

AK PARTY YEARS IN TURKEY

DOMESTIC
AND FOREIGN POLICY

EDITORS
KILIÇ B. KANAT
BURHANETTİN DURAN

SETA

SETA Publications 69
First Published in 2020 by SETA
ISBN: 978-625-7040-73-0

© 2020 SET Vakfı İktisadi İşletmesi

All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized
in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means,
without permission in writing from the publishers.

Cover: Erkan Söğüt
Printed in Turkey, İstanbul by Turkuvaz Haberleşme
ve Yayıncılık A.Ş., September 2020

SETA Publications
Nenehatun Caddesi No: 66 GOP Çankaya 06700 Ankara Turkey
Tel: +90 312.551 21 00 | Fax : +90 312.551 21 90
www.setav.org | kitap@setav.org

CONTENTS

Chapter 1: The Codes of the AK Party's Ideological Transformation	7
Burhanettin Duran	

TRANSFORMATION IN DOMESTIC POLITICS DURING THE AK PARTY ERA

Chapter 2: The AK Party's Policy Towards Transformation of Political System in Turkey	43
Nebi Miş	
Chapter 3: The AK Party's Kurdish Policy	85
Hüseyin Alptekin· Talha Köse	
Chapter 4: Changing Public Administration Reform Trajectories in Turkey: An Evaluation of the AK Party Era	115
Özer Köseoğlu· M. Zahid Sobacı	

IMPACT OF THE JULY 15TH COUP ATTEMPT TO TURKISH POLITICS

Chapter 5: The July 15 Coup Attempt's Effects on Turkish Politics	149
Nebi Miş	
Chapter 6: The Media's Role in the Failure of the July 15 Coup Attempt	185
Serdar Karagöz· Pınar Kandemir	
Chapter 7: Evolution of Public Perceptions of Coups in Turkey	209
Kilic Bugra Kanat	

SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

Chapter 8: Neither Realist Nor Liberal: Turkey's Foreign Aid Policy During the AK Party Era*	243
Veysel Kurt	
Chapter 9: Turkish-American Relations During the AK Party Governments	263
Kilic Bugra Kanat	
Chapter 10: The Rise of Turkey's 'Military Activism': The Causes, Context and Strategic Implications	287
Murat Yeşiltaş	
Chapter 11: Turkey's Humanitarian Foreign Policy under the AK Party	333
Kadir Ustun	
Chapter 12: The Rise of the Turkish Defense Industry in the AK Party Era: Causes, Context, and Strategic Implications	363
Merve Seren	

CHAPTER 3

THE AK PARTY'S KURDISH POLICY

HÜSEYİN ALPTEKİN*
TALHA KÖSE**

INTRODUCTION

This study discusses the AK Party's Kurdish policy from the November 2002 General Elections to-date. As one of the key issues, or rather the number one issue in Turkey; the Kurdish question may be examined along four different dimensions: economic, socio-cultural, security, and political (participation). The policies that have been developed in these particular areas by the AK Party governments since 2002 and the impact of these policies on Kurdish citizens of Turkey and on various Kurdish political and social organizations have varied sporadically during the AK Party's 15-year tenure. In times when political participation or security aspects have become more important, other aspects remained on and off the agenda. While these four areas are interrelated, examining them separately will make it easier to understand the implications of the policies developed by the AK Party to solve the Kurdish problem.

In brief, the policies developed in these four areas during the period of 2002-2017 reveal that the AK Party governments consistently adopted an approach based on rights in economic and socio-cultural

* Researcher, SETA

** Researcher, SETA

areas, and prioritized the expansion of cultural and economic rights. On the other hand, the security and political dimensions had mostly a zero-sum character in that the PKK's political offshoot parties increased their influence during the PKK's ceasefires but found themselves quite limited – in terms of both narrowing popular support and hardening legal sanctions- at times when the PKK broke the ceasefires. Kurdish citizens of Turkey have supported the AK Party both for the party's inclusive policies in the cultural and economic dimensions as well as its conservative-democratic identity.¹ For this very reason, the AK Party has maintained, so far, its position as the only national party to be an alternative to ethnic political parties in the Southeastern and the Eastern Anatolia precincts.

The AK Party establishes direct and one-on-one communication with its electorates in economic and socio-cultural areas and has always competed with the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) and its predecessors for the support of Kurdish constituents. From this point of view, other than the HDP and its antecedents, the AK Party has mobilized the most Kurdish voters in terms of political participation. Even more so, Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin provided utmost support to the AK Party during its 15-year tenure in all local, parliamentary, and presidential elections, except the general elections held on June 7, 2015 in which the HDP attracted a bigger share of Kurdish votes.²

With reference to the security aspect, the AK Party governments and the military and civilian bureaucracy have confronted the PKK. Although the 15-year span of the issue may be characterized as the period of fight against the PKK, the AK Party governments tried to settle the issue through negotiations in 2007-2009 and again in 2013-2015,

¹ For a discussion over policies in such domains in the earlier years: Huseyin Alptekin, "Ethnic incorporation policies and peripheral reactions: How are Turkey's Kurds treated by the state and how do they perceive their treatment," *Afro Eurasian Studies* 1, no. 2 (2012): 97-119.

² For the general election results of the HDP and its predecessor in this period, see Appendix 1.

and exhibited a determination that no other government had before. However, the negotiations fell apart as the two actors' (AK Party and the PKK) expectations from the process turned out to be irreconcilable. The PKK ended its cease-fire in the summer of 2015 and declared a "revolutionary popular war" against Turkey.

Through the four dimensions mentioned above, this study examines the AK Party's approach and policies on the Kurdish question. The most important characteristic that separates the AK Party governments from their predecessors, as a whole, is that the ruling party has not seen the issue simply as a security matter, but rather has made efforts to look into the socio-cultural, economic, and political aspects of it. The AK Party governments did not adopt a plain securitization approach to fight against the PKK and its cohorts in different areas, but instead took political risks and made an unprecedented move to persuade the PKK to end its campaign of armed struggle. Although previous governments had indirect contacts with the PKK in the past, the AK Party governments conducted more direct and extensive negotiation processes in 2007-2009 and 2012-2015.³

In response to this discernable difference in the AK Party's approach, the PKK also changed its tactics and volume of violence considerably during the AK Party's 15 year rule. Since day one, the PKK has maintained strong foreign ties and seized any chance in many areas such as positioning its organization, sheltering, and training of its militants in Syria and Iraq. The terror group obtained ample means after 2003, in particular, and has used every single occasion resulting from the US occupation in Iraq in 2003 and the on-going civil war in Syria since 2011 to expand. To the contrary of past periods, however, the PKK has evolved from simply being a proxy of mid-scale countries into a proxy backed by global powers as well.

