

ERIK RINGMAR

# MOVING BODIES

Embodied Minds and the  
World That We Made

## **Moving Bodies**

Increasingly, we have come to live in our heads, leaving our bodies behind. The consequences have been as far-reaching as they have been devastating. This book employs several case studies – kings performing in ballets, sea captains dancing with natives, nationalists engaged in gymnastics exercises – to explain what has been lost. These curious movements, we will discover, were ways to be, to think, to know, to imagine, and to will. They highlight the limits of historical explanations focusing on cultural factors and question currently fashionable “cultural” and “post-modern” perspectives. Returning to our bodies and their movements enables us not only to explain historical actions in a new way, but also to understand ourselves better.

**Erik Ringmar** is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Ibn Haldun University, Istanbul, Turkey.



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
This started out as a fairly predictable book – a survey of the history of diplomatic practices – but then I stumbled on the work of Mark Johnson, and before long I was awoken from my dogmatic,



interpretivist, slumber. And once I had read him, I started reading Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, who taught me about the importance of movements. Soon I turned to Thomas Fuchs, Hanne De Jaegher, Shaun Gallagher, Eugene Gendlin, Joel Krueger, Michelle Maiese, Alva Noë, Matthew Ratcliffe, Jan Slaby, Evan Thompson, and Dan Zahavi, and my life has not been the same since. The result is quite a different, and a far less predictable, book. Thanks to them all. Thanks also to Alessandro Burrone, Jeffrey Haynes, Diane Pranzo, Naomi Rokotnitz, Göran Sonesson, Jordan Zlatev, and John Åberg for helping me to think again, and better, about these and related topics. Robert Dreesen is an old-school editor who actually reads and actually cares. I'm in awe of the collegial generosity and interdisciplinary curiosity of Shaun Gallagher, Joel Krueger, and John Sutton. As I was completing the book, two of my teachers, Charles Lindblom and Alessandro Pizzorno, died. The first time I explored tacit knowledge was in a term paper I wrote for a course with Charles Lindblom years and years ago. I wonder what he would have made of this book. Alessandro Pizzorno – I only learned when it was too late – had a great interest in the ballet. Too bad we never talked about it. The book was completed in Istanbul, Turkey, a city of cats and sea gulls, mosques and naval vessels passing through the Bosphorus at night. Thanks to Reçep Şentürk, Talha Köse, and Enes Tüzgen for making my Turkish life possible. I am on a daily basis indebted to Ko Jenq-Yuh and Hong Ruey-Long, to İbrahim Azboy, Faik Çetindağ, Özcan Yıldız and colleagues, and to Diane, of course, forever after. *Eppur si muove.*



## MOVING BODIES



## Five Vignettes

- On February 26, 1645, at the start of the negotiations that ended the Thirty Years' War, a ballet, *Ballet de la paix*, was staged and performed in Münster, in the German province of Westphalia. The person responsible for the work, François Ogier, was a theologian and a man of letters, but also a member of the French delegation at the peace conference. During the years he spent in Münster he said mass on Sundays, delivered sermons, and heard confessions, but he also devoted time to ballet performances. Indeed, he not only wrote, choreographed, and directed the *Ballet de la paix*, but also participated in it as one of the leading dancers. The other performers were all members of the French diplomatic delegation suitably dressed up as soldiers, peasants, and various allegorical characters. After the opening night, the ballet was performed twice the following day, and a fourth time at the city hall two days later, with local dignitaries and the wealthier residents of the town in attendance.
- On October 18, 1752, an *opéra-ballet*, *Devin du village*, was performed in the royal palace at Fontainebleau in the presence of Louis XV and members of his court. The composer and librettist was none other than Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the philosopher. The evening, by all accounts, was a great success. All the glamorous women in the audience were moved by the piece, Rousseau reported in his *Confessions*, and the next day the king could be heard bellowing out one of its main themes as he puttered around in his palace. Rousseau was the darling of fashionable Parisian society. And yet already the following year he found himself on the minority side in one of the great culture wars of the day – the *Querelle de bouffons*, the “Quarrel of the Comic Actors.” There can be no such thing as French music, Rousseau insisted, since the French language, when set to music, is utterly unable to express emotions. French music is too rational, and not sufficiently moving.
- On December 1, 1498, the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama and his four ships made landfall in the vicinity of today's South African city of Port Elizabeth. Spotting some natives on the shore, and eager to replenish their supplies, the Europeans launched their dinghies. When they approached land, they threw some small bells in the direction of the natives, who eventually came close enough to take the presents directly from their hands. In return, the Europeans were

given bracelets made from ivory. The following day the exchange continued when 200 natives appeared, bringing oxen and sheep. Four or five of the natives began playing flutes, and they danced in the native fashion. Yet it did not take long for Vasco da Gama and his crew to respond in kind. “The captain-major then ordered the trumpets to be sounded, and we, in the boats, danced, and the captain-major did so likewise when he rejoined us.” When the dancing stopped, the Europeans returned to their ships with a black ox, which they had bought for the price of three bracelets.

- On October 18, 1814, a high-school teacher, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, and a group of his students assembled at Hasenheide, a wooded area on the southern outskirts of Berlin. Hasenheide was where they carried out their physical exercises. Jahn and his students wrestled, jumped across ditches, ran in labyrinths, balanced on beams, and swung from parallel bars and trees. However, they were not only gymnasts, but also liberals and nationalists, and on this particular occasion they were celebrating the victory over Napoleon at the battle of Leipzig the previous year. In the evening, they lit bonfires, sang songs, and gave speeches. Many ordinary Berliners had turned up to watch and participate in the celebrations, and groups of students from neighboring towns had joined in as well. Although the French had been defeated, Jahn reminded everyone present, Germany was still divided into far too many separate political units.
- On June 13, 1911, the Ballets Russes presented the first of its celebrated productions, *Petrushka*, to the Parisian public. The ballet was put together by an all-Russian team, with music by Igor Stravinsky and with Vaslav Nijinsky dancing in the title role. The ballet told the story of Petrushka, a doll that became a mannequin and then an automaton. First it did not move at all; then it moved because the puppet-master moved it; and finally it moved on its own, but in a distinctly robotic fashion. What is the difference between puppets and human beings? the ballet asked. And what needs to be added to an automaton for it to become a human being? These questions were timely since many people at the time – city-dwellers and workers in the new factories in particular – felt increasingly constrained in their movements, and manipulated by the many demands of modern life.

These five vignettes are taken from different historical periods and contexts, but they all have the body and its movements as a common

theme. They tell stories of theologians, diplomats, and sea captains who danced, of nationalists who did gymnastic exercises, and of dolls that tried to move like human beings. Moving bodies are not usually discussed by historians. Or rather, they are discussed only by historians with specializations – by dance historians, for example, or historians of sports. Dance and gymnastics, mainstream historians are convinced, have nothing to do with the kinds of things they write about – military or political affairs, diplomacy, economic or social transformations. There is absolutely no reason why these physical pursuits, interesting though they are in themselves, should feature in these accounts. The books that mainstream historians write focus on the deliberations of rational minds, on how the world is interpreted, and moving bodies can safely be left to others. But if this is our conclusion, we will misunderstand not only bodies and their movements, but also the past itself. After all, bodies are not something that we have, but something that we are, and movement is something that we constantly engage in. Movements place us in the world in a certain fashion, and make our experiences into experiences of a certain kind. And how we experience the world, in turn, determines how we feel, about ourselves and about everything that happens to us. It follows that bodies and their movements should be a primary concern of historians of all kinds. Bodies and their movements will influence questions of diplomacy and war, and even economic and social transformations.

If nothing else, the importance of the topic should be obvious from the fact that the people concerned spent such an inordinate amount of time, and considerable resources, engaged in these activities. In early modern Europe, diplomats at peace conferences danced, but so did kings and queens, leading statesmen and stateswomen, their lovers, legitimate and illegitimate children, courtiers, and advisers. High government officials danced too, and so did lawyers, cardinals, and bishops. Likewise, Vasco da Gama was not the only dancing sea captain. All Spanish conquistadors, including Christopher Columbus, danced with the natives, and so did the first Englishmen – the “First Fleeters” – who arrived in Australia in 1788. Even Charles Darwin danced with the people he encountered in Tierra del Fuego in December 1832. And as far as nationalists are concerned, the gymnastics association that Jahn started was soon copied all over Germany, and their members played an important role in the nationalist uprisings of 1848. In addition to fighting for their cause, they continued their

wrestling and ditch-jumping. German nationalists went on nature hikes too. In the years before the Nazi takeover in 1933, there were nationalist hiking associations that included tens of thousands of members. Some nature hikes even took place in the nude, and so did some of the gymnastics exercises.

This is all quite strange. We are not used to statesmen and diplomats who dance. Or rather, while they certainly may do so in their own free time, we are not used to them donning leotards and dancing in an official capacity. Similarly, while the conquistadors of our imagination raped and pillaged the natives, they never danced with them, and as for German nationalists, we can certainly see them marching, in goose-step, in rows upon rows, but we never see them swinging from trees, and certainly not naked. Truth be told, these rather exuberantly executed movements cast a slightly ridiculous light on the past, and on the people we study. Even just mentioning what they were up to, we seem to make fun of them. For some reason, dancing diplomats and beam-balancing nationalists embarrass us. So it is easy to understand why mainstream historians prefer not to talk about them. What we ignore we do not have to explain, and as a result history will be so much easier to write. If we turn the past into a copy of our present, we will always understand the people we find there, and we will come across nothing that embarrasses us.

This, however, would be a mistake. If we rearrange the past to suit our present concerns, it will no longer challenge us. And being challenged by the past is one of the reasons we write history in the first place. For the strangeness of these movements is indeed challenging. They leave us puzzled, and our puzzlement indicates that a change of some kind has taken place. Today we think differently about our bodies and about our selves, and as a result we can no longer quite understand what the people of the past were up to. The moving bodies are left on the other bank of a river that our comprehension cannot seem to cross. But then again, it could also be that we have not tried hard enough. This, at least, is the possibility we will explore in this book. The alternative, in other words, is to accept the strangeness, get over our embarrassment, and accept the challenge. Instead of ignoring the moving bodies, we should make them the focus of our study. Only in this way can we hope to obtain a more complete account of these historical events, but also, just possibly, a new perspective on ourselves. The aim is to investigate not only why and how people moved in the

past, but also our own preconceptions. This book is that investigation and that self-examination.

## Cultural Explanations

Before we can get to that point, however, we need a method for how to proceed. We know what we want to explain – moving bodies – but we still have to figure out how to do it. The most obvious thing to say, perhaps, is that our puzzlement is a result of “cultural differences.” Societies differ from each other after all, and each society has a certain culture. We are not like them, they are not like us, and it is consequently not surprising that we move in different ways, and with different purposes in mind. This is true across time as well. People moved in a certain way in the past that was specific to the society in which they lived. It follows that if we want to explain why diplomats danced and nationalists ran in labyrinths, it is these cultural differences that we should study.

The way to do this, a cultural anthropologist would argue, is to focus on a society’s “collectively sustained symbolic structures.” It is by means of symbols organized into structures of meaning that societies allow their inhabitants to make sense of their world. “[M]an is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun,” as the cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz puts it. “I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.”<sup>1</sup> Society is a text we can read and interpret. Thus, when something happens to us, we consult the cultural resources of our society much as we might look something up in a dictionary. The dictionary tells us what something is and what it means. And there is in principle no reason why historians could not proceed in the same fashion. While we all have our personal reasons for doing what we do, meanings are not private but public, and although there may be methodological difficulties involved in fully grasping them, there are no philosophical problems involved. If we get our hands on the same dictionary that people used in the society we study, we can look up the same words, and understand what things meant. The task is to reconstruct “the implicit text behind every contingency, the symbolic gesture that frames every action, and the aesthetic envelope that expresses and shapes feeling, belief, and moral conviction.”<sup>2</sup>

Alternatively, a historian might follow suggestions provided by poststructuralist thinkers. This is particularly apposite since writers such as Michel Foucault and Judith Butler often have made references to bodies in their work. Bodies are not natural entities or physiological facts, they explain, but social constructions. Butler's emphasizes the role of discourse. It is by constantly performing the kinds of rituals that a certain established discourse requires that the ostensibly natural comes into being. When we experience the world, we do so as a "woman," a "worker," a "person of color," and so on. This is also how notions of sexual normativity and deviance are established and maintained. Michel Foucault, for a part of his career, invoked the role of *épistèmes*, understood as shared structures of cognitive predispositions. "In any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one *épistème* that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or silently invested in a practice."<sup>3</sup> Knowledge is closely related to power, Foucault explains, and one of the objects on which power is exercised are our bodies. Epistemic power is structural power, and once we come to internalize those structures, we start policing, and disciplining, ourselves. The task for historians is to document such effects.<sup>4</sup>

This is consequently the logic of a cultural explanation. A symbol, such as a word, has no meaning in and of itself, but it represents, stands for, a conception of something. Using the word, or hearing it, we conceive of an object in terms of its denotation – what it refers to – and its connotation – the associations it evokes. Once it becomes a part of a structure of other symbols that all refer to each other, words can be combined in any order that grammar allows. This, in the end, is how we construct our conceptual worlds, or reconstruct the conceptual worlds of others. In case of the people in the five vignettes briefly introduced above, we would consequently explain their movements not as a result of the motives that guided the individuals concerned, or in terms of biographical facts, but rather by means of the meanings that people in that time and place attached to those kinds of movements. A certain person moved a certain way because it made sense in their society. Perhaps, we could surmise, it reflected a mindset common before the Reformation, perhaps it was an expression of the norms of court society, an effect of colonialism, patriarchy, or the revival of Neostoicism in the seventeenth century. There are obviously many other possibilities.<sup>5</sup>



## Against Interpretation

But notice what is happening here. The cultural theorists are no longer really talking about bodies and movements, and instead they discuss all kinds of other things. Focusing on symbolic structures, on discourses and *épistèmes*, actual bodies and their movements quickly recede from view. And this is what always happens in the case of cultural explanations. By virtue of its representation in language, the explanation comes to point away from the object of study and toward that which allows us to interpret it. The interpretation stands between us and the world, and between us and our bodies. Interpretations always proceed by interpreting something in terms of something else. Compare how cultural theorists deal with experiences. An experience is not just something that we feel, and live through, they insist, but instead whatever we can give an account of. It is only as interpreted that an experience comes to exist. “[H]uman experience,” as Geertz puts it, “is not mere sentience, but, from the most immediate perception to the most mediated judgment, significant sentience – sentience interpreted, sentience grasped.”<sup>6</sup> It follows that those who cannot interpret what is happening to them can have no experiences. This includes newborns and animals, as Geertz explains, and perhaps also people with severe disabilities. “Undirected by culture patterns – organized systems of significant symbols – man’s behavior would be virtually ungovernable, a mere chaos of pointless acts and exploding emotions, his experiences virtually shapeless.”<sup>7</sup>

The only problem – or rather, our saving grace – is that society is not a text. Life as we live it cannot be rendered in symbolic form. Not everything can be verbalized, be interpreted, speak or be spoken on behalf of. On the contrary, life as we go through it has an immediate, felt quality that always is far richer than whatever can be labeled, categorized, and represented in symbolic form. The way our bodies interact with their environment is prior to, and more basic than, any linguistic expression. In fact, the relationship works the other way around: It is not our interpretations that give us access to the world, but our access to the world that gives rise to our interpretations. This is obvious in the case of newborn children who have no language in which to interpret what is happening to them, but who nevertheless live in an eminently meaningful world. The dictionaries of the cultural theorists are missing a lot of entries, as it were, but often enough we have no idea

what entries we are looking for. And what we cannot look up, historians cannot look up either. Cultural historians can never reconstruct a lived experience since lived experiences happen off the books.<sup>8</sup>

There is something of an intellectualist fallacy at work here. People who spend most of their time reading assume that everyone else is doing the same. Thus, cultural anthropologists claim to be interpreting a world that already has been preinterpreted for them by the people they study. And poststructuralist scholars insist that we all are trapped in semiotic structures from which there is no escape. Moreover, the intellectualist fallacy is often accompanied by a considerable degree of conceit. Society is a puzzle that must be solved, cultural theorists insist, and since they believe themselves to have found the key that unlocks all meaning, they consider themselves superior to the rest of us. But chances are there is no puzzle, there is no key, and that those who insist on constantly interpreting things miss, and misunderstand, life as we actually live it. Plato was adamant on this point, of course, but we should consider the possibility that those who claim to know more about life actually know less. Unexamined lives are vastly underrated.<sup>9</sup>

Consider an example. In one of his early articles, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture," Clifford Geertz makes a famous distinction between blinks and winks. While the physical movements involved are identical in the two cases, he explains, they denote entirely different things. A wink is deliberate and directed to a particular someone; it is a symbol that imparts a message, rendered in a socially established code, and as such it needs to be interpreted before it can be understood. While a naive observer, or perhaps a film camera, will see a blink, a trained cultural anthropologist will see a wink. Since not that much can be said about blinks, the stories told about them are thin, Geertz insists, but since there is no end to the kind of things that can be said about winks, our accounts result in thick descriptions, that is, descriptions that contain all those layers of significance afforded by a culture. This is consequently what cultural anthropologists should study. Geertz and the historians who follow him practice the art of hermeneutics, and they have no time for human physiognomy.<sup>10</sup>

But blinks are far more interesting than cultural theorists allow. Blinks are not some passive material substratum that becomes significant only once it is turned into a symbol. Blinks have a life of their own, as it were, but in order to study that life we need intellectual tools of an

entirely different kind. We need the tools of cognitive science. Indeed, once we start conducting psychological tests, and read the printouts from fMRI scanners, we will discover any number of fascinating facts. For example, blink rates in humans, it turns out, are strongly associated with mental activity. When we are thinking, solving equations, or just daydreaming, we are not blinking, or not blinking that much. It is as though we need to fix our gaze on some external object. Instead, blinking predominantly happens at the end of a thought, once a daydream is over, or when we have finished a sentence. But we also blink a lot more when we are under pressure, humiliated, or put in embarrassing situations. If sufficiently pressurized, the blink will turn into a twitch or a facial tic.<sup>11</sup>

Does this matter to historians? Of course it does. Blinks and twitches tell us a lot about how people feel and how they experience the situations in which they find themselves. Winston Smith, the main protagonist of George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, knew this only too well. "Your worst enemy, he reflected, was your own nervous system. At any moment the tension inside you was liable to translate into some visible symptom."<sup>12</sup> Winston thought of a man he had passed in the street a few weeks earlier, a quite ordinary-looking man, a Party member, carrying a briefcase. But just as they passed each other the man twitched. It was only a rapid quiver, obviously habitual, and most likely not even conscious. But Winston knew that twitches of this kind were exactly what the Thought Police were looking for. They were not symbols, but signs, signs of a body subject to intense pressure. The Thought Police, we can conclude, had the opposite interests of those of cultural theorists: They cared little for hermeneutics and much for human physiognomy. "That poor devil is done for," Winston thought to himself.<sup>13</sup>

This snapshot of life in Oceania is not an analysis. In Orwell's short paragraph we are given next to no information about Oceanian society, and there is no discussion of its webs of meaning and semiotic structures. And yet, thanks to Orwell's skill as a writer, we know a lot about what it feels like to live under this kind of a regime. In fact, we know all we need to know about Big Brother. And we know not because we have compiled a thick description. Our description is actually exceedingly thin, and it is based on nothing but the realization that the stranger Winston passed in the street was a human being with a human body, that Winston himself is a human with a human body, that

we as readers are humans, and that we have human bodies too. The functions of human bodies do not vary much between societies or across time – indeed, they do not even vary between fictional and nonfictional characters. This is why we can understand each other irrespective of cultural differences. Before we were separated by semiotic structures, there was the body and its movements, and for that reason the most fundamental experiences are universal and shared. As far as bodies are concerned, there is always going to be an up and a down, a front and a back; we will always put things in our mouths, and spit them out; we will run, and we fall over; we are clean, and we get dirty; we are caressed and held, and we caress and hold in turn. Webs of meaning and semiotic structures eventually arise from such fundamentals of human life, but the world makes sense to our interpreting minds only since it first made sense to our moving bodies. The body and its movements are prior to interpretations and to explicit meaning-making.<sup>14</sup>

A twitch is not a symbol, but a sign. A sign does not represent something in terms of something else, and it plays no role in semiotic structures, but instead it indicates the presence of something. A natural sign, such as a cloud, indicates an approaching rain shower, and a conventional sign, such as a door sign, tells us what is happening inside. Signs carry meaning since they matter to someone. Clouds matter to those who contemplate bringing umbrellas to work, and door signs matter to those who need to powder their noses. Signs are “read,” we often say, but reading here does not require any particular cultural resources, and no semiotic system is invoked. Indeed, animals too understand signs – cats recognize the smell of an opened can of tuna, and amoebas can detect sugar in a water solution. Likewise, we interpret twitches, and similar bodily signs, immediately, intuitively, and for the simple reason that we too are human beings. If we peel away all those layers of symbolic meaning, what we find is a human body that moves. And it is here that our own investigation will begin.<sup>15</sup>

## **The Body as Object**

It is easy, and fun, to introduce more research results from the cognitive sciences. Blinking is just the beginning; in fact, every body part reveals something new. What we discover here is a world of the body

about which we previously knew next to nothing. And this is not surprising given that our conscious awareness only rarely is involved. We have no access to our precognitive processes after all. Although we occasionally are informed of what is going on, our deliberating minds are not responsible for what is happening, or responsible only in part. Most of our lives takes place within us, but without us, as it were. These are a few examples:

- Bodies can be primed. To be primed is to be set on a certain path, and to become predisposed to noticing, or doing, certain things. For example, once a researcher primes us with a stimulus denoting “old age,” we tend to do the kinds of things that old people do. Walk more slowly, for example. Likewise, if a researcher convinces us to hold a cup with a warm beverage, we will assess a person shown in a photograph as “warmer” than if we hold on to a cup with a cold beverage. Warm beverages prime for warm feelings, and cold beverages prime for cold.<sup>16</sup>
- Bodies remember. Fingers can remember PIN numbers that deliberating minds fail to recall, and they find keys on a keyboard as if by themselves. Bodies also remember things differently depending on their posture. For example, we recall negative events more easily when sitting in a slumped position, and positive events more easily when sitting in an upright position.<sup>17</sup>
- Bodies judge. We are more likely to find a cartoon funny if we are forced to keep a pencil between our teeth, which activates the muscles we usually use when smiling. It is our muscles that judge what we see. But bodies can also inhibit judgments. For example, a person whose frowning muscles have been injected with Botox has more problems understanding the negative content of a text. We are reading not just with our eyes but with our faces too.<sup>18</sup>
- Bodies adjust to situations. For example, people who experience social ostracism are more likely to take warm baths, and their baths last longer. Actual warmth compensates for the lack of metaphorical warmth. Similarly, people playing games donate more to charity if the game takes place in a room that smells clean than in a room that has a neutral smell. Again, the cause of the difference is not available to our conscious awareness.<sup>19</sup>
- Bodies feel shame. People who are forced to deceive another person via voice mail are prepared to pay more for mouthwash than people

who do not deceive, and those who type the deception in an email are prepared to pay more for hand sanitizer. However, once they have washed their hands and mouths, individuals in both groups are less likely to be helpful to others. Responsibility for the deception is literally washed away.<sup>20</sup>

- **Bodies bond.** People who sing, pray, or row a boat together are more likely to empathize with each other and appreciate each other's opinions, and they identify with the group as a whole even if they have no other means of communicating. Similarly, people who have spent time drumming together are more likely to help each other pick up accidentally dropped pens than people who have not drummed together. Synchronized movements create social bonds.<sup>21</sup>
- **Bodies understand.** When we read a sentence in a text that describes a movement, the section of the brain responsible for the movement of that body part is activated. Our subsequent movements are a consequence of this fact. We take significantly longer imagining walking along a certain path when told we are carrying a heavy load. When we read a sentence about a drawer being closed, we are slower at moving our arms toward our bodies, and quicker at moving them away from our bodies. Likewise, if parents stick out their tongues, the motor cortices of infants resonate directly, and the infant understands and responds in kind. No interpretation is required. A baby only forty-two minutes old can do it.<sup>22</sup>

Cultural theorists – both cultural anthropologists and poststructuralists – have little time for facts such as these. At best, they consider them irrelevant, and ignore them; at worst, they deny that they indeed are facts. And they always worry about “reductionism” – the fear, that is, that social phenomena will be reduced to biological phenomena, thereby making their own analyses redundant. Hitting back, they occasionally insist that everything is “culturally constructed,” including, according to some, the research results of cognitive science itself. This is how a war of sorts has broken out, fought between scientific and semiotic fundamentalists. But the proper question to ask is not which kinds of facts can be reduced to which others, but rather how facts of different kinds can be related to one another. It is surely foolish to deny the validity of cognitive science, but equally foolish not to remember that bodies exist in societies and are subject to social, not only biological, requirements.<sup>23</sup>

## Being Alive

What interests us, we said, is the life of the pre-symbolic body, the body as it exists before it becomes entangled in semiotic webs. This is the body that cultural theorists dismiss, that mainstream historians ignore, and that cognitive science allows us to study. But it should at the same time be obvious that cognitive science by itself is not enough. The reason is that cognitive science necessarily views its objects from a third person's point of view. Science takes an outsider's perspective on bodies and movements. What interests cognitive scientists is what they can see in their lab reports and fMRI scans, but there is much we cannot learn in this way. Most obviously, there is the knowledge we derive from our own experiences. For example, we have a sense of proprioception – “the perception of the position of a part of the body, relative to other parts of the body” – and we have a sense of kinesthesia – “the perception of the movement of one's body, its limbs and muscles.” And neither proprioception nor kinesthesia can be studied by third persons. What it feels like to position one's body in space, and what it feels like to move, are experiences that can be had only by first persons. That is, by people like us, as we go about our lives. And yet these are still facts, and the fact that they belong to first persons makes them no less factual, and more rather than less important to us.<sup>24</sup>

Or, differently put, it is a mistake to think of bodies as things, and as material through and through. For some purposes they can certainly be treated that way – in an anatomical chart in a medical textbook, for example – but most of the time this perspective is insufficient. There is a difference between a human being and a stone, after all, and the difference is that the human being is alive. If we fail to take our aliveness into account, we will never understand ourselves. A living body is an animate form that constantly engages with the environment in which it finds itself. Or, differently put, everything animate moves. Plants and trees may be rooted in one place, but their branches and leaves are moving, interacting with the sun, winds, birds, and insects. Animals are moving all the time – prowling, preening, procreating; feeding, frolicking, fleeing. And as for human beings, we begin moving around already in the womb, and we come out kicking and screaming – and this is also how we eventually leave the world, if only metaphorically so. Between our entrance and our exit, life constantly asserts itself in the form of movements.<sup>25</sup>

The best way to study animate forms is by means of the methods of phenomenology. Phenomenology is the study of experience, and phenomenologists take a first person's view of the world. And yet what matters to phenomenologists are not subjective experiences as such, but rather – and there is no contradiction here – what objectively can be said about subjective experiences. In order to investigate this question, however, we must assume a particular stance. Instead of naively living through an experience, we must observe it and reflect on its functions and forms. We do this as we strip our experiences of everything that is autobiographical, psychological, cultural, or otherwise contingent. What is left, if we are successful, is the structure of the experience itself. Thus, a phenomenologist would not ask, “Does it hurt?” but instead, for example, “How should we characterize the temporal dimension of pain?”; not “What are you looking at?” but “What are the experiential requirements of visual perception?” While the autobiographical and cultural vary widely from person to person, and from one society to the next, the structures that make experiences possible do not. This is the case since human bodies are more or less the same regardless of social and cultural context. In the process of objectifying the subjective, the first person is turned into something like a third person. Hence phenomenology's claim to objectivity.<sup>26</sup>

In this way phenomenology allows us to investigate not only experiences that are directly available to the conscious mind, but also bodies and their movements. In fact, questions regarding perspectives are not always relevant. As both cognitive scientists and phenomenologists point out, much of what happens to us is not registered in consciousness, and we are for that reason not directly aware of what is going on. For example, walking down a flight of stairs, our bodies are processing endless bits of information – How broad and steep are the steps? How is our body positioned? Which body part should move, and in which order? – but little or nothing of this information-processing ever reaches our conscious minds. As it turns out, much of our lives takes place in that murky, indistinct, and badly lit region where the body leaves off and consciousness picks up. The life of the body as it takes place here cannot be claimed by a particular person, and as a result the question of persons does not arise. Indeed, what interests us are the bodily preconditions for there being such a thing as “a person” in the first place.<sup>27</sup>



By focusing on bodies and their movements, phenomenology allows us to study the kinds of meanings that bodies make. Meaning here is a matter not of what things are but of how they feel, and how they feel depends on how we interact with them. All movements result in certain kinesthetic sensations, and this is how we as newborns first make sense of the world. A newborn does not see things, people, and actions, but instead experiences the kinesthetic sensations connected to the vital processes that keep us alive. Hunger feels like a surge; a voice is approaching and then fading away; a cry explodes and ricochets; a full diaper is a release and a relief; a lullaby is a soothing, rhythmic repetition; and so on. And before long we can start moving around by ourselves – first on all fours, and then gingerly on two legs. By picking things up and dropping them we learn about causality and coordination; by moving in a linear fashion, or by failing to do so, we learn about trajectories; and we learn about force as we expend, and experience the expenditure of, effort. By expanding and contracting the range of our movements, we learn about amplitude, and by projecting our bodies forward and upward, we learn about direction.<sup>28</sup>

In this way we acquire the fundamental experiences that we later apply to everything else that happens to us in life. We could talk about “image-schemas” – the “dynamic, recurring patterns of organism-environment interaction.”<sup>29</sup> Thus, we understand a piece of music as an unfolding sequence rather than as a collection of separate notes since we know what it is to move in a sequence, and we understand stories as sequences too, held together by agency, causality, and intentions. Time is a flow with a “before” and an “after”; there is a “here” and a “now”; things have “wholes” and “parts,” “insides” and “outsides,” “backs” and “fronts.” Conceptual thought develops from these basic experiences. Image-schemas give rise to metaphors, and in this way we come to construct conceptual systems of increasing complexity and scope. When we finally acquire language, we are able to express these relationships in more elaborate terms and make all the distinctions, clarifications, and exceptions that a vocabulary, and a grammar, allow. In this way the movements in which we originally engaged eventually come to form the “symbolic structures,” “discourses,” and “*épistèmes*” that cultural theorists like to discuss. Yet such explicit elaborations are possible only in a world that already makes sense to us. The cultural theorists show up too late, as it were, once meaning already has happened.<sup>30</sup>

## Intentional Content

This discussion provides the most general, and not a particularly surprising, answer to the question of why we move: Movement allows us to engage with the various situations in which we find ourselves. Each situation makes certain things available to beings such as ourselves, equipped with the kinds of bodies that we have. Or, in a terminology often invoked by phenomenologists, our environment is filled with “affordances.” It is by moving around that we learn what each situation affords us. Thus we might learn that a chair affords sitting, a tree affords climbing, and so on. The affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property, but rather both at the same time; it is simultaneously a fact pertaining to the environment and a fact of our behavior. If we had different bodies, the environment would not afford us the same experiences. Ants do not sit on chairs, after all, and horses do not climb trees.<sup>31</sup>

Affordances are an example of the signs that make up the world of all animate forms – the world of blinks, ominous-looking clouds, and twitching briefcase-carriers. Through the course of our daily lives we are constantly turning affordances into signs, and before long everything around us has become significant. Thus we never just hear a sound, but we hear someone knocking on a door; we never just smell a smell, but we detect a pot burning in a kitchen; we do not see colors and shapes, but a chair with stacked papers that we must first remove if we want to sit down; and so on. And we pick up on these signs immediately, intuitively, as a result of body-based, prelinguistic processes, and no explicit interpretations are required. We suddenly come across a foreboding shadow as we walk through the forest, and before we know it we have started running in the opposite direction. “A bear, it was a bear,” we realize only mid-flight, once our hearts already are racing, and our knees have gone inconveniently wobbly.<sup>32</sup>

This discussion provides us with a first insight into the collection of rather embarrassing movements with which we began. Our task, we said, is to explain all the unusual activities in which the motley crew of kings, sea captains, and nationalists engaged. The hypothesis is consequently that their movements constituted a certain way of engaging with the world, a way of exploring what was possible in a certain situation. The movements were investigations of affordances, a way of discovering and reacting to signs. And while this still is a far too

general, and not a particularly satisfactory, answer, it can be made more precise by means of what phenomenologists refer to as “intentionality.” Intentionality concerns the directedness of our way of being in the world. As a result of our intentionality, our minds are always filled with some kind of content: We think, know, imagine, and plan; we feel, hope, dream, and remember; and so on. And while the subject matter of our intentional content varies greatly from one person, or one society, to the next, the fact of intentionality itself does not. All human beings think, know, imagine, and so on, and we do so by means of the same physiological processes. Again, this is not surprising. Our intentional content is produced quite automatically, by virtue of being human beings, and by simply being alive.<sup>33</sup>

The role of the body in producing intentional content is perhaps most obvious when it comes to emotions. Fear, for example, is happening not only in our minds but in the body as a whole. We are paralyzed, petrified; we sweat, our muscles tremble, our hair stands on end; and there is that notorious “uncontrollable effect of fear on the muscles of the intestines.”<sup>34</sup> And every emotion is accompanied by a feeling, a certain kinesthetic sensation. Fear moves the body, and moves through the body. “Take away the bodily symptoms from a frightened individual,” the Danish psychologist Carl Georg Lange asked rhetorically, “let his pulse beat calmly, his look be firm, his color normal, his movements quick and sure, his speech strong, his thoughts clear; and what remains of his fear?”<sup>35</sup> Or, as William James insisted, the causal influence does not go from our minds to our bodies, but rather from our bodies to our minds. We do not cry because we feel sorry, but we feel sorry because we cry, feel angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and so on. Without the movements, we would not be moved, and without the motions, there would be no emotions.<sup>36</sup>

The claim to be defended, and developed, below is that the same thing applies to all other forms of intentional content. There is surely no doubt that we think, know, imagine, and so on by means of our minds, but before our minds become engaged, we think, know, and imagine by means of our bodies. Or perhaps better put: that which we call our minds always includes our bodies, their movements, and their engagement with the situations in which they find themselves. If this conclusion is accepted, we have a more precise answer to the question we posed above. What we will discover in the pages below are moving bodies engaged in various intentional activities. Bodies that move in order to

think, know, imagine, will, and so on. This is also how we will explain the embarrassing movements with which we began. This is not a cultural explanation, but a precultural one; what concerns us are not the interpretations reached by our minds but the actions in which our bodies engage. In the beginning, before everything else, there is movement.

## In the Mood

But here too society enters. Bodies never move alone, but always together with other bodies; the situations in which we find ourselves contain other people, and our movements are contingent upon, and often coordinated with, theirs. There are shared ways of moving, ways in which people like us, in this particular society, are likely to move. Polynesians do not swim like us, the anthropologist Marcel Mauss pointed out in a study of *les techniques du corps*, and the present generation of Frenchmen do not swim in the same way Mauss' own generation did. Likewise, the British infantry marches with a different step than the French, and with a different frequency and stride. "I think I can also recognize a girl who has been raised in a convent," Mauss claimed, since, in general, "she will walk with her fist closed."<sup>37</sup> Expanding on Mauss' investigation, Iris Marion Young points out that women throw balls in quite a different way from men. Women use less force, have less swing, and less follow-through, and as a result the ball flies higher and drops down sooner. In short, women throw balls "like a girl." And as Young explains, these differences are not the result of biological differences between men and women, but instead a result of the kinds of claims that women have been taught to make on physical space. Women in patriarchal society are constrained, held back, and in effect physically handicapped. Although some of these observations can be questioned – Did girls raised in convents really walk with their fists closed? – the general point stands. Societies differ in the way their inhabitants move.<sup>38</sup>

If culture is defined as a matter of interpretation, these are not cultural differences. We are often not aware of the way we move; for each one of us there is simply no other way of being in the world. And yet the differences depend on the context provided by a certain time and place. In order to explain such differences, consider the impact of social institutions. We are used to analyzing institutions in terms of the explicit

activities in which they engage – the financial transactions of banks, the incarceration rates of prisons – but in addition institutions are also engaged in disciplining our bodies and their movements. The manipulation starts at birth, and continues throughout our lives. The way the military drills new recruits is a particularly striking example, but bodily habituation takes place in the family, in schools, workplaces, even in shopping malls and nightclubs. As a consequence, when the institutions change, they will often require bodies to move in different ways. A more egalitarian institution is likely to provide everyone with more freedom of movement, and a less patriarchal society will not be as physically debilitating for women.<sup>39</sup>

Manipulated and disciplined in this way, we end up with a vast repertoire of ways of moving. Which one we employ at any given moment depends more than anything on the mood of the situation we are in. The mood lets us know which movements are appropriate. Thus the mood of a mosque is entirely different from the mood of a street market; moods of classrooms differ from moods of lunchrooms, and so do the requisite movements. And even in the same situation – an office meeting, a birthday party – the way we move can change in an instant if there is a sudden change of moods. Since moods compel movements, institutions make considerable efforts to establish them. Music, for example, is a well-established mood-regulator, but lighting, smoke, mirrors, and even smells can be used for the same purpose. A kitchen that smells of freshly baked cinnamon rolls has an entirely different mood than a kitchen that smells of disinfectants. We feel different in these two kitchens, and we carry ourselves, and move, in different ways.<sup>40</sup>

Moods are features not of individuals minds but of situations. We do not say, “I have a mood,” but instead say, “I am in a mood.” We find ourselves in the mood, that is; it is not the mood that can be found in us. And what we find in moods are first and foremost our bodies. Bodies understand moods far more quickly, and more comprehensively, than do conscious, interpreting minds. It is consequently not surprising that the mood that a person is in often can be inferred already from their posture and gait. A bored person rests their head in their hands, slumped on a sofa in a limp and listless position, and a depressed person is often literally pressed down by life. As a result, the mood in which we find ourselves may well be obvious to others before it is obvious to ourselves. “You are in very a happy mood today!” someone might tell

us when they see us climbing the stairs in a few brisk steps while whistling a cheerful tune. And it is only once others have found us in this mood that we find ourselves there too. Our bodies are in a mood before we are; or better put: We are in our bodies before we are fully present to our conscious minds.<sup>41</sup>

Perhaps we could talk about “attunement.” We attune ourselves to the situations in which we find ourselves much as the strings of a guitar are tuned to each other, and as one instrument is tuned to another in an orchestra. To be attuned is to be in sync and in harmony with; it is to know the right steps and the appropriate demeanor. But, equally obviously, not all attunements are successful, and in any case the outcome is not necessarily advantageous to us. We can be badly attuned, but also well attuned to a bad situation. It is the state of our attunement that we report on when we answer a question of how we feel. “How do you feel?” a friend, or perhaps a doctor, might inquire, and the answer we give is a report on how we find ourselves in a certain situation. “I feel great,” we might reply, or “loved,” “awkward,” “rootless,” “over the moon,” “abandoned,” “torn,” “disconnected,” “invulnerable,” “content,” “empty,” and so on.<sup>42</sup>

Although the way we find ourselves in a situation varies from one person to the next, most attunements take place together with others. This is the case with all moods produced by institutions. But there are also public situations characterized by a shared, public mood. Perhaps a performance of some kind is taking place – there is something to look at and listen to – and we are jointly attuning ourselves to what transpires before us. The mood of the performance captures our attention, holds and carries us along, and it captures, holds, and carries us along together with others. Consider the public moods created by a terrorist attack, by a life-threatening pandemic, or by a win in a major sports tournament. Although all members of a society are not copresent with each other on such occasions, they are nevertheless entrained by the same public events. As individuals we feel the presence of the others, and our reactions anticipate, and are influenced by, theirs. We all find ourselves in the same public mood.<sup>43</sup>

Some public moods are even more diffuse and more encompassing. There seems to be a certain fundamental mood, a basic way of attuning oneself, which is shared by most people of a historical era. This is the *Grund* on which we stand and move, and it is on the basis of this foundation that we come to experience the world. Yet such fundamental

attunements are not down to individuals; they are not contingent on particular situations, and we never think about them. Rather, they denote how it feels to be alive in a certain time and place. This is how artists come to exemplify a certain style, and how we can talk about a certain age as a shorthand for a large number of expressions that are united by little more than family resemblances. Thus the ostentatiousness of the Baroque can be found not only in paintings, architecture, and music, but in furniture design and in dress codes. And the Baroque is different from the asymmetrical sinuousness and *trompe-l'oeil* effects of the Rococo. Likewise, there was a synesthetic unity to the sex, drugs, and rock 'n' roll of the 1960s that differed markedly from the synesthetic unity of the sex, drugs, and rock 'n' roll of the punk era of the 1970s. The fundamental mood was different, and so was the way people moved.<sup>44</sup>

The aim, we said, is to explain why the bodies of kings, sea captains, and nationalists moved in various curious ways. All we needed was a method for how to proceed. Now we have one. The movements were a way to explore the situations in which the respective groups of people found themselves; they were a way for them to attune themselves to moods, producing a particular kind of intentional content. Thus, according to the hypothesis, kings and queens danced in order to be; sea captains and diplomats danced in order to know; nationalists jumped across ditches and ran in labyrinths in order to imagine; and soldiers and colonial administrators moved in order to will.

## World-Making

There are many ways to write history, and many ways to investigate how our present world came to be. Thus mainstream historians will bring up political, military, and economic factors, and cultural historians will point to the impact of ideas and social practices. But there is also another, a more fundamental history that has yet to be written. This is a history of bodies and their movements, a history of moods and attunements. This is not a history of what happened, or why, but a history of how that which happened came to be possible. Instead of causes and factors, we are interested in the conditions of possibility for something becoming a "cause" and a "factor." What interests us is not the content that fills our minds, but how that content came to be produced. We want to know how social institutions

discipline our bodies, and how they make us move. This is a seemingly superficial account of styles that really has our way of being in the world as its subject matter. A history of our way of being in the world is a quixotic project, to be sure, never to be satisfactorily completed, but this book is nevertheless intended as a contribution to it.

Despite its sprawling character and inherent elusiveness, there is a way to characterize such a history – at least as it pertains to Europe and North America, and to the last couple of hundred years. This is more than anything a story of how bodies and minds came to be separated from each other, and how bodies and their movements came to be ignored. In contemporary society we are constantly preoccupied with our bodies, but they are no longer recognized for the intentional content they produce. At best, bodies may supply our minds with “sensory inputs,” but it is always minds that think, know, imagine, will, and so on. Bodies are no longer what we are, but instead something that we have, and as all other possessions they are expected to play their role in social games of status and prestige. In this way, we came to profoundly misunderstand ourselves, and once we acted on our misunderstandings, a certain world came into being. This is our contemporary, our modern, way of being in the world. Hence the gap between ourselves and the self-understanding of people in previous times and places. Hence also our embarrassment when we come across dancing kings and sea captains, and nationalists who jump across ditches and swing from trees.

This is not the first history of modern society to be written as a story of a loss. Indeed, much of the social sciences has been preoccupied with lamenting losses. Our lives have become rationalized and disenchanting, the first generation of sociologists argued; we have become alienated from the means of production, and from ourselves. Many suggestions have also been put forward for how to overcome such rifts. And yet none of these attempts has been particularly successful, and some have had perfectly disastrous consequences. There clearly is no easy way to undo the impact of modern society. And it has been equally difficult to give the body its due. Once the inferior status of the body was routinized by the work of social institutions, and once it was affirmed in thousands of daily encounters, there was no way to put bodies and minds back together again.

The political question is whether this outcome is good enough. Perhaps it is; perhaps we should simply be content with the world we



have made. A world ruled by minds offers exciting possibilities, after all; our minds have unleashed enormous potentials, and modern societies are so much better than previous societies in so many ways. Human beings are very good at adapting, and clearly most of us have adapted to this way of being in the world. So what if we have misunderstood ourselves? Misunderstandings might not matter. But if we decide that they do, if we are horrified by the world we have wrought, if we are looking for a way to return to ourselves, we will find that our bodies are still there, doing what bodies always do. Political change – the search for a better world – should start here, in a better understanding of our bodies and their movements.



# BEING



To be is to exist; to have real existence, to be alive; to occupy a place; to occur or to take place. Used to indicate that the subject and object are the same, or that the values on either side of an equation are identical. Used to indicate that the subject is an instance of the predicate nominal.<sup>1</sup>

## To Be

The verb “to be,” according to the dictionary, can be used in three main ways. It can, most straightforwardly, provide a predication. Here “to be” allows us to describe something. Roses are red, and violets are blue. Second, “to be” can denote a function of equivalence or identity. Here “to be” is to be the same thing as something else; it tells us that the values on both sides of an equation are identical, or that my sister’s husband is my brother-in-law. Finally, “to be” can denote existence; the fact that something is rather than is not. Here the verb tends to turn into a noun; “to be” becomes “being.” And there are beings of many different kinds. Animals are beings, and so are human beings. We can even talk about being in the abstract, as “Being,” denoting a capitalized, metaphysical entity of some kind. A sense of being constitutes our most fundamental experience. It is the intentional content that allows for all other intentional content.

Regardless of how it is defined, however, “to be” makes demands on a location; being requires a place. “To be” is always to be somewhere, to “be there.” This can be understood as a concrete, physical location, and then “to be” allows us to describe what it is that we see. Everything that is in a certain place is in a certain way, and it is characterized as we attach predicates to it. Being insists on being described. But the locations can also be socially defined. This is the case for beings that are taken as equivalent to something else. Here “to be” will tell us about roles, functions, jobs, and titles. To be is to be a father, a bus driver, or a YouTube influencer. But objects have social functions too; that is, they provide us with affordances, and to that extent the places they occupy are not merely physical. A door affords a way to enter a room, to lock someone in, or a way to retreat in safety, and its physical structure – a description of wooden paneling and hinges – seems almost incidental to these functions. Finally, “to be” understood as a metaphysical entity also makes claims on a place, although these claims are purely *pro forma*. Capitalized Being is no thing after all – it

has no physical features and cannot be described – but is instead something like the premise of thingness. For this reason some existential philosophers prefer to refer to Being by means of a negative theology. Nothingness points to Being, nothingness too exists, just as the number zero exists. In the place where something once was, or where something was expected to be, there is now an absence. Being would have occupied that place.<sup>2</sup>

These three definitions show up in three completely different moods. Predications are simply statements of facts, and as such they are delivered in a straightforward, no nonsense mood. Things are what they are, and that is plain for everyone to see. As for functions of equivalence or identity, they presuppose a problematizing stance. Not everything is equal to everything else after all, and what qualifies as equal presents itself as a problem. We may be right in our supposition, or we may be wrong, and our conclusions are delivered in this mood of uncertainty. As for questions of capitalized Being, they only rarely arise. Most of the time we take existence for granted, and it is not something we lose much sleep over. Just occasionally, however, we do. Waking up in a cold sweat at 3 a.m. we find ourselves in a mood of utter anxiety.<sup>3</sup>

Since “to be” makes demands on a location, what we are can be specified only by means of an ontology. Ontology is the branch of philosophy that deals with what there is, with existence, and with questions of being and nothingness. However, the indefinite noun – *an* ontology – denotes the way a certain aspect of the world is modeled. An ontology tells us what sort of stuff there is, how things are put together, how processes work, and what the relationships are between variables. As such, ontologies are place-making and being-facilitating. The most basic ontologies are created as bodies come to engage with the situations in which they find themselves. A certain body, and certain movement, makes a certain world possible. We move into place, and the being that we come to be is the being which that world makes possible. A spider creates an ontology as it spins its web; a seagull creates an ontology as it digs in the sand; lions are ontologizing as they hunt together. Again we are talking about attunement. Our bodies attune themselves as they move around, exploring affordances, creating a model of the world in which to make a life for themselves.<sup>4</sup>

It is not only physical space that is modeled in this way. Every scientific theory presupposes an ontology – a model of the kinds of things the theory describes. And we can also talk about “social

ontologies.” Social ontologies are always presented as metaphors. A metaphor shows us a simplified world, reduced to a few salient variables. A metaphor, rather perversely, tells us what something is by comparing it to something else, which it explicitly is not, but which it nevertheless resembles in some crucial respects. “To be” will consequently be a matter of “being as.” Instead of being a specific something or someone, there is a something or a someone else that we are like. Social ontologies too are place-making and being-facilitating, and as such they come to afford us a certain kind of life. Thus a political ontology organizes political life, an economic ontology organizes economic life, and so on. A Marxist ontology is made up of “social classes,” “bases,” and “superstructures,” while the ontology of neoclassical economists includes “utility-maximizing agents” and “self-equilibrating mechanisms.” Depending on the ontology to which we subscribe, we are afforded different options, problems, and solutions, and thereby entirely different lives.<sup>5</sup>

Ontologies operate as legitimating devices. By explaining what something is, and how it works, that something is made inevitable, god- or nature-given. The legitimacy of a scientific ontology is affirmed through experiments. Thus Newton did not only show “that the Sun is agitated by a perpetual motion, but never recedes far from the common center of gravity of all the Planets,” but first and foremost that there are such things as “planets,” “gravitation,” and “motion.”<sup>6</sup> In much the same way, social ontologies are legitimated as we live the kind of lives they make possible. As you move into place you affirm that you indeed are that someone to whom the ontology applies. Moreover, occupying a certain place feels a certain way. There is a proprioceptive feel and a kinesthetic ineluctability associated with social roles and allotted functions. Being a father, a bus driver, or a YouTube influencer comes with a certain bodily comportment. The social ontology is legitimate not as a matter of intellectual acceptance only, but as a matter of a certain embodied obviousness.

