Theories of International Relations, political theory, and classical Muslim thoughts.

Languages

Arabic:	Native
German:	Fluent
English:	Fluent
Turkish:	Good
Hebrew:	Basic