

**IBN HALDUN UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

MASTER THESIS

**THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OR THE STATE:
WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF THE TURKEY'S
NATIONAL INTEREST?**

KEREM AKIL

**THESIS SUPERVISOR
ASSOC. PROF. ALI ASLAN**

ISTANBUL, 2021

**IBN HALDUN UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

MASTER THESIS

**THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OR THE STATE:
WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF THE TURKEY'S
NATIONAL INTEREST?**

by

KEREM AKIL

**A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in
Political Science and International Relations**

**THESIS SUPERVISOR
ASSOC. PROF. ALI ASLAN**

ISTANBUL, 2021

APPROVAL PAGE

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and International Relations.

Thesis Jury Members

Title - Name Surname

Opinion

Signature

Assoc. Prof. Ali Aslan

Assoc. Prof. Talha Köse

Prof. Hasan Basri Yalçın

This is to confirm that this thesis complies with all the standards set by the School of Graduate Studies of Ibn Haldun University.

Date of Submission

Seal/Signature

ACADEMIC HONESTY ATTESTATION

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name Surname: Kerem Akıl

Signature:



ÖZ

ULUSLARARASI SİSTEM YA DA DEVLET: TÜRKİYE’NİN ULUSAL ÇIKAR
KAYNAĞI NEDİR?

Akıl, Kerem

Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans Programı

Öğrenci Numarası: 187039003

Open Researcher and Contributor ID (ORC-ID): 0000-0003-4372-5565

Ulusal Tez Merkezi Referans Numarası: 10433182

Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Ali Aslan

Eylül, 2021, 104 Sayfa

Bu çalışma, devletlerin dış politika davranışlarını yönlendiren bir kılavuz olarak tanımlanan ulusal çıkar kavramını uluslararası sistem düzeyinde incelemektedir. Çalışma, temel olarak uluslararası sistemin döngüsel bir süreç içinde istikrarlı ve istikrarsızlık süreçlerinin ulusların çıkarlarını belirleyen temel kaynak olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Bu iddiaya göre, istikrarlı uluslararası sistemin bileşenleri olan uluslararası yapı ve düzen sistemdeki devletlerin çıkar ve davranışları üzerinde bir belirginlik oluşturacaktır. Bir diğer ifadeyle, uluslararası sistemik güçlerin baskınlığı devletlerin karar alma süreçlerini şekillendireceği veya kısıtlayacağı varsayılabilir. Bunun aksine, istikrarsız uluslararası sistemler ise, kurulu uluslararası yapıya ve düzene karşı meydan okumaların ve belirsizliklerin arttığı dönemler olarak ifade edilebilir. Sistemsel belirsizliklerin devletler üzerindeki baskıyı hafiflettiği istikrarsızlık dönemlerinde, devletlerin güç kapasitelerinin ulusal çıkarları belirlemede temel belirleyici olacağı ifade edilebilir. Bu bağlamda, tez temel olarak üç kısma ayrılmaktadır. İlk olarak literatür taraması ulusal çıkarın kaynağı olarak değerlendirilebilecek diğer alternatif yaklaşımları ortaya koymaktadır. İkinci bölüm ise, tezin ana konusu olan uluslararası sistemin istikrarlı ve istikrarsız dönemleri ve bu dönemlerin devletlerin ulusal çıkarlarını nasıl ve ne yönde etkilediğini tartışmaktadır. Tezin üçüncü bölümünde ise, 1999-2020 yılları arasındaki Türk dış politikası incelenerek uluslararası sistemin iki farklı döneminin ulusların çıkarlarını belirlemedeki rolü gösterilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İstikrar, İstikrarsızlık, Türk Dış Politikası, Ulusal Çıkar, Uluslararası Sistem



ABSTRACT

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OR THE STATE: WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF THE TURKEY'S NATIONAL INTEREST?

Akıl, Kerem

MA in Political Science and International Relations

Student ID: 187039003

Open Researcher and Contributor ID (ORCID): 0000-0003-4372-5565

Ulusal Tez Merkezi Referans Numarası: 10433182

Thesis Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Ali Aslan

September 2021, 104 Pages

This study examines the concept of national interest, which is defined as a guide that directs the foreign policy behaviors of states, at the level of the international system. The study basically claims that the stability and instability processes of the international system in a cyclical process are the main source that determines the interests of the nations. According to this claim, the international structure and order, which are the components of the stable international system, will build a certainty on the interests and behaviors of the states in the system. In other words, it can be assumed that the dominance of international systemic forces will shape or constrain the decision-making processes of states. Conversely, unstable international systems can be defined as periods that there is a high degree of uncertainty in world politics due to challenges to the established international structure and order. In such periods, it can be stated that systemic uncertainties will alleviate the pressure on states, and thus, the power capacities of states will be the main factor to determine the source of national interests. In this context, the thesis is basically divided into three parts. First, the literature review reveals other alternative approaches that can be considered as a source of national interest. The second part, on the other hand, discusses the stable and unstable periods of the international system, which is the main subject of the thesis, and explores how and in what way these periods affect the national interests of the states. The third part of the thesis examines the Turkish foreign policy from 1999 to

2020 and exhibits the role of two distinct periods of the international system in determining the interests of nations.

Keywords: Instability, International System, National Interest, Stability, Turkish Foreign Policy



ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First, I would like to exhibit my sincere gratitude to the Almighty Allah for bringing me this point. Although I am responsible for the arguments in this study, it could be defined as composition because it is emerged from many precious help, guidance, and encouragement from my environment. First and foremost, I am deeply grateful to my advisor Assoc. Prof. Ali Aslan for sharing with me his all ideas, encouragement, suggestions, and queries in the process. Even when I thought that I would not be able to finish the thesis process, he positively approached the process and motivated me to renew my passion and energy throughout the process. Secondly, I want to thank my friends, Şeyhmus Aksoy, Ahmet Safa, and Enedi Domi who made considerable contributions to the thesis process. I also exclusively would like to thank Şeyhmus Aksoy, although he is not a student of international relations, he spared his valuable time to read, understand and fix my thesis, as well as has been the greatest companion during the process. Thirdly, I want to appreciate to organizations, Küçükçekmece Seyyid Abdusselam Solidarity and Culture Association (KUSAYDER) and Fatih Medrese Davutpaşa, which enabled me, suitable study place and atmosphere.

I have completed thesis as a result of the intellectual knowledge, skills and experience I have gained from many academicians throughout my academic life. Therefore, I would like to express my gratitude to Assoc. Prof Pınar Bal, Prof. Ali Vahit Turhan, Prof. Armagan Gözkaman in my undergraduate life and to Assoc. Prof Talha Köse, Prof. Erik Ringmar, Asst. Prof. Kılıç Buğra Kanat, Asst. Prof Heba Rauf during my graduate life. Besides, I owe special gratitude to Prof. Hasan Basri Yalçın that I gathered a number of knowledge in his academic lectures and talks during both my undergraduate and graduation life.

Finally, I also would like to say a big thank you to my parents, Fatıma Tuncer and Nedim Akıl, and my elder sister Kübra Akıl for support to me. Without their help and encouragement, this thesis could not be completed.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to those who never give up fighting despite losing in certain periods of life.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

ÖZ	iv
ABSTRACT	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	viii
DEDICATION	ix
LIST OF TABLE	xiii
LIST OF FIGURES	xiv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xv
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Statement of the Problem and Aim of the Study.....	1
1.2. Previous Studies of the National Interest.....	2
1.3. Argument of Study.....	6
1.4. Methodology of Study.....	9
1.4.1. Why the Turkish Foreign Policy between 1999 – Present.....	9
CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW	11
2.1. International System Levels.....	12
2.1.1. Neo-Realist International System.....	12
2.1.1.1. Defensive Realism.....	14
2.1.1.2. Offensive Realism.....	16
2.1.2. Neo- Marxist International System.....	18
2.1.2.1. Dependency School.....	18
2.1.2.2. Modern-World System Theory.....	19
2.1.2.3. Structural Imperialist Theory.....	20
2.1.3. The Neo – Liberal Institutional International System.....	21
2.1.4. Structural Constructivist International System.....	23
2.2. The State Level.....	25
2.2.1. Classical Realists.....	25

2.2.2. Taxonomic Studies.....	28
2.2.3. Decision-Making Approach.....	31
2.2.4. Liberal Theory.....	32
2.2.4.1. Democratic Peace Theory.....	32
2.2.4.2. Interdependency Theory.....	34
2.2.5. Unit- Level Constructivist Theory.....	35
2.2.6. Other Approaches.....	36
2.2.6.1. Group based Approach.....	38
CHAPTER III THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OR THE STATE: WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST.....	41
3.1. The Nature of the International System.....	42
3.2. Cycle of the International System.....	45
3.2.1. First Period: Stable International System.....	46
3.2.1.1. Status Quo Stage.....	47
3.2.1.1.1. Multipolar International System.....	49
3.2.1.1.2. Bipolar International System.....	50
3.2.1.1.3. Uni-Polar International System.....	52
3.2.1.2. Second Stage: Redistribution of Power.....	55
3.2.2. Second Period: The Unstable International System.....	57
3.2.2.1. Third Stage: Disequilibrium.....	58
3.2.2.2. Fourth Stage: Resolution of Systemic Crisis.....	60
3.3. What is the Source of the National Interest?.....	61
3.3.1. National Interest Formulations in Cycle of International System.....	61
CHAPTER IV TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1999 TO PRESENT... 64	
4.1. The Unipolar Stable International System between 1989 – 2016.....	65
4.2. 1999 – 2016: Turkish Foreign Policy in Stable International System.....	67
4.2.1. General Outlook to Turkish Foreign Policy.....	67

4.2.2. The Effects of the International System on Turkish Foreign Policy.....	71
4.3. Unstable International System Since 2016.....	75
4.4. The Turkish Foreign Policy in Unstable International System	78
4.4.1. Turkey's Syria Policy	79
4.4.2. Turkey's East Mediterranean and Libyan Policy.....	83
4.4.3. Turkey's New Defense Policy	85
CHAPTER V CONCLUSION	88
5.1. Brief Summary	88
5.2. Findings	89
5.3. Discussions and Suggestions.....	89
REFERENCES.....	92
CURRICULUM VITAE.....	104

LIST OF TABLE

Table 4.1. Comparison of the United States of America and People Republic of China's Gross Domestic Product and Defence Budget in 1989 and 2020..... 77



LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1. Theories at the International System Level	12
Figure 2.2. Theories at the State Level	12
Figure 3.1. Cycle of the International System.....	46
Figure 3.2. State Interest (n) = (value of revision) – (value of status quo)	59



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Comecom	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
Cominform	Communist Information Bureau
East-Med	Eastern Mediterranean
EEZ	Economic Exclusive Zone
EU	European Union
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNA	Government of National Accord
IKRG	Iraq Kurdish Regional Government
IMF	International Monetary Bank
JDP	Justice and Development Party
LIO	Liberal International Order
LofN	League of Nations
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PKK	Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan
RF	Russian Federation
PRC	People's Republic of China
SU	Soviet Union
TFP	Turkish Foreign Policy
UAE	United Arab Emirate
UN	United Nations

UK	United Kingdom
USA	United States of America
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization



CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Statement of the Problem and Aim of the Study

This study concerns the sources of the concept of national interest on the basis of international relations theories. It pays attention that the theories of international relations mainly divide into two levels as structural systemic level and non-systemic state level. By looking at this division, it seeks to answer the question which one is more important in order to explore the formulation process of the national interest the international system or the state level? On the one hand, the theories of the state level evaluate the national interest as a subjective concept that arises out as a result of domestic political factors. The explanation of the international system level, on the other hand, sees the national interest as an objective concept that emerges as a result of external factors. However, this study argues that both types of explanation derive from of a static analytical root and they miss out the possibility of change and dynamism of the national interest. More broadly, theories at international system level argues that although the political units or actors that may have contradict and different characteristics such as regime type, economic or cultural system or vice versa their national interests is determined by the domination of structural forces of the international system level. By contrast, theories at the state-level claim that the national interests of political actors or units are determined as a result of their state-level differentials even though there are the same systemic structural conditions over them. By inspiring at these two-edged and static explanation levels, the international system and state level, this study mainly offers an alternative approach that two explanation levels could be important to determine the interests of nations according to stable or unstable periods of the international system. In this point, it asks the question that when the national interest of states is determined by systemic factors and when the interests of nations are affected by state-level theories. Basically, it can be said that this study searches for the change and continuity of the national interests in world politics. Under

this framework, the main purpose of this study is to solve the dilemma that happens between the studies of the international system level and the state level.

1.2. Previous Studies of the National Interest

The previous studies on the determination of the national interest can be categorized into two main parts. On the one hand, the studies claim that the sources of the interests of nations can be explained by the theories of international system level which are the neo-realism, neo-Marxist dependency, liberal institutionalism, structural constructivism. On the other hand, theories at state level which are classical realism, liberal theories, decision-making approach, unit-based constructivism and taxonomic studies assert that the state level is the main source to determine the source of national interests. Although this study mainly takes into consideration this division to analyze the source of national interest there are also different kind of studies about national interest.

Besides the issue that what is the source of national interest in world politics, the national interest literature basically draws special attention to another question that whether national interest is an analytical concept in the foreign policy process. Two main approaches basically become important in order to examine this question. On the one hand, some scholars claim that the national interest is indefinable concept because of its broad meaning or global configuration of power, ideological reasons, effect of mass media or dominance of group interest inside the states (Aron, 2003; George & Keohane, 1975; Gowing, 1994; Mills et., 2000; Nye, 1999; Rochester, 1978; Rosenau, 1968; Sondermann, 1983). In contrast to this, other scholars take the national interest as a subject of political analysis and reply to these allegations and claim that it is explicable, researchable and applicable into the issues of foreign policy (Clinton, 1994; Kaplan, 2014; Krasner, 1978; Kratochwil, 1982). Briefly, this debate mainly revolves around the two main positions at the analytical level and the critical level. However, this study basically accepts the assumption that national interest is an analytical concept and then focuses on the question of what is the source of the national interest? The national interest is defined as an overriding objective that emerges from a certain standard which determines and governs the foreign policy actions of states. Within the framework of this definition, the studies that analyze the standard of national interest

are grouped under two main headings as international system and state level explanations. In the first type of explanation, international systemic analysis argues that national interest is shaped by international structures. The second type of explanation, state level analysis claims that the changes and developments in domestic politics have a determining effect on the concept.

The structural theories of international relations such as neo-realism, neo-Marxism, neo-liberalism and normative constructivism approaches display how the international system level can shape the objective national interests of states in foreign policy process. According to Kenneth Waltz, “the international systems are defined as the set of interacting units in certain structure and arrangement and positioning of units within a structure is crucial to predict and explain behaviors of units” (Waltz, 1979, p. 80). In other words, this type of explanation claims that the international systems limit and push the states to take obligatory steps in their foreign policy processes. Thus, the objective kind of national interest of states may be evaluated on the basis of the supra-party politics and long-term aims despite the fact that of their distinct internal composition.

The neo-realism firstly is one of the most crucial theories in the explanation of the international system level. The theories of neo-realism roughly emphasize the two main points in order to explain the state actions. First, the ordering principle of international politics is defined as anarchy or decentralization which means an absence of higher authority in the system. This puts the states where the self-help system is dominant and the units mainly worry about their survival and this worry conditions their actions (J. Mearsheimer, 2013; Waltz, 1979). Second, the structure of the international system is determined according to distributions of power or number of great powers in the system. Thus, the international structure may change and limit the expectations about how the units in system will behave.

Secondly, the theories of neo-Marxism mainly examine the nature of the international system through capitalism which is ceaseless accumulation of capital and the centre / periphery distinction (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Frank, 1969; Galtung, 1971; Wallerstein, 1996). This distinction which is emerged from the global division of labor places rich countries in the centre and poor countries in the periphery. Except the

general Marxist theories; Wallerstein finds third level as semi-periphery countries that exhibits characteristics of both regions may pass to the core states or become complete periphery states (Wallerstein, 1996) Briefly, the interrelationship of the world economy which is inevitably based on hierarchical structure imprisons states in a certain mode of behavior when they form their national interest.

Thirdly, the neoliberal institutionalist theory mainly argues that the cooperation among states is possible under the conditions of anarchy through international institutions (Keohane, 2005). According to this theory, the international institutions may be seen as an important mechanism that increase the possibility of cooperation among states because they promote mutual trust and build set of norms like open and stable economic system thus, they may reduce the uncertainty and cheating among states' relations. In sum, it assumes that the international institutions have the potentiality to transform or affect the national interests of states.

Unlike rational and material theories, structural social constructivism as fourth way are based on the assumption that social phenomena such as culture, norms, morals, values, identity, and religion are important in international politics. Accordingly, the international system cannot be taken as pre-given however; it is socially constructed reality as a result of interaction of actors. In this framework, social structural constructivist theory assumes that the states' interest is determined by identity in which this identity is built as a result of social process. Thus, Wendt claims that anarchy is what states perceive of it and present three anarchy types to evaluate the state behaviours and national interest of states (Wendt, 1992). First, Hobbesian anarchy type dictates that states fear each other and see others as enemy, second is the Lockean anarchy so that states define others as rival but respect each other's sovereignty and finally, in Kantian anarchy, states tend to cooperate each other and see other states as friend.

Unlike the theories of the international system level, the explanations at the state level, on the other hand, assert that the national interest is not reduced objective drives and structural explanations; however, it assumes that the concept is subjectively explained and formulated as a result of domestic political factors. In other words, state-level explanations say that the formulation of the national interest may be understood by

analyzing the process of state rather than an output of international political interactions.

Liberalism is one of the important theories that relate democracy with foreign policy process in state level explanations. According to this, the national interest could be defined as the set of preferences that may be altered by the requirements and aspirations of nation's members. For example, Miroslav Nincic and Ned Lebow strongly argue that democratic principles, as source of national interest, provide societal consensus and legitimacy so that these principles may play the key role to describe the needs and desires of country's nation or people (Lebow, 2020; Nincic, 1999; Rourke, 2007). Likewise, the proponents of democratic peace theory tend to have a slightly different position in this explanation type. For them, democracies do not fight each other and this empirical fact is based on democratic norms like competitive elections, separation of powers, individual rights and so on (Doyle, 1986; Owen, 1994; Russett, 1994).

Taxonomic studies also aim to examine the national interests of states by categorizing them. In more broad terms, this kind of studies assumes that the national interests must be divided into various subgroups and each group should be examined in a detailed way. For example, Joseph Frankel, one of the crucial representatives of the behaviourist school, says that the concept may be analysed in terms of objective and subjective interest in which objectives are counted as geography, history, resources, population size, ethnicity and subjective interests are choices of specific government or elite, religion, ideology, class identity (Frankel, 1970). In a similar way, the other studies also evaluate the concept through the classification and explanation of national values (Nuechterlein, 1976; Osgood, 1953; Robinson, 1967).

The decision-making process can also be seen as another important source and standard of national interest that is based on a process in which decision-makers are put at the centre. According to Snyder, Bruck, Sapin, decision makers are not independent of internal and external settings which defined a set of factors and conditions which may affect the action of any state. Thus, they say that "decision makers act upon and respond to the conditions and factors of both external setting which refers to situations beyond the territorial boundaries of state as well as internal

setting which is defined as domestic politics, public opinion and geography” (Snyder et., 1969).

The unit - level constructivist theories which is another explanation type assumes like systemic constructivism, the national interest emerges from social construction. But they are the opposite of systemic constructivism and claim that it is necessary to focus on the relationship between domestic social and legal norms and the identities and interests of the states (Reus-Smith, 2013). One of the well – known explanation in this tradition is made by Samuel Huntington in his study of the erosion of American national interest (Huntington, 1997). He basically claims that the existence of national identity is the main milestone to determine national interest. In other words, he says that the national interest of a state can be formed by the presence of other that threatens its national identity.

1.3. Argument of Study

This study mainly argues that the source of the national interest is determined according to the cycle of the international system which consist of two distinct periods, stability and instability and four stages, status quo, redistribution of power, disequilibrium and resolution of systemic crisis. According to this cycle, when the international system is stable, it brings dominance and certainty to interstate relations and inevitably causes the determination of the national interests of states. However, when the system is in an unstable period as a result of revisionist state(s) that challenge the systemic structure and order, the state level becomes a more important factor than systemic forces to determine the interest of nations. Thus, this study basically evaluates the state behaviours and interests under the umbrella of theories of power transition rather than the balance of power and concentrates on the concepts of stability as well as instability to measure the interest of nations.

The stable international system is basically defined as the period of time when the international structure and order has dominance to shape world politics. By using Kenneth Waltz’ definition, the concept of structure could be “defined by the arrangement of its parts and it plays a disposer role to affect and limit the behavior of the units” (Waltz, 1979, p. 80). Likewise, the structure in the international system is

defined as the arrangement formed as a result of the number of great powers in world politics and is regarded as an invisible force that limits the behavior of states (Waltz, 1996). Besides the concept of structure, the international order which is defined as a governing set of rules provides legitimate political, economic, and ideological certainty in world politics (Sørensen, 2006). By looking at these two concepts, the stable international systems can be examined under the context of unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar levels and their specific world orders. Each of these international systems begins with the stage of the status quo period which is the essential and longest time in the cycle of the system and continues with stage of redistribution of power which can be defined as a less stable period due to rise of challengers.

By contrast, the unstable international system emerges as a period when the number of great powers in international politics changes, uncertainty increases, and secondary/regional revisionist states are prevalent in the system. In other words, the unstable international system may also be defined as a process of bi-polarization of world politics. Regardless of the structure of the stable international system is unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar, world politics divides into two blocks as status quo and revisionist states. During this period, revisionist states basically challenge the existing international structure and order and aim to bring a new one in terms of political, economic, and ideological ways under the new legitimate political structure. In this way, the disequilibrium stage, as the third stage of the cycle of the international system, increases the security dilemma among states and exacerbates the chronic or new problems and competition among rival states. Finally, the stage of resolution of systemic crisis means the great/hegemonic wars among states in the system. At the end, the system is renewed and either declining or revisionist or it will establish the new legitimate and sustainable international system.

By making these distinctions, the two distinct periods of the international system can be related to formulations of national interests. By looking the cycle of international system, it could be deduced that one of the sources of the national interest is the structural factors of the international system during the stable period of times. On the one hand, the stable international system pushes and pull the states into an environment where the security risks are low and certainty is high in the world politics. On the other hand, it decreases the freedom of state actions, in other words, it has the capacity to

limit and direct the state actions in their foreign policy process. Even if actions of state-level aim to challenge the international system, such actions could be seen as the source of instability by other actors in the system and she is punished or isolated in existing system because of its wrong actions. Instead, the secondary-tier states attempt to take maximum benefit from collective goods which are defined as international security and economic system and are only produced by great power(s) in the system.