³ For the efforts of negotiation with the PKK: Talha Köse, "Çözüm Sürecinin Yükseliş ve Düşüşü," *Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi* 4, no. 1 (2017): 13-40; Talha Köse, "Rise and Fall of the AK Party's Kurdish Peace Initiatives," *Insight Turkey* 19, no. 2 (2017): 139.

Such a change on the PKK side, its growing self-confidence with external support and its ever-increasing demands - therefore, resistance to laying down its arms – have created a gridlock on part of the AK Party governments' search for a solution to the problem based on negotiations. This study will examine the AK Party's four-part Kurdish policy, a summary of which is already presented in the introduction. First, the status of the Kurdish question in Turkey inherited by the AK Party in 2002 will be discussed, then the development of the AK Party's Kurdish policy in regards to the socio-cultural, economic, security, and political participation aspects of the issue and the implications of that policy will be visited. A summary and future projection will be made in the conclusion.

THE INHERITED KURDISH QUESTION OF TURKEY

Prior to the AK Party's ascension to power in 2002, the security aspect of the Kurdish issue had topped the agenda of Turkish politics. The PKK declared its establishment in 1978, but hit the headlines in 1984 for attacking Turkish security forces. Since then, PKK militants have killed many people either in clashes with Turkish security forces or by targeting civilians.⁴ The organization had topped the political agenda since then, which led to numerous scholarly works on the causes of this violent campaign.

The literature on Turkey's Kurdish issue agrees, to a large extent, that the Kurdish identity was denied in principle and in practice until the 2000's under the assimilation policies followed by past governments.⁵ Although some politicians, such as the late President Turgut Özal and the late Prime Ministers Necmettin Erbakan and Erdal İn-

⁴ Total death toll in 1986-2002 approached 39,000, see Appendix: 2.

⁵ Mesut Yeğen, *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003); Hüseyin Yayman, *Şark Meselesinden Demokratik Açılıma: Türkiye'nin Kürt Sorunu Hafızası* (Ankara: Seta, 2011).

önü, managed to discuss the issue beyond the deep-seated patterns in this period, the discourse did not bring about a change of policy until the 2000's. Upon its coming to power in 2002, the AK Party identified the Kurdish issue as Turkey's main problem to be solved. Although the order of priority among the aforementioned four dimensions have changed from time to time, it is fair to say that the AK Party has followed a policy seeking a final settlement of the issue since 2002.

The problem known as the "Kurdish issue" is a complicated identity-driven matter. Scrutinizing the issue beyond the "PKK Terror", developing inclusive policies in that vein, discussing these policies in public institutions, and sharing them with the public are facets that have become the trademark of the AK Party's Kurdish policy. However, the AK Party's solution-based policy, as of today, has not been sufficient to settle the security aspect of the issue in particular; in other words, to put an end to the PKK terror.

The PKK waged a terror campaign against Turkey from 1984 to 1999, although the attacks were interrupted by occasional ceasefires. The PKK declared a ceasefire for about four years after the group leader Abdullah Öcalan was forced out of Syria in 1998 and eventually captured in Kenya in 1999 and brought back to Turkey. The AK Party came to power during this ceasefire period. As the AK Party struggled to form an effective civilian government against the established military tutelage regime in Turkey; the US invaded Iraq, and the PKK found an opportunity to spread its settlements in northern Iraq and create safe havens in Iraqi territory.

In Iraq under the US occupation, the PKK practically found a security blanket and managed to prevent disintegration within the group to overcome the leadership crisis arising from Öcalan's capture. It also transformed its organizational structure (through KADEK, KONGRA-GEL, and finally KCK hierarchy) both vertically and hori-

zontally (with the PKK/HPG for Turkey and Iraq⁶, the PJAK/YRK for Iran and the PYD/YPG for Syria). The PKK consolidated its structural transformation benefiting from power vacuums in the region.

On the other side, the PKK signaled international actors that the group could be of use to interested actors. In fact, following the escalation of the civil war in Syria, the PKK successfully created a framework in which they could work together with numerous actors, even those with conflicts of interest among themselves, such as the Syrian regime, the US, and Russia. As a consequence, the PKK and the political and social organizations around it have become more acceptable to local and international actors. This process has made it harder for political actors in Turkey to successfully target the PKK in their efforts to resolve the PKK issue.

POLICIES ADOPTED IN SOCIO-CULTURAL SPHERE

Although ethnic identity is associated with a common blood-line, the concrete indicator of this imaginary common lineage usually appears to be the language or religion.⁷ Kurdish ethnic identity in Turkey, as well, differentiates itself in terms of language. While language marks Kurdish identity (as an ethno-linguistic ethnic group) different from Turkish identity, religion cuts across the ethnic groups that are formed according to such linguistic fragmentation. Sunni and Alevi or even Shia groups exist in both ethno-linguistic groups, whether they describe ethnic identity through Turkishness or Kurdishness.⁸ Apart from the religion as a crosscutting social cleavage, intermarriages and centu-

⁶ Although the group named its branch in Iraq “PÇDK”, it did not see any reason to differentiate it from the Turkey branch in terms of organization and function.

⁷ Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg, “Fractionalization”. *Journal of Economic Growth* 8, no. 2 (2003): 155-94.

⁸ Martin Van Bruinessen, *Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999).; Erdal Gezik, *Dinsel, Etnik ve Politik Sorunlar Bağlamında Alevi Kürtler* (Ankara: Kalan Yayınları, 2000).; Ahmet Buran, “Kürtler ve Kürt Dili,” *Turkish Studies* 6, no. 3 (2011): 43-57.

ries-long fusion of ethnicity as a result of numerous interactions make it hard to trace these two ethnic identities in Turkey.

Hence, some Sunni Kurds, for instance, feel that they share more of an identity with Sunni Turks than with Alevi or non-religious Kurds. The main reason behind this difference depends on whether these individuals identify their ethnicity based on language or religion. Thus, the socio-cultural aspect of the AK Party's Kurdish policy may be examined through religious and linguistic perspectives.

With respect to religious policies, AK Party policies resemble those of past governments, but the AK Party's public emphasis on the religious brotherhood between Turks and Kurds is more convincing due to the AK Party's strong conservative political identity. Through this emphasis, conservative Kurds are attracted to the AK Party since it is a conservative democrat party, whereas the PKK and the HDP are known for their secular and Marxist ideology.

The PKK & HDP's criticisms against the established gender relationships and traditional family institution; their actions and discourses in favor of abortion and gay rights - none of which rhyme with conservative values in Turkey- and the AK Party's growing public recognition through its widespread propaganda against anti-religion PKK practices have helped grow conservative Kurdish grassroots support for the AK Party. The criticisms of various PKK leaders, including Öcalan and Murat Karayılan, against the religion of Islam⁹, and the glorification of Zoroastrianism – the PKK has recently abandoned it, but it still exists in print - have played a big role in the growing support among conservative Kurds for the AK Party.