## **A Ballet in Münster**

The Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) was the first all-European war, although most of the actual fighting took place in Germany. The conflict pitted Catholics against Protestants, but power politics and dynastic considerations were always more important than religious

concerns. Thus, Catholic France made an ally out of Protestant Sweden in order to oppose the Catholic Habsburgs in Vienna. The consequences of the war were unprecedented and horrific. Soldiers killed each other en masse, but above all they plundered peasant villages and sacked towns, causing poverty and widespread famine. There were even rumors of cannibalism. In the notorious capture of Magdeburg in May 1631, Habsburg troops massacred some 20,000 innocent civilians, including women and children. And well into the nineteenth century, German children who refused to eat their sauerkraut could be told that “the Swedes will come and get you.” All in all, between 1618 and 1648, an estimated eight million people died, and in parts of Germany this meant up to half of the population.<sup>7</sup>

In the late 1630s, the first attempts at a negotiated settlement were undertaken, first in Cologne, but eventually the talks moved to the two Westphalian towns of Münster and Osnabrück. The discussions were complicated and slow, involving the diplomatic representatives not only of states but of military orders and feudal fief-holders. All in all, no fewer than 100 different delegations were present. And since they were entities of entirely different standing, there were endless disputes regarding matters of protocol and precedent. Stubbornly, the French and the Habsburgs refused to talk directly to one another. When the negotiations dragged on, members of the delegations started complaining – not least about the dreariness and the provincial manners of the two German towns. In January 1648, a treaty was finally signed between Spain and the Dutch Republic, and in October of the same year two additional treaties were concluded among the Habsburg Empire, France, Sweden, and their respective allies. This is how the Treaty of Westphalia came to be concluded.<sup>8</sup>

On February 26, 1645, at the start of the negotiations, a ballet, *Ballet de la paix*, was staged and performed in Münster. The person responsible for the work, François Ogier, was a theologian and a man of letters who in the mid-1630s had made a name for himself as a preacher. When Louis XIII died in 1643, Ogier was given the considerable honor of delivering the funeral oration, and the following year he was included in the French diplomatic mission to Germany. On March 17, 1644, the French delegation made an impressive entry into Münster. It numbered some 200 people, including cooks, tailors, musicians, and guards – and Ogier was one of its leading members. Once they had made themselves at home, and the negotiations were under way, Ogier

settled into a routine. He said mass on Sundays, delivered sermons, and heard confessions, but he also devoted considerable time to ballet performances. Indeed, he not only wrote, choreographed, and directed the *Ballet de la paix*, but participated in it as one of the leading performers. The other dancers were all members of the French diplomatic mission. After the opening night on February 26, the ballet was performed twice the following day, and a fourth time at Münster city hall two days later with local dignitaries and the wealthier residents of the town in attendance. The locals were “delighted in their admiration for a spectacle so new in this country,” Ogier noted in his diary.<sup>9</sup>

The ballet proceeded in fourteen separate scenes depicting the horrors of war, but they also expressed Ogier’s hopes for a negotiated settlement. The first scene featured peasants, soldiers, “ruined gentlemen,” merchants, and a judge, who all declared that they were tired of war. Then a personification of Peace entered, accompanied by dancers who depicted Ceres and Abundance, together with representatives of the four major powers – France, Germany, Italy, and Spain – who all insisted that they were ready to lay down their arms. From the very first scene, Time – “more sudden than lightning, swifter than the wind” – hurried the proceedings along, but then Discord suddenly appeared, and their common efforts were thwarted. Eventually, after some further plot twists, Peace prevailed and the good life returned, with an abundance of food for everyone and plenty of rejoicing. In the *grand ballet* that concluded the evening, the audience members joined the actors in celebrating their good fortune. “And I can assure you,” Ogier concluded his account, “that they all danced as well as possible.”<sup>10</sup>

We are not used to diplomats dancing in front of other diplomats, local dignitaries, and members of the general public. Ballet is not what contemporary diplomats do. While they certainly may dance in their own free time, we are not used to ambassadors who take to the stage and dance in an official capacity. Yet it would be a mistake to dismiss *Ballet de la paix* as a one-off oddity or perhaps as a result of some personal quirk on the part of the people involved. After all, this was only one of a vast number of similar spectacles staged all over Europe. In the seventeenth century, not only diplomats danced, but so did kings and queens, their family members, high government officials, cardinals and bishops, theology students at the Jesuit Collège de Clermont in Paris, and lawyers at the Inns of Court in London. Henry VIII of England was an avid participant. Thus in 1514, the Milanese

ambassador to London reported that Henry, “dancing in his shirt and without shoes,” was able to leap “like a stag” accompanied by the women of the court. His daughter, Elizabeth I, danced before foreign visitors too, and she went on dancing well into her sixties. Thus in 1599, a Spanish visitor was surprised to find “the head of the Church or England and Ireland . . . in her old age dancing three or four galliards.”<sup>11</sup> And the rulers of Hanover, Mannheim, Saxony, and Bavaria danced in much the same way, and so did Christian IV of Denmark, members of the ruling houses of Burgundy and Savoy, and the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, together with his family. Even the ruler of a poor, upstart country like Sweden tried to keep up with the fashion. Queen Christina performed in a ballet at the royal palace in Stockholm in order to celebrate her coming of age in 1644, and she took the lead again in *La naissance de la paix*, a ballet written by René Descartes, the philosopher, in order to celebrate the German peace.<sup>12</sup>

Yet the most celebrated dancers of the day were surely the kings of France – Henri IV, Louis XIII, and above all Louis XIV. Making his stage debut already at age twelve, Louis XIV took part in no fewer than forty different productions in a dancing career that spanned some twenty years. Indeed, the sobriquet “Sun King” derives from the role he played as the sun in a ballet, *Ballet royal de la nuit*, in 1653. He would reprise this particular performance on several occasions, but in other ballets he danced lesser parts – “an Egyptian,” “a Moorish gentleman,” and on occasion he even performed in female roles. Some of the ballets commented on political events, while others explicitly referred to the king’s private circumstances, including his love life. In both *Ballet des arts* (1663) and *Ballet des muses* (1666), the king danced with his preferred mistress, Mlle de la Vallière. It was only in 1670, with declining agility, and much to his own dismay, that he was forced to retire.<sup>13</sup>

A distinction should be made between dances of two different kinds. The galliards in which Henry VIII and his daughter excelled were social dances, ways in which the rulers, their families, and members of their courts entertained themselves. At a typical seventeenth-century court there were three main forms of social dances. There were line and circle dances, first of all, in which all participants linked hands, and moved in the same direction. These dances were relaxed, easy to execute, and the focus was on the group as a whole rather than on individual participants. An example is the branle, popular at the court



of Louis XIV. But there were also processional dances in which couples lined up, one behind the other, and moved together in walking steps, all in the same direction. Examples include the pavane and the allemande. Finally, there were figure dances such as the galliard, minuet, bourrée, sarabande, and gigue. Some of these were performed before an audience, and allowed the dancers to display their individual skills. Others were social dances, properly speaking, undertaken for entertainment rather than for show. In any case, since the figure dances had highly intricate steps, and since the dancers interacted with each other in various elaborate ways, a lot of practice was required.<sup>14</sup>

In addition, however, there were the staged ballets, known in France as *ballets de cour*, or what in England was referred to as “masques.” These were theatrical performances featuring kings and queens in various dancing roles, and the kind of performance that Ogier staged in Münster in February 1645. A *ballet de cour* had a narrative structure, even if one only loosely held together, which proceeded in the form of a set of scenes, known as *entrées*. The performances relied heavily on classical references, on allegories and emblemata, with characters drawn from Greek mythology or from the pantheon of Roman gods. Some of the characters were legible enough – drunken peasants and foreigners in comical clothing – but other figures were more enigmatic, requiring access to a libretto in order to be deciphered. Throughout Europe the best artistic talents of the day helped out with the productions. At Versailles, the *ballets de cour* had music by Jean-Baptiste Lully, texts by Isaac de Benserade and Molière, and choreography by Pierre Beauchamp. In Jacobean England, masques were staged at Whitehall and Hampton Court, with Ben Johnson as the leading writer, and Inigo Jones responsible for costumes, set design, and stage machinery.<sup>15</sup>

Despite all the learned allusions, the point of the *ballets* was never in doubt. A typical story line would tell of some threat, calamity, or political problem. Perhaps the country confronted a hostile army or perhaps there was discord within one’s own ranks. Then some mythological figures would come on stage, or a few men in martial attire, and perhaps a group of lightly clad women would dance and sing. Next a flock of cranes might fly in formation across the stage, a magical mountain appear, and messengers descend from clouds bearing amulets. After some additional plot twists and complications, the ruler eventually emerged – often in the guise of a dancing god – in order to impose

justice on them all. Everything, it was now revealed, had turned out the way the monarch had willed it from the very beginning. Taking each other's hands, the performers thanked their good fortune and their magnanimous ruler, promising each other that peace and harmony henceforth would reign among them. And when the audience members joined them for the concluding *grand ballet*, this message was affirmed by them all, and the evening ended in a joyous and upbeat mood. Problem solved, order restored, monarchy exalted.

In order to be, we said, we must "be there." We must find our place in a social ontology. Most of the time this is simply a matter of taking up the places that have been preordained for us, and questions of being consequently do not arise. Yet there are also times when social ontologies break down, and worlds are destroyed and remade. Early modern Europe was such a time of destruction and remaking. Two previously unheard-of social subjects appeared at this time: the state and the individual. Yet despite the rather extravagant claims they made on their own behalf, it was never clear what they were, or even where they were. Both had an uncertain ontological status. As a result, new ontologies had to be invented that could contain them. How this happened is the topic of this chapter. All the dancing, the argument will be, was a way for both states and individuals to find a place for themselves. They both quite literally danced into place.<sup>16</sup>

## The Theater State

The state was a new entity in the seventeenth century. There had been kings in the Middle Ages too, of course, but they had been far more modest in their pretensions. Medieval kings had next to no bureaucracy at their disposal, no proper way to collect taxes, no standing armies, and their poverty looked like wealth mainly in comparison with the utterly destitute members of the peasantry. The new generation of kings, by contrast, declared themselves "sovereign," meaning that they acknowledged no rival authorities and no limits to the power they exercised within their domains. Their states were increasingly bureaucratized, militarized, and revenue-dependent. The new, sovereign state also had what only can be described as a legitimacy problem. It was not at all clear, after all, with what authority the state exercised its powers and why anyone should obey its commands, pay its taxes, and die in its wars.<sup>17</sup>

The solution to this existential predicament was to make the state beholdable. That which was invisible had to be made to appear. In ancient Greek, “to behold” – to see, watch, discover, descry – was *theaomai*, and from this root, via the Latin *theatrum*, we have obtained contemporary words such as “theory” and “theater.” That makes sense. After all, theory and the theater are both ways of beholding something. By means of a theory, one aspect of the world is set off from its environment, modeled in some fashion, and reduced to a few salient variables. As a result, we are able to see its logic, or one of its possible logics. By keeping the general messiness of the world at bay, a theory can be manipulated, inputs varied, and outcomes observed. Much the same is true for the theater. When James Burbage and John Brayne in 1576 built the first playhouse in England since Roman times, they quite appropriately named it “The Theater” since it too was a device for beholding things. What they had before them, the audiences who flocked here discovered, was a world set off from the world outside, simplified and reduced to a few salient variables. The stage provided a small, easily manipulable model by means of which the big outside world could be represented, and thereby better understood.<sup>18</sup>

The challenge, that is, was how to give the state a presence and a sense of being. This newly emboldened, sovereign entity had to be established on a more secure ontological footing. Rising to the challenge, a number of contemporary political theorists weighed in, suggesting various elaborate metaphors. The state, some declared, was a ship of which the king was the captain, and his subjects crew members of different ranks and responsibilities. The state-as-ship was on a perilous journey, menaced by storms and pirates, and it was for that reason imperative that all crew members stick to their allotted tasks. And mutiny was punishable by death. Or perhaps, the political theorists continued, the state was a family, of which the king was the father, and different social classes were family members of different ages and degrees of affinity. In the state-as-family, the king’s word was law, and the care he bestowed on his children was equal only to the discipline he imposed on them. Or perhaps the state was a clockwork – elaborate, mechanical clocks were fashionable items at the time – and the king was the clock-maker, or perhaps the supervising engineer. The state-as-clockwork followed its own mechanical rules and had a constitution, which even the king was required to respect. The various parts of the

machinery had to be well oiled, and finely tuned to each other, or the clock would not work.<sup>19</sup>

But not everyone read books on political theory, of course. In fact, in early modern Europe only a minority of the population knew how to read at all. This is why kings and their propagandists turned to the theater. It was more than anything by theatrical means that the state was to be made beholdable, and its claims made legitimate. This is the political significance of the *ballets de cour*. Nothing is as effective as the theater, after all, in making fictions seem real. Theories you can interpret, but performances you can feel, and thereby become a part of. As personified by a dancing king, the state had an obvious presence. To later, and more economically minded, ages, these sumptuous displays, all the strutting and the fretting, were regarded a great waste of time and money, but at the time nothing could have been more important. In early modern Europe, stagecraft was a form of statecraft. By means of the *ballets de cour* the state was danced into being.

The origin of these performances can be traced back to Renaissance Italy. Here, warlords and assorted men of distinctly non-distinguished origins had suddenly found themselves in positions of unprecedented power, and their first concern was always to conceal their past. The best way to do this was to convince their presumptive subjects that they possessed that illusive quality known as *maestà*, or “majesty.” A person who could associate a sufficient amount of *maestà* with his name became “His Majesty,” and was thereby confirmed in his pretensions. The best way to pull off this trick was to stage spectacular displays of pomp and circumstance by which everyone was to be bedazzled and overawed. To this end, Renaissance rulers organized *spettacoli* in the public spaces of their cities – processions, entrances, tournaments, jousts, horse and boat races, football matches, and even mock naval battles. In addition, events that took place in their families – births, marriages, deaths – were turned into grand public occasions to which all subjects were invited, wined and dined. This is how in Florence, a family of medical doctors – the Medici – in the course of a few generations transformed themselves into the most magnificent of princes.<sup>20</sup>

Over time, however, the rulers came to depend less and less on spectacles of this kind. Once their majestic status was established beyond doubt, it no longer had to be affirmed quite so frequently and so publicly. Rulers, it turned out, can also affirm their status by staying

aloof and apart. This was when the street theater of the Renaissance city was transformed into theatrical productions staged in the great halls of the royal palaces. And by the end of the sixteenth century, it was more than anything the French monarchy that set the standard for these entertainments. There is in fact a direct link between the *spettacoli* of Northern Italy and the *magnificences* staged in France. In 1533, when Catherine de Medici married Henri II, she took the Italian performative tradition with her to Paris. During the fifty years until her death in 1589, she was the main director of, and often also a performer in, the most ostentatious entertainments ever witnessed in the French capital. No fewer than three of her sons became kings – François II, Charles IX, and Henri III – and she brought them all up as dancers and performers. Given that the French court served as a model for other courts in Europe at the time, it did not take long before all other kings took to the stage in much the same fashion.<sup>21</sup>

Catherine's most celebrated ballet must be *Balet comique de la Royne* (The Queen's Comic Ballet), performed in the large hall of the Hôtel de Bourbon, adjacent to the Louvre, on October 15, 1581. And the *Balet* is often considered as the first example of a *ballet de cour*. The occasion was the wedding of the Duke de Joyeuse, one of the king's favorites, to the queen's sister, and the ballet concluded a week of celebrations that included a mock tournament, a water display, horse ballets, and plenty of fireworks. The *Balet comique* was an extraordinary work. Devised by Balthasar de Beaujoyeulx, an Italian composer and choreographer, and imported to France by Catherine, it cost as much as one million *écu* to produce, and was performed only once. The plot told a tale of bewitchment and liberation, which pitted Circe, the enchantress from Homer's *Odyssey*, against the powers of the French king. The king emerged victorious, of course, but it took five and a half hours to do it, and it involved a bevy of gods, goddesses, and mythological creatures of all kinds, including sea monsters and both wood and water nymphs.<sup>22</sup>

There was a particular kind of magic to these performances. As Pythagoras, in the sixth century BCE, had already explained, and as seventeenth-century audiences affirmed, there is a fundamental harmony to the world and to the heavens. By dancing we attune ourselves to this harmonious order, we become a part of it, and we come to express its logic. But dance was also a way to achieve such harmony. To dance was a way to unite that which had been sundered, and to

bring forth new life. Indeed, “to dance the beginning of the world” was Renaissance slang for sexual intercourse. By dancing before their subjects, the kings vested themselves with these magical powers, and exercised them on behalf of their states. The ballets for this reason were never mere entertainments. Confronted with the extraordinary cost of staging the *Balet comique*, Beaujoyeulx, the director, was unfazed. It may seem like an extravagance, he agreed, not least since France finds itself in the middle of a civil war, and yet this was precisely why the expense was required. The ballet was going to help heal the rift with the Huguenots, Beaujoyeulx explained, and restore peace and harmony to the country.<sup>23</sup>

### To Be or Not to Be

Early modern Europe was a time of profound, and rapid, economic and social changes, associated with what has come to be known as “the commercial revolution.” Land and labor were increasingly turned into commodities, given a price, and bought and sold in markets. Markets in consumer goods expanded rapidly as well – Baltic wheat, North Sea herring, English wool, Swedish copper, French wine – and so did the trade in luxury goods such as spices, silk, porcelain, and tea. As markets expanded, great fortunes were made, often by people who up to this point had occupied a distinctly marginal position in society. The profits were recycled through new financial networks that buttressed kings and bankrolled manufacturing and colonial adventures. Meanwhile, the commercial hubs grew quickly, and the cities attracted people of all kinds. As a result, new social classes were formed, the position and functions of old social classes were transformed, and there was unprecedented social mobility. New wealth coexisted with a new form of poverty.<sup>24</sup>

It was as though everything and everyone suddenly were on the move. Individual human beings were moving, but so too were economic forces, social groups, political entities, religious sects, ideas, and ways of life. Indeed, according to the new scientific cosmology, even the earth itself – the very symbol of immutability – was moving. “The world runnes all on wheelles,” as Michel de Montaigne put it in his *Essais* (1580). “All things therein moove without intermission; yea, the earth, the rockes of Caucasus, and the Pyramides of Aegypt, both with the publike and their own motion.”<sup>25</sup> This sense of instability and

dissolution was perfectly captured by John Donne in a poem, “An Anatomy of the World” (1611). We used to have “strong examples,” Donne began, which were “equal to law”; there was a “cement” that glued all the virtues together. But in this new age of uncertainty all is “resolv’d, and slack’d.”<sup>26</sup>

’Tis all in pieces, e all coherence gone,  
 All just supply, and all relation;  
 Prince, subject, father, son, are things forgot,  
 For every man alone thinks he hath got  
 To be a phoenix, and that then can be  
 None of that kind, of which he is, but he.

As a result, the social ontologies that had held medieval society together no longer seemed to apply. Consider the “great chain” and the “body.” According to the metaphor of the great chain, everything that exists on earth and in the heavens is intrinsically connected to everything else. Everything has its given location on one or the other of the rungs of a *scala naturae*, a “ladder of nature,” which runs from primordial slime to animals, human beings, angels of different gradations, and ultimately to God himself. In the middle of the ladder, halfway to the top, we find human beings, bridging the cosmic chasm between matter and spirit. Taken together, the great chain explained not only the extraordinary plenitude of God’s creation, but also the unity of all things. Alternatively, society was compared to a “body.” In the Middle Ages, a body, a *corpus*, was the preferred way to conceptualize groups of all kinds. Thus guilds of craftsmen, merchants’ associations, fraternities, orders of knights, drinking societies, and universities were all *corporationes*. And all the different bodies of which society was composed came together in the body of bodies, the *corpus Christianorum*, which incorporated all human beings, or rather, it included all Europeans, excluding Muslims in Spain and scattered communities of Jews. The universal body, contemporary theologians explained, had the Pope in Rome as its temporal head, and Jesus Christ in Heaven as its eternal head.<sup>27</sup>

The problem was that neither ontology allowed for movements. Both described an immobile world in which everything was dependent on everything else, and everything had its designated purpose and location. All links in the great chain were required; each rung had to be there or the hierarchical order of the universe would begin to

unravel. An animal could not become a human being, and humans could not become angels, and in much the same way a shoemaker must remain a shoemaker. The body metaphor had the same limitations. Bodies can move, of course, but in the Middle Ages this was not how the metaphor was used. Rather, it depicted the internal workings, the physiology, of society. The different bodily organs corresponded to different social classes, and the metaphor instructed them to cooperate peacefully with each other. Just as our hands cannot fight each other, or one foot trip up the other, social classes must find a way to get along.

As these medieval ontologies came to be seen as irrelevant, it was no longer clear where each person belonged. There was suddenly no given social order into which they straightforwardly could be slotted. Instead, a person's social position came increasingly to be regarded as an achievement, as something for which you had to prepare yourself, and for which you had to fight. People – or rather, select members of the new social elite – believed they could “fashion” themselves, and their lives, into whichever shape they fancied. Every man, as Donne had put it, “thinks that he hath got / To be a phoenix, and that then can be / None of that kind, of which he is, but he.” Thus while medieval biographies, usually written about saints, had showed people who were humble, god-fearing, and next to indistinguishable from each other, the new biographies, often written by or about artists, showed people who were vainglorious, and perfectly ready to inflate their *curricula vitae*. The new kinds of individuals, just as the new states, laid claims to sovereignty, and fame was the currency by which success was measured. The winners in these hard-fought battles for social prestige are still looking out at us from the portraits they commissioned from the painters of the period.<sup>28</sup>

Even though the faces in the portraits seem perfectly self-confident, many clearly feared that their success was illusory, and their prospects uncertain. Life was contingent in a way never previously experienced. There was a general mood of anxiety. The cries of despair emitted by Shakespeare's characters are well known, but other writers were equally amazed when they suddenly, and for no apparent reason, came to realize what the human condition entailed. “We have no communication with being,” in Montaigne's words, “for every humane nature is ever in the middle between being borne and dying.” And “if perhaps you fix your thought to take its being; it would be even, as if one should go about to grasp the water.”<sup>29</sup> “I know not who sent me



into the World, nor what the World is, nor what I am my self,” as Blaise Pascal put it in his *Pensées* (1670). “I only know that departing out of this World, I shall fall Eternally either into the hands of an Angry God, or into nothing.”<sup>30</sup>

Shakespeare’s Hamlet does not grasp at water, of course, but rather at a skull, but he asks the same question. How can this nothing be something, and then turn into nothing again? What good are they now, all these people who once had tongues in their heads that could speak and sing? At best they are balls of dirt which we can use for fixing a hole in a wall. Confronting the fact of our prospective nothingness, our most cherished self-descriptions desert us, and all context falls away. Biographical data, one’s emotional states, social and political facts, economic circumstances – none of it matters. Not surprisingly, Shakespeare’s grand soliloquies are all set in empty castles, on wind-swept beaches, or barren moors, and the staging always emphasizes a mood of utter desolation. Facing eternity in all directions, the soliloquies take place at night, and the spotlight in which the lonely individuals appear is surrounded by complete darkness. When confronting Being, understood as a capitalized abstraction, even the most innocuous props will look like clutter.<sup>31</sup>

## Dancing into Place

The social setting for this existential anxiety was more than anything the court of the sovereign prince. The court played a central role in the political, social, and cultural life of early modern Europe. Your standing in society was more than anything determined by your standing at court. For members of the medieval nobility this meant that they had to give up their claims to independence, leave their rural estates, and decamp to the capital, at least for a part of the year. But in addition, many *uomini nuovi* – “new men,” men and women without previous credentials – showed up, hoping to make a reputation for themselves. Returning to court from the empty castles, windswept beaches, and barren moors, it would not take long before the soliloquizers would find themselves in a much more cheerful mood. Soon their self-confidence had returned, and with it their powers of predication. Yet life at court was stressful in new ways. Every aspect of a courtier’s life was associated with a number of elaborate, and usually quite inapplicable, rules. Everyone was observing everyone else, judging their

bearing, speech, manners, and appearance. In addition, all courtiers had to master the rather more informal arts of back-stabbing, boot-licking, rumor-mongering, and bed-hopping.<sup>32</sup>

For those who were ignorant of such decorum and skullduggery – and initially that included next to everybody – there were handbooks to consult. In the sixteenth century these self-help manuals became immensely popular all over Europe, and they were, next to the Bible, the first best-sellers of the post-Gutenberg era. In England, teachers like Richard Mulcaster, Roger Ascham, and Thomas Elyot contributed to the genre, but in terms of readership no one could compete with Baldassare Castiglione's *Il corteggiano* (The Courtier), first published in 1528, but soon translated into all European languages. The book was, as the subtitle of the first English edition explained, "Very necessary and profitable for yonge Gentilmen and Gentilwomen abiding in Court, Palaice or Place."<sup>33</sup> Castiglione took his socially insecure readers to the elegant court at Urbino, a small city-state just east of Florence, where a group of veteran courtiers discussed the rights and wrongs of courtly life. You have to be an engaging conversationalist, they explained; you need to have knowledge of letters, be blessed with social graces, but you also need to engage in various physical exercise. And, as Castiglione made clear, a successful courtier must know how dance.<sup>34</sup>

In order to get ahead, many courtiers, and those who aspired to a life at court, hired private dance teachers. In London, the demand for dance teachers increased dramatically in the 1570s, and the Italian ones were particularly sought after. Domenico da Piacenza, born sometime around the year 1400, is usually considered as the first member of the new profession. He taught the art of dancing, but he also designed and choreographed the *spettacoli*, processions, and other festivities sponsored by the various upstart rulers for whom he worked. Several of da Piacenza's students went on to have similar careers, teaching essential leadership skills and the right dance moves to assorted Italian condottieri. Yet the most famous dancing-teacher of the age was undoubtedly Thoinot Arbeau, the anagrammatic pen name of Jehan Tabourot, a mathematician, but also a Catholic priest and the author of *Orchésographie* (1588), a much-used compendium on "the honorable exercise of dance." Chapter by chapter, step by step, Capriol, the fictional student featured in the book, was introduced to the terpsichorean arts. "Dancing or saltation," as Arbeau

explained, “is an art both pleasing and profitable which confers and preserves health, is adapted for the youthful, agreeable to the aged and very suitable for all, so far as it is employed in fit place and season, without vicious abuse.”<sup>35</sup>

What dance training taught students more than anything was a certain way of carrying oneself. By learning how to dance you would acquire that elusive, aristocratic air that identified a person as a member of the social elite. The way you stood revealed your standing; your position in society was a matter of your posture; your gait gave you privileges. Other arts could be practiced to the same effect – fencing and horse-riding, for example – but dancing was far easier to organize, and it was more fun too since it provided a way for men and women to spend time together. Dancing, the manuals explained, allows you to acquire a sense of balance – first of your body, then of your thoughts, and eventually of your entire person. In this way you prepared yourself to become a member of the ruling class. Only those who are in charge of themselves, after all, can be in charge of other people. Members of the lower classes knew nothing of all this. They shuffled when they walked, and danced with no consideration for form and manners. And then, as Castiglione explained, once the courtiers had mastered the art, they should forget everything they had learned. The movements of a courtier should convey that carefully studied nonchalance which he called *sprezzatura*. It was *sprezzatura* more than anything that the members of other social classes lacked.<sup>36</sup>

This constituted a challenge for the nouveaux riches members of the middle classes. In order to prepare themselves for the lives to which they always had aspired, they had to learn not only how to dance, but how to do it with ease and self-confidence. This is why Monsieur Jourdain – the hapless *bourgeois gentilhomme* of Molière’s play from 1670 – not only had a personal philosopher, a music teacher, and a fencing instructor in his employ, but a dancing-master too. “When a man has been guilty of a mistake,” as the dancing-master explained, “do we not always say: Such a one has made a false step in this affair?” And “can making a false step result from anything but lack of skill in dancing?”<sup>37</sup> But Monsieur Jourdain stumbled, of course, and already Castiglione had made fun of such clumsy parvenus. “Which of you is it that laugheth not when our M. Peterpaul daunseth after his owne facion with such fine skies and on tipto without moving his head, as though he were all of wood, so heedfullie, that truly a man would

weene he counted his paces.”<sup>38</sup> As both Molière and Castiglione explained, a *bourgeois gentilhomme* is a contradiction in terms.

This is how an alternative social ontology came to be introduced. Society was modeled as a dance. This was never more forcefully, or more playfully, argued than by John Davies in his “Orchestra, or a Poeme on Dauncing” (1596). Davies was a poet but also a rogue and a rascal who repeatedly saved himself from trouble by means of his literary skills. “Orchestra” was the poem that first brought him fame. Things have always been moving, Davies began. That cosmos and the heavens move was explained already by the ancients, and that the stars, planets, and even the earth itself are moving is explained by contemporary science. And as we all know, the air constantly moves – when we breathe, talk, and sing, or when the wind moves clouds across the sky. Yet these movements are not irregular, but follow their own laws; everything that moves follows rhythmic requirements:<sup>39</sup>

How was this goodly Architecture wrought?  
Or by what meanes were they together brought?  
They erre that say they did concur by chaunce,  
Love made them meete in a well-ordered daunce.

When correctly viewed, everything around us is dancing:

Behold the World how it is whirled round,  
And for it is so whirl’d, is named so;  
In whose large volume many rules are found  
Of this new Art, which it doth fairely show:  
For your quick eyes in wandring too and fro  
From East to West, on no one thing can glaunce,  
But if you marke it well, it seemes to daunce.

It is by means of dance, Davies explained, that both society and the world are brought together, made harmonious and whole:

If sence hath not yet taught you, learne of me  
A comely moderation and discreet,  
That your assemblies may well ordered be  
When my uniting power shall make you meet,  
With heav’nly tunes it shall be tempered sweet:  
And be the modell of the World’s great frame,  
And you Earth’s children, Dauncing shall it name.<sup>40</sup>

In contrast to the medieval metaphors of the great chain and the body, a danced ontology was able to make sense of the fluidity of life in early modern Europe. Indeed, once society was described as a dance, movements were required. “Constancy it selfe,” as Montaigne pointed out, “is nothing but a languishing and wavering dance.”<sup>41</sup> Moreover, the metaphor gave individuals a considerable amount of freedom. People joined the dance voluntarily after all; they moved by themselves, and yet everyone’s movements were synchronized with those of all others. The eventual result was a coherent social whole that was at least as well integrated and as harmonious as the societies the medieval metaphors had described. The difference was that the dance ontology presented a world made up of constantly moving, self-directing and self-coordinating, parts.<sup>42</sup>

Behind all the self-direction and self-coordination we find the power of the sovereign state. It was the state, after all, that set the stage for the performances, organized the balls, and sent out the invitations. The state was a place-maker; it made locations available that people could go on to claim as theirs. Indeed, if being is a question of “being there,” the state was the one who provided the there. The French state provides the most striking illustration. In March 1661, Louis XIV founded a dance academy, the Académie Royale de Danse, giving its thirteen members the power to regulate every newly choreographed dance, both social and theatrical, before it could be taught or performed in Paris. The Academy should also make sure that the ballet masters of the capital – of which there were some 200 at the time – attended regular Saturday classes in order to qualify for an official license. The background to these measures, Louis XIV explained in the patent that established the academy, was the “disorders and confusion of the late wars,” which had introduced “such a great number of abuses with the potential to ruin many irreparably.”<sup>43</sup> By dancing in a harmonious, and state-approved, fashion, peace was to be restored to the fractured country.

## The Stately Quadrille

The problem of a world made up of sovereign states is how to ensure peace. Sovereign rulers care only about their own countries, and as a result they can never trust each other. Since there are no pan-European institutions that can contain, and constrain, them, their fate

is in their own hands. The best policy for each state under such circumstances is to arm itself, and this is also what rulers in early modern Europe did. However, since one country's armaments are likely to be seen as menacing by its neighbors, the outcome was arms races and threats and, often enough, actual cases of war. There had been plenty of wars in the Middle Ages too, of course, but early modern states could mobilize more resources, and their wars were correspondingly far more destructive. The ongoing war – what was to become the “Thirty Years’ War” – was a terrifying illustration of the problem.

One way to deal with this new sense of insecurity was to establish more dependable lines of communication. A way had to be found for kings to talk to each other. In medieval Europe, whenever a message was to be conveyed to a foreign prince or a treaty negotiated, envoys would be dispatched to the foreign court. Their business concluded, they would then return home. However, in the course of the sixteenth century, this system of special envoys came increasingly to be replaced by a system of resident ambassadors – ambassadors, that is, who permanently resided at a foreign court. By means of these regular diplomatic channels, it was far easier for rulers to convey messages, to negotiate, but also to plant rumors and engage in acts of espionage. As for the ambassadors in question, they were the ruler's personal representatives, and as such they had immediate access to the king at whose court they resided. This is how a model of the European system of sovereign states came to be replicated at each court. By means of the ambassadors who represented them, all rulers had permanent access to all of their colleagues. When all ambassadors gathered in the same reception hall in order to present their credentials to the same ruler, they constituted a *mini mundus*, a Europe in miniature. It was a small, ambassador-based, society that mirrored the all-European society made up of sovereign states.<sup>44</sup>

However, relations also in this sociable miniature world were complicated. In terms of their functions, all sovereign states may have been equivalent to each other, but there were at the same time obvious differences between them. For example, the Habsburg Emperor in Vienna had an entirely different status than the ruler of a poor, peripheral country such as Sweden. And when the ambassadors gathered in the same room at the same time, such differences could not be ignored. They had to be seated in some fashion, after all, and their carriages could not pass through the same archway at the same time. And while

the differences between Austria and Sweden were obvious, the differences between Sweden and Denmark, or between France and Spain, were less so. The outcome was interminable conflicts regarding the punctilios of precedence. These squabbles have always looked ridiculous to subsequent observers – indeed, they have been taken as evidence of the ridiculousness of aristocratic society itself – but serious issues were at stake. In a tightly knit society, nothing is more important than your reputation.<sup>45</sup>

Even as the diplomats quarreled, however, their shared allegiance to the *corps diplomatique* – the fact that there was such a body, and the fact that they belonged to it – was not in doubt. These commitments were on ebullient display whenever a ball was arranged. A ball at the king's palace was a social occasion to which the resident ambassadors always were invited, and when the courtiers took to the dance floor, the diplomats and their wives, mistresses, and daughters were all ready to join in. For this reason it was crucial that diplomats knew how to dance. But since next to all of them were members of the aristocracy, and had received the same education, next to all of them did. Republicanism, however, constituted a potential problem. When Bulstrude Whitelocke, the ambassador from Oliver Cromwell's England, arrived in Stockholm in 1653, Queen Kristina was alarmed since the Puritans were famous, even in Sweden, for their disapproval of the terpsichorean arts. "Is dancing prohibited in England?" the queen asked the ambassador when they first met. "Some there do not approve it," Whitelocke admitted, "but it is not prohibited by any law, and many there do use it."<sup>46</sup> The queen was much relieved when Whitelocke assured her that he had learned how to dance as a lawyer at the Inns of Court in London and that he objected to balls only if they took place on Sundays.<sup>47</sup>

Since the resident ambassadors effectively were courtiers, they were an integral part of the state-sponsored yet self-coordinating society established at each court. This provided a metaphor by which relations between sovereign states could be organized. The diplomats too, and thereby the countries they represented, danced into place. Compare the idea of "balance of power." In his *Storia d'Italia* (History of Italy, 1540), the Florentine diplomat and historian Francesco Guicciardini emphasized the role of what he called *la politica dell'equilibrio*, the "politics of equilibrium." Although no one had intended it, he noticed, relations between the various Italian city-states tended in *modo*

*bilanciate si mantenessero*, to “maintain themselves in a balanced fashion.”<sup>48</sup> The result was a modicum of restraint, even peace, also between sovereign princes. Today we typically think of balancing in mechanical terms, as an equilibrating device, but in early modern Europe the reference to dance was more obvious. The first requirement of all dancers is to maintain their balance after all, and there must be balance too in the way a group of dancers coordinate their movements. The way alliances were made and broken resembled the way dancers held on to each other, and then let go.<sup>49</sup>

At the time the quadrille was the most obvious reference. The quadrille is a dance performed by four couples who trace symmetrical patterns on the dance floor, changing partners at regular intervals. The dance was popular throughout the eighteenth century, and a standard feature of balls at all European courts. The “stately quadrille” was also the informal name given to the balance of power that in the eighteenth century obtained between the four great powers – France, Spain, Austria, and Britain. It was in the peace treaty signed in Utrecht on April 11, 1713, that the principle of a pan-European balance first was expressed. This was the congress which brought the War of the Spanish Succession to a close, and made it clear that France, despite Louis XIV’s repeated attempts, was not going to be able to dominate the rest of Europe. France could form a couple with Spain, as it were, but Britain would form a couple with Austria. In this way they would secure “the universal good and quiet of Europe, by an equal weight of power, so that many being united in one, the balance of the equality desired, might not turn to the advantage of one, and the danger and hazard of the rest.”<sup>50</sup> Just as in a quadrille, however, the pairs would occasionally break up, find new partners, and join up with each other in new constellations. Most notoriously, in 1756 Britain abandoned Austria, and instead concluded an alliance with Prussia, while Austria joined up with France, its previous arch-enemy.<sup>51</sup>

The diplomatic delegations that assembled in Utrecht in order to determine the future of Europe, not only negotiated, but also had time to enjoy themselves. One of the most talked-about occasions was a party organized by the Portuguese delegation on February 27. Among the guests were no fewer than fifty ambassadors and their staff – “representatives of all the sovereign states of Europe” – and the party lasted for all of three days. The first evening the Portuguese had prepared a sumptuous banquet and a theater performance. Since the first



night's entertainment included only men, the second night was organized by the women. The wives, mistresses, and daughters of the diplomats took part, but since their number was insufficient, an additional 200 women were invited – all women “of an enchanting magnificence.” The ambassadors danced until five o'clock in the morning, only interrupted by a midnight buffet. The third day featured a masked ball. Since this was a form of entertainment unknown to the Dutch, it was difficult for the delegations to find the right costumes. But everything worked out well in the end. Everyone looked gorgeous, especially the women who took the opportunity to dress up in assorted exotic attire. Delighted, if also utterly exhausted after three days of merry-making, the ambassadors thanked their hosts, and returned home.<sup>52</sup>

### Actors on the World Stage

In addition to the social dancing in which they all engaged, the resident ambassadors were also present whenever *ballets de cour* were performed. Much as the audiences made up of the princes' own subjects, the members of the *corps diplomatique* were to be awestruck and bedazzled by these performances, and left in no doubt regarding the majesty of the king. In fact, the resident ambassadors were at least as important an audience for these displays as the courtiers themselves. This is why each court made sure to hire the best directors, composers, musicians, and dance teachers. This is also why the librettos were lavishly illustrated and published in several languages. The hope was that the ambassadors would include them in their correspondence with their home governments and that the foreigners would be suitably impressed. A positive verdict from a foreign court could justify the cost of even the most elaborate productions. “And with regard to foreigners,” as Louis XIV advised his son, “when they see that the state is otherwise flourishing and well settled, such seemingly superfluous expenses make a very advantageous impression of magnificence, power, wealth, and greatness.”<sup>53</sup>

Sovereignty, scholars of international law like to say, has two dimensions. Relations between the state and its subjects constitute the internal dimension while relations to other states constitute the external dimension. In early modern Europe questions of being were raised in both dimensions. The question was what the state was, even where it was, and what an entity such as this legitimately was able to do. The

internal dimension of sovereignty was, as we saw, addressed by means of political theory and political theater. Theory was for the educated elite; theater for courtiers and for ordinary people; but in either case, the aim was the same: to make the state beholdable, visible, indisputably there. Much the same was true for the external dimension of sovereignty, and again the theater played an indispensable role. It was more than anything by means of theatrical performances that the state found a place for itself on the world stage.<sup>54</sup>

The Greek verb *theaomai*, and its Latin root *theatrum*, have given us both “theory” and “theater,” we said, but in early modern Europe, *theatrum* denoted first and foremost what we today would refer to as an “encyclopedia.” At the time literally hundreds of encyclopedias were published, on any number of specialized subjects – *Theatrum humanae vitae* (1587), *Theatrum principum orbis universi* (1596), *Theatrum botanicum* (1640), *Theatrum meteorologicum* (1660), *Theatrum nobilitatis europeae* (1668), *Theatrum passionum* (1721), *Theatrum machinarum hydrotechnicarum* (1724), and many others. Why an encyclopedia could be called a *theatrum* is easily explained. After all, encyclopedias do exactly what both theory and the theater do. Encyclopedias set something off from its environment, reduce something to a few salient variables, and model something in a certain way; encyclopedias tell us what things are, how they came to be, and how they work.<sup>55</sup>

A popular subgenre was the *theatrum mundus*, an encyclopedia of maps, of which Abraham Ortelius’ *Theatrum orbis terrarum* (Theatre of the Orb of the World), published in Antwerp in 1570, was the first example. What was beholdable, simplified, and modeled here was geographical space. Although few of the maps were made by his own hand, Ortelius took the maps made by others, standardized them, and gave them a uniform scale and design. Here it all was, the whole world, within the pages of one volume. Although Ortelius’ original maps showed no borders, by the seventeenth century borders had become the very point of a map. Geographical space was politicized, as it were. Each piece of land was occupied by one state, and one state only, and there was no land that belonged to no state. Thus, as long as you had access to a geographical *theatrum*, the question of the ontological status of the state was easily settled. All you needed to do was to look up a certain page, and there you would find it – each state clearly delineated and, much as in a portrait, given its own distinct features.

England was an island, France a hexagon, Italy a boot; on a map of Europe, Sweden was at the top, Spain at the bottom left, and Germany in the middle. Looking at the map, you knew for the first time what your country looked like, and as a subject it was perfectly obvious where in the world you belonged.<sup>56</sup>

Map-making was a means of state-making, in other words, and before long geographers were employed at each princely court. In the seventeenth century, maps became an indispensable tool of statecraft, and in the eighteenth century national geographical surveys were undertaken by means of triangulation, a technique that assigned a set of unique coordinates to everything that belonged to a certain state. The maps that were produced in this way showed the extent of the rulers' possessions and the resources available to them. Guided by the imperatives of geography, the interests of each state could be calculated with some considerable degree of precision – this, at least, was the hope expressed by the political geographers of the time. Some maps showed secret information, and they were hidden, but often the maps were proudly displayed on the walls of the palaces. In many portraits of the period, the rulers would show themselves pointing to maps, standing on them, or holding globes in their hands. “This is mine,” was the implication, “I am the ruler of all this.”<sup>57</sup>

The only problem with an encyclopedia is that it has no temporal dimension. It can only capture moments in time. Here the theater enjoys a distinct advantage. A theater can show us events as they unfold, one thing after another, and it shows us people as they are moving and acting. But as directors of the *ballets de cour* soon realized, it is not too difficult to turn the *theatrum* into an actual theater, and to make the collection of maps come alive. The map could be mapped onto the stage, as it were. In fact, this could quite literally be done once the coordinates that gave the geographical location of a state were translated into the lines on the floor that denoted where on a stage an actor should stand during a performance. Soon the *ballets* featured personifications of the state – often played by the king himself – acting and interacting with personifications of its neighbors. This is how the metaphor comparing the world to a stage first came to be established. Ever since states have appeared on the “world stage,” whenever matters of international politics have been discussed.

As an example, consider the *Ballet des Polonais*, staged by Catherine de Medici at the court of her son, Charles IX, on September

15, 1573. The occasion was a visit to Paris by eleven Polish ambassadors who had come to negotiate the terms on which Henri, another of Catherine's sons, would take up the Polish throne, which recently had been left vacant. For Henri this was an opportunity to become king after all, and for France it was an opportunity to extend its influence in Europe. The Poles, for their part, wanted military support against Russia, diplomatic assistance in dealing with the Ottoman Empire, and financial subsidies. After a month of complicated negotiations, an agreement was reached, and the festivities could begin. Once again Catherine de Medici spared no expense. Choreographed by Balthasar de Beaujoyeulx, all the dances were highly elaborate and full of classical references. The dancers formed flocks of cranes, as once described by Plutarch; a meandering river straight out of Hesiod; and leaping dolphins, just like those you can read about in Virgil's *Aeneid*. And Henri's martial valor was emphasized too. Like an attacking army, the dancers formed various geometrical patterns, and paraded in unison before the king and his family. And when they eventually stopped, the nymphs all lined up to give Henri a kiss and a golden medallion together with a poem. Afterward, as was the custom, there was a grand ball in which the royal family and the whole court participated; confectioneries, marzipans, and sweets were served; and the evening ended in the early hours. There was surely no doubt in the minds of the Polish ambassadors that they had chosen the best ruler for their country.<sup>58</sup>

Or consider *Britannia triumphans*, a masque performed in London on January 7, 1638. Here Charles I, the king, danced in the role of Britanocles, a personification of Britain, and also something of a superhero. Britanocles was joined by fourteen noble lords who all wore identical white suits, decorated with carnations, and they had pyramidal headdresses made of feathers. But uniquely for this particular ballet, the overall theme was naval. The royal navy had often been in the news in 1637, and Charles had been under a lot of criticism for not employing it more forcefully. In the 1630s, corsairs from North Africa had regularly attacked coastal communities in the British Isles, taking captives whom they proceeded to sell into slavery. Altogether, several thousands of Britons had been enslaved in this way. Clearly, the king needed to do something. However, the ability of the English navy to operate in these faraway waters was limited, and the raids continued. There was consequently a lot to talk about when Admiral Jawdar ben Abdellahan, the Moroccan ambassador, showed up in London. Abdellahan was present

at the performance of *Britannia triumphans* – in fact, he was seated right next to Queen Henrietta Maria – and much of the story seems to have been written with his presence in mind. In the end, of course, and as already the title of the ballet made clear, Britannia triumphed. “So well Britanocles o’er seas doth reign / Reducing what was wild before / That fairest sea-nymph leave the troubled main / And hast to visit him on shore.”<sup>59</sup> This was the message that Charles wanted the Moroccan ambassador to take home with him.

## A World Comes into Being


We are not used to kings who dance as a part of their official duties, and dancing no longer features in the job descriptions of diplomats, government officials, lawyers, or theologians. Indeed, to us behavior such as this is not only odd but also quite embarrassing. The question is how it should be explained. This question can be answered in many different ways, we said. There are answers that refer to personal motives, historical contingencies, and social practices, but it is also possible to explain the dancing in terms of its intentional content. This is what we did in this chapter. Dancing, we said, is a way to be. Or, more precisely put, it is a way to come into being.

In order to be, we must “be there.” To be is to be in some place and some time. Times and places are provided by ontologies that model the world in a certain fashion. They identify the kinds of things that exist and the relationships that obtain between them. Most of the time we are placed in an ontology already from birth, and thereby are never in a position to question how we ended up being who and where we are. Questions of being, as a result, are not issues that we normally think much about. Most of the time we just go about our lives, being who we are, and doing what we do. But just occasionally something happens that makes us question these commitments. Something, it turns out, is not what we thought it was, it does not work as we expected, and suddenly we cannot understand what is going on. And just occasionally we are surprised by the very fact of being. Not what we are, but that we are. And although questions such as these always are available to us, they are more likely to be raised at particular historical junctures – when an existing order breaks down and a new one is put in its place. Existential anxiety, for this reason, has a history that can be traced and told.

Early modern Europe was a time of such ontological confusion. This was a particular problem for the two sovereign subjects that made their appearance at this time: the state and the individual. Despite the rather extravagant claims that both subjects made on their own behalf, it was never clear what, or even where, they were. With John Davies we invoked the metaphor of a dance, and dancing provided a place and a role for both states and individuals. They both danced into place, into being. The *ballets de cour* in which the kings were such eager participants made the state beholdable. In relation to the king's own subjects, the ballet established the king as the undisputed ruler of his country. After all, only a person who commands such obvious *maestà* has the right to call himself "His Majesty." In relations to other countries, the stage became a "world stage," the setting in which sovereign rulers acted and interacted with each other, making wars, making peace, signing treaties. It is on this world stage that the state is placed to this day, and international politics is inconceivable without it.

But the dance metaphor served individuals too. What mattered to them were not staged ballets as much as the kind of social dancing that took place in the ballrooms of the king's palace. The nighttime soliloquizers were relieved of their anxiety once they found themselves participating in a galliard, a minuet, or a bourrée. The court provided a hierarchical system of social positions, ruled by an elaborate etiquette, and the dances were both an expression of and a basis for this social order. Although the dances were directed by the state, they provided an illusion of self-organization perfectly suited for a society, and for individuals, who constantly were on the move. The dance maintained order in a society made up of self-directing and self-coordinating parts. And once the ambassadors who were permanently stationed at each court took to the dance floor, this ontology came to apply also to relations between states. A new conception of international politics came into being as it was danced into place. States balance each other, we have come to say, despite all the disparate actions in which they engage. International politics too is a self-directing and self-coordinating system.

# ||| THINKING



To think is to ponder; to go over in one's head; to communicate to oneself in one's mind; to try to find a solution to a problem; to conceive of something or someone; to be of opinion that; to consider, judge, regard, or look upon something as; to guess; to reckon; to plan; to be considering; to be of a mind to do something; to presume; to venture.

