

**IBN HALDUN UNIVERSITY  
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY**

**MASTER THESIS**

**THREE CONSTITUENTS OF SINGULARITY IN  
HEIDEGGER: ANXIETY, TEMPORALITY AND DEATH**

**SEVİNÇ AKAY**

**THESIS SUPERVISOR: ASSIST. PROF. MUHAMMET İKBAL BAKIR**

**ISTANBUL, 2020**

**IBN HALDUN UNIVERSITY  
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY**

**MASTER THESIS**

**THREE CONSTITUENTS OF SINGULARITY IN  
HEIDEGGER: ANXIETY, TEMPORALITY AND DEATH**

**by**

**SEVİNÇ AKAY**

**A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in  
Philosophy**

**THESIS SUPERVISOR: ASSIST. PROF. MUHAMMET İKBAL  
BAKIR**

**ISTANBUL, 2020**

## APPROVAL PAGE

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy

### Thesis Jury Members

Title - Name Surname	Opinion	Signature
Muhammet İkbal Bakır		
Özkan Gözel		
Ali Aslan		

This is to confirm that this thesis complies with all the standards set by the School of Graduate Studies of Ibn Haldun University.

Date of Submission

Seal/Signature

## ACADEMIC HONESTY ATTESTATION

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name Surname: Sevinç Akay

Signature:



## ÖZ

### HEIDEGGER'DE TEKİLLİĞİN ÜÇ KURUCU UNSURU: KAYGI, ZAMANSALLIK VE ÖLÜM

Yazar Akay, Sevinç

Felsefe Yüksek Lisans Programı

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Muhammet İkbal Bakır

Haziran 2020, 63 sayfa

Bu tezin temel sorusu, Heidegger'in kaygı, zamansallık ve ölüm fenomenleri vasıtasıyla tekilliği nasıl tesis ettiğidir. Öncelikle, felsefe tarihindeki tümel-tikel tartışmaları tekillik için hazırlayıcı bir yol olarak sunulmuştur. Heidegger felsefesinin ayırt edici konumu, varlık ve varolan ayrımıyla ortaya çıkar. Heidegger varlığı varolanların temeli olarak sorgularken seleflerinden farklı olarak varlığı tümel ve tikel gibi geleneksel kavramlar içinde kuramlaştırmaz. Bu çalışmada, Heidegger'in inşa etmeye çalıştığı temel ontolojide ayrıcalıklı bir varolan olan Dasein'in, yani insanın tümel veya tikelden ziyade bu ikisiyle birlikte onları mümkün kılan mesafeyi de ikame eden tekil bir varolan olarak kurulduğu iddia ediliyor. Heidegger, bu temel ontolojiyi formüle etmek için insanın tikel deneyimlerinden yola çıkar, ancak insanı herhangi bir kategori altına yerleştirmez. Dasein, onu aşkın ve tekil kılan açıklık yapısına sahip olduğu için "rasyonel canlı" veya "düşünen şey" gibi belirli kategoriler ve tümellerle tanımlanamaz. İşte bu tez, Dasein'in birtakım kategorilerle belirlenemezliğini, biriciklik manasındaki 'tekillik' terimi altında analiz ediyor ve onu, kurucu unsurları olarak kaygı, zamansallık ve ölüm kavramlarıyla anlamaya çalışıyor. Heidegger kaygıyı, varolanların sınırlarının kayıtsız hale gelmesi suretiyle varlığın kendisini özgün bir şekilde gösterdiği insanın en önemli haleti ruhiyesi olarak tanımlar. Aşkınlık kavramı ışığında, sonsuz ve hesaplanabilir zamanın aksine insana bağlı, sonlu bir zaman formülasyonu olarak zamansallığı geliştirir. Bu tezde analiz edilen son kurucu unsur olarak ölüm, Heidegger felsefesinde Dasein'in hem tekilliğine hem de bütünlüğüne eriştiği bir yaşam fenomenidir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Angst; biriciklik, Heidegger, ölüm, tekillik, zamansallık

## ABSTRACT

### THREE CONSTITUENTS OF SINGULARITY IN HEIDEGGER: ANXIETY, TEMPORALITY AND DEATH

Student Name Akay, Sevinç

MA in Philosophy

Thesis Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Muhammet İkbâl Bakır

June 2020, 63 Pages

In this thesis, the main question is how Heidegger establishes singularity by virtue of the phenomenons of anxiety, temporality and death. At first, an overview of the main discussions about universal and individual is presented as a preparatory way towards singularity. The distinctive position of Heidegger's philosophy appears in his differentiation of Being from beings. While questioning Being as the ground of beings, Heidegger does not theorise it within the traditional concepts of universal or individual as his predecessors do. This study argues that Heidegger formulates a fundamental ontology in which a privileged particular being, i.e. Dasein, is neither universal nor individual, rather a singular being that substitutes both of them along with the relation/distance between universal and individual as something enabling them. To formulate such fundamental ontology, Heidegger starts with individual experiences of Dasein, but he does not thematize it under any categories. Because Dasein has a constitution of disclosedness that makes it transcendent and singular, it can not be defined and determined with certain categories and universals like "rational animal" or "thinking thing". This thesis analyzes Dasein's such indeterminateness under the term of 'singularity' in the sense of uniqueness and attempts to comprehend it with concepts of anxiety, temporality and death as its three constituents. With phenomenological interpretations of these concepts, Heidegger designates anxiety as a primary affectivity of Dasein in which the boundaries of beings become indifferent and Being shows itself in a unique way. In view of the concept of transcendence, he also advances a new formulation of time, i.e. temporality, which is finite and depended on Dasein unlike calculable time in modernity. As the last constituent, death is held as a phenomenon of life by which Dasein attains both its singularity and wholeness.

**Keywords:** Angst, death, Heidegger, singularity, temporality, uniqueness.

To words that can not find voice ...

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am sincerely grateful to

the Owner of all, who has thrown me into the darkness with memory loss, but bestowed a passionate love and a poor light upon me to look for the traces and see my missingness in the mirror;

the one who thrust his fatherly hand to take me out of a dark and deep well;

the one who gave me his shirt with his magnificent smell and warmth when I was cold;

the one who helped me to cross a bridge sharp as a sword even though I resisted her;

and the ones who are always there for me with unconditional patience and compassion.

Sevinç Akay

ISTANBUL, 2020

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>ÖZ.....</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>ABSTRACT .....</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .....</b>	<b>vii</b>
<b>TABLE OF CONTENTS.....</b>	<b>viii</b>
<b>CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>CHAPTER II SINGULARITY FROM AN OVERVIEW .....</b>	<b>7</b>
2.1. Introduction .....	7
2.2. Discussions of Universal and Individual: "The Problem of Universals" .....	7
2.3. Heidegger's Place Regarding the Problem of Universals .....	13
2.4. The Difference of Being and Beings as a Main Path to Singularity .....	15
2.5. From the Difference of Being and Beings to Ability of Asking .....	18
2.6. Conclusion.....	19
<b>CHAPTER III ANXIETY AND SINGULARITY .....</b>	<b>20</b>
3.1. Introduction .....	20
3.2. Universal and Individual -Thinking and Existing- are the Same .....	21
3.3. Affectivity(Befindlichkeit) and Understanding(Verstehen).....	24
3.4. Anxiety as the Primary Affectivity Unveiling Uniqueness of Dasein .....	26
3.5. The Reason For Anxiety: Being-in-the-World.....	28
3.6. Conclusion.....	31
<b>CHAPTER IV TEMPORALITY AND SINGULARITY.....</b>	<b>32</b>
4.1. Introduction .....	32
4.3. Time and Temporality .....	37
4.4. Temporality as Care .....	38
4.5. Finitude.....	41
4.6. Conclusion.....	43
<b>CHAPTER V DEATH AND SINGULARITY .....</b>	<b>44</b>
5.1. Introduction .....	44
5.2. Concept of Death from an Overview .....	44
5.3. The Main Difference of Heidegger's Account of Death From Others .....	48

5.4. Being Toward a Possibility .....	49
5.5. Death as a Possibility .....	51
5.6. Death and Singularity .....	53
5.7. Conclusion.....	54
<b>CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION.....</b>	<b>56</b>
<b>REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>CURRICULUM VITAE.....</b>	<b>63</b>

# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

This thesis attempts to figure out a proper understanding of how Heidegger establishes singularity in his philosophical system through the phenomenons of anxiety, temporality and death. We benefit mostly from *Being and Time* along with some other works of Heidegger, namely *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Identity and Difference, What is Metaphysics, The Concept of Time, Letter on 'Humanism', The Essence of Reasons, What is Called Thinking* and *Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics*. In these works, a meaning interpreting the problem is pursued rather than one particular term. The word 'singularity' is used as the roof under which we bring the analyses of related terms together in order to express the meaning more understandably.

Literally, singularity is a noun coming from an adjective 'singular' which means unprecedented, unpredictable, uncertain, unique, single or individual. As a term in the general sense, singularity is defined as the cases or conditions which can not be explained in the general structure of a theory.<sup>1</sup> What we mean by singularity is not exactly the same with this definition, but it helps us to understand Heidegger's way of philosophizing inasmuch as he destructs philosophical theories with his singular terminology and philosophical method in order to show the unpredictable and non-theorized aspect of being. Does it mean that Heidegger's philosophy is nihilistic? In *Letter of Humanism*, he responds to accusations of nihilism as well as others: He states that his critiques against ordinary representational thinking are falsely assumed as negation of being because metaphysics and all history of philosophy always has presupposed being as 'positive', and nihilism has emerged against this position as its

---

<sup>1</sup> Ayhan Çitil, "Leyla, Mecnun, Mevla ve Tekillik," *Ahlak ve Başkası: Modern Felsefe ve İslam Düşüncesinde Öteki*, no. 1647 (İlem Kitaplığı, 2017): 49.

opposition, i.e 'negative'.<sup>2</sup> However, he does not simply oppose beings. Rather, he questions being as the ground of what is 'positive' and 'negative'. He tries to point out the disclosive motion of being itself in a unique way. Therefore, under the title of singularity, this thesis aims to investigate how Heidegger constitutes the uniqueness of the movement of being without falling into nihilism. This study consists of six chapters including the introduction and conclusion. A brief summary of the chapters will be introduced below.

It would not be wrong to say that Heidegger owes his prominence to his distinguishing critiques on the metaphysics and philosophies before him. His philosophy mainly depends on those evaluations. For this reason, it is inevitable to present an overview of the basic phenomenons at the beginning of each chapter in order to comprehend his interpretations. The first chapter will consider an overview of the main discussions about concepts of universal and individual in the history of philosophy as a preparatory way toward singularity in Heidegger. Then, his differentiation of Being (*das Sein*) from beings (*das Seiende*) will be held as parallel to the relation between universal and individual even if he does not discuss 'the problem of universals' as his predecessors did and not use even their terminology. Regardless of his specific terms and philosophical method, it is argued that in Heidegger's philosophy, neither universal is primary as it is in Plato, nor individual substance as it is in Aristotle. Rather, not only universal and individual, but also distance/interval between them which makes them possible are included in truth. With the help of the distinction of Being from beings, Heidegger tries to formulate a fundamental ontology which not only questions Being, but also grounds metaphysics and other ontologies which deal with just beings rather than Being, he claims. How does he do that?

Heidegger starts with interpreting experiences of a privileged individual being, namely *Dasein*, but he does not thematize it under a universal or any logical category. For him, it can not be defined and determined with certain categories and universals like "rational animal" or "thinking thing" because *Dasein* has a constitution of disclosedness that makes it transcendent and unique. Thus, we will examine *Dasein*'s such disclosedness under the term of 'singularity' in the sense of uniqueness on the basis of three concepts, namely anxiety, temporality and death. Heidegger destructs

---

<sup>2</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Letter On 'Humanism'*, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi in *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 264-265.

existing comprehension of these three phenomenons and then constructs new understandings of them. He designates anxiety (Angst) as a primary affectivity (Befindlichkeit) of Dasein in which boundaries of beings become indifferent and Being shows itself, so Dasein understands itself as a whole. In addition to anxiety, temporality will be examined as another constituent of singularity. In view of the concept of transcendence, Heidegger advances a new formulation of time, which is finite and dependent on Dasein unlike ordinary usage of time in modernity. Lastly, we will consider death as a phenomenon of life by which Dasein attains both its singularity and wholeness.

Before starting, it is also necessary to draw limits of our thesis by explaining what we do not intend by the notion of singularity. This notion is used as a term not only in philosophy but also in different academic fields. For instance, in maths, singularity implies "a point at which a function is not differentiable although it is differentiable in a neighbourhood of that point"; in physics, it refers to "a point or region at the center of a black hole, where, it is theorized, the force of gravity compresses an object such that it has infinite density and almost no volume".<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, there are discussions of singularity in the course of the history which refer to a presumptive confrontation of humanity with a consciousness which surpasses the intelligence of a human being. The emergence of such consciousness has different versions. Ayhan Çitil, in his article called "Leyla, Mecnun, Mevla ve Tekillik", summarizes them as follows:

a) Technological singularity: A hypothesis which assumes that artificial intelligence is going to surpass the intelligence of human being in the future and changes civilizations and the nature of the human being radically. b) Singularity in the process of evolution or in the historical process: It presumes the emergence of a species superior to human being. c) The situation in which human being will confront a superior species like alien etc. In these instances, it is predicted that because such a superior intelligence is going to have abilities which human being can not even imagine, this situation will make the future of humanity unpredictable.<sup>4</sup> We do not aim to analyse all of these versions of singularity since it requires deep researches in diverse fields and goes beyond the

---

<sup>3</sup>Collins English Dictionary, 'Singularity', accessed June 17, 2020, <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/singularity>.

<sup>4</sup> Ayhan Çitil, "Leyla, Mecnun, Mevla ve Tekillik," *Ahlak ve Başkası: Modern Felsefe ve İslam Düşüncesinde Öteki*, no. 1647 (İlem Kitaplığı, 2017): 49-50.

frame of our study. Yet, we glance over only the first one, i.e. technological singularity, from a Heideggerian standpoint, in order to present the difference of the meaning of singularity which we handle in this thesis.

The discussions of technological singularity suggest that ever more accelerating technological change in the future might engender unpredictable outcomes for human beings and the universe. These discussions are highly favored among literature and movie producers rather than academic philosophers and cognitive scientists.<sup>5</sup> It does not mean that they are inconsiderable. On the contrary, if we take critiques of Heidegger about modern philosophy into consideration, there is something to say about those discussions.

Firstly, with terminology of Heidegger, it can be said that modern science and technology disregard Being and are concerned only about only beings. Just like metaphysics and all history of western philosophy, modern sciences also reduce Being to beings which are determined and freezed by definitions, calculations and plannings. For Heidegger, Being is not composed of only what is calculable. In *Identity and Difference*, he criticizes this approach as below:

By this conception of the totality of the technological world, we reduce everything down to man, and at best come to the point of calling for an ethics of the technological world. Caught up in this conception, we confirm our own opinion that technology is of man's making alone. We fail to hear the claim of Being which speaks in the essence of technology.<sup>6</sup>

Before these discussions have emerged,<sup>7</sup> Heidegger proposes that technology is more than something purely mechanical just like beings are more than things present at hand. Technological world belongs to Being even though that is not manifested in representational thinking.<sup>8</sup> He suggests that Being discloses itself in a different kind of thinking with affectivity which we try to consider in more detail in the chapter of "Anxiety and Singularity".

---

<sup>5</sup> David J. Chalmers, "Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis," *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 17 (2010): 3.

<sup>6</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Incorporated, 1969), 34.

<sup>7</sup> Discussions of technological explosion started in late 1960s. The term "singularity" was introduced by the science fiction writer Vernor Vinge in 1983. See David J. Chalmers, Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis, (*Journal of Consciousness Studies* 17:7-65, 2010), pp.1-3.