The AK Party has repeatedly sparred with the HDP and its predecessors over religious and cultural issues. In 2011, then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan countered the remarks of the Peace and

⁹ An example for the negative views of the PKK leaders against Islam and related reactions in the region: "PKK'nın Amacı İslam'dan Uzaklaştırmak," *Haber7*, May 15, 2011, <http://www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/743956-pkknin-amaci-islamdan-uzaklastirmak>.

Democracy Party (BDP) about the headscarf issue, stating, “Can an understanding under the religion of Zoroastrianism really entertain any worry about this?”¹⁰ Later, after the HDP, which was founded to replace the BDP, pledged in the June 7, 2015 General Elections program to eliminate the (general curricular) religion courses in primary and secondary schools and abolish the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the AK Party criticized the HDP’s discourse.¹¹ More recently, in an effort to combat the AK Party’s rising popularity with conservative Kurdish voters, the HDP (and its predecessors) and the PKK, became more friendly to Islamic discourse and revived religious and Kurdish historic figures such as Sheikh Said in collective memory. Moreover, the HDP and the PKK nominated pious Kurdish politicians for the legislature, such as Altan Tan, former Diyarbakır Mufti Nimetullah Erdoğan and several administrators of Mazlum-Der (The Association of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People). By doing so, the HDP and PKK tried to brand the AK Party’s conservative approach as Turkish conservatism to make room for Kurdish conservatism in their repertoire to counter the aforementioned moves of the AK Party.¹²

In response, the AK Party took a number of measures. For instance, the AK Party decided to appoint about 1,000 meles (who provide religious education and function as opinion leaders of Kurds) to the Directorate of Religious Affairs in late 2011.¹³ In response, the “Democratic Islam Congress,” upon the directive of Öcalan, was held in the

¹⁰ Hakkı Kurban, “Zerdüş’tün Başörtüsü Diye Bir Derdi Olmaz,” *Akşam*, October 15, 2011, <http://www.aksam.com.tr/guncel/zerdustun-basortusu-diye-bir-derdi-olmaz--73531h/haber-73531>.

¹¹ “İşte HDP’nin Seçim Vaatleri,” *Milliyet*, April 21, 2015, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/hdp-nin-secim-beyanamesi/siyaset/detay/2047485/default.htm>.

¹² For a detailed information about the PKKs understanding of religion: Necati Alkan, “Dinin Araçsallaşması: PKK Örneği,” *Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Terörizm Dergisi* 3, no. 2 (2012): 17-26.

¹³ “Diyanet’te ‘Mele’ Dönemi,” *Hürriyet*, December 12, 2011, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/diyanet-te-mele-donemi-19443417>.

southeastern Turkish city of Diyarbakır.¹⁴ Individuals from the north of Syria also participated in the meeting.

Concurrently with its emphasis on religious brotherhood that encompassed broad groups, AK Party governments after 2002 also made noteworthy reforms regarding language, which is another aspect of ethnic identity. Throughout the history of the Republic, teaching Kurdish in schools or in special language courses was strictly prohibited. Although the ban on producing Kurdish music was lifted under the initiative of President Özal in 1991, legal barriers regarding education and election campaigns in Kurdish were lifted only during the AK Party governments.

One of the hurdles preventing the use of Kurdish language was the ban on giving newborns Kurdish names in accordance with Population Registration Act, No. 1587, Article 16. The AK Party limited the ban by an amendment in 2003. An annotation was added to the 4th clause of Article 16 limiting the ban to “only names that are not in compliance with ethics and insulting the public.”¹⁵ Under the “Regulation on Radio and Television Broadcasts in Different Languages and Dialects Used Traditionally by Turkish Citizens in Their Daily Lives” directive issued in 2009, the AK Party abolished the older laws forbidding languages and dialects other than Turkish on private radios and televisions.

As legal hurdles about using and learning Kurdish language were removed one by one, Law No. 5767 was also ratified on June 11, 2008 and put into effect on June 26, 2008. Thus, the state-owned Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) was granted authority for broadcasts in Kurdish, by an addition of an article to the “Law Concerning Amendments to the Turkish Radio and Television Law and the Law on the Es-

¹⁴ Zübeyde Sarı and Sinan Onuş, “Diyarbakır’da Demokratik İslam Kongresi,” *BBC*, May 10, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2014/05/140510_kongre_diyarbakir.

¹⁵ Law No. 4928, “Çeşitli Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına İlişkin Kanun,” Article 5, *Resmî Gazete*, July 18, 2003, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/07/20030719.htm>.

establishment and Broadcasts of Radios and Televisions”¹⁶ allowing that broadcasts can be made in different languages and dialects other than Turkish by the institution. Test broadcasts for a new channel dedicated to broadcasts only in Kurdish began on December 25, 2008 and were followed by 24 hour test broadcasts in the Kurmanci and Sorani dialects of Kurdish and in the Zaza language. The channel, launched as TRT Ses or TRT 6 and known today as TRT Kurdi, officially launched on January 1, 2009.

As for education in Kurdish language, which was available through private courses since 2004, teaching of Kurdish officially began to be offered starting in 2012-13 academic year as an elective course titled “Living Languages and Dialects” for students in the 5th grade and above. Additionally, Kurdish language courses were also offered in universities. The establishment of the first Kurdology institute in the history of the Republic was approved by the Council of Ministers in 2009 and opened in Artuklu University, Mardin. Later, the name of the institute was changed to “Institute of Living Languages” and a Kurdish Language and Culture department was formed in this institute. Despite all these improvements, it cannot be said, as of today, that every demand for Kurdish language from different segments of the society is met. The HDP’s demands for education in mother-tongue in primary and secondary schools and undergraduate-level Kurdish Language and Literature programs in universities are not met yet.

POLICIES ADOPTED IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE

The main reason that the AK Party has maintained its single party rule since 2002 is the party’s emphasis on economic stability and growth, and its economic policies to support this emphasis.¹⁷ Evidently, there

¹⁶ Law No. 5767, “Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kanunu İle Radyo Ve Televizyonların Kuruluş Ve Yayınları Hakkında Kanunda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun,” *Resmî Gazete*, June 11, 2008, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5767.html>.

¹⁷ Ali T. Akarca, “Putting Turkey’s June and November 2015 Election Outcomes in Perspective,” *Insight Turkey* 17, no. 4 (2015): 81-104.

is also an economic aspect of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Throughout the history of the Republic, the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia Regions, heavily populated by Kurds, fell behind Western Anatolia in terms of development and economic welfare.¹⁸

In regards to the economic aspect of the Kurdish issue, the policies developed by the AK Party may be examined under two headings: One, the projects to improve economic infrastructure of the region and increase employment, and two, the compensation for material damages directly caused by terror to residents of the region. In order to stop the economic troubles of the region, infrastructure projects and job creation have become the main agenda items of the AK Party governments' economic policies in regard to the Kurdish issue.