## To Think

Thinking, we often assume, is the main activity that goes on in our minds, and yet what we identify as thinking is only one of a number of related activities that serve to maintain the body in equilibrium, allowing it to cope with its environment. The brain has to anticipate problems, budget for contingencies, and prepare the kind of resources that we need in order to get us through the day. This is a matter of regulating body temperature, blood pressure, endocrine levels, and much else besides. None of these tasks is present to our conscious awareness, and we would never consider them to be thoughts, properly speaking. At this basic level it is impossible to separate processes that take place in our brains and in our bodies, and in any case not all conscious processes are attributable to a sense of self.<sup>1</sup>

Between the high-level reasoning and the low-level maintenance, brains are engaged in all kinds of intermediary activities that also serve to maintain the body in equilibrium, allowing us to get by. These activities are conscious, or semi-conscious, but at the same time far less explicit, and less coherent, than rational thought. Consciousness is dialogical. From moment to moment we are talking to ourselves about what we are doing, what is going on, and how we feel about things that happen to us. Occasionally, we may even do so out loud, startling people around us, but children often do so as a matter of course. Walking across the floor, a three-year-old might say, "I walk." To call this "thought," however, might be to give it a dignity it does not deserve, and in any case it is not a commentary, properly speaking, since much of it is implicit and unvocalized. Here too brains and bodies constitute an integrated system, and verbal expressions are difficult to separate from a basic sense of awareness. Many of our thoughts are more like mutterings – an "uff!" and an "ayaa!" – and often they are expressed by means of gestures rather than words. Something happens to us, and we take a deep breath and shake our heads in disbelief. Even



though we are not saying anything, everyone knows what we are thinking. Or rather, the deep breath and the head-shake is the thought.<sup>2</sup>

Once thinking is understood as a stream of thoughts, and as a running commentary on our lives, it is easy to see why thinking is associated with gestures. We gesture in order to give emphasis, and a visual and kinesthetic presence, to what we are saying. But gestures not only illustrate what we want to say; they also help us think. Gestures are a way to retrieve words, organize concepts, and develop suggestions. Often we have no idea what we think about a certain matter, but we have a hunch, and the hunch is explored as we start moving our arms, hands, and heads, and as we exercise our facial muscles. The thought develops through these movements. This is why we often continue to use our hands even when we are reasoning in abstract terms, and why we do it not only as a way to communicate with others, but also when we are trying to think something through for ourselves. Consequently, in situations when we cannot move our hands – in the setting of a psychologist's lab, for example – even the most rational thought is impaired.<sup>3</sup>

There is a certain movement to our thoughts and to the way we use language more generally. There is a rhythm to what we say and to the way we string words together. Thoughts have a way of rising and falling; our thoughts turn around, go off on tangents, and take turns in new directions. We put things into parentheses and within quotation marks. Some thoughts are jagged, jagged, with awkward ... pauses between them. These are the cadenzas and pirouettes of thought, the marathon runs and the boxing matches, and every turn has a certain affective tone. As a result, even perfectly abstract thinking comes to feel a certain way. There is, William James pointed out, a certain feel to a “but” when we say it in a sentence that is different from a “however.” The “but” comes with a short pause and an accompanying halting gesture, while the “however” carries us along, as though over a hill or past some obstacle in the road. Even when we are reading, alone and in silence, we feel faint reverberations of these movements.<sup>4</sup>

Used as we are to equating thinking with reasoning, it is surprising to discover kinesthetic connections such as these. And we cannot quite understand why it is that thought should give rise to movements. From a developmental perspective, however, it could not be otherwise. The symbols we use when reasoning must come from somewhere, after all; they must be grounded in something. But the connection works the

other way around: It is not thought that gives rise to movements, but movements that give rise to thought. Consider, for example, two lions chasing a zebra. They are surely thinking, and they do it not in words but in movements. Moreover, they are thinking together; not one plus one, but the two together as a team. And clearly they are not thinking first, and then making their moves, but thinking in the movements themselves. There is a lot of stalking, chasing, crouching, creeping, sprinting, racing, and so on. The thought is intrinsic to the situation as it evolves as a result of the movements in which they engage. Newborn children think in much the same way, responding to situations as they develop, and so do dancers engaged in improvisations. Lions think on the spot; dance improvisers think on, and with, their feet; and so do children, as they are learning to walk.<sup>5</sup>

This makes thought into a kind of tool, a way of coping with the world around us. And thoughts, just like tools, are employed quite automatically and unselfconsciously once we have learned how to use them. There are habits of thought, as it were. This is obvious in case of compulsive thoughts, when, try as we might, we cannot stop ourselves from thinking about a certain something. But even short of pathological cases, we often think in predictable patterns. When we find ourselves in a certain situation, we draw certain connections, and before we know it the same thoughts pop into our heads. Standardized thoughts, automatically recalled, save time and resources. Habits of thought – and habits more generally – are a way of attuning ourselves to the situations in which we find ourselves. A certain mood calls out for a certain habitual response. As a result, thinking may be less of a deliberative activity than we commonly acknowledge. If thinking is a habitual response to the situations in which we find ourselves, we are not as completely in charge of our thoughts as we like to believe.<sup>6</sup>

In any case, much of what we say is not actually the expression of a thought, but much more similar to an action. Even when we believe we are conveying information, our words fulfill all kinds of nonthinking functions. What matters is not what the words say but what they do. Thus, when we nag a child for the umpteenth time about putting on warmer socks “because it is cold outside,” we are not actually giving an instruction, but rather reminding our daughter that we love her and that we worry when she goes out into the world alone. Analogously, expressions are often used in order to convey loyalty and establish identities. Much of what officially passes for thought, including much academic

discourse, is more similar to the grooming behavior we find in chimpanzees. As long as the words are arranged in the correct grammatical order, what we say will appear to convey content, but actually we are just affirming our allegiance to the tribe.<sup>7</sup>

This is not to say that the high-level reasoning we associate with thinking never occurs. It does. But explicit ratiocination mainly takes place on set occasions or whenever we are presented with a problem that requires an immediate solution. Something is wrong, our habits have led us astray, and the muttered commentary suddenly comes to a screeching halt. While streams of thought generally take place in a fluid mood – things move along in a well-known pattern – the rupture causes an abrupt change of mood. In the new mood we may be surprised to find how strongly we react. We cannot believe our bad luck and the way we have been treated. We get angry, frustrated, or embarrassed. And these emotional reactions immediately estrange us from the situation that until now had contained us. This may be a troubling experience, but it may also feel like a liberation. “To hell with it all!” “You can’t fire me, I quit!” In any case, our sudden displacement provides us with the opportunity to analyze where we are and what actually happened to us. The new situation calls for thought, and once we have calmed down we begin reasoning. We are required to set something in motion, to get something under way. We are provoked into thinking, as it were; “some things make an appeal to us to give them thought, to turn toward them in thought; to think them.”<sup>8</sup>

## Aesthetic Objects

On October 18, 1752, *Devin du village* (The Village Soothsayer) was performed at the royal palace at Fontainebleau, just southeast of Paris, in the presence of the king, Louis XV, and the members of his court. *Devin du village* was a so-called *opéra-ballet*, a performance that combined music and dance, and the composer and librettist was none other than Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the philosopher, who up to this point mainly was known as the author of a collection of articles on music in the *Encyclopédie*. The plot of the piece, such as it was, was set in a pastoral landscape of shepherds and shepherdesses, and the topic was love. Colin was very much in love with his Colette, but he suspected her of infidelity. Meanwhile, Colette suspected her Colin of the same. In their despair, the young couple sought the advice

of a fortune-teller, who after some misunderstandings and additional plot twists, united the two. They married and lived happily ever after.<sup>9</sup>

The performance, by all accounts, was a resounding success. There was no clapping, Rousseau recounted in his *Confessions*, but that was the custom whenever the king was present at a performance. Yet the silence made it all the easier to catch the reactions of the audience members. “I heard around me women, who seemed to me as beautiful as angels, whispering and saying to each other in a low tone, ‘Charming! Delightful! Every note speaks to the heart!’”<sup>10</sup> The fact that something he had written could have such an effect on women such as these brought tears to Rousseau’s eyes. And the king was by all accounts just as pleased with the evening. The following day he could be heard puttering around in his palace bellowing out the main theme song: “J’ai perdu mon serviteur / j’ai perdu tout mon bonheur.”<sup>11</sup> Two weeks later, the performance was repeated at the Château de Bellevue, with Mme Pompadour, the royal mistress, starring in the male lead. And in the spring of the following year, *Devin du village* went on for a run at the Opéra de Paris, a public theater, where it soon became a standard feature of the repertoire with no fewer than 540 performances given during the course of the following half-century. The proceeds provided Rousseau with a much needed regular income.<sup>12</sup>

According to its composer, the *Devin du village* was influenced by Italian models. Rousseau adored Italian opera, which he had experienced firsthand when working for the French diplomatic mission in Venice in 1744. Another, more direct, influence was *Serva padrona* (The Servant Turned Mistress), an *opera buffa* written by Giovanni Battista Pergolesi, which had been performed by an Italian opera company during a visit to Paris in August 1752. Although the orchestra and singers were second-rate at best, Rousseau reported after attending a performance, the music was much better than anything else that was on offer in the French capital. Italian opera is far more passionate than French; the music deals with the emotions, and the voices are sincere. French opera, by contrast, is formal and rigid, too elaborate by half and far too cerebral. And by “French opera,” Rousseau meant above all the works of Jean-Philippe Rameau, the primary exponent of the musical legacy of the court of Louis XIV.<sup>13</sup>

Not everyone agreed with Rousseau’s verdict, of course, and before long Parisian public opinion was divided into two camps, which were “more violently opposed than if it had been a matter of religion or

an affair of State.”<sup>14</sup> On the side of Italian music were the “real connoisseurs, persons of talent, and men of genius,” as Rousseau put it, and on the side of French music were “the great, the wealthy, and the ladies” – “the ladies” here referring to the powerful female leaders of the literary *salons*.<sup>15</sup> In the ensuing so-called *querelle des bouffons*, a number of pamphlets were published supporting one or the other of the two sides. In Rousseau’s camp we find Baron Friedrich Melchior von Grimm, the German-born friend of Diderot and d’Alembert, who wrote a less-than-flattering account of an evening he had spent attending a French opera. A particular outrage, Grimm reported, was the *batteur de mesure*, the “time-beater,” who marked the time of the music by striking a heavy stick against the floor. He made a noise as though he was splitting wood, and he would no doubt have made a good living as a woodcutter.<sup>16</sup>

In 1768, a twelve-year-old Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart wrote a pastiche of Rousseau’s *opéra-ballet*. *Bastien und Bastienne* featured the same sheep-herding couple, the same soothsayer, and the same happy resolution, but more than anything the young Mozart’s version highlighted Rousseau’s limited abilities as a composer. Unable to free himself from the musical conventions he criticized, he could never live up to his own ideals. It was instead Rousseau’s writings from the time of the *querelle* onward that pointed away from the Baroque and toward what we today would identify as a romantic sensibility. Music, according to the Romantics, expresses feelings, and listening to music was a way to experience those feelings. Music was turned into an object of aesthetic contemplation, a way to reflect on beauty. As such, music was also something you could talk about and fight over.<sup>17</sup>

More concretely, before the last decades of the eighteenth century, music had only rarely commanded the full attention of its ostensible audiences. People listened to it, but usually not in silence. Instead, they would unapologetically chat during a concert, flirt with members of the opposite sex, play cards, read newspapers, or eat. The young Mozart was one of the many musicians who complained about this lack of respect, often only playing, he pointed out, “to the chairs, tables and walls.”<sup>18</sup> And audiences were no better behaved at the opera. At the Opéra de Paris the patrons would come late and leave early, and while many different activities were going on in the private boxes, the silent contemplation of beauty was rarely one of them. Indeed, members of the audience would often complain that they had problems carrying out

a conversation since the music was too loud. And on the parterre, where the tickets were cheaper, people would walk around, dance, or sing, and dogs or other animals would occasionally walk in from the street.<sup>19</sup>

The change in attitude, once it occurred, was swift and profound. In the last decades of the eighteenth century, audiences suddenly fell silent and started paying exclusive attention to what they heard. Nothing was now allowed to come between the audience and the aesthetic experience, and listeners who made even the smallest noise during a performance were asked, in no uncertain terms, to hush. There is an irony here. Music, according to the Romantics, represents our emotional lives, and yet these emotional objects are external to us, held up in front of us as objects to behold. And we do this with great attention and utter detachment. As a result, the emotions are analyzed rather than experienced and gone through. The emotions are in the music, and only indirectly in ourselves. The music stirs our minds, not our bodies. And this is how “music appreciation” is taught to this day. The ability to suffer through hour-long performances in complete silence, without even shifting in one’s chair – or, heaven forbid, yawning – is taken as a sign of a good, middle-class education.<sup>20</sup>

The sudden change in listening habits, we will argue in this chapter, was a consequence of a new way of thinking about thinking. In the course of the eighteenth century, thinking came increasingly to be equated with reasoning, and reasoning was seen as taking place exclusively in a person’s mind. No longer engaged in thought, the body was regarded as nothing more than a container for the passions. This stark division created the precondition for the existence of aesthetic objects, understood as objects of beauty and emotion to which thinking could turn. Art – or, as in the case of Paris in the 1750s, the relative merits of French music – suddenly became something about which you could theorize – and fight. And as we will discover, the same division had a profound impact on the ballet. In the seventeenth century, we said, ballet was a matter of statecraft, an art that compelled statesmen to invest enormous sums of money in theatrical productions, and to themselves take to the stage. And the ballet was a decidedly manly activity. One hundred years later, however, there was no longer any political urgency to what happened on the stage, and statesmen no longer danced in front of their subjects. The ballet had become a feminine art, and an art form for men of less than fully manly persuasions. It was all very lovely, to be sure, but also perfectly inconsequential.

## Thinking as Reasoning

Before the middle of the eighteenth century, music was not considered as an aesthetic object to be contemplated, and not thought of as an expression of human emotions. Rather, in a tradition going back to the ancient Greeks, music was considered as a reflection of a rational, cosmic order. Pythagoras, in the sixth century BCE, discussed the *musica universalis*, the “music of the spheres,” and as he explained, it was mathematics, more than anything, that made the universe musical. The length of a vibrating string determines its tone, and the relationships between tones can easily be expressed in numerical terms. And numbers are also the way in which the universe is best described. The position of the planets, and the relative distances between them, can all be expressed in term of proportions. Given these close affinities, it is not surprising that music was taught together with arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy in the *quadrivium* – the curriculum comprising the “four higher arts” – in medieval universities. The subject matter of music was numbers in time, just as the subject matter of astronomy was numbers in space. In fact, well into the eighteenth century, mathematical dictionaries always included a chapter on music.<sup>21</sup>

This affinity was equally obvious to early modern scientists. The world the new science described was a mathematical world, a mechanical world, but for that very reason a world that could be rendered in musical notation. Thus when Johannes Kepler published his *Harmonices mundi* (Harmony of the Worlds) in 1619, it contained not only a statement of what since has come to be known as “the third law of planetary motion” – relating the periodic times of the planets to their mean distances from the sun – but also a discussion of the counterpoint harmonies to which all the known planets contributed. Saturn is the slowest planet, Kepler explained, and as such it represents a G, the lowest note. The notes of all the other planets can then be derived by comparing their speeds when they are closest to, and furthest away from, the sun. By combining the notes, we get music. But these cosmological principles were only one expression of the harmony that organized God’s creation. Religions could be harmonized too, and so could societies, as long as they were organized in the right mathematical proportions. And Kepler was not alone in exploring such affinities. In 1618, a young René Descartes wrote *Compendium musicae*, a musico-mathematical treatise, which he intended as the first installment of a

project that later was to include works on dioptrics, meteors, and geometry. Likewise, Isaac Newton studied music as an undergraduate at Cambridge, and he was much obsessed with numerology throughout his life. Numbers, he was convinced, provided a way to unite music with alchemy, theology, chronology, and optics.<sup>22</sup>

In mid-eighteenth-century Paris, the main exponent of this traditional view of music was Jean-Philippe Rameau, and when Rousseau and his allies complained about French music, it was above all Rameau's music they complained about. As a young man in the 1730s, Rameau had been an innovator who added complexity and dissonance to the rather tired formula that was court-sponsored French music, yet by the 1750s he was himself an establishment figure whose operas had come to dominate the Parisian stage. Moreover, in addition to being a composer, Rameau was a prolific writer on music theory. Beginning with *Traité de l'harmonie réduite à ses principes naturels* (Treatise on Harmony Reduced to Its Natural Principles, 1722), he elaborated on the same basic ideas in a number of works published over the following three decades. It is Rameau more than anyone who established music theory as a discipline in its own right. Just as his music is played to this day, homework based on his theories is still given to aspiring, if slightly exasperated, music students.<sup>23</sup>

Music is rationally ordered, Rameau insisted. There is a logic and a basic structure to all musical compositions. However, this order is not readily discernible to the naked ear, and the musicians themselves have usually no idea what it is they are playing. If we are to understand what music really is about, we need a way to grasp this hidden order. We do this by means of our rational faculties, as instructed by music theory. Once our experiences confirm that which reason authorizes, as Rameau put it, "the latter ought to be given the upper hand, for nothing is more convincing than its decision, especially when they are drawn from a principle as simple as the one it offers us."<sup>24</sup> The simple principle he had in mind was the basso continuo, the "continuous base," a line of notes typically played by a cello or double bass accompanied by a harpsichord. If we begin with the basso continuo, all harmonies and their progressions can be deduced, and ultimately all melodies too. Rameau was overcome with the sheer beauty of this simple solution. "So many harmonies, so many beautiful melodies, this infinite diversity, these expressions, so beautiful and so proper, these sentiments, so well



contrived – all this arises from two or three intervals arranged in thirds whose principle is summed up in a single sound.”<sup>25</sup>

Music is a kind of science, in other words, and Rameau considered himself a scientist – a Newton who had discovered the hidden rational order underlying our superficial sense impressions. The *philosophes* of mid-eighteenth-century Paris – the friends with whom Rousseau constantly fell out – were great admirers of the new science. Indeed, one way to understand their own contributions, and the gigantic undertaking that was the *Encyclopédie*, is as attempts to apply the scientific way of thinking not just to nature but to political life and to society more generally. Society was to be rationally organized just as Newton had organized the physical world. It was to this project that Rameau was enlisted as a contributor. As Jean le Rond d’Alembert explained in the preface to the *Encyclopédie*, Rameau had reduced music to “the most certain and simple rules,” and thereby turned it into “a science which prior to him was left to arbitrary rules or dictated by blind experience.”<sup>26</sup>

An obvious problem for the proponents of the mechanical worldview was what to do with human beings. Human beings are not things after all – we are conscious, and also conscious of ourselves – and as such the mechanical world would seem to have no place for us. Mechanical devices, after all, are neither conscious nor self-conscious. Acknowledging this fact, Descartes simply removed the human soul from the world. While our bodies are subject to same mechanical laws as everything else, he concluded, what makes us distinctly human has no extension and thereby no location in space. What makes us uniquely human is instead our ability to think. This is how Descartes arrived at his notorious dualism: the division of human beings into a *res extensa* – an “extended,” physical “thing” – and a *res cogitans* – a “thinking thing.” “I thereby concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature resides only in thinking, and which, in order to exist, has no need of place and is not dependent on any material thing.”<sup>27</sup> *Cogito ergo sum*, “I think therefore I am.”

Thinking was so much easier to engage in once the soul was removed from the mechanical world. From this detached perspective, the world showed up as an external object, something set before you, which you could analyze and have theories about. This stance is ultimately what made science possible. We must strip the world of secondary qualities, scientists and philosophers agreed, and focus instead on

primary qualities. That is, while phenomena such as colors, smells, and flavors all are subjective, and thereby endlessly disputed, features such as solidity, extension, motion, number, and form can be measured objectively and with great precision. While sense impressions constantly deceive us, our minds can find the rational order that organizes all things. “Silence your imagination,” as Nicolas Malebranche, a French priest and arch-Cartesian, advised his interlocutor in *Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion* (Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion, 1688). “Let all things in you be in perfect silence. Forget also, if you can, that you have a body... Without this effort or this struggle of the mind against the impressions of sense, we can make no conquest in the realm of truth.”<sup>28</sup>

Thinking, according to the proponents of the new mechanical science, is a matter of the manipulation of logical relationships. To think is to establish facts, to define terms, and to draw conclusions by means of syllogisms. To think is to reason, as Thomas Hobbes explained. “When a man Reasoneth, hee does nothing els but conceive a summe totall, from Addition of parcels; or conceive a Remainder, from Substraction of one summe from another.”<sup>29</sup> In a world constructed as a mechanical device, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz and Blaise Pascal concurred, thinking proceeds by means of algorithms, trigonometric tables, and probability theory. “Number is therefore,” Leibniz explained, “a fundamental metaphysical form, and arithmetic a sort of statics of the universe, in which the powers of things are revealed.”<sup>30</sup> “Man is but a Reed, the weakest thing in Nature, but he is a thinking Reed,” in Pascal’s words. “So that all our dignity consists in thinking.”<sup>31</sup>

This is how an enormous residual category was created that came to include everything which could not be expressed in terms of rational calculations. In the philosophical jargon of the eighteenth century, this category was referred to as “the passions.” The passions, scientists and philosophers explained, constantly threaten to cloud our minds, bend our logic, and make us think less than perfectly clearly about ourselves and the world. And although their analyses varied depending on how they conceived of the architecture of the soul, it was always the body that was to be blamed. To control the passions was consequently a matter of controlling the body. Our bodies are constantly propositioning us, but by means of our rational faculties we can deliberate on these propositions, judge and moderate them,

and perhaps pit one passion against another. The passions “raise themselves up with such might,” Jean-François Senault, a French cleric and widely translated moral philosopher, explained in *De l’usage des passions* (The Use of Passions, 1641). “They are horses which have more of fury than of force. They are seas which are oftner troubled than calm.”<sup>32</sup> But the passions, once stirred, can be domesticated much as we would domesticate wild animals. Lions can be tamed and convinced to draw triumphant chariots, and elephants can be made to carry towers on their backs. Likewise, once the passions “have lost their natural fierceness, Reason makes good use of them, and Vertue shapes no design which she executes without their mediation.”<sup>33</sup>

### *Ballets d’action*

In the middle of the eighteenth century, a new genre of ballet, known as *ballet d’action*, became popular. Strictly speaking, however, “ballet” might not be the best label for this art form. The point of a *ballet d’action* was not to dance as such, but rather to tell a story entirely by means of movements. Although the movements in question were accompanied by music, there was no singing and no recitatives, and the performers were not dancers as much as actors. And although the plays contained traditional dance steps too, gestures and mime were generally better ways to explain things to the audience. As for the plays, they were often classical dramas filled with divinities and mythological creatures, but there were also plays on more contemporary themes. The dancers-cum-actors dressed differently than traditional ballet dancers since the expressive movements in which they engaged required more free-flowing clothes. As a result, the *ballet d’action* mimicked life far more closely than the *ballets de cour* had ever done. Dancing was no longer a collection of random steps; instead, each movement carried meaning. With the *ballet d’action* the ballet had for the first time joined the respectable arts, such as literature and painting, which sought to imitate life.<sup>34</sup>

The person most closely associated with the new genre is Jean-Georges Noverre, a French dancer and ballet master, who put on performances in Lyon and Strasbourg, but also in Württemberg and at the court of Empress Maria Theresa in Vienna. In 1776 he returned to Paris, sponsored by Marie-Antoinette, the queen, and here he staged ballets until the French Revolution gave everyone other things

to think about. Today Noverre is remembered above all for his *Lettres sur la danse, sur les ballets et les arts* (Letters on Dancing and Ballets, 1760), in which he promoted his ideas. He was quick to claim credit for this “revolution in dancing,” and he had no hesitations referring to his “numerous brilliant successes.”<sup>35</sup> However, Noverre was not alone in promoting the genre. Marie Sallé, a prima ballerina at the Opéra de Paris, had introduced many similar innovations in her own performances already in the 1720s. Sallé went on to stage ballets in London, in collaboration with other immigrant artists such as George Frideric Handel. Another advocate of the *ballet d'action* was Louis de Cahusac, a librettist for Rameau, who discussed the new ideas in his *La danse ancienne et moderne* (Ancient and Modern Dance, 1754), as well as in articles on dance-related topics in the *Encyclopédie*.<sup>36</sup>

As an example of the new genre, consider *Agamemnon vengé* (Agamemnon Avenged), a *ballet d'action* in five acts by Noverre, first performed in Vienna in June 1772. The ballet told the story of Agamemnon, the hero of the battle of Troy, who was killed on his return to Greece at the instigation of his wife, Clytemnestra, and her lover. The opening scene, according to the libretto, featured the illicit couple “waiting only for a happy circumstance to manifest the feelings that unite their hearts, but this circumstance is yet too distant and still uncertain.”<sup>37</sup> In Act II, Agamemnon returns from Troy covered in glory, and a feast is held in his honor. His three daughters are well aware of the cruelty of their mother and the ambitions of her lover. Clytemnestra uses all her charms to convince Agamemnon that she is delighted to have him back, but in secret she hatches a plan to kill him. The murder takes place in Act III, and in the remaining acts, Orestes, Agamemnon’s son, avenges his father by killing his mother and her lover. Yet this only incites the wrath of the Furies, who end up driving him mad. In the last scene, the sisters share their sorrow, but also their tender feelings for their brother and their father. And according to the libretto, “they see neither crime, nor remorse, nor desperation.”<sup>38</sup>

The obvious problem here is how to convey all this information by means of nothing but movements. While authors who write novels have endless opportunities to explain things to their readers, playwrights have to provide explanations by means of nothing but dialogue. And in the *ballets d'action* this challenge was compounded by the fact that the dialogues in question were entirely mute. If the plot was complicated – as in the case of *Agamemnon vengé* – it would be next to

impossible to explain what was going on. How could you ever convey that a couple “waited only for a happy circumstance to manifest the feelings that unite their hearts,” using nothing but gestures? Or that a wife was “delighted to have her husband back, but in secret hatches a plan to have him killed”? There are many things that the ballet can represent only obscurely and imperfectly, noted Adam Smith, the economist, in an early essay on aesthetics. This includes “reasonings and judgments of the understanding; the ideas, fancies, and suspicions of the imagination; the sentiments, emotions, and passions of the heart.”<sup>39</sup> One way to deal with such challenges was to present strong, crudely drawn characters whose expressions, despite their silences, were both well enunciated and loud. Thus, in a *ballet d'action* evil stepmothers were always really evil, and cuckolded husbands really cuckolded. And there was a lot of eye-rolling, fist-shaking, and collapsing in swoons. Or, differently put, it was all very melodramatic. In fact, the much maligned genre we know today as “melodrama” is derived from the tradition established by the *ballets d'action*. A *ballet d'action*, after all, was exactly that – a lot of drama accompanied by melodies.<sup>40</sup>

Despite the popularity of the genre, there were plenty of critics. Ange Goudar, a writer and friend of Giacomo Casanova, insisted that plays about heroic or historical topics inevitably were demeaned by being danced and that they should be treated only in spoken drama. Ballet was suitable for grotesques, he argued, or for showing the customs of exotic peoples such as the Chinese, Tartars, and Indians. The *ballet d'action* tried to do something that cannot be done. There is no way to fully replicate words in movements and gestures, and the attempt to do so will always end up looking ridiculous. “The more the graceful rhythm of the figures is sacrificed in the attempt to speak by gesture and dumb-show,” as the German music critic Eduard Hanslick put it in *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen* (On the Musically Beautiful, 1854), “and to convey definite thoughts and emotions, the closer is the approximation to the low rank of mere pantomime.”<sup>41</sup> In *Gazette musicale de Paris* in 1834, an anonymous reviewer had a lot of fun with a mimed version of Shakespeare’s *The Tempest*. It was an absurd performance, he explained, the actors exaggerated their movements to the point where they dislocated their arms and fractured their spines.<sup>42</sup>

This is the received opinion to this day. While gestures can add emphasis, and perhaps pathos, to what is being said, they do not add anything we cannot be told in words. Compare silent movies. There was

a reason, after all, why silent movies required title cards in order to be understood, and why they quickly were replaced by talkies. While we still can be entertained by the comedies of the silent era, the serious pieces – *The Ten Commandments* (1923) or *Ben-Hur: A Tale of the Christ* (1925) – are of interest mainly to film historians. There is just too much melodrama. Indeed “melodramatic” is about the last word that artists want to see in reviews of their work. Today it is applied mainly to soap operas on TV, and similar forms of daytime entertainment.<sup>43</sup>

### On the Origin of Language

In addition, and quite unintentionally, the *ballet d'action* constituted something of a philosophical experiment. One of the great topics of discussion among the *philosophes* of the day concerned the nature and origin of language. Rousseau's contribution to this debate – *Essai sur l'origine des langues* (Essay on the Origins of Language, written in 1755, but published posthumously in 1781) – is today the best-known example, but at the time many other authors weighed in on the same subject. The most influential was Abbé de Condillac's *Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines* (An Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, 1746). And, in fact, Rousseau's essay is largely a gloss on Condillac's argument.<sup>44</sup>

Although the philosophers discussed the origin of language, what really interested them was the origin of reason. If we human beings are to “emerge from our self-imposed immaturity” – which is how Immanuel Kant defined the idea of enlightenment – learning to think rationally is an essential part of our skill set. But where does that skill come from? Some saw language as innate, or perhaps as given to us by divine intervention, and various experiments were conducted with *enfants sauvages*, “wild children,” who had grown up without contact with other humans. Denis Diderot, for his part, became interested in the language of the deaf. What is the relationship, he asked in *Lettre sur les sourds et muets* (Letter on the Deaf and Dumb, 1751), between gestures and words, and to what extent is language necessary for thought? Deaf people cannot hear, but can they still think and, if so, how? For example, can the deaf hear “the voice of reason”?<sup>45</sup>

As Condillac pointed out, before the invention of language, gestures and sounds constituted the only way humans could communicate with each other, and as a result gestures and sounds provided the

basis for the first words. He imagined two children, a boy and a girl, who “wandered about in the deserts, before they understood the use of any sign.”<sup>46</sup> The children were hungry, and when they came across a tree loaded with fruit, “the perception of a particular want, was connected with that of the object which had contributed to relieve it.” However, once the first sounds were uttered, and understood, human beings soon left their gestures behind. Sounds became words, and words provide a far more efficient way of communicating. Once our vocabulary was complete, the entire world could be represented in language, and thereby also in thought. It was all quite miraculous, Condillac noted. By means of language we are able to take leave of that which is immediately present to our senses, and think in universal categories and in the abstract. Symbols allow us to conceptualize, and to conceptualize is to reason.<sup>47</sup>

Just like the mechanical philosophers of the seventeenth century, Condillac insisted that reasoning is the essence of thought and that once we have learned how to reason, we have no further need of our bodies. Yet he reached this conclusion by means of a different route. He did not, like Descartes, make thought into the starting-point of his investigation. Rather, following John Locke, he regarded the mind as a blank slate. Language develops as we experience the world and as a result of our interaction with other people. As such language is a human, a social, construction. And yet the end result was much the same. Condillac too regarded the ability to reason as a universal faculty. Reason is fully transparent, and every word can be translated from one language to another with no loss of meaning. This is why there can be universal rights, and universal truths expressed in universal declarations.<sup>48</sup>

Not everyone was convinced by Condillac’s argument. In Germany, in particular, many were unimpressed with the idea of universal reason. Germany had already been exposed to French cultural imperialism for a century and more, and once Napoleon’s armies began their conquests, they were exposed to French military imperialism too. The language of universal reason, to many Germans, had an unmistakably French accent. Johann Gottfried Herder was the most prominent of these critics. It is not helpful, he insisted in his *Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache* (Treatise on the Origin of Language, 1772), to talk about the origin of language in the abstract. After all, there are many different languages, and each one of them is deeply immersed in

the way of life of a given community. Each language is the language of particular speakers who live particular lives. All language use is situated, as it were, and so, as a result, is thought. Words are colored by the moods in which they are uttered; they have a certain feel, a rhythm, and a melody to them that is our own and that of the society in which we live. As a result, reason is not transparent, and there can be no such thing as a universal language. Translations, in fact, are never straightforward. In order to understand what somebody meant in a foreign language, it is not enough to look up the words in question. In order to provide a perfect translation, the words must feel the same for us as they once did for the person who spoke or wrote them.<sup>49</sup>

There is a step missing in the logic of Condillac's argument, Herder concluded. Condillac assumed that the children he described in his prelinguistic state of nature already understood what it is for a word to stand for something. But anyone can be taught the meaning of a word, guess at its meaning, or even invent a new one, once they grasp how language works. But this is just the problem. Condillac assumed that the ability to reason would be there from the start. He saw reason as essential to speech, but at the same time he saw speech as essential to reason. What is required in order to break this circle, Herder insisted, is a kind of leap into language. Animals, quite evidently, cannot make this leap. They do not understand that mere sounds can represent things that are not present, that symbols can point to other symbols, and that we in this way can construct entire systems of thought. Thus, while parrots might learn how to utter the words that fit perfectly with a particular occasion, they never understand what they are saying.<sup>50</sup>

Herder's own explanation focused on the relationship between living beings and their environment. Every living being engages with the situations in which they find themselves, and explores what their particular ecological niche affords them. If the ecological niche is small and stable, the interaction takes place within a small set of well-known variables, but human beings belong in no particular ecological niche. Rather, we move around all the time, and we learn to adjust to all kinds of situations. This is why we need generic rather than specialized skills. Such a generic skill is what language is, and this is why humans originally acquired the ability to speak. The leap into language took place once our affective experiences gave rise to metaphors. It is by means of metaphor that we realize that one thing can stand for something else. This realization avoids Condillac's circle. It is by means of



movements that we come up with the image-schemas – “dynamic, recurring patterns of organism-environment interaction” – that in turn give rise to metaphors. Before language, there were bodies that moved. And yet bodies move in different ways in different societies, and the metaphors by which we organize our lives are not universally shared. This is why translations are hard, sometimes impossible, to provide. “My love” can be compared to a “red, red, rose,” only in countries with climates that allow the cultivation of such flowers; and “she walks like an elephant” sounds like an insult in places where people are not used to seeing elephants. Language is embedded in our bodies, and bodies are indeed more or less the same everywhere, but our bodies belong to unique places, to situations with particular moods of their own. Hence Herder’s rejection of universalism.<sup>51</sup>

### Dancing Sex Workers

In 1767, Rousseau’s *Devin du village* was staged once again, this time in Chantilly, just north of Paris, at the château of Louis François, the sixth Prince of Conti, a French *prince du sang*, whose younger sister was the mother of the king, Louis XV. This time the role of Colette was played by a professional dancer, Anne Victoire Dervieux. Born in 1752, Mlle Dervieux, the daughter of a washerwoman, had joined the Opéra at the tender age of thirteen. She had started out as a dancer, but after taking lessons she was given singing roles too, and soon her considerable talents were recognized. By the time she came to perform in Rousseau’s *opéra-ballet*, at the age of fifteen, she was already a star of the Parisian stage. In fact, Mlle Dervieux was one of the first celebrities of the modern era, and her private life was if anything more widely discussed than her dancing. Wagging tongues often mentioned her name in the same sentence as Marie-Madeleine Guimard, the prima ballerina of the Opéra at the time. The two competed for attention, for roles, and for the favors of male benefactors.<sup>52</sup>

Before Jean-Baptiste Lully introduced the first professional female ballet dancer in *Le triomphe de l’amour* (1681), professional dancers had always been men. Already by the middle of the eighteenth century, however, female performers had come to completely dominate the stage. It was the ballerinas, more than anything, whom the audiences came to see, and the performances catered to a distinctively male gaze. The ballerinas showed themselves off, displaying their looks,

graces, and physical skills before the men of the establishment. In fact, according to a contemporary observer, they struck poses “that would make the greatest libertine blush,” and the Opéra was often compared to a *gynécée*, the women’s quarter in a house in classical Greece.<sup>53</sup> Or, in less erudite language, it was an “asylum of vice,” a brothel, where male audience members could receive visits from dancers in their boxes during performances, and where *négociations de volupté* took place quite openly at the end of the evening. “Fille d’opéra” was not a job description, in other words, but an insult.<sup>54</sup>

For the young women in question, often orphans and run-aways, the sex trade was initially a way to survive, but at least some of them ended up doing very well for themselves indeed. Thus Mlle Dervieux gained her first customers as soon as she joined the Opéra, and over the course of the years she acquired an extraordinary clientele, including dukes, counts, foreign diplomats, an archbishop, and no fewer than two kings – Charles X and Louis XVIII. But Mlle Guimard did no less well for herself. She too had a string of illustrious benefactors, including tax collectors, generals, and government ministers. And both of them surrounded themselves with all the luxuries prescribed by the latest fashion. They dressed in style, and took their fancy carriages and Arabian horses for drives in the public parks of Paris on Sundays. Marie Antoinette, the queen, was reputedly outraged by such ostentatious displays, presumably since she found it difficult to compete with the young celebrities. The most successful ballerinas also had large townhouses built for themselves. The Hôtel Guimard, in neoclassical style, known as “the temple of Terpsichore,” was particularly impressive. In fact, this was Mlle Guimard’s second palace. The previous one had been too small, she had complained, and too far away from the center of Paris. And it was always her latest benefactor who footed the bill – the Hôtel Guimard was paid for by an archbishop. To keep a ballerina in the luxury to which she had become accustomed was a form of conspicuous consumption that only the super-rich could afford.<sup>55</sup>

A feature of many Parisian townhouses were private theaters where performances were staged for invitees only, and it was on such a stage, at the Prince of Conti’s château, that Rousseau’s *Devin du village* was revived in 1767. At the time, Paris had only three public theaters – the Opéra, Opéra-Comique, and the Comédie-Française – where plays with spoken words legally could be performed. There were street theaters too, of course, and spectacles put on by visiting Italian

commedia dell'arte troupes, but even with these more informal additions, the supply of spectacles was not nearly enough to meet the demand. The private theaters added to the output. Mlle Guimard, for one, would often entertain guests at her private theater. Able to accommodate an audience of some 500 people, it featured a winter garden to which couples in an amorous mood could retreat. In addition, many of the audience members sat in *loges grillées*, boxes covered with grids, which made it possible to watch the performance while remaining invisible. Often, it seems, at least as much action was taking place in these loges as on the stage itself.<sup>56</sup>

Since the shows were held for invited audiences only, it was possible to put on entirely different kinds of plays. Many dealt with *galant* themes, and a sizable portion can only be described as pornographic. Although Marquis de Sade never wrote for the stage, the other leading pornographer of the day, Nicolas Restif de la Bretonne, did. In his plays, pederasts and pedophiles would appear onstage, orgies would be enacted, and some plays – although perhaps never performed – contained explicitly excremental themes. There were also productions staged by the Loge Androgyne, with only women in the audience. Indeed, one of the accusations launched against Marie Antoinette was that she had been too good a friend of Mlle Raucourt, the notorious leader of the Loge. The ballerinas of the Opéra would occasionally take part in these sex shows too, and Mlle Dervieux seems to have been a participant in the all-female performances. And then, in 1789, it all came to an abrupt halt. One of the reasons the Revolution was undertaken was to put an end to this aristocratic culture of sexual exploitation and libertinage. It was, the revolutionaries insisted, a depraved, utterly disgusting world, radically at odds with the values held dear by all decent Frenchmen. The daughters of the middle classes must never know that such a world even existed, and the sons must be shielded too lest they succumb to temptations.<sup>57</sup>

## Romantic Ballet

After the revolution and the wars, in the 1830s and 1840s, public interest in the ballet was revived, new conventions were established, and new stars were born. We know this as “romantic ballet,” with slender women in white tutus dancing *en pointes*, and the occasional, leotarded male dancer supporting and catching them. This is the

kind of ballet we are likely to associate with Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky, and perennials of the repertoire such as *Swan Lake* (1875–76), *Sleeping Beauty* (1889), and *The Nutcracker* (1892). Yet the first romantic ballets – *La sylphide* (1832), *Le diable boiteux* (1836), *Giselle* (1841), and many others – premiered half a century earlier, usually at the Opéra de Paris, and they went on from there to conquer Europe. *Coppélia* (1870) is often considered the last example of the genre. The Russian love of romantic ballet, and Tchaikovsky's additions to the genre, are from this perspective best understood as a belated, provincial offshoot of the main European tradition.<sup>58</sup>

Despite the political upheavals of the previous decades, the new ballets were not really all that revolutionary. Rather, trends that had begun already in the *ancien régime* were picked up and developed. Thus, the dresses of the female dancers became ever more loosely fitting, veiling the body in diaphanous white frocks rather than constraining it by means of corsets. This was also when the tutu was invented. Today a tutu is short and stiff, and projects horizontally from the waist, but the tutus of romantic ballet were bell-shaped skirts, made from tulle or gauze, and they reached all the way down to the ankles. Marie Taglioni, an Italian-Swedish dancer and the first great star of the romantic era, was the first to popularize it. Mlle Taglioni also introduced dancing *en pointes*, the literally toe curling technique whereby a ballerina supports her entire weight on the tips of her fully extended feet. Dancing high on her tippy-toes in *La sylphide*, Taglioni seemed to be hovering in the air, a remarkable achievement not least since reinforced ballet shoes not yet had been invented. Her weightless, ethereal appearance had audiences in rapture. “It comes as easily to her as the song comes to the bird,” Jules Janin, one of the enraptured critics, insisted. It was as though Mlle Taglioni had “ascended to heaven, and only had decided to return to earth when she knew the audience members could not follow her any longer.”<sup>59</sup>

The plots of the romantic ballets were similar to those of the *ballets d'action* in that they too told stories. Yet the narrative of the romantic ballets never actually mattered, and in a ballet such as *The Nutcracker*, the story just falls apart. The plots concerned love, of course, but the setting was not the idyllic pastoral of the eighteenth century, and the stories never ended with hand-holding and communal rejoicing. A suicide was a more likely outcome, or perhaps a poisoning. The protagonists were ordinary people, and while various otherworldly

creatures made frequent appearances— nymphs of the water and air, and witches and sorcerers – there were no Greek or Roman gods in sight. Instead, the plots combined the monstrous and the mysterious, the Gothic and the grotesque. Many inexplicable things go on at night after all, in the shadows, or in the unconscious, unreachable parts of our minds. And thanks to the invention of gas lighting, the monstrous and the mysterious were now much easier to stage.<sup>60</sup>

The most characteristic feature of the romantic ballet concerns the role of the ballerina. The first professional female dancers were, as we saw, introduced by Lully in 1681, and in the course of the eighteenth century they gradually became the focus of everyone's attention. However, in the nineteenth century, the ballerinas became the objects of a veritable cult. They were idolized by fanatical followers, and referred to in both suicide notes and divorce proceedings. A group of Marie Taglioni's Saint Petersburg fans are even said to have cooked and eaten a pair of her ballet shoes. The ticket prices were commensurate with the stars' popularity, and so were their salaries. Newspapers were filled with stories of their carriages, villas, and well-heeled benefactors. The manager of the Opéra de Paris paid Taglioni a salary of 40,000 francs per year, and leaked a story to the press about treating her to a dinner where a plate of jewels was served as dessert. A trick that many subsequent promoters have copied was to pit two stars against each other, artificially stoking their rivalry and forcing fans to take sides. For a few years Marie Taglioni had no obvious rival, but when Fanny Elssler, an Austrian ballerina, appeared in Paris in 1834, the promoters decided to pair them up, insisting that they were equally talented, yet at the same time each other's radical opposite. The dance critics played along with the game, spending much creative energy making up paired contrasts. While Taglioni was ethereal and fragile, Elssler was fiery and articulate; Taglioni danced like a Christian, Elssler like a pagan; it was goddess against bacchante, innocence against sensuality, sky against earth, and on and on. Before long Taglionistas and Elssleristas were at each other's throats. More measured observers, such as the Danish actress Johanne Luise Heiberg, who visited Paris in the 1830s, were dismayed. "A. believed that Taglioni was supreme; B. that Elssler took the prize; and this resulted in the formation of two factions which raved like madmen because red was not blue and blue was not red – as if there weren't a use for both colors."<sup>61</sup>

## A World Rethought

The transformation could hardly have been more profound. By the end of the eighteenth century, the ballet had none of the significance it had had 100 years previously. Dancing no longer had ontological implications; dancers could no longer channel cosmic forces, make places, and create worlds, and the allegories had lost all of their magical powers. From a matter of statecraft entrusted to the capable hands, and nimble feet, of statesmen and their entourages, the ballet was transformed into a display of feminine graces and allures, and into the acrobatic skills of a few effeminate men. The ballet was a question of an evening's entertainment, nothing more. And sure enough, kings, statesmen, and public officials no longer appeared on stage, but sat instead in the audience enjoying themselves together with everyone else. This is how the ballet was transformed from a tool of statecraft of utmost importance into a lovely, but utterly inconsequential, art form.

In this chapter we explained this transformation as a consequence of a reconfiguration of the way we think about thinking. Thinking, we said, is actually a broad category of intentional activities that helps us attune ourselves to the situations in which we find ourselves. That which we call thought is really just a way of coping with our environment. This is obvious in streams of thoughts that provide us with a running commentary on where we are and what we are going through. In a stream of thoughts, an internal dialogue is mixed with grunts and gestures, and they are all situated in a particular place. We think with our hands, and with our facial muscles, and we think with help of the things that we find in the world around us. As long as thinking was understood in this way, the ballet was a part of this process of attunement. To move was to think, and thinking we moved.

However, at the time of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, thinking was redefined as a matter of reasoning. The headline event here is Descartes' definition of the human subject in terms of thought, and the way he removed the *cogito* to a place outside the world ruled by physical causes. But more generally, the culprit was the prominence of the new, mechanical worldview. In order to understand the world, we need to know math, philosophers argued, and before long thinking became associated with calculations and rational deliberations. We think as we manipulate symbols, and thinking is for that reason something that happens exclusively in our heads. The

symbols that once referred to a particular situation now referred only to each other, and they were no longer arranged in the way the world is arranged, but rearranged by means of the rules of grammar and the logic of mathematics. As a result, reasoning belongs to nowhere in particular, but can be applied to any domain in life. By using this abstract, dislocated code we can reason freely and rationally.

But this is also how an enormous residual category was created that came to include everything which could not be expressed in terms of rational calculations. Philosophers talked about the “passions.” The passions threaten to cloud our minds, bend our logic, and make us think less than perfectly clearly about ourselves and the world. And it was the body that was to be blamed. Our bodies are constantly propositioning us, but by means of our rational faculties we can deliberate on these propositions, judge, and contain them. Rational thought must be undisturbed by emotional connections and by bodily demands. From this point of view, the *ballet d'action* was the body's last attempt to defend its relevance. Yet what it tried to do could by the middle of the eighteenth century no longer be done. Once thinking was equated with reasoning, the ballet was no longer a way to think. There is no way to replicate reasoning in movements and gestures after all, and the attempt to do so ended up looking ridiculous.


Once the body was betrayed and left behind, and thinking equated with reasoning, the ballet became an inconsequential art. What the ballet offered was pleasure, beauty, and a refuge from thought. Or, differently put, this is how the ballet was turned into an aesthetic object. Aesthetics, understood as a philosophical discipline, became possible once thinking was separated from beauty, and the beautiful came to be placed as an object before the reasoning mind. Beauty became something we can theorize about or – as in the *querelle des bouffons* or in the showdowns between Taglionistas and Elssleristas – something to fight over. While highbrow audiences contemplated performances with utmost attention, and in perfect silence, more plebeian audiences treated the arts as a circus or a blood sport. Occasionally, the ballet was turned into pornography, and aesthetic contemplation came to equal voyeurism.

At the same time it is obvious that reason alone cannot sustain us. A perfectly rational life is inhuman. We all need each other; we need our bodies; and we need access to our emotions. This is how the newly created aesthetic objects came to play a part in the political economy of

the nineteenth century. The ballet captured and contained the unruly female and sublimated the passions as bodies and movements were turned into objects to be contemplated from a distance. In this way, by attending a ballet performance, even a perfectly regular, hard-working, middle-class man was able to get in touch with his emotional self. At the theater you could vicariously experience the kind of emotions you would have had if you still had been a complete human being. The theater is one of the places where people in modern society keep their emotions, and keeping them there, they will not interfere with the demands of logic. Having paid our emotions a visit for an evening, we are ready to return to our daily, rational, lives.



# IV KNOWING



To know is to perceive the truth or factuality of something; to be certain of something; to be convinced that something is the case; to be aware of; to be acquainted or familiar with, something; to have encountered or experienced something; to be able to distinguish, discern, or recognize the nature of something; to understand; to have a grasp of through experience or study.