By contrast, the state level may emerge as the other source of the national interest when the international system goes into an unstable period of times in the world politics. As it is indicated, the unstable international system basically aims to bring the alternative order against the existing one so that, it represents the weakening process of the influence of structural factors in the international system. In other words, it could be said that unstable periods of time push states into realms where insecurity, uncertainties, and possible crises are prevalent. In such period of time, the state gains more relative independence to act in their foreign policy activities and states' power capabilities become more important than structural factors to form the formulation of the national interest. In addition to this, the study prefers to stick the neo-realist framework to evaluate the state level. Put it another words, it assumes that the state is an entity that can make decisions independently of different elite groups, different parties, social pressures or tensions between the bureaucracy and the political party. Thus, this study argues that the state, as independent of weakening international structural factors and internal pressure groups, has the ability to pursue its broader foreign policy objectives in unstable international systems.

As a consequence, this study puts forward that the international system which is the main cause of the state behavior and interests can be divided into stable and unstable period of times. Accordingly, it emphasizes that both international system and state level analysis can be crucial to explain the source of national interest according to structure of the international system. On the one hand, when the international system is stable, the national interest of states is determined by structural force of the system. On the other hand, when the international system is the going into bi-polarization process and in the unstable period of time, the states' relative independence increase and state level become the more important to form the interest of nations.

1.4. Methodology of Study

This study is explanatory in nature and scope because the definitions of concepts employed and their operationalization are more problematic and refer to questions of why (Babbie, 2014). The source of the national interest literature is examined in the scope of international relations theories so that, deductions and inferences are made to explain the central question of the study. By this, this study aims to retune the debate on what is the source of national interest as new variables are introduced and evaluated. In terms of mainly secondary materials are utilized, in other words, the data used for this study is collected by books, scientific journal articles, encyclopedia articles, reports and other secondary online documents. It also involves distilling the logical basis of theories constructed in international relations.

This study utilized a case study approach employing the Turkish foreign policy from 1999 to 2020 to measure the effect of the international system on the national interest. The use of case study method enables the researcher to obtain detailed and comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon under study through the utilization of a wide range of research tools (Gerring, 2006). For the purpose of this study, the qualitative technique is used and this entails conducting a literature review, text interpretation, and theory testing in order to explain the source of the national interest.

1.4.1. Why the Turkish Foreign Policy between 1999 – Present

This case is worth examining due to Turkey's having complex and dynamic domestic politics and external relations with other countries. On the one hand, Turkey has faced a number of domestic issues such as bureaucracy-ruling party tensions, social change, polarization, and frequent elections. Turkey, on the other hand, has tried to design and conduct regional-wide foreign policy aims by using its soft and hard power capabilities. However, this study mainly asserts that Turkey adapted its foreign policy to the structural characteristics of the international system during the whole period. In this context, it could be said that even though Turkey was governed by the coalition government and then single-party administration between 1999-2016, these parties mostly pursued similar national interests in foreign policy and, more importantly, took a position according to the American-led liberal international system. However, it

could also be deduced that the Turkish foreign policy from 2016 to 2020 has largely acted independent of the influence of international constraints such as the USA and the EU and determined its national interest by state level.



CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review basically aims to exhibit the sources of the concept of the national interest in foreign policy process by using the theories and perspectives international relations. In this respect, the studies that explore sources of the national interest can be grouped into two camps, on the one hand, the level of structural international system and on the other hand, level of state- based internal politics. The further classification can be made according to theories of analysis in these levels. Firstly, the structural studies of international system level base their national interest explanation into four main perspectives which are the neo-Realist, neo-Marxist, neo-Liberal institutionalist and structural social constructivist international system. Secondly, the state-based studies of internal politics level also examine the sources of national interest into six sub-categories which are the classical realism, liberal theory, unit-based constructivism, decision-making approach, taxonomic perspective and other studies. Unlike the other structural international system theories, neo-realism is mainly divided into sub-theories which are defensive and offensive theories. In a similar way, realism and liberalism in the actor-based internal politics level is divided in their sub theories. In this way, realism is examined in two parts as classical realism and neo-classical theory as well as liberal theory is also divided into two parts as democratic peace theory and interdependency theory. Figure 2.1 and figure 2.2 display this complex framework of the national interests' formulations.




Figure 2.1. Theories at the International System Level




Figure 2.2. Theories at the State Level

2.1. International System Levels

2.1.1. Neo-Realist International System

This part of study mainly aims to explore the national interest on the basis of the neo-realist explanations. Neo-realist international system, like other international systems, concentrates on exhibiting that how states' behaviours are limited and moulded in international politics. Basically, this part finds two distinct perspectives as defensive and offensive, to explain the sources of the national interest in the neo-realist international system. In this way, although the general tenets of the neo-realism imply that the national interest of states is an automatic product of structural international system, the main motivations/determinant of states' behaviours can be either defensive or offensive

The neo-realist international political system is basically composed of two parts in which these are the self-interested states and structure meaning the arrangement of a system's parts. More clearly, the main tenets of neo-realism are described into three parts. First, the anarchy meaning the absence of higher authority can be called an ordering principle so that it fundamentally determines the character of international politics. Second tenet assumes that states are undifferentiated and unitary actors/units, in spite of the fact that states vary according to their size, wealth, power. The third tenet is the distribution of the capabilities of the units so it enables the different political structures that can be measured by looking at the number of great powers, in other words, polars in the system (Waltz, 1979, p. 88, 1988, 42, 1990, p. 29). Under this system, there are two fundamental factors that determine the state actions. On the one hand, the anarchy pushes and pulls the states into an insecure environment and this situation is also called the security dilemma, in which increasing a state's own security decreases the other states' security (Herz, 1950; p. 157). On the other hand, the structural political systems, unipolarity, bipolarity or multi-polarity, are another fundamental determinant to constrain as well as direct the formulation of the national interests of the states in their foreign policy processes.

Beside these three basic tenets, the neo-realism put the three assumptions to explain that why foreign policies of states go in similar ways despite the fact they have different internal characteristics and have interactions with other states. Firstly, it says that if states live in an insecure world, their ultimate motivation is naturally to guarantee their survival. Secondly, the order of the system is based on self-help, so that states have only two choices to secure themselves which are either power maximization or forming alliances to secure themselves. Thirdly, the cooperation among states is rarely seen since each state on the system takes into consideration maximizing the relative power that is the gains at the expense of others. Therefore, neorealism, like other structural international systems, ignores the domestic factors in which they may be government forms of states like democracy and authoritarianism or economic preferences of states like mercantilism and capitalism or political ideologies of states like conservatism, liberalism, and nationalism. Instead, it says that the national interests of states are largely the same because the internal or domestic composition of states is essentially irrelevant to their fundamental diplomatic goal – survival (Burchill, 2005).

2.1.1.1. Defensive Realism

The neo-realism is one of the dominant ways to explain the state behaviours in international politics. In addition to this, the survival motivation of states is the top priority and unavoidable facts to measure and explain the source of the national interest. However, the question of how much power is enough to ensure the survival of states becomes the main issue that is needed answering. In this way, the defensive realists that derives from the tenets of neo-realism mainly argues that in case of any states gain too much power, other actors in the system tend to balance it. In other words, according to proponents of the defensive realists, states have neither too much powerful or weakness but have only appropriate amount of power otherwise, system punish it so that states pursue security as the highest end rather than the profit or power (Waltz, 1979, p. 126, 1990, p. 36). On the contrary to this, other some scholars who are named offensive realists claim that the best way to ensure survival is to establish a hegemonic relation with other states so states wish to have the power as much as possible.

Defensive realism is basically examined in two ways which are structural explanations and half structural explanations including some of the elements of foreign policy analysis besides the structural factors. One of the main representatives of the structural defensive view is Kenneth Waltz who directly finds that the balancing behaviours of states are a result of the anarchic structural systems. In other words, states are more concerned with having security rather than power because the logic of the balance of power is repeatedly generated. To him “the balancing is a preferable action for states where the victory of one coalition over another put weaker members of the winning coalition at the mercy of stronger ones therefore, no great powers wish one of their peers to appear as a leader” (Waltz, 1979, p. 126). Therefore, States balance power because if they wanted to maximize strength and allied with powerful ones, world hegemony would result; however, this does not happen because states flock to the weaker side and build sufficient deterrent and defensive capabilities to dissuade attackers.

On the other side, there are also other studies that can be called half-structural explanations that try to explain why states tend to behave in defensive ways by adding

the factors of foreign policy analysis. In this way, Stephen Walt who searches for the question of when do alliances form finds a different answer rather than the one Waltz portrayed. Basically, he challenges the classical assumption that the states balance with weaker side and align with stronger which is called as bandwagoning as a result of solid structural obligatory. Put it another words, he emphasizes that the power factor is not the only reason to build the alliances. To him, “states establish alliances, balancing or bandwagoning, as response against the most threatening power” (Walt, 1985, p. 4). In this point, it is clearly deduced that the intensity of threat is the main motivation to determine and explain the states' national interest policies. Thus, he basically examines the levels of threat into four parts which are the aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive capability and offensive intentions. Besides the question of why states form alliances, Walt, like other defensive realists, assumes that “balancing behaviour for states is safer than bandwagoning behavior since the intentions may change as well as the perceptions are unreliable thus, it increases the states' freedom of action” (Walt, 1985, p. 15). Beyond that he also pays special attention to the secondary factors like ideological solidarity, bribery, and penetration. Despite the fact that they are secondary considerations, they may contribute to retain and strengthen incentives as leverage for existing alignments.

The other study which takes into consideration the defensive policies of state behaviours is done by Robert Jervis. He mainly put forward that the explanation of offense-defence balance is the key concept to ameliorate the uncertainty of security dilemma (Jervis, 1978). Accordingly, this balance can be in favour of either side as a result of the effectiveness of geography and technology variables. In more clearly, when the offense has advantages, the security is scarce and when the defence has the advantage, the security among states is prevalent. On this point, he advocates those geographic conditions like impenetrable barriers and nationalism as well as new and cheap anti-offensive military weapons changes the balance in favour of the defensive side. Similarly, Stephen Van Evera also examines the offense-defence balance by looking at factors that are counted as military factors, geography, social and political order, and the nature of diplomatic factors (Evera, 2001, p. 160-166). To him, military factors such as technology, force posture, and deployment as well as popular regimes are generally may appear better conditions for both sides. However, he also adds that the nature of diplomacies such as collective security systems, defensive alliances, and

balancing behaviours, as well as geographic conditions, increases the durability of the defensive states against the offensive states.

2.1.1.2. Offensive Realism

The offensive realists, as the opposite approach of the defensive realists, both criticize the arguments of the defensive realists and also claim that the national interest of states is shaped according to the offensive policies. Offensive realists basically bring the alternative solution to reduce the security dilemma among states, so that “the best way to ensure the survival is to be the most powerful state in the system” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 29). In other words, the aim of state is to dominate the system therefore, bigger power gap between regional hegemon and other states makes the war nearly impossible. In the example of western hemisphere; the United States of America (USA) is the most powerful country in the region and no other states, like Canada, Cuba or Mexico, would even think about the going war against the USA. In addition to this, John Mearsheimer, in his study tragedy of great power, stresses that “being the regional hegemony does not mean status quo power because regional hegemons keep on control the other regions” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 41). To him, the first option for regional hegemons is the buck-passing strategy. This predicts that there are two great powers in other regions and they concentrate on each other. The second option appears when buck-passing does not occur; then, distant hegemony would come to balance the possible or potential hegemony at that region.

On the other hand, Christopher Layne, the other offensive realist, basically challenges the Mearsheimer’s assumption that global hegemony is out of reach (Layne, 2002). In fact, he agrees that states firstly aim to be regional hegemon, however, he opposes the assumption that regional hegemony adopts the buck passing strategy and if necessary, it plays regional stabilizer role in other continents. Instead, he employs the offensive realism’s logic that the best defence is the offence, and claims that global hegemony is the best response to uncertainty and fear that are endemic in international politics. Therefore, great powers firstly aim to be regional hegemon and then need to go all the way to be a global hegemon, because the only way to dissuade other states from challenging it is to amass absolute power and remove possible rivals before they become serious threats.

However, a number of studies find the neo-realist arguments as deficient to explain behaviours of units in foreign policy analysis. In this way, Gerard Ruggie emphasizes static nature of the neo-realism and says that it lacks an explanation for the systemic changes that happens in international politics (Ruggie, 1983, p. 273-281). To him, the contextual transformations in international politics like shift from medieval era to the modern era, may be explained only when the outcomes of certain historical circumstances is evaluated. The other critique of neo-realism comes from the pre-given acceptance that states are the only actor to explore the international system. In this way, Richard Ashley basically claims that neorealism immunizes its statist commitments from any kinds of falsifications. For him, statism in neorealism is metaphysical commitment and exempted from scientific criticisms because it is excluded historically testable hypothesis (Ashley, 1984, p. 238-242).

Except for the ahistorical characteristic of neorealism, the other criticisms emphasize that the assumption that international politics can and should be studied purely at the systemic level is mistaken and deterministic. In this way, Fred Halliday points out that while the Germany and France co-operate with each other because of systemic factors but the India- Pakistan or Iran- Iraq initiates war with each other. To him, these wars cannot be explained without looking at internal factors such as historical experiences they had, or the political and socio-economic regimes they maintain (Halliday, 1994, 36). Beside this, another important questioning against neo-realism has started with disintegration of the Soviet Union without a major war because the proponents of the neo-realism generally failed to predict this major change (Kratochwil, 1993). In this term, on the one hand, the new issues such as human rights, democratization and mass movements changes the international political agenda in which all are the outside of the neorealism. On the other hand, unlike the distribution of powers, the intra-state issues such as ethnic, cultural and religious factors become more important to determine states' the security dilemma perceptions in international politics (Posen, 1993, p. 455).

On the other hand, another criticism of neorealism is made by a group of scholars in which they call themselves neoclassical realism. The neorealism and its offshoot sub-schools essentially address the general outcomes of international politics and inevitably say little for foreign policy analysis and particular ones (Waltz, 1996, 54-

57). In a similar way, the neoclassical-realists say that although neo-realism exhibits the main incentives and challenges states faces, it does not refer the particular state behaviours and changes (Rose, 1998,p. 146-147). To fill this gap, this view basically intends to sort out this imbalance by rejecting main tenet of neorealism that states are billiard balls or black box in international politics. Thus, they mainly assume that although neorealism put the basic parameters of a country' foreign policy yet foreign policy is, at the end, made by domestic factors such as state leaders' perceptions, bureaucracy and societal harmony/unity.

2.1.2. Neo- Marxist International System

Neo-Marxist international system mainly argues that the capitalist world economy is the main factor determining the state behaviours and shaping the interests of nations. In a general way, studies in this school questions why third world countries have successfully not realized their economic development, in other words, why they have become underdeveloped when they are compared with rich countries. To address the issue, the neo-Marxist tradition puts aside the local factors such as corrupt governments, military coups, or ethical/sectarian conflicts and focuses on the results of the international capitalist world economy. Basically, it assumes that there are a huge number of inequalities among states because the international capitalist system is based on exploitative characteristics, and this system forces the states to act coherently with the structural dependency cycle. Briefly, although each theory in this tradition agrees that the capitalist system is the main determinant of the state actions, they slightly have distinct expectation for state behaviours. Thus, this section mainly examines three positions as dependency school, world system theory, structural imperialism within the neo-Marxist international system.

2.1.2.1. Dependency School

Dependency school basically argues that the current state of underdevelopment is largely the result of past and ongoing economic and other interactions between the satellite underdeveloped countries and the now developed metropolitan countries (Baran, 2019; Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Frank, 1969). According to this historical-structural process, the capitalist world-economy has established dependency

relationships in two periods of time: imperialism/colonization and neo-imperialism/colonialism. In first stage of dependency; the majority of third world states were the colonies of the Western capitalist powers, serving both captive markets and as source of raw materials and cheap labour. The second stage of dependency begins when the colonised states gained their political independence. This second stage in the literature is named as the development of underdevelopment by Andre Gunder Frank and dependent development by Cardoso and Faletto. In sum, a neo-colonial kind of development, on the one hand, provides the poor countries with vast capital input, a large store of technological knowledge, and highly skilled managerial organization through multi-national corporations. On the other hand, this situation makes it possible at the expense of autonomy of the national economic system and political decisions to sustain capital flow and the industrialization process.

2.1.2.2. Modern-World System Theory

Similar to dependency theory, modern world system theory that is developed by Immanuel Wallerstein also examines how the world system has determined inter-state relations (Wallerstein, 1996). To him, although there are a number of mini or empire systems such as Rome and Chinese civilization that imply economic, political, social units with single culture isolated from another one, the capitalist world economy has been today's prominent and final system. The capitalist production system basically refers to a social process in which the surplus-value that emerges as a result of the relationship between labour and capital is transferred to the capitalist. By using this logic, Wallerstein assumes that the international division of labour identifies the states' places as core, semi-periphery and periphery in international politics. In this system, while core states, composing of industrialized states, provide capital to global economy and as highly skilled and well-paid labour, the periphery provides inexpensive, unskilled labour and raw materials (Pease, 2018, p. 83). Besides, semi-periphery that is the newly-industrializing countries provides cheap, skilled and semi-skilled labour to the global economy. In addition to this, Wallerstein stresses that in spite of the fact that the semi-periphery region has a specific economic role in world system, more importantly, the existence of this category means that the upper stratum of the system is not faced with unified opposition of all the others (Wallerstein, 1974,

p. 405). Therefore, the middle stratum, as both exploited and exploiter position plays a highly crucial role to sustain the system.

2.1.2.3. Structural Imperialist Theory

Structural theory of imperialism written by Johan Galtung is the other crucial example to exhibit the how the neo-Marxist international system directs the state behaviours and interests of states. He basically differs from the classical imperialist theories that are derived from Marxist-Leninist theories. In this way, he rejects the idea that imperialism is an economic relationship under capitalism and motivated by the need for expanding the market. Instead, he describes imperialism as “a system that divides collectivities and connects some of the parts to each other in terms of interest harmony and disconnects other parts in terms of interest disharmony/conflict”(Galtung, 1971, p. 81). According to his theory, either inter-state relations and intra-state relations are based on central and periphery division so that the degree of structural imperialism is determined as a result of their interaction each other. In more specifically, the mechanism works that “center in the Center has a bridgehead in periphery nation; it is named as center in the Periphery nation, and this periphery center is tied to the Center center with best possible tie: so, this relationship is called as ties of harmony of interest” (Galtung, 1971, p. 83). Furthermore, such kind of imperial relation type between the center and periphery nations is established and strengthened through economic, political, military, communication, and cultural ways.

However, the views in the neo- Marxist structural international system are criticized in a number of different ways. First of all, having too much reductionism is nearly common point of many critiques of the Neo-Marxist tradition. According to this, “it explains all phenomena – war, economic crisis, inequality, aspects of identity and so forth – to the dynamic of capitalism and to social class and class struggle” (Stearns et al., 2013, p. 100-101). Besides this, wars happen before the capitalist economic system because of geo-strategic security, nationalism or religion. For example, neo- Marxist tradition has nearly no answer to explain that what factors causes the violent conflict over such barren territoriality as the Gaza Strip or the West Bank (Pease, 2018). Secondly, the capitalist world economy is far away to explain the situation/location of socialist countries such as Eastern Europe, China and the Soviet Union during the cold

war period. Although some of these states are industrialized, it is not clear whether they are placed in center or periphery or semi-periphery. Thus, it can be deduced that capitalist international system only explains north-south relations but not the east-west relations. Thirdly, neo-Marxist structural analysis is seriously challenged by a number of successful development cases. For example, though such countries South Korea, Japan, Singapore had the colonial experience they achieved to manage to their economic development in a successful way. In addition to this, countries that implement the protectionist policies due to dependency theory were failures, leading to inefficiency and stifled technological progress (Viotti & Kauppi, 2013, p. 444). As a result of this, in the 1980s Latin America began a period of trade liberalization policies. Finally, there are some studies claims that dependency theory overestimated the power of international system or imperialism in southern affairs. Instead these studies points out the internal affairs, and national histories (Landes, 1998; Smith, 1979) for example, Ricardo Hausman offers that “landlocked nations may never enjoy access to the markets and new technologies they need to flourish in global economy” (Hausmann, 2001).

2.1.3. The Neo – Liberal Institutional International System

This part of study mainly argues that although each state in the system has separate and contradicting national interests, the liberal institutionalist theory claims that cooperation among states can be established without the presence of a hegemonic force that makes possible peace and stability in the system. In this way, proponents of liberal institutionalists assume that the cooperation in anarchic international political relations can be established through international institutions/regimes because they basically reduce the uncertainty and provide information and credibility among state relations. Besides this, liberal institutionalism, like Neo-realism, is based on the solid division of external and internal factors to explore state behaviours. In other words, it assumes that states are unitary actors and also act rationally in a self-help system. However, unlike the neo-Realist theory, liberal institutionalist theory claims that the international institutions and regimes, as facilitating mechanism among states, may curtail the effects and constraints of the anarchy and promotes cooperation in international politics.

As a general, there is a clear relationship between cooperation and institutions regardless of the connection of this relationship are vertically or horizontally made up. On the one hand, regimes are basically described as “ the set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converges in a given area of international relations” (Krasner, 1982, p. 186). On the other hand, cooperation, unlike harmony, arises in actual or possible conflict and necessitates mutual adjustment as a result of policy coordination. By considering all these information, Robert Keohane (1984, p. 50-51) argues that in spite of the fact that hegemonic power is essential to construct the international institutions and regimes this does not mean that the decline of hegemony is necessarily lead to their decay. For him, although the international institutions/regimes do not expose the new order beyond the nation-state, they may facilitate cooperation by reducing uncertainty and raising the information flow, openness and communication (Keohane, 1982, p. 345). In other words, the role of institutions/regimes is the key importance to formalise the expectations of each of actors to agreement where there is a shared interest thus, they have the ability both mitigate the effect of anarchy and limit the state behaviours.