As a matter of fact, the development projects set in motion by the AK Party in order to address the underdevelopment of the region predate both the AK Party period and the PKK. The most comprehensive and critical of these projects is the on-going Southeastern Anatolia Project (SAP, or Turkish *abv.* GAP). Launched in compliance with a Council of Ministers decision dated October 27, 1989, the GAP Project was designed to provide infrastructure, industry, mining, agriculture, energy, and transportation services to the region and to improve education level of locals.

The GAP still stands as the most comprehensive and expensive project in the Republic's history and covers the Southeastern Anatolian provinces of Adıyaman, Batman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, and Şırnak. Although the program is aimed at the development of the region, the ongoing construction of 22 dams and multiple energy production facilities, some of which have already been completed, make the project important for the whole country. The latest action plan for GAP, prepared by the AK Party for the period of

¹⁸ İsmail Beşikçi, *Doğu Mitingleri'nin Analizi* (Ankara: Yurt, 1967).; Ahmet İçduygu, David Romano, and İbrahim Sirkeci, "The Ethnic Question In An Environment Of Insecurity: The Kurds in Turkey," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22, no. 6, (1999): 991-1010.

2014-2018, focuses particularly on sustainable development. Investment allocations, for this purpose, are listed in Table 1 as follows:

TABLE 1, GAP ACTION PLAN!
1.628 billion Turkish Liras to accelerate economic development;
6.195 billion Turkish Liras to strengthen social development;
1.4 billion Turkish Liras to increase liveability in cities;
17.836 billion Turkish Liras to improve infrastructure, and
25 million Turkish Liras to increase institutional capacity
Total 27.084 billion Turkish Liras

* AK Parti, "GAP Eylem Planı Açıklandı," last modified March 8, 2015, <https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/gap-eylem-planı-aciklandi/72187#1>.

As new education projects, construction of dams for irrigation, and energy production in the region continued and the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Industry Development Organization (KOSGEB) offered government loans for the region, the PKK criticized and sabotaged these investments frequently. Viewing the increasing schooling rate as an activity to raise secret agents, the PKK murdered teachers working in the region while presenting the construction of dams as the "construction of military dams." These were among the main reasons for the PKK's ending the Resolution Process in the summer of 2015.¹⁹

Ending the cease-fire in the summer of 2015, the PKK resumed unrest in residential areas and terror attacks, and mobilized personnel and vehicles of the Democratic Regions Party (DBP, the name the HDP uses in local politics of the Eastern cities of Turkey). In response, the State of Turkey appointed trustees to many DBP municipalities. Most of the trustees were already civilian authorities (i.e., governors) in those regions and they were appointed as new mayors. With this policy, the AK Party government adopted service-based

¹⁹ In an interview to the Radikal daily, then the HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş said regarding the dams under construction in Southeastern Anatolia, "Yes, Mr. Prime Minister doesn't get this. I want to explain. The dam under construction is not for irrigation or energy [production]. It is a military dam. It is a dam to prevent the guerilla to transit mountains and plains. It is a dam to fill these areas with water."

municipal policies instead of ideological municipal policies and prioritized the use of municipality resources and services for anti-PKK propaganda, instead of the PKK propaganda.²⁰

As part of economic policies developed for the settlement of the Kurdish issue, the post-2002 AK Party governments paved the way for compensation by the State of terror-related material damages to natural and legal persons. To this end, the “Law on Compensation for Damages Due to Terror and the Fight Against Terror” was ratified on October 4, 2004.²¹ According to the law, the State of Turkey compensates terror-related material damages arising from death, injury, and disability as well as the damages that occur to movable and immovable assets owned by natural and legal persons or persons who fail to retrieve their properties.

Under the leadership of deputy governors in relevant cities, commissions for damage assessment were established to meet demands for material damages rapidly and justly. From the the law’s date of enforcement in 2004 until August 2017, damage assessment commissions finalized 429,630 out of 429,630 applications, and decided to pay compensation to 227,157 applicants. In this period, the State of Turkey paid total 4,055,072,643 Turkish Liras in compensation for terror and counter-terrorism victims.²²

SECURITY POLICIES

The PKK has committed assassinations, planted bombs in city centers, and engaged in rural guerilla tactics before and after 2002, i.e. during

²⁰ For further information of infra and suprastructure investments of municipalities under trustees: Kayyum Haber, Twitter, accessed September 21, 2017, <https://twitter.com/kayyumdanhaber?lang=en>.

²¹ Law no. 5233, “Terör ve Terörle Mücadeleden Doğan Zararların Karşılanması Hakkında Yönetmelik,” *Resmî Gazete*, October 20, 2004, <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Mevzuat-Metin/3.5.20047955.pdf>.

²² Ministry of Interior, “5233 Sayılı Kanun’un Uygulanma İstatistikleri,” General Directorate of Provincial Administration, last modified June 9, 2015, <http://www.illeridaresi.gov.tr/5233-sayili-kanun-uygulanmasi-istatistikleri>.

the AK Party period. The PKK has attacked its non-state rivals in local areas, directly targeted the State of Turkey, launched rural guerilla fights, and supported these fights with acts of terrors in cities.

In this entire process, the PKK failed in its terror campaign it called the “strategy of long-term people’s war.” In other words, the group could not bring the initial stage, called “strategical defense,” up to a desired level and failed to jump to the second stage, called “strategical balance”. The PKK’s terror campaign could not sustain any concrete and durable gains, but caused significant death tolls and economic setbacks to Turkey. The PKK underwent a period of restructuring after Öcalan was captured in 1999, and resumed terror attacks against Turkey in 2003.

In addition to rural guerilla tactics used along with terror attacks in cities for many years, the PKK adopted a method called “rural-based urban war” in the summer of 2015.²³ The group’s terror strategy was to create a sphere of dominance in cities by applying the method of rural-based urban war and to establish de facto autonomy in these cities. However, the PKK’s attempts hit a dead-end thanks to counter-terrorism operations launched by Turkish security forces in the summer of 2015.

In their fight against the PKK, subsequent Turkish governments sometimes adopted military measures, and political means at other times. Despite the use of both measures, Turkey reached no final and permanent solution for the PKK to lay down arms. Subsequently, the PKK ended its ceasefire in July 2015 and left Turkey no other choice but to fight against terrorism by means of military measures. Considering the number of terrorists killed, of terror activities prevented, and decreasing participation in the PKK inside Turkey since then, it is fair to say that Turkey has become successful in its fight against the PKK.