## To Know

The dictionary definition of “to know” breaks down quite neatly into two separate categories, corresponding to a distinction that Bertrand Russell once made between knowledge “by description” and knowledge “by acquaintance,” or what Gilbert Ryle talked about as the difference between “knowing that” and “knowing how.” Many languages, but not English, make this conceptual distinction obvious by using different verbs. Thus knowledge by description is what Germans refer to as *wissen* and the French as *savoir*, while knowledge by acquaintance is *kennen* and *connaître*, respectively.<sup>1</sup>

Knowledge by description is explicit, and consciously entertained by our minds. It is the kind of knowledge we can put into words, and give an account of, to ourselves or to others. As rendered in language, this is knowledge that represents the world in the form of concepts. The concepts stand for the world, and we know about the world since we know about the concepts. Knowledge by description is mainly acquired in an indirect fashion. We know things not primarily because we have experienced them ourselves, but because we have read about them, watched movies about them, and heard other people talk about them. We know that Asunción is the capital of Paraguay since we learned that in school. As such, the amount of descriptive knowledge is potentially enormous, and by gaining access to it we can vastly increase what we know. Moreover, as organized by words and sentences, descriptive knowledge is fine-grained and precise. Whatever we can do with language, we can do with descriptive knowledge too. This is knowledge that can be added up, contrasted and compared, and subject to experiments; we can stack it on library shelves, scrutinize it in academic seminars, and make it public online.<sup>2</sup>

To know something by acquaintance, by contrast, is to have a personal experience of something; it is to know something directly, in the first person. We know something because we have been there and

done that. Knowledge by acquaintance is based on signs, not symbols; what matters is that which is present to us, not that which is represented in language. We know because our bodies know, and because things feel a certain way. We learn about oceans by swimming in them, not by reading books about them. The most important knowledge in our lives is arguably gained by acquaintance rather than by description. It is by means of our acquaintance that we come to trust other people, come to know that someone is telling us the truth, or know that we are safe and loved. Or consider the knowledge you have of your sister. Although there is no way you can describe her face in sufficient detail for me to pick her out in a group of a hundred people, you will always recognize her regardless of the size of the crowd. And if I ask you how you know her, the answer is that you just do. "She's my sister, for heaven's sake!"<sup>3</sup>

Although limited and imprecise, knowledge by acquaintance is the far richer of the two. When we become acquainted with something, all sensory modalities are engaged at once, and it is difficult to separate one impression from another. As a result, knowledge by acquaintance far exceeds that which can be expressed in language, and for that reason translating the experience into words necessarily reduces and flattens it. There is an excess that cannot be captured by a description, but at best only hinted at. And when words fail us, we often try another medium. Music, dance, and painting are ways of hinting at this excess, and if we necessarily must use words, we should write poetry rather than prose. If we want a measure of what words cannot tell us, try describing a wrestling match, and then compare that description with what you see in front of you. Yet thereof which we are forced to remain silent our bodies can still eloquently speak. Warriors dance before they go to war, and they dance once again when they return home victorious. But there are dances of mourning too, performed by parents in darkened rooms, and by girlfriends and wives who remember the men who have died.<sup>4</sup>

In the course of our everyday lives, the two forms of knowledge work together so seamlessly that we rarely consider them as separate. Our descriptions add to that which we are acquainted with, and that which we are acquainted with confirms our descriptions. Yet the two ways of knowing presuppose an entirely different relationship between the knowing subject and the object known. Depending on what we know, and how we know it, we will relate to the world, and to other people, in entirely different ways. Thus knowledge by description can be obtained only from a distance. We need to take a few steps back in

order to better see what we are trying to describe. As a result, the world is put before us as an object to be inspected. There is a certain mood to these situations – the mood of a classroom or a science lab – and unless we pay attention we will miss the knowledge that is being conveyed. Knowledge by acquaintance, by contrast, requires presence; we must be there, and we must engage. We become acquainted with things, and with other people, through repeated interaction, under many different circumstances. Only by means of such intimate engagements will objects and persons come to reveal themselves to us. Knowledge by acquaintance is an implicit, relational knowledge, a knowledge of how to get along with others – how to have fun together, express joy, elicit attention, avoid rejection, restore interrupted contacts, and so on. We must hear the “undertones,” the “music” that is playing inaudibly in background of the interaction.<sup>5</sup>

In terms of the developmental trajectory of human beings, knowledge by acquaintance precedes knowledge by description by quite a few years. Toddlers know their parents’ faces far earlier than they can describe them. And they learn about the world not through descriptions, but by following their parents’ gaze and by looking at whatever their parents are pointing at. Animals are acquainted with things too – cats are acquainted with tuna – although they have no access to language. Since knowledge by description is the unique achievement of humans beyond the age of four, we often conclude that this is the only kind of knowledge we need, but this is a mistake. Instead, it is knowledge by acquaintance that gets us through the day. It is only relatively rarely that we need to describe things, but we often need to know how things work, and how to use them. Although we cannot explain it in so many words, we know how to ride a bicycle or how to tie our shoes. In fact, most of us go through our lives with little or no descriptive knowledge even of the things, or people, with which we are best acquainted. I do not know the name of the woman I see every day who lives across the street, and I could not explain to you how the Wi-Fi box connects me to the internet.<sup>6</sup>

There is consequently no reason why knowledge by acquaintance must be translated into knowledge by description. Not all experiences have to be cashed in as descriptive coin. Much of the time our bodies are happy enough acquiring experiences by themselves without constantly updating our describing minds. Bodies like to be with other bodies, after all. We like marching up and down, dancing in circles or in

pairs, and we like playing games that involve a lot of running back and forth. And we like sex. While sexual desire usually is thought of as a nature-given “urge to procreate,” it is also, and perhaps primarily, an urge to know. Adam and Eve “knew” each other once they had eaten from the tree of knowledge, and Mary, allegedly a virgin, insisted that she could not be pregnant “seeing I know not a man.”<sup>7</sup> It is by marching, dancing, playing games, and having sex that our bodies become acquainted with one another, and often descriptive knowledge plays no role here at all. We can dance all night with someone who suddenly, perhaps at the stroke of midnight, just vanishes. We got to know her so well, so intimately – perhaps we even fell in love with her – yet we can only describe her by means of clichés, and we have no idea who she is. If we are lucky, she may have dropped a shoe – perhaps a glass slipper – which we later can come to recognize her by.<sup>8</sup>

The movements in which we engage here are best described as a participatory form of sense-making. We know because we do things together with others. There is a certain pattern, a rhythm, and flow to the common activity that cannot be reduced to any one individual contribution. Moving together with others, we pay attention to the same things. Joint attention makes things stand out, as it were, and what stands out we regard as more relevant. We know something is important, and we remember it as such. And as we would expect, there is a neurophysiological basis to such engagements. When we see someone move, sections of our brains responsible for processing visual information light up, but so do the sections responsible for movements. As far as the brain is concerned, seeing and moving are closely related. In this way, our bodies know what they are required to do before our conscious minds become engaged, and this allows us to prepare our contributions in advance, and often well before our counterparts have completed theirs. Such bodily anticipations are what allows us to play games, engage in conversations, and have arguments, and it is what distinguishes love-making from sexual intercourse.<sup>9</sup>

## Dancing with Strangers

On December 1, 1498, Vasco da Gama and his four ships made landfall in the vicinity of today’s South African city of Port Elizabeth. Spotting some natives on the shore, and eager to replenish their supplies, the crew members launched their dinghies. When they approached

land, they threw some small bells in the direction of the natives, who eventually came close enough to take the presents directly from their hands. In return, they were given bracelets made from ivory, which Da Gama was quick to note as one of the valuable products of this part of the world. The following day the exchange continued when some 200 natives appeared, bringing oxen and sheep. Then four or five of the natives began playing flutes “and they danced in the style of Negroes.”<sup>10</sup> Yet it did not take long for Vasco da Gama and his crew to respond in kind. “The captain-major then ordered the trumpets to be sounded, and we, in the boats, danced, and the captain-major did so likewise when he rejoined us.” When the dancing ended, the crew returned to their ships with a black ox, which they had traded for three bracelets.

The first Europeans to reach various far-flung non-European locations did not arrive as colonial overlords. At first they were few in number, always short on water and supplies, often sick, and even if they had access to firearms, they were not necessarily militarily superior to the locals – as the violent deaths of Ferdinand Magellan in 1521 in the Kingdom of Mactan, Philippines, and of James Cook in 1779 in the Kingdom of Hawai‘i, illustrate. It was consequently crucial to get to know the natives and their intentions, but it was equally important for the natives to get to know the Europeans. The question was only how, in the absence of a shared language, this could be done. The interaction between Da Gama’s crew and the natives of southern Africa shows us one technique. The dance performance put on by the natives was a ceremony of introduction designed to demonstrate their friendly intentions – and the Europeans responded in kind.<sup>11</sup>

Dance came easily to sailors onboard the ships involved in European explorations. In early modern Europe, the members of many professions, including sailors, spent time dancing together. To dance was a way to entertain oneself, but also a way to establish and affirm a sense of unity and *esprit de corps*. Sailors often danced the hornpipe, a jig-like dance popular all over the British isles, but nowhere more so than in Scotland. Dancing provided a readily available form of entertainment, especially when fair weather gave them time to spare. On a trans-Atlantic crossing in 1774, one of the passengers reported, “we play at cards and backgammon on deck,” and “the sailors dance horn pipes and Jigs from morning to night.”<sup>12</sup> But dancing was also a way for sailors to stay fit. Captain James Cook, for one, “wishing to

counteract disease on board his vessels as much as possible, took particular care, in calm weather, to make his sailors and marines dance to the sound of a violin.”<sup>13</sup> Herman Melville, the whaler turned author, has a cosmopolitan crew dance with each other in his *Moby Dick* (1851). “Hist, boys!” said a French sailor. “Let’s have a jig or two before we ride to anchor in Blanket Bay. What say ye?... Jig it, men, I say; merry’s the world; hurrah!” Yet a Maltese sailor was not convinced. “Me too; where’s your girls? Who but a fool would take his left hand by his right, and say to himself, how d’ye do? Partners! I must have partners!”<sup>14</sup>

These dancing skills allowed European explorers to organize introduction ceremonies of their own. Thus, when Abel Tasman on January 22, 1643, cast anchor at Tongatapu, the largest island in the Tonga archipelago, he invited the locals onboard and treated them to an impromptu performance – “the mate and the boatswains boy blew on trumpets, another played on the flute, the fourth on a fiddle; the ship’s crew danced; at which the South-landers were so astonished, that [they] forgot to shut their mouths.”<sup>15</sup> Here, just as in the case of Vasco da Gama in southern Africa, the introduction was well received, and the dance became a prelude to an exchange of goods. Yet all first encounters were not equally friendly. On July 31, 1498, during his third voyage to the New World, Christopher Columbus arrived on the eastern coast of the island he came to call Trinidad. The following day a big canoe approached them containing some twenty-four men, armed with bows, arrows, and wooden shields. The Europeans wanted to start trading, but the natives refused to come close. Then Columbus had an idea: “I ordered a drum to be played upon the quarter-deck, and some of our young men to dance, believing the Indians would come to see the amusement.”<sup>16</sup> Yet what Columbus intended as an inviting gesture was not understood as such. The natives left their oars, strung their bows, and began launching arrows at the ships. At this, “the music and dancing soon ceased; and I ordered a charge to be made from some of our cross-bows.” Dancing, we can conclude, works best when both parties participate in it. When both parties dance, both parties can get to know each other better. The problem with the dance performance staged by Columbus was that it was preceded by no other form of interaction. The natives were given no context by which to understand what the Europeans were up to. They may have interpreted their dancing as a prelude to war.

The first encounter between Charles Darwin, the naturalist, and the natives of Tierra del Fuego illustrates the importance of reciprocity. "In the morning the Captain sent a party to communicate with the Fuegians," Darwin wrote in his diary on December 17, 1832. The natives are a sad lot, he reported. "Their very attitudes were abject, and the expression of their countenances distrustful, surprised, and startled."<sup>17</sup> Yet, luckily, they were excellent mimics. As soon as we coughed or yawned or made any odd motion, they immediately imitated us. This is how a face-pulling competition got underway. At first, "some of our party began to squint and look awry," but sure enough one of the young Fuegians "succeeded in making far more hideous grimaces." Next, an old man patted Darwin on the chest and made "a chuckling kind of noise, as people do when feeding chickens," and this demonstration of friendship was repeated several times. "It was concluded by three hard slaps, which were given me on the breast and back at the same time. He then bared his bosom for me to return the compliment, which being done, he seemed highly pleased." This exchange soon led to dancing. "When a song was struck up by our party, I thought the Fuegians would have fallen down with astonishment. With equal surprise they viewed our dancing; but one of the young men, when asked, had no objection to a little waltzing."<sup>18</sup>

A similar interaction took place on January 29, 1788, three days after the first British shipload of convicts – the "First Fleeters" – had spotted land in what was to become New South Wales. Given the tragedy of the subsequent interaction between Europeans and the native peoples of Australia, it is remarkable how well the parties seem to have understood each other at the time of their first encounter. The natives the Europeans came across on the shore were welcoming, and they pointed to a good landing place "in the most cheerful manner, shouting and dancing" in excitement. And as soon as the British had dropped anchor, they joined in. "We had frequent meetings with different parties of the natives," John Hunter, a naval officer, reported in his journal. "They danced and such with us, and imitated our words and motions, as we did theirs."<sup>19</sup> "These people mixed with ours," William Bradley, a British officer, recalled, "and all hands danced together."<sup>20</sup> A picture that Bradley painted of the occasion shows Englishmen and natives joining hands and dancing together like children at a picnic.

There is something wonderfully endearing about natives, conquistadors, naturalists, and transported convicts who dance together.



After an initial hesitation, the interaction proceeded in a cheerful mood, which guided the parties and their movements and assured them regarding the intentions of their counterparts. There is an equality to these interactions, a respect and an immediate rapport, that never was replicated in subsequent exchanges. The reason, we will argue in this chapter, is that the knowledge required and pursued by the Europeans soon changed. Knowledge by acquaintance was not sufficient in order to rule a colonial empire, the Europeans decided. Effective government requires a level of detachment that only descriptive knowledge provides, and a person with whom you once happily have danced is more difficult to turn into a pliant subject. Yet, as we will discover, knowledge by acquaintance continued to be important in relations between the Europeans themselves. Indeed, diplomatic relations between the great powers depended heavily on these body-to-body exchanges. This fact was not lost on countries such as Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and Japan, which in the nineteenth century sought to join the exclusive club of European states. Reading up on the laws of war and peace, or perusing the annals of diplomatic history, got them only so far. In order to belong you had to know how to behave, and in order to behave correctly you had to know the right moves.<sup>21</sup>

## Getting Acquainted

Although they eventually came to be separated, the bodies of Europeans and natives continued to engage with each other even once relations had been established on a more permanent footing. There was an enduring curiosity regarding what their counterparts were up to, and their respective bodies clearly continued to enjoy each other's company. Although the Spanish missionaries were quick to complain about the *fiestas* of the locals, which reminded them of the drunken orgies of European peasant fairs, they took a great deal of interest in the choreographed performances that the natives staged on ceremonial occasions. These dances revealed a predetermined design and a high degree of control, precision, and synchronization, which, as the Europeans knew only too well, required a lot of hard practice. Many of these dances told the history of the people dancing or of their gods, or they provided a means of conveying shared values and social prohibitions. Some dances even recorded the atrocities committed during the Spanish conquest itself. As such, sympathetic observers like Bartolomé de las Casas noted,

the dances took the place of the books that the natives lacked. Their dances bore testimony to their humanity.<sup>22</sup>

They were not satisfied with only descriptions. In the Americas, Europeans staged religious ceremonies to which the natives contributed dances of their own, often lasting for days on end. In Australia too natives and Europeans continued to dance together long after their initial beach encounters. John Hunter, once he had settled in the new continent, describes one such occasion. "Their dance was truly wild and savage," he recalled, referring to a ceremony known as a *corroboree*, "yet, in many parts, there appeared order and regularity." One of the dance moves impressed him in particular – "that of placing their feet very wide apart, and by an extraordinary exertion of the muscles of the thighs and legs, moving the knees in a trembling and very surprising manner." This was a move, he conceded, "such as none of us could imitate."<sup>23</sup> The Englishmen, as this passing comment reveals, not only had watched what the natives were doing but had participated in the dance, and they had tried, but failed, to imitate the movements.<sup>24</sup>

Knowledge by acquaintance of an even more carnal kind was on offer in the first encounters between Europeans and the peoples of the South Seas. "As soon as we had moored, the ship was surrounded by a great many canoes, several in which there were women," Charles-Félix-Pierre Fesche recalled, referring to the first encounter between the crew of Louis Antoine de Bougainville's ship *Boudeuse* and the natives of Tahiti on April 5, 1768.<sup>25</sup> With no further ado, one of the native women climbed onboard, stripped herself naked, and made it quite clear to the startled Frenchmen that she wanted to get to know them better. "Our senses were excited to the utmost degree," Fesche confessed, "a burning warmth seized upon our minds, we were consumed." And yet none of the Frenchmen dared to act on his inclinations. After all, sexual intercourse, in public, is not a part of European welcoming ceremonies. "[C]ommon decency, that horrible monster employed so often against our will, came to labour wholly against our pressing manly desires, obliging us to beg, though in vain, of the God whose reign is over pleasure, to render us invisible for a sole instant or to make himself master of all those present." Waiting, in vain, for the Frenchmen to rise to the occasion, the woman in question eventually left the ship in a pique, fully convinced "of our want of gallantry and strong ardour, qualities which are otherwise so generally met with and known of amongst French men."<sup>26</sup>

In a sense, the women who climbed onboard Bougainville's ship committed the same mistake as Columbus on his first visit to Trinidad. In both cases the welcoming ceremonies were sprung on their unsuspecting counterparts without sufficient contextual information. Sex, as traditionally practiced in Europe, needs a prelude. Indeed, dance often plays that role. Dance – as any number of rock song lyrics make clear, and as seventeenth-century Puritan critics repeatedly warned – is often nothing but a code word for sexual intercourse. In fact, in the South Seas too, dance often served as a way to arouse the spectators, and thereby as an invitation to further carnal explorations. There is a dance, the *timorodee*, a stunned James Cook reported, performed by young girls, which consists of “motions and gestures beyond imagination wanton, in the practice of which they are brought up from their earliest childhood, accompanied by words, which, if it were possible, would more explicitly convey the same ideas.”<sup>27</sup> “At certain parts they put their garments aside,” William Anderson, the surgeon on Cook's expedition explained, “and exposed with seemingly very little sense of shame those parts which most nations have thought it modest to conceal.”<sup>28</sup>

In Tahiti, dances of this kind were the responsibility of a secret religious order known as the *areoi*. The *areoi* were all young and unmarried, and explicitly chosen for their good looks. They spent their time traveling around the island, reciting prayers to the war god 'Oro, but they also organized seances, wrestling matches, and theatrical performances. Sexual intercourse was an important feature of the ceremonies. In addition, the *areoi* were in charge of distributing the largesse by means of which the kings of Tahiti maintained their social status. Huge feasts, known as *heiva*, were regularly organized, featuring elaborate meals, music, and dance. And it was most likely an occasion such as this that had astonished Cook and his crew members. The ceremonies constitute “a worship of the generative powers of nature,” the rather dry article in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1911) explains, yet they are at the same time “grossly licentious.”<sup>29</sup> The sex-starved European sailors were amazed that such forms of religious worship existed, and audiences back in Europe were amazed too once the sailors returned home and began telling their tales. In London, South Sea-style *timorodees* were soon reproduced in *ballets burlesques* performed in less reputable theaters.<sup>30</sup>

Although the native women who first encountered the Europeans may have turned away disappointed, relations soon

improved. Fesche noted with some satisfaction that their stay on the island “procured us the opportunity to greatly repair the bad opinion that they must have conceived of us.”<sup>31</sup> As soon as a bit more privacy was guaranteed, a flourishing exchange was set up. The native women gave themselves to the Europeans, and native men would offer them their daughters and wives. Yet there seems to have been some confusion regarding exactly what was being exchanged. Sex, to European sailors, was a commodity with a price, and if you wanted it, you had to pay for it. In Tahiti, the standard currency for this exchange was soon determined to be iron nails, such as the nails the Europeans used to repair their ships. The larger the nail, the more beautiful the woman you could procure. However, since the supply of nails was smaller than the demand for sex, prices soon rose, and before long the sailors started drawing nails out of the planks of the ships themselves. “It was now thought necessary to look more diligently about the ship,” Samuel Wallis, a British sea captain, complained in his diary, “to discover what nails had been drawn; and it was soon found that all the belying cleats had been ripped off, and that there was scarcely one of the hammock nails left.”<sup>32</sup>

What the native women were looking for, however, were not nails. Rather, they sought access to the *mana* of the Europeans. *Mana* is a term much discussed by anthropologists and variously translated as “power,” “authority,” “status,” or “dignity.” An important component of *mana* concerned sexual prowess – the more frequently you did it, and with the more prominent partners, the more *mana* you would acquire. On the islands of the South Seas, sex was a way to gain and maintain political power. Knowledge is power in every society, of course, but in the Pacific the knowledge that counted was knowledge by acquaintance. The Europeans, it was soon decided, had a lot of *mana*, and it was in order to acquire it that they native women approached them. The Europeans were to be incorporated into local society, and what better way of doing that than by means of one’s body? The nails involved in the exchange are from this point of view best understood as a concession to European cultural practices.<sup>33</sup>

However, Captain Cook, for his part, staunchly refused to become better acquainted with the natives. Ever the reticent Englishman, he never succumbed to temptation. Perhaps he felt that too much carnal knowledge would jeopardize his position as sea captain and intrepid explorer. Knowledge by acquaintance, after all, can make

it difficult to maintain the emotional distance required in order to exercise power. Captain Bougainville, however, was more open to informal knowledge acquisition. Three native women visited his cabin, Fesche reported, and although the captain “made much resistance” at first, they ended up staying a while.<sup>34</sup> It was only once they left that it was discovered – and you would have to be a Freudian to make this up – that his telescope had vanished.

## Dancing in Vienna

The story continues, but a few decades later, and far away from the South Seas. In October 1814, one year after the resounding defeat of Napoleon at the Battle of Leipzig, representatives of all European countries assembled in Vienna for a conference. The ostensible purpose was to settle a number of outstanding issues left unresolved by the wars, notably, the question of the status of Saxony and of Poland. There had been major peace conferences before, of course. Each war ended with a conference of some kind, and the ones in Westphalia in the 1640s and in Utrecht in the 1710s had also been all-European affairs. However, what was unprecedented about the Congress of Vienna was the fact that the heads of state were there in person, together with teams of diplomats and their extensive retinue. As a result, between October 1814 and June 1815, Vienna was the capital not only of the Habsburg Empire but of Europe as a whole.

Historians have been harsh in their assessment of the Congress. The proceedings were a waste of time, we have been told. Instead of actually negotiating, Europe’s elites spent their time on frivolities. “Le Congrès ne marche pas,” as Prince Charles-Joseph de Ligne famously put it, “il danse.”<sup>35</sup> But these harsh judgments show a misunderstanding of the nature of the occasion. The purpose was not really to conduct negotiations. More serious, more focused discussions had already been held – resulting in the Treaty of Paris, signed on May 30, 1814, before the Congress began – and more diplomatic meetings were to be held again in the fall of 1815, once the Congress was concluded. In fact, throughout the ten months they spent together, there were no general meetings or plenary sessions, and it was only on the dance floors that all the delegations met in the same place at the same time. Instead of thinking of the Congress of Vienna as a peace negotiation, it is better

to think of it as a celebration – a celebration of the unexpected military success of the allies and of the equally unexpected return to power of the *anciens régimes*.<sup>36</sup>

The aim, more than anything, was for the crowned heads of Europe to get to know one another. The object, as Klemens von Metternich, the Austrian foreign minister, put it, was to create “a Europe without distances.”<sup>37</sup> And distances could be reduced only if the heads of state were present in the same place at the same time. Before Vienna, peace treaties had always been negotiated by diplomats. The reason, more than anything, was that meetings of heads of state inevitably raised thorny questions regarding precedence, status, and standing, which were sure to lead to confrontations. Diplomats fought over the punctilios of protocol too, of course – and as a result, fisticuffs had occasionally broken out, and blood had been spilled – but this was still nothing compared to the kind of conflicts that could erupt from a confrontation between the sovereigns themselves. In the wake of the victory against Napoleon, however, a general sense of intermonarchical camaraderie pervaded Europe, and matters of diplomatic protocol were surprisingly easily settled. “The intercourse of the sovereigns was marked by a condition of unparalleled intimacy,” an eyewitness reported. “They vied in showing reciprocal friendliness, attentions, and in anticipating each other’s wishes.”<sup>38</sup>

The festivities started off in the grand style in which they were to continue for the duration of the Congress. On October 2, 1814, a masked ball was organized in the Redouten Halls in the Hofburg, the imperial palace of the Habsburg court in the center of Vienna. The *crème de la crème* of Europe’s elite were here – altogether some 12,000 guests, including two emperors and eleven heads of state; ministers, plenipotentiaries, diplomats, aristocrats of all ranks, socialites, and members of the *haute bourgeoisie*. But fairly ordinary people were also present – apothecaries and their wives, wine merchants and their daughters, artists, journalists, sex workers, and thieves. The Hofburg “presented a moving multitude,” a visiting Englishman recalled, “many of whom were in masks, or in dominos, and were busily engaged in talking and laughing, or dancing to the music of a powerful orchestra.”<sup>39</sup> Here was the Emperor of Austria; there the Russian Tsar; those four gentlemen over there are arch-dukes of Austria; and that fine fellow with the

mustaches must be the Viceroy of Italy. A French aristocrat confessed that he was overwhelmed by the magic; “[t]he uninterrupted music, the secrecy surrounding the disguises, the intrigues by which I was surrounded, the general incognito, the merry-making without measure or restraint, the wealth of seductive opportunities.”<sup>40</sup> It was in this mood of joy and excitement that the interaction unfolded.

This is how the Congress proceeded for the following ten months. The Congress worked, to be sure, but it also danced, and there was no real contradiction between the two. Although the most brilliant evenings were those organized by the Habsburg court, many balls were hosted by prominent Austrian families such as the Metternichs or by the visiting delegations themselves. There were dinner parties, children’s balls, *tableaux vivants*, chivalric tournaments, and plenty of theatrical and musical performances – including oratorios by Handel and Haydn, and music written especially for the occasion by Beethoven. On a Sunday you could go for a walk in the Graben, the open space at the heart of the city, or drive to the Prater, the famous amusement park, with your horse and carriage. There were firework displays, sleigh rides in the winter months, hunts, and plenty of religious ceremonies, if you were so inclined. In addition, many of the most celebrated literary salons of Europe had in whole, or in part, decamped to Vienna, together with many of their regular attendees.<sup>41</sup>

No dance is more closely associated with Vienna than the waltz. This connection is due mainly to Johann Strauss, father and son, but their famous compositions, like *An der schönen, blauen Donau*, date from much later in the nineteenth century. Originally a German countryside dance, the waltz was introduced to fashionable European society at the end of the eighteenth century, yet it was long considered insufficiently communal and also as far too risqué. The dancers danced in pairs instead of together in a group, and the man and the woman in question held each other far too tightly. Thus, although some waltzing indeed did take place during the Congress of Vienna, other dances were more common. The minuet – that seventeenth-century French favorite – was still danced, but many preferred a quadrille, polka or a schottische. Yet the most popular dance was the polonaise. It started with a long promenade where the pairs lined up together, forming a long train – often “miles long” – which took them up and down stairs, through galleries and private apartments. The polonaise was easy to learn, not too strenuous, and offered plenty of opportunities for both conversation

and social observation. And since the couples lined up in accordance with their rank, the dance provided a means by which social hierarchies could be both expressed and preserved.<sup>42</sup>

As far as the diplomats were concerned, they already knew each other well, of course. The ambassadors were constituent parts to the social life of the courts where they were stationed, and over the course of their residency they got ever better acquainted. It was more than anything the intense social agenda of the court that provided this knowledge. Other occasions were the recurring peace conferences. The three-day party organized by the Portuguese ambassador in Utrecht in 1713 may have been particularly lavish, but similar occasions were common whenever international negotiations were held. The diplomats were in any case, socially and culturally speaking, members of the same transnational social class. In next to all cases, they were aristocrats, and as such they shared the same outlook on life. They all spoke French, of course; their families intermarried; and they had received the same kind of education. In fact, at the time of the Congress of Vienna, a large number of the negotiators had been educated at the very same school, the *Europäische Staatsakademie*, a college for diplomatic training established in Strasbourg in 1752. All the Russian diplomats in Vienna in 1815 had studied there, and so had Metternich himself. For the former classmates from Strasbourg, the Congress of Vienna constituted something of a school reunion.<sup>43</sup>

So, the diplomats were already well acquainted with one another; the heads of state became well acquainted with one another in Vienna; but the awkward question remained what to do about ordinary people. In the abstract, the issue had already been settled, of course. In order to assure the future peace and tranquility of Europe, the assembled monarchs all agreed, it was crucial to make sure that ordinary people had as little as possible to do with politics. After all, it was the bloodthirsty crowds that had thronged the streets of Paris in the summer of 1789 that had caused all the subsequent problems. The heads of state unanimously rejected the idea that their own power rested on popular consent. At the same time, it was obvious, at least to some of them, that things could not continue as before. It is dangerous to neglect public opinion, Metternich concluded, and in today's world newspapers are the way in which public opinion is formed. In this "century of words," "[p]osterity will hardly believe that we have regarded silence as an efficacious weapon to oppose to the clamors of our opponents."<sup>44</sup>



Somehow or another the rulers had to engage with their subjects in a more direct fashion.<sup>45</sup>

One solution was to invite their subjects to the balls. This was not a first step in a process of democratization, but it was an acknowledgment that ordinary people somehow or another had to be included in the life of the state. The monarchs made themselves visible; they talked to their subjects; they danced with them. Emperors and kings, it turned out, were human beings after all, and they were not at all remote. At the masked ball in the Redouten Halls on October 2, 1814, the crowds were “in transport” at seeing their rulers in civilian clothing, and in such “friendly proximity” with commoners.<sup>46</sup> “One could hardly distinguish them from private persons,” and as long as you wore a masque, you could speak with them perfectly freely. “[T]he monarchs moved about in the crowd without attendants, viewed everything, gossiped condescendingly . . .”<sup>47</sup> And the subjects who could not attend these events in person could read detailed accounts about them in the newspapers the following day. As a result, a personal bond was established between the rulers and their subjects; the subjects felt they knew their rulers, and they included them both in their prayers and their gossip. This illusion of a personal acquaintance with the ruling elite functioned as an ersatz for democracy, as it does, to some extent, to this day.<sup>48</sup>

As historians have pointed out, the Congress of Vienna did not live up to expectations. Being well acquainted with each other was not enough to assure peace. Sovereign states still looked out for their own interests first of all. And yet if we compare the nineteenth century to the twentieth, it is striking how comparatively few the wars were, how short, and how relatively low the casualties. The fraternal mood established at Vienna continued to characterize international relations throughout the nineteenth century, although brothers too sometimes fight. The people responsible for this qualified success were more than anything the cosmopolitan class of diplomats. When the heads of state quarreled, it was the diplomats who made sure that relations did not break down completely. And even when they did, it was the diplomats who negotiated the settlements that returned relations to the *status quo ante*. Foreign policy took place in the gilded chambers of the foreign ministries – they took place in a mood of entitled privilege – and here members of the unwashed, newly enfranchised masses were not admitted. At a time of extraordinary economic, social, and political change

and rising nationalist sentiments, the cosmopolitan class of aristocrats made sure that the disruptive impact on pan-European relations remained limited. It was only in 1914 that all hell finally broke out, but by that time the general mood in which diplomacy was conducted had changed. A new earnestness pervaded diplomatic efforts, a sense of accountability, and diplomacy was no longer the exclusive privilege of a well-acquainted aristocratic elite.

## Colonial Administrators Don't Dance

It is difficult to imagine two cultures clashing with a louder bang than when HMS *Duff* arrived in Matavai Bay, on the northern coast of Tahiti, on March 5, 1797. By this time, the Tahitians were long accustomed to foreign visits. Captain Samuel Wallis, the first European, had come here already thirty years earlier, and captains Bougainville and Cook had arrived after that. As a result, the Tahitians knew what to expect from the encounter, and they were clearly excited by the prospect. "There were soon not less than one hundred of them dancing and capering like frantic persons about our deck," noted William Wilson, the editor of the account of the voyage of HMS *Duff*.<sup>49</sup> "Their wild disorderly behavior, strong smell of the cocoanut oil, together with the tricks of the *areois*, lessened the favorable opinion we had formed of them." On March 13, King Pomare, the local ruler, made his way to the harbor to greet them. By means of gestures he made some pretty specific demands. The king wanted "sky-rockets," he explained, and he wanted violin playing and dancing, "and lastly the bagpipe, which he humorously described by putting a bundle of cloth under his arm, and twisting his body like a Highlander piper."<sup>50</sup> Yet HMS *Duff* did not contain the normal shipload of sex-starved hornpipers. These were serious men, on a mission from God, or at least on a mission from the London Missionary Society. They were in the South Seas not to explore and trade but to save souls. They were to settle here permanently, they tried to explain, and this was why the passengers included six women and three children. Although two of the missionaries eventually produced "a German flute" and played a few tunes, "it plainly appeared," Wilson noted with a reference to the natives, "that more lively music would have pleased them better."<sup>51</sup>

The London Missionary Society (LMS) was founded in 1795, two years prior to the encounter in Matavai Bay, with the explicit

aim of converting the people of Africa, Asia, and Polynesia to the true Christian faith, by which they meant a nonconformist version of Christianity. The LMS was predominantly made up of Baptists, Presbyterians, and Methodists, who counted themselves as the spiritual heirs to the Puritan dissenters of the seventeenth century. Theirs was a stern lower-middle-class, lower-middlebrow faith, which imposed particular duties on its believers. Above all, they constantly reminded themselves of how little time we humans have on this earth and how an ever-watchful God judges all our actions. This stern outlook gave them a rather particular understanding of what counts as entertainment. "All recreations are improper," according to John Angell James, a nonconformist preacher with a huge following in the LMS, "which in their nature have a tendency to dissipate the mind, and unfit it for the pursuit of business; or which encroach too much on the time demanded for our necessary occupations."<sup>52</sup> That is, all kinds of entertainments are acceptable as long as they do not actually entertain. So, no exchange of *mana* for nails, in other words. On the contrary, the missionaries declared an outright war on the indigenous culture of the islands, and as one would expect, the *areoi* cult, its practitioners, and their devotional practices were the prime targets. Once the LMS took political control of Tahiti in 1815, all forms of dancing, singing, and wrestling were banned. By the 1830s, all *areoi* societies had been disbanded.<sup>53</sup>

The London Missionary Society was active in India too, although here they met with more resistance. One obstacle was the first generation of colonial administrators dispatched by the British East India Company. These men were explorers and adventurers, and they worked neither for God nor for the British government. They appreciated India as they found it, took local women as mistresses and wives, and were fully prepared to enjoy themselves in their new roles as sultans and pashas. In fact, until 1813, British missionaries were banned from India on suspicion that their prudery would spoil the fun everyone was having. In the 1830s, however, once it had lost its monopoly on trade with the East, the East India Company began engaging with its colony in a novel fashion. The colonial administrators who now were dispatched from England were men of an entirely different ilk. They had a university education, for one thing, and strikingly many of them were trained in the Utilitarian doctrines of Jeremy Bentham and James Mill. The Utilitarians were rationalizers and world-improvers, and their former students who took up positions in the colonial service wanted

not to enjoy India, or even primarily to exploit it, but rather to reform and civilize it. While Utilitarian reforms often had been difficult to implement in England itself, India, they hoped, would prove a more amenable environment.<sup>54</sup>

In order to successfully carry out these projects, new forms of knowledge were required. While the first generations of colonial administrators mainly had acquired knowledge by acquaintance, too much intimate knowledge, the Utilitarians pointed out, can be an obstacle to political and administrative reform. Rather, what is required is explicit, verbal, and statistical information based on a careful study of Indian society – the kind of descriptive knowledge that can be written down and compiled in reports that can be sent back to London. And sure enough, before long the new generation of British administrators had organized and categorized as much of India as they could survey: geographical space, languages, ethnic groups, religions, marriage systems, legal codes, and much else besides. In this way, the colonial world was turned into an object that was easy to grasp, manipulate, and control. It was by means of descriptive knowledge such as this that James Mill, sitting at his desk in the East India Company in London, could write a five-volume history of British India without having visited the country even once, and speaking none of the local languages. Not being personally acquainted with the country was actually an advantage, Mill explained in the preface to the work. What is required is not “mere observing,” but “the powers of combination, discrimination, classification, judgment, comparison, weighing, inferring, inducting, philosophizing.”<sup>55</sup>

Although natives and Europeans had danced happily together at the time of their first encounters, such fraternizing was now a thing of the past. Colonial masters cannot dance with colonial subjects. And as the descriptive knowledge they had gathered revealed beyond all doubt, the natives were inferior to the Europeans, the representatives of earlier stages of human evolution. To dance with a native, as a result, was the equivalent of dancing with a monkey. Besides, it would have been to undermine one’s authority. A native who once had danced with a European would never fear him again, and fear, in the colonies, was one of the most efficient tools of public administration. By intimately engaging with people very different from themselves, the Europeans would become exposed and vulnerable, and such engagements could end badly, as horror stories of Europeans who had “gone native”

testified. Better then to follow Mill's advice, and never venture far beyond one's desk. Reading books and reports, they could easily gather all the knowledge they needed in order to facilitate continued European resource extraction as well as economic and social development.<sup>56</sup>

Yet things were never as simple as all that. Despite their rational detachment, the colonial administrators could never detach themselves from their physical locations, and despite the power they wielded over the natives, they could never fully control their own bodies. Their bodies would always know more than their minds acknowledged, and they carried the colonial prejudices with them in their very posture and gait. But their bodies were also more honest. Even if the acts of brutality never were referred to in official reports, the bodies remembered the injustices they had committed. Even if the natives were treated with impunity, the actions could still leave a lump in the pit of a stomach or be revealed as a slight stutter when excited. In unguarded moments, the bodies of the colonial administrators might even feel pity or remorse. And sometimes at night, when they heard the sound of drums far off in the jungle, they had to steel themselves. The rhythm "would spread out over the forest, roll through the night, unbroken and ceaseless, near and far, as if the whole land had been one immense drum booming out steadily an appeal to heaven."<sup>57</sup> It was a primitive sound, as Joseph Conrad explained, but also a sound that was strangely inviting. It was enough to drive you mad.<sup>58</sup>

## Civilized Dancing

Although all Europeans took great pride in the achievements of their civilization, the concept of civilization itself was annoyingly difficult to define. For one thing, there were plenty of non-Europeans who could make credible claims to being civilized – above all, people in the great empires of Asia. Indeed, Indians, Chinese, Japanese, and Persians had arguably been civilized long before the Europeans themselves. This may well be the case, European legal experts conceded, but this does not mean that they are civilized in the same way as us, and it is only states that are civilized in the European manner that we will regard as our equals, and thereby as fully sovereign. Other states – "primitive" states, "barbarians," and "savages" – have no inherent right to independence. Moreover, what distinguishes us Europeans is more than anything that we share the same norms and institutions. Thus, when one of us behaves

in a certain fashion, the others reciprocate. This more than anything is what turns us into a society. The same does not apply to the kingdoms of Asia. Their rulers are “haughty” and “proud”; Asian kingdoms never follow international practices or behave according to shared norms. When foreign delegations show up at their courts, they are treated not as the representatives of fellow sovereigns but as tribute bearers who have to prostrate themselves before the imperial thrones.<sup>59</sup>

If European states were civilized, and non-European states were not, the question was what to make of states located on the fringes of Europe – Imperial Russia, for example, or the Ottoman Empire. Russia, early modern visitors pointed out, may have been a European country, but it was marred by various customs that could only be described as “Asian.” The Russians had played no part in the European system of resident ambassadors, and aristocratic Russian families never married into the aristocratic families of the rest of Europe. Reciprocity did not come easily to the Russians either. If anything, the tsarist authorities seemed to be afraid of foreign influences. The envoys the tsar dispatched abroad all went on temporary missions; they had no mandate to negotiate; and they displayed little curiosity about the countries they visited. The Europeans complained that the Russians who occasionally showed up at their courts lacked manners – they drank too much, got into fights, and destroyed property.<sup>60</sup>

Russia’s relations with Europe were dramatically transformed in the 1680s and 1690s when Peter the Great dispatched study missions – and himself, under an assumed name – to various European countries. They were there to learn about the latest European developments – the art of navigation, mathematics, foreign languages, but also social customs and etiquette. Some of the students remained in Europe for ten years or more, and thoroughly immersed themselves in the aristocratic culture of the courts where they were stationed. And when they eventually returned home, they had much to teach their fellow Russians. The day after Peter himself returned on August 25, 1698, he forced his officials to shave off their beards and replaced their traditional flowing garments with more tight-fitting, Western-style clothing. And there were to be no more prostrations. In the following decades, Russia joined the Europe-wide system of resident embassies, establishing twenty-three permanent diplomatic missions of their own. The new generation of diplomats were of a much higher rank, often personal friends of Peter’s, and they had a license to negotiate with the courts

where they were stationed. They spoke French and German, and often other languages as well, and they carried themselves with self-confidence and ease.<sup>61</sup>

In a symbolic move, Peter abandoned Moscow and his medieval court and built a new capital for himself by the Baltic Sea. Here he constructed a new palace, the Winter Palace, which after his death was expanded into one of the most impressive royal residences in Europe. It had no fewer than 117 staircases and 1,500 rooms, the largest of which were used for balls where members of the court danced in the European fashion. Indeed, when Théophile Gautier, a French dance critic, visited Russia in 1860, he was disappointed to find that no traditional Russian dances were practiced here. The Russian elite seemed perfectly Europeanized. By this time, Russian aristocrats also married into European families or raided them for erotic adventures. In fact, this new self-confidence had been on ample display already in Vienna. One of the leading socialites at the Congress was Catherine Bagration, the wife of a Russian general, who was notorious not only for her peripatetic lifestyle but also for her décolletage and her privileged access to secret information. Dorothea Lieven, the wife of the Russian ambassador, who is said to have introduced the waltz to London, had affairs with both Metternich and Lord Palmerston, the British prime minister. Meanwhile, Tsar Alexander was busy acquainting himself with the daughters of the Viennese bourgeoisie. The tsar dances almost continuously, eyewitnesses reported, and always with his latest romantic conquest by his side.<sup>62</sup>

The Ottoman Empire had if anything an even more tenuous position in relation to Europe. Since the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the Turks had been regarded as the common enemy of all Europeans, and there was no doubt that the customs of the sultan's court were perfectly Oriental. Here, much as in the rest of Asia, the aim was to bedazzle the visitors and to put them in a supplicant position. Here too foreign envoys were regarded as lowly servants of the kings who had sent them, and not as representatives of fellow sovereigns. There were consequently few opportunities for reciprocal exchanges, and no European-style dancing took place. Indeed, the kind of licentious social activities engaged in at European courts were quite obviously *haram*. Instead, surprised Europeans reported, the closer you came to the audience hall in the Topkapı Palace, the more quiet the surroundings became, and in the proximity of the sultan himself there was next to

complete silence. The sultans often communicated by means of sign language, and many of their closest attendants were deaf.<sup>63</sup>

Once their military defeats became more common than their victories – after the failure of the Siege of Vienna in 1683 – this haughty attitude changed. The Ottoman Empire was still a great European power, to be sure, and in order to look after its interests it began to engage in the same kinds of balance-of-power politics as other European states. In the 1720s, the first Ottoman diplomatic envoys were sent abroad; in the 1790s, the first permanent diplomatic missions were set up; and in 1836, a European-style foreign ministry was established. In 1856, the old Topkapı Palace was abandoned and a new palace, the Dolmabahçe Sarayı, was constructed in an eclectic mixture of European and Ottoman architectural styles. With 2,000 square meters of floor space in its ceremonial hall, staircases made entirely from crystal, and modern conveniences such as gas lighting and water closets, it was quite obviously built to impress European visitors. Life in the Dolmabahçe Palace was as modern, and the mood as boisterous, as life in the Topkapı Palace had been medieval and the mood somber.<sup>64</sup>

On March 30, 1856, the Ottoman Empire was officially included in the European society of civilized of states. As article seven of the Treaty of Paris, which concluded the Crimean War, made clear, the country would henceforth “participate in the advantages of the Public Law and System (Concert) of Europe.”<sup>65</sup> As a result, other European countries promised to respect the country’s independence and territorial integrity. To celebrate this achievement, Mehmed Emin Ali Pasha, the sultan’s representative at the negotiations, organized a ball in Paris on April 10 with no fewer than 1,200 invited guests, including Napoleon III himself. And in 1867, Sultan Abdülaziz, as the first Ottoman ruler ever, went on an extended European tour. In Paris he visited the Exposition Universelle, which, like other world expos, provided a convenient excuse for Europe’s upper classes to get together. On June 8, a grand ball was given in the sultan’s honor by the City of Paris, and two days later Napoleon III was hosting the Ottoman delegation in the Palais des Tuileries. It was, no doubt, a British journalist concluded, “the most brilliant assemblage of the century,” with “the most voluptuous music that ever floated from horn or rang from string” conducted by none other than Johann Strauss (son) himself. After Paris, the sultan continued on to London where the dancing continued at



Buckingham Palace on July 13, and in the India Office on the 19th, where the orchestras played waltzes, quadrilles, and galops.<sup>66</sup>

In Japan, a similar transformation took place. Japan, which prior to 1853 had had only limited intercourse with the rest of the world, would in the latter part of the nineteenth century make a successful bid to join the Europe-based society of states. In 1899, all unequal treaties with foreign countries were renegotiated and the country's sovereignty fully restored. And only a few decades later, Japan joined the Europeans in the colonial carve-up of Asia. This astonishing transformation is best explained by the rapid pace of the reforms undertaken by the Japanese government. A foreign ministry was established in 1869, and soon afterward permanent embassies were opened in all European capitals. In 1875, Japan joined the Universal Post Union, then the International Telecommunication Union, and Japanese diplomats were also present at the Hague Conferences on the laws of war in 1899 and 1907. At Versailles in 1919, Japan was one of the victors, treated as a great power, and given concessions in China that previously had been controlled by the Germans. And Japanese diplomats abroad were at least as well behaved as the Ottomans. "They never commit a blunder in etiquette," a correspondent for *The Times* noted; they are "scrupulously punctilious in their social duties" and "irreproachable in their dress and bearing at State functions."<sup>67</sup>

Japan's enthusiasm for things European reached a peak in the middle of the 1880s, a few years sometimes referred to as the "Rokumeikan era." The Rokumeikan was a club and an entertainment venue, constructed in the European manner and sponsored by the Japanese foreign ministry. "It resembles, by God, a casino in one of our spa towns," noted Pierre Loti, the French author, who spent an evening there, "and you can really imagine yourself being anywhere in the world except in Edo."<sup>68</sup> The aim of the club was to create a social environment where foreign diplomats could feel at home and where Japanese officials could learn how to conduct themselves in the European manner. At the inauguration on November 28, 1883, Japanese men in evening dresses made by Savile Row tailors danced in the European fashion with Japanese ladies dressed in the latest Parisian haute couture. And for those who did not know the right steps, evening classes had been arranged beforehand, with foreign Tokyo residents as dancing tutors. Loti, for his part, made fun of these arrangements, but

many of the locals clearly enjoyed themselves. “The party last night has made my eyes blink all day long,” a young Japanese lady recalled. “Well, it seems to have been a very successful affair – a crowd, a crush of gay dresses, dancing, low necks, and all that sort of thing.”<sup>69</sup>

### Colonized People on Display

In 1910, a group of Samoans, led by King Tupua Tamasese Lealofi, finally made their way to Germany where they hoped to meet the Kaiser. The islands of Samoa had been a German colony since 1900, but in 1908 a conflict arose regarding ownership of a copra business established by a group of natives. The issue turned political, and soon the Samoans began calling for independence. And now they were on their way to discuss the matter with Kaiser Wilhelm II himself. The journey was sponsored by Fritz Marquardt, a former Samoan police chief, and his brother Carl, an amateur anthropologist. Their motives, however, were quite different from that of the Samoan delegation. What the Marquardt brothers wanted to bring to Germany was a troupe of natives, dressed in exotic outfits, who not only danced but sang, wrestled, climbed coconut trees, paddled canoes, and cooked food in earthen pots. And it was in this capacity that they toured Germany and Europe for the following two years – performing mainly in zoos, but also in the Berlin Wax Museum and at the Oktoberfest in Munich. The Samoan king eventually did get to meet the Kaiser, but the audience was not the diplomatic occasion he had hoped for. Rather, in a show of benevolence toward his distant subjects, the Kaiser made an appearance in the audience at one of their shows.<sup>70</sup>

Ethnographic exhibitions – so-called *Völkerschauen*, “people displays” – were first popularized by Carl Hagenbeck, a Hamburg impresario famous above all for importing exotic animals that he sold to zoos and circuses in both Europe and North America. In the 1870s, during a lull in the animal business, he hit upon the idea of importing native peoples who could be displayed together with their animals. The first such performance, staged in September 1875, featured a group of Sami from Norway with a herd of reindeer. “Within a few weeks, all of Hamburg had seen our Laplanders,” Hagenbeck recalled, and he decided to take the group on a tour to Berlin and Leipzig.<sup>71</sup> Encouraged by the enthusiastic response, he imported natives from Sudan the following year, then Australian Aborigines, Greenlanders, a

group of Tierra del Fuegians, and nomads from Kalmykia. In Paris in 1886, during a two-and-a-half-month stay, Hagenbeck's "Ceylon Caravan" was viewed by no fewer than one million people. And Hagenbeck soon had many imitators, including the Marquardt brothers in Samoa. Before long, collections of natives were put on display at zoos and museums all over Europe, and they featured prominently at the world exhibitions – such as the one in Chicago in 1893 and in St. Louis in 1904 – as well as at the various *expositions coloniales* where European countries showcased their colonial possessions.<sup>72</sup>

Hagenbeck took great pride in the authenticity of his displays. They were true copies of the actual lives of actual human beings, he insisted. In making this claim he was backed up by the highest scientific authorities of the day. When Hagenbeck's Eskimos were on display in the German capital in 1878, Rudolf Virchow – known to his colleagues as "the Pope of Medicine" – recommended all scientists to visit the exhibit. In particular, Virchow appreciated this unique opportunity to collect anthropometric data from people who never had been measured before. By gauging body proportions and nine different measurements of the head, indices could be established for the breadth of the head in relation to the its length, the breadth and width of the nose, and the height of the ear in relation to the person's overall height. Such data provided a way to describe the physical characteristics of different ethnic groups, Virchow explained, but it could also help determine each group's place in the evolution of the human species. In this way scientists might just possibly find the "missing link" – the humanoid group that stood halfway in the development from apes to humans.<sup>73</sup>

Hagenbeck complained that his competitors lacked a serious scientific purpose and that they demeaned the performers, yet it is not clear that his own displays were all that different. For one thing, his natives were often next to naked. At a time when public nudity was banned in Germany, the *Völkerschauen* provided a respectable, indeed, a scientific way to titillate the viewing public. And of course they all danced. Dancing, semi-naked natives were more than anything what the ticket-paying audience had come to see. In Hagenbeck's first exhibition in 1875, the Sami danced, and so did every subsequent group of exotic performers. Likewise, the Columbian Exhibition in Chicago in 1893 featured dancing Nubian boys and dancing girls from Persia, Cairo, and Algiers, and among the many attractions at the Louisiana Purchase Exhibition in St. Louis in 1904 were "dancing cannibals." Ota Benga,

the leading cannibal of the St. Louis expo, was subsequently put on display in the Bronx Zoo in New York. He tried to return to Africa, but the outbreak of World War I in 1914 made it impossible to find a passenger ship that could take him. He died two years later, by suicide, thirty-three years old.<sup>74</sup>

## A World Known

In today's society, knowledge is almost always equated with descriptive knowledge. Knowledge is something that we have in our heads and find in books; it is what we are tested on in entrance exams, or in quiz shows on TV. When we talk about the "knowledge economy," we refer to STEM – science, technology, engineering, and math – and it is investment in these subjects, we are constantly told, that will make our societies smarter and the economy grow. But this is not how we know most things. Most things we know not by description but by acquaintance. Knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge held by our bodies, not by our minds. When we are acquainted with things, we know what they are, and how they work. This is also how we know how to trust other people, how we know that we are safe and loved. According to a broader and more relevant definition, the ballet should be included in the knowledge economy too, and so should gyms and massage parlors.