Related to this debate, the other important topic which is also disputed between neoliberalism and neorealism is how states assess their own interests. In this way, there are possible two dominant views in literature in order to analyse states’ behavior when they intend to cooperate with each other. On the one hand, proponents of liberal institutionalism basically argue that states are concerned with maximizing their absolute gains regardless of the other side's gains, on the other hand, the neo-realist view says that states always act in accordance to relative gains (Burchill, 2005, p. 122). The main difference between two theoretical views comes from their anarchy definitions. For neo-liberal institutionalist, although the anarchy means the lack of the higher authority, relationship among actors can may be carefully established (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985, p. 226). Whereas, neo-realists define anarchy as that “there is no overarching authority to prevent others from using violence, or threat of violence, to destroy or enslave them” (Grieco, 1988, p. 498). In more clearly, neo-realists reminds that the issues like survival and security are always the main determinant behind states’ foreign policy actions so that states are highly suspicious to confront a likely dangerous power as a result of unequal mutual gains between sides. Briefly, while the neo-

realism argues that states cannot cooperate with another one due to the issue of who will gain more, the neo-liberalism insist on saying that institutions can facilitate the issue over the distribution of gains from cooperation as well as by disclosing information about the military expenditures and capacities of alliance members (Keohane & Martin, 1995).

However, a number of studies in the literature assert that institutions are the just reflections of the states and they mostly fail to achieve the desired outcomes in international politics. Besides the absolute and relative gains dichotomy, the critiques of neo-liberal institutionalism can be aggregated into four points. In this way, Grieco, firstly, pays attentions that although it is known that cooperation will be very beneficial for all parties in the long term, the threat of cheating is always put the states in danger and prevent doing this (Grieco, 1988, p. 498). By looking from the neo-classical point of view, states cannot be sure regarding the rival's future intention because no matter how much statesmen are devoted to the cooperation, they cannot bind themselves and their successors to the same ways. As Robert Jervis recalls that "minds can be changed, new leaders can come to the power, values can shift and new opportunities and dangers can arise" (Jervis, 1978, p. 168). Secondly, John Mearsheimer points out that liberal institutionalism basically disregards the security realm, where issues about wars and peace are of fundamental place. In other words, he says that "liberal institutionalism is based on the assumption that international politics are divided into two areas – security and political economy – and that liberal institutionalism mainly concentrates on the latter but not the former" (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 15-16). Finally, he also finds that empirical record, supporting the theory, quite weak and inadequate even though the proponents of the theory analyse the few historical cases. Furthermore, they also don't have proper evidence when the states worry much about the relative gains in security and even economic realms (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 24).

2.1.4. Structural Constructivist International System

This school mainly argues that the international politics is a social construction that is prone to change. By questioning the neo-realist anarchy definition and its inevitable result of self-help behavior in international politics, structural constructivism put in effect a new pattern of national interest perspective to the literature. To them, the self-

help behaviour pattern is not the inevitable or natural result of anarchy but it is just the institution that is socially produced as a result of long repeated practices in the historical processes. Instead, Alexander Wendt who is the main representative of the school offers three different “cultures of anarchy” characterized by different institutions. According to him, these three kinds of cultures of anarchy could be categorized as conflictual and based on self-help, or competitive and based on rivalry or friendly and based on cooperation (Wendt, 1992). Thus, he implies that anarchy is what states make of it, and beyond this, cultures of anarchy can be changed. Although it is clear that national interest and behaviours of states is dependent on which culture of anarchy is prevalent in the world politics, the problem is that how states move from one culture to another. Thus, this section examines the constructivism literature to find the proper answer.

Basically, there are four main points that analyse the relationship between national interest and structural constructivist international system order. The first characteristic of constructivism comes from its different ontology which is related with the nature of reality. According to this, an understanding of reality emerges from inter-subjective knowledge, in other words, people act towards objects based on the meanings the object has for them (S. Smith et al., 2016, p. 81-82). In addition to this, as the social facts produces and reproduced through the human agreement and shared knowledge gained through repeated practices, likewise, states’ behaviours may also be affected by social factors such as shared knowledge, identities, norms, etc. Secondly, constructivism asserts that the material structures such as balance of power or mode of capitalist production, are important indicators but don’t determine directions of actors’ actions. Instead, constructivism emphasizes ideational structures in which system of shared ideas, beliefs, and values bear the structural property, as well as these structures, are also codified in formal rules and norms (Wendt, 1992, 399). An example of this, the period of absolutism between 1555 and 1848 that was conducted by Christian monarchs was the prevalent form of the sovereign state and it is backed by coercive practices of a community of states to undermine the Muslims, liberals and nationalist policies.

Thirdly, constructivists argue regarding how the non-material structures constrain and form the actors’ identity and in turn, their actions. On the contrary to the realism and

liberal assumption that states' interests are given and based on rational cost-benefit relations, they basically say that identities as the basis of interests, provide actors with a particular role in international relations (Steans et al., 2013, p. 196). Fourthly, constructivism puts the key assumption that structures and agents are mutually produced by each other. In more clearly, Anthony Giddens, writing the structuration theory, emphasizes that structure influences agents but that agents have the potentiality to influence or change the existed structure through their practices in the reproduction process (Giddens, 1984). By looking these four main tenets, it may be deduced that structural constructivism evaluates ideational structures/factors just as important as material structures/factors. Moreover, it solely focuses on the interaction between unitary state actors and hence, explores how ideational structural contexts, systemic processes, and strategic practices produce and reproduce the different sorts of state identities and then interests.

However, the structural version of constructivism is heavily criticized by the unit level of constructivism as well as rationalist theories. For unit-level constructivism, one of the crucial deficiencies of the structural analysis is that bracketing everything in domestic politics makes it impossible to explain the fundamental change that occurs, either in the nature of an international society or the nature of state identity (Reus-Smith, 2005). As it is known that Wendt excludes by theoretical imperative most of the normative and ideational forces that might prompt change. On the other hand, rationalist critiques mostly concentrate on the lack of empirical evidence for the proposed arguments (Steans et al., 2013, p. 201). In addition to this, some of the critiques say that a number of concepts in social constructivism that are taken as explanatory factors are rather unclearly defined. In other words, the analyses regarding identity, culture, norms, and institutions are difficult to separate from each other.

2.2. The State Level

2.2.1. Classical Realists

The classical realist approach basically evaluates the national interest in three distinct points. First, the foreign policy must be refined of ideal/moral policies, secondly, states' interests can only be explained and measured in proportion to their power, and

thirdly, the balance of power may be thought as the complementary the factor to explain the international politics.

For realists, one of the important impediments to the attainment of national interests in foreign policy is the tendency of states to adopt ideal/moral principles. According to the idealist view in international politics, moral principles that are for the benefit of all humanity can be applied to the state behaviours (Wilson, 2011). In this way, idealist policies such as promoting democratic and free governments around the world, relying on universal law and common security mechanisms, supporting human rights and creating world public opinion/pressure may make up the more stable and peaceful atmosphere among states. However, the classical realism that is complete opposite to the idealism argues that the moral ideals are the quite general expression as well as ambiguous meanings however, these may far away states' political actions from rationality guideline. Instead, the Morgenthau, one of the most important representatives of the classical realism, argues that any foreign policy operating on the basis of national interest should be built on minimum requirements defined as the protection of physical boundaries, political institutions and cultural identity (Morgenthau, 1952). Similarly, George Kennan indicates that state behavior in foreign policy cannot be categorized around moral principles such as good or bad, but he assumes that "the national actions result from common needs such as military security, the integrity of political life, and the enhancement of the wealth of the people" (Kennan, 1985).

Beside this, the power, as a second point of realism, is considered as only key criteria for the determination and realization of the national targets. According to one of the main tenet of classical realism, is "the politics is governed by objective laws that comes inherent human nature so that the world is place where men, societies and states have opposing interests" (Morgenthau, 1997, p.3-4). In this way, he says that states design their foreign policy goals in order of importance, but the main determinant of state action and objectives is directly proportional to the power held rather than the importance of the objectives. Briefly, the power in realism is defined as yardstick in order to protect and realize national policies (Morgenthau, 1954).

The other key point that shapes the national interest of states is the balance of power derived from pure power politics. For Morgenthau, “the international politics may be summarized as a power struggle among states” (Morgenthau, 1997). Moreover, he adds that the states in the international system can be divided into two categories as status quo and imperialists. Accordingly, on the one hand, there is a state or alliance that wants to change the existing order in their favour, on the other hand, there is also state or alliance group that are satisfied with the existing order and tend to protect the system. The balance of power policies necessarily emerges as a result of the struggle of states that wish to achieve one of these two goals. Accordingly, the mechanism aims to protect all units of the system and also prevent any of the units from dominating the other. Thus, states that pursue on the basis of their national interests will not hesitate to use foreign policy tools such as “divide and rule”, “compensation”, armament, or “establish alliances” to fulfil the principle of balance of power (Morgenthau, 1997, p. 134).

George Kennan, another representative of classical realism, claims in his study titled *American diplomacy between 1900 and 1950* that liberal democracies would drag states’ foreign policies towards moral-legal direction (Kennan, 1984). To him, on the one hand, the liberal policies open the ways to adopt idealistic principles, on the other hand, public opinion, is an inevitable characteristic of democracies, can be easily swayed into areas of emotionalism and subjectivity by using liberal rhetoric and thus, these reasons make difficult to reach national interests. However, Kennan believes that the formulation and conduct of foreign policy must be left to the area of professional skilled diplomats in order to prevent fallacies in the process of policy making.

James Rosenau, in his criticism of realist approach, refers to power concept as elusive and ambiguous concept. However, the power in realism which is considered as source of national interest consists of both the tangible components the geography, natural resources, industrial capability, military preparedness, and intangible components the population, national character and national morale and diplomacy ability (Morgenthau, 1997, p. 80). In this framework, Rosenau pays attention two problematic point to exhibit the problem of the power calculations (Rosenau, 1968). The first problem relates to the intangible components of national power, so there is no logical mechanism that can measure and evaluate these components, and they may vary

according to time and context. Secondly, he emphasizes that decision-makers relatively measure the importance of each component of national power due to their value judgments. Thus, it is deduced that the relativity of some components in power calculation process is crucial issue and some may be over the others due to decision-makers' framework.

On the other hand, Ernst Haas challenges the assumption arguing the balance of power system is the key motive that subordinates all other factors in the foreign policy making process, in other words, is a guide for preservation and realization of national interest of states (Haas, 1953) Instead, the he assumes that the existing or changing socio-economic conditions of a country are the most important fundamental factor that formulates national interest. Accordingly, national interest, beyond being a general concept that unites all subgroups of the nation, is a major subject of conflict between groups, that is, the concept of national interest changes according to the motivations of the dominant group in a given period.

2.2.2. Taxonomic Studies

Taxonomic studies aim to examine the national interest goals of states by categorizing them. More broadly, these kinds of studies assume that the national interests should be divided into various subgroups and each group should be examined in detail way thus, the ambiguous structure of the concept may be eliminated. Besides this, they provide a suitable basis for comparing similar and different points of the foreign policies of states. In this way, taxonomic studies may be examined in various distinct ways. For example, while the behaviourist school focuses on factors of decision-making process, (Frankel, 1970) the other studies also explore the concept through the classification and explanation of national values (Nuechterlein, 2019; Osgood, 1953; Robinson, 1967).

The behaviourist school basically emphasizes that foreign policy studies should focus on decision-making processes rather than the results of international political actions. By following similar methodology, Joseph Frankel asserts that, although the concept of national interest is perceived as an ambiguous and general expression and abused by politicians, it may be investigated as subjective guide to clarify and organize the

purpose of foreign policy. In this way, while Frankel examines the national interest in three different categories, besides, he deals with the factors/dimensions that may affect the determination and realization process of the concept.

In Frankel's analysis, the aims of national interest are divided into three different levels: the aspirational, operational and explanatory/polemical levels (Frankel, 1969). Firstly, the aspirational level refers to the vision or ideal set of goals which is long term policies derived from history and ideology, secondly, the operational level is the short-term active policies that have to be pursued as a result of the constraints of international politics, domestic policy and various other factors. Thirdly, policy makers need the polemical level to explain, rationalize or criticize any specific foreign policy actions.

Beside this three-level classification, he proposes six dimensions to evaluate the national interest of states (Frankel, 1970). These dimensions are counted as bureaucratic cohesion, salience, scope, spatial and time which are briefly summarized. First dimension point out that the coordination or vice versa among three key bureaucratic organs which are strategic/military, political/diplomatic and economic. Second represents the importance, prominence, urgency and intensity of issue or interest. For him, "the determination of salience is utmost political importance because the salience largely determines the political choice of priority. However, its assessment implies quite subjective process and may change from person to person and from occasion to occasion" (Frankel, 1970, p. 61). Third dimension refers to the scope of national interest which may be measured by either power capability of state or volition and success of political leaders. Fourth is a vital interest in which states can take many risks, including war, to protect these interests. The fifth is the spatial dimension that includes the geographical boundaries and regional character of states. However, it is subjected to change over time; since the technological change, economic and social evolutions have almost eliminated the physical distance between countries. Time, as a sixth dimension, necessitates suitable interest arrangement among past, present and future.

On the other hand, the other taxonomic studies in the literature aim to make the national values more concrete by adding a degree of intensity. For this aim, Robert Osgood tries to classify the national purposes in a certain order (Osgood, 1953).

According to his classification, the territorial integrity, political independence and protection of government institutions of a nation are considered within the survival interests of the country. The second degree is named as vital interest which includes wide range ends to increase nation's welfare. Third interest degree is the self-sufficiency which is the conduct of foreign policies without reference to other nations' help. The fourth interest degree is ranked as national prestige which are the policies that exhibit the moral force of nation and final degree is national aggrandizement which is defined the wish of more power.

Using similar method, Thomas Robinson which benefited Hans Morgenthau's texts analyses the concept in a detail way (Robinson, 1967). For him, the interest analysis can be divided into two groups which are made on the axis of a single nation or the relations between two or more nations. For a single state, the national interest is grouped into three parts which are degree of primacy, degree of permanence of the interests and degree of generality of interest. In other words, a nation's interests may take three adjectives in which it is primary or secondary, permanent or variable, and general or specific. For two or more states, nations' interests may also be classified in three adjectives as complementary, identical, and conflicting interests.

The other taxonomic conceptual framework to analyse the national interest is developed by Donald Nuechterlein. Accordingly, he assumes that four main national interests of each state can be determined and each of them will be tried to be realized with four different degrees of intensity (Nuechterlein, 1976, 2014, 2019). In this framework, a country has four basic national interests: defence of homeland, economic welfare, favourable world order, and ideological. Beside this, the intensity of interests which are affected by several factors such as distance from borders or composition of government or historical relationship so on is classified into four groups: as survival, vital, major and secondary. However, although the application of these studies to foreign policy issues provides an important analysis framework for explaining state behaviours, the scholars generally determine the types of interest and the degree of intensity of interests through external observations. Thus, separating the types of national interest from each other and determining the degree of intensity of any type of interest remains as considerable problem.

2.2.3. Decision-Making Approach

This approach simply argues that the determination of a national interest standard is based on a process in which decision-makers are put at the centre. Unlike the realist and taxonomic approaches seeing the state as a unitary actor that behaves rationally, this approach assumes that all events occurring in the international system can be reduced to the actions of individuals and cannot be separated from individuals' perceptions, choices and expectations. In other words, this approach claims that policy-makers and diplomats discover, define, and preserve the national interest.

According to Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, the decision-making process in international relations is analysed by focusing governmental level, intersocietal interaction, non-governmental level, and intra-societal actions (Snyder et al., 1969). In more broadly, they assume that decision makers are not independent of internal and external settings which defined a set of factors and conditions which may affect the action of any state. Thus, "decision makers act upon and respond to the conditions and factors of both external setting which refers to situations beyond the territorial boundaries of state as well as internal setting which is defined as domestic politics, public opinion and geography" (Snyder et al., 1969, p. 203).

James Rosenau, in his critique of national interest, claims that the decision making approach cannot be conducted either in democratic or authoritarian regimes. In democratic politics, the main weaknesses of the approach are considered to be the multiplicity of decision makers and the inability to always determine when a policy has been formally decided. In American example, official decision makers such as president, members of cabinet, leaders and individual members of congress and pressure groups and so on contend the best for whole nation but the question that is correct remain unanswered to predict the national interest. On the other hand, decision making in closed authoritarian regimes, many groups in societies have no opportunity to express their needs and wants, so this fact mainly goes against the main assumption that various interests of society are sorted and summed in its political process.

2.2.4. Liberal Theory

Liberal ideas have a profound impact on the political shape of all modern industrial societies. In general ways; it draws special attentions some concepts such as political freedom, democracy, market capitalism and human rights so, it tries to implement these concepts into international arena. Thus, this section basically analyses the liberal theories into two parts which are respectively the democratic peace theory and interdependency theory.

2.2.4.1. Democratic Peace Theory

One of the most assertive explanations of the national interest in the liberal school is the democratic peace theory. To the proponents of this theory, there is an apparent empirical correlation and consistency in world political history that liberal democracies avoid making wars with each other. More clearly, this theory establishes solid relations between the democratic political system and foreign policies of states in the international system, and in addition to this; it assumes that the spread of democratic regimes produces the separate peaceful zones in spite of the fact that they have conflicting economic, geopolitical or cultural interests/relations. In this framework, this theory argues that the issue of formulation of the national interests depend on whether a state is governed by democratic or other kinds of political system.

Although there are different views about what is the source of democratic peace, each study certainly supposes that the more democratic regimes are prevalent, the more peaceful world politics will be. One of the important contributions to this theory is done by Michael Doyle during the 1980s (Doyle, 1983, 1986). He basically pointed out that the seminal study, “perpetual peace” that was written by political philosopher Immanuel Kant, is the best explanation to answer the question of why liberal democratic states are prone to peace in their relations. As Doyle summarizes in his study, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs”, Immanuel Kant consider three principles as necessary to build peace among states. First, the republican civil constitutional is based on private property, market oriented and representative government with separation of powers and other civic rights. Second principle is the international law meaning guarantee of respect, in other words, states agree a mutual

non-aggression pact though there is no higher authority. Finally, the eternal peace necessitates cosmopolitan laws to function with harmony in pacific union, namely, it is recognition of the right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility when he arrives upon the soil of another country.

There are other versions of the democratic peace theory. In this context, John Owen considers the liberal ideas as independent variable behind the distinctive foreign policies of liberal democracies (Owen, 1994). In addition to this, there are also two intervening variables which are the liberal ideology and domestic democratic institutions. Under this mechanism, he believes that liberal democracies can be taken as reasonable, predictable and trustworthy because they are governed by their citizen's true interests as well as democratic institutions keep liberal values active through competitive elections. However, illiberal states are ruled by despots and populated by non-enlightened citizenry so they may follow illiberal ends and potentially dangerous. Thus, he deduces that liberal elites believe that fellow liberal states share their ends and intention and they don't fight each other. On the other hand, Bruce Russett emphasizes that the source of the democratic peace can be appeared a result of some features of democracy (Russett, 1994). He basically develops two-fold explanation. The first is the democratic norms which are the culture, perception, and practices that permit compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence within countries. The second set of constraints is structural/institutional constraints, which include the structure of power divisions, checks and balances, which would make it hard for democratic leaders to lead their countries into war.

In a similar way, other approach also argues that democratic principles, as source of national interest, provide societal consensus and legitimacy so that these principles may play the key role to describe the needs and desires of a country's nation or people (Lebow, 2020; Nincic, 1999). Miroslav Nincic basically argues this view around three basic assumptions. First, in the case of absence of democratic procedures, the national interest may be misinterpreted by government or constrained by purely narrow interests that originate from the desires of security bureaucracy. The second is that democratic evaluation effectively operated on a particular issue produces a link between national interest and foreign policy. Third point emphasizes the dynamic structure of national interest since societal preferences and interests may alter over the

time about what is desirable or the consensus behind initial opinion may be undermined by new information or experience. Similarly, Ned Lebow asserts that the source of the national interest is strictly related with domestic politics because citizens are more sensitive and aware of perceived domestic threats than foreign ones and want these threats to be handled by their elected officials (Lebow, 2020). To him, realist researchers exaggerate the foreign threats and make preparation for the worst-case scenario in international relations. Instead of that, the determining national interests needs a crucial catalyst so that stimulating open and transparent public debates as an essential requirement of democracy may help to arise out of national policies.

However, there are some objections to democratic peace theory, for example Waltz claims that “in anarchy, if all states were democratic or socialists, they wouldn’t assure that today’s friend won’t be tomorrow’s enemy” (Waltz, 2000). Specifically, he finds the democratic regimes are prone to war since their way to maintain peace is to beat non-democratic states and make them democratic (Waltz, 2000, p. 11-14). On the other hand, Layne also evaluates democratic peace theory as minimal explanation. He examines four empirical cases which are “the Trent affairs between the US and Great Britain in 1861, the Venezuela crisis between the US and Great Britain, the Fashoda crisis between France and Great Britain and the Ruhr crisis between Germany and France in 1923” (Layne, 1994). Thus, he says that in each of these crises, one of democratic state prepared to go war because of its strategic stake, and other side set back its move and the problem was solved not through democratic peace theory but realist imperatives

2.2.4.2. Interdependency Theory

The other state-based national interest explanation in liberal theory is the complex interdependency. This view mainly claims that the high politics of military security issues dominates the low politics of economic and social relations are not adequate to explain the politics of the world where states’ borders become increasingly permeable. Instead, complex interdependence is a system in which multiple channels of communication connect societies (that is, states do not monopolize these relationships), there is no hierarchy of issues, and governments do not employ military force against one another (Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 24-25). Thus, proponents of this

view argue that all issues in international politics fall in somewhere between two ideal types which are known as realism and complex interdependency.

According to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, three main characteristics of complex interdependency exhibit distinct national interest perspective in the process of international politics. Firstly, the multiple channels connect the societies which are inter-state, trans-governmental, and trans-national relations. In other words, these connections may be described as transmission since they make government policies in various countries more sensitive to one another. Secondly, the absence of hierarchy among issues means that foreign affairs agendas have become larger in terms of energy, international monetary problems, multi-national corporations, environment and food policies. Basically, these variety issues blur the distinctions between the domestic and international problems and also disrupt the influence of security issues in decision-making process. Finally, the minor role of military force asserts that the use of force, in most situations, has costly effects on non-security goals as well as popular opposition to prolonged military is quite high especially in pluralistic countries.