²³ For a detailed analysis on urban warfare launched by the PKK in the summer of 2015: Murat Yeşiltaş and Necdet Özçelik, “PKK Terörünün Yeni Dinamikleri: Radikalleşme ve Şehir Çatışması,” *SETA Analiz*, no. 157 (April, 2016).

The AK Party's counter-terrorism strategy in the recent period may be examined under two headings: efforts to stop the PKK from committing attacks in Turkey, and efforts to eradicate the PKK's presence outside Turkey. In order to put an end to the PKK's acts of terror in Turkey, Turkish security forces cleansed residential areas such as Sur and Silvan in Diyarbakır, Derik and Nusaybin in Mardin, and Silopi and Cizre in Şırnak of dug-up and fortified PKK ditches. Turkish security forces conducted ditch-operations, filled them up and removed road blocks, finally establishing public order in these regions in a short span of time.²⁴

For this purpose, trustees were appointed to the municipalities that had declared autonomy in response to the PKK's call and had provided logistical support to the PKK before and during the ditch operations. The fight against the organization, which is nested in rural areas and in the mountains, has continued non-stop, the system of fortified military stations (*kalekol*) have been put in service, and national defense industry projects have been accelerated. Thus, Turkey tried to guarantee sustainability of its counter-terrorism campaign by increasingly using locally designed and produced equipment and resources. In this context, Turkey, producing its own unmanned air vehicles, began to use them more effectively, and built a wall along the Turkish-Syrian border in order to prevent PYD militants from Syria from crossing into Turkey to join the PKK's Amanos units or providing logistic support to the PKK.

Turkey's prioritizing security in terms of the PKK issue is nothing new. However, even if the criticism that the "fight against the PKK

²⁴ According to information about the Ditch Operations submitted by the then Interior Minister Efkân Ala during a session held at the Parliamentary Planning and Budget Commission, a total of 2,040 ditches and road blocks were removed and 2, 213 bomb set-ups were destroyed as of February 14, 2016. During the operations, 830 long-barrel weapons, such as bxc, kanas, kaleshnikov; 47 rocket launchers, 645 rocket launcher projectiles, 1,000 improvised explosive devices, 431 hand grenades, and 98,650 munitions were confiscated: "Efkân Ala'dan Hendek Operasyonları Açıklaması," *NTV*, February 14, 2016, <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/efkan-aladan-hendek-operasyonlari-aciklamasi,zm0BHloELEKno0upRPCXObQ>.

cannot be won by using security measures alone” is accurate, the security aspect of this struggle is undeniably critical. Drones, *kalekols*, and border walls are new security measures that had not been tried before and have substantially worked, in conjunction with new security methods, in favor of Turkey during encounters with the PKK in rural areas. Meanwhile, the path to a political resolution is currently blocked, as the HDP remains subordinate to the PKK and is unable to influence the military wing to end its terrorism campaign, proving once again that no negotiations can be held with this organization for the foreseeable future.

As a further measure, Turkey also launched cross-border military operations in Syria where the PKK, with its Syrian offshoot PYD, was expanding the territories under its control. The most recent example of such operations is called Olive Branch operation, which lasted from January 20th to March 24th, 2018. The operation pursued a strategy of encirclement and the entire city of Afrin with its neighboring towns in Northwest Syria fell in two months with minimum collateral damage. The PKK’s military training camps and its schooling system where the PKK’s founder Öcalan’s texts were used as textbooks were all eradicated with the completion of the operation. Consequently, Turkey has put forward effective security measures against the PKK in Turkey.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLICIES

Socio-cultural, economic, and security dimensions of the Kurdish issue are, in a way, subdimensions of the political dimensions. In this section, however, the policies developed and the approaches adopted by the AK Party are discussed in terms of political participation, representation, and definition of the Kurdish question. One of the first steps of the AK Party took in the political arena was to use its legislative authority based on its parliamentary majority to expand and deepen the political participation of Turkey’s Kurdish community. Thus, the

AK Party amended Law No. 2911, on Meetings and Demonstrations²⁵ in 2008, 2010, and 2014, ratified Law No. 5253, of Associations in 2004,²⁶ and amended it in 2006 and 2009. Again, the AK Party expanded the limits of the non-parliamentary political sphere through the ratification of Law No. 6459, “Amendments Made in Some Laws within the Context of Human Rights and Freedom of Expression” in 2013. The most obvious expansion in this area occurred with the Constitutional Referendum held in 2010.

Through this popular vote in 2010, individuals were granted the right to appeal individually to the Constitutional Court, narrowing the sphere of the military judiciary. Additionally, obstacles to peaceful Kurdish mobilization were removed due to the impact the referendum had on party closure cases. Before 2010, Kurdish political parties such as the HDP suffered the most from lawsuits seeking the closure of political parties in Turkey. The latest example of this was the closure of the DTP (Democratic Society Party) in 2009. Following the referendum however, prohibitive decisions to close political parties or to deprive them of state funds required a larger majority among the Constitutional Court justices, 3/5 of votes compared to 2/3 previously.

Beside lifting political bans on legal entities, another significant difference between the Kurdish policies of the AK Party period and of past periods is the initiatives that the AK Party has undertaken to find political solutions to the PKK problem. In this regard, the most critical negotiation process was launched in March 2013 after the PKK decided to agree to a ceasefire, but ended in the summer of 2015. This two-year negotiation process is known as the Resolution Process, an initiative to find a permanent solution to the Kurdish issue.

²⁵ “2911 sayılı Toplantı ve Gösteri Yürüyüş Kanunu,” *Resmî Gazete*, October 8, 1983, <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.2911.pdf>.

²⁶ Law No. 5253, “Dernekler Kanunu”, *Resmî Gazete*, November 23, 2004, <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin1.aspx?MevzuatKod=1.5.5253&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXml-Search=&Tur=1&Tertip=5&No=5253>.

The Resolution Process signifies all constructive efforts made after the 2013 ceasefire in order to find a peaceful political solution to Turkey's Kurdish issue. The Resolution Process was a comprehensive plan addressing the legal, social, and economic aspects of the issue. Public diplomacy and communication strategies were other critical aspects of this process. Universal legal arrangements were made²⁷ through the democratization steps, taken before and during this process, to meet some expectations about rights for ethnic minorities; however, a constitutional amendment for local self-government and even for a confederation, both of which are the demands of the Kurdish ethno-national movement, was never discussed. Despite all these hurdles, psychological and bureaucratic barriers to a comprehensive peace were eliminated during the Resolution Process.