The two forms of knowledge presuppose an entirely different relationship between the knowing subject and the object known. Depending on what we know, and how we know it, we will relate to the world, and to other people, in entirely different ways. Knowledge by description can be obtained only when the world is put before us as an object to be inspected. Yet an object or person who is put on display will be a very different object or person than the ones we are directly acquainted with. Knowledge by acquaintance, by contrast, requires presence, not representation. We must be there, do that, and share the experience. In this way, depending on the form of knowledge we have acquired, we will be either excluded or included. We can know much in a superficial way or little in a complex way. We can use the power our knowledge provides as a way to explain and exploit the world or as a way to engage with others, and ourselves, in a more intimate fashion.


This chapter documented how people who previously never had met eventually got to know each other. This concerned Europeans in

relation to non-Europeans, but also European kings in relation to each other and in relation to their own subjects. The first encounters proceeded by means of gestures, and often explorers and natives danced together. The mood was cheerful and inviting, and after some initial hesitation the bodies came to know each other well. In fact, the body-based interaction continued well past the initial contacts – sexual favors traded for *mana* in the South Seas, and First Fleeters and Aborigines exchanging tips on dance moves. There was a sense of respect, and an equality, to these exchanges that never was replicated in later interaction. However, once knowledge came to be acquired by minds rather than by bodies, the Europeans lost touch with the world they had known. In the case of missionaries, changing the mood of the interaction was a religious imperative. The previous interaction was condemned as licentious, and the local culture was destroyed. Political reformers, in India and elsewhere, were often drawn from the same set of lower-middle-class overachievers as the missionaries, and even if they had no explicitly religious agenda, they often imposed the same mood of austerity on social relations. Colonial administrators wanted their possessions and their respective inhabitants to be put before them as external objects, as things to be inspected and judged, reformed and improved. As a result, the Europeans suddenly knew infinitely more than before, but in an increasingly shallow fashion. The political consequences are obvious, and they are with us to this day. The representatives of aid agencies, and consultants working for the World Bank and the IMF, are not dancing with the natives either, and they much prefer, like James Mill, to remain behind their desks far away from the countries in question.

As far as Europe's heads of state were concerned, the Congress of Vienna was for many a first encounter. With the occasional exception, the kings had not met each other before. Dancing together, however, they soon became better acquainted. The fraternity struck up in this way was not in itself enough to preserve the peace, but the nineteenth century was nevertheless more peaceful and more civilized than both the eighteenth and the twentieth centuries. To this end, the transnational class of diplomats contributed strongly. In contrast to the heads of state, the diplomats were well acquainted with each other. Thus, even as Europe was going through a rapid process of economic, social, and political transformation, their control of the gilded salons of the foreign ministries made sure that each country's foreign policy

remained on course. Yet even the staunchest of conservatives realized that there was no returning to the pre-revolutionary era. Somehow or another, ordinary people had to be acknowledged and included. One way to do this was for the heads of state to engage directly with their subjects. Dancing with the wives of apothecaries and the daughters of wine merchants, many subjects came to believe that they knew their rulers and that they, despite their lack of political rights, had a stake in the life of the state. A basic, embodied, sense of inclusion is a premise of politics to this day.

# V IMAGINING



To imagine is to form a mental image of something; to envision or create something in one's mind; to believe in something created by one's own mind; to assume; to conjecture or guess; to contrive in purpose; to scheme; to devise.

## **To Imagine**

Again we seem to be dealing with a mind-based activity. When we are imagining something, according to the received wisdom, we are making a picture of that something in our minds. Perhaps we could talk about the “picture theory of the imagination.” According to the picture theory, to imagine is to see something in “our mind’s eye.” These pictures are like photos that we store in our brains, and when we imagine something we retrieve those photos. And the picture theory does indeed have considerable scientific support. As neurophysiological experiments have demonstrated, the same areas of the brain are activated when we imagine something as when we actually see something in front of us. Even if the mind has no eye, and nothing actually is seen, seeing and imagining seem to be closely related.<sup>1</sup>

But this cannot explain how we can imagine things that do not exist. The only reason we can talk about what Santa Claus or the Silent Princess are like is that the imagination has created them. They are “merely imaginary,” after all. And yet, that we do see something is obvious if nothing else from the fact that we often object to the way books are represented in movies. The leading man is “much shorter than we had imagined,” we might say, or “we never imagined” the leading lady as a redhead. However, prior to objecting to descriptions such as these, chances are we did not actually have an original picture, derived from our readings, to compare with. For one thing, our mental pictures are often exceedingly vague. Rather than showing us the exact features of a person, to imagine a character is more like allowing a person to present themselves to us. Bodily movements are crucial in this respect. The movements prompt the reader to enter into the world of the story and to come into the presence of the characters. The characters move, and move us. In a story well told, this presence is quite tangible, and there is no need to conjure up a detailed picture in our minds. In fact, fictional characters make themselves present not as pictures only, but in all sensory modalities at once. It is only when we are called upon to do so, such as when confronted with a movie version of a book, that



we translate this presence into more definite features, and find them acceptable or wanting.<sup>2</sup>

Rather than conjuring up pictures, the imagination conjures up experiences. A picture merely takes a snapshot of an event, but an experience of an event gives it meaning and an affective charge. All experiences feel a certain way, and they happen in a certain mood. Since they take place in all sensory modalities at once, experiences are also rich in information. A picture may say more than a thousand words, but an experience says more than a thousand pictures. In addition, the experience has a time dimension that pictures lack. Experiences are situated, and all situations are dynamic; they are unfolding and open to the future. The mood in which we find ourselves provides us with hunches of whatever might be coming up next. When we imagine something, we draw on these features, and what we imagine becomes a rich, multimodal, dynamic event.<sup>3</sup>

We can also draw on the experiences of others. Imagine, for example, what the Grand Bazaar in Istanbul is like. If you have been there, it is easy to do. You recall the old Ottoman buildings, the smell of spices, the tourists fresh off the cruise ships, the beautiful carpets, the fake brand names, the overly friendly shopkeepers. But even if you have never been there, you can imagine what the experience is like since you may have watched movies and read books about bazaars in faraway countries. This information allows you to imagine since you too have experiences of old buildings, exotic smells, crowded places, fake brand names, and so on. This is why it is difficult to imagine things of which we in principle could have no experiences, such as what it is like to be a bat. Human beings may have some experiences in common with bats, but probably not that many.<sup>4</sup>

This also explains why we have an intuitive, and often overwhelming, resistance against imagining certain things. We do not, for example, want to imagine ourselves torturing babies. But why not, in a way? The horrors we imagine are not happening after all, we are just imagining them, and there is no question of us actually committing such acts. But even just imagining them makes us feel guilty. Guilty, that is, by means of the associations to which the imagination gives rise, the experiences it evokes, and the feelings associated with those experiences. Just imagining, we cringe, recoil, and shudder. On the other hand, there is what we perhaps could refer to as “imaginative insistence.” A child might cry all night because an imaginary cat just died, and a soldier

might risk life and limb fighting for a flag. The child will not be consoled by us pointing out that the cat never actually existed – “No, pappa, you don’t understand!” – and the soldier will not accept that a flag is a piece of fabric attached to a stick. That which we imagine has a hold on us, and once we get into an imaginary world, it may be difficult to get out.<sup>5</sup>

The imagination is a creative force, and artists in particular are known for their “lively” imagination. But no picture theory can explain how creativity works. For the imagination to move, and to move us, we must go beyond that which is immediately present to our senses. The imagination must take us somewhere. Such transgressions are possible only because experiences always take places in a certain mood. Consider, for example, the way the mood of a deserted house alerts us to danger – to things that may leap out at us in the dark and to floorboards that suddenly may give way. The spooky mood comes with a set of premonitions. As a result, when we make our way through the building, we are likely to walk in a certain way and to listen out for certain things, but we are also more likely to have certain kinds of emotional reactions and thoughts. The mood prepares us for what might be coming up. In fact, our language has an entire vocabulary for describing such premonitions. We have “hunches,” a “sixth sense,” an “inkling,” *Ahnungen*, and “presentiments.” And strikingly often this vocabulary refers to things known by various body parts. The feelings are in “our guts” or in “our bones”; we have “eyes in the back of our heads,” thoughts “in the back our minds,” and words “on tip of our tongues.” And it is by means of such anticipations that the creative process proceeds. It is by pursuing our hunches, inklings, and premonitions that we come up with new things. This is how we add words to a poem or brush strokes to a picture.<sup>6</sup>

Imagination is often shared, meaning not only that we imagine the same things as other people but that we do it together. The question is how this is done. This too is a problem for the picture theory, but it is a problem for every theory that confines the imagination to individual minds. In order to imagine something together, we need a collective experience. Consider, for example, what is going on when a group of children play “hospital.” One of them becomes a doctor, another a patient, and there may be nurses and concerned family members too; a few chairs are transformed into a doctor’s office, and a bed becomes an operating theater. The children imagine in the process of pretending; that is, the imagination unfolds as a result of the activity in which they

engage. Props are crucial here. Dolls, hobbyhorses, snow forts, toy trucks, mud pies, and any number of other objects coordinate and guide the imagination, and indicate to the participants how the game should go on. And more than anything, the props want to be activated. Dolls want to speak; toy trucks want to go somewhere; snow forts must be conquered or defended. It is by sharing props, by making them move and by moving along with them, that we imagine things together with others.<sup>7</sup>

Grownups play pretend games too, of course, and they too use props in order to do it. The nation provides an example. The nation is imagined as we play with maps, flags, cuisines, costumes, Uncle Sams and Moder Sveas, borders, institutions, anthems, and many other things besides. And just as in the games played by children, these props initiate movements. The national anthem makes an audience stand up, with a hand to their hearts, at the beginning of a sports event; the flag unites people in processions at national celebrations, it leads the soldiers into war, and it drapes their coffins when they return. By means of props such as these, we are all paying attention to the same thing, in a certain mood, and we are doing it together. Some social psychologists talk about “entitativity” – “the perception of a group as a single entity, distinct from its members.” We are one entitative entity as long as we keep moving together, in the same mood, with the same purpose, and the same goal.<sup>8</sup>

As we would expect, there is neurophysiology at work here. Whenever bodies in close proximity to each other engage in coordinated movements, a number of physiological processes are synchronized, including breathing and heartbeat, blood pressure, and gastric and endocrinal processes. Our muscles bond. And this in turn leads to a synchronization of various psychological and cognitive processes and states. Thus people who sing, pray, or row a boat together are more likely to empathize with each other and to appreciate each other’s opinions; they are even more likely to think about the same things, and in a similar fashion. Moving together we lose ourselves in the interaction, and losing ourselves we gain a sense of being a part of the group as a whole. We are one, and we share each other’s burdens and joys. Once the movement stops, and the group disperses, this sensation quickly dissipates, to be sure, but what remains – lodged in our bodies, if not in our minds – is the memory of what occurred. It is memories such as these that we draw on when we imagine our collective selves.<sup>9</sup>

## **Turnplatz Hasenheide**

On the very same day – October 18, 1814 – that the kings and diplomats at the Congress of Vienna celebrated the first anniversary of the defeat of Napoleon, a group of students assembled in Hasenheide, a wooded area on the southern outskirts of Berlin. They were brought there by their teacher, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, and they too were going to celebrate the victory over Napoleon. Yet Jahn and his students moved in quite different ways than the diplomats in Vienna. They engaged in physical exercises: They wrestled, jumped across ditches, ran in labyrinths, balanced on beams, and swung from parallel bars and trees. And in the evening, they lit bonfires, sang songs, and gave speeches. Many ordinary Berliners had turned up to watch and participate in the celebrations, and groups of students from neighboring towns joined in as well. Everyone was animated by lofty patriotic sentiments. Although the French had been defeated, Jahn reminded everyone present, Germany was still divided into far too many political units. The physical exercises in which he and his students engaged, he explained, were not only enjoyable in themselves, but also a way to prepare themselves physically for the coming war of German unification.<sup>10</sup>

Friedrich Ludwig Jahn was one of the first German nationalists. Born in Brandenburg in 1778, he had begun as a pro-Prussian patriot, but as a result of the French invasion of 1806 he transferred his loyalties to the German *Volk* as a whole. Pan-German nationalism had been virtually unknown in the eighteenth century, and many German liberals had at first greeted Napoleon as a liberator and a man of peace. But Jahn never made that mistake. He was skeptical of foreign influences and praised instead the virtues of *Deutschtum*, the mythological “Germanness,” which attributed a unique, and superior, quality to all things German. It was because they had lost touch with their traditions, and no longer knew who they were, that the Germans had become divided and weak. Yet Jahn and his students were not only nationalists, but also liberals. Nationalism at the beginning of the nineteenth century was a liberal creed. Liberals wanted a united Germany run by German citizens, not by an entitled elite; they wanted democracy, freedom of expression, and an end to inherited privileges. The French invasion provided an opportunity for all Germans to unite against the common enemy, and Jahn had enthusiastically joined the all-German army. Yet when the war finally was over, the peace was a disappointment. The

traditional, reactionary regimes were returned to power, and Germany was as divided as ever.<sup>11</sup>

In 1810, while Germany still was occupied by French troops, Jahn had begun working as a teacher at the *Gymnasium zum Grauen Kloster*, the most prestigious high school in Berlin. Since there were no lessons scheduled for two afternoons each week, he took his students on excursions. In the forest at Hasenheide they played games and engaged in physical exercises. It was all quite unorganized at first, but the activities proved popular, and the number of participants grew week by week. The following year, 1811, they fenced off a rectangular area in the woods, built a small hut, and set up all kinds of homemade gymnastic equipment – balancing beams, parallel bars, ropes to swing from, and ditches to jump across. They dressed in cheap but durable linen clothing, ate simple meals, and addressed each other as *Du* rather than with the customary and more formal *Sie*. And every so often, Jahn and his students would go off on long walks, visiting various scenic locations in the vicinity of Berlin. On these occasions, songs on nationalistic and devotional themes were sung, bonfires lit, and accommodation was found in haylofts or under the stars. And Jahn never missed an opportunity to hold forth on the importance of German unity and on the obligations that lay before the country's youth. They called themselves *Turner*, with a reference to the "tournaments" in which medieval knights had engaged. Replacing the slogans of the French Revolution with their own, the Turner were "*frisch, fromm, fröhlich, frei*" – "fresh, pious, cheerful, and free."<sup>12</sup>

The gymnastics association, the *Turnverein*, which Jahn rather unexpectedly had started, proved a great success. Already in 1811, some 500 students from high schools all over Berlin had found their way to his *Turnplatz*, and by 1816 there were over a thousand of them. The concept was soon copied in other towns, and within only a few years similar associations had sprung up all over German-speaking lands. One way to spread the message was to get university students involved. This happened quite naturally as the high schoolers graduated and went on to further studies, but Jahn also actively promoted his ideas. Beginning in January 1817, he gave semi-weekly public lectures in Berlin on his favorite topics – *Deutschtum* and the need for German unity. Around the same time, a new kind of fraternity, the so-called *Burschenschaften* – "young men's associations" – were established at many German universities. Student associations have a long tradition in

Germany, going back to the Middle Ages, but the medieval associations comprised students from individual German states, not from Germany as a whole, and their members spent most of their time drinking and dueling. While alcohol was consumed by the members of the *Burschenschaftler* too, fencing was combined with Jahn-inspired exercises, and cultural and political activities took up much of their time. Above all, the *Burschenschaften* were pan-German in their outlook and membership, and just like the high schoolers at the Hasenheide, they thought of themselves as the citizens of a future, united country.<sup>13</sup>

On October 18, 1817, some 500 *Burschenschaftler* gathered at the Wartburg Castle in Thuringia, southwest of Berlin, to celebrate the fourth anniversary of the defeat of Napoleon at Leipzig. The students marched, sang hymns, waved flags, gave speeches, and drank toasts to the fallen heroes of the past. Following Jahn's suggestion, they also burned books. Or rather, they burned bundles of papers that represented books written by various authors to whom they objected. One example was *Geschichte des deutschen Reichs* (History of the German Realm, 1814), by August von Kotzebue. Kotzebue was a cosmopolite, skeptical of liberalism, and an anti-anti-Semite – and thereby a representative of everything the *Burschenschaftler* hated. On March 18, 1819, Kotzebue was assassinated by one of them, a theology student who also turned out to be a Turner. The Prussian authorities, who initially had been quite positive toward Jahn and his students, now turned against them. The authorities, who suspected Jahn of having been involved in the murder, had him arrested, and Hasenheide was closed. In the so-called *Turnsperre*, “the ban on gymnastics associations,” of 1820, the *Turnvereine* were outlawed in most German states. Although Jahn eventually was cleared of involvement, he remained in prison; and even once he was released in 1825, he was banned from living in Berlin and from having anything to do with the education of children.<sup>14</sup>

We imagine, cultural theorists like to tell us, as we read texts. The text gives rise to images in our minds, and these images are the source of our imagination. To imagine something together with others is consequently a matter of reading the same texts. For example, we might read books in which our nation features, and we might do so in our national language, or the nation might turn up in the pages of the newspapers we read. And there is indeed a striking correlation between the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century and the creation of a

mass market in newsprint. But this is not how the imagination works. The reason is that the images we conjure up in this way, such as they are, are devoid of emotional charge. There is no reason why reading about a nation should make us feel more allegiance to it than reading about some other collective entity – a national association of auditors, say, or an ornithologists' club. In order for the imagination to make us feel, it must first make us move. Such movements are what this chapter is about. We will investigate how nations, but also social movements – the labor and the women's movements – and national liberation movements were imagined. Movements require movements, the argument will be, and communities require communion, that is, etymologically speaking, a "shared service." A shared service is not a mental activity; it is a practical activity we engage in together with others.

### Commanded by the State

Ninety-nine years later, in 1913, at the first centenary of the defeat of Napoleon, some 62,500 Turners assembled for a *Turnfest*, appropriately enough in the city of Leipzig itself, the location of Napoleon's defeat. On the big exercise field constructed especially for the occasion, the gymnasts, dressed in identical white uniforms, performed assorted synchronized movements in front of some 100,000 spectators. The overall impression was one of discipline and uniformity, as enforced by a *Vorturner*, the leader and instructor, positioned on a podium in front of them all. They looked "like a cornfield swaying in the wind," according to one enthusiastic eyewitness, or like "the heaving of the waves on the ocean."<sup>15</sup> It was "a wonderful sight, those endless, white lines, like a gigantic chessboard, like an army ready to fight." Yet coordinated mass movements of this kind had not been a part of the Turners' original routines. On *Turnplatz* Hasenheide in 1814, the gymnasts had exercised together to be sure, but each of them had engaged in their own individual activities. This shift from diversity to uniformity, and from self-coordination to coordination by leaders, made gymnastics into an activity of an entirely different kind. Something must have happened to the Turner movement.

The short answer is that the Turners had been taken over by the state. In 1820, at the time of the *Turnsperre*, the leaders of the various German statelets had persecuted the gymnasts and outlawed their activities, but in the course of subsequent decades one politician after

another realized that gymnastics could be made to serve their own ends. This realization, in fact, can be dated with some considerable degree of precision. Thus, the first two all-German *Turnfesten*, held in Coburg in 1860 and Berlin in 1861, were both infused with Jahn's original liberal ethos, while already the third meeting, in 1863, was directed according to official requirements – in this case, by the requirements of the Kingdom of Saxony. The Saxon authorities took an active part in organizing the proceedings, and the Saxon king, Friedrich August III, was in attendance during the opening ceremony. And it was now that synchronized mass movements for the first time came to feature prominently in the program.<sup>16</sup>

This transformation corresponded closely to a dramatic transformation that all European societies were going through at the time. The Industrial Revolution may have begun in England 100 years earlier, but it was only in the latter part of the nineteenth century that industrialization came to transform the rest of Europe. Responding to the call of the satanic mills of the Industrial Revolution, some 80 percent of Europe's population moved – either to cities to find work or overseas, to the United States in particular. When people moved to the cities, the traditional safety nets of agricultural society were ripped apart, and so were the social and psychological contexts by means of which people traditionally had defined themselves. Once they had overcome their initial confusion, they often found themselves the members of crowds. The crowd was a new social phenomenon. There had been no crowds in the countryside, but in the cities they were everywhere. There were crowds showing up for their shifts in the new factories; crowds thronging the streets on state occasions and in national celebrations; crowds gathering at football matches, bicycle races, and other sporting events; and crowds that took to the streets in demonstrations and political riots.<sup>17</sup>

Before long the crowd became the primary subject matter of a new academic discipline: sociology. Crowds, the first sociologists explained, are characterized by a number of highly troubling features. Gustave Le Bon, the French sociologist, pointed to “impulsiveness, irritability, incapacity to reason, the absence of judgment and of the critical spirit, the exaggeration of the sentiments, and others besides – which are almost always observed in beings belonging to inferior forms of evolution – in women, savages, and children, for instance.”<sup>18</sup> Crowds, thus defined, have no will of their own and no direction, and



as such they are easily manipulated by demagogues. “The given suggestion,” Boris Sidis, a social psychologist at Harvard, explained, “reverberates from individual to individual, gathers strength, and becomes so overwhelming as to drive the crowd into a fury of activity, into a frenzy of excitement.”<sup>19</sup> What such irrational behavior could lead to was obvious during the Paris Commune in the spring of 1871, and in subsequent decades the crowds seemed to have grown even more restless.<sup>20</sup>

It was now that states all over Europe took charge of the way people moved. Acting in the capacity of a *Vorturner*, the state came to coordinate the movements of its subjects. This happened first in the public schools, free and mandatory for all, which now were established in one European country after another. But it happened in the army too, in particular in the new armies made up of conscripted soldiers. At school, pupils learned to read and write, and they were taught a few anecdotes illustrating the glories of their fatherland; and in the army, they learned to shoot a gun and to submit to authority. But above all, both schoolchildren and soldiers were drilled. They had to wake up on time, show up on time, sit quietly at their desks, stand to attention, form orderly queues, march in sync, think in sync, and do as they were told. And in both institutional settings, the representatives of the state inflicted corporal punishment on those who failed to fall in line.<sup>21</sup>

In the middle of the nineteenth century, Jahn’s original program of gymnastic exercises came increasingly to be replaced by an alternative program, known as “Swedish gymnastics.” Originally developed by Pehr Henrik Ling, a fencing instructor and educator in the southern Swedish town of Lund, its most prominent feature were the *fria övningar*, the synchronized group movements, or what the Germans later were to refer to as *Freiübungen*. As Ling explained, his program was a way to prepare young men for war. Ling was a nationalist, in other words, who, when he did not teach gymnastics, wrote poetry in what he took to be the ancient style of the Vikings. Gymnastics for him, much as for Jahn, was a way to imagine the nation. Yet his imagination was not liberal, but instead served the interests of the traditional political authorities. In 1813, he founded Gymnastiska Centralinstitutet, the “Central Gymnastics Institute,” in Stockholm, where teachers for both military and school gymnastics were educated. Later in the century, Ling’s son Hjalmar continued his father’s work by applying its principles to the gymnastics programs implemented in schools.<sup>22</sup>

It was here, at Ling's Gymnastics Institute in Stockholm, that German military men came to further their education. The most prominent such student was Hugo Rothstein, a lieutenant in the Prussian artillery, who, once he returned to Germany, published an enthusiastic survey, *Die Gymnastik, nach dem Systeme des schwedischen Gymnasiarchen P. H. Ling* (Gymnastics According to the System of the Swedish Gymnast P. H. Ling). What attracted Rothstein to the Swedish system was more than anything the *fria övningar*. Free exercises help develop all parts of the body, he insisted, not just a certain muscle group, and the movements are easy to learn – an important consideration when training pupils and new military recruits. More than anything, however, it was the affinities between Swedish gymnastics and military drill that appealed to the German reformers. The mood in which the exercises took place was one of order and discipline; everyone was forced to pay attention not only to the *Vorturner* but to each other. The gymnasts looked like soldiers, large groups of identically clad young men who moved in a coordinated fashion.<sup>23</sup>

Meanwhile, Adolf Spiess, a gymnast and *Burschenschaftler*, undertook similar reforms in German schools. In 1842, the Prussian authorities officially recognized that physical training was an indispensable part of male education, but it would take until the 1860s before it became mandatory and before every school had facilities where exercises could take place in the winter too. And in the 1880s, physical exercises became obligatory also for girls. In another innovation, Spiess added music to the movements. This made them easier to coordinate and more fun to execute, and the music established a mood of shared effort. Much as Rothstein, Spiess insisted that Swedish gymnastics provided a more comprehensive training than Jahn's program and that it was easier for everyone to learn. Moreover, free exercises were not competitive; they did not pit one student against another. Rather, everyone moved together and as one. This, according to Spiess, was a far more appropriate image of a nation.<sup>24</sup>

Jahn's nation was a liberal, middle-class community made up of freely moving parts. Since all participants engaged in their own exercises and worked at perfecting their own respective skills, the overall impression was one of diversity and teeming activity. Yet since they were doing it together, they were at the same time united by a strong sense of camaraderie. Something similar, Jahn suggested, could be accomplished for Germany as a whole. The nationalism of Ling, Rothstein, and

Spiess, by contrast, was a conservative doctrine, supported by and supportive of the state. Theirs was a hierarchical nation in which traditional elites were in charge. The *Freiübungen* involved no freedom, only discipline. And eventually this was the conception of the nation that came to prevail. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, decade by decade, more synchronized activities were included in the program of the Turner, until there finally was little difference between their gymnastics and the imported Swedish program. Individual exercises too, it was discovered, can be synchronized as long as a sufficient number of identical pieces of gymnastics equipment were lined up in rows upon rows. This was the spectacle to which the 100,000 spectators were treated at the *Turnfest* in Leipzig in 1913.<sup>25</sup>

## A Return to Nature

Since it is easy to miss, it is worth emphasizing the political nature of the exercises in which Jahn and his followers engaged. Jahn wanted his students to start with the easiest movements possible. As he explained in *Die deutsche Turnkunst* (A Treatise on Gymnastics, 1816), we should begin by learning how to move our limbs, one by one, and only then are we ready to go on to more complex movements such as walking. To walk may seem like an easy thing to do, but “to walk well is a great art” that all too often is neglected. We should aim for “a straight natural carriage of the whole body, particularly the head, without anything artificial, or affected.”<sup>26</sup> We should just walk, that is, not crawl, jump, waddle, or stagger. And only once we know how to walk can we begin to run – “breast out, shoulders back, upper part of the body forwards; upper arms close to the body, elbows bent, and kept backwards.”<sup>27</sup> And it is only once we have mastered the arts of walking and running that we can go on to more complex movements – leaping, vaulting, balancing, swinging, hanging, climbing, throwing, and so on.<sup>28</sup>

The political nature of these instructions becomes obvious if we compare Jahn’s manual with the self-help books that had been such bestsellers in early modern Europe. These books, written for presumptive courtiers, prescribed movements that were as different as possible from those of ordinary people. It should be possible, their authors had explained, to distinguish the members of the aristocracy already by their posture and gait. Jahn’s advice was radically different. He started with movements that everyone could carry out, and his aim was to develop a

posture that was as unaffected as possible. The aim was to return to the basics of human locomotion, and thereby to undo the damage done by society. There was an egalitarian ethos here, and a democratic one. Jahn imagined a moving community of which everyone could become a member and where no one strutted like an aristocrat. Yet there was an anti-French message here too. To reject the artificial posture of the aristocracy was to reject the French models that European elites had copied for so long. By returning to a more natural way of moving, Germans would be able to finally return to themselves.

In addition, and as we saw, Jahn and his students went on hikes, known as *Turnfahrten*. And following in their footsteps, we find the Wandervogel movement. Although these groups of “wandering birds” cared little for the kinds of strenuous exercises in which Jahn and his students excelled, they were very keen on hiking. Beginning in 1897, at Gymnasium Steglitz – another prestigious high school in Berlin – groups of boys began to go on outings together with their teachers. They were going to try something different, they declared – a simpler, healthier, less hypocritical way of life than that of their parents, a life in closer connection to nature. So off they went into the forests and the hills, carrying backpacks, tents, and guitars. Although their parents initially gave their blessings to these activities, many Wandervogel were difficult to control, and some advocated a radical break with established, grown-up society. They sought to define a *Jugendkultur*, a “youth culture,” and set their ideals against the conventions of the older generations.<sup>29</sup>

Some of the groups were also quite explicit in affirming their budding sexuality, which was easier to do once girls increasingly came to be involved in the activities. “We make our dances unmistakably erotic,” one of the birds wrote, “we flirt and love wherever we can. We are creating new chances for youthful erotic sociability.”<sup>30</sup> Naturally, reports regarding activities of this kind made parents and teachers alarmed, and the mixed membership did not stop rumors spreading regarding homosexual digressions. In a campaign of moral outrage that ended only with the outbreak of war in 1914, the Wandervogel movement was denounced by politicians and by assorted conservative and Christian organizations. Although the movement, even at the height of its popularity, never included more than a couple of thousand members, the example they set was to have a profound impact on other social movements.<sup>31</sup>

But you can also dance your way back to nature. Jahn had not included dance in the original, 1816 edition of his *Die deutsche Turnkunst*, no doubt since he regarded most dances as too contrived and too French. Dance, moreover, fit badly on his list of basic exercises. However, subsequent generations of Turner took a different view. Adolf Spiess dedicated a whole book to the topic, *Reigen und Liederreigen für das Schulturnen* (Circle Dances and Circle Dance Songs for School Gymnastics), published in 1869. *Reigen*, “circle dances,” he explained, are nothing like the dances of the French aristocracy. For one thing, they are easy to learn and perform. You just join hands with the person to your left and to your right, and then you do what everyone else in the circle is doing. Indeed, in its most basic version, a *Reigen* is little more than a rhythmic form of circular walking. And yet the circle they enclosed in this way was a perfect image of their community. The movements “not only satisfy the demand for agility of the dancers,” Spiess explained, “but also prove that free play animates the dancers to realize increasing communal interaction.”<sup>32</sup> Moreover, circle dances had impeccable folkloristic credentials. *Reigen* had been danced by German peasants in the Middle Ages; Friedrich Hölderlin had written poems about them; and in the 1930s, Martin Heidegger would hold them up as eternal symbols of *Deutschtum*. When the second edition of Jahn’s *Die deutsche Turnkunst* was published in 1847, it contained a chapter on circle dances.<sup>33</sup>

It was free, natural movements such as these that eventually resulted in what we today think of as “modern” dance. Modern dance, that is, was not the result of a development of classical ballet in the French tradition as much as a result of the German rejection of it. Traditional ballet was certainly very much *en pointe*, but it was at the same time utterly pointless. The ballet dancers strutted and fretted for a while, but their movements signified nothing. Modern dance, by contrast, was expressive. Rudolf Laban, a choreographer and dance teacher, called it *Ausdruckstanz*, “expressionist dance.” *Ausdruckstanz* expressed the feelings of the dancers, but it also gave expression to more basic, primordial forces of which the dancers themselves were only dimly aware. A dancer’s moving body was a medium, like the medium in a seance, which had the power to convey spiritual messages. Mary Wigman, a student of Laban’s, would dance with masks covering her face, effacing her own individuality, and thereby allowing all kinds of other beings to emerge. “Now am I light, now do I fly; now do I see myself under myself.

Now there danceth a God in me.”<sup>34</sup> By dancing in this natural, distinctly non-French fashion, we can return to that primordial community of which we all originally were members.<sup>35</sup>

## **Social Movements**

The rapid changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution gave rise to a host of new demands – for higher salaries, better housing, the right to vote, and so on – and it was when these demands were directed toward the political authorities that the notion of “the social” came into being. The social was one of the buzz words of the nineteenth century, and before long public debates were replete with references to “social problems,” “social workers,” “social sciences,” “social democratic parties,” and “socialists.” And there were “social movements” too. Social movements consisted of the same people whom the authorities, and concerned sociologists, had referred to as “crowds,” but these were not collections of erratically moving, easily manipulated individuals. On the contrary, they moved in the same direction, at the same time, demonstrating both unity and determination. Their movements had a goal – often the parliament building or the main square of the capital – and the members marched there carrying placards and shouting slogans. Before the language in which the activists expressed themselves became metaphorical, it was perfectly concrete. The members really were “standing up for” each other, “standing side by side,” “shoulder to shoulder,” “hand in hand,” and so on.<sup>36</sup>

The history of the labor movement is consequently best told as a series of demonstrations and mass rallies. However, it can also be told as a series of festive occasions. The workers organized parties – not political parties only, but parties with food and beer, singing and dancing. In Italy and Germany, in particular, but in Scandinavia too, the aim was to create an alternative sphere, with an alternative mood, in which workers could spend their leisure time together, enjoying themselves while strengthening their communal bonds. The revolution, when it comes, will be a carnivalesque occasion. In Germany, some workers followed the example set by the Wandervögel. They too were looking for a more natural way to live, away from the oppressive discipline of the factory, and before long they too took to the forests and hills carrying backpacks and guitars. In Germany there was even a nudist socialist walking society, which counted tens of thousands of members.

The leader of the movement, Adolf Koch, insisted that exercises in the nude was a part of the radical transformation of society. Not surprisingly, perhaps, his League for Social Hygiene, Body Culture and Gymnastics was shut down by the Nazis in 1934.<sup>37</sup>

As for the history of the women's movement, it unfolded rather differently. Women too were placed in new positions by the Industrial Revolution. Many poor women moved from the countryside to the cities where they found work in factories, yet middle-class women were often confined to their homes. While the world outside came to be ruled by market forces, the middle-class home came increasingly to be thought of as separated from society and governed by an entirely different logic. The home became an intimate sphere ruled by attention and love, but also a disciplinarian institution in charge of preparing its younger members for the demands of market capitalism. And it was women who were in charge of this unique combination of love and discipline. The first women's organizations were also those that sought to protect the home from external dangers. One such danger was alcohol, which led husbands to neglect their families and their financial obligations, and risked jeopardizing all the hard work the mothers had invested in their offspring. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the Woman's Christian Temperance Union mobilized half a million American women behind its calls for sobriety and responsibility. The WCTU organized marches and conducted a number of campaigns, none more successful than the one that resulted in the prohibition on alcohol sales in the United States in 1920.<sup>38</sup>

As far as the movement for women's right to vote was concerned, it came to rely heavily on the iconic examples of a few brave individuals who broke with conventions, and sometimes with their husbands, in pursuit of the common cause. The likes of Susan B. Antony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton in the United States, Emmeline Pankhurst in Britain, Helene Lange in Germany, and Maria Deraismes in France spread the message in print, but they also took to the road, traveling up and down their respective countries, organizing women, and raising awareness. By themselves moving, they mobilized the women who were confined to their homes. The bicycle – an invention that had become cheaper and far more common in the 1890s – became a feminist symbol. “The bicycle,” wrote Stanton, will “cultivate all the cardinal virtues; it will inspire women with more courage, self-respect and self-reliance and make the next generation more vigorous of mind

and body.”<sup>39</sup> Besides, the bicycle allowed women to replace assorted pieces of tight-fitting clothing with more practical garments. Frances Willard, who took up biking at the age of fifty-three, wrote a book about it, *A Wheel within a Wheel: How I Learned to Ride the Bicycle, with Some Reflections by the Way* (1895). It keeps you fit and healthy, she explained, but “I also wanted to help women to a wider world.”<sup>40</sup>

The automobile, by contrast, once it arrived, was nothing if not a male attribute, yet this fact did not stop a few adventurous women from appropriating it too. Between 1911 and 1915, Margaret Foley and Florence Luscomb toured New England by car, stopping at every village green to make the case for the right to vote. Another motorized activist was Mabel Vernon, who visited small mining towns in Nevada, holding outdoor meetings and giving speeches. The state has only 80,000 people, she reported, and they are scattered across an enormous area. “The great part of the population must be sought out in small mining camps and on ranches that can be reached only by motor or stage.” But the hard work was not in vain. “Suffrage spirit rose to a high pitch, and it shows the people of this state are not indifferent if something is done to arouse them.”<sup>41</sup>

## Marching for Independence

If nationalists succeed in imagining their nations, and if they go on to act on behalf of the communities they have imagined, empires, despite their undeniable power, will find it impossible to survive. Empires are made up of many different ethnic groups after all, their subjects speak many different languages, and if all of them make themselves independent, there will be no empires left. This is what happened in Europe after World War I, and it is what happened everywhere else in the decades after World War II.

This is not to say that the empires simply gave up. Before the world wars settled the matter, the respective imperial authorities tried their best to counteract the nationalist propaganda with a propaganda of their own. In many cases they developed an imperial ideology – an imperial form of nationalism – meant to bring the various ethnic groups together and to foster a sense of loyalty to the imperial center. Hence “Ottomanism,” the idea of a “Greater Britain,” and of Russia as “The Third Rome.” For nationalists, this pro-imperial propaganda complicated the situation. After all, it was rarely clear even to them what the



relevant nation was and whether they should establish themselves as leaders of the former empire as a whole or as only one of its constituent parts. In the case of India and China, the nationalists took over the whole thing, arguing that the empire actually was a nation and that it always had existed in this form. In the case of Russia, the Bolsheviks first granted independence to the constituent parts, then quickly took it back, insisting on the integrity of the former, imperial borders.<sup>42</sup>

Consider the case of the British in India. Having arrived from the other side of the globe, and ruling the country with a heavy hand, it was easy for Indian nationalists to portray British imperialism as illegitimate. In 1883, the Indian National Association held its first conference in Calcutta, and in 1885, the Indian National Congress – the organization that Gandhi was to lead – was established in Bombay. After having advocated a limited form of home rule, the leaders of the movement came in the 1920s to make increasingly explicit calls for full independence. The aim was to keep the colony together while making sure that the colonizers themselves left. To that end, they needed to come up with their own form of pan-national nationalism.

An obvious problem was that next to all inhabitants of the subcontinent lived in one or another of several hundreds of thousands of villages. Indian village life was exceedingly local, and people's horizons were inevitably narrow. This parochialism meant that India, for most prospective Indians, was difficult to imagine. Not coincidentally, the first generation of nationalist leaders were people who had managed to make their escape from village life. Thus, Gandhi left his native Gujarat for England in 1888, only nineteen years old, and proceeded to study law at the Inns of Court in London. And other sons of wealthy Indian families – Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the future first president of Pakistan; Jawaharlal Nehru, the future first prime minister of India – made the same journey. It was from their vantage point in England that they saw their country for the first time, an India they imagined as both united and free.<sup>43</sup>

The problem facing the Indian nationalists, in other words, resembled that faced by the Suffragettes. Since the presumptive members of their intended community saw no reason and had no opportunity to move, it was instead its leaders who had to do the moving. And if ordinary Indians were to start imagining an independent country, they had to be mobilized. Thus once Gandhi returned to India in 1915, forty-six years old, he crisscrossed the continent by train.

His model was that of the religious pilgrimage. Pilgrimages unite different kinds of people who otherwise never would have met, and direct them, walking together step by step, toward a common destination. Pilgrimages, as most religions have discovered, are effective ways to imagine a community of believers. Our ancestors knew perfectly well that gods can be worshipped in our own homes, as Gandhi put it, but since they wanted all Indian to unite, “they established holy places in various parts of India, and fired the people with an idea of nationality in a manner unknown in other parts of the world.”<sup>44</sup>

The political actions that Gandhi organized copied this format. He had already organized marches during his time in South Africa, and once he returned to India, he employed the same tactics. The most celebrated example was the Salt March. At the time salt was heavily taxed by the British authorities, and it was illegal to make your own from seawater. In an act of defiance, Gandhi gathered his closest associates, and from March 12 to April, 6, 1930, they marched the 384 kilometers from his ashram in Ahmedabad to the coast of Gujarat. They held meetings along the way, spreading news of the insurrection, and before long the march was covered by both domestic and international media. Once Gandhi reached the ocean, some 50,000 protesters had joined him. Here he proceeded to make salt, and challenged the British to arrest him. Although the Salt March had no immediate consequences for the political situation in the country, its long-term impact was huge. For the first time it was obvious to everyone, including the British authorities, that an independent, self-confident India was both united and on the move.<sup>45</sup>

Chinese nationalists faced similar challenges. China too consists of a large number of ethnic groups, and much as their counterparts in India, the Chinese nationalists wanted to get rid of the emperor while keeping the empire for themselves. And just as in India, life for next to all Chinese people was village-based, local, and parochial. Chinese farmers were also exceedingly poor, and starting in the nineteenth century, some of them had emigrated in order to look for new opportunities abroad – to Southeast Asia in particular, but also to North America. It was among this diaspora community that a Chinese nation first was imagined. Sun Yat-sen, the first leader of the Guomindang, the nationalist party, was born in Guangdong in 1866, but emigrated at twelve years old to the independent Kingdom of Hawai‘i. His wife, Soong Qing-ling, was educated in the United States, and her sister,

Soong Mei-ling, who married Chiang Kai-shek, the subsequent leader of Guomindang, was educated in the United States too. In fact, the first generation of Communist leaders had also lived abroad for extended periods of time. Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping both spent several years in France, and it was here that they became both Communists and nationalists. Just as India was much easier to imagine when seen from London, China was much easier to imagine when seen from Paris or from the United States.<sup>46</sup>

Returning home, the Chinese nationalists too had to find a way of mobilizing ordinary people. The subsequent civil war between the Guomindang and the Communists, and the war against the Japanese invaders, displaced many farmers, but the conflicts also united them. In the fall of 1934, encircled by Chiang Kai-shek's forces, the Communist army was in a desperate predicament. Eventually, some 100,000 of the soldiers broke free, and together they walked the 12,500 kilometers from the Jianxi province in southeastern China to the Shaanxi province in the north. It was during this march – later known as “The Long March” – that Mao Zedong established himself as the undisputed leader of the party. Although many aspects of the Long March are contested, there is no questioning the role the event played in subsequent propaganda. “The Long March is a manifesto,” as Mao put it. “It has announced to some 200 million people in eleven provinces that the road of the Red Army is their only road to liberation.”<sup>47</sup> And sure enough, references to “The Long March Spirit” are still commonly made whenever ordinary people are expected to make sacrifices of behalf of the country. In this way the Communist leaders try to make a nation out of the former empire.<sup>48</sup>

## Watching the Olympics

In the course of the nineteenth century, nationalism was transformed from a liberal doctrine that emphasized freedom and equality to a conservative, disciplinarian doctrine in the service of the state. And during World War I, the Turner were often turned into cannon fodder. Yet some of Jahn's young gymnasts escaped this fate; some of them escaped across the Atlantic, and in the United States they were free to practice not only their exercises but also their liberal faith. Carl Beck and Carl Follen, both active Turner, are two examples. Beck had been a student of Jahn's at Hasenheide, and Follen was a gymnast,

a *Burschenschaftler*, and a liberal activist. When they arrived together in New York on Christmas Day, 1824, they both changed their first names to “Charles” and proceeded to look for work as teachers. Beck obtained a job teaching Latin at the Round Hill School, a high school for boys in Northampton, Massachusetts; Follen too worked there for a while, but continued on to a teaching position at Harvard. True to his mission, Beck established a *Turnplatz* at the Round Hill and proceeded to translate Jahn’s *Deutsche Turnkunst* into English. And at Harvard, Follen taught not only German language and ecclesiastical history, but also physical exercises in a gym he built for the purpose. This is how gymnastics was introduced to the United States.<sup>49</sup>

In the New World setting, the liberal ethos of the Turner movement was preserved, with its emphasis on the achievements of individual athletes. And gymnastics, on the German model, continued to be the primary form of physical exercise in the United States until the end of the nineteenth century. At the same time, however, the Turner came increasingly to be influenced by the ethos of competitive sports. In the nineteenth century, “sports” referred primarily to “country sports,” that is, to hunting and fishing, and “sportsmen” were outdoorsy types, such as the adventurers who took off for the colonies with rifles and fishing rods in hand. Sports, as we know them today, were basically an English invention, associated with a few public schools – Eton, Rugby, Harrow, and so on – where the scions of the English upper classes learned the meaning of cut-throat rivalry and fair play. Here, much like the ancient Greeks, the students competed with each other in various physical exercises, but they also played team sports like football, cricket, and what came to be known as rugby. It was when the scions of the American upper classes emulated these English practices that sports too made their way to the United States.<sup>50</sup>

At this time, no ordinary people had an interest in activities such as these. No one outside the social elite practiced sports, and no one watched it. As late as the 1890s, the very thought that members of the working class should have access to sports facilities was regarded as ridiculous. That sports soon afterward did become both popular and widely practiced was largely due to the indefatigable efforts of a French aristocrat, Pierre de Coubertin. A patriot, Coubertin was deeply concerned about France’s loss in the war with Germany in 1871, which he blamed on the lack of physical preparedness on the part of French males. At the same time he was dismissive of German gymnastics, which

“knows nothing beyond ensemble movements, rigid discipline, and perpetual regimentation.”<sup>51</sup> Instead, he saw sports as the model to emulate, and to this end he made repeated study trips to English public schools. Sports made their practitioners strong and competitive, Coubertin explained, and besides it was fun both to practice and to watch. Yet his countrymen remained skeptical. Sports were the preoccupation of an elite after all and too Anglo-Saxon; and in any case French people much preferred to watch bicycle races. Throughout Europe, people responsible for physical education drew similar conclusions, and officers in charge of military training were particularly concerned. Gymnastics, they explained, is a communal activity that brings people together, but sports divides them by making them compete against each other. Given such objections, it is not surprising that gymnastics, not sports, remained the predominant form of physical exercise until World War I.<sup>52</sup>

Yet gymnastics was defeated in the end. Or rather, although we to this day engage in many forms of noncompetitive physical exercise, even gymnastics is now regarded as a sport with points and medals awarded to its most distinguished practitioners. This transformation was more than anything achieved as sports came to be internationalized. And this is where Coubertin made his main contribution. He took a great interest in the excavations at Olympia, in Greece, begun by French archaeologists, and he was soon struck by the possibility that the ancient form of athletics practiced here could be revived. In 1894, he put together an international committee, consisting mainly of his aristocratic friends, and two years later the first modern Olympic Games were held in Athens. Coubertin conceived of the Games as a revived form of religion, a “religion of the muscles,” which would provide the basis for a new sense of international collaboration. The rituals he devised for the purpose became more elaborate with each game: Olympic flags and oaths, eternal flames, released pigeons, national anthems, award ceremonies, and so on. Just as in ancient times, sports were to bring peace and universal brotherhood – at least for the duration of games.<sup>53</sup>

Although the first Olympic Games had few participants and attracted little attention, Coubertin persisted. The following two Games, held in Paris and St. Louis, rode piggyback on the World Expositions that were held in these cities at the same time. In fact, so many different events were arranged on these occasions that some of the athletes were unaware that they had participated in the “Olympic Games.” Moreover, the

quality of the athletes was unimpressive, and since there were few participants from abroad, the host country always won the majority of the medals. In St. Louis, some of the events doubled up as US championships, and until the Games were held in Stockholm in 1912, it was possible for individuals, not representing a particular country, to take part. There was also a lot of confusion regarding the rules, and the concluding marathon race in particular was always associated with various scandals. And yet, in every four-year cycle, the Olympic Games gained in prestige, with national governments getting more involved, and the Olympic Committee taking increasingly better charge of the proceedings.<sup>54</sup>

Despite the rather imprecise talk of international camaraderie and mutual understanding, sports provided a perfect arena for interstate rivalry. Indeed, sports really only became popular once the competitions were seen as taking place between the representatives of different states. The athletes were, in the common phrase, “ambassadors” of their respective countries, and sports came to be seen as a continuation of diplomacy by other means. In every country, national sports associations were established that took responsibility for “developing the sport” – for setting up clubs, training athletes, and organizing tournaments and championships. The national sports associations also made sure that each country’s rules corresponded to the international standard. Nationalists who had worried about the prospect of a universal brotherhood of man had worried needlessly. Sports force them to make sacrifices for the common good, Henri Massis et Alfred de Tarde noted in a survey of French university students undertaken in 1913, and it fosters “endurance, *sang-froid*, military virtues, and maintains young people in a bellicose mood.”<sup>55</sup> “Far from extinguishing patriotic passions, all this false cosmopolitanism of the stadium only increases it,” Charles Maurras, a proto-fascist French writer, reported with great satisfaction at a visit to the Olympic Games in Athens in 1896. “The force which has brought people together will only render international incidents all that more likely.”<sup>56</sup>

This is consequently another way to imagine a nation. What we see before us on the sports field is not the nation itself, but instead its heroic representatives. Athletes personify their nation, much as kings in early modern Europe had personified their states. The stadium is the world stage on which they display their prowess. When the winner is standing there on the podium, with a gold medal around their neck – when the national anthem is playing and the flag is raised – it is perfectly obvious which nation is the most successful. It is a stirring

moment for everyone in the audience or for TV viewers at home. It makes you feel immensely proud of your nation, and lucky not to have been born a foreigner. The members of the nation are watching TV now, and letting their representatives do all the moving.