However, interdependency theory is also criticized by both neo-Marxist and neo-realist researchers. One of the Marxist criticisms asserts that the interdependence put the states into an asymmetric and dependency relationship and helps to sustain the exploitative system between rich and poor countries (Wagner, 1988). On the other hand, neo-realist view similarly defines the concept as “myth and rhetoric which obscure the inequalities of national capability because great powers’ sphere of political and military influence always determines the economic relation direction” (Waltz, 1970). In addition to this; Waltz also stresses that trade may only be a weak effect to prevent war, rather than this; it may also spread protectionism, mutual resentment, conflict and even war because of uneven effect of interdependence (Waltz, 2000).

2.2.5. Unit- Level Constructivist Theory

The unit-level constructivism, like structural constructivism, argues that social factors and interactions play a key role in the formulation process of national interests. However, unlike the structural one, it pays attention to show the character and

identities of states are mostly affected through the internal determinants of national policies. By looking at this framework, proponents of the unit-level constructivists assert that rationalist theories such as neorealism and neo-liberalism become silent for the above- issues because they both label states as undifferentiated and unitary actors and also reduce history to the perpetual recurrence of sameness, conflict, and balancing. Instead, unit-level constructivism that define the history as the process of change claims that the effect of cultural institutional context and political identity have the determining influence on national interest and security issues (Katzenstein, 1996).

On the other hand, Jutta Weldes evaluates that the national interest is an important concept because it both provides the basis for state actions and functions as a rhetorical device legitimacy of and political support for state behaviors is generated. In this way, he sees the national interests are produced in construction process (Weldes, 1996). More clearly, he argues that before state officials can act on behalf of the state, they must first engage in an interpretation process in order to comprehend both the situation and how they should react to it. This process of interpretation, in turn, necessitates a common language, at the very least, among state officials involved in deciding state action and the audience to whom state action must be communicated.

Finally, Samuel Huntington, in his study of the erosion of American national interest, claims that the existence of national identity is the main milestone to determine national interest (Huntington, 1997). For him, the national interest of a state can be formed by the presence of other that threatens its national identity. In more concretely, he gives an example that “after World War II, the US defined itself as the leader of the democratic free world against the Soviet Union and communism so that, though the US pursued many foreign policy goals, one overriding national purpose was to contain and defeat communism” (Huntington, 1997, p. 29). As a result, he says that in the absence of definite sense of national identity, the foreign policy can be dominated by subnational business interests, transnational or non-national ethnic interests.

2.2.6. Other Approaches

Other approaches defining national interest are not as basic and dominant as the previous approaches in the literature. However, these studies basically enrich the

existing studies of national interest in the literature. Thus, these studies fundamentally provide alternative answers to the question of what is the source or standard of concept of national interest by exhibiting new versions and meanings.

By rejecting the traditional studies that reduces the national interest into categorizations such as survival and territorial integrity due to their ambiguous meanings, Friedrich Kratochwill asserts that the concept is disclosed in specific context and need satisfying the certain criteria. According to him, the interest argument necessarily demands some giving of reasons, so that such a justification may eliminates the personal desires, preferences or any kind of arbitrariness. By using this method, he assumes that the national interest is used to justify and explain the claims, arguments and requests, thus, it may obligate members of the public to accept such a decision even though it goes against their personal interests. However, when there are alternative justifications and other logical reasons against the existing national interest claim, it appears clear problem of deciding between two views. In this point, “the public deliberation as a criterion require weighing evidences offered in support of public interest claims thus, this might not enable us to decide once and for all the real public interest but, it provides the conditions for assessing national interest claims” (Kratowil, 1982).

The other approach in this study focuses on the formation and analysis process of national interest is developed by Shaohua Hu (Hu, 2016). According to him, framework of national interest may be analyzed in four factors which are the players, preferences, prospects and power. In first factor, the presidents generally are taken as the most crucial players in the decision-making processes so that their personal characteristics such as world views and life experiences bear quite important indicators. The second factor is the determination of foreign policy preferences on a particular issue, which can be listed as survival, security, economy, prestige. The third factor is to identify and calculate all foreign policy prospects that may better serve the national interest and finally, the function of power mostly becomes the key determinant to carry out the national interests of states.

2.2.6.1. Group based Approach

This part argues the role of subnational groups in the determination of the national interest. Group-based approach basically points to two points in foreign policy processes. Firstly, the state's unitary position, since the period of democratization of nationalism in 19th century, has eroded and various private groups have started to influence the foreign policies formulations in favor of their private interests. In other words, this approach assumes that a modern nation may include many different goals and interests, be it personal, ethnic, religious, racial, economic or regional, but what goal or interest will be transformed into foreign policy is determined by the current internal balances of power. Secondly, the concept is the quite powerful discourse that legitimizes the actions in society. Thus, although group interests are normally unlikely to receive support from the whole society, groups can use this discourse to impose their interests on the whole society as well as they also can also gain an advantage against rival group interests. In short, the group-based approach defines the national interest as the sum of all specific interests within the country however; this definition is dysfunctional due to the ambiguous nature of the nation, the lack of a procedure for the collection of identified group interests.

Martin Rochester in his study "the national interest and contemporary world politics" claims that the traditional international political paradigm has transformed into a new paradigm of world politics (Rochester, 1978). While the international political paradigm accepts nation states as the only actors of world politics, it sees sub-national actors such as bureaucratic and social interest groups and trans-national actors such as multinational corporations as an extension of states. Additionally, it assumes that the influence of these organizations on international politics remain at the marginal level. Whereas, the basic assumption of world politics or cobweb paradigm is that trans-national and sub-national actors can be regarded as independent and autonomous actors separately from nation-states. Thus, the paradigm makes possible the trans-nation coalition of interest; in other words, it claims that sub-national actors can directly influence world politics by interacting with another foreign state or sub-national actor. As a consequence, while cobweb paradigm questions the traditional national interest understanding, it also emphasizes that private groups rather than

nation increasingly become more important place to explain and evaluate the world politics.

The other study highlighting the importance of group interests in society is done by Wright Mills (Mills et al., 2000). According to him, who sees the society in hierarchical social stratification, the national interests are actually determined by the power elites who control the military-economic and political spheres. More clearly, high-ranking politicians, admirals/generals and owners of large companies at the top of the hierarchy in these institutions are composed of people who are in close bonds and solidarity in terms of their social origins and world views, and at the same time, these individuals can become interchangeable over time. Thus, while the social developments and all power are concentrated in the hands of this triple power centre, it also becomes nearly impossible for the people to participate in political decisions.

Another way to explain the national interest in terms of group-based studies comes from neo-conservative approach. This view basically claims that liberal values and nihilism cause social degeneration and decay in domestic politics and weakness in foreign politics. In this sense, national interest should be evaluated beyond being an analytical tool or a strategic necessity. For this view, “it is a symbol and barometer of the health of political order and it contain moralism, history, values and idea of national greatness to constitute a vision of future world order in accordance with those values and interests” (Williams, 2005).

However, some studies, in their criticism of group-based approach, claims that the national interest is not independent of state autonomy and constraints of international politics. Stephen Krasner, in his study called “defending the national interest”, say that states, as an autonomous actor in foreign policy processes, do not determine their actions in line with group pressures (Krasner, 1978). In order to prove this assumption, he examines the influence of the state and huge private corporations on the international raw material investments of the US. Accordingly, he indicates that central decision makers prefer broad political objectives such as security, economic well-being, and ideological interests at the expense of private corporate interests. Aside from the policy objectives, he also emphasizes that central decision maker play leadership role either playing upon divisions within the private sector or taking

advantage of situations in which corporate managers have been unable to determine what policy would maximize their own interests.

The other view that deals with state behavior and the concept of national interest independently from domestic political developments is international system theories (Hoffmann, 1969). Accordingly, international relations, which are diametrically opposed to the domestic political system, are a decentralized structure composed of different units. In such a system, there are basically two situations: the first is the formation of a limited and conditional cooperation between the units, or the second is the emergence of each unit's use of violence in the absence of central authority. Under this framework, the international system is seen the main determinant of the national policies as well as underestimate the autonomy of nations and diversity of their actions.

CHAPTER III

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OR THE STATE: WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST

This chapter aims to evaluate the sources of the national interest through the examination of two distinct periods of the international system. By looking at this main assumption, the chapter is divided into three sub-parts. In the first part, it examines the studies which analyse the nature of the international system. This part basically explores the three issues regarding what are the characteristics of the system, what are the types of the international system, and what is the main cause that transforms the international system. In the second part, the chapter aims to clarify the issues regarding what is the stable and unstable international system, in other words, how they can be distinguished from each other. For this aim, the study concentrates on examining the cycle of the international system which has two main periods, which are stable and unstable and has four stages, status quo, redistribution of power, disequilibrium and resolution of crisis. Basically, the first and second stages of the international cycle imply that the world politics experience the stable international system. Whereas, the third and fourth stages of the cycle points out that the states take positions towards each other under the conditions of the unstable international system. In the third part, it relates the behaviours and interest of the states with two distinct period of international system. In this context, it is assumed that the stable international system erodes the autonomy of the states and the national interest of states in the stable international system is determined by structural forces. Whereas it can be asserted that the unstable international system inevitably pushes states into an environment where uncertainty is widespread in world politics, and thus, this increases states' relative independence to determine their national interests in foreign issues. Thus, the chapter basically puts forward that when the stable international system is dominant in world politics, the interests of states necessarily resemble each other. In contrast, it can also

be said that when the international system goes into an unstable trend, the national interest of states differ from each other.

3.1. The Nature of the International System

Since this study basically argues that the source of the national interest can be explained through the examination of two distinct periods of the international system, it becomes more essential to analyse the studies that explores the nature of the international system. The nature of the international system can simply be aggregated and examined into three parts. Firstly, what is the exact characteristic of the international system and how it functions in world politics, secondly what is the structure of international systems and thirdly, more importantly, how the changes and transformations happen in international politics? By answering these questions, this part of the study basically intends to compare the studies that explain why and how the international system affects the national interests of states.

The proper definition of the international system is one of the important issues to explain the nature of the international system. Basically, the concept of the system refersto the regular patterns of interaction within and between units. Likewise, “the international system can be evaluated as the aggregation of diverse nation states by regular interaction according to a form of control” (Gilpin, 1981, p. 26). By looking these definitions, the differentiation between ancient empire systems and the single modern international system becomes more essential. The several ancient international systems such as Roman Empire or Persian Empire had existed with little or no connection with one another until the 1500s. In other words, while the ancient empire or international systems are bounded with specific region, the modern international systems can be called as boundless and make connection all around the world. Beside this, the other important distinction between two international systems is the ordering principle of the system. On the one hand, the great ancient civilizations or empires had the vertical and hierarchic rule of governing within their realms; on the other hand, the modern single international systemhas established a decentralized and anarchic order and mutual interdependency since the 1500s. In this way, two crucial properties, being at the global reach and anarchic ordering principle, which is the absence of world government, are the key to label and evaluate one system as modern and international

one. Thus, the modern international systems compel the states to interact with one another in harmony with their sovereignty principle.

For example, George Modelski who defined the modern international system according to the definition mentioned above in his famous study “the long cycle of global politics and the nation-state” argues that the units/actors that control the intercontinental, oceanic, and global interactions can be defined as the world power (Modelski, 1978, p. 214). However, he distinguishes the global, regional, and national relations and events from each other and adds that although the world powers dominate the political and economic relations at the global reach, they may not have the capability to control all local/regional political system or process. To him, Portugal, the United Provinces, Great Britain, and the United States that achieved to establish institutions and arrangements to manage the global problems and relations can be categorized as the world power in history.

The second issue, beyond the first anarchic characteristic of international system, is the clarification of the structure of international system. The concept of the structure is simply defined as the arrangement/positions of parts in the system (Waltz, 1979, p. 81) and it functions as a constraining and disposing force across the units/states (Waltz, 1996). Although there are variety of distribution of power models in literature which these are counted as the non-polarity, multi-polarity, tri-polarity, bi-polarity, non-hegemonic unipolarity, hegemony and universal state or empire, (Wilkinson, 1999) this study pays more attention to three types of international structure which are the unipolarity, bi-polarity, multi-polarity. Firstly, the unipolar structure means that single dominant power control or direct the actions of other states in the system, secondly, the bipolar structure points out the prevalence of the two great powers above other powers in the system. A third type of the structure refers to the three or more great powers governing the international system. Unlike these sui generis three kinds of structure or control mechanism of the international system, this study basically sees the uni-polarization and bi-polarization as two key distinct structures of the international system. In other words, although there is a variety of distribution of power models, the study advocates that all these models, in the end, can be reduced to two main blocs which are the status quo and the revisionist bloc.

Beside the anarchic order and different kind of international structure, the third issue to explore the nature of the international system is the process of change and transformation periods. To explain this issue, Robert Gilpin says that there are three different kinds of the change in international system. To him, “first change is related with system-level which is the nature of the actor such as empires, nations, city- states, second is the systemic level which is the structure of the system, and thirdly, change in interactional level which includes the inter-state process” (Gilpin, 1981, p. 40). Unlike the Robert Gilpin, Kalevi Holsti says that “the change in international politics can be actualized in four forms which are change as addition, dialectical change, change as transformation and change as replacement” (Holsti, 2016, p. 43-47). More broadly, he argues that change as addition only brings complexity to the system, dialectical change is the synthesis and represents new forms on the old, change as transformation brings the new form to life over a period of time and finally, in change as replacement the old form of structure completely disappears.

Beside the question of that what type of change happens in international politics, this part also pays attention to the question of what is the main cause(s) or factor(s) to transform the system from stability to the instability. In this way, Robert Gilpin in his seminal book “War and Change in World Politics” asserts that “the nature of international political changes is examined under the three main dimensions which are the environmental factors, domestic politics and structure of international system” (Gilpin, 1981, p. 55). To him, important incentives or disincentives for a state to attempt to change the international system originates from the international balance of power and environmental factors which are the transportation and communication systems, military technology, and the nature of the economy. Beyond these factors, whether or not states take steps to change the system depends on internal factors such as interest groups, social classes, and other social considerations.

On the other hand, Abramo Fimo Organski evaluates that the power transition or change in the international system happens as a result of differential growth of the industrialization process of states (Organski, 2014). To him, balance of power policies falls into the pre-industrial dynastic period so, they are unable to explain the change of international system because states had relatively same powers at those times. For him, the states can be grouped into three parts as pre-industrial powers; transnational powers

are in stage to pass an agricultural to industrial economy and maturity powers which are highly industrialized states. Under this context, England and the US achieved to set up stable international system despite the fact that they are faced the challenges by other newly industrializing powers such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (SU).

Final examination about the reason the change of international system in this part is the hegemonic stability theory. The concept of the hegemon, according to one definition, is a power that can mainly enforce its rules and wishes (at least through effective veto power) in the economic, political, military, and even cultural arenas over other powers in the system. (Wallerstein, 1984, p. 38). In this way, the proponents of this theory basically argue that the international economic openness and stability depends on whether the hegemon power provides leadership to other members of the system (Gilpin, 2011; Kindleberger & Kindleberger, 1986; Webb & Krasner, 1989). Thus, on the one hand, the hegemon provides public/collective goods which must be nonexcludable and nonrival such as security to the system. On the other hand, it also responsible promotes liberal international institutions or sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures to ease the cooperation among member states of the system. To this theory, Great Britain in the 19th century and the United States in the 20th century that are the representatives of the theory that make possible lower tariff, rising trade proportions, and less regionalism so that it kept a stable system.

3.2. Cycle of the International System

The international political system, like other social phenomena, begins, develops, and ends in a certain cyclical process. This cyclical process is basically divided into stable and unstable periods. Accordingly, stable systems are defined as periods in which the distribution of power is durable and status quo states are dominant in international politics; however, the unstable systems are considered as periods when the number of great powers in international politics changes, uncertainty increases, and revisionist states emerge. In the cycle, each of the stable and unstable international periods contains two basic phases within themselves. In this context, the stable system is also divided into two sub-stages as the status quo and transition phases, similarly, the

unstable system passes through the stages of a state of disequilibrium and resolution of the systemic crisis.

By using this framework, it could be deduced that the cycle of the international system is divided into two basic periods and four basic stages in total. In the first stage, the status quo emerges, in which the political, economic, and ideological order, emerges as a result of the existing international power distribution, is accepted as legitimate by the other members/actors of the system. The second phase is assumed to be a transitional stage in which the distribution of power changes markedly as a result of uneven growth among states, yet there are no direct challenges to the existing stable system. The third phase is considered as the period when the change in the distribution of power turns into concrete alliances and international politics is divided into two opposing blocs. The last phase is considered as crisis periods in which problem areas and uncertainty in world politics are resolved and the system is renewed. Figure 3.1. shows the periods and stages in the cycle of the international system.




Figure 3.1. Cycle of the International System (Author, 2021)

3.2.1. First Period: Stable International System

This study assumes that the dominance and certainty of international systemic structures in world politics is the main reason that ensures stability in the system. In a general way, the structure, which is defined as the order and arrangement of the parts in the system, acts as a power that regulates and limits the behavior of the units. Likewise, the structure in the international system is defined as the arrangement formed as a result of the number of great powers in world politics and is regarded as

an invisible force that limits and regulates the behavior of states (Waltz, 1996). These structural situations that bring stability to international politics are basically reduced to three levels as unipolar, bipolar and multipolar international systems.

The stable study assumes that each of the stable international systems will go through the status quo and later transitional stages, and thus the system will return to instability. The status quo phase is basically expressed as long-term periods in which the dominant political, economic and ideological order in international relations is maintained and preserved. However, the transitional phase can be expressed as the periods when power is redistributed in the international system and thus revisionist states emerge. In this process, it is assumed that although the existing balance of power is eroded and the opposite bloc emerges, the status quo powers will still be dominant in the international system. This stage, in which the stability decreases relatively compared to the previous period, can basically be evaluated as a short-term period that passes from the stable system to the period of instability.

3.2.1.1. Status Quo Stage

The status quo stage can be defined as the periods in which the international systemic structure restricts and shapes the behaviors of states in the system. Besides this, international order that emerged as a result of structure of the international system can be considered as an important touchstone that ensures the continuation of the status quo and determines the interests of states. Thus, the state of status quo is assumed to persist until revisionist states emerge or one of the dominant powers falls into civil turmoil.

The establishment of stability and status quo in the international system is mostly shaped as a result of a great war in which great powers in the system participate. The comprehensive international peace agreements made after such great wars are considered of vital importance for the legitimacy, continuation, and protection of the new system. Thus, the new order design includes a set of rules that all the major powers in the system follow and accept. George Modelski claims that there were five cyclical processes in modern political history and they were started by international peace treaties. To him, these international peace treaties can be listed as: the treaty of

Tordesillas in 1494, the treaty of 12-year peace in 1609, the treaty of Utrecht in 1713, Congress of Vienna in 1815, and Yalta, San Francisco Potsdam in 1945 (Modelski, 1978). In addition to this, he argues that all peace treaties enabled to be established the stable international systems under the leadership of Portugal, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Besides the all-inclusive and legitimating international treaty, another fundamental feature of the stage of status quo within the stable system is the emergence of an order generated through international institutions. According to famous definition made by John Ikenberry political order may be defined as governing arrangements among the group of states, including its fundamental rules, principles, and institutions (Ikenberry, 2001, p. 23). More concretely, it could be said that the international order that is mostly built by great powers can basically be defined as institutions or organizations for the management of world-wide problems, relations, or interdependencies (Modelski, 1978). The international orders can be examined by looking at their scope (regional, global), depth of coverage (thick and thin), and kinds (realistic, agnostic, ideological) (Lascurettes & Poznansky, 2021; J. J. Mearsheimer, 2019). Related to this, Mearsheimer says that the international order can be determined by looking at the two criteria which are the number of powers in the system and the ideology of the dominant power. Accordingly, the international system which is shaped according to the distribution of power points out that the distinct international structures such as the multipolar, bipolar, and unipolar systems are quite important to examine the international orders in world political history.

There are a number of international political order examples in modern political history. For instance, the international order which is known as the concert of Europe in the 19th century was established through international conferences/congresses. During this period, the international meetings such as the congress of Vienna in 1815, the Congress of Paris in 1856, and the Congress of Berlin in 1876 were very important tools to sustain the order as well as solve the existing problems among great powers. During the interwar period which is the period of 1919-1939, although the international order was established through the league of nations which aims to organize state relations through collective security, negotiation, and arbitration, this system failed and paved the way for the new great war. The bounded order in the

bipolar international system that emerged between 1945-1989 produced a stable period in world politics. During the period, the US-led- liberal order has arisen out institutions such as NATO in the security area and European Union (EU), General Agreement Trade and Tariffs (GATT), World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the economic area. Whereas, the Soviet-led communist order was established through its own institutions such as the Warsaw pact in the security area and Comecon in the economic area. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989 has initiated the new term in world politics, the bounded international order in the unipolar system which is known as the American-led liberal order has expanded in global reach. During the period of 1989-2013, institutions of the international system's order such as the NATO, EU, World Trade Organization (WTO) entered the expansion trends and increased their influence around the world.

3.2.1.1.1. Multipolar International System

This part of the study argues how the multi-polar international system brings international stability and how it builds the pattern and characteristics of state behaviors in world politics. The multipolar system basically assumes that an increase in the number of great powers causes the stability of the international structure in the system (Deutsch & Singer, 1964). Accordingly, the system argues that the increase in the number of great powers and the diffusion of power, the potential for cooperation and maneuvering areas between states increases. According to the proponents of this system, a state of equilibrium/balance that may be established in the international system acts as a mechanism that preserves and maintains stability in the system. On the contrary to this, it is assumed that the system may go into instability if the number of great powers in the system decreases.

Although the stability and balance of power in the multipolar system occurs as a result of the equal distribution of power at least three great powers the balance in the system is inclined to change due to the fact that the powers of the states can increase or decrease. By using scale analogy, Hans Morgenthau claims that the balancing can be achieved either by diminishing the weight of heavier scales or by increasing the weight of lighter ones (Morgenthau, 1948). In this way, he casts five distinct methods to maintain the status quo and stability in the system which are divide and rule,

compensations, armaments, alliances. However, the sides of the balance of power process, status quo, and revisionist states may also include the third side which is called the balancer of the balance. According to this, the balancer state, as the non-member of both sides/coalition, aims to sustain the status quo by supporting the weaker side when a single actor or coalition gets more powerful and threatens the other states' sovereignty (Morgenthau, 1948).