<sup>8</sup> Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, 34-41.

Secondly, there seems to be a contradiction in the background of the discussions of technological singularity. It is assumed that artificial intelligence, which is calculable and predictable at the moment, might create more intelligent technologies than themselves which can cause something unpredictable and incalculable in the future. How this would happen, no one can explain yet. Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that these assumptions postulate an unforeseeable and uncontrollable spring which artificial intelligence will somehow have in the future. What is significant and contradictory is that if such a spring is possible, it has to be accepted that technology is more than what is technical and mechanical. In other words, discussions of technological singularity have acknowledged—without noticing—that the technological world can not be reduced to beings which are determined, calculated or planned. That is precisely what Heidegger claims as mentioned above.

In addition to technological singularity, we encounter discussions under the title of singularity in social and political philosophy affected by Heidegger's philosophy. These discussions are more about the question of whether it is possible to think of a community composed of singular and ek-static individuals who stand side by side without coming together under a determinate identity or ideology. Michel Foucault, Jean-Luc Nancy and Giorgio Agamben are among leading figures of these discussions. With the help of Heidegger's terminology about Dasein such as 'ek-static', 'as such' and 'being-with', they criticize the self-sufficient Cartesian subject which is isolated from the community and individuals separated from each other with certain identities. They also criticize real communism in which the individual did not have much room for his/her existence.<sup>9</sup> In this study, under the title of singularity, we do analyze not those discussions, but their very foundation, namely Dasein.

The issue of singularity/uniqueness in Heidegger is not about refuting certain political ideologies or identities. Neither can it be seen as similar to self-sufficient and isolated subject in Cartesian Solipsism or in other discussions of individualism. On the contrary, singularity in this study is mainly dependent on Heidegger's critiques on

---

<sup>9</sup> See their related works as follows:

Giorgio Agamben, *The Coming Community* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

Michel Foucault, "Introduction," in *The Use of Pleasure: History of Sexuality*, V.2 (New York: Vintage, 1986).

Jean-Luc Nancy, *Inoperative Community*, ed. P. Connor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991).

defining existence with certain logical categories such as subject and object. Thus, we will analyze Heidegger's way of formulating Dasein as the place where traditional difference of *essentia* and *existentia* comes together without being fused and Being manifests itself as a gift.

## CHAPTER II

### SINGULARITY FROM AN OVERVIEW

#### 2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, we try to present an overview of the main discussions about universal and individual as a preparatory way toward our subject singularity in Heidegger. Before handling Heidegger's viewpoint on being with respect to the issue of universal/individual, it is necessary to look over how it was discussed before Heidegger in order to comprehend his critiques to these discussions and to understand how he constitutes singularity more clearly.

#### 2.2. Discussions of Universal and Individual: "The Problem of Universals"

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger begins his inquiry of being with examining three prejudices about concept of being preventing questioning the concept. From what he tells us, the first one is of Aristotle, namely "Being is the most universal concept."<sup>10</sup> In this part of the chapter, we search for the answers of what it means to be a universal or individual in terms of why Heidegger takes this statement as a prejudice which prevents questioning of being.

As it is well known, Plato tries to explain being in such a way that there are permanent and essential ideas, separated from the sensible world in which individual things have to participate in those ideas to exist. Aristotle does not agree with his teacher about the existence of separated entities from particular things in the world. Questioning 'being qua being' in *Metaphysics*, Aristotle puts individual substances (ousia) in the center of his ontology. Instead of separated universals apart from particular things, Aristotle

---

<sup>10</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 2.

proposes substances in things themselves in the real world. While Plato takes ideas as original entities and sees particular entities in the world as their shadows, Aristotle grants each individual its own real substance on which all of its attributes are dependent.

Aristotle reaches that point through a linguistic evaluation. For him, proper names (onoma) can not be predicates of other terms. Rather, they can be subjects on which others need to be predicated. Therefore, they are prior to others in a linguistic sense. Also the things corresponding to the names, i.e. substances, are prior to other beings in an ontological sense. For instance, in the sentence of 'Ali is a man.', the subject 'Ali' is a substance, and 'man' is his attribute. The fact that the term 'man' can be predicated of other substances makes it a universal term. Universals need to be dependent on a subject. In other words, they can not exist without a subject, i.e a substance. That's why, universals are not actual substance. They are just sets of entities, so if particular substances disappear, universals as their attributes also disappear. Therefore, we can say that universals which Plato regards as primary are pushed into secondary position in Aristotle's philosophical system.<sup>11</sup>

When it comes to "the most universals of all predicates", namely being and unity, Aristotle asserts that being and unity are nothing apart from substances or accidents. For him, the unity implies the same meaning as being in terms of that it belongs to categories. To be 'one' indicates to be a particular thing. That is, 'one woman' means nothing more than 'woman'.<sup>12</sup> Although they are not members of categories unlike accidents, being and unity are somehow attributed to all categories. The question of how they are attributed to categories remains unanswered in *Metaphysics*.

Considering being and unity, we also need to ask whether there is a difference between other universals and 'the most universal' ones in Aristotle. Is the claim of secondary position of universals valid also for them? As far as we understand, they differ from other universals in such a way that they are necessarily predicated on regardless of what, either a substance or an accident, so it can not be said that they are secondary as other universals. Nevertheless, Aristotle underlies the fact that they are nothing apart from categories. It implies that if categories do not exist, also being and unity do not

---

<sup>11</sup> Aristoteles, "7. Kitap, 13. Bölüm" and "12. Kitap" in *Metafizik*, trans. Ahmet Arslan (İstanbul: Sosyal Yayınlar, 1996), 357-360, 484-527.

<sup>12</sup> Aristoteles, "10. Kitap, 2-3. Bölüm", in *Metafizik*, 424-429.

exist as in the case of all universals. Then, one can argue that being and unity are reduced to categories in Aristotle's philosophy.

Even though the discussion of universal and individual does not go far away from Aristotle's, it is held deeper and detailed by many philosophers in mediaval age. At first, Avicenna must be mentioned in this respect. In *The Metaphysics of the Healing*, he defines a universal as "a meaning that whose very conception does not prevent its being predicated of many". As a peripatetic, he opposes Plato's separately existing ideas, and takes universals as attributes of subjects which are not by themselves, but always with a substance in the external reality. They can exist separately only in the mind as intelligible forms abstracted from matter.<sup>13</sup> At this point, it could be asked how does a universal in the mind relate to individuals in the external world? Is one of them prior to the other as it is for Aristotle?

When we look at Avicenna's further explanations on the issue of relationship between universal and individual in *Metaphysics*, we see his proposition of a new meaning which is slightly different from his definition of universal and individual quoted above. As a thing only in the mind in potency, Avicenna abstracts a concept from all its adjectives with which it exists in the external world, and he relates its being only to itself. Humanity, for instance, is neither universal, nor particular in itself. It is nothing but only humanity in terms of being humanity. It has an implication that humanity can be attributed to nothing but itself with respect to being itself. Even being or non-being is an accident attributed to it afterwards. Humanity can be predicated of accidents such as one or many, universal or individual as occasion requires, but it is, in itself, not those accidents that are added to it from outside. When it is predicated of 'universal', it is not universal in actuality as being common to all things. Rather, its universality stems from being realised with its governing rules for many individuals. Those rules of the universal are performed not in the mind but in the external world.<sup>14</sup> That is the difference of an existence of a universal in the mind and existence of its relating individuals in the external world with all its accidents and governing rules.

The relationship between universal and individual is discussed elaborately not only in Avicenna but also in other mediaval Islamic and Christian philosophers and

---

<sup>13</sup> Avicenna, "Book Five, Chapter One", *The Metaphysics of the Healing*, trans. Michael E. Marmura (Provo UT: Brigham Young University, 2005), 149-155.

<sup>14</sup> Avicenna, "Book Five, Chapter One" and "Book Five, Chapter Two", *The Metaphysics*, 150-159.

theologians (mutakallimûn). Without going into details due to the frame of our work, it would be beneficial to look over their answers to the question of how a universal being in the mind exists in the external world. According to most Islamic philosophers and theologians, there is a correspondence between a meaning as abstracted form in the mind and the thing in the external world. However, the nature of that correspondence differs from one to another. For Kîndî and Avicenna, an abstracted meaning in the mind and the thing in the world are identical to each other. As said above, the difference is that the form can realise its governing rules not in the mind, but in the external world. On the other hand, Fârâbî, Tûsî and Kutbuddin ar-Râzî assert that they are not identical to each other. The nature of that correspondence is similarity. That is, the form in the mind is only an example(misâl) or shadow of the form in the external world. Also for Fahraddin ar-Râzî and many theologians like him, the form in the mind is not identical to the one in the external world. The former is only an imagination of the latter.<sup>15</sup>

After handling the problem of relationship between universal and individual in general, we can deal with the second question, namely priority of individuals over universal ones. Unlike in Aristotle's philosophy, it can not be said in Avicenna's philosophical system that universals in the mind are secondary, and not that if individuals disappear, they also disappear. For Avicenna, although universals are realised in individuals one by one in the external world, they are more essential than individuals as meanings abstracted from matter. It is because of the fact that they come from "the providence of God". We can see that explicitly in the following passage:

Animal, then, taken with its accidents, is the natural thing. What is taken in itself is the nature, of which it is said that its existence is prim to natural existence [in the manner of] the priority of the simple to the composite. This is [the thing] whose existence is specified as being divine existence because the cause of its existence, inasmuch as it is animal, is the providence of God, exalted be He. As regards its being with matter and accidents and this individual-even though through the providence of God, exalted be He-it is due to the particular nature.<sup>16</sup>

Supposedly, Avicenna's difference from Aristotle in this issue resulted from his Neo-Platonic metaphysics based on the theory of emanation. Briefly stated, meanings(universals) as abstracted forms in the mind are given by one of the intellects

---

<sup>15</sup> Ömer Türker, *Varlık Nedir?: İslam Filozoflarının Varlık Tasavvuru* 3<sup>rd</sup> ed.(İstanbul: Ketebe Yayınları, 2019), 79-104.

<sup>16</sup>Avicenna, "Book Five, Chapter Two" in *The Metaphysics*, 156.

which emanate from God in a hierachical manner. The system has a gradation such that abstracted quiddities/essences are in a higher position than individuals including matter, accidents and also 'being' in the external world.<sup>17</sup> In this respect, Avicenna's famous differentiation of essence(mahiyya) from being(wujud) becomes clear inasmuch as essence has neither being nor non-being in itself. God endows essences with being, so their beings are possible. Therefore, essences are related to the possibility of being or nonbeing. On the other hand, God's being is necessary in itself because it is not given by something outside. For that reason, his being and his essence are identical to each other while others' being and essences are not.<sup>18</sup> The differentiation of God's being from others' and the gradation of being from the necessary on the top to the possible ones on the bottom caused outstanding discussions after Avicenna in the medieval age as we will point out below.

Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus must be mentioned in this regard not only due to their prominence in medieval Christian philosophy, but also to Heidegger's reference to them while criticizing many philosophers with missing the question of being.<sup>19</sup> Beginning with Thomas Aquinas, it can be said that his discussion of universal and individual does not much differ from Avicenna's. In his book *On Essence and Being*, Aquinas examines the relation of universal and individual comparatively to his predecessors, namely Aristotle, Avicenna and Averroes. Regarding the difference of essence from being, he claims that both terms 'man' and 'humanity' imply the essence of human being but in two different ways: While 'man' indicates the essence as a whole, i.e. substantial form and matter, 'humanity' expresses the essence as a part because of the fact that the concept of humanity is abstracted from matter, which is included in the definition of man. Moreover, humanity is not universal when it is regarded absolutely. Like Avicenna, Aquinas also thinks that humanity as the essence involves 'only what belongs to man as man'.<sup>20</sup> That's why, it can not be a predicate of an individual substance as in the case 'Ali is a man.' On the other hand, every individual man has humanity. How does it exist in every individual if it is not universal when it is regarded absolutely? Aquinas accepts that human nature has a being in the mind

---

<sup>17</sup> Avicenna, "Book Nine" in *The Metaphysics*, 299-347.

<sup>18</sup> Ömer Mahir Alper, *İbn Sina* (İstanbul : İSAM Yayınları, 2008), 88-99.

<sup>19</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2.

<sup>20</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *On Essence and Being*, trans. Armand Maurer, 2.d. rev. ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968), 44.

abstracted from all its adjectives, but it has a universal character because of its relation to individuals in the external world as their likeness. Its universality stems from not being exactly the same in every individual but being 'a particular apprehended likeness'<sup>21</sup> as in the case certain Muslim peripathetic philosophers.

When it comes to Duns Scotus, the discussions of essence/being and universal/individual become a bit different from his predecessors. While the concept of being in Avicenna and Aquinas is that which is attributed to essence subsequently and that which differs by gradation, Scotus does not take being as that which is attributed to essence accidentally. He claims that "All genera, species, individuals, and the essential parts of genera, and the Uncreated Being all include 'being' quidditatively."<sup>22</sup> For him, if the concept of being would not be univocal to the created and Uncreated, God's being could not be known spontaneously. In the same way, the concept of being is common to substances and to accidents because substances do not move our mind to be comprehended directly without sensible accidents.<sup>23</sup> Then, he answers the question of in what way individuals differ if they do not differ in the concept of being: Refusing a number of theories about principle of individuation previously claimed, Scotus proposes that there are certain positive entities in things individuating those things intrinsically.<sup>24</sup> Each thing has a simple entity, called *haecceity*(*thisness*), provides the thing with both distinctiveness and indivisibility.<sup>25</sup> Along with "primarily diverse items" because of which each individual differs, he does not deny common natures of things. For him, there are also items with which individuals agree.<sup>26</sup> It does not mean that he accepts existence of separated universals as common natures without individuals. That keeps him within the framework of realism, one of the two mainstreams in the problem of universals.

---

<sup>21</sup> Aquinas, *On Essence and Being*, 48.

<sup>22</sup> Duns Scotus, *Philosophical Writings*, trans. Allan Wolter, O.F.M. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 4.

<sup>23</sup> Scotus, *Philosophical Writings*, 2-7.

<sup>24</sup> He argues that individuality of a substance is not caused by matter or by its own nature or actual existence or any accidents like quantity. For his detailed replies to theories of individuation see *Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham*, trans. and ed. Paul Vincent Spade (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), 57-113.

<sup>25</sup> *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, s.v. "Medieval Theories of Haecceity," accessed March 1, 2020, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-haecceity/#3>

<sup>26</sup> Duns Scotus, "Six Questions on Individuation" in *Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham*, trans. and ed. Paul Vincent Spade (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), 101-102.

On the other side of the problem of universals in the medieval age, stands nominalism which has to be touched upon briefly, before evaluating above mentioned thoughts with Heidegger's philosophy. William Ockham is one of the leading figures for nominalism proposing that abstracted universals exist neither in the mind in a real sense nor in individuals in the external world. They are just concepts as output of consideration of the similarities of things in the world. There is no common nature in or/and outside of individuals in the external world. Only matter and particular form are real entities in individuals.<sup>27</sup> When there is no universal in reality, the problem of relation between universals and individuals also disappears. However, nominalism results in new problems which is the topic of another study.

### **2.3. Heidegger's Place Regarding the Problem of Universals**

In the problem of universals going back and forth between realism and nominalism, what is crucial for our study is the distinctive place of Heidegger's understanding of being. Although he asserts that no philosopher in the Ancient Greek lightens "the darkness of concept of being", he appreciates Aristotle in terms of raising the problem of 'unity of being'.<sup>28</sup> To understand why he appreciates Aristotle, it is necessary to be reminded of the difference between him and Plato regarding the issue of universal and individual. Aristotle brings particular beings into the forefront while denying the separate universal beings which are primary for Plato. This could be what Heidegger highly values in Aristotle because Heidegger implies that there is no separate universals apart from individuals by claiming that "Being(das Sein) is always the being of a being(das Seiende)."<sup>29</sup>

On the other hand, Heidegger points out that Being is not something like beings.<sup>30</sup> That is, Being can not be understood only through categories. Because it can not be reduced to beings, Being is neither like predicates(universals) nor subjects(individual substances) as in Aristotelian logic. Even though Heidegger acknowledges that Aristotle raised the problem of 'unity of being' contrary to diverse categories, he

---

<sup>27</sup> Scotus, "Six Questions on Individuation", 189,190, 205-207.