## A World Imagined

To imagine something, according to the received wisdom, is to see a picture of something. To imagine a cat is to see a picture of a cat in “one’s mind’s eye.” But this cannot explain how it is possible to imagine things that cannot be seen, and it cannot explain why our imagination functions in all sensory modalities at once. Merely seeing something, moreover, cannot account for the fact that the products of our imagination often exert a strong affective power over us. People, after all, live and die for figments of their imagination. Collective imagination is also impossible to explain by reference to pictures. Collective imagination is not just a matter of people imagining the same things but a matter of people imagining the same things together. And, perhaps most obviously, the imagination is nothing if not a creative force. The picture theory of the imagination can never explain where the new and unexpected come from. Pictures are static, after all, and they will not by themselves tell us what is coming up next.

Failing to understand how the imagination works, we fail to understand what collective entities are and how they come to be established. Thus, cultural theorists have insisted that communities are read into existence. The nation came to be once people read about it in books and newspapers. And there is indeed a correlation between the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century and the creation of a mass market in newsprint. Meanwhile, Western academics and aid agencies have been concerned about the lack of a viable nation in many newly independent countries. Here ethnic groups and “tribes” have continued to play an important role, and as a result people have lacked the requisite sense of loyalty to the nation. And without a viable nation, the Westerners have concluded, it is difficult to establish a viable state. The recommended solution is, consequently, that the new leaders should double down on their efforts at “nation-building.” That is, they should construct the kind of institutional structure that can command a broad sense of support. Thus cultural theories recommend “reading,” and academics and aid agencies recommend “building.” But reading is far too cerebral an activity, and it

relies too much on interpretations. In this way we can certainly conjure up various images, but even the most vivid descriptions will mean nothing to us unless they refer to more fundamental experiences. Unless we move, we will never be moved. This is also why the attempts at “nation-building” have failed. Nations are not buildings. Buildings belong to a certain place; they are where they are, and they never move.

To imagine, we suggested, is not a matter of conjuring up an image in our minds but rather a matter of conjuring up an experience. We imagine something as we recall how something made itself known to us. The experienced has a presence that explains the richness of the imagination, but also its emotive and creative force. Experiences always feel a certain way. And when we imagine things together with others, we move together. We do this as children when the toys with which we are playing ask us to move in a coordinate fashion, but we do this as adults too, playing with toys for adults. We march, side by side, arm in arm, with raised fists, and behind the same banners. The result is a shared experience, and the shared experience serves as the basis for a shared imagination. Moving we imagine, and to imagine is to move.

In this chapter we documented how collective entities were imagined – nations, but also social movements. As a result of the workout sessions at Hasenheide, young people in their most formative years experienced what a united Germany might be like, and they carried that memory with them for the rest of their lives. Carl Beck and Carl Follen, both active Turner, carried the memory with them all the way to America. However, what kind of a nation we imagine will vary from case to case. Jahn’s nation was a liberal, middle-class community made up of freely moving parts, and the exercises were carried out in a carefree and cheerful mood. The nationalism of Ling, Rothstein, and Spiess, by contrast, was a conservative doctrine, supported by, and supportive of, the state. Theirs was a hierarchical nation in which the traditional elites were in charge and the mood was disciplinarian. The *Freiübungen* involved no freedom, only discipline. And eventually this was the conception of the nation that came to prevail. Social movements, like the working class and the women’s movements, were marching too, sometimes in a restless, insistent, mood, but often in a carnivalesque spirit. It is a rare, exhilarating feeling, after all, to march through the center of a city together with thousands of strangers in support of the same cause. Now if not before it was obvious to everyone, not least to the participants themselves, that they constituted a movement.



# VI WILLING



To will is to wish, desire or intend for something to happen; to habitually do; to choose to do something; to be able to do; to have the capacity to do. Used as a grammatical device it expresses the future tense.

## To Will

The will, the dictionary tells us, is a kind of power. Something that is not the case will become the case once this power is exercised. It is not raining now, but a rain-making power will make it happen; the sun-rising power will make the sun appear; and so on. As far as the will of individuals is concerned, we talk about “willpower,” and willpower is often compared to a muscle. To will is to flex a mental muscle, which grows stronger through repeated use. This, in any case, is one of the metaphors employed in self-help books on “how to strengthen your willpower.” Here the will is understood as a self-creating force that allows us to impose ourselves on ourselves, as well as on other people and on our environment.<sup>1</sup>

The will is the subject of some of the most notorious puzzles in philosophy. “For that which I do I allow not,” St. Paul lamented in *Epistle to the Romans*. “For what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I.”<sup>2</sup> “Whence this monstrosity? and to what end?” St. Augustine asked in his *Confessions*, expanding on the same theme. “The mind commands the mind, its own self, to will, and yet it doth not.”<sup>3</sup> Strangely, there seem to be two wills within the same person, or perhaps multiple persons fighting it out over the control of our actions and our selves. In the Christian tradition, this conflict has usually been understood as a battle between bodies and minds. The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak. Temptations arise in the body and in its unruly needs, but by exercising the power of our minds we will eventually come to prevail. By the force of our will we can impose ourselves on ourselves, as it were, and settle the conflict in favor of our best interests and our highest ideals. By means of a decisive *fiat* – “let it be done” – we will sin no more.<sup>4</sup>

A related, and equally notorious, puzzle concerns the question of free will. In order for the mind to conquer the body, we must have the freedom to act otherwise. If everything we do is determined beforehand, or if our actions are caused by something or someone else, we are deprived of our sense of agency. And a loss of agency will quickly

undermine our notions of who we are. Our ability to make choices and act on them, our sense of purpose in life, are intimately connected to our ability to will things to happen. Without a free will we are reduced to robots and automata. Besides, a free will is required in order to assign legal and moral responsibility for actions. If we could not have done otherwise, we cannot be held accountable, and we cannot be judged. Without freedom of will, our legal system collapses. Facing such existential threats, a simple experiment is enormously reassuring: It is obvious that free will exists since I, at will, can decide to raise, or not to raise, my right arm. If I will it, it will happen; if I do not will it, it will not happen. I am the origin of the action and responsible for my arm going up. And what is true for raised arms is true for everything else that we do.

Despite considerations such as these, cognitive scientists and contemporary philosophers are both reluctant to refer to “the will” or to “willpower,” and they are certainly not going to talk about “muscles” that we can “flex.” The will is not a thing, not any kind of an entity, they will explain, and willpower is not a distinct physiological process. Instead, cognitive scientists may talk about synapses in the brain that fire in certain patterns, and contemporary philosophers may refer to “a sense of volition” or some similar circumlocution. The fact that we talk about the will, and that we have experiences of exercising it, proves nothing. Or rather, it is not that we are mistaken regarding our experiences of willing, but rather that we are mistaken if we think that these experiences themselves have no causes. In nature – and human beings are a part of nature – everything is caused by something else, and that includes our sense of agency. The will is not a first cause or an unmoved mover, and what appears to us as an exercise of the will is always preceded by other, more basic, neurological processes. If this were not the case, there would be a mysterious, otherworldly entity located somewhere inside our heads, and as science explains, there can be no such entities.<sup>5</sup>

These conclusions are troubling, to be sure, and they raise all kinds of far-reaching philosophical and legal questions, but they do not necessarily contradict our phenomenological experiences. If we pay closer attention to the way a day in our lives unfolds, we will notice that we make surprisingly few explicit decisions. We are not actually exercising our will all that often. Rather, most of what we do is ruled by habit. We do what we do since this is what we always tend to do in

situations such as these. Curiously, habits are at the same time both consciously carried out and automatic. Take the habits on which an experienced knitter relies. Knitting is not a fully conscious activity since we can do it while watching TV or when engaged in a conversation, but neither is it a fully automatic activity since we never would say that our hands are knitting by themselves. There seems to be a continuum between deliberation and instinct, in other words, and our habitual behavior can be placed somewhere in the middle of this continuum. Between consciousness and automaticity there is a feel for what we are doing, and this feel is in our fingers – as a *Fingerspitzgefühl*, a “tip of the finger feeling” – more than in our minds. Our conscious minds are kept in the loop, as it were, and occasionally informed of what is going on, but they are not responsible or are responsible only in part.<sup>6</sup>

But we can also program ourselves to behave in a certain fashion. In fact, much of the behavior we now carry out habitually was once explicitly deliberated on, chosen by us, and consciously carried out. Something became a habit only through repetition, and because we explicitly intended it that way. During endless hours of practice, we learned how to play the violin, but now our fingers are moving as if by themselves. Thanks to such pre-programming, that which we call the will has been lodged in the body, and we can act in accordance with it even when not explicitly exercising it. A certain behavior has become “second nature,” we say. Often, of course, our habits are not actually chosen by us, but rather pre-programmed for us – by the time-honored traditions of our society, by drill sergeants, schoolteachers, or advertising agencies. William James talked about habits as the “fly-wheel of society,” a “conservative agent,” that keeps us in our places even in times of dramatic social change.<sup>7</sup>

This is not to say that we never make plans or that we do not try our best to carry them out. We certainly do. But the problem is that actions always take place in a certain time and place. Attuning ourselves to the mood of the situations in which we find ourselves, we do what feels like the right thing to do under the circumstances as they come to appear to us. We are not acting automatically and unthinkingly; rather, we simply respond to what the situation seems to require. We are not like a captain who determines where a ship should go, and then steers it toward that destination. Instead, we are like a jazz musician whose next note is determined by all the notes we already have played and by the notes that everyone else is playing. Our intention is in the movement,

not outside it. This is an intuitive process – we are feeling our way through – and when something feels right we simply act. In many cases it is as though we heard a voice calling out to us, and our actions are undertaken as a response to this call. This is how a path in the forest invites us to walk on it; how a newly made bed asks us to lie down on it; and how a place of religious worship insists that we should assume a reverential posture.<sup>8</sup>

This explains the curious fact, first noted by St. Paul and St. Augustine, that merely having a reason to do something is not a sufficient cause for an action to occur. Moreover, having a reason does not necessarily mean that we do what we do for that reason. What intervenes between the ostensible cause and its potential effect is the fact of our situatedness. Before we can come to act in terms of the reasons we have, the reasons must be activated, as it were. We must come to think of them when it matters; they must feel like the appropriate thing to do. Or, slightly differently put, reasons and actions are entities of entirely different ontological kinds. Reasons are things that exist in our minds; they are fictions, but actions take place in the world. Willpower, from this point of view, is a matter not of flexing a muscle but of finding a way to adjust our plan so that it fits with the situation as it is given to us. Alternatively, it is a way of changing the situation so that it fits with the plan. It is not that there are two wills within the same person, or multiple persons fighting it out between themselves, but rather that we are situated in the world in different ways at different moments in time. As a result, a certain plan can suddenly seem perfectly irrelevant, and we ignore it, or we simply never remember what it was that we wanted to do.<sup>9</sup>

This highlights the fussy boundary of that which we are accustomed to calling our “selves.” We might indeed accept that our explicit plans and conscious actions have neurological precedents of which we are not aware, but we are at the same time reluctant to include those in our notion of self. We are not our brains, we will explain, and we are not our bodies. Rather, the self is limited to processes of which we are conscious and to processes we explicitly can control. The will, from this point of view, is the means by which our selves are determined. To become a certain someone, it is not enough to make up something in our minds after all; we cannot become whoever we wish to be. But by successfully exercising our will, we can make a certain someone come into being. By means of our actions we can give a definite content to ourselves. The will is a means of self-determination.<sup>10</sup>

And yet no act of self-determination, no matter how forcefully carried out, will make the self less fussy. The line we like to draw between unconscious and conscious processes is vague at best, and so is the line between bodies and minds. In fact, given that bodies always engage with the situations in which they find themselves, it is even difficult to make a sharp distinction between our selves and our environment. Somehow or another that which we call the “self” is a result of all of these processes, activities, and engagements. This is where the self appears – in minds, in bodies, and in situations. Quite obviously, the self thus understood is not a something or a someone over which we have much control. Self-determination is an illusion – a necessary illusion perhaps, but an illusion nonetheless.

### *Petrushka*

*Petrushka*, which premiered on June 13, 1911, was the first ballet that Sergei Diaghilev and his illustrious ballet company, the Ballets Russes, performed in Paris. It was an all-Russian production, with music by Igor Stravinsky, a libretto by Alexandre Benois, choreography by Michel Fokine, and with none other than Vaslav Nijinsky dancing in the title role. The ballet tells the story of three puppets – Petrushka, the Ballerina, and the Moor – who are brought to life by a puppet-master, known as the Charlatan, during a Shrovetide fair in St. Petersburg in 1830. Petrushka is the Russian version of Punch, of “Punch and Judy” fame. Petrushka is a subversive prankster who teaches moral lessons by means of slapstick, argues with the devil, and is chased by policemen and dogs. But in Paris in 1911 he was out of luck. In the eponymously named ballet he falls in love with the Ballerina, but she rejects him and flirts instead, rather shamelessly, with the Moor. When Petrushka challenges him to a fight, the Moor kills him with his scimitar. The people who attended the fair were naturally quite disturbed by this turn of events, and as the person responsible for the performance, the Charlatan was questioned by the police. Yet he reassured them all by pointing out that Petrushka is nothing but a doll after all, and that consequently no crime has been committed. In the last scene, Petrushka’s ghost rises momentarily from his body; he shakes a fist at the Charlatan before once again dying.<sup>11</sup>

Petrushka was not the only ballet that premiered in the decades around the turn of the twentieth century to contain inanimate

characters. The plot in a number of other ballets featured puppets, statues, and toys that suddenly came to life. This fascination with dancing toys paralleled advances in the natural sciences. If life can be conclusively explained in scientific terms, philosophers would ask, what happens to everything we regard as uniquely human? What, for example, happens to the notion of free will? The most radical answer to this question was given by Thomas Henry Huxley – popularly known as “Darwin’s bulldog” – a British biologist and fervent advocate of Darwin’s theory of evolution. “All states of consciousness,” Huxley pointed out with some considerable glee, “are immediately caused by molecular changes in the brain-substance.” What we call “volition” is consequently not the cause of our actions, but is instead only “a symbol of that state of the brain which is the immediate cause of that act.” Human beings are “conscious automata,” and thereby “parts of the great series of causes and effects which, in unbroken continuity, composes that which is, and has been, and shall be – the sum of existence.”<sup>12</sup>

That the authorities of the Anglican Church were unhappy with these conclusions is easy to understand, but some philosophers were unhappy too. You did not have to believe in an eternal, God-given, soul in order to conclude that Huxley’s position was detrimental to human values, even detrimental to our conception of human life. Henri Bergson was one such unhappy philosopher. As he insisted in his *L’évolution créatrice* (Creative Evolution, 1907), evolution is nothing like the deterministic process that Darwin and his many disciples had described. Instead, evolution is a spiritual process that unfolds according to a creative logic; evolution has an inner dynamic force that always manages to overcome the inertia of mere matter. Bergson called it *élan vitale*, the “life force,” which he connected to human consciousness and to the will to life. It is our will that proves science wrong, he insisted. This argument was eagerly seized on by the reading public, and Bergson became the most fêted philosopher of the age, causing the first-ever traffic jam on Broadway when he gave a lecture in New York in January 1913. The French philosopher, it seemed, had found a way of defining that elusive *je ne sais quoi* that characterizes human existence.<sup>13</sup>

The ballet would seem to be an unlikely medium for exploring topics such as these, but at the turn of the twentieth century they easily suggested themselves to both librettists and choreographers. After all, the foremost sign of life is movement, and ballet is about little else. And

yet, as the ballets eloquently explained, since there are many different ways to move, movement itself is not enough to constitute life. In *Petrushka* the characters started out as mannequins, and mannequins move only because someone else moves them, and then they were transformed into automata, which are machines that move by themselves. But this is still not good enough since automata move in an unmistakably robotic fashion. The question the Russian team of creators behind *Petrushka* asked is what it would take for these automata to become truly human. But it is also possible to turn the question around, and ask in what sense human beings are not automata. This is a question that was asked with a particular sense of urgency in the decades around the turn of the twentieth century. As many contemporary observers complained, life in modern society has limited our freedom of movement. City life has trapped us in routines; our days are ruled by clocks; we are all hooked up to machines that determine what we can and cannot do. People in modern society, many feared, are becoming more and more like robots.<sup>14</sup>

In response to this perceived predicament, everybody suddenly started talking about the will and about willpower. Doctors discovered more and more patients who suffered from “neurasthenia,” a depletion of the will, and in pathological cases, the will seemed to be entirely absent. Self-help books were sold offering various remedies; newspapers wrote about exercise regimes and special diets; and educated members of the public, and the not-so-educated too, quoted Nietzsche on “the will to power.” This was the public mood in which various political solutions came to be suggested, and it is these we will discuss in this chapter. Colonial expansion and war were proposed as ways in which individuals could learn to exercise their individual will, and ways for states to exercise their collective will. American presidents and an increasing number of leaders of national independence movements made demands for “national self-determination.” In order to assert our humanity, they all insisted, we have to start to move in a more assertive, independent fashion. The consequences of this rhetoric determined the course of the twentieth century.

## **An Affliction of the Nerves**

Although ingenious automata were constructed already in early modern Europe, it was the Industrial Revolution that made the machine



into both an economic and a social force. It was when machines were placed in factories, and human beings connected to them, that modern society – “the Machine Age” – began. “Nothing is now done directly, or by hand, all is by rule and calculated contrivance,” Thomas Carlyle, the British historian, noted already in 1822. “On every hand, the living artisan is driven from his workshop, to make room for a speedier, inanimate one. The shuttle drops from the fingers of the weaver, and falls into iron fingers that ply it faster.”<sup>15</sup> And it was in factories, in front of machines, that the denizens of modern society spent most of their lives. The challenge of factory production, explained Andrew Ure, a Scottish physician and early business theorist, in *The Philosophy of Manufactures* (1835), consists not in designing the machines but rather in “the distribution of the different members of the apparatus into one co-operative body,” and “[in identifying] themselves with the unvarying regularity of the complex automaton.”<sup>16</sup> The workers have no choice but to service the machines, and “on the automatic plan, skilled labour gets progressively superseded, and will, eventually, be replaced by mere overlookers of machines.”<sup>17</sup> Such deskilling of the workforce was a constant complaint among left-wing and right-wing critics alike. The organized labor of the factory, as R. Austin Freeman put it in *Social Decay and Regeneration* (1921), “is virtually a single mechanism of which all the parts move in unison. The starting of the engine sets the whole in motion; and as the machines begin to move, so must their human attachments.”<sup>18</sup>

A first requirement was that factory workers pay attention to the tasks before them. The machines had to be served; they constantly demanded inputs of one kind or another, or the production process would grind to a halt. If nothing else, workers who failed to pay attention could easily get hurt by moving pistons and churning wheels. But it was not only machines that had to be attended to. In a modern, bustling, city, you had to pay attention just crossing the street, and you had to pay attention to many more things besides – to rules and regulations, to clocks, and to the latest news, to orders from bosses, and instructions from teachers, policemen, and government officials. And you had to pay attention to yourself – to your actions, your looks, and how you came across when interacting with others. It is only by paying attention to yourself, the burgeoning advertising industry explained, that you can develop a unique personality. “Be prepared!” Robert Baden-Powell instructed his young followers in *Scouting for*

*Boys* (1908), but he might as well have provided instructions to everyone else. To be prepared, Baden-Powell explained, means “having disciplined yourself to be obedient to every order, and also by having thought out beforehand any accident or situation that might occur, so that you know the right thing to do at the right moment, and are willing to do it.”<sup>19</sup>

No one paid closer attention to the movements of factory workers than Frederick Winslow Taylor. A mechanical engineer and inventor from Philadelphia, Taylor began studying the succession of movements that workers go through in the course of tending their machines. By dividing these actions into their smallest constituent parts, he sought to identify the “effective movement” – the movement undertaken in the quickest time and with the least effort. As he explained in *Principles of Scientific Management* (1911), the aim of such time-motion studies was to save energy and time and to make the production process as a whole more efficient. By moving in a more rational fashion, workers could raise their wages and employers could raise their profits. Or, as union representatives complained, workers ended up working much harder for the same pay. In 1913, “Taylorism,” as his collection of principles came to be known, was put into practice at the new car factory that Henry Ford opened in Highland Park, Michigan. Here labor was divided, rationalized, but also integrated into a process controlled by the managers. The workers, much like Charlie Chaplin’s Little Tramp in *Modern Times* (1936), became integral parts of the machines. The machines did not feed them and wipe their mouths, to be sure, but they might as well have.<sup>20</sup>

It is tiring to constantly stand to attention. It is impossible to relax if something new and unexpected always is coming up, and it is degrading to constantly be at the beck and call of a machine. Life in the city was certainly exciting – the speed, the lights, the thronging crowds – but it was also profoundly alienating. Life in modern society, many complained, was not easy on “the nerves.” The nerves were frazzled, shattered, and in some cases they simply snapped. This predicament came to be known as a “nervous breakdown,” a term first introduced in 1901, which, although never employed by the medical profession, would continue to be invoked by folk psychology throughout the twentieth century. Yet, strictly speaking, “breakdown” is a misnomer. It is machines that break down, not humans, and when they do machines can be repaired. Human beings, by contrast, suffer, and we

feel better only as we come to heal. Afflictions of the nerves were proof positive that the new conditions were inhuman and that the sufferers were more than machines. Mental illness is mark of the human.<sup>21</sup>

Indeed, it was only in the decades around the turn of the twentieth century that a majority of today's mental illnesses first came to be diagnosed, and it was a German psychologist, Emil Kraepelin, who came up with the first comprehensive list. An obvious question to ask is why no similar catalog had been compiled earlier. One reason could be that it only was now, at the end of the nineteenth century, that psychology emerged as an independent discipline with practices and practitioners of its own. Thus Kraepelin's list would be the proud achievement of this process of professionalization. An alternative explanation is that the descriptions were new since the illnesses themselves were new. Afflictions such as manic depression, first diagnosed in 1854; hysteria, diagnosed in 1859; multiple personality disorder, 1889; and schizophrenia, 1908, were brought on by people's inability to cope with the conditions of modern life. And it is indeed striking that many of the entries in Kraepelin's nosology referred to bodily postures and movements. Consider catatonia. First described in 1874, the most prominent feature of catatonic states is a rigid immobility and a fixed stare. The patient would sit in the same, often highly contrived position for hours, and then suddenly explode in spasms of aggressive acts and repetitive words of abuse.<sup>22</sup>

Yet the most common illness was a condition that doctors diagnosed as "neurasthenia." George Miller Beard, a New York neurologist, was the first to name the new condition, and in *American Nervousness* (1869), he provided a long list of symptoms. Neurasthenics, Beard explained, are among other things suffering from insomnia, dilated pupils, heaviness in the head, tenderness of the teeth and gums, fear of society, fear of being alone, fear of fears, localized peripheral numbness, difficulty swallowing, dryness of the hair, tremulous and variable pulse, and ticklishness. But he also admitted that no exhaustive list of symptoms can be drawn up since all cases are different. Neurasthenia, in other words, casts a very wide net, and this, no doubt, is why the affliction was so common. In the decades around the turn of the twentieth century, the illness spread quickly across Europe and North America. Indeed, since it at first affected mainly city-dwellers and members of the free professions, neurasthenia soon became something of a fad. It was the illness that everyone who was anyone just had

to have. And the list of patients reads like a Who's Who of the cultural and political elite of the day – including William James, Theodore Roosevelt, Marcel Proust, Max Weber, Henri Bergson, Virginia Woolf, Oscar Wilde, Charles Darwin, Thomas Mann, and many others.<sup>23</sup>

What the items on Beard's bewildering list of symptoms had in common was the fact that they all were signs of a depletion of nervous energy. And nervous energy was understood as a resource that, much like money, could be spent, saved, and invested. "Dissipation" was the term for nervous energy spent unwisely, and dissipation was what eventually led to neurasthenia. Members of the middle classes were particularly vulnerable in this respect. Since they worked with their brains rather than with their bodies, they became too cerebral, too sensitive, and since they often lived in cities, they were exposed to the ever-present temptations of modern life. As a doctor in Philadelphia, Silas Weir Mitchell, explained in best-selling books such as *Fat and Blood* and *How to Make Them* (1877) and *Wear and Tear, or Hints for the Overworked* (1897), people in modern society worked much too hard. There were too many late nights and too many early mornings; too much mental strain and not enough physical activity. Moreover, men indulged themselves too much – in gambling, financial speculations, alcohol abuse, or excessive sexual activities, including, most deleteriously, masturbation.<sup>24</sup>

The treatments prescribed followed from this etiology. There were two main ways to get well, popularized as the "rest cure" and the "West cure." The rest cure was all about convincing the patients to conserve nervous energy. The best way for women to do this, Mitchell advised, was to focus on housework or on repetitive tasks such as needlepoint or knitting. In particularly severe cases of neurasthenia, women were advised to take to bed and to abstain from physical activities of all kinds. Male patients, for their part, had to find ways of becoming more manly. "The surest remedy for the ills of civilized life is to be found in some form of return to barbarism... Civilization has hurt – barbarism shall heal."<sup>25</sup> One way to do this was to return to nature. Nature, after all, is far easier to influence than an urban or a social environment, and even a weak-willed man, who never would dare to stand up to his boss, can learn how to cut down a tree or kill a deer. This was why neurasthenics in Europe often would spend their weekends on nature hikes, and why the sufferers in the United States were

encouraged to explore the new national parks that were opening up. “Thousands of tired, nerve-shaken, over-civilized people,” wrote John Muir, an enthusiastic promoter of the land out west, only recently brought under federal jurisdiction, “are beginning to find out that going to the mountains is going home; that wildness is a necessity; and that mountain parks and reservations are useful not only as fountains of timber and irrigating rivers, but as fountains of life.”<sup>26</sup>

## A Question of Willpower

In the decades prior to World War I, this predicament came to be understood as a problem of the will. People in modern society suffered from *abulia*, defined as a “loss, lack or impairment of the power to will or to execute what is in mind.”<sup>27</sup> It was the will that was weak in neurasthenic patients, and this is what rendered them listless, passive, and confused. It is not that the muscular system is paralyzed, Théodule Ribot explained in his *Les maladies de la volonté* (The Diseases of the Will, 1883) or that there is a lack of a desire to realize a certain end; rather, it is the transition from motive to execution that proves to be so exceptionally difficult. And he went on to tell the story of an abulic patient who spent two hours getting undressed and who kept a servant waiting half an hour before he succeeded in taking a glass of water from a tray. The will, differently put, is another mark of the human. While puppets and automata do only what their makers make them do, human beings are free to will, or not to will, something to happen. Thus, whenever we are treated like machines, our humanity is denied us. Life in modern society, from this point of view, is not only exhausting, constraining, and stultifying, but dehumanizing too. Learning how to exercise one’s will is to learn how to affirm one’s humanity.<sup>28</sup>

Before the will could be exercised, however, it had to be found. Some contemporary scientists doubted whether this could be done. From a purely scientific point of view, the Harvard psychologist Hugo Münsterberg explained, there is no need to assume the existence of a will since human actions satisfactorily can be explained in terms of innate instincts and reflexes. Some psychologists, however, found such conclusions problematic. Ribot, for one, agreed that actions originate in instincts and reflexes, but this, he argued, still leaves a role for the will in determining which instincts and reflexes end up being translated into

action. The body proposes, as it were, but the will disposes, and our biological urges can be channeled, directed, or stopped by means of our conscious interventions. Meanwhile, William James found it impossible to get out of bed. It was a cold winter morning, he explained; he knew he had to get up, but he was simply too cozy between the sheets. The “resolution faints away and postpones itself again and again just as it seemed on the verge of bursting the resistance and passing over into the decisive act.”<sup>29</sup> And then, and much to his own surprise, he finds that he is up, and that the day has begun. “A fortunate lapse of consciousness” occurs, an idea flashes across his mind, and getting up suddenly is what the situation calls for. “This case seems to me,” James concludes, “to contain in miniature form the data for an entire psychology of volition.”<sup>30</sup>

While psychologists debated what the will was, and how exactly a mental state could be translated into a physical action, the authors of self-help books were busy dispensing more hands-on advice. What is required, they explained, is better self-control. Instead of letting machines or science take charge of us, we must learn to take charge of ourselves. Or, to be more precise, we must learn to discipline ourselves. This could, for example, be done through physical exercises and regimens of all kinds. Compare the turn-of-the-twentieth-century boom in calisthenics, nudism, and yoga, or the interest in vegetarianism and specialized diets such as the “kumiss cure,” the drinking of fermented mare’s milk. But self-control was above all a matter of mind control. “By learning to handle our will, we shall learn to govern our method of reaction,” Paul Émile Lévy explained in *L’éducation rationnelle de la volonté* (The Rational Education of the Will, 1898). In this way we can “keep painful emotions or sensations far from our consciousness, and, on the contrary to extract from pleasant emotions, or sensations, all the joy that they can give us.”<sup>31</sup> It is a question of self-hypnosis, as Émile Coué put it in *La maîtrise de soi-même par l’autosuggestion consciente* (Self-Mastery through Conscious Autosuggestion, 1922). “If you persuade yourself that you can do a certain thing, provided this thing be possible, you will do it however difficult it may be.”<sup>32</sup> The irony is of course that people in modern society needed the help of outsiders in order to help themselves. The self-help books, in the end, defined another set of goals that everyone was required to achieve, and which, if you failed to achieve them, constituted another example of inattention.<sup>33</sup>

Philosophers were helping out too. At the time, the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer was a name on everyone's reading list. Although he published his *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (The World as Will and as Representation) already in 1818, it was only in the 1880s that he came to be widely read. The world, Schopenhauer had suggested, appears to us as a representation, but it is only by means of the will that that representation can come to life. The will has something of a subterranean presence. The will is a life force – a *Wille zum Leben*, “will to live” – that shows up in our drive for self-preservation, but also in our ever-present urge to procreate. We are all put on this earth because our parents had sex, and sex is also what we ourselves constantly are thinking about – and those who claim that they do not, usually think about it all the more.<sup>34</sup>

This was an argument that in turn influenced Sigmund Freud. Life, Freud reiterated, is mainly about finding food and having sex. We see this in all animals, including in the members of the human species. Yet human beings are not only animals but also products of civilization, and civilization requires us to repress primordial urges such as these. Sex is too disruptive a force to be admitted into public life, and sure enough we do not see much of it on the surface of society. Civilization, Freud concluded, is a result of such repression. Modern societies are the most civilized, and for that reason the most repressive. But since repression is deleterious to our mental health, people in modern societies often suffer from mental illnesses.<sup>35</sup>

In Nietzsche's philosophy, these primordial, procreational urges were associated with Dionysus, the Greek god of wine and ecstasy, while civilization and repression were associated with Apollo, the god of reason and order. The problem of modern society is that we have forgotten about Dionysus and have allowed Apollo to rule our lives. This Apollonian logic is the logic of the factory, and Nietzsche bemoaned the fate of the “factory slaves” who work there. They are all accomplices in the madness that tells us to produce as much as possible, and become as rich as possible. But what is life, if we cannot breathe freely and have no command over our own selves? “Fie, that there should be a regular price at which a man should cease to be a personality and become a screw instead.”<sup>36</sup> Nietzsche's solution was to call on the will to assist us. While the *Wille zum Leben*, according to Schopenhauer and Freud, is a subconscious force, *der Wille zur Macht*, “the Will to Power,” as Nietzsche described it, could be both directed

and controlled by human beings. This, at least, was what an elite of human beings were in a position to do. By taking charge of themselves, these *Übermenschen* would set new standards for themselves and live according to their own moral codes. At its most unrestrained, the will could create just the kinds of authentic selves that modern society had denied us. The super-humans could will themselves into existence.<sup>37</sup>

Following Nietzsche, a whole generation of Europeans came to think differently about the will. While he had been little read before his mental breakdown in 1889, a virtual Nietzsche cult developed in subsequent decades, and it was his doctrine of the will, more than anything, that everyone quoted and misquoted. While the will described by Schopenhauer and Freud had been a disruptive force, at odds with middle-class morality, Nietzsche's will was creative and life-affirming. By means of the will we can stand up for ourselves in the face of the demands of modern society. Instead of paying attention to the world, we would force the world to pay attention to us. Instead of standing up straight, we should dance with joy and abandon. "Lift up your hearts, ye good dancers, high! higher! And do not forget the good laughter!"<sup>38</sup>

## Colonial Adventures

The colonies was one location where the will was going to be asserted. Going off to the colonies, Europeans imagined themselves traveling back in time to a more pristine, more primitive stage of human history, untouched by modern life. In the colonies there were no machines, no repetitive movements, no fixed routines; instead, you could mold your life into your own preferred shape. You were free to exercise your will, to assert yourself, and the opportunities were endless. This, indeed, was the solution Nietzsche advocated for the factory slaves of Europe. "They should bring about an age of great swarming forth from the European beehive such as has never yet been seen," as he put it, "protesting by this voluntary and huge migration against machines and capital."<sup>39</sup> And everywhere they went, even quite ordinary Europeans soon discovered, the colonies allowed them to live like kings, in big houses with servants, and with natives paying deference to them. The fact that the natives had societies of their own, with their own ways of life, mattered little to a settler armed with a mandate to civilize and a Gatling gun.

The colonies provided an opportunity for countries to assert themselves too. Prior to the Franco-German War of 1871, colonialism,



to the French, had largely been a matter of migration to Algeria. Other colonial projects, such as the ones in North America and India, attracted little attention and no public enthusiasm. It was only in the 1880s – with the occupation of Tunisia (1881) and Tonkin (1885) – that colonies were actively pursued. It is an economic imperative, explained Jules Ferry, the liberal prime minister: An overseas empire provides us with a guaranteed market for our exports. Besides, in the wake of the humiliating defeat to Germany in the war of 1870–71, a growing empire was a way for the French to prove to themselves, and to the world, that they still were able to impose themselves on others. For Germany too colonies became an economic imperative and sign of national self-affirmation, although the Germans came late to the colonial carve-up and had to be satisfied with smaller and more marginal lands. Much the same was true for the colonies the Italians could lay their hands on. Intimidated by this sudden expansion by its European rivals, the British sought to consolidate their already extensive empire. The result was a scramble for colonies, above all in Africa. The colonies were trophies proudly displayed by colonial masters as proof of their political prowess.<sup>40</sup>

In the minds of ordinary Europeans, the non-European locations were more than anything the settings for various exotic adventures. For one thing, they offered plenty of wild game. As books on “sport” and for “sportsmen” explained, you can hunt elephants and buffaloes in Ceylon; markhors, ibexes, and red bears in Kashmir; anything from giraffes to lions in South Africa; and in New Zealand you can not only kill deer and boar, but also go fly fishing for trout. Hunting in China, Oliver Ready explained in *Life and Sport in China* (1904), is nothing like hunting at home. In China, there are no rules, no restrictions, and plenty of wild animals to aim at. You can look at all of China and say: “Here is my ground, there I can take my gun and my dogs and go just wherever, and do whatever, I please, without let or hindrance; about what I will, stay as long as I like without asking anyone’s leave, and where keepers and game licenses are unknown.”<sup>41</sup> No better place to impose yourself on Mother Nature, in other words. Returning home in triumph, their willpower restored, the sportsmen handed over the heads of the kings of the jungle, the steppe, and the tundra to the taxidermist.

The colonies were also where a number of exciting competitions took place. The rules were simple enough: to make sure that you were

the first person to get to a certain exotic location – to be the first European to reach the North or South Pole, to find the sources of the Nile or the Northwest Passage, to climb a certain mountain, or to reach mysterious cities like Mecca or Lhasa. The invention of new, quickly moving machines made these quests particularly attention-grabbing. Who would be the first to cross the Atlantic Ocean by airplane? To fly across the Sahara or all the way to South America? And who would do it at a record-breaking speed? The intrepid men, and a few intrepid women, who undertook these feats were referred to as “explorers” and “adventurers,” but they were also invariably known as “heroes.” Heroes had willpower aplenty; they were daring and dashing, and they unhesitatingly went where others feared to tread. Their fellow Europeans would read about their exploits in the newspapers, cheering them on, and they would show up to welcome them home once their expeditions were concluded. In this way, a life to which next to no one had access was easy to experience vicariously.<sup>42</sup>

Vicarious experiences were on offer in books too, such as in stories about cowboys and Indians. Owen Wister’s *The Virginian: A Horseman of the Plains* (1903) is generally considered as the first example of the new genre. Wister was a neurasthenic who had cured himself from his ailments through strenuous activities in the outback, and in *The Virginian* he provided a description of life in what came to be known as the “Wild West.” The book introduced all the themes that later became staples of the genre: the rugged, taciturn, tender of bovine herds; the saloon bar with its sultry matron, hard-drinking customers, and poker games; the bank robbers and the posse of anxious civilians who set off to round them up. The genre was wildly popular in Europe too. In Germany, Karl May, an author of adventure stories for adolescents, had great success with his character Winnetou, the wise chief of the Apaches, and Old Shatterhand, Winnetou’s European blood brother. May’s books sold some 200 million copies worldwide and taught all European children how to play “cowboys and Indians.”<sup>43</sup>

In addition, Karl May wrote stories set in the colonies and in the lands of the Ottoman Empire, in particular. For these exploits Old Shatterhand was renamed “Kara ben Nemsî” and given a trusty Arab sidekick. G. A. Henty wrote similar tales of colonial derring-do, as did H. Rider Haggard, Rudyard Kipling, Robert Louis Stevenson, and Jack London. In France, Jules Verne provided his many readers with the same combination of European bravery and exotic stereotypes, to

which Pierre Loti, in a large number of books, added the frisson of sexual license. In general, however, sex was taboo since many of the books were intended for a younger readership. Several autobiographical accounts testify to the profound impact of these stories. Future missionaries, such as David Livingstone and Albert Schweitzer, read them; scientists such as Albert Einstein read them; the soldiers of World War I read them too; as did the perpetrators of genocides. As a child, Adolf Hitler liked to dress up as various Karl May characters, and later, during his first year as chancellor, he reread all of May's novels. He recommended the books to his generals, and he had special editions distributed to soldiers at the front.<sup>44</sup>

In the colonies, everyone agreed, the Europeans were going to do great things. They were going to fell trees, master tempestuous rivers, plant new crops, build roads, and lay down railroad tracks. We left France to become kings, a French colonial administrator recalled, "[a]nd not do-nothing kings either, but artists at our job, enlightened despots organizing our kingdoms according to maturely reflected plans."<sup>45</sup> The choice of a career in the colonies, wrote another French official, was shaped by a wish to change the world. "To assume real responsibilities, to dispose of real powers of tutelage and protection. In sum to be a chief." "Africa is one of the last places where our best sentiments still can be affirmed," Ernest Psichari, a young French writer, explained before he left for the Congo. Here we still have "a hope of finding a field for our extended activities."<sup>46</sup> As Paul Rohrbach, a German colonial administrator and writer on world politics, noted in 1915, it was "the love of enterprise and the desire of shaping his life along broader and freer lines than is possible at home" that made the Germans leave for Africa.<sup>47</sup> "Not only our men, but also our women in Africa notice with satisfaction the absence of that restraint which at home is due to the demands of social sets and habits. . . . There is inspiration even for people who at home would have withered, in the thought that they are the sole arbiters of their own actions and their choice of associates." Rohrbach explicitly advocated that the indigenous population of Africa be replaced by Europeans, if need be by genocidal means.<sup>48</sup>

The European avant-garde responded to the same opportunities. In the colonies there were no bourgeois philistines, they soon discovered, and no stultifying moral authorities. After writing his last poem at the age of twenty-one, Arthur Rimbaud went to Africa in

1880 and settled in Harar, Abyssinia, where he sold coffee and firearms. Paul Gauguin went to Tahiti twice in the 1890s, and lived in the Marquesas Islands until his death in 1903. In each location he displayed a preference for fourteen-year-old girls whom he proceeded to make pregnant. André Gide went to North Africa in October 1893, and it was here that he discovered his attraction to young boys. The Algerian city of Biskra, on the edge of the desert, turned out to have not only Muslim holy men, but also plenty of brothels where all forms of love dared to speak its name. It did not take long before Oscar Wilde too came to visit. Wilde smoked hashish and found the local boys “quite lovely.” And once Gide and Wilde had reported on their exploits to their audiences back home, a posse of avant-garde artists made the same North African pilgrimage – Henri Matisse, Paul Klee, and Béla Bartók, among others. Clare Sheridan, a sculptor, Communist sympathizer, and cousin of Winston Churchill, held a literary salon in Biskra well into the 1920s.<sup>49</sup>

### **Toy Soldiers Going to War**

War is another great adventure on which you can embark. Wars too allow you to go to distant places, encounter foreigners, and impose your will on them. For anyone suffering from maladies of the will, war is a cure. When Henri Massis and Alfred de Tarde, two conservative writers, surveyed the attitudes of young people in Paris in 1913, they found them to be waiting for something. “Students in our best high schools insist that they find war to be an aesthetic idea of energy and power”; they believe “France needs heroism in order to live.”<sup>50</sup> War for them, Massis and Tarde noted with considerable satisfaction, contains all the beauty of which their everyday life has deprived them; they want energy, mastery, and an opportunity to sacrifice themselves for a higher cause. “Better a war than this perpetual wait.” Three years previously, William James in Boston had made much the same point. “Pacifist though I am,” he prefaced his remarks, before insisting that life is contemptible unless it is characterized by the kind of “hardihood” that militarism instills.<sup>51</sup> “There is a type of military character which every one feels that the race should never cease to breed, for every one is sensitive to its superiority.”<sup>52</sup>

And yet in a war, it is never actually your own will that is being asserted. The military expects submission and discipline after all, and

life in the army is from this point of view not all that different from life in a factory. The last thing the army wants is a person who thinks for themselves. Not surprisingly, armies are often referred to as “machines” of which soldiers are the integral parts. Why being a part of the factory machine is reprehensible, while being a part of the army machine is glorious, is not immediately obvious. But surely the difference has to do with the purposes served by the respective machines, and how easily the purposes can be explained and embraced. While factories were run by employers who had only their own interests in mind, the army was supposedly serving the nation, and everyone was invited to make its purposes their own. A melding of wills was supposed to take place. It was not that you gave up on exercising your will, but rather that your will was transformed into the will of the nation and that the will of the nation was transformed into your will. What was referred to as “exploitation” in the factory became “self-sacrifice” in the army, and self-sacrifice of this kind was always described as a supreme exercise of the will. By subjecting themselves to the discipline of the military, young men would learn how to discipline themselves. In order to facilitate such melding of wills, props of various kinds played a crucial role. Props, we said, facilitate collective acts of the imagination. Props can help us imagine a nation. But props also allow us to exercise the will of the collective entity that we have conjured up in this way. Consider toy soldiers. A toy soldier always submits to the command of the person who plays with them and serves as our avatar in imaginary games of heroic action. In a game we are both persons at once – both the individual toy soldier and the person playing with them. Going to war, we are invited to engage in the same kind of exercise, seeing our actions from both points of view at once. We are the soldiers engaging the enemy, but also the generals directing the troops.