The world political history is replete with examples of the balance of power in a multipolar international system. For example, the establishment of the concert of Europe between 1815-1890 is one of the important periods to describe the stable international system in world politics. This period can be divided into two parts which are the stages of status quo and transitional stages. Basically, the status quo stage which took place between 1815 - 1871 can be considered as a highly stable period for the international system. Five great powers, United Kingdom (UK), France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia, were keeping and controlling balance in the system. During this period, on the one hand, the holy alliance which consisted of Prussia, Austria, and Prussia, was controlling France's expansionist policies, Great Britain, as the balancer power, was in favor of status quo policies. For this purpose, she participated in the Crimean war to balance and limit the Russian power in the system. This process had continued the emergence of two main blocks which are the central powers, Germany, Austria- Hungary, Italy, and allied powers, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia in the early 1890s.

3.2.1.1.2. Bipolar International System

The bipolar distribution of power is another international system model that explains international stability and state behaviors in world politics. Although the bipolar system, like the multipolar system, assumes that the logic of balance of power among states is the source of international stability and state actions, they disagree about whether the power among states is dispersed or concentrated in the system. According to proponents of the bipolar international system, the structure of the international system turns into bipolarity when the only two states become more powerful than all other states in terms of political, military, economic, and cultural ways (Gaddis, 1986; J. J. Mearsheimer, 1990; Wagner, 1993; Waltz, 1964). In other words, it could be

described as the condition in which states are polarized into two hostile coalitions; a strategy of global deterrence in which there are only two states capable; a system in which two states are so powerful that they can each defend themselves against any combination of other states (Wagner, 1993)

The question of how the bipolar system produces international stability is mainly based on the tight and equal balance of power between two poles in the system. In this way, when the two international systems - multipolarity and bipolarity - compare with each other, the characteristics of the bipolar balance of power which are simplicity, clarity, and certainty, become more clear. According to proponents of the bipolar system, preservation of balance and keeping alliance formation against potential aggressor power is based on a highly complex and hard process in the multipolar system. For example, the chain gang behavior which is defined as the high degree of security interdependence within the alliance makes up power concentration in world politics, the passed buck behavior which is defined as leaving the balancing responsibility makes up a power vacuum in world politics (Christensen & Snyder, 1990). Beyond these factors, geographical conditions, coordination problems between states, and miscalculations about states' policies and power may also cause uncertainty and thus break out the local and major wars in the system (J. J. Mearsheimer, 1990). On the contrary, the bipolar international systems eliminate such kinds of potential conflicts and problems among states. According to Kenneth Waltz, the stability within the bipolar system can be explained in four ways. To him, the ways which are the absence of peripherals, range, and intensity of competition, the persistence of pressure and crisis, and revolutionary political, military, and economic developments in predominant powers make the bipolar system both more stable, sustainable, and durable.

The cold war years 1945 - 1989 was one of the examples to illustrate the characteristics and stability of the bipolar international systems in political history. After the Second World War, there were only two great powers that had the potential to shape international politics in the fields of military, political, economic, and ideological. On the one hand, the US, as the leader of the western bloc states, on the other hand, the Soviet Union (SU), as the leader of the eastern bloc states, had made up two opposite camps in world politics. During the period, individual actions of

periphery states in both camps did not break the stability. For example, the Suez Crisis in 1956, or France's abandonment of NATO or China's followed distinct and disputed politics from the Soviet Union did not change the existing balance and stability in the system. On the other hand, another important factor that created the balance of power in the system was the developments in weapon technology. Both superpowers' increasing nuclear and conventional weapons arsenals also reduced the risk of war and increased wars' costs, thus causing mutual deterrence. Briefly, it could be said that both superpowers had played their roles to preserve stability so that they could maintain a tight balance of power policy and alliance system until the fact became clear that the Soviet Union entered a highly intensive economic crisis in the late 1980s.

3.2.1.1.3. Uni-Polar International System

The unipolar international system is the other kind of distribution of power that explains the international stability and the state behaviors in world politics. Unipolarity is basically defined as a structure in which a single state has remarkably more capability than other states and unbalanced and unchallengeable power in the system (Ikenberry et al., 2009; Jervis, 2009; Krauthammer, 2017; Pape, 2005). In other words, the unipolar international system begins to function when one state reaches clear superiority in the area of the power components which are the size of the population, resource endowment, territory, economic capability, military strength, and competence (Waltz, 1979, 131). Accordingly, as it is argued in the previous part, the bipolar system is considered stable since it reduces the uncertainty of state behaviors such as free-riding, buck pass, fear of allied defection. In the same way, it is evaluated that unipolarity may also oblige the stable periods in world politics since it reduces hegemonic rivalry and security competition among great powers in the system (Wohlforth, 1999). Thus, the unipolar system examines international stability and peace in a degree of hierarchical order rather than the logic of balance of power.

Unlike the bipolar and multipolar systems, the unipolar system puts more responsibility polar state to sustain stability and certainty in international politics. In this context, the behaviours of polar state can be examined into three main questions in which is the unipole a satisfied state, provision of public goods in unipolarity, and domestic politics in unipolarity (Ikenberry et al., 2009). Firstly, polar state is prone to

pursue revisionist foreign policy and it possibly desire to turn system into hegemonic order because of absence of clear balance of power in the system. Secondly, polar state takes on more responsibility to promote collective goods which are general world problems such as international security, justice or open market. Thirdly, the polar state foreign policy behaviours is prone to be shaped and affected by domestic politics or decision – makers’ manipulations due to absence of clear structural constraints in the system.

On the other hand, secondary the states behaviors are also highly affected by the unipolar system constraints and incentives. One of the prominent the state behaviour type in unipolar system is the “soft balancing strategies” (Finnemore, 2009; Pape, 2005; Walt, 2009). While the logic of the soft balancing does not target the polar state actions in the system, nevertheless, it chooses to delegitimize and complicate the polar state by using non-military tools such as international institutions, economic statecraft, and strict interpretations of neutrality. Besides the soft balancing, the other well-known state behaviour type in a unipolar system is the alliance and alignment, in other words, bandwagoning with the polar state (Ikenberry et al., 2009; Walt, 2009; Wohlforth, 1999). Bandwagoning which is defined to align with the powerful side presents secondary states and even lesser states structural inducements. By helping and supporting local states in different regions, the polar state undertakes a distant balancer role, by this, checks potential polar states in other regions. Thus, the secondary-tier and even lesser states arise out structural inducements such as political, economic cooperation opportunities when the security competition minimizes in the region.

The post-cold war period from 1989 to 2016 is a unique and single example to illustrate how the unipolar international system practically functions as well as provides the stability and certainty in world politics. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States (US) has remained as the only single dominant power that has the capability to control and shape events in international politics. During the term, the foreign policy of the US is divided in two sharp foreign policies: status quo and revisionist policies. Although these two different foreign policies were realized under the conditions of the unipolar system, September 11, 2001, the terrorist attacks caused dramatic change in the US foreign policy actions.

The first period of US foreign policy was clearly based on the status quo policies aimed at protecting the unipolar system (Huntington, 1999; Jervis, 2006; Mueller & Stewart, 2021; Wilkinson, 1999). Basically, the US aimed to preserve the existing unipolar system and thus, keep its foreign policy limited in the international system. During the process, the US took important foreign policy actions which are government displacement and installation in Panama and Haiti; restoration of order in Bosnia; good offices and mediation in Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine; Middle East peace subsidies; joint command in the Persian Gulf; and the Kosovo Operation. However, the second period of the US foreign policy which starts with 9/11 attacks was carrying considerable differences with the previous period and it has been prone to pursue revisionist policies in the system. According to Robert Jervis, in order to get long-term peace, stability and prosperity, the US foreign policy had three main milestones in which it does not act to protect system but desire to transform it, uses the prevention policy including preemptive wars and aims to spread and promote democracy all around the world (Jervis, 2006). In this framework, the US foreign policy revolved around the issues which were the wars against terrorism in Afghanistan and then Iraq, supporting the colorful revolution in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan and Greater Middle East project which were aiming to come to power democratic movements in those countries.

As a result, it could be evaluated that the unipolar international system has relatively been successful and brought international stability from 1989 to 2016 in world politics. During the process, structural constraints of the unipolar system such as absence of hegemonic aspirations among great powers, the polar state's voluntary leadership to provide collective/public goods such as security and open trade has been important to stabilize the international relations. On the other hand, the characteristic of unipolar state, America, ideology, such as spreading liberal-democracy around the world and unexpected events such as 9/11 terror attacks and 2008 economic crisis has negatively affected and limited the durability of the unipolar system when compared with other international systems.

3.2.1.2. Second Stage: Redistribution of Power

This stage is the transitional period that shifts the international system from stability to instability as a result of the redistribution of power in world politics. Although new centers of power, in other words, possible revisionist states, emerge in the system, it takes some time for these states to translate their political, economic, and cultural capacities into real power and influence around the world. For this reason, although it is assumed that the current international order and status quo powers are still dominant and legitimate by other actors in the system, the system is no longer as rigid and durable as it happened to be in the previous stage.

The power of states in the international system has always been prone to change in international political history. According to Robert Gilpin “a state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefit exceeds the expected costs (if there is an expected net gain)” (Gilpin, 1981, p. 10). If there was no state of change in international politics, this would mean that a great power or power bloc would constantly dominate the political, economic and ideological order of the international system, which has never happened in world history. Over the process, the main factor that causes power transitions, namely, the rise and fall of the great power in the system is the unequal rate of growth among societies (Gilpin, 1981; Kennedy, 1989; Organski, 2014). In this framework, the unequal growth of power among societies, which are the unchanging laws of change in the international system, can be considered as major breakthroughs in areas such as politics, military, economy, technology, or ideology in a country. There are many examples of such inventions that affected world political history and increased the relative power of some states over other states. For example, the discovery of thoroughbred horses, long-range and gunships, steam power, railways, in communication and transportation area; the inventions of heavy armor, gunpowder, cannon, machine guns, tanks, and aircraft in the military area; innovations in banking, credit, and commercial in the economic area; have enabled some states to increase their relative power compared to other states.

There is an important relationship between defining the concept of power in international relations and gaining great power status. For example, Kenneth Waltz generally prefers to explain the concept of power through the concept of capacity. To

him, whether a state's rank can be called polar or not depends on its combined capabilities which are defined as the size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence (Waltz, 1979, p. 131). However, according to Jack Levy, in order to measure whether a state is a polar power or not, one should look at the position of the relevant state in the international system besides its capacity. According to him, a state that bears on a great power status may differ from other states in three ways. In this way, The polar states meet conditions that "a high level of military capability that makes them relatively self-sufficient and capable of projecting power beyond their borders; a broad concept of security that includes a concern with regional or global power balance; greater confidence than lesser powers in defining and defending their interests" (Levy, 2014, p. 11-17). Looking at these two definitions, the following two conclusions can be drawn. First, a state that wants to gain great/polar power status needs to take pro-change steps that challenge the status quo powers, in addition to increasing its capacity. Secondly, despite the redistribution of international power in the system, if the emerging great powers do not desire to translate their potential power capacities into real power, it is assumed that the system continues to function in a stable and status quo line for a while.

There are many examples that explain these two conclusions in world political history. For instance, although states had increased their economic and other types of power for various reasons, they could not aimed to automatically transform these powers into real influence around the world. In this sense, although the United Kingdom in the 1860s, the United States in the 1890s, or Japan and Germany after the second world war were economic great power, they did not feel the need to transform their economic power into military power. However, during the reign of Wilhelm II and Hitler in Germany and Japan pre-second world war period, succeeded to translate their power capabilities into real political and military influence around the world despite the fact that they have fewer power capabilities compared to their rivals. As a result, although there are significant changes in the power equilibrium during this phase, it is difficult to deduce that there is a complete uncertainty in the system. In other words, this stage can be described as a transitional period because the potential challenger power emerges and the status quo state begins to enter a period of decline.

3.2.2. Second Period: The Unstable International System

This section examines the structural change and transformation processes in which the international political system goes into unstable periods. The concept of instability can generally be defined as short-term periods of uncertainty that occurs as a result of transition periods. According to Morgentau, the process of instability that arises as a result of the change and power struggle between the revisionist and status quo sides in the international system can be adapted into all social life and relations. For example, social clubs, associations, faculties, and business organizations are scenes of constant power struggle between groups that want to retain the power they already have or to achieve greater power. In another example, Morgentau describes this situation in terms of family relations as follows:

On the family level, the typical conflict between mother in law and her child's spouse is in its essence a struggle for power, the defence of an established power position against the attempt to establish a new one. As such it foreshadows the conflicts on the international scene between the policies of the status quo and the policies of imperialism (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 18).

By using the same logic, the unstable international system can basically be considered as the period of uncertainty that occurs as a result of the emergence of revisionist states in international politics or the decline of the power of the status quo great states. In other words, it covers the time periods pre-new structural system, which will build as a result of the rise or fall of great powers in the international system. For example, transition periods from a unipolar system to a bipolar or multipolar system or transition periods from a multipolar system to a bipolar or unipolar system can be given as examples of these processes. During this period, states in the international system are divided into two groups/blocs as status quo and revisionist powers. The competitive, tense and even conflicting environment between these two groups can be assumed as the main reason for the uncertainty and obscurity in the system. Such an unstable international system, on the one hand, relatively weakens the relations of the status quo great powers with the small and middle powers in their sphere of influence, on the other hand, it will enable the states that are not satisfied with the system to form alliances with the new power centers.

As a result, the unstable international system basically points to the volatility and uncertainty in the balance of power as a result of the increase or decrease in the number

of poles in the system due to various reasons. Moreover, the unstable periods of the international system can be divided into two phases, namely disequilibrium and resolution of systemic crisis. During the stage of disequilibrium, an alternative order emerges under the leadership of the revisionist pole power and challenges the existing status quo order in terms of political, economic, and ideological ways. In addition, such a system also triggers the emergence of interstate disputes in possible crisis and conflict areas and encourages states to resolve those problems by using military power. In the last and fourth stage of the system, the cycle of the system will be completed with a great war in which many states will participate under the leadership of the great polar powers of the two blocs, and a peace agreement to be made afterwards.

3.2.2.1. Third Stage: Disequilibrium

This period basically covers the time period from the stage of disequilibrium to the stage of resolution of systemic crisis. According to Robert Gilpin, the stage of disequilibrium is considered as a situation in which economic, political, technological, developments have increased the potential benefits or decreased the potential costs to one or more states of seeking to change the international system (Gilpin, 1981, p. 14). During the stage of disequilibrium, the general trend that dominates international politics is security dilemmas at both a systemic and regional level. In this way, on the one hand there is a sharp competition between the status quo and revisionist leaders in terms of raw material resources, markets, political influence and gaining prestige, on the other hand, power vacuums and crises at the regional level accelerate the armament of states and cause the establishment of new alliance networks. In this context, both status quo and revisionist state behaviours in this stage can be divided and examined under two periods due to distinct structural variants of the international system.

The question of why secondary states don't make balancing against the rising state but are in favor of the change side is answered by Randall Schweller's balance of interest theory (Schweller, 1994). He basically argues that the change process in multipolar international system can mostly be motivated by states' bandwagoning behaviors for profit. According to this explanation type, it is a missing expectation that survival and security motivations are always the primary motivation that determines the alignment preferences of states. Instead of this, he simply says that "states' alliance decisions are

frequently motivated by both opportunities for gain as well as danger and by both appetite and fear” (Schweller, 1994, p 74). By using this logic, it could be deduced that during the unstable periods, the status quo states prefer to choose the balancing behavior (allying with the weaker side) and aim to protect their self-preservation and the values they already have. Whereas, the revisionist states tend to be bandwagoner (allying with a stronger side) aims to expand their self-extensions and to get the values they envy. In this way, Schweller cast many historical example to support his thesis which is bandwagoning for profit. For example, to entice bandwagoners, XIV Louis and then Napoleon Bonaparte had employed territorial or economic incentives and stunning military successes (Ibid, 94). In this context, the aims and behaviors of the mentioned status quo and revisionist states are cleverly illustrated in the table below.




Figure 3.2. State Interest (n) = (value of revision) – (value of status quo) (Schweller, 1994, 100)

Unlike the multipolar international systems, balancing is another type of behavior that pushes the international system towards changing direction in unipolar systems. Balancing, which is generally described as a type of status quo behavior aiming to protect the system and maintain order, necessarily takes on a behavior pattern adopted by revisionist states in unipolar international systems. Although the unipolar international system is defined as the unbalanced superpower necessitating the stability in the system, the logic of anarchy that puts the states in competitive and self-sufficient environmental conditions forces them to follow the balancing policy due to their survival and security concerns (Layne, 2009, p. 11-16). In addition to the balancing policy and survival motivation of the revisionist states, the sole superpower

predominant position may go into decline due to two factors which are overexpansion (Kennedy, 1989) and sameness effect (Waltz, 1979, p. 127). On the one hand, the sole superpower's over-expansion in terms of political, military, and economic ways increases the cost of maintenance and its eminence in the system; in return, it diminishes its military and economic capabilities. On the other hand, the sameness effect, which means duplication of leader states' success, also increases the relative power of its adversaries.

3.2.2.2. Fourth Stage: Resolution of Systemic Crisis

This last stage of the international system can be defined as short periods of time during which the structural crisis and problematic areas between the status quo and revisionist states are generally resolved through a hegemonic war. Although many other types of war such as between great powers, interstate, or civil wars in international politics include important results for the distribution of power in the system, none of these wars have an effect that directly aims to change the system. Instead, the type of hegemonic war aims to solve the systemic problems such as who will govern the international system and whose interests will be primarily served by the new international order, how the new territorial configuration is shaped and determined a new set of rules in terms of political, economic and ideological dimensions in the system.

According to Robert Gilpin, hegemonic wars can be distinguished from other wars in terms of their scale, objectives at stakes, and the means employed to achieve those objectives (Gilpin, 1988, p. 600-601). By looking at this, the hegemonic wars could be more broadly described that the scale of war means the status quo and revisionist leaders and their respective allies in the system, the objective of war is about the structure and leadership of the system and finally, the means of the war employed often is unlimited (Gilpin, 1988, p. 601-602). In this context, a number of wars in the world political history that had a great amount of effect on international politics can be evaluated in this category. For example, the hegemonic wars like 1618 – 1648 religious wars, 1701 – 1713 the war of Spanish succession, 1801 – 1815 Napoleonic wars, First world wars, and second world wars, were symbolizing the final point to transform the system from unstable into stable periods.

3.3. What is the Source of the National Interest?

Since the study mainly assumes that the source of national interests of states is determined according to the distinct period of the international system which can be stable or unstable, it finds quite useful to use the security-freedom analogy to analyze the state patterns in the system. According to this analogy, being secure entails giving up, at least reducing, the freedoms at some extent, by contrast, increasing the freedom causes the reduction of one's security. By using this logic, it could be deduced that when the structural stability and order in the international system become predominant in system, certainty and mutual trust are extremely high among interstate relations. However, it can also be assumed that when the international system is destabilized and uncertainty prevails, states relatively remain free to choose and direct in their foreign policy actions and find more area for maneuver, but at the same time, they also undergo quite an uncertain environment due to security risks and crisis areas in the system.

On the other hand, these two distinct periods of the international system could also be evaluated to measure the relations between the pole states and secondary states in the system. Accordingly, the pole states in the system produce necessary and sufficient influence to make up relative certainty in their relations with secondary states in terms of political, economic, and ideological issues during the stable periods. Contrary to this, the certainty and established relations between pole powers and secondary powers becomes more flexible during the unstable periods. As a summary, it could be reiterated that the national interests of the states are determined by the systemic structural factors during the stable periods of the system. Whereas, it also could be assumed that when the international system turns into an unstable period of time, the decision-making skills of the actor increase so that the interests of the nation are determined at the state level.

3.3.1. National Interest Formulations in Cycle of International System

This part basically examines the formulations of the national interest as well as the possible state behaviours under the cycle of the international system which is divided into four stages as the status quo, redistribution of power, disequilibrium, and resolution of the crisis. Although the systemic structural factors which are stable and

unstable periods of the international system are the main effect to evaluate the state behavior, the four stages which exhibit the intensification of the structural factors is could also be evaluated as important indicators to measure the state behaviors.

The stage of the status quo could be defined as the period in which all great powers in the system find the international structure and order as legitimate in terms of political, economic, and ideological ways. Basically, the key reason that brings certainty to the international system is the active and voluntary presence of the great powers and international organizations to solve the general world problems in the system. In this context, it may be deduced that stable international system promotes and increases the cooperation opportunities among states and solve or minimize the security dilemma among states. Put it another words, although the some interstate or intra-state wars or conflicts may happen in the system, the main topics or agendas in international politics revolves on non-security issues such as trade, human rights or cultural issues. Besides this, the secondary-tier states in such periods concentrate on power building and centralization steps as well as try to spread its influence in the areas that the global great power ignores (Yalçın, 2017, p.35).

The stage of redistribution of power in the cycle of the international system can also be defined as the period in which existing great powers are still dominant in the international system but less capable to affect the secondary state behaviours because of the emergence of revisionist states. Although the redistribution of power explicitly and relatively appears the emergence of the revisionist state in the system, it takes time for revisionist states to translate their power capacity into real influence around the world. In this way, it could be deduced that existing political, economic, or ideological order keep on enforcing the system stable. As a result, it could be assumed that regardless of the structure of the international system is multipolar, bipolar, or unipolar, it becomes dominant to shape the interests and behaviors of the states in international politics.

The disequilibrium, as the third stage of the cycle of the international system, could be described as bi-polarization of the system between status quo and revisionist states in world politics. In other words, this stage of disequilibrium basically implies that the revisionist bloc tries to enhance their military, political and economic interests at the

expense of the status quo powers. During this period of time, states generally shape their national interest formulations on the basis of revisionist foreign policies which are the jackal bandwagoning, power concentration, alliance formation and expansion, passing buck and arms race, and so on.



CHAPTER IV

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1999 TO PRESENT

This chapter mainly argues that the two distinct periods of the international system are the main factors to explore the national interest formulations of Turkey from 1999 to present. In other words, it tries to prove that the foreign policy in Turkey is mostly shaped and implemented in accordance to cycle of the international system. By looking at reference points in the cycle of the international system, the foreign policy of Turkey from 1999 to present can be divided and examined into two parts. According to this division, the first part of this study basically argues that the Turkish foreign policy from 1999 to 2016 is mainly determined by forces of the international system. In other words, it argues that although Turkey individually tried to shape and direct its bilateral and regional policies in this period, these attempts mostly failed because of their dependence on the structural forces of the international system. By contrast, the second part of the study mainly asserts that when the international system goes into an unstable period of times, the national interest formulations in TFP between 2016-2020 have started to be determined by state level. During this period, the structural factors of unipolar international system has been into declining process and less capable to shape events that happens in international politics so that Turkey has necessarily increased its capacity and has taken active foreign policy steps to deal with its vital national interest issues in the region. Furthermore, attention is paid to the idea that although Turkey has met structural constraints during this period, they remain less capable and sufficient to change or shape the direction of Turkish foreign policy. Thus, this chapter basically aims to exhibit that how the two distinct periods of international system which is the stable and unstable ones affected the direction of Turkish foreign policy in the periods of 1999 – present.