<sup>28</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2.

<sup>29</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 7.

<sup>30</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2-4.

accuses Aristotle of that he could not clear up the obscurity of categorial relations.<sup>31</sup> As stated above, Aristotle does not explain how 'being and unity' attribute to categories necessarily, so it seems that Heidegger has right about the darkness of the relations.

Aristotle is not the only philosopher criticized with incapability of clarifying the problem. For Heidegger, the problem was not interpreted fundamentally also in medieval philosophy although it was debated in diverse ways especially in Thomist and Scotist schools.<sup>32</sup> On this point, his critique could be seen a bit overgeneralised at first glance, considering sophisticated evaluations of Avicenna, Aquinas and Scotus on being and essence. However, it would be understandable when Heidegger's attitude to metaphysics is taken into consideration. While he does not refuse metaphysics and previous ontologies entirely, he sees them all as secondary, and he underlines their inadequacy in clearing up the meaning of Being and in interpreting basic constitutions of beings.<sup>33</sup> That's why, he searches for a root which ensures the formulation of the question of Being, and suggests that a fundamental ontology is required in order to ground not only metaphysics, but also positive sciences and certain ontologies that provides research areas with their fundamental concepts.<sup>34</sup> Could he achieve that fundamental ontology at the end of the day? To answer this question would go beyond the limit of our study, so we can touch upon only the question of how he shapes his philosophy in order to achieve that ontology.

In our opinion, Heidegger tries to formulate an ontology which displays not only conditions of possibility of universal but also of individual and accidental. The latter is assumed impossible by certain philosophers such as Aristotle and Avicenna. Aristotle proposes that the subject of every science is what always is or for the most part. The accidental and individual are not of such classes.<sup>35</sup> Similarly, Avicenna suggests that an individual can not be defined because it is corruptible. If it is defined, it would not be a true definition because it is valid only for some time at which the

---

<sup>31</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2. For his further critiques to Aristotle in terms of the obscurity of the relation of the reasons see Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Reasons: A Bilingual Edition, Incorporating the German Text of Vom Wesen des Grundes*, trans. Terrence Malick (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 5, 7.

<sup>32</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2.

<sup>33</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 9.

<sup>34</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 42-47.

<sup>35</sup> Aristoteles, "11. Kitap, 7. Bölüm 1064 b14", *Metafizik*, 463, 464.

individual is not changed.<sup>36</sup> Heidegger intends to disclose what is undefinable and how it is undefinable by way of "deconstructing" philosophical and scientific approaches before him.

The distinctive position of Heidegger's philosophy appears in his differentiation of Being from beings. This could be regarded as parallel to the relation between universal and individual even though he does not discuss 'the problem of universals' as his predecessors and not use even their terminology. Regardless of his specific terms and philosophical method, it can be said that in Heidegger's philosophy, neither universal is primary as it is in Plato, nor individual substance as it is in Aristotle. Rather, not only universal and individual, but also distance/interval between them which makes them possible are included in truth. We argue in this study that Heidegger formulates a fundamental ontology in which human being is neither universal nor individual, rather a unique/singular being that substitutes both of them along with the relation/distance between universal and individual as something enabling them. We analyze this issue with the term of 'singularity' in the sense of uniqueness and try to figure it out with its three constitutives, namely anxiety, death and temporality. Before studying them, it can be beneficial to deal with the ground of them, i.e. the difference between Being and beings.

#### **2.4. The Difference of Being and Beings as a Main Path to Singularity**

Singularity finds its root in Heidegger's differentiation of Being (*das Sein*) and beings (*das Seiende*), which makes his philosophy distinctive. His critiques to western thought in the history of philosophy basically depends on that difference: He proposes that because metaphysics and modern sciences question always beings, they see only beings and suppose falsely that they contemplate Being. This is one of the reasons for forgottenness of the question of Being. That's why, he tries to change the focus of the question from beings to Being. Actually, he tries to change the way of questioning itself. For, the truth of Being is not something like a being which is determined and explained positively, so the way of questioning of Being can not be the same as the way that sciences search beings. Moreover, Being as something which brightens

---

<sup>36</sup> Avicenna, *The Metaphysics*, 188.

beings can not be comprehended unless thinking turns toward the ground of philosophy and lets itself to Being to reach its truth, i.e. disclosedness.<sup>37</sup> At this point, we need to ask on the one side, what is the difference between Being and beings if there is a difference, and how can we understand this difference if it can not be conceived by ordinary understanding? On the other, how does the difference give rise to singularity?

In *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger explains the distinction between Being and beings and calls it 'ontological difference' which fundamentally conditions all distinguishing and all distinctiveness. For him, when we utter anything such as a sentence or preposition etc., we employ this difference though we are not aware of that. For instance, whenever we give voice to a sentence including "is", we make use of the difference. Yet, it is not something knowable like a being because the nature of the difference is itself ambiguous. Then, how it is possible to make a difference between a being and its Being? Heidegger affirms that the difference is not something that we set before us and make in an explicit manner at a certain time objectively. Instead, the difference "happens to us fundamentally and constantly".<sup>38</sup>

With the help of the difference between Being and beings, Heidegger attempts to question the condition of distinguishing between essentia and existentia of the things which has been made in the history of philosophy. As it is known, while certain philosophers prioritize unchangeable essences/universals beyond changeable existence/individuals, others give a particular importance to the existence of things rather than essences. Plato, for instance, puts changeless ideas in the center of his philosophy. Aristotle prioritizes *energeia* over *dynamis* although he does not disregard essences of things. In medieval philosophy, abstracted forms/essences are in the first place rather than material individuals. Hegel makes an effort to bring two sides together in a synthesis/suspension of the two as a result of a dialectical process eliminating the otherness/distance between them. Heidegger, on the other hand, tries to hold them together without reducing one to the other or without removing the distance between them. Besides, he points out the very condition of making such

---

<sup>37</sup> Martin Heidegger, "Giriş" in *Metafizik Nedir? Was ist Metaphysik?*, trans. Yusuf Örnek (Ankara: Türkiye Felsefe Kurumu, 2015), 7-14.

<sup>38</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 356,357.

difference. For him, it is indispensable for us to understand what-being(Wassein) and that-being(Sosein) of beings even in an enigmatic manner in order to experience beings as they are. In traditional metaphysics and ontology, philosophers distinguish between *essentia* and *existentia*, i.e. what-being and that-being of beings, but they never problematize the fact that the distinction of them appertains to the very essence of Being. Furthermore, they did not realize that we have the possibility of asking questions in terms of what-being and that-being thanks to the fact that the distinction between Being and beings is always already understood inexplicitly, i.e. not conceptually.<sup>39</sup>

Then, how does that distinction give rise to singularity? In his published conference called *The Essence of Reasons*, Heidegger comes up with the idea that ontological difference between Being and beings is grounded upon the essence of Dasein, which is transcendence. As it might be expected, he uses the term, transcendence, with a new meaning apart from its ordinary meaning in traditional metaphysics. He takes transcendence not as surpassing a boundary before the subject and afterwards reaching what is original, but as a primary characteristic of Dasein which makes its existence and its subjectivity possible. What Dasein as a subject—"because to be a subject means to be a being in and as transcending"—surpasses are actually itself as a being(das Seiende) and beings in the general sense that are already included in its existence. Being of beings uncovers itself through this surpassing.<sup>40</sup>

Where did Heidegger get the idea of that kind of transcendence? In terms of making existence and subjectivity possible, that kind of transcendence reminds us of Kant's transcendental categories which make the "phenomenal world" possible by enabling us knowledge of things as they appear to us.<sup>41</sup> However, there is a distinctive feature in Heidegger that transcendence is based on temporality and projection(Entwurf) which we will explain in detail as one of the basic constitutives of singularity in the third chapter. We wish to point out here only that the transcendence depends on the "essence

---

<sup>39</sup> Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 356-358.

<sup>40</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Reasons: A Bilingual Edition, Incorporating the German text of Vom Wesen des Grundes*, trans. by Terrence Malick (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 35, 37, 39.

<sup>41</sup> When Heidegger explains phenomenon of 'world' toward which Dasein transcends, he acknowledges that Kantian concept of world opens the way of a possible existentiell meaning of world. For his further explanations see *The Essence of Reasons*, 63-75.

of time", i.e. temporality, as a founding figure for the difference between Being and beings.

## **2.5. From the Difference of Being and Beings to Ability of Asking**

In the above passage, we have mentioned about the obscure understanding of the difference of Being and beings. It follows that this ambiguity of the difference is the very condition of asking questions which is the singular feature of Dasein among other beings. What enables Dasein to ask the question of what-being and that-being is the inexplicit distinction of Being and beings. The possibility of the act of questioning stands in an essential position in Heidegger's philosophy. When we look at his interpretations in general, we can see easily that he does not try to give clear definitions and answers for the questions which have been asked throughout the history of philosophy. Rather, he aims to disclose the ground of asking questions which serves for his fundamental ontology. Using classical logic, metaphysics and other ontologies to deal with propositional sentences which are closed and determined. They do not concern conditions of uttering questions or exclamations or prepositions etc. For Heidegger, however, what they concern is derivative and secondary. What is primary are items like copula, pronouns, prepositions and questions in language because they are not closed as propositional sentences.

As it is known, questions and additions are such items in language that we need other concepts to use them. They are not whole as a concept or a sentence giving a determined, frozen meaning. In other words, they have somehow an open and relational nature as themselves. That's why, Heidegger nominalizes prepositions and creates new concepts from additions such as "Vor-handen", "Zu-handen", "da-sein", "in-der-Welt-sein" etc. In his works, he usually emphasizes copula, pronouns, additions and particles when he tries to interpret a phenomenon. In *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, for instance, he draws attention to the function of certain words as 'the dimension of the possible' while explaining his crucial term projection as "an opening for making-possible" and as disclosing the Being of beings.

The look into the light of the possible makes whatever is projecting open for the dimension of 'either/or', the 'both/and', the 'in such a way', and the 'otherwise', the 'what', the 'is' and 'is not'. Only insofar as this irruption has occurred to the 'yes' and 'no' and questioning become possible. The projection raises us away into and thus unveils the dimension of the possible in general,

and what is possible is in itself already articulated into possibly 'being in such a way or otherwise', into the possibility of 'being or not being'.<sup>42</sup>

In short, Heidegger neither reduces Being to beings nor beings to Being. He always underlines the obscure distinction between them which makes Dasein a transcendent and unique being questioning Being.

## 2.6. Conclusion

To formulate a fundamental ontology by way of questioning Being, Heidegger starts with interpretation of experiences of individual being, i.e. Dasein. However, he does not thematize it under any universal because Dasein stands for universal and individual at the same time. In other words, because Dasein has a constitution of disclosedness that makes it transcendent and singular, it can not be defined and determined with certain categories and universals like "rational animal" or "thinking thing". It might be said that Being of Dasein as *being-in-the-world* stands both for universal-individual and for the relation between them. It is not a metaphysical subject or predicate, to put it into his terms, not a *present-at-hand*, which one can close by defining in a certain way. Instead, it is something that opens itself in Dasein through its distinctive affectivity (Befindlichkeit), namely anxiety which we will consider in detail in the next chapter with respect to our topic singularity.

---

<sup>42</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), 364, 365.

## CHAPTER III

### ANXIETY AND SINGULARITY

#### 3.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, we have noticed the difference between Being and beings in general in order to understand the way through singularity. Questioning Being, Heidegger's starting point is experience of human being, i.e. Dasein, but he neither defines it as an abstract universal without content, nor as a thing like other beings which can be determined and closed with certain content. This does not mean that Dasein does not have any form and content, nor it is isolated from all these adjectives. Rather, it means that its existence can not be limited to these concepts such as rational animal or thinking thing. For, its essence is transcendence on which ambiguous difference between Being and beings and the act of questioning are depended. For this reason, Dasein is the place where Being shows itself, and where Being and beings come together. In addition to this, the distance between Being and beings is not closed permanently which is the distinctive feature of Heidegger's philosophy comparing his predecessors.

In this chapter, we will handle at first Heidegger's attempt to bring together thinking and being regarding the unstable distance between Being and beings by virtue of a specific affectivity (Befindlichkeit), namely anxiety (Angst). Dasein as *being-in-the-world* experiences two modes, i.e. inauthentic and authentic, both of which belong to the truth of Dasein. In the former, Dasein lives mostly and primarily in average everydayness with everyone, which Heidegger calls *das Man* (the-they). In the latter, it encounters Nothingness in anxiety. He understands anxiety as a phenomenological experience in which border of beings disappear in their totality, and Being discloses itself. At the end, we discuss authenticity and anxiety as constituents of singularity of Dasein, which also opens the way to freedom and to a kind of death as a wholeness.

### 3.2. Universal and Individual -Thinking and Existing- are the Same

By bringing together Being and beings, Heidegger tries to overcome an old challenge which has been there since Parmenides. Parmenides claims that thinking and existing are the same, but he leaves questions about its conditions unanswered.<sup>43</sup> Heidegger concerns the sameness of thinking and existing as the difference of Being and beings. He reads not only metaphysics but also Hegel's philosophy as the appearances of concealed movement of the distance between Being and beings. The difference prevails even in metaphysics although it remains hidden as "perdurant"(Austrag). He means with the term perdurance "the circling of Being and beings around each other."<sup>44</sup> What he opposes is the systematization of that movement which means closing the distance and reducing Being to beings or vice versa. Being can not be explained with a repeating structure of beings as it is done in Hegel because the nature of Being is unstable and unique. The unsteady distance between Being and beings keeps this singularity. Then how does Heidegger interpret the sameness of thinking, i.e. an abstract universal concept, and existing, i.e. concrete individual existence? What kind of sameness is that?

In *Identity and Difference*, Heidegger discusses the claim of the sameness of thinking and being, in two parts first of which deals with what identity means and the second includes how Heidegger's thought differs from Hegel's in this sense. Heidegger appreciates what he calls "the philosophy of speculative idealism, which is prepared by Leibniz and Kant, and established by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel" because this philosophy concerns the issue in such a way that the sameness and the unity of thinking and existing signify a connection and synthesis of the two. He thinks that the unity of identity is regarded only in an abstract manner, as a mere sameness without mediation before the emergence of speculative idealism.<sup>45</sup>

To understand Heidegger's appreciation of Hegelian philosophy clearly, it would be inevitable to remember the discussions in medieval age about universals as abstract essences and their relation to individuals in the external world. As we have seen in the

---

<sup>43</sup> Parmenides, *Fragmanlar*, trans. Kaan Ökten (İstanbul: Alfa Basım Yayım Dağıtım San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti., 2019), 71.

<sup>44</sup> Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, 68, 69.

<sup>45</sup> Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, 25, 26.

previous chapter, most philosophers and theologians, on the one hand, take that relation either as a correspondence between universal and individual in such a way that the latter is only a shadow of the former, or they are identical to each other along with the fact that the later is a realization of the former's governing rules in the external world. Some of the philosophers, on the other, argue that universals are nothing but names in the language. However, in Hegelian philosophy what differs from medieval philosophers is that Hegel tries to bring thinking and being together by virtue of the movement of Spirit/Consciousness. He does not favor one of them as a basis and sees the other as its shadow. Rather, he considers the unification of the two equal parts and suspending the otherness between them as a result of the process of negation.<sup>46</sup> In short, because the relation of universal/thinking and individual/existing in medieval philosophers is not a mediation of two as it is the case in Hegelian dialectic, Heidegger criticizes metaphysics and acknowledges the active relation of thinking and existing.