In the decade before the outbreak of World War I, toy soldiers were the please-mummy-please presents that all children hoped for. In Germany, three-dimensional, solid, cast soldiers were produced and sold to an all-European market. In 1893, William Britain, a small company in North London, started making the first hollow soldiers, using a technique similar to that used when making wax heads for dolls. Britain’s dolls were far cheaper, within the budget of most families, and by 1914, some 10 million toy soldiers were produced per year. And it was not only children who were playing with them. “For many years my adult life was haunted by the fading memories of those early war

fantasies,” H. G. Wells confessed, not without some embarrassment. “Up to 1914, I found a lively interest in playing a war game, with toy soldiers and guns, that recalled the peculiar quality and pleasure of those early reveries.”<sup>53</sup> And Wells was not alone. “I have met men in responsible positions whose imaginations were manifestly built upon a similar framework and who remained puerile in their political outlook because of its persistence.”<sup>54</sup> Wells mentions Winston Churchill as an example, but several other members of the government that took Britain to war in 1914 were playing with toy soldiers too.<sup>55</sup>

In the United States, Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy and president-to-be, played with life-sized toy soldiers. Also Roosevelt had suffered from neurasthenia in his younger days, but he had cured it by means of ceaseless activity: He had gone out west to hunt for bears and bison, and he bought a cattle ranch in North Dakota. The highest form of success, as he put it, comes “to the man who does not shrink from danger, from hardship, or from bitter toil, and who out of these wins the splendid ultimate triumph.”<sup>56</sup> Hence also Roosevelt’s enthusiasm for imperial expansion. Once the European settlers had pushed their way to California, there was no longer a frontier left in North America that called for frontiersmen, but, Roosevelt suggested, the frontier could be moved across the sea. In 1893, the American government engineered a coup against Queen Lili‘uokalani, the ruler of the independent Kingdom of Hawai‘i, and in May 1898, as a result of the war with Spain, the United States invaded the Philippines. Only timid, stupid, ignorant, and lazy men will refuse the challenge, Roosevelt insisted, and in this group he included “the over-civilized man, who has lost the great fighting, masterful virtues.”<sup>57</sup> Men like this all “shrink from seeing us do our share of the world’s work, by bringing order out of chaos in the great, fair tropical islands from which the valor of our soldiers and sailors has driven the Spanish flag.”<sup>58</sup>

It was in Cuba that Roosevelt’s life-sized soldiers first were deployed. When war was declared in April 1898, new recruits had quickly to be raised. The government appealed for volunteers, and a ragtag band – “Roosevelt’s Rough Riders” – was assembled. The Rough Riders was a mixture of rugged men from the former Wild West and rather more neurasthenic types, often Roosevelt’s personal friends, from Ivy League schools eager for an opportunity to confront danger. The name itself was borrowed from a circus act – “Buffalo Bill’s

Wild West and Congress of Rough Riders of the World” – which William Frederick Cody was taking on tours both around the United States and in Europe. And it was when Roosevelt took his Rough Riders to Cuba that a connection was established between the cowboys of the imagination and the real-life soldiers employed in imperial expansion. Cuba called for frontiersmen, and so did the Philippines. It was going to be a heroic adventure, Roosevelt assured them, dangerous but fun, like a game of cowboys and Indians played by grown-ups.<sup>59</sup>

When the big war, the worldwide conflagration, finally broke out in August 1914, it was greeted by jubilant crowds in every European capital. “Enormous throngs have paraded the streets of the capital all day,” the *New York Times* reported from Berlin on July 26, 1914.<sup>60</sup> The crowds were singing, cheering, and thousands of people were preparing to hold an all-night vigil in Unter den Linden in support of the Kaiser and the war. In Paris, too, great, cheering crowds assembled. Hundreds of thousands of Parisians lined the streets from the Gare du Nord to the Élysée Palace, shouting, “Vive Poincaré!” “Vive l’armée!” “Vive France!” “Vive l’Alliance!” And similar scenes were reported from Vienna and St. Petersburg. The enthusiasm spread all the way to the United States where immigrant groups took to the streets. “Britons, Frenchmen, and Belgians march up Broadway singing national anthems,” the *New York Times* reported, and 10,000 Germans who assembled in Ulmer Park in Brooklyn “enthusiastically cheered the German Emperor, sang war songs, and manifested great enthusiasm for the cause of the Triple Alliance in the present crisis.”<sup>61</sup>

The moment of self-assertion had finally arrived. “How I long for the Great War!” wrote the journalist Hilaire Belloc. “It will sweep Europe like a broom, it will make kings jump like coffee beans on the roaster.”<sup>62</sup> “I almost desire a monstrous war,” Paul Valéry wrote to André Gide, with “the funeral trampling of beating hooves and the rip of gunfire.”<sup>63</sup> “Today’s man,” wrote the Hungarian author Dezső Kosztolányi, has “grown up in a hothouse, pale and sipping tea,” but now he “greet[s] this healthy brutality enthusiastically. Let the storm come and sweep out our salons.”<sup>64</sup> “This is not a war against an external enemy,” the German Expressionist painter Franz Marc insisted; “it is a European civil war, a war against the inner invisible enemy of the European spirit.”<sup>65</sup> Before long Henri Bergson had put his philosophy on a war footing, weaponizing the *élan vitale* and redeploying it in the fight against the Germans. The creative life force was now

personified by France, he explained, and the mechanical inertia of matter was personified by Germany. German intellectuals, meanwhile, responded in kind. In the so-called Manifesto of the Ninety-Three, an illustrious collection of German intellectuals expressed their support for the invasion of Belgium. “We intend to glorify war – the only hygiene of the world,” as Filippo Tommaso Marinetti put it in “The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism” (1909), together with “militarism, patriotism, the destructive gesture of anarchists, beautiful ideas worth dying for, and contempt for woman.”<sup>66</sup>

The reality of combat was entirely different, of course. In the Philippines, the Americans were welcomed not as liberators but instead as another foreign occupier, and soon a native guerrilla movement took up arms against them. The American response was genocidal, and captured guerrilla fighters were tortured and waterboarded – not a heroic, will-affirming way to wage war. Neither did the Great War provide much place for heroism. There was not even much place for movement. Instead, the soldiers sat for years in the trenches they had dug, waiting for something to happen. The use of chemical weapons and mortar shells meant that many met their deaths without attacking, but also without defending themselves. It was a horrible way to die. It was only once they eventually ventured out into the no-man’s land that separated the armies that the soldiers had an opportunity to actually do something. Dodging machine-gun fire, they jumped and skipped across the battlefield; “enemy shots were spluttering against the parapet; men danced to and fro in the greatest excitement.”<sup>67</sup> And yet, if they only looked up, the soldiers could see war as they once had imagined it. Air combat was romantic since airplanes were romantic, and the pilots were heroes since the outcome of the encounters depended entirely on their courage and individual skill. Their duels were like the hand-to-hand combat of chivalric knights.<sup>68</sup>

And yet, as historians have pointed out, these accounts of the enthusiasm for war are not representative of the views of Europe’s population as a whole. Most people in most countries, the bulk of the fighting armies, did not leave for their respective fronts with a spring in their steps and a song in their hearts. Most people were skeptical; they showed up only because they were conscripted, and even then they dragged their feet. Instead, war enthusiasm was confined to quite a specific group of people: city-dwellers, intellectuals, artists, independent professionals, and university students– that is, to the segments of the population most likely to suffer from neurasthenia. It was they who had



complained about a lack of willpower. It was they who hoped that the war would provide a cure and restore their zest for life.<sup>69</sup>

## Self-Determination

When Woodrow Wilson arrived in Europe on December 13, 1918, “national self-determination” was a novel concept, and many of the diplomats who assembled at Versailles were uncertain regarding exactly what it meant. If consistently applied, the principle would surely break up not only the empires defeated in the Great War but all empires everywhere, including the very extensive empires of Great Britain and France. In fact, the United States was vulnerable too. By 1919, the United States was also an empire, which included the Philippines, Hawai‘i, Puerto Rico, and the Panama Canal Zone, not to mention the recently colonized western parts of the North American continent itself. If self-determination were to determine the way borders between countries were drawn, some very extensive revisions were going to be required. “The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite,” as Robert Lansing, Wilson’s own secretary of state, put it. “It will raise hopes which can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives.”<sup>70</sup> In the end a fudge was devised. For one thing, British and French colonial administrators insisted, there was no reason to grant self-determination to parts of the world whose fate already had been conclusively determined. This, to their minds, included the peoples who made up the British and the French empires. The question was rather how the principle was to be applied to the colonies that in the wake of the Great War no longer belonged to a European colonizer. Self-determination concerned not the right of the natives to rule themselves, in other words, but rather their right to choose a European master.<sup>71</sup>

Already before the war there had been widespread condemnations of the crimes committed by Belgium in the Congo and by the United States in the Philippines, and after the war it was clear that the continued exploitation of non-European parts of the world required both a new rationale and a new institutional format. As a result, former German and Ottoman territories were not simply annexed, but instead granted as “trusteeships” to be ruled not for the benefit of the mandatory powers but rather for the benefit of the indigenous populations themselves. This is how Britain got its hands on Palestine and Iraq, France came to control Syria, and how the various bits and pieces of the

German empire were parceled out between Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, South Africa, New Zealand, Australia, and Japan. In addition, the League of Nations set up a Mandates Commission that was to oversee the work the mandatory powers carried out, and to which each of them was required to submit an annual report.<sup>72</sup>

The official goal was to prepare the mandates for independence, and the way to do this was to encourage “development.” It was by means of development that the natives would learn how to determine themselves. By expanding ports and building railroads, establishing plantations and mines, explained Frederick Lugard, a British colonial administrator, in *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (1922), the natives would come to enjoy the benefits of civilization. And cultural development would soon follow. Economic change would promote European values such as rationality and individualism, together with the kind of social discipline that accompanies regular, salaried employment. As a result, native society, and the natives themselves, would be transformed. And cultural development, in turn, would lead to political development. Eventually, a new, Europeanized elite would emerge, Lugard assured his readers, and with its help representative institutions would be established, “in which a comparatively small educated class shall be recognized as the natural spokesmen for the many.”<sup>73</sup> Yet, as everyone agreed, at least in the case of Africa, this process of step-by-step development was going to take a long time. “There never has been, and never will be within any time with which we are practically concerned, such a thing as good government in the European sense of the tropics by the natives of these regions.”<sup>74</sup>

Moreover, development, at least in the short run, was likely to be disruptive. “The advent of Europeans,” Lugard noted, “cannot fail to have a disintegrating effect on tribal authority and institutions, and on the conditions of native life.”<sup>75</sup> Suddenly, “the primitive African is called upon to cope with ideas a thousand years in advance of his mental and social equipment.”<sup>76</sup> And just as in Europe in the previous century, members of the new urban working class that had emerged in the colonies started moving in crowds – “a rabble, with thousands of persons in a savage or semi-savage state, all acting on their own impulses, and making themselves a danger to society generally.”<sup>77</sup> What such disaffected mobs were capable of soon became apparent. From British India to the mandates in South West Africa and Syria, demonstrators rose up in protests against new taxes, heavy-handed

repression, and the lack of political representation. Obviously, the mandatory powers concluded, if self-determination meant that unruly mobs such as these would come to power, independence will never happen. Uncouth rioters led by demagogues would do irreparable damage not only to European interests and investments but also, once independence was achieved, to the international order as a whole.<sup>78</sup>

For independence to be possible, the natives had first to be taught how to control themselves. National self-determination was first and foremost a matter of self-control. As far as the French were concerned, they taught self-control above all by means of direct rule. Each colony was treated as an integral part of France itself and governed by officials dispatched from Paris who took charge of matters of day-to-day administration. In addition to facilitating the development of the natural resources of each colony, they had a mandate to change native minds. By spreading French culture and by learning French, the natives were to be raised from their barbarian state. The colonial masters ruled not only by means of the *gendarmérie*, but also by means of the *lycée*, the museum, and the opera house. In the end, the African natives who subjected themselves to this *mission civilisatrice* and survived the frenchification were proud to call themselves Frenchmen. In this way, a new, *franco-phone* self was created that, when independence finally arrived in the decades after World War II, was in a position to determine itself.<sup>79</sup>

The British, for their part, preferred to teach self-determination by means of indirect rule. Instead of taking charge of the minutiae of administration, the natives were to be ruled by traditional chiefs, as advised and directed by British officials. In part, this was a consequence of the fact that the British in a country like India were so few in number, but it was also, colonial officers explained, a more efficient method of governance. In this way, the British could convince “the backward races, by their own efforts, in their own way, to raise themselves to a higher plane of social organization.”<sup>80</sup> But this presupposed, of course, that there really were tribal chiefs who could be employed for the purpose, and in many places this was not the case. Here a system of native chiefs was introduced by the British. The first step, as Lugard explained, is to convince the natives to make the transition from a patriarchal to a tribal stage of social development, and then to gradually move their loyalty to more impersonal, more advanced – that is to say, more European – institutions. In this way, self-government could “evolve from their own institutions, based on their own habits of thought, prejudices, and

customs” – as overseen and directed by British officials.<sup>81</sup> This was the British way of constituting a native self that, when independence finally arrived, would be in a position to determine itself.

## A Will in the World

We think of the will as a power to get something done. When we say that it will rain, we assume the existence of a rain-making power; when we say that we will do something, we assume that it is within our power to do it. The will is a kind of muscle that we can flex. And if someone doubts our abilities, we can always conduct the “I will raise my right arm” experiment in order to prove them wrong. But as a long tradition of philosophical investigations has revealed, this definition results in a number of quandaries. One is the problem of weakness of will. Rather mysteriously, we can want to do something, and yet not do it, and if we were a Church father, we would blame the flesh for leading us into temptation. And then there is the problem of free will. For the will to be free, it would have to be determined by us and not by external causes, but the question then becomes what it is that determines us. If nothing does, we are no longer on the side of science, and explanations that defy science are hard to sustain.


At the same time, science accords quite nicely with our phenomenological experiences. Going through an average day, we are not really exercising our will all that often. Rather, we do the kinds of things that we find to be appropriate for the occasions that arise. What is appropriate we learn as we attune ourselves to the moods of the situations in which we find ourselves, and as we come to understand what the situation affords us. Some of these affordances we explicitly recognize, but most of them are acknowledged only by our bodies. The problem with explicit plans is that they have an entirely different ontological status than the situations in which we find ourselves. Our plans will become relevant only once they are relevant in a certain context; the representations must become presentable in a here and a now. And it is only if the situations call for the plans that we have made that we will come to execute them. Sometimes they do, sometimes they do not, but in either case there is no temptation involved and no sinning. It is not fair to blame the body or the devil.

In this chapter we studied the question of willpower as it appeared in public discussions in the decades around the turn of the twentieth

century. At the time a veritable willpower craze was sweeping across Europe and North America. Everyone insisted they had problems imposing themselves on themselves, on the world, and on other people. In the cities, by their machines, people were forced to stand to attention, and the habits they had brought with them from the countryside fit these conditions exceedingly badly or not at all. People could not adjust, and they fell ill with all kinds of mental afflictions. Neurasthenia was the illness that everyone who was anyone just had to have. Hence the best-selling manuals with suggestions regarding self-hypnosis or odd dietary recommendations, and hence also the Nietzsche cult. The willpower rhetoric sought to convince people that they could reshape themselves according to their own preferred design. Yet these projects were never likely to succeed, and many of them ended in utter disaster. When the Great War finally broke out in the summer of 1914, it was greeted with enthusiasm by neurasthenics everywhere. It was a tragedy to see the most well-educated, the most creative, Europeans line up in defense of a war that really, even at the time, made little sense. The idea of the will, and the rhetoric associated with it, created problems outside Europe too. In every colony, a new generation of national leaders insisted on their right to self-determination, although, in most cases, the national selves on whose behalf the determination was to take place, did not actually exist. Establishing such selves has taken the better part of 100 years – causing wars, coups, genocides – and the work of national self-determination is still not complete.

Behind these historical tragedies, we find a philosophical mistake. If we are looking for a muscle to flex and to strengthen, there is no such thing as “the will,” and there is no way to determine ourselves by its means. Imposing ourselves on ourselves and acting aggressively toward others can never be a cure for what ails us. The self on whose behalf the determination is to take place is not a thing but a process, or perhaps a recurring event, which takes place in the interaction between a moving body and its environment. All we can do is to respond, as best we can, to the situations in which we find ourselves. We start out life unsure of who we are and where we are going, but gradually, through the path we come to trace, our lives take on a certain shape. But this is a process of self-realization, not self-determination. We walk into our selves, as it were, and step-by-step, situation-by-situation, we come to be who we are. Quite obviously, the self that is determined in this way is not a self that we have much control over. And yet the path as a whole is a unique life, the life that is ours, the life that we lived.

## VII THE WORLD THAT WE MADE



All sustained criticisms of modern society are written as elegies. There is something we have lost, and the critique is developed as this loss is mourned. An entire academic discipline – sociology – was founded as a way to institutionalize such mourning. Modern society, the first generation of sociologists insisted, was the result of a rupture – between a *Gemeinschaft* and a *Gesellschaft*, between social positions ascribed by status and by contract, between a barter and a money economy, or between the bucolic customs of “Merrie old England” and life in the iron cage of the bureaucratic state. And while modern

society offered much that was worth celebrating, the *Kulturpessimismus* was easily justified. Modern society provided hot and cold running water, astonishing medical breakthroughs, and movies with Greta Garbo and Marlene Dietrich, but it also produced world wars and genocides. And, most disconcertingly, according to the critics, the benefits and the horrors were intrinsically linked. You could not have the one without the other.<sup>1</sup>

Many of the critics spoke of “alienation.” Something that once belonged to us, something that used to be an integral part of our lives, has now become alien, not us. Under conditions of factory labor, Karl Marx argued, workers are alienated from the products of their labor. They do not own what they produce, and they have no control over the production process; instead, the production process is controlling them, and the products belong to the capitalists. Alienated from the activities we spend most of our lives engaged in, we soon become alienated from other human beings, and eventually also from ourselves. Modern society has made us all into consumers, critics such as Herbert Marcuse pointed out, and the plethora of items we consume substitute for the lives we have lost. The fact that we actually enjoy all the superficial entertainments means only that we never will understand the degree to which we have become deformed. “Free choice among a wide variety of goods and services does not signify freedom if these goods and services sustain social control over a life of toil and fear – that is, if they sustain alienation.”<sup>2</sup>

And we have become alienated from God too. Although this particular predicament surely dates back to our original eviction from the Garden of Eden, human beings in all previous ages sought a way to reunite with the divine. This, enlightened opinion tells us, is no longer possible. God is dead, he remains dead, and we know because it is we, the denizens of modern society, who killed him. Max Weber talked about “disenchantment.” In a society where all authorities are required to give accounts of themselves and to justify the power they hold over us, there are no mysteries left and no sense of wonder. Everything is illuminated by the light of reason. “All the decent drapery of life,” Edmund Burke complained, “is to be rudely torn off.” “On this scheme of things, a king is but a man, a queen is but a woman, a woman is but an animal – and an animal not of the highest order.”<sup>3</sup> Even democracy, one of the proudest accomplishments of modern society, is a part of the problem. To the extent that democracy is a matter of public deliberation

and decision-making, politics will never concern that which we cannot make explicit. In this way politics too comes to alienate us from ourselves.<sup>4</sup>

The main plot of this book too was told as an elegy and a lament. And it too was a story of alienation – of how we lost contact with our bodies and how we no longer understand the movements in which they engage. In modern society, bodies are not us; they are not something that we are, but something that we have. And we move in different ways, for different purposes. As a result, some ways of being in the world have been elevated, others have been demoted, and some completely ignored and forgotten about. If anything, the alienation we documented is today more pronounced than ever. We are no longer moving into place, but take being to be a matter of interpretation, and we think we can become whomever we want to be just by reinterpreting ourselves. Likewise, knowledge is more than ever equated with knowledge by description, as conveyed by omnipresent screens. We swipe and we type, but engage in few other movements. And thinking is now only a matter of reasoning. Engaging in no motions and expressing no emotions, algorithms designed by Google and Facebook are increasingly thinking on our behalf. And although we today are less likely to watch ballets, we readily encounter our passions online. Here we are shown a stream of objects – clickable memes, political outrage, cute cats, pornography – which demand our constant attention. Frustrated by our immobility, we still dream of a life of action in which we are free to impose ourselves on other people and the world. We are increasingly passive, but also increasingly aggressive.

If alienation is the problem, the solution readily suggests itself. Somehow or another we must regain what we have lost; we must find a path that takes us back home. This is the solution Heidegger suggested to the inhabitants of Messkirch, his hometown in rural Swabia, on the occasion of the 700th anniversary of its founding in 1961. “How can we set ourselves up as a bulwark against the on-rush of the alien?” he asked. “Only in this way, that we awaken unceasingly the bestowing and healing and conserving powers of Home, that time and again we tap the powerful springs of Home and secure the correct course for their flow and influence.”<sup>5</sup> This, half a century earlier, was also Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s solution for India. We Indians, Gandhi explained, have become alienated from ourselves. We have been uprooted by the modern way of life, strange ideas have been implanted



in our heads, and in many cases we have also been physically displaced by the capitalist system introduced by the British. We demand “home rule,” Gandhi insisted – the right to determine ourselves – but for this to happen we must first create a home that is truly our own. As long as we model our home on theirs, it is not enough to get rid of the British.<sup>6</sup>

What, more specifically, such a homecoming would entail varies from author to author, of course, but many have pointed to the importance of returning to the body. Friedrich Nietzsche, for one, championed a new kind of body-based philosophy. The ruminations of German thinkers, he insisted, are nothing but a consequence of the fact that they spend too much time indoors in the winters, in badly ventilated rooms heated by smoking wood stoves. Nietzsche was overjoyed when he moved to Italy where life was lived in the streets and singing and dancing took the place of metaphysics. Inspired by Nietzsche, choreographers such as Rudolf Laban and Mary Wigman taught the Germans how to move in different ways. The *Ausdruckstanz* they invented reunited the dancers with their bodies, but also with assorted primordial forces long ignored by modern society. Our bodies are vehicles for truths that our minds are unable to grasp. In England, Edward Carpenter embarked on a kindred project. Modern society, he explained in *Civilisation: Its Cause and Cure* (1889), has made us sick both physically and mentally. In order to restore our health, we must respond to the urges of our bodies, which, in Carpenter’s case, turned him into one of the first gay rights activists. We should do gymnastics, live communally, eat vegetables, and sunbathe in the nude.<sup>7</sup>

Well-meaning, innocuous, and eccentric though such suggestions may be, they have been remarkably difficult to implement. Going back home is far more difficult than the likes of Heidegger and Gandhi envisioned. The journey, and our long time away, has changed us, and when we return we will always come back to a different place than the one we left. Compare the emotions that romantic poets insist must be added to the bare bones of rational logic, the traditions conservatives want to revive, or the communities that sociologists hope to recreate. Although presented as perennial features, none of these concepts existed in premodern society. There were no “emotions” before the hegemony of reason, no “traditions” before rapid social change, no “community” before the rise of individualism. Adding them now may be a good idea, or it may not, but it can never return us to a prelapsarian state. It is too late; we have gone through too much; you can lose your virginity only

once. What we end up with by following suggestions such as these is always a venture into something new and different.<sup>8</sup>

Thus, while the rhetoric of homecoming and embodiment is enormously seductive, policies imposed with these aims in mind are likely to be ineffectual, reactionary, or worse. Compare the way Heidegger pointed a wagging finger at all the TV antennas that recently had been installed on the rooftops of the houses in his native Messkirch. By hooking themselves up to these context-transcending devices, Heidegger warned, people are pulled into “strange, enticing, exciting” realms that “offer no abiding, reliable resting-place; they change unceasingly from the new to the newest.”<sup>9</sup> In order to stay put, Heidegger is saying, you must stay ignorant. Gandhi was equally dismissive of modern inventions, and he had a particular animus toward the railroad. Much as Heidegger’s TV antennas, trains take us away from our homes. And Gandhi too raised a wagging finger. By means of the railroad we extend ourselves too far and come to develop unnatural ambitions; “man comes into contact with different natures, different religions, and is utterly confounded.”<sup>10</sup> Again, we have to stay ignorant in order to feel at home.

Coming back to the body is at least as problematic. Having organized modern society in accordance with the requirements of our conscious minds, it is difficult to find a place for the intentional content produced by our bodies. Edward Carpenter was surely correct in emphasizing the benefits of gymnastics and a vegetable-rich diet, but it is not enough to make a few changes in our daily routines. And, more ominously, advocates of body-based solutions will far too easily come to promote irrationalism, mysticism, and a cult of power. This is how Nietzsche’s philosophy came to be appropriated by Fascists who insisted that we should be marching instead of thinking. This is also what happened to the *Ausdruckstanz*. The primordial forces channeled through these expressive moves were all too easily associated with the spirit of the German *Volk*. And sure enough, Laban and Wigman soon convinced themselves that the National Socialist Party was the agent that would return the Germans to their bodies and to themselves.<sup>11</sup>

Laments and elegies will never get us very far, and nostalgia in politics is downright dangerous. There is a methodological problem here, first emphasized in this context by G. W. F. Hegel. “Whatever happens,” Hegel wrote, “every individual is a child of his time; so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thoughts.”<sup>12</sup>

Everything is historical, Hegel points out; no one can defy gravity and leap over their own age. Trapped in history, we are limited by the options that our moment in time makes available. Or, as a cultural theorist would argue, the political solutions we arrive at are made available by a certain web of symbols. And, as they go on to explain, such webs are always going to be self-referential. One interpretation presupposes another, and a word, if we look it up in a dictionary, will refer us only to other words. Hegel's historicism and the self-referentiality of the cultural theorists point to the same devastating conclusion: We cannot think our way out of our modern predicament since all our thoughts are a product of our modern predicament. The proposed solution will always recreate the problem, or possibly just make it worse.<sup>13</sup>

The solution, for that reason, can come only from outside history or from outside symbolic structures. Historicists and cultural theorists have always had problems making sense of the idea of such an outside. Nothing can escape history, a historicist will say, and cultural theorists will insist that everything is "socially constructed." But we know better, of course. Outside history and culture there are bodies, and bodies are basically the same regardless of time and place. A solution to the problem of modern society, if it exists, must consequently be sought here – in the embodied, pre-symbolic, world of bodies that move.

A true homecoming will consequently mean something quite different than Heidegger and Gandhi suggested. They had preconceived ideas of what it would be like to return home, and when they eventually did they were horrified to discover people who watched TV and traveled on railways. But a home, we should remember, is not a particular place. Instead, to be at home is to feel at home. It is a particular way of attuning ourselves to the mood of a situation. And it is in fact possible to feel at home almost anywhere. You can feel at home in an exotic, foreign city although you only have spent a short time there. For the same reason, returning to the body must mean something different than Laban, Wigman, Carpenter, and Nietzsche's Fascist followers intended. They thought that a bit of dancing, marching, and sunbathing would cure what ails us, but the problem was never a lack of physical activities as such. The problem was, rather, that the societies in which they lived provided no socially recognized place for the intentional content that bodies produce. Even as bodies were recognized and lauded for their

strength and beauty, they still played no role in thinking, knowing, imagining, willing, and so on.

The goal, differently put, should not be to return to something we have lost. Nothing should be recreated. Instead, political change must happen at the social, yet pre-symbolic level where briefcase-carrying party members twitch and where there are gender-based differences in the way balls are thrown. What we need is a new, radical form of infra-politics that addresses bodies and the intentional activities in which they engage. Here democracy is not a matter of regular elections, but a matter of the postures we assume; status is not a title but a question of how we stand; justice is not a matter for judges but a feeling in the stomach; peace is the ability to breathe freely; and equity demands that every location be at the same time both a center and a periphery. Once change has taken place on this embodied, social, yet pre-symbolic level, everything else will fall neatly into place. Politics is easy once we get our movements right. And, conversely, unless change happens here, no amount of reinterpretation will have a lasting impact. Our bodies are our last refuge, but also our best hope. For this is the amazing thing: Although we have neglected and ignored it, the body is still here; it has been with us all the time, doing what bodies do regardless of historical contexts and cultural elaborations. Interpretations differ, different worlds are made, *eppur si muove* – and yet the body keeps on moving.

# NOTES

## Chapter 1

- 1 “It is explication I am after,” he goes on to say, “construing social expressions on their surface enigmatical.” Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 5.
- 2 As Alexander and Smith summarize Geertz’s method. Jeffrey C. Alexander and Philip Smith, “Introduction: The Rise and Fall and Rise of Clifford Geertz,” in *Interpreting Clifford Geertz* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 2.
- 3 Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (London: Routledge, 1989), 183. “And though practice and pure speculation may be placed in opposition to one another, they nevertheless rest upon one and the same fundamental ground of knowledge.” Ibid., 182.
- 4 On disciplinary mechanisms, see “Panopticism,” in Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Allen Lane, 1977), 195–228. “Gender is in no way a stable identity,” Butler explains, “rather, it is an identity tenuously constituted in time – an identity instituted through a *stylized repetition of acts*. Further, gender is constituted through the stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and enactments of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self.” Judith Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory,” *Theatre Journal*, no. 4 (1988): 519.
- 5 More on symbols in Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 45–60.
- 6 Clifford Geertz, “Person, Time, and Conduct in Bali,” in *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 405. “It is not individuals who have experiences,” as the historian Joan Scott puts it, “but subjects who are constituted through experiences.” Joan W. Scott, “The Evidence of Experience,” *Critical Inquiry* 17, no. 4 (July 1, 1991): 779.
- 7 Clifford Geertz, “The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man,” in *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 46. “Neonates,” as Geertz explains, “are human only *in posse* anyway.” Geertz, “Person,

- Time, and Conduct in Bali,” 405; This is also why newborns still in the 1980s were operated on without anesthesia. Helen Harrison, “Why Infant Surgery without Anesthesia Went Unchallenged,” *New York Times*, December 17, 1987. As Harrison points out, “Research now indicates that infants not only feel the severe pain of such procedures, but they can also be damaged by it physically and perhaps psychologically.” Ibid. Alcott criticizes Foucault’s notion of experience in Linda Martín Alcoff, “Phenomenology, Post-Structuralism, and Feminist Theory on the Concept of Experience,” in *Feminist Phenomenology*, ed. Linda Fisher and Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Springer, 2000), 51–58.
- 8 “In good films,” as Sontag puts it, “there is always a directness that entirely frees us from the itch to interpret.” Susan Sontag, “Against Interpretation,” in *Against Interpretation and Other Essays* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1966), 9. “Philosophy,” in Gendlin’s words, “needs to discover that there can be a direct relation between thinking and experiencing.” Eugene T. Gendlin, “Beyond Postmodernism,” in *Understanding Experience: Psychotherapy and Postmodernism*, ed. Roger Frie (London: Routledge, 2003), 100. “We can have direct access to experiencing through our bodies,” as he goes on to explain. “Our bodily sense of situations is a concretely sensed interaction process that always exceeds culture, history, and language.” Ibid., 101.
  - 9 “What is important now is to recover our senses. We must learn to see more, to hear more, to feel more... The function of criticism should be to show how it is what it is, even that it is what it is, rather than to show what it means.” Sontag, “Against Interpretation,” 10. On Plato, see *ibid.*, 1.
  - 10 Geertz, “Thick Description.” Geertz takes the example from Gilbert Ryle, “The Thinking of Thoughts: What Is ‘Le Penseur’ Doing?,” in *Collected Papers* (London: Routledge, 2009), 494–510. “To wink,” as Ryle explains, “is to try to signal to someone in particular, without the cognisance of others, a definite message according to an already understood code.” Ibid., 494.
  - 11 Among many studies, see Morris K. Holland and Gerald Tarlow, “Blinking and Thinking,” *Perceptual and Motor Skills* 41, no. 2 (1975): 403–6; John A. Stern, Larry C. Walrath, and Robert Goldstein, “The Endogenous Eyeblink,” *Psychophysiology* 21, no. 1 (1984): 22–33. For an application to politics, see Erik P. Bucy, “The Look of Losing, Then and Now: Nixon, Obama, and Nonverbal Indicators of Opportunity Lost,” *American Behavioral Scientist* 60, no. 14 (2016): 1780–82. “In the 1988 presidential debates, the blink rate of Democrat Michael Dukakis was elevated compared to Republican George H. Bush, indicating a heightened level of emotional stress or cognitive exertion.” Ibid., 1781.
  - 12 George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, in George Orwell, *Complete and Unabridged* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1980), 780.
  - 13 Ibid.
  - 14 Gendlin develops this point in Eugene Gendlin, “What First and Third Person Processes Really Are,” *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 16, nos. 10–11 (January 1, 2009): 334–35.
  - 15 On the difference between symbols and signs, see Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key*, 45–60. A “sign is that which renders present to knowledge something other than itself.” Jacques Maritain, “Sign and Symbol,” trans. Mary Morris, *Journal of the Warburg Institute* 1, no. 1 (1937): 1.
  - 16 John Bargh has explored priming in a number of articles, including John A. Bargh and Idit Shalev, “The Substitutability of Physical and Social Warmth in Daily Life,” *Emotion* 12, no. 1 (2012): 154–62; John A. Bargh, “Varieties of Automatic Influence in Social Perception and Cognition,” in *Unintended Thought*, ed. James S. Uleman

- and John A. Bargh (New York: Guilford Press, 1989). Summarized in John A. Bargh, ed., *Social Psychology and the Unconscious: The Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes* (New York: Psychology Press, 2006).
- 17 John H. Riskind, “They Stoop to Conquer: Guiding and Self-Regulatory Functions of Physical Posture after Success and Failure,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 47, no. 3 (1984): 479–93; William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. 1 (New York: H. Holt & Co., 1890), 115.
  - 18 Fritz Strack, Leonard L. Martin, and Sabine Stepper, “Inhibiting and Facilitating Conditions of the Human Smile: A Nonobtrusive Test of the Facial Feedback Hypothesis,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 54, no. 5 (1988): 768–77; David A. Havas et al., “Cosmetic Use of Botulinum Toxin-A Affects Processing of Emotional Language,” *Psychological Science* 21, no. 7 (2010): 895–900.
  - 19 Katie Liljenquist, Chen-Bo Zhong, and Adam D. Galinsky, “The Smell of Virtue: Clean Scents Promote Reciprocity and Charity,” *Psychological Science* 21, no. 3 (2010): 381–83; Bargh and Shalev, “The Substitutability of Physical and Social Warmth in Daily Life.”
  - 20 Spike W. S. Lee and Norbert Schwarz, “Dirty Hands and Dirty Mouths: Embodiment of the Moral-Purity Metaphor Is Specific to the Motor Modality Involved in Moral Transgression,” *Psychological Science* 21, no. 10 (2010): 1423–25; Chen-Bo Zhong and Katie Liljenquist, “Washing Away Your Sins: Threatened Morality and Physical Cleansing,” *Science* 313, no. 5792 (2006): 1451–52.
  - 21 Scott S. Wiltermuth and Chip Heath, “Synchrony and Cooperation,” *Psychological Science* 20, no. 1 (January 2009): 1–5; Tanya Vacharkulksemsuk and Barbara L. Fredrickson, “Strangers in Sync: Achieving Embodied Rapport through Shared Movements,” *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 48, no. 1 (January 2012): 399–400; Natalie Sebanz, Harold Bekkering, and Günther Knoblich, “Joint Action: Bodies and Minds Moving Together,” *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 10, no. 2 (February 2006): 70–76.
  - 22 Giacomo Rizzolatti and Laila Craighero, “The Mirror-Neuron System,” *Annual Review of Neuroscience* 27 (2004): 169–92; Daniel L. Schwartz, “Physical Imagery: Kinematic versus Dynamic Models,” *Cognitive Psychology* 38, no. 3 (1999): 433–64; Andrew N. Meltzoff, “Elements of a Developmental Theory of Imitation,” in *The Imitative Mind: Development, Evolution, and Brain Bases*, ed. Andrew N. Meltzoff and Wolfgang Prinz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 19–41.
  - 23 Butler criticizes Julia Kristeva for “imputing a maternal teleology to the female body prior to its emergence into culture.” Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (London: Routledge, 1989), 90. But, says Butler, “her argument could be recast within an even more encompassing framework.” That is, “What cultural configuration of language, indeed, of discourse, generates the trope of a pre-discursive libidinal multiplicity, and for what purposes?” *Ibid.*, 91. See Julia Kristeva, *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980). For Butler, as Bordo puts it, “there is one correct, unimpeachable position: it is that any conception of the ‘natural’ is a dangerous ‘illusion’ of which we must be ‘cured.’” Susan R. Bordo, *Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 290–92.
  - 24 The notion of proprioception was introduced in Charles Scott Sherrington, *The Integrative Action of the Nervous System* (New York: Scribner, 1906). On “kinetic

- melodies,” see Alexander Luria, *The Working Brain: An Introduction to Neuropsychology* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 176, 179, 253. See further Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, *The Primacy of Movement* (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2011), 113–52.
- 25 Sheets-Johnstone, *The Primacy of Movement*, 113–52. “We literally discover ourselves in movement,” as Sheets-Johnstone puts it. “We grow kinetically into our bodies. In particular, we grow into those distinct ways of moving that come with being the bodies we are.” *Ibid.*, 117. Stern talks about “vitality affects.” Daniel N. Stern, *The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology* (London: Karnac Books, 1998), 54–61. “The body is environmental interaction through and through.” Gendlin, “What First and Third Person Processes Really Are,” 342.
  - 26 On “phenomenological reduction,” see, for example, Dan Zahavi, *Phenomenology: The Basics* (London: Routledge, 2019), 32–43. On ways to combine neurology and phenomenology, see Francisco J. Varela, “Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem,” *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 3, no. 4 (April 1, 1996): 330–49.
  - 27 Compare Gallagher’s definition of a “body schema,” which “operates in a non-conscious way, is pre-personal, functions holistically, and is not something in-itself apart from its environment.” Shaun Gallagher, “Body Image and Body Schema: A Conceptual Clarification,” *Journal of Mind and Behaviour* 7, no. 4 (1986): 541. See also Stern’s investigation into how a newborn puts together various experiences of body-world interaction into an “emergent sense of self.” Stern, *The Interpersonal World of the Infant*, 45–61.
  - 28 Susanne K. Langer, *Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 57; Stern, *The Interpersonal World of the Infant*, 56; Sheets-Johnstone, *The Primacy of Movement*, 122–23; Mark Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 33–51.
  - 29 Johnson, *Meaning of the Body*, 136. Compare Langer: “Our primitive intellectual equipment is largely a fund of images, not necessarily visual, but often gestic, kinesthetic, verbal or what I can only call “situational.”... Suffice it now to point out that we apprehend everything that comes to us as impact from the world by imposing some image on it that stresses its salient features and shapes it for recognition and memory.” Langer, *Mind*, 59.
  - 30 Johnson, *Meaning of the Body*, 176–206. “What we call abstract concepts,” Johnson summarizes, “are defined by systematic mappings from body-based sensimotor source-domains onto abstract target domains.” *Ibid.*, 177.
  - 31 There are also negative affordances – features of the environment to fear, things best avoided or ignored. Thus a precipice is a danger to beings such as ourselves, if not to cats or goats, and subzero temperatures are better endured by penguins and polar bears. On the theory of affordances, see James J. Gibson, *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1986), 36, 127–43. “The affordances of the environment,” as Gibson explains, “are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill... I mean by it something that refers to both the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does.” *Ibid.*, 137.
  - 32 Compare Heidegger’s notion of the *Zuhandenheit*, “readiness-to-hand,” of tools like hammers. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), para. 68. Kurt Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1935), 353; Gendlin, “What



- First and Third Person Processes Really Are,” 344. The bear in the forest was discovered by William James, “What Is an Emotion?,” *Mind* 9, no. 34 (1884): 190.
- 33 “Consciousness has a directedness to it,” as Zahavi explains, “it is a consciousness of something, it is characterized by intentionality.” Zahavi, *Phenomenology*, 16. For the phenomenologist, intentionality “is the generic term for this pointing-beyond-itself proper to consciousness.” Ibid.
- 34 Carl Georg Lange, “The Emotions,” in *The Emotions*, ed. Knight Dunlap, vol. 1 (New York: Williams & Wilkins Company, 1922), 48. Or in the Danish original: “Ængstelighedens uimodstaaelige Indflydelse paa deres Tarmmuskulatur.” Carl Georg Lange, *Om Sindsbevaegelser: En psyko-fysiologisk Studie* (Copenhagen: Jacob Lunds forlag, 1885), 29.
- 35 Lange, “The Emotions,” 66; Lange, *Om Sindsbevaegelser*, 62.
- 36 James, “What Is an Emotion?,” 190; James’ theory of the emotions is updated in Antonio R. Damasio, *Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010), 91–95.
- 37 “Techniques of the Body,” 1935, in Marcel Mauss, *Techniques, Technology and Civilization*, ed. Nathan Schlanger (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014), 80.
- 38 At the same time, these differences are not fixed, and changes can take place surprisingly quickly. The way we swim, as Mauss noted, can change from one generation to the next, and today girls throw balls in quite a different way than they did when Young made her observations. Today women throw more like boys. Iris Marion Young, “Throwing like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility and Spatiality,” *Human Studies* 3 (1980): 152. Young criticizes Erwin W. Straus, “The Upright Posture,” *The Psychiatric Quarterly* 26, nos. 1–4 (January 1, 1952): 529–61. Johnson discusses how the gendered differences in ball-throwing have diminished over the last forty years. Johnson, *Meaning of the Body*, 24.
- 39 The differences that Mauss recorded can all be traced back to techniques taught by institutions. You learn how to swim in school or in summer camp, and in convents you learn what to do with your hands. Compare the rejection of swaddling of newborns by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and others. Free individuals must be able to move freely already as neonates. Ralph Frenken, “Psychology and History of Swaddling. Part Two: The Abolishment of Swaddling from the 16th Century until Today,” *The Journal of Psychobistory* 39, no. 3 (2012): 219–45.
- 40 On “Coming to a preliminary understanding about the significance of awakening a fundamental attunement,” see Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 59–66; see further 66–77, 180–184. On moods as different from emotions, see Noël Carroll, “Art and Mood: Preliminary Notes and Conjectures,” *The Monist* 86, no. 4 (2003): 521–55. Music as mood-regulator: Ronald M. Radano, “Interpreting Muzak: Speculations on Musical Experience in Everyday Life,” *American Music* 7, no. 4 (Winter 1989): 448–60; “Music as an inspiration for combat,” in Jonathan R. Pieslak, *Sound Targets: American Soldiers and Music in the Iraq War* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 46–57.
- 41 This is why, even if their ultimate causes may remain obscure, moods are easily manipulated with the help of drugs – drugs administered by doctors, recreational drugs, or everyday drugs like coffee or alcohol. J. B. Deijen, M. L. Heemstra, and J. F. Orlebeke, “Dietary Effects on Mood and Performance,” *Journal of Psychiatric Research* 23, nos. 3–4 (1989): 275–83; Andrew Smith, “Effects of Caffeine in Chewing Gum on Mood and Attention,” *Human Psychopharmacology: Clinical and Experimental* 24, no. 3 (April 1, 2009): 239–47.

- 42 Ratcliffe calls them “existential feelings.” Matthew Ratcliffe, “The Feeling of Being,” *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 12, nos. 8–9 (January 1, 2005): 43–60. See also Matthew Ratcliffe, “Heidegger’s Attunement and the Neuropsychology of Emotion,” *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 1, no. 3 (September 1, 2002): 287–312; Thomas Fuchs, “The Tacit Dimension,” *Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology* 8, no. 4 (2001): 323–26.
- 43 Garriy Shteynberg, “Shared Attention,” *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 10, no. 5 (2015): 579–90; Garriy Shteynberg and Evan P. Apfelbaum, “The Power of Shared Experience: Simultaneous Observation with Similar Others Facilitates Social Learning,” *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 4, no. 6 (2013): 738–44; Henning Nörenberg, “Elementary Affective Sharing: The Case of Collective Embarrassment,” *Phänomenologische Forschungen* (2017): 11–14; Eva Weber-Guskar, “Moved by Masses? Shared Moods and Their Impact on Immoral Behavior,” *Philosophia* 45, no. 4 (2017): 1667–74.
- 44 The idea of a *Grundstimmung* is borrowed from Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 63–77, 180–84. “The Baroque attitude,” according to Panofsky, “can be defined as being based on an objective conflict between antagonistic forces, which, however, merge into a subjective feeling of freedom and even pleasure.” Erwin Panofsky, “What Is Baroque?,” in *Three Essays on Style* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 38, 45.

## Chapter 2

- 1 All definitions and etymologies, here and throughout the book, are taken from [www.wiktionary.org](http://www.wiktionary.org).
- 2 “We call it the ‘thrownness’ of this entity into its ‘there’; indeed, it is thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the world, it is the ‘there.’” Heidegger, *Being and Time*, para. 135; On the presence of missing chairs, see Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, *The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities* (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 241. Compare Jean-Paul Sartre, *L’être et le néant* (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), 51–56. “Le néant porte l’être en son cœur.” Ibid., 53.
- 3 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, paras. 184–91. Or perhaps the question of Being presents itself to us in a mood of profound boredom. Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, paras. 19–38. In profound boredom, as Heidegger puts it, “what is boring is neither beings nor things as such . . . nor human beings as people we find before us and can ascertain, neither objects nor subjects, but *temporality as such*.” Ibid., 158.
- 4 Eugene T. Gendlin, “The Wider Role of Bodily Sense in Thought and Language,” in *Giving the Body Its Due*, ed. Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 192–207.
- 5 Mary B. Hesse, “The Explanatory Function of Metaphor,” in *Models and Analogies in Science* (Indianapolis: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), 157–77.
- 6 Proposition XII, Theorem XII, in Isaac Newton, *The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* (London: Benjamin Motte, 1729), 232.
- 7 There are endless studies about the history of the Thirty Years’ War. One collection of eyewitness accounts is Geoff Mortimer, *Eyewitness Accounts of the Thirty Years War 1618–48* (2002). Grimmelhausen might not have been an objective observer, but he certainly influenced our perception of the war. Hans Jakob Christof von Grimmelhausen, *Simplicissimus, the German Adventurer* (Knoxville: Newfound

- Press, 2009). See further Kevin Cramer, *The Thirty Years' War and German Memory in the Nineteenth Century* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007).
- 8 To subsequent generations of scholars of international relations, the “Westphalian system” has come to denote an international political order constituted by the interrelationships of sovereign states. Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” *International Organization* 55, no. 2 (March 2001): 270–81.
  - 9 François Ogier, *Journal du Congrès de Münster* (Paris: E. Plon, 1893), 105. Discussed in Jürgen Grimm, “Ballets Danced in Münster: François Ogier, Dramatist,” trans. Margaret M. McGowan, *Dance Research* 20, no. 2 (2002): 27–37. For more on the French delegation, see Anuschka Tischer, “Claude de Mesmes, Count d’Avaux (1595–1650): The Perfect Ambassador of the Early 17th Century,” *International Negotiation* 13, no. 2 (October 1, 2008): 197–209.
  - 10 Ogier, *Journal du Congrès de Münster*, 212–14.
  - 11 Bella Mirabella, “‘In the Sight of All’: Queen Elizabeth and the Dance of Diplomacy,” *Early Theatre* 15, no. 1 (2012): 68.
  - 12 See, inter alia, James Ronald Mulryne, *Europa Triumphans: Court and Civic Festivals in Early Modern Europe*, vol. 15 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); Jennifer Nevile, ed., *Dance, Spectacle, and the Body Politick: 1250–1750* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); Jennifer Nevile, *The Eloquent Body: Dance and Humanist Culture in Fifteenth-Century Italy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). On dancing lawyers, see Robert R. Pearce, *History of the Inns of Court and Chancery with Notices of Their Ancient Discipline, Rules, Orders, and Customs, Readings, Moots, Masques, Revels, and Entertainments, Including an Account of the Eminent Men of the Four Learned and Honourable Societies* (London: Richard Bentley, 1848). There is a considerable debate regarding whether Descartes indeed was the author of *La naissance de la paix*. Richard A. Watson, in *Descartes’s Ballet: His Doctrine of the Will and His Political Philosophy* (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2007), insists that he was not. In a more recent work, Gustafsson insists that he was. Lars Gustafsson, “Was Descartes Queen Kristina’s Peace Advocate? The Authorship of *La naissance de la paix*,” *Studia Neophilologica* 90, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 71–89.
  - 13 Julia Prest, “The Politics of Ballet at the Court of Louis XIV,” in Nevile, ed., *Dance, Spectacle, and the Body Politick*, 229.
  - 14 Ingrid Brainard, “Court and Social Dance before 1800,” in *International Encyclopedia of Dance*, ed. Selma Jeanne Cohen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
  - 15 Roy C. Strong, *Art and Power: Renaissance Festivals 1450–1650* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1999) and *Splendor at Court: Renaissance Spectacle and the Theater of Power* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).
  - 16 See Jacob Burckhardt, “The Italian State and the Individual,” in *The Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy*, vol. 1 (London: Sonnenschein, 1904), 129–33. The most unashamedly self-promotional individual was surely Benvenuto Cellini; see *The Life of Benvenuto Cellini*, ed. Royal Cortissoz, trans. John Addington Symonds (New York: Brentano’s, 1906).
  - 17 See, e.g., Daniel Philpott, “The Founding of the Sovereign States System at Westphalia,” in *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 75–149; or the summary in Daniel Philpott, “Sovereignty,” in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2016), <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/>.

- 18 This paragraph paraphrases sections from William N. West, “The Idea of a Theater: Humanist Ideology and the Imaginary Stage in Early Modern Europe,” *Renaissance Drama* 28 (1997): 247–48. For a cognitive perspective on early modern theater, see Evelyn B. Tribble, *Cognition in the Globe: Attention and Memory in Shakespeare’s Theatre* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Laurie Johnson, John Sutton, and Evelyn Tribble, eds., *Embodied Cognition and Shakespeare’s Theatre: The Early Modern Body-Mind* (New York: Routledge, 2014).
- 19 On the ship metaphor, see Hans Blumenberg, *Shipwreck with Spectator: Paradigm of a Metaphor for Existence* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). On the clockwork metaphor, see Otto Mayr, *Authority, Liberty, and Automatic Machinery in Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). On the kite as a metaphor for the state, see Gert-Jan Johannes and Inger Leemans, “The Kite of State: The Political Iconography of Kiting in the Dutch Republic 1600–1800,” *Early Modern Low Countries* 1, no. 2 (December 22, 2017): 201–30.
- 20 On *lo stato* as the “status” of the ruler, see Quentin Skinner, “The State,” in *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, ed. Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 90–131; “The Politics of Spectacle,” in Strong, *Splendor at Court*, 19–78.
- 21 On the *politique magnificence* of Catherine de’ Medici, see Strong, *Splendor at Court*, 121–68. “The history of festivals at the Valois court in the second half of the sixteenth century,” as Strong puts it, referring to Catherine de’ Medici, “is so closely bound up with her that they can almost be written in biographical terms.” *Ibid.*, 121.
- 22 Margaret M. McGowan, “Balet Comique de La Royne, Le,” in Cohen, ed., *International Encyclopedia of Dance*; Thomas M. Greene, “The King’s One Body in the Balet Comique de La Royne,” *Yale French Studies*, no. 86 (1994): 75–93.
- 23 On Renaissance slang, see Alan Brissenden, *Shakespeare and the Dance* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981), 11. On the Pythagorean magic and dance, see Jennifer Nevile, “Order, Proportion, and Geometric Forms: The Cosmic Structure of Dance, Grand Gardens, and Architecture during the Renaissance,” in Nevile, ed., *Dance, Spectacle, and the Body Politick*, 295–311.
- 24 The commercialization of agriculture was brought on by the enclosure movement, Thomas More pointed out, “by which your sheep, that are naturally mild, and easily kept in order, may be said now to devour men, and unpeople, not only villages but towns.” Thomas More, *Utopia*, trans. Gilbert Burnet (London: Richard Chiswell, 1684), 21.
- 25 Michel de Montaigne, “Of Repenting,” in *The Essayes of Michael Lord of Montaigne*, trans. John Florio, vol. 2 (London: Grant Richards, 1908), sec. II, 21. In John Florio’s translation from 1603.
- 26 John Donne, *An Anatomy of the World: Wherein, by Occasion of the Untimely Death of Mistris Elizabeth Drury* (London: S. Macham, 1611). On Renaissance conceptions of motion, see Michel Jeanneret, *Perpetual Motion: Transforming Shapes in the Renaissance from Da Vinci to Montaigne*, trans. Nidra Poller (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). Cognitive theory meets Renaissance literature in Kathryn Banks and Timothy Chesters, eds., *Movement in Renaissance Literature: Exploring Kinesic Intelligence* (London: Springer, 2018).
- 27 On the great chain metaphor, see Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976). On the body metaphor, see Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King’s Two Bodies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).