4.1. The Unipolar Stable International System between 1989 – 2016

The post-cold war period from 1989 to 2016 is a unique and single example to illustrate how the unipolar international system practically functions as well as provides the stability and put the certain order in world politics. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the structure of the international system had turned from bipolarity to the unipolarity, so that, the United States has remained as the only single pole that has the capability to control and shape events in international politics. This structural changes in international system naturally brought new order and clarity in terms of political, economic, and ideological dimensions that put constraints the state behaviors around the world. Firstly, the United States as the global power and the international organizations established under its leadership have quite powerful and enough means to intervene and influence the other states' foreign policies all around the world. Secondly, despite the fact that the USA has important rivals such as rising China, Western Europe, and Japan in terms of economic area, which is one of the main dimensions of power, it was the reality that they don't have enough capability to challenge the US even in the economic ways. Thirdly, the ideological dimension of international order may be summarized as the market capitalism, nationalism and democracy. In addition to this, the globalization that is defined as as speedup of movements and exchanges (human beings, goods, services, capital, technologies and cultural practices) all over the planet ('What Is Globalization?', 2020) has also left important leverage to impact state behaviours during this period. Under this framework, the unipolar international system can be divided and examined into two periods according to the US foreign policy steps. The first period that covers the years of 1989 – 2001 exhibits that the US preferred to pursued the status quo prone foreign policies. Whereas, the second period in the system that covers the years of 2001 – 2016 can be evaluated that the US preferred to pursue revisionist foreign policy steps and aimed to change the system from unipolarity to the hegemony.

The first period of US foreign policy was clearly based on the status quo policies aimed at protecting the unipolar system (Huntington, 1999; Jervis, 2006; Mueller & Stewart, 2021; Wilkinson, 1999). Basically, the US aimed to preserve the existing unipolar system and thus, keep its foreign policy limited in the international system. During the

process, the US took important foreign policy actions which are government displacement and installation in Panama and Haiti; restoration of order in Bosnia; good offices and mediation in Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine; Middle East peace subsidies; joint command in the Persian Gulf; and the Kosovo Operation.

However, the second period which starts with 9/11 terrorist attacks against the US caused dramatic change in US foreign policy actions as well as international politics. Unlike the first period of the unipolar international system, the US actions could be evaluated pro – revisionist policies during the period (Jervis, 2006, 2009; Mueller & Stewart, 2021). According to Robert Jervis, in order to get long-term peace, stability and prosperity, the US foreign policy had three main milestones in which it does not act to protect the system but desires to transform it, uses the prevention policy including pre-emptive wars and aims to spread and promote democracy all around the world (Jervis, 2006). In this framework, the US foreign policy revolved around the issues which were the wars against terrorism in Afghanistan and then Iraq, supporting the colourful revolution in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan and Greater Middle East project which were aiming to bring to power democratic movements in those countries.

As a result, it could be evaluated that the unipolar international system has relatively been successful and brought international stability from 1989 to 2016 in world politics. During the process, structural constraints of the unipolar system such as absence of hegemonic aspirations among great powers, the polar state's voluntary leadership to provide collective/public goods such as security, open trade and effects of globalization has been important tools to stabilize the international relations. However, the characteristic of unipolar state, in other words, American exceptionalism or ideology and values, such as spreading liberal-democracy all around the world and unexpected events such as 9/11 terror attacks and 2008 economic crisis has negatively affected and limited the durability of unipolar system when the compared with other international systems.

4.2. 1999 – 2016: Turkish Foreign Policy in Stable International System

This part of the study basically argues that the national interest formulation of Turkey from 1999 to 2016 was mostly determined by the structural factors of the stable international system. Furthermore, it claims that although Turkey was governed by two distinct governments, there was continuity rather than ruptures in formulating and implementing national interest decisions as a result of structural factors. In this way, this part is divided and examined into two sub-parts. First part basically claims that although Turkish foreign policy (TFP) is administered by distinct parties, general characteristic of foreign policy remained untouched and both parties' actions become complementary each other. In second part, it is pointed out that how the structural factors constrained and shaped the Turkey' foreign policy steps and policies throughout the period.

4.2.1. General Outlook to Turkish Foreign Policy

This part basically assumes that although the TFP is governed triple coalition government (democratic left party, nationalistic movement party and mother-land party) in the years of 1999-2002 and conservative democrat justice and development party (JDP) governments between 2002-2013, both distinct governments followed the same kind of foreign policy line. In other words, it could be claimed that both distinct governments tried to use and enhanced Turkey's soft power capabilities in order to keep political stability and increase its political and economic influence in the region and world. Throughout the period, TFP generally revolved around some concepts such as necessity of new vision or image, Europeanization of foreign policy, zero – problem with neighbours, prioritizing the economic relations and civilization-based political dependence. In this way, it may be deduced that although the governments in Turkey followed and implemented exclusive foreign policies steps, in the end, the general characteristic and vision of foreign policymakers remained suitable with general systemic trends of unipolar international systems. Under this context, TFP during the period of 1999 – 2016 can be divided into three parts which are the period of 1999 – 2002 governed by the coalition government, the first JDP administration in the periods of 2002 – 2011, and the second JDP administration in the periods of 2011 – 2016.

One of the most distinguishing policies during this period was the planned and implemented foreign policy vision or image. The both triple coalition and single JDP government were the critiques of the traditional Turkish foreign policy which had made alienation from its own cultural roots and historical past. According to İsmail Cem who was the foreign minister and key figure in the coalition government, Turkey has important cultural and historical assets, has dual identity as Asian and European, has potentiality being role model in the region and needs to improve the relations with neighbours (Altunışık, 2009, p. 183). Likewise, JDP governments tried to translate Turkey's soft power such as Ottoman historical, cultural and religious as well as geography proximity in a positive way. Under this framework, Ahmet Davutoğlu who was the foreign minister and key figure of JDP governments explain the principles of foreign policy as balance between security and democracy, zero-problem with neighbors, rhythmic, multi-dimensional and proactive diplomacy (Davutoglu, 2010; Davutoğlu, 2008).

Turkey's foreign policy, which was governed by a coalition government between 1999 and 2002, basically progressed on the axis of the European Union as well as the policy of rapprochement with neighbours (Balçı, 2018). At the Helsinki Summit held in December 1999, the EU's acceptance of Turkey as a candidate country started the process of Europeanization of foreign policy. During this period, the EU demanded that Turkey adopt a foreign policy towards the adoption and spread of values such as peace, stability, prosperity, democracy and human rights and the rule of law. Thus, a new process started between Turkey and the EU in which issues such as cooperation, interdependence and trade are important and dominant.

On the other hand, it is seen that the coalition government dramatically established good relations with neighbouring states from tensions to the rapprochement process. In this way, TFP under coalition government started to recover relations with the Middle East region. For example, after the resolution of the conflict over Syrian support to the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane) in the Adana Agreement, the government worked hard to develop close relations with Syria in this respect, and the two states signed a number of cooperation agreement in terms of military and economic areas. Likewise, Turkey and Greece agreed to start exploratory talks and take confidence-building measures to resolve the problems in the Aegean Sea. Finally,

Turkey developed relations with Russia Federation (RF) in terms of trade, energy, and security issues. In this context, the two countries signed the Blue Stream project, which would bring Russian natural gas to Turkey in the field of energy, and the declaration of cooperation against terrorism in the field of security. Thus, Turkey promised not to get involved in the ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus, the Chechnya problem, in return, Russia pledged that it will not support the PKK terrorist organization. Finally, Turkey developed an “Africa Policy” with an Action Plan document in 1998 to cultivate diplomatic relations and foster political, economic, and cultural cooperation with the Continent (Oğurlu, 2018).

Turkish foreign policy from 2002 to 2011 mainly continued to function around three cornerstones which are the zero – problem policy with neighbours, soft power such as historical and cultural ties, and economic factors. In this context, Turkey developed very similar policies compared with the previous period in the stage of the implementation of foreign policy. Turkey, on the one hand, kept on maintaining good relations with the EU and the USA on a global scale, on the other hand, it also developed relations with the Middle East politics in general and its neighbours Syria, Iran, and Iraq Kurdish Regional Government (IKRG) in particular, at the regional level.

Throughout the period, there has been no significant change in Turkey's relations with the US and EU, which are the global actors of the system. In this sense, although Turkey's rejection of the March 1 motion banning the entry of American soldiers into Iraq through its own territory deteriorated the bilateral relations between Turkey and the USA, in the following process, both countries managed to recover the relations which were defined at the level of strategic partnership. Turkey's relations with the EU remained another important dynamic of foreign policy. Following Turkey's start of the negotiations for full membership to the EU in 2005, the process entered a relative stagnation, but still, Turkey's EU accession process continued to be one of the important dynamics of foreign policy.

On the other hand, Turkey's policy of rapprochement with the Middle East region in general and the neighbouring states such as Syria, Iran, and Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in a specific way continued increasingly during the AK Party

period. In this context, on the one hand, Turkey was diplomatically acting as a mediator in the solution of Syria's problems with Israel and Iraq, on the other hand, the free trade agreement signed between the two countries revealed the economic dimension of the relationship between the parties. In addition, another important agreement signed between the two countries was the mutual abolition of visas in 2009, thus, the relations between the two countries progressed towards the level of regional integration. Another dimension of zero-problem policy with neighbors was close relations that were established with Iran in terms of energy, trade, and political issues. In addition to these relations, Turkey opposed the international pressure and isolation policy implemented due to Iran's nuclear energy activities and supported the solution of the problem through diplomacy. Finally, Turkey's Iraq policy was quite fragmented and complex to implement zero -problem policy. Basically, the issues such as the new Iraqi government's pro-Iranian policies, newly discovered energy resources, and the resumption of PKK terrorism enabled Turkey to strengthen its relations with the Northern Iraqi regional government.

The third term of TFP that took place in the conditions of a stable international system covers the years from 2011 to 2016. The Arab Spring that emerged in 2011 brought about new areas of crisis and opportunities for Turkish foreign policy. As a result of Arab Spring, it was quite clear that the zero problem policy with neighbours was no longer functioning as Turkey's relations with Syria, Iraq, and Iran were adversely affected. However, Turkey has adopted a new foreign policy behavior, which is summarized as a civilization-based political dependency during this period. According to this policy, by taking into consideration the assumption that Turkey is the geographical and cultural centre of the region, it was designed that Ankara will be at the centre of this new order when the stage of establishing a new order at the regional-global level. In this context, Turkey gave up the economic liberalism that was implemented in the first decade of the 2000s, regardless of whether the neighbouring country's regimes were dictatorships or democracies. Instead, it started to support pro-democracy opposition groups against the authoritarian regimes after the Arab Spring. At the beginning of the process, although Turkey had good relations with Egypt, Libyan, Tunisia, and Yemen which experienced democratic revolutions, however, counter-revolutions and insurgencies that have taken in these states made up uncertainty and deteriorated good relations with Turkey.

4.2.2. The Effects of the International System on Turkish Foreign Policy

This part of the study basically assumes that the events that happened in Turkish Foreign Policy from 1999 to 2016 were shaped by the structural factors of the stable international system. In other words, the study argues that the US's domination and unrivalled position in both the Middle East region and worldwide as well as the EU membership negotiations of Turkey were the foremost structural factors to limit the autonomy of the foreign policy. Although Turkish foreign policy tried to build and pursue formulation of national interest by taking its own axis, it is mostly constrained by the domination of a stable international system. Thus, this part basically concentrates on exhibiting the relations between Turkey's foreign policy steps and the effects of the international system.

One of the most important structural impacts on the TFP during the stable international system was the position and location of the United States in both the region and around the world. The Iraqi war, which the USA had been planning for a while after the September 11 terrorist attacks, was the first major event that affected between Turkey and the USA during the period. In this context, the US requested to use Turkey's border to topple the Saddam Hussein regime so that it started to negotiate with the Turkish government to find a consensus over the issue. Although Turkey had known that it could have undergone possible economic losses and political instability due to the American invasion of Iraq, nonetheless, the newly elected Turkish government supported the White House and drafted a bill for a vote in Parliament to allow foreign forces to be deployed and to be sent Turkish troops outside (Arı & Pirinççi, 2010). Under these conditions, on March 1, 2003, the bill at the Turkish Parliament could not reach the absolute majority of 276 votes needed, despite the fact that the parliamentary majority did support in favour of the bill. Following Turkey's rejection of US troops, another bill allowing foreign air forces to use Turkish airspace was prepared and approved in parliament, however, this last bill could not prevent to deteriorate Turkish-American relations (Oran, 2013, p. 147).

The consequences of these events on TDP can be evaluated at several points. Firstly, the study argues that Turkey's rejection of the March 1 motion cannot be considered as a challenge to the international system. In this matter, Brooks and Wohlforth argue

it has more to do with domestic political dynamics than with state-level politics, to put it another way, Turkey's powerful military and opposition Republican People's Party chose to free-ride and let the ruling party bear the domestic political cost of enacting legislation, anticipating that it would succeed (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2005). Secondly, the US, in response to the March 1 bill, excluded Turkey from making plans for the future of Iraq. During this period, there were some series of events that left important implications on TFP. These were counted as the detention of 11 Turkish Special Forces officers in Sulaymaniyah on July 4, 2003; the US' urge to take toward Iraqi Kurdish groups, particularly on the Kirkuk disputed which one of the problematic points for Turkey was. Lastly, another source of concern for Turkey in its relations with Iraq is Washington's unwillingness to collaborate with it in the battle against PKK terrorism (Arı & Pirinççi, 2010, p. 22). Thus, these events are important because it exhibits that the US explicitly punished Turkey in return for its decision on the March 1 bill that prevented the US troops use Turkish soil during the invasion.

Except the Iraq invasion of American, it can be said that Turkey-US relations was in harmony when it comes to strategic and security issues throughout the period. In this way, one of the important events happened during the Turkey prime minister Erdogan's visit to the US in 2007 so that, Washington agreed firm commitment to sustain joint intelligence and military efforts on the ground in northern Iraq. In 2007, although Turkey and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding under which a new pipeline would be built, to carry 30 billion cubic meters of gas per year from Iran to Turkey and then to Europe, the US opposition had become one of most serious obstacles to realize this project (Hale, 2009). In addition to this, the missile shield project, on the one hand, deepened Turkey-US relations, on the other hand, produced a new problem area for the zero-problems policy with neighbours. Last notable event during the period, Turkey requested NATO to deploy patriot missiles in its country in 2012 as a result of the growing security problem that emanated from Syrian civil war (NATO, 2013).

On the other hand, the study also argues that Turkey's policies such as zero problems with neighbours and the civilization-based foreign policy in the Middle East region during the term were shaped by the structural factors of stable international system. One of the main structural factors that shaped the regional policies of Turkey

was the presence of the US, in other words, the US's invasion of Iraq. According to Anderson and Djeflat, Iraq, along with Iran and Egypt, was one of the three countries that had the potential to be a leader in the region over last half-century. Saddam Hussein, on the one hand, had initiated an economic modernisation process to develop infrastructure, industry, agriculture and education, on the other hand, he was playing an important role to balance the Shiite Iran within the Middle East politics (Andersson & Djeflat, 2013, p. 32). The elimination of Saddam's regime in Iraq by the American forces basically caused reduction of the security dilemma among regional states and made possible relative stability in the Middle East region. Using this structural situation well, Turkey has had the opportunity to initiate and establish an intense economic relationship with the countries of the region. In terms of economics, the Middle East and North Africa were accounting for 16.2% of Turkey's overall goods trade, up from 11.4 percent in 2002 (Hale, 2009). Beside this, it was also announced the joint declaration on the establishment of a free trade and visa free zone between Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. However, it could be deduced that although Turkey developed good relations with its neighbouring states such as Iran and Syria which are hostile to the US these relations were based on Turkey's economic motivations and it did not cause any cooperation covering strategic and security areas.

The Arab spring process was another important dimension that gains momentum to Turkey-US relations. Both countries followed a harmonious policy at the beginning of the revolutionary processes that resulted in the overthrow of the dictatorial regimes in the Middle East. The basis of the democratization movements that emerged with the Arab Spring can be taken back to the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative process, which was announced as the official policy of the USA in 2004. In this context, the USA had warned the regional leaders to initiate the democratization process and to make reforms since September 11, but as a result of the failure of these attempts, the USA aimed that these regimes, which were insufficient to meet the social demands and needs, would be overthrown and replaced by Islamist movements (Uzgel, 2013, p. 332). Under these circumstances, the Arab Spring that was a series of pro-democracy uprisings ultimately resulted in regime changes in countries such as Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, and Libya. Turkey, as a non-Arab country, compatible with the capitalist economic system, a member of NATO, and a candidate to the EU, was arising out as a model that could set an example for other countries in the region. By

this capacity, Turkey was one of the first countries to support the revolutionary processes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen. However, in the Libyan case, Turkey initially expressed its reservations about NATO's intervention, and then acted on the basis of cooperation with NATO and its western partners.

Beside the US actions, the influence of the EU in Turkish foreign policy can be considered as one of other important structural factors during the period. Although relations with the EU have had an important place in TFP throughout the entire period, the term between 1999 and 2005 can be specifically called as the Europeanization of foreign policy. Following the European Council Helsinki summit in 1999 in which Turkey had been given a candidate country status, The EU has made some demands on Turkey to change its foreign policy. These could basically be summarized that promoting and embracing values such as peace, stability, democracy, and human rights, and making every effort to resolve ongoing border disputes and other issues (Alkan, 2015). In addition to this, The EU process continued during the JDP administrations, and the EU decided to start negotiations with Turkey in 2005. However, the Cyprus problem was one of the most important problem areas that were raised in the process of Turkey's full membership to the European Union. In this way, the Annan Plan, which envisages the unification of the northern and southern regions of Cyprus into a single federal state, was supported by the majority of the government, media, business and society in Turkey. However, despite the Turkish side's acceptance of the referendum on the unification of the island of Cyprus, the solution of the problem did not occur as a result of the Greek Cypriots ' rejection of the plan.

The Annan plan, the also known Cyprus reunification plan, basically had two important implications for TFP. Firstly, it displays that the traditional understanding of foreign policy in Turkey could be changed by structural factors. Following the Helsinki summit in 1999, the EU had implied that if political solution cannot be achieved in Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot side could become a member of the European Union, this taken decision played important role to accelerate Turkey's efforts to resolve the Cyprus issue. Another important consequence of the Annan plan was that the nationalist reflexes and reactions in Turkey had weakened. In other words, globalization and a world order dominated by neoliberal values have indirectly been

affecting in changing the opinion of the Turkish public, so the Cyprus issue in Turkey has no longer been a topic discussed on security grounds

4.3. Unstable International System Since 2016

The years from 2016 to 2020 clearly exhibit and reflect the fall of the liberal international system that had been established by the United States following post-World War II. In this time, it could be deduced that structure of international system and distribution of power in world politics has been passing through systemic transformational process. To put it more concretely, on the one hand, the China as rising revisionist power seriously challenges declining and status quo the US to revise its international position in the system. On the other hand, the Chinese-led international order constitutes a considerable alternative against the existing liberal international order (LIO) that puts the rules other states in terms of political, economic, and ideological ways. In addition to this, the international system now witnesses the non – western powers such as Brazil, Russia, India, and Iran that is capable and potential revisionist states in their regions. In this framework, this part basically aims to mention the issues of how the international system transformed into an unstable international system and what is the breaking point to label the system as unstable, and what happened during this short unstable period of time.

The emergence of an unstable international system can be examined into two main parts which are dysfunctionality of the liberal international order as well as the rise of China and its alternative order. Like every order, LIO has been established some rules, mechanism and institutions to help and govern state behaviours in the system. However, such kind of liberal order under the leadership of the US has inevitably produced some outcomes to the state behaviours in terms of political, economic, ideological, and institutions (Sørensen, 2006). In this context, failure of LIO can basically be evaluated under the four rubrics which are the high rate of growth of China, globalization, the efforts for the spread of democracy, and the lacking capability of multilateral institutions in world politics.

One of the important outcomes of LIO has been the high rate of growth of China as non – western and liberal state. According to LIO and the US's policy of engagement,

the integration of China into a liberal global economy would necessarily make it more prosperous and then mature into human rights and adopt democracy and turn as a responsible global actor (J. J. Mearsheimer, 2021). As a result of this, China has benefited from the incentives of LIO but now, it has appeared the biggest threat both to the US power and liberal order in the system. Globalization, as the second outcome of LIO, which spread the free –trade and economic openness around the world caused the financial crisis of 2008 – 2010 as well as widened the income inequality between elite and middle-rank people in developed countries. In the end, nationalism, populism, and authoritarianism against liberalism have been the rising trend in world politics (Lake et al., 2021, p. 238). The spreading liberal – democratic values, as third factor, has negatively affected liberal order. On the one hand, American's ideological-oriented wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and on the other hand, the logic of open border in EU's Schengen agreement and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has caused important problems such as illegitimate migration problems in the US and EU region (ibid, 240). Finally, it has been seen that the international institutions become more dysfunctional when the US leadership has entered in declining process. In this context, the US under the Trump administration has acted protectionist state behaviours: abandoned from Paris Treaty on climate change, withdrew the United Nation (UN) Human Rights Council, imposed substantial tariffs on many of its major trading partners and started serious trade wars against China as well as abandoned the intermediate Nuclear Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and other arms control agreement against Russia.

On the other hand, the rising China has been another important dimension to evaluate that the international system is in an unstable period. During the period, China has tried to increase at the regional and global level influence by initiating economic-oriented relations. For this purpose, China's "Belt and Road Initiative" that is a multi-country economic development and commercial project aims to improve connectivity and collaboration between countries throughout Asia, Africa, and Europe (Huang, 2016). Besides this, China, as a rising power, tries to expand its economic partners and builds its own regimes and institutions against the existing system. For example, China closely engages with regional and global institutions such as the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) plus three (China-South Korea and Japan) and ASEAN plus one (China). Additionally, China directly builds its own institutions such as Asian

Infrastructure Investment Bank known as the answer to the World Bank (Perlez, 2015). In this way, China has attempted and sustained to translate its economic power into military power in order to balance the US dominance in East Asia (J. J. Mearsheimer, 2005). Thus, it could be deduced that China's increasing economic growth and its military modernization process has changed the international system into instability. Table 3.1 comparing China's power capability with the US's power capability is drawn to describe this fact.