Unlike medieval philosophers but likewise to Hegel, Heidegger does not regard the sameness of thinking and existing as an identity without relation. Nonetheless, he interprets the sameness as "belonging together of the two" and underlines the term belonging rather than together. He implies that thinking and being are not two equal parts, and they cannot be used interchangeably. Moreover, thinking and being do not become fused and suspended in a synthesis as in Hegelian dialectic because their difference/distance does not disappear. They belong to each other in the way that thinking is not thinking in the real sense if it is taken without being. Thinking is neither an immaterial act of soul, nor depended on any kind of categories.<sup>47</sup> It is the place where Being discloses itself in a unique way, free of the boundaries of categorial definitions. However, Being is not a product of thinking. On the contrary, he asserts that essential thinking is *Ereignis* of Being.<sup>48</sup>

We need to touch upon what Heidegger means by *Ereignis* briefly because it helps us to understand how he relates thinking to being and what kind of singularity he suggests. He criticizes the attempt of the modern world to reduce thinking only to representational thinking which is in the service of technology dedicated to calculating

---

<sup>46</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, "Preface: On Scientific Cognition" in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 21, 22.

<sup>47</sup> Martin Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking?*, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Incorporated, 1968), 240, 241.

<sup>48</sup> Heidegger, *Metafizik Nedir?*, 51.

and planning of beings. In order not to be stuck in such thinking, a sudden and unexpected spring is required to experience belonging together of thinking and being authentically. That spring includes a mutual ownership in which man and Being are reciprocally "extended as a gift" one another.<sup>49</sup> With the term *Ereignis*, Heidegger points to such a spring. *Ereignis* means literally 'event' or 'occurrence' in current German. Nevertheless, he states that it is not used simply for an occurrence or happening. Rather, he means with it "happening only in the singular, not in any number, but uniquely".<sup>50</sup> When we look at the etymology of the word, we can have a clue why he chooses it. *Ereignis* comes from a reflexive verb *er-eignen*, which means 'to become a reality'. It was originally *er-aeugnen*, a derivative of *Aeuge* (eye), meaning 'to show' in old German. That is, *Er-aeugnis* means literally 'what is shown', 'what can be seen'.<sup>51</sup> What is more, the verb *er-eignen* reminds us the verb *eignen* meaning 'to lend itself to something', 'to be suited for something'. Shortly, it is obvious that Heidegger does not choose that word randomly when he says that essential thinking is *Ereignis* of Being. It implies that Being shows itself to itself by giving itself to itself in a singular way. There is a self-moving activity uniquely in every case.

What differs in such movement from Hegel's self-reflective motion of the spirit? Heidegger acknowledges that Hegel concerns the issue of thinking with the self movement of Being, a motion from an empty universal concept in the beginning towards its full completeness with individual contents at the end.<sup>52</sup> Hegel tries to bring universal and individual together as the result of a dialectical process like he does with other dualities such as being/nothing, form/content and thinking/existence. Heidegger's distinction is that the distance between two sides is not closed as we have said above.<sup>53</sup> In other words, the difference/otherness of the two does not become vanished and suspended at the end of a predictable process. For this reason, the active

---

<sup>49</sup> Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, 33.

<sup>50</sup> Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, 36.

<sup>51</sup> Friedrich Kluge, s.v. 'Ereignis' in *Etymological Dictionary of the German Language 1856-1926*, trans. John Francis Davis, (London: George Bell & Sons, 1891), 74.  
<https://archive.org/details/etymologicaldict00klugoft/page/74/mode/2up> accessed April 28, 2020.

<sup>52</sup> Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, 56.

<sup>53</sup> I have obtained this comparison from Dr. M. İkbâl Bakır, who lectured it in the class called "Hegel" on 6<sup>th</sup> of November 2019 at Ibn Haldun University. For further information see M.İkbâl Bakır, "l'affectivité chez Descartes et Heidegger", M.A. Thesis, Galatasaray University, 2010, 62.

nature of Being can not be exemplified through beings since "it is itself the unprecedented exemplar".<sup>54</sup>

After all, how is such activity realized while the difference as well as singularity are kept? To handle the issue, Heidegger comes up with a different kind of thinking as a phenomenological experience, which is grounded in Dasein's specific affectivity, namely anxiety.

### **3.3. Affectivity(Befindlichkeit) and Understanding(Verstehen)**

Before handling anxiety(Angst) as a primary affectivity of Dasein, it would be convenient to discuss the function of affectivity in bringing thinking and being together in general. Heidegger intends with affectivity 'to be in a mood(Stimmung)', 'attunement'. As it might be expected, he criticizes western thought arguing that affects and feelings are regarded only as psychic phenomena and seen as a third class after representational thinking and willing. He also affirms that after Aristotle, who examines passions in his book *Rhetoric* in relation to the public's needs of affectivity and the addressing of the speaker according to the public's attunement, it did not progress even a step further in terms of ontological interpretation of affects. For him, it becomes possible to look over these phenomena from a larger point of view with phenomenological inquiries.<sup>55</sup> It is well known that in the modern thought, especially in sciences, affects and feelings are seen as mostly misleading in comparison to representational thinking, so it is widely accepted that they could and should not only be separated from cognitive reasoning, but also be totally arranged by it. We can see this approach easily within current scientific and psychological investigations and practices. Thus, Heidegger might be right in his criticism.

Disparately, Heidegger takes affectivity as one of the fundamental constitutions of Dasein. It can not be separated from thinking because even in activity of 'the purest *theoria*', there is a tranquil dwelling while observing things. Dasein is never deprived of being in a mood. Furthermore, affectivity makes possible for Dasein to encounter itself as a whole. Heidegger states that discovering the world ontologically is the matter

---

<sup>54</sup> Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, 64.

<sup>55</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 129, 130.

of mere being in a mood. However, this is not a kind of knowing through a theoretical cognitive faculty. Affectivity has a more profound character of disclosing the world than representational thinking. This character grounds Dasein's different modes of existing. In other words, Dasein can have a tendency to something or take care of something by the reason of the fact that affectivity has already disclosed Dasein as a whole. Dasein is always in a mood, and these moods are not steady. Thanks to that affectivity provides Dasein with an unstable look at the world, beings can disclose themselves in their specificity. In resentment, for instance, Being shows itself as a burden while in an elevated mood, the burden can be lightened. Theoretical looking at the world, however, levels things down to the uniformity of determined things *present-at-hand*. That's why, affectivity is exploratory and opening.<sup>56</sup>

By virtue of affectivity, Dasein always already understands itself through definite possibilities. Heidegger sees Dasein completely as *thrown possibility*. What he means by possibility is different from what it signifies in classical metaphysics: It means that something can occur, and it is not actual yet. Ontologically, possibility has a lesser degree than actuality and necessity in metaphysics. For him, however, "possibility as an existential is the most primordial and the ultimate positive ontological determination of Dasein" apart from an empty logical category of beings.<sup>57</sup> It can be regarded as a grand shift since Aristotle, who supposes in *Metaphysics* that *energeia* comes before *dynamis*<sup>58</sup>, because it seems that Heidegger regards something which is not real yet, i.e. a non-being, as the positive foundation of Dasein. He implies that Dasein understands itself and exists depending on its possibilities since it always projects itself to its potentiality. Potentiality for being implies here that Dasein exists for the sake of somebody and something. This is not about altruism or sacrifice, but about being intended for somebody or something. It does not have to be a being for which Dasein is intended. Its existence is itself intended for what it is not yet, so Dasein is always ahead of itself. We will explain this subject in detail with the terms 'temporality' and 'transcendence' in the next chapter. What we want to point out here is that Dasein understands and knows itself not by theoretical thinking, but by affectivity disclosing potentiality of its being as a whole. Therefore, it can be said that

---

<sup>56</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 126-131.

<sup>57</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 135.

<sup>58</sup> Aristoteles, *Metafizik*, 408.

this kind of knowing indicates that the existence of Dasein is closely related to affectivity, and that thinking and existing belong together in such existence.

### **3.4. Anxiety as the Primary Affectivity Unveiling Uniqueness of Dasein**

After we have seen the place of affectivity in understanding of Dasein in general, we need to ask what affectivity he suggests to us specifically to bring thinking and being together differently from its predecessors. Apart from a stable act of abstraction and representation, he introduces anxiety into thinking as a primary and unstable affectivity which could not be put in the limits of categories. In this part, we will chase traces of the function of anxiety in unification of thinking and existing.

To interpret anxiety, Heidegger needs to compare it to another affectivity, fear(Furcht). Anxiety is differentiated from fear inasmuch as fear is always fear of something while anxiety is not. Unlike in fear, Dasein does not encounter a being causing threat and does not know the reason of boredom because the boundaries of beings are melted and become indifferent in anxiety. That's why, anxiety provides us with the experience of Being as something different from beings even though beings can never be without Being, and Being does not prevail its essence without beings in the same way.<sup>59</sup>

What does Dasein experience in anxiety if it is not an anxiety of something? Heidegger claims that Nothingness prevails in anxiety and manifests itself pressurizing melted beings in its totality. Dasein experiences Nothingness which results in a kind of closure and wholeness. Nothingness here can not be conceptualized as it is done in metaphysics. He criticizes science and metaphysics with supposing that Nothingness comes out of negation of beings in its totality because they reduce Nothingness to negation, in the same way that they reduce Being to beings. For him, on the contrary, negation is derived from Nothingness. The ability to say "no" is possible only by virtue of Nothingness.<sup>60</sup>

---

<sup>59</sup> Heidegger, *Metafizik Nedir?*, 49.

<sup>60</sup> Heidegger, *Metafizik Nedir?*, 35-39.

Same as Being, Nothingness is neither determinable nor freezable as a being because Nothingness is related to movement like Being which unveils itself thanks to anxiety.<sup>61</sup> Such interpretation of Nothingness reminds us of Hegel's claim that absolute Being and absolute Nothing are the same. Acknowledging that claim, Heidegger says that Being and Nothingness belong to each other not because they overlap in their undeterminateness and immediacy as it is the case in Hegel, but because Being is finite in its essence and discloses itself in the transcendency of Dasein with Nothingness.<sup>62</sup>

In anxiety, categories of subject and object also disappear. That's why, during anxiety if we are asked "What is the matter?", we can not find an answer because Nothingness exists there literally. Nevertheless, it is not a kind of Nihilism because Nothingness is not simply the negation of all beings and it does not destroy beings at all. It manifests beings in its veiled strangeness, as a complete otherness.<sup>63</sup> Indifferency of categories of beings in anxiety enables Dasein to experience itself authentically and freely since Dasein encounters itself without any categorial definitions.<sup>64</sup> Anxiety keeps Dasein away from understanding itself through its fallen average everydayness and relations with others. Dasein is also removed from the ordinary understanding of time. By freeing it from its content, anxiety individuates Dasein. If Dasein endures this lack of content and lets anxiety reign over, it drives Dasein to the extremity of its genuine potentiality. He calls this originary point *Augenblick* (the moment of vision) and explains it as 'the look of resolute disclosedness of Dasein for its Da-sein, a Da-sein that in each case is as existing which is always singular and unique'.<sup>65</sup>

What remains making Dasein singular and unique if it is removed even from time? In anxiety, instead of ordinary measurable time, Dasein confronts temporality, i.e. the essence of time, which Heidegger assigns to the essence of Dasein as well. Being free of categories of beings does not mean that Dasein becomes as an abstract empty universal or isolated self-sufficient individual. Rather, it means that in anxiety, Dasein has a chance to experience the disclosure of its uniqueness in its transcendency. It is a

---

<sup>61</sup> The evaluation that Heidegger regards Nothingness as movement belongs to Dr. M. İkbal Bakır, who lectured it in the class "Heidegger" on 6<sup>th</sup> of May 2019 at Ibn Haldun University. For detailed information see Muhammet İkbal Bakır, "L'Absolu et l'Être chez Hegel et Levinas", Phd Thesis, Galatasaray University, 2017, 7-51.

<sup>62</sup> Heidegger, *Metafizik Nedir?*, 43.

<sup>63</sup> Heidegger, *Metafizik Nedir?*, 37.

<sup>64</sup> Heidegger, *Metafizik Nedir?*, 38 and *Being and Time*, 176.

<sup>65</sup> Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 170.

closure, on the one hand, in terms of being removed of categories. On the other, it is a disclosure in the sense of experiencing its authenticity and freedom.

To sum up, Heidegger suggests that in anxiety, Dasein has a chance to experience Nothingness in such a way that categories of beings become indifferent and its freedom and uniqueness disclose themselves. Anxiety is the condition of the realm where Dasein confronts its unveiled essence as a thinking being. However, it does not mean that in anxiety, Dasein becomes an isolated being from the world. Anxiety is not an emotion originated only internally in which Dasein is abstracted from things outside, but it is an existential experience by virtue of *being-in-the-world*. That is, affectivity, in Heidegger's philosophy, is not only associated with individual human being's internal conditions alone as it is so in the history of philosophy, but also closely related to what s/he encounters in his/her world. That's why, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger asserts that the reason for anxiety is not a being, but *being-in-the-world* (in-der-Welt-sein) itself.<sup>66</sup> Then, what does being-in-the-world mean?

### **3.5. The Reason For Anxiety: Being-in-the-World**

After we have seen that anxiety as an essential affectivity bringing thinking and existing together, it is inevitable to explain what Heidegger implies by the phenomenon of being-in-the-world as well as its different modes, i.e. authenticity and inauthenticity, in order to understand how anxiety makes singularity possible.

To understand a phenomenon, Heidegger starts with interpreting it in its finite characteristics and relations, i.e. in its context, because he thinks that they belong to its very essence. He criticizes abstracting things from all their relations and changeable features and reducing their essence to extension as it is done in Cartesian thought. It does not mean that Heidegger refuses extension and spatiality of things at all. Rather, he proposes that there are different existing modes of beings, and that being objectively *present-at-hand* (Vorhandenheit) as a spatial thing which modern sciences concern is a secondary and derivative mode. Thus, he does not take the phenomenon of 'the world' as the totality of all things or a space where things stand side by side. For him, the world can not be separated from Dasein. That is, the world belongs to the essence of

---

<sup>66</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 175.

Dasein. It is something relative and dependent on Dasein in each case as its own construct because Dasein understands itself and its potentiality through its world.<sup>67</sup>

He considers Dasein different from other beings inasmuch as Dasein has essential relations with what is around itself since Dasein consists of not only inside but also outside of itself. In other words, it is not an isolated but open being. Things which it encounters and cares about are also included in its existence. Heidegger expresses the distinction between Dasein and other beings by saying that Dasein *exists* while other beings *are*. For that reason, only Dasein has world although other beings are *worldless* because they can not touch or be together with each other. In the same way, 'to be in' for Dasein is not as a spatial relation of two extended things, i.e. *being-present-at-hand*, like water in the glass since Dasein is not a being which is determined and closed. In German, the preposition 'in' is originated from the word *innan* meaning to dwell, to live, to inhabit. Therefore, Heidegger interprets 'to be in the world' as a fundamental constitution of Dasein signifying to be familiar with, engaged with, to inhabit in the world which belongs to Dasein as a characteristic of itself.<sup>68</sup>

Dasein as being-in-the-world has different modes of existing such as authentic and inauthentic modes all of which are involved in its essence. One of them is being-with (*mit-sein*). In average everydayness (*Alltaglichkeit*), Dasein mostly lives with others, but it does not mean simply that there are other human beings in the same place with Dasein. As mentioned above, Dasein essentially exists as being engaged with what it confronts, so being-with implies to take care, behave toward, deal with, get closer to somebody and something. For instance, Dasein may be closer to someone in a foreign country than the one sitting next to it in the bus since becoming closer to someone is not about metrical distance, but about being familiar with. That's why, Dasein may be alone within a crowd. Even loneliness indicates the mode of being-with of Dasein as its deprivation. It might seem a bit poetical, but it is actually about the the web of meaning which Dasein constructs and is constructed by it at the same time. It does not imply that Dasein lives in an imagined world, which is not real. Rather, it means that Dasein understands itself through what it takes care.