THE AK PARTY'S KURDISH INITIATIVE

Prior to the Resolution Process, the AK Party had launched a process publicly known as the Kurdish Initiative on July 29, 2009.²⁸ However, the Kurdish Initiative had been frozen due to the incidents that occurred upon the arrival of PKK militants at the Habur Border Gate on October 19, 2009. The Kurdish Initiative was based on a rationale and modus operandi different from those of the Resolution Process. When the AK Party government launched the "democratic opening/ouverture" process, or mostly known as the "Kurdish Initiative", then-Interior Minister Beşir Atalay was assigned to coordinate the relevant efforts. The opening policy, launched as a government initiative, focused on the Kurdish issue on the basis of democratization.

²⁷ For a comprehensive collection of the steps taken towards democratization during the AK Party period, see the 4th version of the work printed by: Undersecretariat of the Public Order and Security, *Sessiz Devrim: Türkiye'nin Demokratik Değişim ve Dönüşüm Envanteri 2002-2014* (Ankara: 2014).

²⁸ Kürt Açılım Start Alıyor," *Vatan*, July 29, 2009, <http://www.gazetevatan.com/-kurt-acilimi--start-aliyor-251217-gundem/>.

The Kurdish Initiative was later renamed the “National Unity and Brotherhood Project” in January 2010. To promote this project, the AK Party published and distributed a booklet entitled “The Democratic Opening Process with Questions and Answers: The National Unity and Brotherhood Project” in January 2010.²⁹ The Kurdish Initiative adopted the approach of “deliberative democracy” rather than a negotiation process and was an ex-parte democratization attempt by the government.³⁰

Expectations from the Kurdish Initiative were much more limited compared to the Resolution Process. While the Kurdish Initiative failed to reach its expected targets, largely because the societal support was not sufficiently ready for such a process, it was not a completely ineffective or fruitless effort. On legal and political grounds, the Kurdish Initiative tried to create a proper environment in order to make more durable moves towards the resolution of the Kurdish issue; for this reason, public discussions formed a critical part of the process. The Kurdish Initiative was a process that prepared political, social, and psychological grounds for a comprehensive negotiation process. The initiative was unable to transform the conflict spirit from its foundations, but made significant changes in the Kurdish community’s mentality.

The Kurdish Initiative demonstrated a paradigm shift in the official vision regarding the Kurdish issue. Official actors, for the first time, acknowledged that the Kurdish issue was not simply an issue of terror or of violence and that other approaches should also be used in addition to the security policies. While the Kurdish Initiative failed to change the spirit of the conflict at the community level, discussions were very useful at the official level. Legal regulations granting further political rights for ethno-political mobilization were significant conciliatory steps.

²⁹ AK Parti, “Sorularla ve Cevaplarıyla Demokratik Açılım Süreci: Milli Birlik ve Kardeşlik Projesi,” The AK Party Publicity and Media Department, January 2010.

³⁰ Sezen Ceceli Köse, “Müzakereci Demokrasi Kuramı ve Toplumsal ve Politik Dönüşümün İmkanları: Kürt Açılımı Üzerine Bir İnceleme.” *Spectrum* 89, (2012):115

Legal arrangements made in the context of the Kurdish Initiative aimed to permanently eliminate the reasons behind the emergence and rapid spread of the PKK. From this perspective, the adoption of a relevant policy sufficiently showed the remarkable change in the positions of official actors. Since the AK Party Government refrained from directly engaging actors who are linked to the PKK the process continued as a one-sided effort during this period.

FROM THE KURDISH INITIATIVE TO THE RESOLUTION PROCESS

The Head of the National Intelligence Organization (MİT), Hakan Fidan, met with Öcalan on İmralı Island on December 16, 2012.³¹ The meeting was publicly announced on December 29, 2012. A delegation of BDP members visited Öcalan on İmralı Island in early January 2013.³² The Resolution Process was coordinated in consultation with Öcalan, leading some to refer to the initiative as the “İmralı Process.” As part of the process, a three-stage plan was prepared to end the conflict. The first stage would be the withdrawal of PKK elements from Turkish territory, the second stage would concentrate on the government’s democratic reforms, and the third stage would plan the re-integration of PKK elements into political and civilian life following their disarmament and demobilization.³³

Negotiations were held with Öcalan through various representatives in this process. The Turkish State, announced its direct meeting with Öcalan for the first time and indirectly getting together with the PKK leaders in Mount Qandil and with the PKK/KCK representatives in Europe. For the first time in the last three decades, the region ex-

³¹ Abdülkadir Selvi, “Öcalan’la Hakan Fidan Görüştü,” *Yenişafak*, January 1, 2013 <http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/abdulkadirselvi/ocalanla-hakan-fidan-gorutu-35654>.

³² “BDP ve HDP Heyeti İmralı’ya Gitti,” *NTV*, January 11, 2014, <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/bdp-ve-hdp-heyeti-imraliya-gitti,19M-PSmWlkmFvzuwYHwCvA>.

³³ *Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict: An Assessment of the Current Process*, (London: Democratic Progress Institute, November 2013).

perienced a political, social, and economic normalization. Many psychological obstacles before peace were overcome during this process. A new environment paved the way for genuine talks, which might have made sustainable peace possible. However, the PKK's terror attack that murdered two police officers in the town of Ceylanpınar, in Şanlıurfa, on July 22, 2015 went down in history as a move ending the process.³⁴

Although the process ended unexpectedly after violence rapidly escalated with the Ceylanpınar attack committed by the PKK, the Resolution Process is one of the most serious peace initiatives established to settle the Kurdish issue. The Resolution Process had a more extensive program than the Kurdish Initiative, yet still it may be considered as the continuation of, or complementary to, the previous democratization process. Future peace initiatives will be based on the experiences gained under these processes.

THE DECLINE OF THE RESOLUTION PROCESS

There were two principal reasons behind the weakening of the Resolution Process. The first was that the expectations of the Kurdish social segment who sympathize with the PKK constantly increased during the peace process. It was difficult for the government to meet these ever-increasing expectations. The PKK, in general, believed that the Gezi Protests in the summer of 2013, the wave of investigations and detentions of government officials and pro-government individuals by FETO (The Gülenist terror organization)-affiliated officials in the Police and the Judiciary departments in 2014, the changing power balance in Syria's civil war, and the progress made by the PKK's Syria branch had weakened the AK Party government's bargaining power. That belief rapidly increased the expectations of the PKK. Concordantly, a perception occurred amongst the PKK ranks that the balance of power had changed to the detriment of the Turkish Government during the Resolution Process.

³⁴ "Şanlıurfada İki Polis Memuru Şehit Oldu Saldırısı PKK Üstlendi," *Habertürk*, July 22, 2015, <http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1106043-sanliurfada-2-polis-sehit-oldu>.

The second reason was that the course of events that led to the General Elections on June 7, 2015 in Turkey caused the adoption of a polarizing discourse as part of the escalating tensions. The more polarized political environment in the country poisoned the atmosphere necessary for peaceful negotiations. On the other hand, different actors of the Kurdish Movement gave inconsistent messages while the government adopted a more consistent attitude. Notably, the AK Party's constituents have never overtly supported the process. It even strengthened national sentiments in the party.