Table 4.1. Comparison of the United States of America and People Republic of China's Gross Domestic Product and Defence Budget in 1989 and 2020

Years	1989		2020	
Countries	GDP	Defence Budget	GDP	Defence Budget
The United States	\$ 5.6 Trillion	\$ 321 Billion	\$ 20.9 Trillion	778
China	\$ 360 Billion	\$ 11.2 Billion	\$ 14.7 Trillion	\$ 252 Billion

Source: World Bank, 2021

Besides China's political and economic power, it also put the alternative ideological order against the liberal order. In this point, China which is the most important representative of state capitalism, nationalism, and authoritarianism promotes an alternative ideological order against the market capitalism, nationalism, and democracy that is promoted by the liberal system (Sakamoto, 1995). To put it more concretely, China's ideological perspective can be summarized in "five principles of peaceful coexistence" that includes a number of contradictions with the liberal international order. Accordingly, the rules which are arranged the state behaviors can be summarized as "the mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual

non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence” (Jiabao, 2004).

Finally, the increase in the number of revisionist states, like the emergence of the challenger great power, could be taken as an indicator to label the international system is in the unstable periods of time. In order to embody this situation, the study prefers to focus on the recent political struggles that happen between the status quo sided and revisionist secondary/regional powers. In this way, Andrew Hurrell pays attention that “the revisionist second-tier states of the international system such as China, India, Brazil, and Russia in world politics emerge as another block and they are more different than other second-tier states like Japan, South Korea, Canada, Australia, major European countries which are closely integrated with alliance systems with the US. (Hurrell, 2006, p. 3). Moreover, Artyom Lukin draws special attention of strategic cooperation between Russia and China in terms of their geo-economic and military relations (Lukin, 2021). In this way, it may be argued that quasi alliance and entente between Russia and China may return the great power politics and this may deepen the crisis in the existing international system.

As a summary, the year 2016 could be taken as critical point to measure the fall of the unipolar system and liberal international order. Two events in 2016, Brexit and the election of Donald Trump as the US president has strongly uncovered that world politics experience an unstable international system. On the one hand, Donald Trump clearly express that he runs against the liberal international order during the his election campaign (Harwood, 2018). On the other hand, it is well known that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU that is known as the BREXIT process was closely related to the open border logic (Schengen area) and the illegal immigration problem that challenged the EU’s borders.

4.4. The Turkish Foreign Policy in Unstable International System

This part of the study concentrates on exhibiting how the state level in Turkish foreign policy becomes more important rather than the constraints of the international system. During this period of time, the status quo great power, the US basically has turned and taken position against the emerging China threat and tried to preserve its existing status

quo position in other regions. The US's new foreign policy choice has inevitably affected and encouraged the regional powers to change the status quo in the Middle East region. This new situation basically gained Turkey an expansive manoeuvring area and flexibility to solve its foreign issues. Accordingly, Turkey, on the one hand, as a regional power makes cooperation with Russia, on the other hand, if necessary, as NATO power could take a counter-position against Russian policies in the region. In other words, although Turkey has faced crucial security threats in region, it has managed to transform crisis areas into opportunities. In this framework, Turkey gained relative independence and enhanced its capability and influence in both region and world politics as a result of unstable international system.

4.4.1. Turkey's Syria Policy

The examination of Turkey's Syria policy after 2016 cannot be evaluated independently of the positions of other actors in the region. During the Arab Spring, the conflict and conflict environment between the regime and the opposition in Syria, which is one of the countries where pro-democracy revolutionary movements took place, dragged the country into a civil war. In addition to this situation, the Syrian war has become an international problem where it wages proxy wars through global and regional actors. In this context, the new positions taken by the actors in the process necessitated Turkey to create a new Syria policy after 2016.

Throughout the period, the most important external factor affecting the Syrian civil war was the policies followed by the USA. Despite the fact that at the beginning of the war, the USA openly declared that it supported opposition groups along with the EU, Gulf countries and Turkey, it changed this policy over time. According to the Grand strategy of Barrack Obama, who was the US President during this period, known as retrenchment, the US should follow a policy that prioritizes its domestic political problems and minimize its costs and responsibilities in the international system (Özdemir, 2018, p. 67). In this context, the USA avoided any new military intervention after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and gave more diplomatic support to the Syrian opposition. In addition to this situation, the beginning of the civil war in Libya, one of the countries where revolutions took place during the Arab Spring process, and the bombing of the American consulate in 2012 became a breaking point for the Obama

administration's Syria policy. As a result, the White House preferred not to get involved in the events in the country due to the unpredictability of the post-Assad political situation (Yalçın, 2015).

One of the most important factors affecting the Syrian civil war and Turkey's Syria policy is Russia's support for the Syrian regime since 2015. After the NATO intervention to Libya, which was one of its closest allies of Russia in the Middle East region during the Arab Spring, Russia gave more importance to the preservation of the regime's presence in Syria, another ally. In this context, he declared that after the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime, he would send Russian forces to mediate between the Western states and the Regime and to fight against Daesh. Over time, Russia shifted its main focus to opposition groups, and thus, the regime made significant advances against the opposition, with Russian air forces attacking from the air and Iranian and Hezbollah militias attacking from the ground.

Other important actors of the Syrian civil war are the existence of terrorist organizations that emerged by taking advantage of the power vacuum in the country. While DAESH, which emerged as an organization affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the process, gained influence in the geography of Syria and Iraq, the PYD – Democratic Union Party – the Syrian branch of the PKK (Kurdistan Worker Party), increased its effectiveness in some regions in northern Syria. Over time, the PYD, equipped with the intense support of the United States against the rapid spread of DAESH in the Syrian geography, has further increased its influence in Syria. In this context, the PYD stated that its ultimate goal in the country is to create an independent state in Northern Syria. To this end, the PYD first established liberated areas in northern Syria, where the Kurdish population is concentrated, under the fight against Daesh. In the second stage, it aimed to create a line that would reach Hatay via Afrin and Idlib by occupying the regions along the southern border of Turkey and including the Arab geography. Within the scope of this policy, the PYD's capture of the Manbij region, despite Turkey's objections, was the last point where Turkey's red lines were crossed.

One of the other leading actors that affect the direction of Syrian civil war was Turkey's policies and its influence in the regional issues. Although Turkey, like the US and EU and gulf countries, supported the Syrian opposition at the beginning of the Syrian civil

war, it is diplomatically isolated by its traditional allies as well as was exposed to security problems due to the instability on its border over the process. Throughout the period, Turkey, on the one hand, struggled with Daesh and the Syrian regime and its supporters such as Iran, Russia on the other hand, it faced the danger of establishing a PYD/PKK state supported by the USA on its borders. The second problem was that the US backed force PYD/PKK was being moved to the areas evacuated by DAESH, had become as a national security issue, in other words, a matter of survival that directly contradict with the interest of Turkey. Under these circumstances, Turkey restarted diplomatic negotiations with Russia, which had experienced significant crises during the Syrian crisis. According to the implicit reconciliation between Turkey and Russia in 2016, neither state would take a position against the vital interests of their own countries. Therefore, while Russia guaranteed the future of the Assad regime, Turkey, in turn, promised that it would build its Syria policy on weakening the PYD rather than overthrowing the Assad regime (Siccardi, 2021, p. 17). As a result of this, Turkey, on the one hand, determined its new strategic target, it, on the other hand, got rid of diplomatic isolation by reconciling with Russia and Iran on a purely pragmatist basis.

Under the new conditions and context, Turkey, which prioritized the removal of terrorist organizations from its border, carried out four major military operations in Syria. Operation Euphrates Shield, the first of Turkey's four operations in Syria, was carried out between August 24, 2016, and March 31, 2017. In this operation, Turkey had two clear and distinct goals in terms of politics and strategic ways. Accordingly, Turkey acted to establish border security and to push DAESH away from the borderline as well as, aimed to block the YPG, a PKK offspring in Syria, from carving out a corridor by taking control of the east-west line in the north of Syria (Seren et al., 2017). Although Turkey consulted with the USA and Russia at the beginning of the operation, it acted completely alone in the later stages of the operation. Moreover, Turkey carried out this operation independently of the US-led anti-DAESH coalition, otherwise, the groups against Ankara could dominate the region (Ülgen & Kasapoğlu, 2018).

Turkey's Operation Olive branch, which ended with the capture of Afrin city center on January 20, 2018, and March 18, 2018, was the second military operation carried out

in Syria. By conducting this operation, it was aimed to repel the PYD and its armed wing, People's Protection Units (YPG), from Turkey's immediate doorstep. The operation Peace Spring against PYD/PKK forces was Turkey's third military operation in Syria after the withdrawal of the US forces as a result of Ankara's intensive pressures (Lee & Kube, 2019). By undertaking this operation, Turkey hoped to prevent the creation of an autonomous PYD/PKK entity along its border, as well as locate another prospective resettlement destination for Syrian refugees sponsored by Turkey (Siccardi, 2021, p. 5). Finally, Turkey announced the operation the Spring Shield and targeted Syrian regime forces and elements in Idlib to guarantee de-escalation zone in northern west of Syria (Özer, 2020).

It can be assumed that the main reason for Turkey's four military operations on Syrian territory has been the unstable structure and order of the international system. The retrenchment policy adopted by the USA in this period aimed to protect its global superiority with the least cost with its international issues, but in the process, it drastically had to focus its foreign policy on the rising Chinese threat. This situation is the US' involuntariness to intervene in events in other regions encouraged the secondary states to follow a more active in their foreign policies. In this period, Turkey has successfully managed to overcome the structural factors that put obstacles against its operation in Syria. In other words, Turkey was able to take a position against an organization under the protection of the USA and the Syrian regime under the protection of Russia. This situation is briefly evaluated through the complex network of alliances Turkey has established (Yalçın, 2020, p. 324). According to this policy, on the one hand, Turkey cooperated closely with the Russian and Iranian sides in the Astana process, which was gathered under the name of Syria peace talks, on the other hand, it reached a compromise against the US side by using the coercive diplomacy method, and thus, it was able to carry out military operations in order to build safe security zones on both sides. As a result, unlike the first period Syria policy, although Turkey had much more limited goals, it both increased its diplomatic bargaining ability in the ongoing Syrian civil war and also appeared as a more independent actor to solve issues at the regional level.

4.4.2. Turkey's East Mediterranean and Libyan Policy

Turkey's policies towards the eastern Mediterranean (east-med) and Libya within the unstable international system have been the second important issue that can be evaluated in this period. In recent years, large amounts of hydrocarbon reserves discovered in the eastern- Med have caused significant changes in the policies of regional and global states. Accordingly, two issues which are the projected route for the eastern Mediterranean gas pipeline project and the creation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, including Greece, Greek Cyprus, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Palestinian Authority, and Italy, have been the key points to designing new security and energy order in the region (Dalay, 2021). However, Turkish anxieties of being left out of the growing energy and security framework in the eastern Mediterranean have been exacerbated by the proposed pipeline and forum, as well as the regional realignment that underpins them. To prevent the emergence of such a framework, Turkey has used a hard power-driven approach and coercive diplomacy. Over the process, maritime boundary and security and military cooperation treaties which Turkey signed with the legitimate Libyan government in 2019, could be considered as another step against eastern Mediterranean energy cooperation. As a result, Turkey managed to balance the coalition formed against it on the energy platform in the eastern Mediterranean, especially as a result of its successful intervention in the Libyan civil war, and changed the existing status quo.

Eastern Mediterranean politics can basically be grouped and analyzed in three layers: maritime borders, energy competition and centuries-old regional and global power struggles. Although these three-level layers are highly intertwined, each one can be evaluated a different context. The first category mainly covers the determination of the continental shelf or exclusive economic zones of the states. For example, Turkey and Greece have a serious dispute over Kastellorizo (or Meis in Turkish), a small Greek island in the far east of the Aegean that hugs Turkey's Anatolian coast. On this issue, Athens insists that Kastellorizo has a full 200-mile Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ), whereas, Turkey argues that only a country's mainland can form an EEZ, while the islands cannot (Bryza, 2020). The second problem is related to the extraction, processing and transportation of hydrocarbon reserves in the eastern Mediterranean. In this way, in January 2019, Israel, Egypt, Italy, Greece, Jordan and Palestine, as it is

said, created a consortium to look for oil and gas in the region. In third level, actors like EU, France, US, regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and UAE have supported anti-Turkey coalition. As a response to these actions, Turkey decided to send its own ships to the Mediterranean Sea in may 2019 as well as began seismic surveys and exploration drilling along the north coast of Cyprus. Beyond this, Turkey also decided to claim its stake via diplomatic means. In November 2019, the country signed a maritime agreement with Libya and through this agreement; both countries expanded their exclusive economic zones from Turkish southern coast to Libya's north east coast. Therefore, this deal ensured that no eastern Mediterranean energy settlement would take place without Ankara joining the negotiating table.

Besides this tension in the Mediterranean region, there were a civil war between the UN-supported Government of National Accord (GNA) and eastern Libya-based commander Khalifa Haftar. In 2019, when the forces of Khalifa Haftar which were explicitly supported by the such countries United Arab Emirate (UAE) and Russia launched a destructive operation against Tripoli which is the capital city of the UN-backed GNA, Turkey militarily intervened in the ongoing Libyan civil war in favor of GNA as a result of the agreement that military and security cooperation between countries (Harchaoui, 2021,). During the period, while Turkish-backed GNA forces succeeded in expelling Haftar's brigades from Libyan's northwest quadrant, Turkey also signed a memorandum with the UN-recognized government on the delimitation of continental shelf and exclusive economic zones in the Eastern Mediterranean to break the geopolitical containment that was arranged against it in the region. According to one view, Turkey's intervention to Libya could be evaluated under the variety of motivations (Köse & Öztürk, 2020, p.123). For example, adoption of Blue Homeland doctrine which is aspirant geostrategic concept developed by Ankara (Kasapoğlu, 2019), fell into offensive motivation; establishment/ maintenance of economic interests between Libyan and Turkish trade companies fell under the opportunistic category; whereas the diplomatic opposition to the East Med project at inclusion in it fell under defensive motivations.

It can be argued that Turkey has significantly acted independently of the structural limitations of the system when it conducts its foreign policy on eastern Mediterranean. In the process, although the USA, which is the status quo state of the liberal

international system, was one of the leading countries of the regime change through the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011, it hardly got involved directly or indirectly to the tensions in the eastern Mediterranean and the Libyan civil war. On the other hand, the institutions of the system such as the EU and NATO have been quite dysfunctional to find solutions to problems. At this stage, the attitude taken by the EU is worth examining much more closely. Despite the EU council met to negotiate the Turkey's steps in 2019, it couldn't take any considerable sanction or counter-step to deter Turkey's activities on the mediterranean. However, some members of the bloc such as Spain, Italy, and Germany has been clearly more interested to sustain negotiations rather than supporting sanctions pushed by Greece, Greek Cyprus administration and France. In addition to this, Turkey had decisively declared that any possible EU sanctions wouldn't change Turkey's position in East Mediterranean (Avundukoğlu, 2020). Thus, ongoing issues such as the Mediterranean crisis between Greece and Turkey as well as the Libyan civil war seems to continue in the near and medium-term so that all these developments could be exhibited as proof that the unstable international system may bring too much complicated and complexity to the world politics

4.4.3. Turkey's New Defense Policy

The unstable international system basically puts the states in an environment where threat, crisis, and opportunity areas are widespread. In this respect, it could be seen that Turkey's security strategy has undergone a significant change. Accordingly, Turkey had designed its security strategy in the 1990s on the logic of a two-way interstate war as well as a half-war. As a practical reflection of this view, Greece in the West and Syria in the East could be considered as the fight against the PKK terrorist organization in addition to these (Kasapoğlu, 2020). This general security policy, which did not experience a major transformation in the 2000s, has experienced a significant change in the mid-2010s. In this context, Turkey's newly formed security policy is basically based on forward deployment and a strong defense industry. According to this policy, Turkey's border security should be built on a wider area beyond its own borders. In other words, Turkey's new security policy plans to develop policies to intervene, deter and prevent threats beforehand, rather than taking isolationist policies in the face of external problems. As a result, Turkey carries out a

relatively more independent foreign policy in its region and in the world in the scope of the new security policy when it is compared to the previous period. In this way, Turkey's foreign policy under the conditions of the unstable international system can be better evaluated by looking at the forward deployment and the growth in the defense industry, which are the two main pillars of the new general defense policy.

The forward deployment policy has been key step to securing Turkey's regional interest. In other words, Turkey's forward base policy basically aims to establish solid security architecture and build a political-military sphere of influence in the region by positioning its military assets in a wide geography from the eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa. The first and most important pillar of Turkey's forward deployment policy since 2015 has been the small military bases and continuous military operations established in the Northern Iraq region (Outzen, 2021, p. 4). In this way, Turkey aims to cut off PKK training, supply, and operational movement in the region. Secondly, Turkey firstly made an agreement to establish a military base in Qatar in 2016 when the recent crisis in which Saudi-UAE led gulf countries imposed land, sea, and air blockade to Qatar erupted in the region (Aras & Akpınar, 2017). Thirdly, Turkey sets up the largest overseas army base in Somali to increase its influence around the region and trained the Somalia soldiers against al Shabaab terrorist organization. Fourth, Turkey provided diplomatic support and weapons to Azerbaijan during the war for the region known as Nagorno-Karabakh occupied by Armenia. Finally, Turkey's new airbase, in other words, the deployment of surveillance drones to northern Cyprus (News, 2021) could be considered another step in the wider architecture of the new security policy. Basically, all these developments in the new Turkey's foreign policy bring the necessary tactical depth and crucial geostrategic advantages to sustain and consolidate its regional security in foreign policy.

Another driving force and dimension of Turkey's new defense policy has been the rising defense industry. In the process, Turkey's establishment of close relations with the traditional actors such as the US and West European countries in the defense industry, in general, has caused it to encounter many difficulties in foreign policy issues. Especially in the last ten years, Turkey's cooperation with the USA and the Western bloc in advanced weapon systems caused to strengthen its domestic arms industry and to diversify its existing weapon systems in order to pursue a more

independent foreign policy. For example, the decision to be withdrawing the patriots, the air defense systems, from Turkey by NATO at the height of the Syrian civil war, has risked of Turkey against any possible attacks. In this context, after the failure of Turkey's attempt to purchase air defense weapons from the USA, it purchased the S-400 air defense systems from Russia. This situation has revealed that Turkey can cooperate with other countries besides its traditional partners in the field of defense industry. However, Turkey has increased its capacity to develop indigenous weapon systems in the field of defense industry in recent years. In the process, while the rate of meeting Turkey's defense needs from domestic sources was 24 percent in 2002, this rate has increased to 70 percent in 2020. Besides this, in 2010, while Turkey had one company on the list of Top 100 Global Defense Companies, presently it has seven, and Turkey's share of arms imports from 2015 to 2019 decreased by 48 percent compared to the preceding five-year period (Gurini, 2020). Finally, Turkey plans to configure the TCG Anadolu amphibious assault ship as a light aircraft carrier thus, the fact that Turkey has such an opportunity will provide flexible military options for pursuing its strategic overseas agendas.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

5.1. Brief Summary

The concept of the national interest is simply defined as an overriding purpose governing states' relations with the outside world, however, recent studies basically debate whether the concept has an analytical and concrete meaning, rather than evaluating it as part of foreign policy-making processes. According to those studies, although the concept was used by expressions such as the interest of the dynasty, the interest of the prince, or *raison d'état* in ancient times as well as the national honour, public interest, and general will in the age of nation-state, the definition of the concept remained undefined due to its overly general and ambiguous structure. Instead, it is assumed that the concept could be evaluated as a legitimacy-providing tool or discourse used by politicians to convince the public about foreign policy decisions. However, this study draws attention to the fact that if the concept of national interest is removed from the terms of international relations, there is no alternative or better concept to comprehensively examine and evaluate the state behaviours. Thus, since the study evaluated the concept as the most basic source of motivation that directs state behaviours, it focuses on the question of what is the source of national interest.

In this context, the study aims to examine the national interest concept in the theories of international relations to enrich its analytical meaning in the foreign policy process. The study firstly assumes that the source of the national interest can be grouped into two main analytical level within the theories of international relations which are the international system and state level. Secondly, the study aims to exhibit the alternative approach as to question of what is the main cause that shapes the national interest of states by focusing to solve the dilemma between the international system and the state level. According to this study's main hypothesis, the interest of nations can be explained by looking at the structure of the international system. On the

one hand, a stable international system can increase the capacity of structural factors to affect the national interest, on the other hand, the unstable international system enables the state-level to play a more important role to determine the interest of nations. Thirdly, this theoretical context examines the formations of national interests in Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) from 1999 to 2020. Accordingly, the study examines TFP by dividing it into two main periods and argues that TFP from 1999 to 2013 acted in harmony with the international system however, it says that TFP from 2013 to 2020, acted independently of the structural factors of the international system.

5.2. Findings

The main finding of this study is to handle both the international system level and the state level as the source of national interest under the context of the Neo-realist structural theory. Although this study basically uses the structural neo-realist type of explanation as the theoretical context, it reevaluated this type of explanation in a certain way. According to the general assumption of neo-realism, the international system is always stable as well as the structural factors are always dominant to determine the national interests in foreign policies however, they mainly don't take into consideration periods of instability in the international system. In this way, the study has benefited from the assumptions of neo-realist international relations theories such as "Hegemonic stability theory" and "Power Transition theory", which attempt to explain the change and unstable periods in the international system. Thus, this study, as the branch of the structural realism, on the one hand, refers to the national interest formulations in stable international system. On the other hand, this study, the more importantly, attempts to explain/explore the formation of national interests during unstable periods when change, power vacuum, increasing opposing polarization in the international system is highly intense. As a consequence, this study can be considered as revised version of neo-realist international theory which focuses on the change to explain the national interest formulations in both stable and unstable period of times.