---

<sup>67</sup> Heidegger, *The Essence of Reasons*, 85-87.

<sup>68</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 50-53.

Heidegger claims that being-with-one-another in average everydayness has the character of distantiality(*Abstaendigkeit*). What he means is that Dasein is concerned about the distance and the differences between it and others. This can be sometimes to care for closing the distance when it falls behind others and wants to catch up them, and sometimes to care for keeping the distance when it is ahead of others and wants to maintain its priority over them. Even if it is hidden from itself, Dasein is disturbed by the care about the distance by means of the mode of being-with. This care causes domination of indefinite others over Dasein, which Heidegger calls the-they(*das Man*). Dasein is the-they for the most part. For instance, Dasein watches, judges, enjoys, acts like the-they, and interprets itself through the-they. The distance and difference between Dasein and others disappear when it resigns itself to the-they. Therefore, Dasein's tendency of being-with-one-another results in averageness and levelling down its own possibilities of being. Due to this averageness and levelling down of its possibilities, Dasein experiences itself through average and uniform possibilities of others, so it seems to be substitutable by others. On that account, Heidegger regards this kind of self as dependent, inauthentic, fallen mode of Dasein and names it they-self.<sup>69</sup>

Heidegger does not consider they-self as insignificant or the mode Dasein should avoid although he names it fallenness and inauthenticity of Dasein. Believing that it also belongs to the essence of Dasein, he even begins his existential analysis with examining fallen average everydayness of Dasein in order to reach the right formulation of the question of the meaning of Being. Fallenness or inauthenticity is not about valuableness or morality, but about interpretation of Dasein's diverse manners of existence and their conditions which Heidegger calls fundamental constitutions of Dasein.

Along with the fact that Dasein primarily and mostly lives in the mode of the-they in average everydayness, in anxiety it occasionally has a chance to confront with its own genuine possibilities and understands itself through them because average and uniform possibilities of others are blurred. Therefore, Dasein withdraws from substitutability by the-they and experiences authenticity by virtue of anxiety. This unsubstitutability by noone refers to the very singularity/uniqueness of Dasein.

---

<sup>69</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 118-122.

### 3.6. Conclusion

As we have seen above, Heidegger tries to bring thinking and existing, i.e. abstract universal and concrete individual, together as certain philosophers have done in the history of philosophy since Aristotle. His difference is that he neither reduces the one to the other as in Aristotle, nor unites them in a suspended synthesis by closing the distance between them as in Hegel. Heidegger keeps the distance/difference/otherness between the two with the movement of circling around each other. That movement, however, does not include a foreseeable system because the nature of Being is 'unprecedented exemplar'. Then, the question arises: How do two sides come together while singularity is kept? Affectivity as the phenomenological experience of Dasein is one of the components of the answer to the question. In every mode of its existence, authentic or inauthentic modes, Dasein always understands itself within a mood. As being-in-the-world, Dasein's existence refers to be intended for something, to care for something, i.e. to be outside of itself thanks to the affectivity. In anxiety as a primary affectivity, Nothingness manifests itself resulting in disappearance of categories of beings. Thus, Dasein encounters its authentic possibilities and becomes individuated and unsubstitutable by the-they. In that sense, anxiety plays a role as a temporal closure to the-they. On the other sense, it is a disclosure to its ownmost, unsubstitutable potentiality of being, i.e singularity.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **TEMPORALITY AND SINGULARITY**

#### **4.1. Introduction**

In the previous chapter, we have discussed that anxiety as a primary affectivity of Dasein plays a significant role in bringing thinking/universal and being/individual together, not by reducing one to the other as in classical philosophy or by a synthesis in predictable system as in Hegel, but by the unique and unprecedented movement of Being and beings. This movement shows itself in anxiety as Nothingness melting categories of beings, so Dasein becomes independent from all boundaries of categories, even from concepts of subject, object and calculated time. What remains behind, Heidegger claims, is the essence of time, i.e. temporality. In this chapter, at first, we will examine considerations of certain philosophers about time in general. Before analyzing the details of Heidegger's interpretation of time and its relation to singularity, it would be advantageous to trace their impacts on him in order to comprehend his arguments and critiques clearly. We will chase these questions throughout the chapter: Does time exist apart from beings or do we, as humans, assume its existence through motion of beings? How does Heidegger criticize classical understanding of time? On what does he establish his view? What does temporality imply as the essence of time? How does temporality relate to singularity?

#### **4.2. An Overview of Time Considerations Throughout Temporality**

Firstly, we will investigate the classical questions about time in the history of philosophy briefly. Does time exist apart from beings or do we, as humans, assume its existence through motion of beings? Is it just the production of our minds or does it really exist in the external world? We begin with the first detailed examination of time, i.e. that of Aristotle. For him, time exists as something which belongs to movement

while it is not the movement itself. As an attribute of the movement, time is the number of the movement in terms of before and after. Because it is a number of something continuous, it is also continuous. As a limit of time, now(nun) holds past and future together as a continuous whole. At the same time, it divides time potentially. In that sense, it is always different, but as something connecting one time to another, it is always the same. In this respect, the now is similar the point in mathematical lines. To be in time means to be measured by time since it is a measure of change and rest.

Then, what change do we take as the measure? The uniform circular movement of the world, for Aristotle, is the movement which we take as the measure because its number is the most comprehensible due to its uniformity. Moreover, he questions whether time would exist if the spirit, which counts change and rest, does not exist. He claims that time would exist if there is no spirit. For, time is an attribute of movement which is numerable, so the one which is numerable can exist even if the one who numbers does not exist. In short, Aristotle would answer our questions in such a way that time exists objectively in the external world inasmuch as it is dependent on the movement of things which can be measured, and independent from who measures it.<sup>70</sup>

In Descartes' philosophy, time exists in our thinking. He differentiates time from duration. Duration implies to endure, so duration is not distinct from substance in reality, but we differentiate it in thought as an attribute of things.<sup>71</sup> Descartes argues that the duration of our life is the evidence for the existence of God because he assumes that duration consists of parts which are neither coexistent and self-created, nor mutually determined by one another, so there has to be a producer in order to maintain its parts/moments continually. Since things can not continue to exist on their own at every moment, duration of things proves the existence of God.<sup>72</sup> That is, Descartes relates the duration of something to its very existence. On the other hand, time as the measure of motion is only a certain mode under which we think of duration itself. For, we do not indeed conceive the duration of things that are moved to be different from the duration of things that are not moved. It follows that time is dependent on our thinking just like the numbers and orders, i.e. universals, while duration exists the

---

<sup>70</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, trans. Robin Waterfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 102-117, 193.

<sup>71</sup> Rene Descartes, *Felsefenin İlkeleri*, trans. Mehmet Karasan (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1963), 61-67.

<sup>72</sup> Descartes, *Felsefenin İlkeleri*, 40.

things in themselves as their attributes which can be differentiated from the things only by thought. Unlike duration of things, time and universals do not exist outside of our thinking.<sup>73</sup>

As said above, Aristotle takes time as a measurable attribute of movement existing independently from who measures it. In Descartes, although time as an accident of duration is dependent on the thinking subject as universals, duration as an attribute of existing things exists independently from the subject. When it comes to Augustine, we encounter a different approach to the question of time in terms of dependency on the subject. Augustine implies in his *Confessions* that time can be seen nowhere except in the spirit. He thinks that we can not measure past and future because they do not exist themselves at the moment. What we call past, present and future is respectively what is remembered, what is considered, and what is expected in our mind. In the same way, 'a long past' means a long memory of the past and 'a long future' signifies a long expectation of the future. Therefore, we measure not the time itself, but the presence of things past in our memory, the presence of things present in our sight, and presence of things future in our expectation.<sup>74</sup> That's to say, for Augustine, time exists depending on the remains of what has been experienced in the spirit.

In *The Concept of Time*, Heidegger paraphrases certain parts from *Confessions* of Augustine and appreciates him inasmuch as Augustine ventured asking whether the spirit is time itself, but Heidegger claims also that Augustine left the question there and did not go further.<sup>75</sup> We will see the passage of Augustine with its English translation below in order to investigate whether there is a difference between Heidegger's interpretation of the text and its original.

It is in thee, my mind, that I measure times. Interrupt me not, that is, interrupt not thyself with the tumults of thy impressions. In thee I measure times; the impression, which things as they pass by cause in thee, remains even when they are gone; this it is which still present, I measure, not the things which pass by to make this impression. This I measure, when I measure times. Either then this is time, or I do not measure times.<sup>76</sup>

---

<sup>73</sup> Descartes, *Felsefenin İlkeleri*, 61-63.

<sup>74</sup> Augustine, *The Confessions of Saint Augustine: Webster's Thesaurus Edition*, ed. Philip M. Parker (San Diego: Icon Classics, 2005), 210-218.

<sup>75</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Concept of Time, Der Begriff der Zeit*, trans. William McNeill (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 5E, 6E.

<sup>76</sup> In Latin, it is "In te, anime meus, tempora metior; noli mihi obstrepere: quod est; noli tibi obstrepere turbis affectionum tuarum. In te, inquam, tempora metior; affectionem quam res praetererunt in te faciunt, et cum illae praeterierint manet, ipsam metior praesentem, non ea quae praeterierunt ut fieret:

When we compare Augustine's text above with Heidegger's explanation on it<sup>77</sup>, we notice that Heidegger interprets the phrase "the impression, which things as they pass by cause in the spirit, remains even they are gone" as affectivity (Befindlichkeit) of present Dasein. Heidegger explicitly designates affectivity for what is actually measured when we measure time while Augustine does not put a special emphasis on affects. Augustine uses in his *Confessions* not only 'impression' for the remains which we measure, but also other phrases such as 'what is remembered' and 'the memory of the past' signifying that measure of time is actually not about the things outside but about the spirit. With this contribution of Augustine, affectivity shows its significance in Heidegger's philosophy here again. As mentioned in the previous chapter, affectivity is a fundamental constitution of Dasein disclosing the world. It substitutes here for what is actually measured when we measure time.

Apart from Augustine, it would be beneficial to mention Bergson's account of time briefly as another name to whom Heidegger refers in his works. Bergson proposes that duration is the successiveness of different states of a consciousness that has memory. This successiveness is the continuity of the states which are set into one another by memory. In consciousness, states are found inside of one another. Duration is not an extended straight line homogeneously but broadening circle which stays identical and changes at the same time. That is, we do not have two completely identical moments in our existence. In this sense, duration is what manifests itself to each of us individually. For instance, my consciousness has the feeling of its own duration. However, it does not follow from this that there is only my consciousness and my duration in the universe. There are other consciousness and durations apart from mine in the amount of simple substances. Every consciousness has its own duration which is nothing but the evolution of its own story. Then, what is homogeneous time? How does it manifest itself as a line on which our successive states are placed? Bergson asserts that time is an empty homogeneous milieu which shows what is common in personal durations. For him, it can be said that unlimited time is an impersonal consciousness which does not belong to anyone. Homogeneous time is nothing but the

---

ipsam metior, cum tempora metior." See Augustine, *The Confessions of Saint Augustine*, 217 and *The Concept of Time*, 6.

<sup>77</sup> "Die Befindlichkeit messe ich in dem gegenwertigen Dasein, nicht die Dinge, welche vorübergehen, dass sie erst entstünde. Mein Mich-befinden selbst, ich wiederhole es, messe ich, wenn ich die Zeit messe." in Heidegger, *The concept of Time*, 6.

transfer of the common element in all durations just as space is the expression and the transfer of some dynamic relations between substances.<sup>78</sup>

Heidegger refers to Bergson in *Being and Time* when he evaluates origins of ordinary concept of time since Aristotle. He claims that Aristotle's interpretation of time is the first detailed interpretation which determined basically all subsequent analyses including Bergson's.<sup>79</sup> For Heidegger, Bergson regards time as space which is quantitative succession and describes duration as its counter which is qualitative succession.<sup>80</sup> As far as we are concerned, Heidegger criticizes him with reducing time to space and regards Bergson's interpretation within the framework of psychological/psychological analyses of time. He distinguishes Dasein's analysis from any anthropological, biological and psychological accounts which he accuses of concerning Dasein's way of existence as any other things.<sup>81</sup> That's why, he finds Bergson's interpretation of time ontologically indeterminate and insufficient.<sup>82</sup>

To sum up, Heidegger criticizes Aristotle that he does not problematize the condition of the possibility of ordinary concept of time.<sup>83</sup> In the same way, he finds Augustine's questioning as unfinished even if he acknowledges his contribution. He also accuses Bergson's account of being ontologically inadequate. As a matter of course, Heidegger disregards neither Aristotelian or Cartesian concepts of time, which are homogeneous, measurable and objectified, nor Bergson's duration, which is inhomogeneous, impersonal and unique to every consciousness. Nonetheless, he claims that these kinds of time are grounded by a more essential one, namely temporality. Heidegger formulates temporality as the essential character of Dasein which means time is dependent on the human being. In this sense, it seems similar to Kant's account of time, which is a form of intuition of human being. What differs in Heidegger from Kant is that primordial time is not only psychological as in Kant but also physical as in Aristotle. In other words, it is neither subjective, nor objective. Rather, it is prior to any subjectivity and objectivity inasmuch as it serves as the condition of the possibility of

---

<sup>78</sup> Henri Bergson, *Metafizik Dersleri Giriş: Uzay, Zaman, Madde*, trans. B. G. Beşiktaşlıyan, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (İstanbul: Pinhan Yayıncılık, 2019), 49-53.

<sup>79</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 23.

<sup>80</sup> Heidegger, 'Author's Notes' in *Being and Time*, 407.

<sup>81</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 40, 41.

<sup>82</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 306

<sup>83</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 385, 386.

that priority.<sup>84</sup> In the following passage, we will examine how Heidegger establishes temporality as the essence of time depending on Dasein.

### 4.3. Time and Temporality

It is not too much to say that Heidegger's fundamental ontology is based on temporality, which he sees as the essence of time. He differentiates conventional understanding of time from temporality and calls them vulgar concept of time and primordial or original concept of time respectively. His interpretation of time is closely related to his understanding of being. Just like his assumption of the ambiguous and unclosed distance between Being and beings, he also suggests an unclosed distance between time and temporality. His way of analysing the phenomenons is also the same in such a way that he begins with examining everyday usage of time, proceeds with destructing it and with claiming its derivativeness, and then he ends up with explaining temporality as the ground of time. He also places special importance on uniqueness in his inquiry of time just as he does so in his analysis of being.

For Heidegger, just like determining and freezing Being designates levelling down Being to beings, calculating time also denotes bringing it down to something present at hand. Measuring time makes it public and recognizable.<sup>85</sup> When we look at the clock which supplies us with equal duration that is arbitrarily divided and steadily repeated, we level down time to a uniform, homogeneous and numerically determined thing. Time manifests itself in the vulgar understanding as a succession and a flow of objectified nows which disappear and appear concurrently. Heidegger suggests that this understanding of time, as things present-at-hand within a fallen mode of existence of Dasein, is possible only by a more primary one, which is ecstatic and horizontal temporality. Ordinary understanding of time covers over the wholeness of temporality within a web of meaning and its inhomogeneous character. It is flattened to a sequence of numbered nows. However, ecstatic temporality includes three ecstasies of time, i.e. present, past and future, simultaneously.

---

<sup>84</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 384, 385.