Despite these negative developments during the process, AK Party Chairman Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the party leadership spearheaded efforts to persuade the party grassroots to support the continuation of the process. The AK Party lost some votes to the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) as a reaction to the Resolution Process. The PKK used the process in order to collect more arms and re-organize and prepare its militants for urban warfare. Thanks to the ongoing civil war in Syria, the PKK had more opportunities to procure more weapons and gained international legitimacy for fighting against DAESH. After the PKK ended the ceasefire in the summer of 2015, Turkey considered other alternative measures against the PKK.

CONCLUSION

The failure to end the terror problem and resolve the security aspect of Turkey's Kurdish issue, stonewalls developments in other areas, such as political participation and socio-economic development. In regards to the the security aspect of the issue, the most important reason behind the failure to reach a total and permanent end of the PKK's terror campaign is that since the beginning of the Iraq War in 2003, the PKK has gradually established itself as an international organization.

While the PKK was active in terror camps abroad before 2003, the group seized the opportunity presented by the power vacuum in Iraq, which emerged after the American occupation in 2003. The PKK took

Iraqi regions under control, naming them “Media Defense Areas.” The PKK settled down in such regions, provided not only training and sheltering but also numerous public services including order and legal transactions. It also has become one of the dominant actors in the areas controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). All these developments have carried the PKK into a larger scale than ever.

With the outbreak of the civil war, or rather the proxy war, in Syria, the US began to use the Syria-branch of the PKK, the PYD, as a combatant force against DAESH in 2014. The fight against DAESH brought prestige and propaganda opportunities to the group as its material capacity increased through delivery of arms by the US. The terrorist organization developed the capacity to arm thousands of young men and women among the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds, train them in camps outside Turkey, and help them sneak into Turkey for terror attacks through the Turkish-Iraqi and Turkish-Syrian borders.

As we have outlined in this study, the number one factor for rendering inadequate the political, economic, and socio-cultural reforms of the AK Party in Turkey and the negotiations with the PKK in the years of 2007-2009 and of 2013-2015 is the fact that the PKK shifted its weight, more than ever, to territories outside Turkey.

Even if the PKK cannot recruit militants from within Turkey or find financial support in the country, the group has reached a level where it is able to maintain its presence through militants recruited from Iraq and Syria, the arms and logistic support provided to it by various countries, particularly the US, and the propaganda opportunities presented to it in the US and European countries. We do not mean that the PKK issue has totally left Turkey and that it follows a course independent from the developments taking place within Turkey’s borders. Turkey is already facing problems in the construction of an all-encompassing national identity, consolidating its democratic institutions, and lowering the differences among regions with respect to the distribution of economic wealth. Without doubt, all these problems interrelate with the Kurdish issue. However, today the PKK is largely nurtured from outside Tur-

key, and developments within Turkey are not sufficient to eradicate the PKK terror. Thus, the AK Party approaches the Kurdish issue through a multi-faceted and a multi-layered policy. On one side, it makes socio-cultural, economic, and political reforms in Turkey, and on the other side, it carries out a counter-terrorism strategy beyond its borders.

Appendix 1: Ethnic Kurdish Movement the 2002-2015 General Election Results

TABLE 1, ETHNIC KURDISH PARTY ELECTION RESULTS, 2002-2015*					
General Elections	Name of the Party	Number of Constituents	Valid Votes	Party's Vote	Vote Percentage
1995	HADEP	34.155.981	28.040.392	1.171.623	4,2
1999	HADEP	37.495.217	31.119.242	1.482.196	4,8
2002	DEHAP	41.407.027	31.414.748	1.960.660	6,2
2007	The Thousand Hope Candidates (DTP)	42.799.303	34.822.907	1.338.810**	3,8**
2011	The Labor, Democracy and Freedom Bloc (BDP)	52.806.322	42.813.896	2.439.605**	5,7**
2015 (June 7)	HDP	47.507.467	46.163.243	5.847.134	13,12
2015 (Nov. 1)	HDP	48.537.695	47.840.231	4.914.203	10,76

* For the data of 2002-2011: Hüseyin Alptekin, "Explaining Ethnopolitical Mobilization: Ethnic Incorporation and Mobilization Patterns in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Turkey, and Beyond," PhD Diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2014.; for data after 2012, High Election Board results are used: "Millietvekili Genel Seçim Arşivi," *YSK*, accessed October 4, 2017, <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/milletvekili-genel-secim-arsivi/2644>.

** Candidates of block parties rather than individual parties joined the elections (depicted with asterisk), so the total of their votes are shown here.

Appendix 2: PKK-related Deaths

TABLE 2: NUMBER OF DEATHS DUE TO THE PKK TERROR, 1984-2016*					
Year	Members of Turkish Security Forces	Civilians	Total deaths caused by the PKK	The PKK militants	Total
1984	26	43	69	28	97
1985	58	141	199	201	400
1986	51	133	184	74	258
1987	71	237	308	95	403
1988	54	109	163	123	286
1989	153	178	331	179	510
1990	161	204	365	368	733
1991	244	233	477	376	853
1992	629	832	1461	1129	2590
1993	715	1479	2194	3050	5244
1994	1145	992	2137	2510	4647
1995	772	313	1085	4163	5248
1996	608	170	778	3789	4567
1997	518	158	676	7558	8234
1998	383	85	468	2556	3024
1999	236	83	319	1458	1777
2000	29	17	46	319	365
2001	20	8	28	104	132
2002	7	7	14	19	33
2003	31	63	94	87	181
2004	75	28	103	122	225
2005	105	30	135	188	323
2006	111	38	149	132	281
2007	146	37	183	315	498
2008	171	51	222	696	918
2009	62	18	80	65	145
2010	92	27	119	137	256

2011	128	50	178	211	389
2012	163	42	205	438	643
2013	3	0	3	435	438
2014	9	0	9	950	959
2015	218	39	257	3.764	4.021
2016	505	99	604	12.281	12.885

* For the data of 1984-2012: Alptekin, "Explaining Ethnopolitical Mobilization: Ethnic Incorporation and Mobilization Patterns in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Turkey, and Beyond.;" for the period from 2013 to June 2016, see. "İşte Yıllara Göre Erkisiz Hale Getirilen PKK'lı Sayısı," Habertürk, May 31, 2016, <http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1247022-iste-yillara-gore-etkisiz-hale-getirilen-pkcli-sayisi/53>.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

“2911 sayılı Toplantı ve Gösteri Yürüyüş Kanunu.” *Resmi Gazete*, October 8, 1983. <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.2911.pdf>.