5.3. Discussions and Suggestions

One of the important discussions about the study is the evaluation of the state as a black box, in other words, exclusion of the domestic factors from the formation

processes of the national interest. Furthermore, this debate especially becomes more evident in the unstable periods of the international system. In this way, the study claims that while structural factors of the international system weaken in the unstable periods of the international system, the autonomy of the state and the effectiveness of the decision-makers in foreign policy increase. Accordingly, although the study acknowledges the existence and importance of elite groups in the country, public opinion, institutional structures, opposition parties and pressure groups and other internal factors in the determination of national interests, it does not consider them as the main determinant. This study basically asserts that both structural factors and state level can be more important according to stable or unstable period of international system. Moreover, the study also asserts that decision-makers who are defined as the presidency and foreign minister relatively have the autonomy to determine and conduct the foreign policies. In other words, state-level can control the domestic politics because both have the ability to manipulate the events in favour of their side and the domestic factors consist of too much complexity and fragmented parts against the state

Another discussion regarding the study is why the examination of Turkish foreign policy starts from the year 1999 even though the international system had turned the unipolarity from bipolarity since 1989. Furthermore, the other question is that were domestic politics important to examine the Turkish foreign policy in the year 1999? In fact, this study generally argues that the international system was in a stable period since 1945 and the American-based liberal international system mostly dominated the many regions around the world, especially industrialized and developed countries. However, this study evaluates that the Soviet Union could be considered as a regional great power during this period of time so that, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989 expanded the influence of the structural factors of the international system around the world. In this framework, the study generally assumes that TFP has generally pursued harmonious foreign policy with its western partners during the dominance of the stable international system except for its inevitable reactions such as the “Cyprus Peace Operation” in 1974. Therefore, the periodization of Turkish foreign policy during the stable international system can be considered as the study’s preference, in other words, it is not directly related to domestic factors that took place in Turkish domestic politics.

As suggestions, it could be predicted that the concept of the national interest remains as the key to explain, evaluate and describe the state behaviours as long as the nationalism ideology and nation-state structure are not replaced with another ideology and state system in the future. In addition to this, although this study explores the source of the national interest in terms of the structure of the international system, regional politics and balance, as another analytical level, can also be considered to measure and evaluate as the alternative source of national interest. For example, the rise and fall of states and other regional characteristics such as ethnicity, religion, and culture that take place in the Middle East region may play important roles to shape and constraint the other regional states' national interest formulations in the foreign policy process.



REFERENCES

- Alkan, U. (2015). Türkiye’de Dış Politikanın Avrupalılaşması. *Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Topluluğu Enstitüsü Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 21(2), 119–142.
- Altunışık, M. B. (2009). Worldviews and Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 40, 169–192. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600005264>
- Andersson, T., & Djeflat, A. (Eds.). (2013). The Changing Landscape of the Middle East. In *The Real Issues of the Middle East and the Arab Spring: Addressing Research, Innovation and Entrepreneurship* (pp. 19–57). Springer-Verlag. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5248-5>
- Aras, B., & Akpınar, P. (2017). Turkish foreign policy and the Qatar crisis. *IPC Policy Brief (Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center)*.
- Arı, T., & Pirinççi, F. (2010). Turkish-American Relations in the Context of Iraq War. *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, XXXIV, 17–27.
- Aron, R. (2003). *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*.
- Ashley, R. K. (1984). The poverty of neorealism. *International Organization*, 38(2), 225–286. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300026709>
- Avundukoğlu, E. (2020). ‘EU sanctions won’t change Turkey’s position in E.Med’. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/eu-sanctions-wont-change-turkeys-position-in-emed/2076856>
- Axelrod, R., & Keohane, R. O. (1985). Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. *World Politics*, 38(1), 226–254. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010357>
- Babbie, E. R. (2014). *The Basics of Social Research* (6th edition). Cengage Learning.
- Balcı, A. (2018). *Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler ve Uygulamalar*. Alfa.
- Baran, P. A. (2019). *The Political Economy of Growth*. NYU Press.
- Brooks, S. G., & Wohlforth, W. C. (2005). Hard Times for Soft Balancing. *International Security*, 30(1), 72–108.
- Bryza, M. (2020, September 23). Solving the Eastern Mediterranean crisis requires compromise. *Atlantic Council*. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/solving-the-eastern-mediterranean-crisis-requires-compromise/>

- Burchill, S. (2005). *The National Interest in International Relations Theory*. Palgrave Macmillan UK. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230005778>
- Cardoso, F. H., & Faletto, E. (1979). *Dependency and Development in Latin America*. University of California Press.
- Christensen, T. J., & Snyder, J. (1990). Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity. *International Organization*, 44(2), 137–168.
- Clinton, W. D. (1994). *Two Faces of National Interest*.
- Dalay, G. (2021, January 28). Turkey, Europe, and the Eastern Mediterranean: Charting a way out of the current deadlock. *Brookings*. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/turkey-europe-and-the-eastern-mediterranean-charting-a-way-out-of-the-current-deadlock/>
- Davutoğlu, A. (2008). Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007. *Insight Turkey*. <https://www.insightturkey.com/articles/turkeys-foreign-policy-vision-an-assessment-of-2007>
- Davutoglu, A. (2010). Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy. *Foreign Policy*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/20/turkeys-zero-problems-foreign-policy/>
- Deutsch, K. W., & Singer, J. D. (1964). Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability*. *World Politics*, 16(3), 390–406. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009578>
- Doyle, M. W. (1983). Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 12(3), 205–235.
- Doyle, M. W. (1986). Liberalism and World Politics. *The American Political Science Review*, 80(4), 1151–1169. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1960861>
- Evera, S. V. (2001). *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict*. Cornell University Press.
- Finnemore, M. (2009). Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked up to Be. *World Politics*, 61(1), 58–85.
- Frank, A. G. (1969). *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution*. Montly Review Press.
- Frankel, J. (1969). National Interest: A Vindication. *International Journal*, 24(4), 717–725. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002070206902400406>
- Frankel, J. (1970). *National Interest*. Palgrave Macmillan UK. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00942-8>
- Gaddis, J. L. (1986). The long peace: Elements of stability in the postwar international system. *International Security*, 10(4), 99–142.

- Galtung, J. (1971). A Structural Theory of Imperialism. *Journal of Peace Research*, 8(2), 81–117.
- George, A., & Keohane, R. (1975). The Concept of National Interest: Uses and Limitations. In *Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy: Appendices* (Vol. 2). The Commission.
- Gerring, J. (2006). *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. Cambridge University Press.
- Giddens, A. (1984). *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. University of California Press.
- Gilpin, R. (1981). *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Gilpin, R. (1988). The Theory of Hegemonic War. *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18(4), 591–613. <https://doi.org/10.2307/204816>
- Gilpin, R. (2011). *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order*. Princeton University Press.
- Gowing, N. (1994). *Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does It Pressure or Distort Foreign Policy Decisions?* John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
- Grieco, J. M. (1988). Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism. *International Organization*, 42(3), 485–507. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027715>
- Gurini, F. (2020). *Turkey's Unpromising Defense Industry*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/82936>
- Haas, E. B. (1953). The Balance of Power as a Guide to Policy-Making. *The Journal of Politics*, 15(3), 370–398. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2126103>
- Hale, W. (2009). Turkey and the Middle East in the 'New Era' [Full Text]. *Insight Turkey*. <https://www.insightturkey.com/articles/turkey-and-the-middle-east-in-the-new-era-full-text>
- Halliday, F. (1994). *Rethinking International Relations*. Red Globe Press.
- Harchaoui, Z. T., Jalel. (2021). What Erdogan Really Wants in the Eastern Mediterranean. *Foreign Policy*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/19/turkey-greece-what-erdogan-wants-eastern-mediterranean-sovereignty-natural-gas/>
- Harwood, J. (2018, July 27). *The cost of Donald Trump's mission to put America first and abandon the liberal world order*. CNBC. <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/26/donald-trump-disrupted-the-liberal-world-order.html>

- Hausmann, R. (n.d.). Prisoners of Geography. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved 4 July 2021, from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/20/prisoners-of-geography/>
- Herz, J. H. (1950). Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. *World Politics*, 2(2), 157–180. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009187>
- Hoffmann, S. (1969). Theory and International Relations. In J. N. Rosenau (Ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (pp. 30–40). The Free Press.
- Holsti, K. (2016). *Kalevi Holsti: A Pioneer in International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Analysis, History of International Order, and Security Studies*. Springer International Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26624-4>
- Hu, S. (2016). A framework for analysis of national interest: United States policy toward Taiwan. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 37(1), 144–167. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.1149970>
- Huang, Y. (2016). Understanding China's Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation, framework and assessment. *China Economic Review*, 40, 314–321. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2016.07.007>
- Huntington, S. P. (1997). The Erosion of American National Interests. *Foreign Affairs*, 76(5), 28–49. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20048198>
- Huntington, S. P. (1999). The Lonely Superpower. *Foreign Affairs*, 78(2), 35–49. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20049207>
- Hurrell, A. (2006). Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great Powers? *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 82(1), 1–19.
- Ikenberry, G. J. (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*. Princeton University Press.
- Ikenberry, G. J., Mastanduno, M., & Wohlforth, W. C. (2009). Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences. *World Politics*, 61(1), 1–27. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S004388710900001X>
- Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. *World Politics*, 30(2), 167–214. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009958>
- Jervis, R. (2006). The remaking of a unipolar world. *The Washington Quarterly*, 29(3), 5–19. <https://doi.org/10.1162/wash.2006.29.3.5>
- Jervis, R. (2009). Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective. *World Politics*, 61(1), 188–213.
- Jiabao, W. (2004). Carrying Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the Promotion of Peace and Development. *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 3, 363.

- Kaplan, M. A. (2014). Values, National Interests, and Other Interests. *International Journal on World Peace*, 31(2), 57–72.
- Kasapoğlu, C. (2019). 'The Blue Homeland': Turkey's largest naval drill. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/-the-blue-homeland-turkey-s-largest-naval-drill/1404267>
- Kasapoğlu, C. (2020). Turkey's Growing Military Expeditionary Posture. *Jamestown Foundation*, 18(10). <https://jamestown.org/program/turkeys-growing-military-expeditionary-posture/>
- Katzenstein, P. (1996). Introduction: Alternative Perspective on National Security. In *The culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. Columbia University Press.
- Kennan, G. F. (1984). *American diplomacy*. University of Chicago Press.
- Kennan, G. F. (1985). Morality and Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs*, 64(2), 205. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20042569>
- Kennedy, P. (1989). *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (Vol. 1–F). Vintage Books.
- Keohane, R. O. (1982). The Demand for International Regimes. *International Organization*, 36(2), 325–355.
- Keohane, R. O. (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7sq9s>
- Keohane, R. O. (2005). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*.
- Keohane, R. O., & Martin, L. L. (1995). The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. *International Security*, 20(1), 39–51. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539214>
- Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (2001). *Power and Interdependence*. Longman.
- Kindleberger, C. P., & Kindleberger, F. I. P. of E. C. P. (1986). *The World in Depression, 1929-1939*. University of California Press.
- Köse, T., & Öztürk, B. (2020). A Sea Change in the MENA Region: External Interventions in Libya. *Insight Turkey*. <https://www.insightturkey.com/articles/a-sea-change-in-the-mena-region-external-interventions-in-libya>
- Krasner, S. D. (1978). *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv15r5858>
- Krasner, S. D. (1982). Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes as intervening variables. *International Organization*, 36(2), 185–205. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300018920>

- Kratochwil, F. (1982). On the Notion of 'Interest' in International Relations. *International Organization*, 36(1), 1–30.
- Kratochwil, F. (1993). The Embarrassment of Changes: Neo-Realism as the Science of Realpolitik without Politics. *Review of International Studies*, 19(1), 63–80.
- Krauthammer, C. (2017, August 31). *The Unipolar Moment*. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1990-01-01/unipolar-moment>
- Lake, D. A., Martin, L. L., & Risse, T. (2021). Challenges to the Liberal Order: Reflections on International Organization. *International Organization*, 75(2), 225–257. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000636>
- Landes, D. (1998). *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor*. W.W. Norton & Company.
- Lascurettes, K. M., & Poznansky, M. (2021). International Order in Theory and Practice. *International Studies Association and Oxford University Press*.
- Layne, C. (2009). The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers will Rise. *International Security - INT SECURITY*, 17, 5–51. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539020>
- Layne, C. (1994). Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace. *International Security*, 19(2), 5–49. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539195>
- Layne, C. (2002). The “Poster Child for offensive realism”: America as a global hegemon. *Security Studies*, 12(2), 120–164. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410212120011>
- Lebow, N. (2020). *A Democratic Foreign Policy: Regaining American Influence Abroad*. Palgrave Macmillan. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21519-4>
- Lee, C. E., & Kube, C. (2019). *Chaos in Syria, D.C. after Trump-Erdogan call unleashed Turkish troops*. NBC News. <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/chaos-syria-washington-after-trump-call-erdogan-unleashed-turkish-military-n1063516>
- Levy, J. S. (2014). *War in the Modern Great Power System: 1495–1975*. University Press of Kentucky.
- Lukin, A. (2021). The Russia–China entente and its future. *International Politics*, 58(3), 363–380. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00251-7>
- Mearsheimer, J. (2013). Structural Realism. In T. Dunne, M. Kurki, & S. Smith (Eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity* (Third). Oxford University Press. <https://www.oxfordpoliticalstrove.com/view/10.1093/hepl/9780198707561.001.0001/hepl-9780198707561>
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (1990). Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War. *International Security*, 15(1), 5–56. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2538981>

- Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994). The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security*, 19(3), 5–49. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539078>
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. W.W. Norton & Company.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2005). Better to Be Godzilla than Bambi. *Foreign Policy*, 146, 47–48.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2019). Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order. *International Security*, 43(4), 7–50. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2021, November 16). *The Inevitable Rivalry*. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-10-19/inevitable-rivalry-cold-war>
- Mills, C. W., University), C. W. (Former P. of S. M., Former Professor of Sociology Columbia, & Wolfe, A. (2000). *The Power Elite*. Oxford University Press, USA.
- Modolski, G. (1978). The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 20(2), 214–235.
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Knopf.
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1952). Another "great debate": The national interest of the United States. *The American Political Science Review*, 46(4), 961–988.
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1954). The Yardstick of National Interest. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 296(1), 77–84. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000271625429600110>
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1997). *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Peking University Press.
- Mueller, J., & Stewart, M. G. (2021, October 8). *America the Humble*. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-09-30/america-humble>
- NATO. (2013). *NATO support to Turkey: Background and timeline*. NATO. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_92555.htm
- News, A. B. C. (2021). *Turkish drones in northern Cyprus heighten regional unease*. ABC News. <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/turkish-drones-northern-cyprus-heighten-regional-unease-79633918>
- Nincic, M. (1999). The National Interest and its Interpretation. *The Review of Politics*, 61(1), 29–55. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670500028126>

- Nuechterlein, D. E. (1976). National Interests and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Decision-Making. *British Journal of International Studies*, 2(3), 246–266.
- Nuechterlein, D. E. (2014). *United States National Interests in a Changing World*. University Press of Kentucky.
- Nuechterlein, D. E. (2019). *National Interests And Presidential Leadership: The Setting Of Priorities*. Routledge.
- Nye, J. S. (1999). Redefining the National Interest. *Foreign Affairs*, 78(4), 22–35. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20049361>
- Oğurlu, E. (2018). 1998-2018 Arası Dönemde Türkiye'nin Afrika Deneyimi: Fikirden Eyleme Bir Dönüşüm. *Avrasya Etüdleri*, 54(2), 65–94.
- Oran, B. (2013). *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt: III (2001-2012)*. İletişim. <https://www.kitapyurdu.com/kitap/turk-dis-politikasi-cilt-iii-20012012/293383.html>
- Organski, A. F. (2014). Power Transition. In M. Jensen & E. Colin (Eds.), *The Realism Reader* (pp. 207–210). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315858579>
- Osgood, R. E. (1953). *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations*. University of Chicago. <http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=7B1778DA51C3DDE8BC014450674EA482>
- Outzen, R. (2021). *Deals, Drones, and National Will: The New Era in Turkish Power Projection*. The Washington Institute. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/deals-drones-and-national-will-new-era-turkish-power-projection>
- Owen, J. M. (1994). How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace. *International Security*, 19(2), 87–125. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539197>
- Özdemir, Ç. (2018). *Amerikan Grand Stratejisi*. SETA Yayınları.
- Özer, S. (2020). *Turkey announces Operation Spring Shield in Idlib, Syria*. Anadolu Agency. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-announces-operation-spring-shield-in-idlib-syria/1750711>
- Pape, R. A. (2005). Soft Balancing against the United States. *International Security*, 30(1), 7–45.
- Pease, K.-K. S. (2018). *International Organizations: Perspectives on Global Governance* (6th ed.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351213110>

- Perlez, J. (2015). *China Creates a World Bank of Its Own, and the U.S. Balks—The New York Times*.
<https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/business/international/china-creates-an-asian-bank-as-the-us-stands-alooof.html>
- Posen, B. R. (1993). The security dilemma and ethnic conflict. *Survival*, 35(1), 27–47.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339308442672>
- Reus-Smith, C. (2005). Constructivism. In S. Burchill, A. Linklater, R. Devetak, & J. Donnelly (Eds.), *Theories of International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Reus-Smith, C. (2013). Constructivism. In S. Burchill, A. Linklater, & R. Devetak (Eds.), *Theories of International Relations*.
- Robinson, T. W. (1967). A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations. *International Studies Quarterly*, 11(2), 135–175.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/3013925>
- Rochester, J. M. (1978). The “National Interest” and Contemporary World Politics. *The Review of Politics*, 40(1), 77–96.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670500026450>
- Rose, G. (1998). Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. *World Politics*, 51(1), 144–172.
- Rosenau, J. (1968). National Interest. In *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (pp. 34–40). The Macmillan Company & The Free Press.
- Rourke, J. (2007). *International Politics on the World Stage* (12th edition). McGraw-Hill Education.
- Ruggie, J. G. (1983). Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis. *World Politics*, 35(2), 261–285.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2010273>
- Russett, B. (1994). *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*.
- Sakamoto, Y. (1995). The Long Transformation for a Democratic World Order. *Macalester International*, 1(1).
<https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl/vol1/iss1/20>
- Schweller, R. L. (1994). Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In. *International Security*, 19(1), 72–107. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539149>
- Seren, M., Yeşiltaş, M., & Özçelik, N. (2017). *Operation Euphrates Shield Implementation and Lessons learned*. SETA.
<https://www.setav.org/en/operation-euphrates-shield-implementation-and-lessons-learned/>

- Siccardi, F. (2021). *How Syria Changed Turkey's Foreign Policy* (pp. 1–40). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Smith, S., Hadfield, A., & Dunne, T. (2016). *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. Oxford University Press.
- Smith, T. (1979). The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory. *World Politics*, 31(2), 247–288. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009944>
- Snyder, R., Bruck, H. W., & Sapin, B. (1969). The Decision-Making Approach to the Study of International Politics. In J. N. Rosenau (Ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory* (pp. 199–206). The Free Press.
- Sondermann, F. (1983). The Concept of National Interest. In *The Theory and Practice of International Relations* (Sixth Edition, pp. 57–65). Prentice-Hall.
- Sørensen, G. (2006). What Kind of World Order?: The International System in the New Millennium. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 41(4), 343–363. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836706069601>
- Steans, J., Pettiford, L., Diez, T., & El-Anis, I. (2013). *An Introduction to International Relations Theory: Perspectives and Themes*. Routledge.
- Ülgen, S., & Kasapoğlu, C. (2018). Fırat Kalkanı ve El Bab Operasyonu: Hedefler, Kazanımlar. In *Türkiye'nin Güvenlik Stratejisi*. Anadolu Ajansı.
- Uzgel, İ. (2013). ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler. In B. Oran (Ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: 2001-2012* (2nd ed.). İletişim.
- Viotti, P. R., & Kauppi, M. V. (2013). *International Relations and World Politics*. Pearson.
- Wagner, R. H. (1993). What was bipolarity? *International Organization*, 47(1), 77–106.
- Wallerstein, I. (1974). The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 16(4), 387–415.
- Wallerstein, I. (1984). Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of Capitalist World- Economy. In *The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements and the Civilizations* (pp. 37–46). Cambridge University Press.
- Wallerstein, I. (1996). The Inter-State Structure of the Modern World System. In S. Smith & K. Booth (Eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (pp. 87–107). Cambridge University Press.

- Wallerstein, I., & Booth, K. (1996). The Inter-State Structure of the Modern System. In S. Smith, S. A. Smith, & M. Zalewski (Eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*. Cambridge University Press.
- Walt, S. M. (1985). Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power. *International Security*, 9(4), 3–43. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2538540>
- Walt, S. M. (2009). Alliances in a Unipolar World. *World Politics*, 61(1), 86–120.
- Waltz, K. N. (1964). The Stability of a Bipolar World. *Daedalus*, 93(3), 881–909.
- Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Waveland Press.
- Waltz, K. N. (1988). The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory. In R. I. Rotberg & T. K. Rabb (Eds.), *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*. Cambridge University Press.
- Waltz, K. N. (1990). Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory. *Journal of International Affairs*, 44(1), 21–37.
- Waltz, K. N. (1996). International politics is not foreign policy. *Security Studies*, 6(1), 54–57. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419608429298>
- Waltz, K. N. (2000). Structural Realism after the Cold War. *International Security*, 25(1), 5–41.
- Webb, M. C., & Krasner, S. D. (1989). Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment. *Review of International Studies*, 15(2), 183–198.
- Weldes, J. (1996). Constructing national interests. *European Journal of International Relations*, 2(3), 275–318.
- Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization*, 46(2), 391–425.
- What is Globalization? Examples, Definition, Benefits and Effects. (2020). *Youmatter*. <https://youmatter.world/en/definition/definitions-globalization-definition-benefits-effects-examples/>
- Wilkinson, D. (1999). Unipolarity without Hegemony. *International Studies Review*, 1(2), 141–172.
- Williams, M. C. (2005). What is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory. *European Journal of International Relations*, 11(3), 307–337. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066105055482>
- Wilson, P. (2011). Idealism in International Relations. In K. Dowding (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Power* (pp. 331–332). Sage Publications.
- Wohlforth, W. (1999). The Stability of a Unipolar World. *International Security*, 24(1).

Yalçın, H. B. (2015). Obama Stratejisi ve Ortadoęu. *Akademik Orta Doęu*, 9(2), 56–75.

Yalçın, H. B. (2017). *Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi*. SETA.

Yalçın, H. B. (2020). *Asimetrik Savaş*. SETA Vakfı İktisadi İşletmesi.



CURRICULUM VITAE

Personal Information:

Name- Surname: Kerem Akıl

Education:

2013 – 2018 BA in International Relations, Beykent University

2018 – 2021 MA in Political Science and International Relations Ibn Haldun University