<sup>85</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 384.

How does Dasein experience three ecstasies of time simultaneously? As mentioned in the previous chapter, categories of beings are melted in anxiety. Heidegger asserts that while becoming indifferent to Dasein, beings withdraw from it in 'the single and unitary universal horizon of time'. We encounter beings in three perspectives of time, namely respect, retrospect and prospect corresponding to present, having-been/past and future respectively. With these perspectives, Heidegger points out neither any theoretical or contemplative understanding nor mere perception. Instead, he intends all activities of Dasein that moves perpetually in the united simultaneity of these perspectives. These perspectives are not arranged on a line side by side, but essentially united in the horizon of time although one perspective is preferred and another is concealed. In anxiety, Dasein does not bother about calculating time. There is a moment as 'a flash of lightening', and in this moment specifically, the entire time of Dasein is given itself completely. It is not a spanned 'now', explicitly integrated or demarcated in accordance with past and future. Dasein confronts neither a mere past, present or future, nor all of them calculated together, but rather 'their unarticulated unity in the simplicity of this unity of their horizon all at once'. By all these, Heidegger does not qualify the horizon clearly but underlines the fact that this withdrawal of beings as a whole in anxiety enables Dasein in the midst of beings to encounter the unity of temporal horizon of time in which Dasein in each case is itself as a whole.<sup>86</sup> He calls this moment *Augenblick* (the moment of vision) which he explains as the look of disclosedness of Dasein. In that look, Dasein is in each case individuated in regards to itself and exists as singular and unique.<sup>87</sup>

#### 4.4. Temporality as Care

As of *being-in-the-world*, Dasein is characterized as *care(Sorge)*, which is a mode of primary affectivity of Dasein, i.e. anxiety. Dasein is engaged with its own world in which it always cares for and concerns about. While Dasein is existing, it understands itself depending on its own possibilities, so its existence is itself intended for what it is not yet. In anxiety, Dasein is free for its own potentiality for being, in other words, for the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity. Because Dasein exists as being

---

<sup>86</sup> Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 145-148.

<sup>87</sup> Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 170.

for the sake of its own possibilities, it is always beyond itself. Heidegger calls this character of Dasein *being-ahead-of-itself*.<sup>88</sup>

The feature of being-ahead-of-itself implies that Dasein understands itself depending on the future. Unlike modern thought, Heidegger suggests that the basic phenomenon of time is not the present, but the future. It does not mean that Dasein lives in an unreal, nonfactual world which becomes actual in the forthcoming days. Rather, it signifies that Dasein understands itself through its potentiality for being which involves its past, present and future as a whole. Heidegger names this character of understanding of Dasein as projection(Entwurf). It is not simply about understanding itself in terms of an arranged plan for the future. That would be reducing Dasein, whose existence denotes potentiality, to a determined given content. Instead, it is about concerning itself as being thrown into its possibilities or as the disclosedness of its world.<sup>89</sup>

Heidegger relates projection and disclosedness to transcendency of Dasein. As said in the first chapter, Heidegger does not use transcendency as surpassing a boundary before the subject and afterwards reaching what is original. What he intends by transcendence is "what is unique to Dasein-unique not as one among other possible, and occasionally actualized, types of behaviour but as a basic constitutive feature of Dasein that happens prior to all behaviour."<sup>90</sup> Transcendence is the primary character of Dasein which makes its existence and its subjectivity possible. Dasein exists as transcendent, not because it, as subject, reaches higher levels after overcoming objectified beings, but because Dasein is always ahead of itself. It indicates that there is a distance between itself, and it surpasses what is disclosed to itself as beings. Then, toward what does Dasein transcend and what does it reach? Heidegger replies the question by asserting that Dasein transcends toward the world which is not a being. The essential feature of Dasein's world is being for the sake of its possibilities. Dasein reaches its selfhood in surpassing since Dasein is identified with its own world.<sup>91</sup> Do these all mean that Dasein lives in its own-constructed and isolated world closed to outside of itself? Quite the contrary, being ahead of itself and being for the sake of its possibilities announce to stand outside of itself, namely ek-statis. Dasein as a

---

<sup>88</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 179.

<sup>89</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 136, 137.

<sup>90</sup> Heidegger, *The Essence of Reasons*, 35, 37.

<sup>91</sup> Heidegger, *The Essence of Reasons*, 39, 41.

transcendent being exists in each case as what it is not, i.e. otherness. For the very reason, it is always singular.

As a transcendent being that projects itself to its own possibilities, Dasein interprets itself in each case in reference to its own world in a certain affectivity. As *being-in-the-world*, Dasein is identified with where it dwells in and whatever it is occupied with. Also as *being-with-one-another*, it is closely related to whoever it encounters and concerns, so Dasein can be abstracted neither from its own current mood and attributes, nor from its average everydayness.<sup>92</sup> For that reason, Heidegger states that all fundamental characters of Dasein unites in *Jeweiligkeit* as *Jemeinigkeit* of Dasein when he explains its essential constitutions.<sup>93</sup> The word *jeweilig* signifies 'at this particular time, regarding this particular individual', and *jemeinig* means 'in-each-case-mine'.<sup>94</sup> What does Heidegger imply with these terms in terms of temporality? He underlines temporal particularity of Dasein as always-its-own-being. What Dasein questions and makes an issue in its world at first is not certain universal categories determined by representational thinking, but in each case its own particular existence within a particular mood. Even its average everydayness is grounded on its in-each-case-mineness. Because it understands itself with respect to its own potentiality for being, its existence resists a common definition. Others can not substitute for Dasein since it is never others. In-each-case-mineness individualizes Dasein in such a way that its way of existence can not be thematized or defined with certain universals like things objectified and determined as present-at-hand.<sup>95</sup> Therefore, it can be said that Heidegger's concept of in-each-case-mineness makes a sign to singularity/uniqueness of Dasein's way of existence.

The ecstatic, transcendent existence of Dasein referring in each case to its own world alludes in Heidegger's philosophy to the concept of finitude. In *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, he introduces three questions, namely "What is world?", "What is finitude?" and "What is individuation?" as the questioning essence of time, i.e.

---

<sup>92</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 178-183 and *The Concept of Time*, 7E-9E.

<sup>93</sup> Heidegger, *The Concept of Time*, 8E.

<sup>94</sup> For the translation of *Jeweiligkeit*, the phrases like 'each particular time', 'always', 'at this particular time regarding this particular individual' and 'temporal particularity' are used in 'Lexicon' at the end of *Being and Time*, 448. Also 'specificity' is used in *The Concept of Time*, 8E.

<sup>95</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 40, 41.

temporality of Dasein.<sup>96</sup> He places this questioning into the center of his fundamental ontology which intends to bring actuality and possibility together. In the following passage, we can observe the crucial function of this questioning in the task of his ontology.

This questioning will bring us to the brink of possibility, the possibility of restoring to Dasein its actuality of Dasein, that is its existence. Yet between this uttermost brink of possibility and actuality of Dasein there lies a very fine line. This is a line which one can never merely glide across, but one which man can only leap over in dislodging his Dasein. Only individual action itself can dislodge us from this brink of possibility into actuality, and this is the moment of vision.<sup>97</sup>

The questioning world, finitude and individuation serves as a bridge to the edge of possibility of Dasein while the moment of vision(Augenblick), provides a spring<sup>98</sup> which brings possibility and actuality of Dasein together. Then, what does this questioning unfold in Heidegger's philosophy? Heidegger declares that he formulates these three questions in such a way that finitude is raised as the vital question unifying the others as their root.<sup>99</sup> Here we will mainly touch on the concept of finitude as we have discussed in the previous chapters the concept of world regarding *being-in-the-world* and the issue of individuation regarding singularity.

#### **4.5. Finitude**

In ancient philosophy, philosophers search for unchangeable eternal veritas behind changeable things which are seen as accidental. In medieval philosophy, finite and infinite beings become two different categories inasmuch as contingent/changeable beings are finite while the necessary being is infinite. When it comes to Hegel, infinite and indetermined being needs finite being and determination in order to be actual. That is, finitude becomes essential for infinite being.

In Heidegger's philosophy, finitude is directly related to the question of Being. In *Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger discusses the essential connection between the question of Being and the finitude in human beings. As usual, he does not

---

<sup>96</sup> Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 170-173.

<sup>97</sup> Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 173.

<sup>98</sup> Mentioned in the first chapter regarding concept of *Ereignis*.

<sup>99</sup> Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 170.

give a strict definition of finitude. For him, through imperfections of human beings, it can only be evident that human being is finite. Nevertheless, the questions of wherein the essence of this finitude exists, and of how the finitude completely determines human beings remain unanswered. Thereby, he explains his ontology as the displaying of the constitution of the Being of Dasein, and what makes his ontology fundamental is the finitude of Dasein in which the possibility of metaphysics is found as its basis.<sup>100</sup>

In his fundamental ontology, Heidegger handles the question of Being with the elucidation of Dasein's existence. Because the essence of Dasein lies in existence, which is finitude in itself, Dasein should be interpreted in its finitude. His existential ontology starts with the analysis of Dasein's everydayness aiming at the understanding of Being. In the following passage, it is possible to see how Heidegger designates the finitude of Dasein, i.e. its existence, as the understanding of Being.

As a mode of Being, existence is in itself finitude, and as such it is only possible on the basis of the understanding of Being. There is and must be something like Being where finitude has come to exist. Thus, the understanding of Being which thoroughly dominates human existence, although unknown in its breadth, constancy, indeterminacy, and indisputability, manifests itself as the innermost ground of human finitude. Compared with many other human peculiarities, the understanding of Being does not have the harmless universality of others which frequently occur. Its "universality" is the originality of the innermost ground of the finitude of Dasein. Only because the understanding of Being is the most finitude in what is finite, can it also make possible the so-called "creative" capacities of the finite human creature. And only because it occurs within the ground of finitude, does it have the breadth and constancy, but also the concealedness, previously characterized.<sup>101</sup>

Regarding the text above, it can be suggested that Dasein has its disclosedness and uniqueness/singularity by the virtue of the fact that the understanding of Being manifests itself on the basis of finitude. Heidegger explains that with the thrownness and transcendence of Dasein. As being thrown into possibilities, Dasein understands itself through what is not-yet. This makes Dasein to be always ahead of itself, i.e. transcendent. Therefore, he claims that the thrownness of Dasein makes a reference to its transcendental finitude in which Dasein is in need of the understanding of Being. The unity of the transcendental construction of this neediness emerging from finitude manifests itself as care(Sorge).<sup>102</sup>

---

<sup>100</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. enlarged, trans. Richard Taft (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), 154-163.

<sup>101</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics*, 160.

<sup>102</sup> Heidegger, *Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics*, 165.

As said before, the structure of 'being for the sake of' characterizes Dasein in such a way that Dasein understands itself through its own possibilities. Dasein's end is not something in the future awaits externally, but it is an essential characteristic of Dasein since Dasein is in each case futural. Therefore, finitude, for Heidegger, is neither an accidental feature of a substance supplemented to it subsequently as in the ancient philosophy, nor the negation of the infinite and as in Hegel.<sup>103</sup> Rather, finitude of Dasein is its essential characteristic which conditions understanding of Being. Related to Nothingness, which Dasein confronts in anxiety as its primary experience, finitude has different forms regarding possibilities of Dasein. Death, not as passing away but as an utmost and unique possibility of Dasein is also a form of finitude which we will explain in framework of singularity in the next chapter.

#### **4.6. Conclusion**

Heidegger places temporality of Dasein into the heart of his fundamental ontology which tries to bring actuality and potentiality together on the one hand, thinking/universal and being/individual on the other. He proposes that as the root of the questions of world, finitude and individuation in their own unity and relation, temporality stands for the ground of all the questions of metaphysics, what he calls the question of Being.<sup>104</sup> This is neither an empty, formal or logical ground, nor psychic, psychological or antropological investigation. Rather, it is dependent on the experiences of Dasein as being always ahead of itself. Consequently, it can be said clearly that temporality is the basic constitutive of singularity of Dasein in its ecstatic/transcendent/projected, so unique existence.

---

<sup>103</sup> Heidegger declares that he does not seek for a knowledge of finitude which will be absolute by way of mediation as in Hegel. Rather, for Heidegger, the analysis of the essence of finitude must always be fundamentally finite and can never become infinite. See Heidegger, *Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics*, 166.

<sup>104</sup> Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 170.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **DEATH AND SINGULARITY**

#### **5.1. Introduction**

In the previous chapter, we have analyzed that temporality is one of Dasein's essential characters which gives rise to uniqueness of its being. Dasein's existence is futural that makes it being ahead of its possibilities. Heidegger takes Dasein's uttermost phenomenon in its future, namely death, as its most distinguishing possibility which discloses its authentic and singular being. In this chapter, we will consider how the concept of death refers to singularity of Dasein during its entire life.

#### **5.2. Concept of Death from an Overview**

A preliminary remark on death will secure our examination of Heidegger's concept of death and prepare the way for its relation to singularity. From ancient to contemporary philosophy, there have been lots of theories about the meaning of death in diverse aspects. The focus of this part of the chapter is not to sort and summarize all those theories, but to present only a few of them as a preparatory comment in order to understand the place of Heidegger's concept. Regarding Heidegger's existential analysis of death, we try to examine accounts of different philosophers with respect to the function of thought of death in 'this world'. That is, we can neither touch upon sophisticated metaphysical interpretations of death depending on the afterlife, nor evaluate psychological or scientific interpretations of death depending on the body due to the frame of our study.

To begin with, it could be said that concept of death in Plato symbolises an unreplaceable phenomenon which plays a role of the condition to reach the truth both in this life and in the afterlife. Plato states that devoting oneself to philosophy is in a sense a practice of death in the life. Death means withdrawal of the soul from the body

which is the prison of the soul. Only after death one can reach the truth because the body occupies him with its needs. In order to come closer to pure knowledge in the life, one has to be free as much as possible from desires of the body which keep him away from wisdom. By searching for the truth, philosophers are those who try to avoid relation with the body. That's why, philosophers practice dying throughout the life.<sup>105</sup>

For Aristotle, death means losing warmth of the body since life endures as long as the warmth continues.<sup>106</sup> Apart from this physical interpretation, Aristotle mentions 'noble death' in *Nichomechaen Ethics* when he describes features of courageous people who are not afraid of even the most frightened thing, i.e. death. He argues that brave people show courage not in all forms of death but in noble ones, especially death in battles which is the most honorable of all.<sup>107</sup> This argument of Aristotle is compatible with the concept of 'beautiful death' of the warriors used in Athenian funeral orations. As it is known in Homeric epics, the beautiful death in battles raises the warrior to a state of immortality because by means of the achievement of *aretē*, it assures him of indisputable fame as the man of virtue and bravery.<sup>108</sup>

Augustine has a different account of death. He suggests that one begins to head constantly towards death since his birth. Thus, it can be said that one is never in life from the moment he inhabits in this body which is dying rather than living. When he makes an issue of three times, i.e. before death, in death and after death, which correspond to the three states of a human, i.e. living, dying and dead, he argues that it is so difficult to define the state of 'in death' or dying because neither before nor after death, can it be said that he is 'in death'. While one is living, it is called 'he is living'. After his soul departs, it is called 'he is dead'. Dying does not have a place between these two states. In the following passage, what could be interesting in terms of

---

<sup>105</sup> Plato, *Phaedo* in *Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 55-58 (64b, 66b-e, 67b).

<sup>106</sup> Aristoteles, , "Gençlik ve İhtiyarlık, Yaşam ve Ölüm Üzerine" *Doğa Bilimleri Üzerine (Parva naturalia)*, 2. Basım, trans. Elif Günçe (İstanbul: Morpa Kültür Yayınları, 2004), 4, (469b5-20) in *Ölüm Kitabı: Ölüm Düşüncesinin Temel Metinleri*, ed. Kaan H. Ökten, 2. basım (İstanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, 2016).