AK Parti. “GAP Eylem Planı Açıklandı.” Last modified March 8, 2015. <https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/gap-eylem-planı-aciklandi/72187#1>.

AK Parti. “Sorularla ve Cevaplarıyla Demokratik Açılım Süreci: Milli Birlik ve Kardeşlik Projesi.” The AK Party Publicity and Media Department. January 2010.

Akarca, Ali T. “Putting Turkey’s June and November 2015 Election Outcomes in Perspective.” *Insight Turkey* 17, no. 4 (2015).

Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg, “Fractionalization”. *Journal of Economic Growth* 8, no. 2 (2003).

Alkan, Necati. “Dinin Araçsallaşması: PKK Örneği.” *Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Terörizm Dergisi* 3, no. 2 (2012).

Alptekin, Huseyin. “Ethnic incorporation policies and peripheral reactions: How are Turkey’s Kurds treated by the state and how do they perceive their treatment.” *Afro Eurasian Studies* 1, no. 2 (2012).

———. “Explaining Ethnopolitical Mobilization: Ethnic Incorporation and Mobilization Patterns in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Turkey, and Beyond.” PhD Diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2014.

“BDP ve HDP Heyeti İmralı’ya Gitti.” *NTV*, January 11, 2014. <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/bdp-ve-hdp-heyeti-imraliya-gitti,19M-PSmWlkmFvzuwYHwCvA>.

Beşikçi, İsmail. *Doğu Mitingleri’nin Analizi*. Ankara: Yurt, 1967.

Buran, Ahmet. “Kürtler ve Kürt Dili.” *Turkish Studies* 6, no. 3 (2011).

“Diyanet’te ‘Mele’ Dönemi.” *Hürriyet*, December 12, 2011. <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/diyanet-te-mele-donemi-19443417>.

“Efkan Ala’dan Hendek Operasyonları Açıklaması.” *NTV*, February 14, 2016. <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/efkan-aladan-hendek-operasyonlari-aciklamasi,zm0BHloEIEKn0upRPCXObQ>.

Gezik, Erdal. *Dinsel, Etnik ve Politik Sorunlar Bağlamında Alevi Kürtler*. Ankara: Kalan Yayınları, 2000.

Haber, Kayyum. Twitter. Accessed September 21, 2017. <https://twitter.com/kayyumdanhaber?lang=en>.

İçduygu, Ahmet, David Romano and Ibrahim Sirkeci. "The Ethnic Question In An Environment Of Insecurity: The Kurds in Turkey." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22, no. 6 (1999).

"İşte HDP'nin Seçim Vaatleri." *Milliyet*, April 21, 2015. <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/hdp-nin-secim-beyannamesi/siyaset/de-tay/2047485/default.htm>.

"İşte Yıllara Göre Etkisiz Hale Getirilen PKK'lı Sayısı." *Habertürk*, May 31, 2016. <http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1247022-iste-yillara-gore-etkisiz-hale-getirilen-pkcli-sayisi/53>.

Köse, Sezen Ceceli. "Müzakereci Demokrasi Kuramı ve Toplumsal ve Politik Dönüşümün İmkanları: Kürt Açılımı Üzerine Bir İnceleme." *Spectrum* 89, (2012).

Köse, Talha. "Çözüm Sürecinin Yükseliş ve Düşüşü." *Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi* 4, no.: 1 (2017).

———. "Rise and Fall of the AK Party's Kurdish Peace Initiatives." *Insight Turkey* 19, no. 2 (2017).

Kurban, Hakkı. "Zerdüşt'ün Başörtüsü Diye Bir Derdi Olmaz." *Akşam*, October 15, 2011. <http://www.aksam.com.tr/guncel/zerdustun-basortusu-diye-bir-derdi-olmaz--73531h/haber-73531>.

"Kürt Açılımı Start Alıyor." *Vatan*, July 29, 2009. <http://www.gazetevatan.com/-kurt-acilimi--start-aliyor-251217-gundem/>. Law No. 4928. "Çeşitli Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına İlişkin Kanun." Article 5. *Resmî Gazete*, July 18, 2003. <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/07/20030719.htm>

Law No. 5233. "Terör ve Terörle Mücadeleden Doğan Zararların Karşılınması Hakkında Yönetmelik." *Resmî Gazete*, October 20, 2004. <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/3.5.20047955.pdf>.

Law No. 5253. “Dernekler Kanunu.” *Resmi Gazete*, November 23, 2004. <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin1.aspx?MevzuatKod=1.5.5253&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch=&Tur=1&Tertip=5&No=5253>.

Law No. 5767. “Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kanunu İle Radyo Ve Televizyonların Kuruluş Ve Yayınları Hakkında Kanunda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun.” *Resmi Gazete*, June 11, 2008. <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5767.html>.

“Milletvekili Genel Seçim Arşivi.0” *YSK*. Accessed October 4, 2017. <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/milletvekili-genel-secim-arsivi/2644>.

Ministry of Interior. “5233 Sayılı Kanunun Uygulanma İstatistikleri.” General Directorate of Provincial Administration. Last modified June 9, 2015. <http://www.illeridaresi.gov.tr/5233-sayili-kanun-uygulanmasi-istatistikleri>.

“PKK’nın Amacı İslam’dan Uzaklaştırmak.” *Haber7*, May 15, 2011. <http://www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/743956-pkknin-amaci-islamdan-uzaklastirmak>.

“Şanlıurfada İki Polis Memuru Şehit Oldu Saldırısı PKK Üstlendi.” *Habertürk*, July 22, 2015. <http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1106043-sanliurfada-2-polis-sehit-oldu>.

Sarı, Zübeyde and Sinan Onuş. “Diyarbakır’da Demokratik İslam Kongresi.” *BBC*, May 10, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2014/05/140510_kongre_diyarbakir.

Selvi, Abdülkadir. “Öcalan’la Hakan Fidan Görüştü.” *Yenişafak*, January 1, 2013. <http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/abdulkadirselvi/ocalanla-hakan-fidan-gorutu-35654>.

Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict: An Assessment of the Current Process. London: Democratic Progress Institute. November 2013.

Undersecretariat of the Public Order and Security. *Sessiz Devrim: Türkiye’nin Demokratik Değişim ve Dönüşüm Envanteri 2002-2014*. Ankara: 2014.

Van Bruinessen, Martin. *Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999.

Yayman, Hüseyin. *Şark Meselesinden Demokratik Açılıma: Türkiye'nin Kürt Sorunu Hafızası*. Ankara: Seta, 2011.

Yeğen, Mesut. *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2003.

Yeşiltaş, Murat and Necdet Özçelik. "PKK Terörünün Yeni Dinamikleri: Radikalleşme ve Şehir Çatışması." *SETA Analiz*, no. 157 (April 2016).