<sup>107</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. and ed. Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 49, (1115a24 - 1115b6).

<sup>108</sup> Jean- Pierre Vernant, "A 'Beautiful Death' and The Disfigured Corpse in Homeric Epic", in *Mortals and Immortals: Collected Essays* ed. Froma I. Zeitlin (Princeton/ New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991), 50-51.

Heidegger's philosophy is that Augustine associates the state of death to the present time which is hard to determine.

Never, then, is he dying, that is, comprehended in the state of death. So also in the passing of time,—you try to lay your finger on the present, and cannot find it, because the present occupies no space, but is only the transition of time from the future to the past. Must we then conclude that there is thus no death of the body at all?... But not only does it now exist, but so grievous a thing is it, that no skill is sufficient either to explain or to escape it.<sup>109</sup>

As in his account of time, Augustine's consideration about death also reminds us of Heidegger's way of understanding death with respect to time in the life.

In the medieval age, imprints of thoughts of Plato and Aristotle are seen on many philosophers along with metaphysical elaborations. For instance, Avicenna affirms that there are two kinds of death: volitional death and natural death. By natural death, the substance of soul (nafs) departs from the body and reaches eternity in the afterlife. By volitional death, one kills all kind of desires and abandons fondness of desires. He refers to Plato in such a way that he advises one to die of one's own will in order to revive with the nature.<sup>110</sup>

When it comes to Descartes, death has become more about the body rather than the soul. He declares that the movements and the warmth of the body does not depend on the soul. On the contrary, because organs of the body break down and the warmth terminates, the soul leaves. Death does not occur due to the leaving of the soul, but happens due to decay of the body just like a broken machine.<sup>111</sup>

Hegel's distinguishing approach to death has influenced many philosophers including Heidegger. In Hegelian terminology, death signifies the negation of the life of Spirit itself, which is an essential moment of the dialectical process. The life actualizes itself through confrontation with death as its otherness which is also itself. In this sense, death is not something from outside supplemented to the life at its end. Rather, the movement of Spirit includes its own destruction. Spirit does not keep itself away from

---

<sup>109</sup> Augustine, "Book 13, chapters 10,11" in *The City of God*, trans. Marcus Dods, Vol. 1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark), [https://www.gutenberg.org/files/45304/45304-h/45304-h.htm#Page\\_521](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/45304/45304-h/45304-h.htm#Page_521) accessed May 28, 2020.

<sup>110</sup> İbn Sina, *Ölüm Korkusundan Kurtuluş*, trans. M. Hazmi Tura (İstanbul: Bürhaneddin Matbaası, 1942) in *Ölüm Kitabı: Ölüm Düşüncesinin Temel Metinleri*, ed. Kaan H. Ökten, 2. basım, (İstanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, 2016), 147-151.

<sup>111</sup> Rene Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul* in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Vol.I, trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 328-330.

dismemberment. On the contrary, only in its dissolution, it finds its truth and maintains itself. Therefore, it can be said that death is the power of Spirit not only to extinguish itself, but also to bring itself to life.<sup>112</sup>

Then, can it be asserted that death in Heidegger's philosophy is a negation as it is in Hegel? It is obvious that there is a dialectical aspect in Heidegger's account of death inasmuch as he sees death as a phenomenon of life in the widest sense.<sup>113</sup> However, Heidegger criticizes Hegelian negation because it is negation of beings. Additionally, death is not a possibility in Hegel as it is in Heidegger, but the condition of dialectical process of self-realization. That's why, Heidegger would not say that death is a negation. Rather, regarding its character of being the possibility of absolute impossibility of existence, death can be seen as a mode of Nothingness by which Dasein becomes free of boundaries of beings. Authentic being towards death makes Dasein indifferent to concerning about beings. Thus, its own possibilities disclose themselves and it can understand itself via concerning not possibilities in the-they but its genuine potentiality of being.

Another philosopher whose impact can be seen on Heidegger's concept of death is Kierkegaard. His account of death could be examined within the framework of existentialism. He states that the thought of death for an earnest person provides one's life with the most suitable power. Thought of death makes one attentive in the life as nothing else does. It can stimulate living when earnestness strains the thought. Then, what does Kierkegaard mean with earnestness? While not interpreting the term explicitly, he places hesitating person opposed to earnest person by claiming that the former is only an observer to steady conflict of the border between life and death. Hesitating person's life consists of only doubt about his situations, and ending of his life is a delusion, too. The earnest person, however, becomes friend with opponents and finds his most faithful friend in 'the earnest thought of death'.<sup>114</sup>

The distinctive thing in his thought is the relation between earnestness in life and the function of death on it. He claims that death is the teacher of earnestness who is assigned to everyone at birth for an entire lifetime. How does death teach one to be

---

<sup>112</sup> Hegel, "Preface: On Scientific Cognition" in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 19.

<sup>113</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 229.

<sup>114</sup> Soren Kierkegaard, *Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions* in *The Essential Kierkegaard*, ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna. H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 167.

earnest? Kierkegaard corresponds the certainty of death to earnestness, and the uncertainty of death to the instruction and the practice of earnestness. While certainty of death is signified with 'unchanging', uncertainty of death is expressed with the statement of 'It is possible.' The particularity and the daily concerns of one's life occur with the help of the uncertainty. Certainty confirms them at the same time. The uncertainty of death teaches one constantly to pay attention to the certainty of death by means of practising the thought of certainty. Only then, earnestness comes into being.<sup>115</sup>

As far as we concerned, earnestness here is a kind of authenticity in which the possibility of death makes the certainty of death experienced in every second. That is the only strength which endows one with grasping moments of life and getting into the act genuinely. In this sense, it seems similar to Heidegger's account of death in terms of its relation to authenticity and potentiality of being as we will see more precisely in the following sections.

### **5.3. The Main Difference of Heidegger's Account of Death From Others**

Heidegger aims to constitute a fundamental ontology which is prior to any metaphysical, psychological, antropological, scientific and religious approaches by grounding them. As that applies to his analysis of all phenomenons, his existential analysis of death also comes before the interpretations of biology, psychology, theodicy, and theology of death. For him, if Dasein is characterized by being-in-the-world, it is not possible to say something about 'after death', which implies not being-in-the-world anymore. Without questioning what it means to be living and what it implies to encounter death in a genuine sense, theologies and metaphysics have certain theories about dying as a point at which Dasein runs out of its life. Related to this critique, Heidegger defines his examination of death merely "this-worldly" because when he speaks of death, he means neither passing away physically, nor entering the afterlife. That is, he takes death not as an opposition of life which appears at the end of the life, but as the phenomenon of life<sup>116</sup> which Dasein phenomenologically

---

<sup>115</sup> Kierkegaard, *Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions* in *The Essential Kierkegaard*, 164-169.

<sup>116</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 229.

experiences in the life itself. If Dasein confronts with death throughout the life, how does it happen?

#### 5.4. Being Toward a Possibility

Heidegger's 'this-worldly' analysis of death tries to show that death engages in actual Dasein as its unique possibility.<sup>117</sup> What does it mean that death is a possibility? Before examining death as a possibility, we need to remember the meaning of possibility in Heidegger's philosophy at first. As mentioned in the second chapter Heidegger takes Dasein entirely as *thrown possibility*. What he implies by possibility is different from its signification in classical metaphysics: Possibility means something which can occur, and which is not actual yet. Ontologically, possibility has a lesser degree than actuality and necessity in metaphysics. However, Heidegger states that "possibility as an existential is the most primordial and the ultimate positive ontological determination of Dasein" apart from an empty logical category of beings.<sup>118</sup> This shows that Heidegger sees possibility not as a secondary but an essential character of Dasein. It can be regarded as a grand shift since Aristotle, who proposes that *energeia* (what is actual) ontologically comes before *dynamis* (what is possible)<sup>119</sup> because Heidegger considers what is a non-being as the positive foundation of Dasein. Then, how can being 'not-yet' be a positive determination of Dasein? In other words, what does it mean to experience a possibility if it is considered as a non-being?

It can be argued from classical point of view that a possibility becomes actual when it is experienced. From Heideggerian standpoint, however, that would be not the case. Dasein always understands itself in a certain affectivity which discloses its possibilities. In a specific affectivity, Dasein projects itself to its possibilities in the future that is not real yet. It always exists depending on its possibilities since it is always ahead of itself as an ek-static, transcendent and temporal being. That makes Dasein to be for the sake of a possibility. Therefore, to experience a possibility for Dasein indicates not the actualization of that possibility, but understanding of itself within an affectivity based on that possibility. In other words, Dasein exists toward its

---

<sup>117</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 230.

<sup>118</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 135.

<sup>119</sup> Aristoteles, *Metafizik*, 408.

possibility. It does not imply that Dasein never actualizes its possibilities, which is Dasein's another mode of being. Rather, it means that a possibility becomes the condition of Dasein's being as long as it maintains to be a possibility.

From an Aristotelian perspective, it can be said that being for the sake of a possibility refers to being toward a telos, i.e. a final cause inasmuch as both possibility and final cause condition existence from the beginning. In addition to this, we suppose that there is a small but crucial difference between becoming a final cause and a possibility in such a way that a possibility does not have to be a determinate and demanded thing while final cause as an aim mostly does so at least from an Aristotelian point of view. For Heidegger, a possibility is mainly related to Nothingness rather than an objectified thing that will be actual in the future as in Aristotle.<sup>120</sup> Nothingness is not a negation of a thing as in classical metaphysics and in Hegel, but a kind of movement which grounds the act of negation as mentioned in the second chapter. Just as Heidegger criticizes metaphysics and western philosophy with reducing Being and Nothingness to beings by defining them within the boundaries of logical categories, so too he would not accept reducing a possibility to a thing. Thus, it can not be said from a Heideggerian standpoint that Dasein exists toward a final cause instead of saying that it exists toward a possibility since Dasein's existence is itself intended for what is non-being even if there is not an end of it in the meaning of an categorised final cause. Indeed, Heidegger states that the analysis of being toward a possibility focuses not on an actualized version of the possibility, but on Dasein's being intended for a possibility.<sup>121</sup>

Dasein's character of being toward a possibility might evoke that Dasein never comprehends itself as a total being because it looks at itself from what it is not-yet. Its incomplete feature perpetually prevails in the essence of Dasein because 'being-there' signifies being toward its possibilities which are not realized yet.<sup>122</sup> Then, does it mean that Dasein can never experience its being as a whole? Heidegger finds a way out of this issue by indicating Dasein's different way of existing from other beings. Being ahead of itself can not be seen as a deficiency or shortcoming of a thing present-at-

---

<sup>120</sup> Aristotle determines potentiality of a thing as its dynamis right before when it is actualized. That's why, he can say that *energeia* comes before *dynamis*. See *Metafizik*, 408.

<sup>121</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 241.

<sup>122</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 219-220.

hand such as an unripe fruit or unfinished building because Dasein exists not as a thing. Even though Dasein is steadily 'not-yet' due to its being intended for its potentiality of being, it is able to experience its being as a whole by the virtue of affectivity. Also thinking and being belong together in such existence as explained in the second chapter. Dasein understands and knows itself not by theoretical thinking, but by affectivity disclosing potentiality of its being as a whole. Anxiety is the primary affectivity in which Dasein confronts with Nothingness through the dissolution of boundaries of beings. In anxiety, Dasein becomes free of categories of beings and finds itself in the disclosedness of its genuine possibilities which are veiled in average everydayness. In this way, Dasein has a chance to encounter its being as a whole.

### **5.5. Death as a Possibility**

The question of death comes in sight following the analysis of being toward a possibility in general. We need to ask at first what death means. Is it something that Dasein experiences at the end of the life? Is it the negation of life? By way of existing as 'being-with' in the-they, Dasein witnesses death of others and knows that it is a possibility for itself too. It is the only way of knowing that it will die sooner or later because as long as it maintains to be Dasein, it can not actually experience its own death. Then, can something that Dasein never experiences belong to Dasein's life? Or is death a thing supplemented to Dasein's life at the end?

We have seen above that a possibility is a positive determination of Dasein because it is an ek-static and transcendent being. It is not necessary that a possibility has to be actualized in order to belong to the life of Dasein. Heidegger does not regard any phenomenon as a thing supplemented to Dasein's life from outside subsequently because Dasein means existing outside since the very beginning. The fact that there is a distance between Dasein and its possibilities does not make those possibilities apart from life of Dasein. To put it another words, in the life of ek-static Dasein, there is not an ontological hierarchy between something possible and actual in Dasein's life although they are different modes of existence. Just like other possibilities, Heidegger also takes death as a positive constituent of its world regardless of that it is possible or actual. Therefore, death can not be regarded as a thing which is added to Dasein's

existence when it passes away. In this sense, death can be neither an opposition, nor a negation of life. Rather, it pertains to the world of Dasein since it was born.

On the other hand, it is the only possibility of Dasein which is never actualized as long as Dasein lives. Death has to continue to be a possibility in the life so that Dasein exists as a *being in the world*. Its being as a possibility is the very condition of Dasein included in it since it was born. When one leaves the world, death ceases to be possible. The only way of death to manifest itself in Dasein is to preserve its aspect of being a possibility. That's why, Heidegger differentiates Dasein's death as a possibility from the actualization of its passing away. He uses the verb *sterben* (to die) for the former while he chooses a different verb *ableben* (to demise) for the latter. The German word *ab-leben* consists of the verb *leben* (to live) and the prefix *ab* (away or off) connotating 'off-life'.<sup>123</sup> When one becomes off-life, death does not belong to Dasein as its condition anymore.

If death has nothing to do with something actual, then we need to ask how does Dasein experience death? It can be said that there are two modes of experiencing death in the life with respect to Dasein's two modes of existence, i.e inauthentic and authentic modes. As it is explained in the previous chapters, Dasein mostly lives in average everydayness with others. Because it acts like others and interprets itself through the-they, Dasein does not encounter itself genuinely in that mode. This fallen and average mode veils its ownmost possibilities since others' interpretation becomes dominant and determines what affectivity Dasein needs to have. That mode designates even what attitude Dasein should have toward death too. The common sense of the-they tells Dasein that death is an opposition of life which it will encounter someday in the future. It will be experienced only once, but not at the moment. The common sense covers up the characteristic of death to be the condition of life in every second. Thus, Dasein becomes calmly indifferent to its death, and stays in a perpetual flight from the most extreme possibility of its existence.

Dasein is not allowed to have anxiety about death in average everydayness in such a way that its aspect of being the condition of life is covered up. Having anxiety of death is neither to contemplate the meaning of death nor to fear from a feeling of a probable pain caused by dying or from any punishment in the afterlife. Rather, it is the primary

---

<sup>123</sup> For a proper translation of *Ableben* as an antinomy of living, I use 'off-life' meaning 'being out of life' instead of the verb 'to demise' which is used for 'to die' in general.

affectivity that keeps Dasein away from taking care of things and from concerning fallen possibilities in the-they because Nothingness prevails there and Dasein is free of borders of beings. By virtue of being kept away from things and the common sense of the-they, Dasein is faced with its ownmost and genuine possibilities as a whole in anxiety. It has a chance to concern about itself absolutely.<sup>124</sup> In other words, the distance between itself is momentarily closed. That is the authentic experience of death in terms of the experience of wholeness. On the one hand, this experience corresponds to the togetherness of life and death. On the other, it reveals the sameness of Being and Nothingness. As mentioned in the second chapter, Heidegger admits that Being and Nothingness belong to each other. It is not because they overlap in their undeterminateness and immediacy as it is the case in Hegel, but because Being is finite in its essence and discloses itself in the transcendence of Dasein with Nothingness.<sup>125</sup> Therefore, it can be said that in anxiety, life and death can be regarded as parallel with Being and Nothingness. That shows Heidegger's monadological interpretation of Dasein which tries to grasp it entirely in every phenomenon.<sup>126</sup>

## 5.6. Death and Singularity

After examining what means death as a possibility, it is inevitable for this study to underline the relation between death and singularity. We have seen that in average everydayness Dasein witnesses deaths of other people because it has a character of being-with others. In this mode, can Dasein understand its own death in a real sense? The feature of being-with always implies being-with-one-another in the same world. However, when one, with whom Dasein exists, passes away, s/he is no longer being-in-the-world while Dasein continues to exist there. They are not in the same world anymore. That's why, Heidegger suggests that Dasein can not be faced with its own death by observing dying of others because its death is unique to itself very much like its being. Moreover, while certain possibilities can be performed by others, death of Dasein precisely can not be represented by another because no one can remove other's

---

<sup>124</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 234, 235, 240.

<sup>125</sup> Heidegger, *Metafizik Nedir?*, 43.

<sup>126</sup> It is possible to see affects of Leibniz on Heidegger's works in some of which he explicitly refers to Leibniz. See *The Essence of the Reasons*, 29, 30.

death from him. Even in the case of sacrificing oneself for the other, one can not prevent death of the other ultimately. Death of Dasein becomes always and substantially its own just like that Dasein always understands its being specifically as in-each-case-mine.<sup>127</sup>

In addition to that, being toward death as the endmost possibility paves the way for the experience of wholeness. Heidegger tries to explain this with the term 'running ahead' (vorlaufen)<sup>128</sup> to death. He describes running ahead as "the authentic and singular future of Dasein." By virtue of being ahead of itself, Dasein turns back its past and present in its being futural. In running ahead, neither its past is just a sequence of points in the time which Dasein has left behind, nor its death is an abrupt rupture of a succession of events which Dasein will have in the future. Rather, Dasein exists in each case as carrying its birth and death on itself because in running ahead Dasein is not in time in usual fashion, but it is the time itself as temporality. Being temporal implies wholeness of Dasein including its past, present and future at the same time.<sup>129</sup> Thus, running ahead to death, Dasein projects itself to its death so that it understands itself with respect to its own genuine possibilities as a whole and exists authentically.<sup>130</sup> This experience of wholeness and authenticity reveals singularity of Dasein.

## 5.7. Conclusion

Heidegger presents a distinctive account of death which carries the essence of his philosophy. Undoubtedly, it is possible to see some traces of certain accounts before him on his analysis of death in terms of taking death as a phenomenon of life. As mentioned above, in Plato, death is identical to make philosophy inasmuch as it is the only way of approaching to the truth in the life by removing the soul from desires of the body. In this sense, death is the unreplaceable phenomenon especially also for this life. Also Augustine admits that one begins to head constantly towards death since his birth. Moreover, in Hegelian terminology, death as an essential moment of the

---

<sup>127</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 221-225.

<sup>128</sup> In German, 'Vor-laufen' consists of the prefix 'vor' and the verb 'laufen' meaning 'running up to the front' or 'running on ahead'. We use it as 'running ahead' because it reminds us Dasein's character of being ahead of itself. Joan Stambaugh translated it as 'anticipation'. See *Being and Time*, 242.

<sup>129</sup> Heidegger, *The Concept of Time*, 11E, 12E, 13E.

<sup>130</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 242.

dialectical process signifies negation of the life of Spirit itself. The movement of Spirit includes its own destruction meaning also its construction in every moment of the life. In addition to these, in Kierkegaard, death is the teacher of earnestness in which the possibility of death makes the certainty of death available in every second. It is the only strength which endows one with grasping moments of life and getting into the act genuinely.

Similar to these philosophers, Heidegger takes death not as an opposition of the life which appears only at the end of the life. Differently from theologies and metaphysics that have certain theories about death as a point at which one runs out of his/her life and passes away to the afterlife, Heidegger takes death as a phenomenological experience of Dasein throughout the life and defines his examination of death merely "this-worldly". What is distinctive in his account is that he considers death as a positive constituents of Dasein's world, i.e. the essential possibility which conditions all the life. It is not something from outside supplemented to the life as its end. Rather, death pertains to life of Dasein from its birth till its abandoning to be in the world.

By means of its ek-static and temporal character, Dasein is always intended for its possibilities. Death differs from other possibilities because Dasein always exists toward death without concerning about its actualization. It is the possibility of the impossibility of existence. Furthermore, death individuates Dasein from the-they because just like being, death has the feature of in-each-case-mineness too. Dasein can not experience death of others in a real sense. This makes death a constituent of singularity of Dasein. Additionally, in anxiety about death, Dasein confronts with its unveiled and authentic potentiality of being as a whole with the help of being kept away from concerning about things in the mode of fallenness. This confrontation endows Dasein with the experience of wholeness genuinely. That points out its singularity in terms of the absolute disclosure, i.e. complete closure of Dasein. To put it another way, it is manifested in anxiety that life and death belong together. As a singular moment, this experience indicates the sameness of Being and Nothingness.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION

Since ancient greek philosophy, there is a main problem which has been discussed throughout all the history of philosophy. Even the way of questioning and concepts used by philosophers differ from time to time, the problem has always been the same: Is there something behind what is seen? In other words, is there anything unchangeable(essentia) beyond what is changeable(existentia)? Does the truth of beings consist of only what is perceived? Plato assumes separated ideas/universals behind doxa/individuals while Aristotle accepts individual substances together with accidents instead of separated ideas. In medieval philosophy, it is discussed as God and created/emanated beings. In Descartes, it is discussed in the framework of soul/mind and body. Kant divides them as numena/thing in itself and phenomena. In Spinoza, they become united as God/Nature. In Hegel, it turns out to be the dialectical movement of Being and Nothing which are the same.

When it comes to Heidegger, the problem shows itself up as not only movement of what-being(essentia) and that-being(existentia) but also the condition of making such difference. Heidegger criticizes metaphysics and all the history of philosophy with determining and freezing the movement of Being by certain categories. Because he accuses all history of philosophy of forgetting the question of Being by reducing Being to beings/things which are defined and frozen he refuses the terminology used before him and creates his own terminology. He proposes a distinction between Being and beings and the movable and enigmatic distance/interval between them. He tries to question the condition of the difference which has been made between essentia and existentia of beings and he claims that this difference appertains to the very essence of Being rather than beings.

Heidegger criticizes not only metaphysics but also modern sciences and technology in such a way that they cover up the question of Being with beings. In this thesis, we have

tried to analyze how Heidegger shows the way of taking this covering off. To be more precise, we have discussed Heidegger's attempt to reveal that the essence of human being, which he names Dasein, has such a constitution that it can experience a spring from representational thinking, which defines and freezes everything, to understanding Being uniquely. For Heidegger, Dasein always understands itself within certain affectivity. That makes thinking and existence identical, differently from representational thinking.

To put it another words, Heidegger tries to bring thinking and being together, i.e. abstract universal and concrete individual, as certain philosophers have done in the history of philosophy since Aristotle. His difference is that he neither reduces the one to the other as in Aristotle, nor unites them in a suspended synthesis by closing the distance between them as in Hegel. Heidegger keeps the distance/difference/otherness between the two with the movement of circling around each other. That movement, however, does not include a foreseeable system because the nature of Being is 'unprecedented exemplar'. The question of how two sides come together while singularity is kept is asked in this thesis. Affectivity as the phenomenological experience of Dasein is given as one of the components of the answer to the question. In every mode of its existence, authentic or inauthentic modes, Dasein always understands itself within a mood. As being-in-the-world, Dasein's existence refers to be intended for something, to care something, i.e. to be outside of itself thanks to the affectivity. In anxiety as a primary affectivity, Nothingness manifests itself resulting in disappearance of categories of beings and individuation of Dasein. In that sense, anxiety plays a role as a closure. On the other sense, it is a disclosure of its ownmost potentiality of being, i.e singularity.

Temporality has been held as another constituent of singularity in the third chapter. Heidegger places temporality of Dasein into the heart of his fundamental ontology which tries to bring actuality and potentiality together on the one hand, thinking/universal and being/individual on the other. He proposes that as the root of the questions of world, finitude and individuation in their own unity and relation, temporality stands for the ground of all the questions of metaphysics, what he calls the question of Being.<sup>131</sup> This is neither an empty, formal or logical ground, nor psychic, psychological or anthropological investigation. Rather, it is dependent on the

---

<sup>131</sup> Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, pp. 170.

experiences of Dasein as being always ahead of itself. Consequently, it can be said clearly that temporality is the basic constitutive of singularity of Dasein in its ecstatic/trancendent/projected, so unique existence.

As the last constituent but not the least, concept of death comes into the scene. Heidegger takes death as a phenomenological experience of Dasein throughout the life differently from theologies and metaphysics that have certain theories about death as a point at which one runs out of his/her life and passes away to the afterlife. He defines his examination of death merely as "this-worldly". What is distinctive in his account is that he considers death as a positive constituent of Dasein's world, i.e. the essential possibility which conditions all the life. It is not something from outside supplemented to the life as its end. Rather, death pertains to life of Dasein from its birth till its abandoning to be in the world. By means of its ek-static and temporal character, Dasein is always intended for its possibilities. Death differs from other possibilities because Dasein always exists toward death without concerning about its actualization. It is the possibility of the impossibility of existence. Furthermore, death individuates Dasein from the-they because just like being, death has the feature of in-each-case-mineness too. This makes death a constituent of singularity of Dasein. Additionally, in anxiety about death, Dasein confronts with its unveiled and authentic potentiality of being as a whole with the help of being kept away from concerning about things in the mode of fallenness. This confrontation endows Dasein with the experience of wholeness genuinely. That points out its singularity in terms of the absolute disclosure, i.e. complete closure of Dasein. To put it another way, it is manifested in anxiety that life and death belong together. As a singular moment, this experience indicates the sameness of Being and Nothingness.

## REFERENCES

- Agamben, Giorgio. *The Coming Community*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
- Alper, Ömer Mahir. *İbn Sina*. İstanbul: İSAM Yayınları, 2008.
- Aquinas, St. Thomas. *On Essence and Being*. Translated by Armand Maurer, 2.d. rev. ed. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968.
- Aristoteles, "Gençlik ve İhtiyarlık, Yaşam ve Ölüm Üzerine" in *Doğa Bilimleri Üzerine (Parva naturalia)*, Translated by Elif Günçe, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. İstanbul: Morpa Kültür Yayınları, 2004. In *Ölüm Kitabı: Ölüm Düşüncesinin Temel Metinleri*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., edited by Kaan H. Ökten, 108-110. İstanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, 2016.
- Aristoteles. *Metafizik*. Translated by Ahmet Arslan. İstanbul: Sosyal Yayınlar, 1996.
- Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*. Translated and edited by Roger Crisp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Aristotle. *Physics*. Translated by Robin Waterfield. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Augustine, "Book 13, Chapters 10, 11" in *The City of God*. Translated by Rev. Marcus Dods, Vol. 1. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 2014. [https://www.gutenberg.org/files/45304/45304-h/45304-h.htm#Page\\_521](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/45304/45304-h/45304-h.htm#Page_521).
- Augustine. *The Confessions of Saint Augustine: Webster's Thesaurus Edition*. Edited by Philip M. Parker. San Diego: Icon Classics, 2005.
- Avicenna. *The Metaphysics of the Healing*. Translated by Michael E. Marmura. Provo UT: Brigham Young University, 2005.
- Bakır, M.İkbal. "l'affectivité chez Descartes et Heidegger", M.A. Thesis, Galatasaray University, 2010.
- Bakır, Muhammet İkbal. "L'Absolu et l'Etre chez Hegel et Levinas", Phd Thesis, Galatasaray University, 2017.

- Bergson, Henri. *Metafizik Dersleri Giriş: Uzay, Zaman, Madde*. Translated by B. G. Beşiktaşlıyan, 4. basım. İstanbul: Pinhan Yayıncılık, 2019.
- Chalmers, David J. "Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis." *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 17 (2010): 7-65.
- Çitil, Ayhan. "Leyla, Mecnun, Mevla ve Tekillik." *Ahlak ve Başkası: Modern Felsefe ve İslam Düşüncesinde Öteki*, no. 1647 (March 2017): 37-59.
- Descartes, Rene. *Felsefenin İlkeleri*. Translated by Mehmet Karasan. İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1963.
- Descartes, Rene. *The Passions of the Soul*. In *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Vol.I. Translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, 325-404. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Foucault, Michel. "Introduction," in *The Use of Pleasure: History of Sexuality*, V.2. New York: Vintage, 1986.
- Hegel, G. W. F. "Preface: On Scientific Cognition". In *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Translated by A. V. Miller, 1-45. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.
- Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996.
- Heidegger, Martin. *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*. Translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995.
- Heidegger, Martin. *Identity and Difference*. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Incorporated, 1969.
- Heidegger, Martin. *Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed., enlarged. Translated by Richard Taft. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- Heidegger, Martin. *Letter On 'Humanism'*. Translated by Frank A. Capuzzi, 239-275. In *Pathmarks*, edited by William McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Heidegger, Martin. *Metafizik Nedir? Was ist Metaphysik?*. Translated by Yusuf Örnek. Ankara: Türkiye Felsefe Kurumu, 2015.

- Heidegger, Martin. *The Concept of Time, Der Begriff der Zeit*. Translated by William McNeill. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
- Heidegger, Martin. *The Essence of Reasons: A Bilingual Edition, Incorporating the German Text of Vom Wesen des Grundes*. Translated by Terrence Malick. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969.
- Heidegger, Martin. *What Is Called Thinking?*. Translated by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Incorporated, 1968.
- İbn Sina, *Ölüm Korkusundan Kurtuluş*, translated by M. Hazmi Tura. İstanbul: Bürhaneddin Matbaası, 1942. In *Ölüm Kitabı: Ölüm Düşüncesinin Temel Metinleri*. Edited by Kaan H. Ökten, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., 147-151. İstanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, 2016.
- Kierkegaard, Soren. *Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions*. In *The Essential Kierkegaard*, edited by Howard V. Hong and Edna. H. Hong. Princeton/New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Kluge, Friedrich. s.v. 'Ereignis'. In *Etymological Dictionary of the German Language 1856-1926*. Translated by John Francis Davis. London: George Bell & Sons, 1891. <https://archive.org/details/etymologicaldict00kluguoft/page/74/mode/>
- Nancy, Jean-Luc. *Inoperative Community*. Edited. by P. Connor. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991.
- Parmenides. *Fragmanlar*. Translated by Kaan Ökten. İstanbul: Alfa Basım Yayım Dağıtım San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti., 2019.
- Plato, *Phaedo* in *Complete Works*. Edited by John M. Cooper, 49-100. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997.
- Scotus, Duns. "Six Questions on Individuation". In *Five Texts on the Medieval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns, Scotus, Ockham*, translated and edited by Paul Vincent Spade, 57-113. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994.
- Scotus, Duns. *Philosophical Writings*. Translated by Allan Wolter, O.F.M. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987.

*Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. s.v. "Medieval Theories of Haecceity,"  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-haecceity/#3>.

Türker, Ömer. *Varlık Nedir?: İslam Filozoflarının Varlık Tasavvuru*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. İstanbul:  
Ketebe Yayınları, 2019.

Vernant, Jean- Pierre. "A 'Beautiful Death' and The Disfigured Corpse in Homeric  
Epic". In *Mortals and Immortals: Collected Essays* edited by Froma I. Zeitlin.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.

## CURRICULUM VITAE

### Personal Information:

Name - Surname: Sevinç Akay

E-mail (1): sevinc.akay@ibnhaldun.edu.tr

E-mail (2): sevincakay@gmail.com

### Education:

2006-2012 BA in Turkish Language and Literature, Boğaziçi University, Turkey

2018-2020 MA in Philosophy, Ibn Haldun University, Turkey