- 28 Human beings, as Pico della Mirandola pointed out in “Oration on the Dignity of Man” (1486), are constrained by no limits, but “[t]o him it is granted to have whatever he chooses, to be whatever he wills”; human beings are “the makers and the molders” of themselves. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, “Oration on the Dignity of Man,” in *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man: Petrarca, Valla, Ficino, Pico, Pomponazzi, Vives*, ed. Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman Randall, trans. Elizabeth Livermore Forbes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 225.
- 29 Montaigne, *Essayes of Michael Lord of Montaigne*, vol. 2, sec. XII, 399. Compare Pascal: “I behold the vast distances of the Universe that contains me, and find myself confin’d to a Corner of this vast Body, not knowing wherefore I am placed rather in this place than another; nor why the little time allotted to be to live, is assign’d me at this Point rather than any other, of that Eternity that has gone before, or shall follow after me.” Blaise Pascal, *Monsieur Pascall’s Thoughts, Meditations, and Prayers, Touching Matters Moral and Divine*, ed. Gilberte Perier and Jean Filleau de la Chaise, trans. Joseph Walker (London: Jacob Tonson, 1688), 43.
- 30 Pascal, *Monsieur Pascall’s Thoughts*, 43–44. On Renaissance theories of subjectivity and theories of mind, see Miranda Anderson, *The Renaissance Extended Mind* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 145–78.
- 31 “Imperious Caesar, dead and turn’d to Clay / Might stoppe a hole, to keepe the wind away / O that that earth which kept the world in awe / Should patch a wall t’expell the waters flaw!” William Shakespeare, *The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmarke* (London: John Smethwicke, 1611), Act V, scene 1.
- 32 Norbert Elias, *The Court Society*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Pantheon, 1983), 78–115. “Etiquette was borne unwillingly, but it could not be breached from within, not only because the kin demanded its preservation, but because the social existence of the people enmeshed in it was itself bound to it.” Ibid., 87; Lepenies, referring to Elias, points to the immense tedium covered up by the rulers. “Etiquette was, after all, a means of passing the time; the lack of it made people conscious of time and of the fact that there was nothing to do because they were not allowed to do anything.” Wolf Lepenies, *Melancholy and Society* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 35.
- 33 Baldassarre Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier*, trans. Thomas Hoby (London: D. Nutt, 1900), 1. The Italian original has no similar subtitle. Baldassarre Castiglione, *Il libro del cortegiano del conte Baldesar Castiglione* (Venice: Alessandro Paganini, 1528).
- 34 See Richard Mulcaster, *The Educational Writings of Richard Mulcaster*, ed. J. Orin Oliphant (Glasgow: James Maclehose, 1903); Roger Ascham, *The Scholemaster* (London: Iohn Daye, 1570); Thomas Elyot, *The Boke Named the Governour Devised by Sir Thomas Elyot, Knight*, ed. Henry Herbert Stephen Croft (London: K. Paul, Trench, 1883).
- 35 Thoinot Arbeau, *Orchesography: A Treatise in the Form of a Dialogue Whereby All Manner of Persons May Easily Acquire and Practise the Honourable Exercise of Dancing*, trans. Cyril W. Beaumont (New York: Dance Horizons, 1966), 22.
- 36 “Affectation or curiosity and (to speak a new word) to use in every thyng a certain Recklessness, to cover art withall, and seeme whatsoever he doth and sayeth to do it wythout pain, and (as it were) not mynding it.” Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier*, 59.
- 37 Molière, *Le bourgeois gentilhomme: The Tradesman Turned Gentleman*, trans. Curtis Hidden Page (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1912), 15. The title of the play is variously rendered into English as “The Bourgeois Gentleman,” “The

- Tradesman Turned Gentleman,” “The Middle-Class Aristocrat,” or “The Would-Be Noble.”
- 38 Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier*, 59.
  - 39 “Since, when, they still are carried in a round / And changing come one in anothers place / Yet doe they neither mingle nor confound / But every one doth keepe the bounded space.” John Davies, “Orchestra,” in *The Complete Poems of Sir John Davies*, ed. Alexander Balloch Grosart (London: Chatto and Windus, 1876), 167. Discussed in Sarah Thesiger, “The Orchestra of Sir John Davies and the Image of the Dance,” *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 36 (1973): 277–304.
  - 40 Davies, “Orchestra,” 173.
  - 41 Montaigne, *Essayes of Michael Lord of Montaigne*, vol. 2, sec. II, 21.
  - 42 See the contributions to Banks and Chesters, eds., *Movement in Renaissance Literature*.
  - 43 Quoted in Maureen Needham, “Louis XIV and the Académie Royale de Danse, 1661: A Commentary and Translation,” *Dance Chronicle* 20, no. 2 (1997): 180–81.
  - 44 This *corps diplomatique*, as Mattingly points out, was first established at the Papal court in Rome. Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964), 91–93.
  - 45 On the rules of precedent and the quarrels occasioned by them, see, e.g., Ernest Mason Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1922), 22–35.
  - 46 Bulstrode Whitelocke, *A Journal of the Swedish Embassy in the Years 1663 and 1664*, ed. Charles Morton and Henry Reeve, vol. 1 (London: Longman, 1855), 287. See further R. H. Whitelocke, *Memoirs, Biographical and Historical, of Bulstrode Whitelocke: Lord Commissioner of the Great Seal, and Ambassador at the Court of Sweden, at the Period of the Commonwealth* (London: Routledge, Warne, and Routledge, 1860), 319–414.
  - 47 Whitelocke, *A Journal of the Swedish Embassy*, 1:293.
  - 48 Francesco Guicciardini, *Storia d'Italia di Francesco Guicciardini*, vol. 1 (Naples: Unione tipografica editrice torinese, 1874), 41.
  - 49 As a young man, Guicciardini confessed, he had been skeptical of dancing and similar frivolities, but he came to regret this verdict once he had “seen from experience that these ornaments and accomplishments lend dignity and reputation even to men of good rank.” Francesco Guicciardini, *Maxims and Reflections*, trans. Mario Domandi (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972), para. 179.
  - 50 John Almon and John Adams, eds., “Treaty of Peace between England and France,” in *A Collection of All the Treaties of Peace, Alliance, and Commerce, between Great-Britain and Other Powers* (London: J. Almon, 1772), 116.
  - 51 Desmond F. Strobel, “Quadrille,” in Cohen, ed., *International Encyclopedia of Dance*. The term *quadrille* may derive from Italian *squadra*, meaning a troop of armed horsemen formed into a square for military defense and tournament games.
  - 52 Anne Marguerite du Noyer, *Lettres historiques et galantes*, vol. 6 (Paris: F. Seguin, 1790), 111–22. Madame du Noyer was one of the first female journalists. A Calvinist who had taken refuge in Holland, she was the editor of *Quintessence des nouvelles historiques, critiques, politiques, morales et galantes*. Her life is discussed in Henriette Goldwyn and Suzan van Dijk, “Madame Du Noyer Presenting and Re-Presenting the Peace of Utrecht,” in *Performances of Peace: Utrecht 1713* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 93–113.
  - 53 Louis XIV, *Mémoires de Louis XIV pour l'instruction du Dauphin* (Paris: Didier, 1860), 568. And the foreigners will “juger avantageusement, par ce qu'on voit, de ce qu'on ne voit pas.” Ibid.



- 54 On the distinction between external and internal sovereignty, see, e.g., Philpott, “Sovereignty.”
- 55 These etymological connections are explored in West, “The Idea of a Theater.” A more extensive treatment is William N. West, *Theatres and Encyclopedias in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
- 56 Abraham Ortelius, *Theatrum orbis terrarum*, ed. Aegid Coppenius Diesth and Humphrey Llwyd (Antwerp: Apud Aegid. Coppenium Diesth, 1570). More generally on the “geographical revolution” in early modern Europe, see P. D. A. Harvey, *Maps in Tudor England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 7–25; Michael Biggs, “Putting the State on the Map: Cartography, Territory, and European State Formation,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41, no. 2 (1999): 390–98. Compare Thongchai’s concept of a “geo-body.” Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997).
- 57 On the triangulation of France, see Josef W. Konvitz, “The Nation-State, Paris and Cartography in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century France,” *Journal of Historical Geography* 16, no. 1 (January 1990): 3–16. On the political use of maps, see Harvey, *Maps in Tudor England*, 42–65.
- 58 Jean Dorat, *Magnificentissimi spectaculi a regina regum matre in hortis suburbanis editi, in Henrici regis Poloniae* (Paris: F. Morelli, 1573). Extensively discussed in Ewa Kociszewska, “War and Seduction in Cybele’s Garden: Contextualizing the Ballet des Polonais,” *Renaissance Quarterly* 65, no. 3 (2012): 809–63. Compare the discussion in Greene, “The King’s One Body in the Balet Comique de La Royne.”
- 59 William Davenant, “Britannia Triumphans,” in *The Dramatic Works*, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: W. Paterson, 1872), 245–300. Quote from “Galatea’s Song,” *ibid.*, 288. Discussed in Barbara Ravelhofer, *The Early Stuart Masque: Dance, Costume, and Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 102–7, 238–41.

## Chapter 3

- 1 Damasio builds a conscious self in three stages: (1) the protoself, (2) the core self, and (3) the autobiographical self. Conscious processes develop before a sense of self. Damasio, *Self Comes to Mind*, chap. 8.
- 2 James, “Stream of Thought,” in *Principles of Psychology*, 1:224–90. On self-commentary by small children, see Marie-Cécile Bertau, “Developmental Origins of the Dialogical Self: Early Childhood Years,” in *Handbook of Dialogical Self Theory*, ed. Hubert J. M. Hermans and Thorsten Gieser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 64–81. On the dialogical self more generally, see the contributions to Hermans and Gieser, eds., *Handbook of Dialogical Self Theory*.
- 3 David McNeill, *Gesture and Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Susan Goldin-Meadow, “The Role of Gesture in Communication and Thinking,” *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 3, no. 11 (1999): 419–29; S. L. Beilock and S. Goldin-Meadow, “Gesture Changes Thought by Grounding It in Action,” *Psychological Science*, no. 11 (2010): 1605.
- 4 “We ought to say a feeling of and, a feeling of if, a feeling of but, and a feeling of by, quite as readily as we say a feeling of blue or a feeling of cold.” James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1:245–46. Mark Johnson discusses “James’ but” in “Language and Embodied Mind,” YouTube, [www.youtube.com/watch?v=nda7xAIG3do](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nda7xAIG3do). And with an application to music: Mark L. Johnson and Steve Larson, “‘Something in the Way She Moves’: Metaphors of Musical Motion,” *Metaphor and Symbol* 18, no. 2 (2003): 63–84.

- 5 Sheets-Johnstone, *The Primacy of Movement*, 315–16, 439–41. Steve Paxton talks about “contact improvisation” in “Steve Paxton Talking Dance,” Walker Art Center, 2015, YouTube, at 31:23, [www.youtube.com/watch?v=\\_82Od5NM4LI](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_82Od5NM4LI). Mary Wigman: “There was from the very beginning something like a feeling of ‘being called’ that came from afar, emerging from a deep darkness and relentlessly demanding. It forced the glance of my uplifted eyes to turn toward the depths and made me spread out my arms like a barrier which rose up against an onrushing power.” Mary Wigman, *The Language of Dance* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1966), 18.
- 6 Alva Noë, *Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009), 117–20. Carlisle discusses Spinoza’s critique of habitual thinking in Clare Carlisle, *On Habit* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 41–46. “When we see that our thinking is far more often passive than active, we realize that we are seldom the authors of our thoughts.” *Ibid.*, 46.
- 7 Noë, *Out of Our Heads*, 106–10.
- 8 Martin Heidegger, “What Calls for Thinking?,” in *Basic Writings*, ed. Krell Farrell (New York: Harper & Row, 1997), 372. “What calls on us to think demands for itself that it be tended, cared for, husbanded in its own essential being, by thought.” *Ibid.*, 390. On how emotions break situations and provoke thought, see Eugene T. Gendlin, “A Phenomenology of Emotions: Anger,” in *Explorations in Phenomenology*, ed. David Carr and Edward S. Casey (Dordrecht: Springer, 1973), 382–88.
- 9 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Le devin du village: Intermède représenté a Fontainebleau devant leurs majestés les 18. et 24. octobre 1752, et a Paris par l’Academie royale de musique le 1er. mars 1753* (Paris: Le Clerc, 1753). Or watch it in a production with L’Orchestre de la Suisse Romande: “Le Devin du Village,” Télévision Suisse Romande, September 16, 1962, <http://archive.org/details/RousseauLeDevinDuVillage>.
- 10 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Confessions* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1904), II:32.
- 11 *Ibid.*, II:31–32.
- 12 On the history of performances, see Jean-Claude Brenac, “Le Devin du Village,” *Opéra Baroque*, 2019, [https://operabaroque.fr/ROUSSEAU\\_DEVIN.htm](https://operabaroque.fr/ROUSSEAU_DEVIN.htm).
- 13 As for Rousseau’s encounter with Italian opera: “I had brought with me from Paris the national prejudice against Italian music, but Nature had also endowed me with that fine feeling against which such prejudices are powerless. I soon conceived for this music the passion which it inspires in those who are capable of judging it correctly.” Rousseau, *Confessions*, I:286; Rousseau tells the story of *Devin du village* in *ibid.*, II:31–38.
- 14 Rousseau, *Confessions*, II:35.
- 15 *Ibid.*, I:286–88. For more on “the ladies,” see Jolanta T. Pekacz, “Salon Women and the Quarrels about Opera in Eighteenth-Century Paris,” *The European Legacy* 1, no. 4 (1996): 1608–14.
- 16 F. W. von Grimm, “The Little Prophet of Boehmischbroda, 1753,” in *Source Readings in Music History: From Classical Antiquity through the Romantic Era*, ed. Oliver Strunk (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950), 622–23. Or, in Rousseau’s own words: “I think I have shown that there is neither measure nor melody in French music, because the language is not capable of them. . . . From this I conclude that the French have no music and cannot have any; or that if they ever have, it will be so much the worse for them.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Lettre sur la musique française,” in Strunk, ed., *Source Readings in Music History*, 654.



- 17 Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, *Bastien und Bastienne*, KV50, Settimana Mozartiana 2016, 2018, YouTube, [www.youtube.com/watch?v=y9JLymKOPho](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y9JLymKOPho). Mozart's version is directly based on Marie Justine Benoîte Favart and Harny de Guerville, *Les amours de Bastien et Bastienne: Parodie du Devin de village* (Paris: Chez Duchesne, 1770).
- 18 "At last . . . I played on that miserable, wretched pianoforte! But what vexed me most of all was that Madame and all her gentlemen never interrupted their drawing for a moment, but went on intently, so that I had to play to the chairs, tables and walls." Quoted in James H. Johnson, *Listening in Paris: A Cultural History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 76.
- 19 Ibid., 17–19.
- 20 Paul Guyer, "The Origin of Modern Aesthetics, 1711–35," in *The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics*, ed. Peter Kivy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 15–44. Compare an incident at a concert with the New York Philharmonic. When "the unmistakably jarring sound of an iPhone marimba ring interrupted the soft and spiritual final measures of Mahler's Symphony No. 9," the conductor, unusually, stopped the performance, and the audience was "baying for blood." Daniel J. Wakin, "Ringing Finally Ended, but There's No Button to Stop Shame," *New York Times*, January 13, 2012.
- 21 On Pythagoras, see Eli Maor, *Music by the Numbers: From Pythagoras to Schoenberg* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 13–21. As Ozanam's *Dictionnaire mathématique* explained, "La musique est une science, qui recherche, et explique les propriétés des sons, en tant qu'ils sont capables de produire quelque mélodie, ou quelque harmonie." Jacques Ozanam, "Musique," in *Dictionnaire mathématique ou idée générale de mathématique* (Amsterdam: Huguëtan, 1691), 640. An eighteenth-century example is Alexandre Savérien, "Histoire de l'acoustique et de la musique," in *Histoire des progrès de l'esprit humain dans les sciences exactes et dans les arts qui en dépendent* (Paris: Chez Lacombe, 1766), 336–74.
- 22 Johannes Kepler, *The Harmony of the World*, ed. E. J. Aiton, A. M. Duncan, and J. V. Field (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1997), 439–48. For a wider application of the argument, compare the "Political Digression on the Three Means" that Kepler inserts in the middle of the text. Ibid., 255–79. On Descartes in this context, see Kate van Orden, "Descartes on Musical Training and the Body," in *Music, Sensation, and Sensuality*, ed. Linda Phyllis Austern (Routledge, 2013), 29–50. On Newton, see Penelope Gouk, "Newton and Music: From the Microcosm to the Macrocosm," *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science* 1, no. 1 (1986): 36–59.
- 23 Jean-Philippe Rameau, *Traité de l'harmonie réduite à ses principes naturels* (Paris: Baptiste-Christophe Ballard, 1722), translated into English and reprinted as Jean-Philippe Rameau, *Treatise on Harmony*, trans. Philip Gossett (New York: Dover Publications, 1971).
- 24 Jean-Philippe Rameau, "From the *Traité de l'harmonie*," in Strunk, ed., *Source Readings in Music History*, 567.
- 25 Ibid., 569. See further Rameau, *Traité de l'harmonie réduite à ses principes naturels*; Jean-Philippe Rameau, *A Treatise of Music: Containing the Principles of Composition* (Dublin: Luke White, 1779).
- 26 Jean Le Rond d'Alembert, "Discours préliminaire des éditeurs," in *Encyclopédie*, n.d., <https://artflsrv03.uchicago.edu/philologica4/encyclopediae1117/navigate/1/3/>; Cynthia Verba, *Music and the French Enlightenment: Rameau and the Philosophes in Dialogue* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
- 27 René Descartes, *A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences*, trans. Ian Maclean (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 28.

- 28 Nicolas Malebranche, *Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1923), 33.
- 29 Thomas Hobbes, “Of Reason, and Science,” in *Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan; or, The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civill* (London: A. Crooke, 1651), 18.
- 30 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Leibniz: Selections*, ed. Philip Wiener (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951), 17.
- 31 Pascal, *Monsieur Pascall’s Thoughts*, 150.
- 32 Jean-François Senault, *The Use of Passions*, ed. Henry Carey Monmouth and Riviere & Son. Binding (London: J. L. and Humphrey Moseley, 1649), 103; Jean François Senault, *De l’usage des passions* (Paris: Claude De La Roche, & C. Rey, 1684).
- 33 Senault, *The Use of Passions*, 108.
- 34 Edward Nye discusses pantomime and *ballet d’action* in a number of works, summarized in Edward Nye, *Mime, Music and Drama on the Eighteenth-Century Stage: The Ballet d’Action* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Compare Noverre: “Je sentis que la danse en action pouvoit s’associer tous les arts imitateurs et le devenir elle-même.” Jean Georges Noverre, *Lettres sur la danse, sur les ballets et les arts* (St. Petersburg: J. C. Schnoor, 1803), viii.
- 35 Noverre, *Lettres sur la danse, sur les ballets et les arts*, iv; Jean Georges Noverre, *Lettres on Dancing and Ballets* (Brooklyn: Dance Horizons, 1975), 2.
- 36 Louis de Cahusac, *La danse ancienne et moderne, ou Traité historique de la danse* (The Hague: Jean Neaulme, 1754). On Marie Sallé’s pioneering work, see Sarah McCleave, “Marie Sallé and the Development of the Ballet en Action,” *Journal of the Society for Musicology in Ireland* 3 (2007): 1–23.
- 37 Jean Georges Noverre, *Agamemnon vengé: Ballet tragique en cinq actes* (Strasbourg, 1784). The libretto is reprinted in its entirety in Nye, *Mime, Music and Drama*, 259–71.
- 38 The similarities between this plot and that of Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* is explored in Gilbert Murray, *Hamlet and Orestes: A Study in Traditional Types* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1914).
- 39 Adam Smith, “Of the Nature of That Imitation Which Takes Place in What Are Called the Imitative Arts,” in *Essays: Philosophical and Literary* (London: Ward, Lock, 1869), 417. Smith’s essay was written sometime before 1759. See further Catherine Labio, “Adam Smith’s Aesthetics,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Adam Smith*, ed. Christopher J. Berry, Maria Pia Paganelli, and Craig Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 105–25.
- 40 Brooks discusses pantomime in a chapter on “the text of muteness,” but does not mention the *ballet d’action*. Peter Brooks, *The Melodramatic Imagination: Balzac, Henry James, Melodrama, and the Mode of Excess* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 56–80.
- 41 Eduard Hanslick, *The Beautiful in Music: A Contribution to the Revisal of Musical Aesthetics*, trans. Gustav Cohen (London: Novello, 1891), 59.
- 42 Ange Goudar, in a book published in his wife’s name: Sara Goudar, *Supplement au supplement sur les remarques de la musique et de la danse* (1774), 75–112. As he also pointed out: “Ordinary mute people have an easier time making themselves understood than [these dancers].” *Ibid.*, 82.
- 43 Thomas Elsaesser, “Tales of Sound and Fury: Observations on the Family Melodrama,” in *Imitations of Life: A Reader on Film and Television Melodrama*, ed. Marcia Landy (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1991), 68–91; Peter Brooks, “The Melodramatic Imagination,” in *ibid.*, 68–91. On the style of acting in silent films, see Erwin Panofsky, “Style and Medium in the Motion Pictures,” in *Three Essays on Style* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 26–27.

- 44 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Essai sur l’origine des langues: Où il est parlé de la mélodie et de l’imitation musicale,” in *Oeuvres complètes de J.-J. Rousseau* (Paris: Hachette, 1856), 370–408; Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, *Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines* (Paris: Libraires associés, 1787); Abbé de Condillac, *An Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge: Being a Supplement to Mr. Locke’s Essay on the Human Understanding* (London: J. Nourse, 1756).
- 45 Denis Diderot, *Lettre sur les sourds et muets: À l’usage de ceux qui entendent & qui parlent* (Paris, 1751). In 1760, Charles-Michel de l’Épée opened a first school for deaf children in Paris, giving them instructions in the *signes méthodiques* he invented. Charles Michel L’Épée, *L’art d’enseigner à parler aux sourds-muets de naissance*, ed. Roch Ambroise Sicard (Paris: Dentu, 1820).
- 46 Condillac, *Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge*, 169–71.
- 47 Ibid., 169–300.
- 48 For Locke’s views on language, see John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (London: W. Baynes, 1823), 330–439.
- 49 Johann Gottfried von Herder, “Treatise on the Origin of Language,” in *Herder: Philosophical Writings*, ed. Michael N. Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 65–164; Charles Taylor, *The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2016), 102–28.
- 50 Charles Taylor, “Language and Human Nature,” in *Human Agency and Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 227–28. Langer talks about “the great advent of Language” and quotes Helen Keller: “Everything had a name, and each name gave birth to a new thought. As we returned to the house every object which I touched seemed to quiver with life.” Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key*, 50–52. See Helen Keller, *The Story of My Life* (New York: Doubleday, Page, 1903), 24.
- 51 Herder, “Treatise on the Origin of Language,” 77–81, 127–39; Taylor, *The Language Animal*, 6–13, 37–41; Charles Taylor, “The Importance of Herder,” in *Philosophical Arguments* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 79–99. On “image-schemas,” see Johnson, *Meaning of the Body*, 136, 176–206.
- 52 Brenac, “Le Devin du Village.”
- 53 Johnson, *Listening in Paris*, 24; Gaston Capon and Robert Yve-Plessis, *Les théâtres clandestins* (Paris: Plessis, 1905), 188, 206.
- 54 Natalie Lecomte, “The Female Ballet Troupe of the Paris Opera from 1700 to 1725,” in *Women’s Work: Making Dance in Europe before 1800*, ed. Lynn Brooks (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), 106–7.
- 55 On Mlle Guimard, see Robert Bruce Douglas, *Sophie Arnould, Actress and Wit* (Paris: C. Carrington, 1898), 33–35, 78, 91; Catherine Rosalie Gerard Duthé, *Souvenirs de Mlle Duthé de l’opéra, 1748–1830*, ed. Paul Ginisty (Paris: L. Michaud, 1909), 38–39, 180–82, 307–10; Karl Toepfer, “Orgy Salon: Aristocracy and Pornographic Theatre in Pre-Revolutionary Paris,” *Performing Arts Journal* 12, nos. 2–3 (1990): 115–17.
- 56 Capon and Yve-Plessis, *Les théâtres clandestins*, 210, 214; Toepfer, “Orgy Salon,” 116.
- 57 Capon and Yve-Plessis, *Les théâtres clandestins*, 216–17. Restif de la Bretonne is today remembered above all as the first chronicler of foot fetishism. Restif de la Bretonne, *Le pied de Fanchette* (Paris: A. Quantin, 1881). On the relationship between Mlle Raucourt and Mlle Dervieux, see Hector Fleischmann, *Le cénacle libertin de Mlle Raucourt (de la Comédie-Française)* (Paris: Bibliothèque des curieux, 1912), 102.

- 58 Marius Petipa, a French choreographer, became head of the Imperial Ballet in Moscow in 1862 and proceeded to stage many of the classical Russian ballets, including those of Tchaikovsky. Tim Scholl, *From Petipa to Balanchine: Classical Revival and the Modernization of Ballet* (London: Routledge, 1994), 1–16.
- 59 Jules Janin, “Notices sur *La sylphide*,” in *Les beautés de l’opéra, ou Chefs-d’œuvres lyriques*, ed. Théophile Gautier, Jules Gabriel Janin, and Philarète Chasles (Paris: Soulié, 1845), 22; Susan Leigh Foster, “The Ballerina’s Phallic Pointe,” in *Corporealities: Dancing Knowledge, Culture and Power*, ed. Susan Leigh Foster (London: Routledge, 1996), 1–24.
- 60 On the effect of gas lighting on nineteenth-century stagecraft, see Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *Disenchanted Night: The Industrialization of Light in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 191–221. But the lights were dangerous: “Several principal dancers were killed when their gossamer costumes accidentally touched the gas lanterns lining the stage.” Molly Engelhardt, “Marie Taglioni, Ballerina Extraordinaire: In the Company of Women,” *Nineteenth-Century Gender Studies* 6, no. 3 (2010): 1.
- 61 Johanne Luise Heiberg, “Memories of Taglioni and Ellsler,” *Dance Chronicle* 4, no. 1 (1980): 17. See also the reviews collected in Gautier et al., eds., *Les beautés de l’opéra*. More on the rivalry in Engelhardt, “Marie Taglioni, Ballerina Extraordinaire,” 11–16. The director of the Opéra de Paris, Louis-Désiré Véron, tells the story in “Les demoiselle de l’Opéra,” in *Mémoires d’un bourgeois de Paris comprenant: La fin de l’Empire, la Restauration, la Monarchie de Juillet, et la République jus-qu’au rétablissement de l’Empire*, vol. 3 (Paris: Gabriel de Gonet, 1853), 269–309.

## Chapter 4

- 1 Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy* (London: Williams & Norgate, 1912), 72–92; Gilbert Ryle, “Knowing How and Knowing That,” in *The Concept of Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 14–48. James made a distinction between “knowledge of acquaintance” and “knowledge-about.” James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1:221–23. The distinction is updated by Thomas Fuchs in “Embodied Knowledge – Embodied Memory,” in *Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives: Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium*, ed. Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl and Harald A. Wilsche (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), 215–29.
- 2 Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, 74–75, 82–90.
- 3 Ibid., 73–81. On face recognition, see Michael Polanyi, *Tacit Dimension* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 4–5. Knowledge that is tacit to humans may not be tacit to a computer. Compare Alfred Ng, “China Tightens Control with Facial Recognition, Public Shaming,” *CNET*, August 11, 2020, [www.cnet.com/news/in-china-facial-recognition-public-shaming-and-control-go-hand-in-hand/](http://www.cnet.com/news/in-china-facial-recognition-public-shaming-and-control-go-hand-in-hand/).
- 4 Eugene Gendlin discusses embodied knowledge in a number of works. See, e.g., Eugene T. Gendlin, “Thinking beyond Patterns: Body, Language, and Situations,” in *The Presence of Feeling in Thought*, ed. Bernard den Ouden and Marcia Moen (New York: Peter Lang, 1992), reprinted at <http://previous.focusing.org/tbp.html>. “My ideas about another person (or myself),” he points out, “can lead to finding something in direct experience. But what comes in direct experience is always much more intricate than my original ideas.” Ibid., 4. On why robots cannot dance, see McArthur Mignon and John Sutton, “Why Robots Can’t Haka: Skilled

- Performance and Embodied Knowledge in the Māori Haka,” *Synthese*, January 3, 2021.
- 5 The term “implicit relational knowledge” is from Stern, *The Interpersonal World of the Infant*. The last couple of sentences in this paragraph paraphrase Fuchs, “The Tacit Dimension,” 324. Fuchs associates a loss of implicit relational knowledge with mental illnesses such as schizophrenia. *Ibid.*, 325.
  - 6 On imitative behavior in newborns, see Andrew N. Meltzoff and Wolfgang Prinz, *The Imitative Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Andrew N. Meltzoff and Rechele Brooks, “Eyes Wide Shut: The Importance of Eyes in Infant Gaze Following and Understanding Other Minds,” in *Gaze Following: Its Development and Significance*, ed. R. Flom, K. Lee, and D. Muir (Mahwah: Erlbaum, 2007), 217–41; Johnson, *Meaning of the Body*. On “skillful coping,” see Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Skillful Coping: Essays on the Phenomenology of Everyday Perception and Action*, ed. Mark A. Wrathall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
  - 7 Luke 1:34.
  - 8 On marching, see William H. McNeill, *Keeping Together in Time: Dance and Drill in Human History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 1–11. On dancing, see Barbara Ehrenreich, *Dancing in the Streets: A History of Collective Joy* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), 207–24.
  - 9 Hanne De Jaeger and Ezequiel Di Paolo, “Participatory Sense-Making,” *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 6, no. 4 (2007): 485–507; Vittorio Gallese, Morris N. Eagle, and Paolo Migone, “Intentional Attunement: Mirror Neurons and the Neural Underpinnings of Interpersonal Relations,” *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 55, no. 1 (2007): 131–75. And a sociological perspective: Kelvin Jay Booth, “The Meaning of the Social Body: Bringing George Herbert Mead to Mark Johnson’s Theory of Embodied Mind,” *William James Studies* 12, no. 1 (2016): 1–18.
  - 10 E. G. Ravenstein, *A Journal of the First Voyage of Vasco da Gama, 1497–1499* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 11.
  - 11 Colley claims Europeans gained a military advantage over non-Europeans only after about 1850. Linda Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850* (London: Anchor, 2004). The welcoming ceremonies in Dahomey, West Africa, included dancing kings. John Milum, *Thomas Birch Freeman: Missionary Pioneer to Ashanti, Dahomey, and Egbá* (New York: F. H. Revell, 1893).
  - 12 Janet Schaw, *Journal of a Lady of Quality: Being the Narrative of a Journey from Scotland to the West Indies, North Carolina, and Portugal, in the Years 1774 to 1776*, ed. Evangeline Walker Andrews and Charles McLean Andrews (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1921), 68. Schaw was a Scottish traveler known for the diary she kept during her journey to the West Indies. See further Elizabeth A. Bohls, “The Aesthetics of Colonialism: Janet Schaw in the West Indies, 1774–1775,” *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 27, no. 3 (Spring 1994): 363–90.
  - 13 Quoted in Carlo Blasis, *The Code of Terpsichore: The Art of Dancing*, trans. R. Barton (London: Edward Bull, 1830), 26. “The dance they generally indulged in is called the Hornpipe.” *Ibid.*, 27.
  - 14 Herman Melville, *Moby Dick, or The Whale* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1851), 190.
  - 15 Abel Janszoon Tasman, *De reizen van Abel Janszoon Tasman en Franchoyts Jacobszoon Visscher ter nadere ontdekking van het Zuidland in 1642/3 en 1644*, ed. R. Posthumus Meyjes (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1919), 61; translated and reprinted in Andrew Sharp, *The Voyages of Abel Janszoon Tasman* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 121.

- 16 Christopher Columbus, *Select Letters of Christopher Columbus: With Other Original Documents, Relating to His Four Voyages to the New World*, ed. Richard Henry Major, Charles McKew, and Ruth Parr, trans. Diego Alvarez Chanca (London: Hakluyt Society, 1870), 120. The quote continues on p. 121.
- 17 Charles Darwin, *Journal of Researches into the Natural History and Geology of the Countries Visited during the Voyage of H.M.S. "Beagle" Round the World*. (London: Ward, Lock, 1906), 206.
- 18 Ibid., 207.
- 19 John Hunter, *An Historical Journal of the Transactions at Port Jackson and Norfolk Island* (London: John Stockdale, 1793), 52–53.
- 20 Inga Clendinnen, *Dancing with Strangers: Europeans and Australians at First Contact* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 8. The picnic comparison is from p. 9. Bradley William, *A Voyage to New South Wales: The Journal of Lieutenant William Bradley RN of HMS Sirius, 1786–1792* (Auburn: Trustees of the Public Library of New South Wales, 1969).
- 21 On the subsequent fate of the Tierra del Fuegians, see John M. Cooper, *Analytical and Critical Bibliography of the Tribes of Tierra Del Fuego and Adjacent Territory* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian, 1917).
- 22 These exchanges are chronicled in Paul A. Scolieri, *Dancing the New World: Aztecs, Spaniards, and the Choreography of Conquest* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013), 127–49. On Las Casas, see pp. 102–13. Although the natives eventually converted to Christianity, it was difficult to convince them to abandon their former communal dances. Andrés Pérez de Ribas, *History of the Triumphs of Our Holy Faith amongst the Most Barbarous and Fierce Peoples of the New World*, ed. Daniel T. Reff, Maureen Ahern, and Richard K. Danford (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999), 550, 676.
- 23 Hunter, *Transactions at Port Jackson and Norfolk Island*, 211–12.
- 24 As noted by Clendinnen in *Dancing with Strangers*, 41. On the corroboree, see Candice Bruce and Anita Callaway, “Dancing in the Dark: Black Corroboree or White Spectacle?,” *Australian Journal of Art* 9, no. 1 (1991): 78–104.
- 25 Charles-Félix-Pierre Fesche, “Charles-Félix-Pierre Fesche’s Journal of Navigation,” ed. Sandhya Patel, *Journal for Maritime Research* 5, no. 1 (December 2003): 2. The official account of the journey is Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, *Voyage autour du monde, par la frégate du roi La Boudeuse et la flute l’Étoile, en 1766, 1767, 1768, & 1769* (Neuchâtel: L’Imprimerie de la Société typographique, 1772). “It was ver difficult, amidst such a sight,” Bougainville admitted, “to keep at work four hundred young French sailors, who had seen no women for six months.” Ibid., 218.
- 26 Fesche, “Journal of Navigation,” 3.
- 27 John Hawkesworth, *An Account of the Voyages Undertaken by the Order of His Present Majesty for Making Discoveries in the Southern Hemisphere* (London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1773), 2:206–7.
- 28 Quoted in Christopher Balme, *Pacific Performances: Theatricality and Cross-Cultural Encounter in the South Seas* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 39.
- 29 “Areoi,” in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (London: Horace Everett Hooper, 1911), Wikisource.
- 30 The ceremonies of the *areoi* are discussed with horror by William Ellis, *An Authentic Narrative of a Voyage Performed by Captain Cook and Captain Clerke, in His Majesty’s Ships Resolution and Discovery, during the Years 1776, 1777, 1778, 1779 and 1780*, vol. 1 (London: G. Robinson, J. Sewell, and J. Debrett, 1784), 159–62. “Many remain members all their lives,” Ellis notes, “and die in a most emaciated state, occasioned by their very debauched way of living.” Ibid., 1:161.



- Richard Lovett, *The History of the London Missionary Society, 1795–1895*, vol. 1 (London: H. Frowde, 1899), 148–50. On the staging of adventures in the South Seas, see Balme, *Pacific Performances*, 47–73.
- 31 Fesche, “Journal of Navigation,” 3.
- 32 Hawkesworth, *An Account of the Voyages*, 1:461.
- 33 The concept of *mana* was first introduced in Robert Henry Codrington, *The Melanesians: Studies in Their Anthropology and Folklore* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1891), 51, 57, 90, 103. He defines it as “spiritual power” (p. 51), a “magic chant” (p. 57), “magical power” (p. 90), and “supernatural influence” (p. 103). On the sexual politics of Pacific Ocean societies, see Marshall Sahlins, *Islands of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 37–38, 134–35, 155–56.
- 34 Fesche, “Journal of Navigation,” 14.
- 35 “Vous le voyez: le carnaval semble avoir donné une commotion électrique aux plaisirs. Le Congrès ne marche pas, il danse, nous disait le prince de Ligne.” Auguste Louis Charles La Garde-Chambonas, *Fêtes et souvenirs du Congrès de Vienne: Tableaux des salons, scènes anecdotiques et portraits*, vol. 2 (Paris: A. Appert, 1843), 548. Charles-Joseph, Prince of Ligne, was an Austrian field marshal, diplomat, prolific writer, and famous wit.
- 36 There are many accounts of the busy social agenda of the Congress. One collection is Friedrich Freksa, ed., *A Peace Congress of Intrigue (Vienna, 1815); A Vivid, Intimate Account of the Congress of Vienna Composed of the Personal Memoirs of Its Important Participants*, trans. Harry Hansen (New York: Century Co., 1919). A recent treatment is Brian E. Vick, *The Congress of Vienna: Power and Politics after Napoleon* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 21–65.
- 37 This is not a normal peace conference, as Metternich put it, but it should rather be considered as “une Europe sans distances.” Quoted in Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, *Mémoires du prince de Talleyrand*, ed. Albert de Broglie, vol. 2 (Paris: Lévy, 1891), 327.
- 38 Auguste Louis Charles La Garde-Chambonas, *Fêtes et souvenirs du Congrès de Vienne: Tableaux des salons, scènes anecdotiques et portraits*, 1814–1815, vol. 1 (Bruxelles: Société belge de librairie, 1843), 8. Translation taken from Auguste Louis Charles La Garde-Chambonas, *Anecdotal Recollections of the Congress of Vienna* (Chapman & Hall, 1902), 30.
- 39 Richard Bright, *Travels from Vienna through Lower Hungary: With Some Remarks on the State of Vienna during the Congress, in the Year 1814*, ed. Matthias Sennowitz et al. (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable, 1818), 10.
- 40 The ball is described in *ibid.*, 10–12; and in Garde-Chambonas, *Fêtes et souvenirs du Congrès de Vienne: Tableaux des salons, scènes anecdotiques et portraits*, 1814–1815, 1:29–35. Quote on p. 33. “La diplomatie et le plaisir se font presque toujours la guerre; à Vienne, on les voit se donner la main et marcher de compagnie.” *Ibid.*, 1:32.
- 41 On Viennese attractions, see Karl Baedeker, *Handbuch für Reisende in Deutschland und dem Oesterreichischen Kaiserstaat* (K. Baedeker, 1855), 1–34; Birgit Lodes, “‘Le Congrès Danse’: Set Form and Improvisation in Beethoven’s Polonaise for Piano, Op. 89,” *The Musical Quarterly* 93, nos. 3–4 (2010): 414–49. On the “salon networks,” see Vick, *The Congress of Vienna*, 112–52.
- 42 Ruth Katz, “The Egalitarian Waltz,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 15, no. 3 (1973): 368–77.
- 43 Arno J. Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War* (London: Verso, 2010), 129–87.

- 44 Clemens Wenzel Lothar Metternich, “Of the Necessity of a Censorship of the Press,” in *Memoirs of Prince Metternich*, ed. Alfons Klinkowström and Robina Napier, trans. Gerard W. Smith, vol. 2 (London: Richard Bentley, 1880), 226.
- 45 *Ibid.*, 227.
- 46 “Bal masque pendant le congres, 6 novembre, 1814,” René de La Boutetière Alexandrine Prévost de la Boutetière de Saint-Mars Du Montet, *Souvenirs de la baronne du Montet, 1785–1866* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1904), 113.
- 47 Albert Dresden Vandam Auguste Louis Charles La Garde-Chambonas, “A Famous Wit at the Congress: From the Reminiscences of the Count de La Garde,” in Freksa, ed., *A Peace Congress of Intrigue*, 82.
- 48 Some, such as Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, the French foreign minister, worried about the long-term consequences of such intimacy. “Royalty undoubtedly loses at these assemblies some of the grandeur which attends it,” as he put it. “To find three or four Kings and many more Princes at a ball or at tea with ordinary people of Vienna I find very unseemly.” Adam Zamoyski, *Rites of Peace: The Fall of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2008), 36.
- 49 William Wilson, *A Missionary Voyage to the Southern Pacific Ocean, Performed in the Years 1796, 1797, 1798, in the Ship Duff* (London: T. Chapman, 1799), 56.
- 50 *Ibid.*, 73–74. Compare the show put on during Bougainville’s visit in 1768: “We let them hear the music of our flutes, base-voils, and violins, and we entertained them with a fire-work of sky-rockets and firesnakes.” Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, *A Voyage Round the World. Performed by Order of His Most Christian Majesty, in the Years 1766, 1767, 1768, and 1769*, trans. Johann Reinhold Forster (London: J. Nourse, 1772), 223.
- 51 Wilson, *A Missionary Voyage to the Southern Pacific Ocean*, 74.
- 52 John Angell James, “The Christian Father’s Present to His Children,” in *The Works of John Angell James*, vol. 2 (London: Hamilton Adams & Co, 1860), 200. “Restrain your love of pleasure then, and do not consider it a necessary of life.” *Ibid.*, 206.
- 53 On the London Missionary Society in the Pacific Ocean, see William Ellis, *History of the London Missionary Society*, vol. 1 (London: John Snow, 1844), 1–46; Lovett, *The History of the London Missionary Society*, 1:3–113; Noenoe K. Silva, “Kānāwai E Ho’Opau I Na Hula Kuolo Hawai’i: The Political Economy of Banning the Hula,” *Hawaiian Journal of History* 34 (2000).
- 54 The go-to text on this topic is Eric Stokes, *The English Utilitarians and India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989). See further Jennifer Pitts, “Legislator of the World? A Rereading of Bentham on Colonies,” *Political Theory* 31, no. 2 (April 2003): 200–234.
- 55 James Mill, “Preface,” in *The History of British India*, vol. 1 (London: Baldwin, Cradock & Joy, 1826), xii. Cohn investigates the “investigative modalities” – how knowledge allowed them “to classify, categorize, and bound the vast social world that was India so that it could be controlled” – in which the British gathered knowledge. Bernard S. Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 4–5. “The British,” he points out, “felt most comfortable surveying India from above and at a distance – from a horse, an elephant, a boat, a carriage, or a train. They were uncomfortable in the narrow confines of a city street, a bazaar, a *mela* – anywhere they were surrounded by their Indian subjects.” “Mela” here refers to a fair or a festival. *Ibid.*, 10. Fabian makes the same point regarding knowledge acquisition in Africa. Johannes Fabian, *Out of Our Minds: Reason and Madness in the Exploration of Central Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 180–208.



- 56 On terror as administrative tool, see Elbridge Colby, “How to Fight Savage Tribes,” *The American Journal of International Law* 21, no. 2 (April 1927): 279–88. “Overwhelming, strange, and devastating force,” Colby explains, “may break down resistance completely and make for an early peace.” *Ibid.*, 283. On missionaries in Tonga going native, see Lovett, *The History of the London Missionary Society*, 1:156–57. “The hearts of the missionary community were deeply grieved by the receipt of a letter from Mr. Lewis, stating that it was now his fixed determination to marry a native woman.” *Ibid.*, 1:156. On the vulnerability of the Europeans, and their use of performative violence, see Fabian, *Out of Our Minds*, 143–50.
- 57 Joseph Conrad, “Outpost of Progress,” in *Tales of Unrest* (London: E. Nash & Grayson, 1900), 143. See also Joseph Conrad, “The Heart of Darkness,” in *Youth, a Narrative, and Two Other Stories* (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1902), 107–8, 162–63.
- 58 “Race operates pre-consciously on spoken and unspoken interaction, gesture, affect and stance,” as Alcoff points out. “Greetings, handshakes, proximity, tone of voice, all reveal the effects of racial awareness, the presumption of superiority vis-à-vis the other, or the protective defences against the possibility of racism and misrecognition.” Linda Martín Alcoff, “Towards a Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment,” *Radical Philosophy*, no. 95 (1999): 17–18. Compare the bodily posture of the elephant killing Englishman in George Orwell, “Shooting an Elephant,” *New Writing* 2 (Autumn 1936).
- 59 The tendency, as James Mill noted, is to decide that some European country is the pinnacle of civilization, and then to call non-European countries “civilized” to the extent that they resemble that country. James Mill, “Review of M. de Guignes, *Voyages à Peking, Manille, et l’Île de France, faits dans l’intervalle des années 1784 à 1801*,” *The Edinburgh Review* 14 (July 1809): 413. On reciprocity as the foundation for European international society, see James Lorimer, “La doctrine de la reconnaissance: Fondement du droit international,” *Revue de droit international et de législation comparée* 16 (1884): 333–59. The ideas and traditions of the Chinese are diametrically opposed to those of Europe, the German consul in Shanghai, A. Krauel, reported, “l’Empereur s’arrogeait le premier rang parmi les souverains, et prétendait être maître légitime du tous les peuples du monde.” A. Krauel, “Applicabilité du droit des gens européen à la Chine,” *Revue de droit international et de législation comparée* 9 (1877): 390. On similar problems in the Ottoman Empire, see Paul Rycaut, *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London: J. Starkey and H. Brome, 1670), 84–89.
- 60 Avis Bohlen, “Changes in Russian Diplomacy under Peter the Great,” *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 7, no. 3 (July 1, 1966): 345–46. Henning’s recent works tries to “overcome the conventional Petrine divide,” but he too has to admit that Russia before Peter the Great was peripheral and exotic. Jan Hennings, *Russia and Courtly Europe: Ritual and the Culture of Diplomacy, 1648–1725* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 10. The ceremonial is described in Jean Dumont, Jean Barbeyrac, and Jean Rousset de Missy, “Le cérémonie de la cour impériale de Russie,” in *Le cérémonie diplomatique des cours de l’Europe*, 5 vols. (Amsterdam: Janssion à Waesberge, Wetstein & Smith, & Z. Chatelain, 1739), 2:623–72.
- 61 Dan Altbauer, “The Diplomats of Peter the Great,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, no. 1 (1980): 1–16; Bohlen, “Changes in Russian Diplomacy under Peter the Great.”
- 62 Visitors to the Winter Palace and the Hermitage were guided by John Murray and Thomas Michell, *Hand-Book for Travellers in Russia, Poland, and Finland* (London:

- John Murray, 1868), 80–112. Gautier report from “Un bal au palais d’hiver,” Théophile Gautier, *Voyage en Russie*, vol. 1 (Paris: Charpentier, 1867), 227–42. “Les danses n’ont rien de caractéristique: ce sont des quadrilles, des valse, de rédowas, comme à Paris, comme à Londres, comme à Madrid, comme à Vienne, comme partout dans le grand monde.” Ibid., 1:236. On Princesse Bagration, see Garde-Chambonas, *Fêtes et souvenirs du Congrès de Vienne: tableaux des salons, scènes anecdotiques et portraits*, 1814–1815, 1:149–51.
- 63 “When the Embassadour comes to appear before the Grand Signior,” Paul Rycaut, an English diplomat, reported from an audience at the Topkapı palace in the 1660s, he is led in, supported under the arms by two attendants, “who bringing him to a convenient distance, laying their hands upon his neck, make him bow until his forehead almost touches the ground.” Rycaut, *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire*, 85. The sign language in which the courtiers communicated “is of much use to those who attend the presence of the Grand Signior, before whom it is not reverent or seemly so much as to whisper.” Ibid., 35. The ceremonial is described in Jean Dumont, Jean Barbeyrac, and Jean Rousset de Missy, “Le cérémoniale de la Porte Ottomane,” in *Le cérémoniale diplomatique des cours de l’Europe*, 5 vols. (Amsterdam: Janssion à Waesberge, Wetstein & Smith, & Z. Chatelain, 1739), 2:673–727.
- 64 On the establishment of resident embassies, see J. C. Hurewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System,” *Middle East Journal* 15, no. 2 (1961): 141. On the Dolmabahçe Palace, see “Dolmabahce Palace,” 2021, [www.dolmabahcepalace.com/](http://www.dolmabahcepalace.com/).
- 65 Augustus Henry Oakes and Robert Balmain Mowat, *The Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1918), 177, cf. 163, 169; Fikret Adanir, “Turkey’s Entry into the Concert of Europe,” *European Review* 13, no. 3 (July 2005): 395–417. Lorimer, for one, regrets the decision to extend recognition to the Ottomans. Lorimer, “La doctrine de la reconnaissance,” 336.
- 66 On Mehmed Emin Ali Pasha’s ball, see Maurice Fleury and Louis Sonolet, *La société du second empire* (Paris: Michel, 1911), 244. On the festivities held at the Exposition Universelle, see Henry Morford, *Paris in ’67: The Great Exhibition, Its Side-Shows and Excursions* (New York: Geo. W. Carleton & Co., 1867), 157–71; and George Augustus Sala, *Notes and Sketches of the Paris Exhibition* (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1868). “Let me add that the Oriental potentate, all unused as he was to such company and such environment, comported himself, as every well-trained Turk is sure to do, as a polite and courteous gentleman.” Ibid., 296. Sultan Abdülaziz not only danced, but was also an accomplished musician and a composer who wrote orchestral pieces in the European tradition, including waltzes. Hikmet Toker, “The Musical Relationship between England and the Ottoman Empire,” *Rast Müzikoloji Dergisi* 7, no. 1 (August 23, 2019): 1959–78.
- 67 As reported by Adolphe Oppé de Blowitz, “Latest Intelligence: The War in the East,” *The Times*, September 22, 1894. On the establishment of a European-style diplomatic service, see Andrew Cobbing, “Opening Legations: Japan’s First Resident Minister and the Diplomatic Corps in Europe,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 28 (June 20, 2017): 195–214. On Westernization more generally, see Sukehiro Hirakawa, “Japan’s Turn to the West,” in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, ed. Marius B. Jansen, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 443–98.
- 68 Pierre Loti, “Un bal à Yeddo,” in *Japoneries d’automne* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1889), 83. The Japanese ministers, admirals, and functionaries are all a bit too dressed-up, too garish, Loti concluded, and news had not reached them that tail-coats no longer are in fashion. “It is impossible to say in what it resides, but I find

- that they all, and always, display a close resemblance to monkeys.” Ibid., 88. On Rokumeikan more generally, see Margaret Mehl, “Dancing at the Rokumeikan: A New Role for Women?,” in *Japanese Women: Emerging from Subservience, 1886–1945*, ed. Hiroko Tomida (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2005), 157–77.
- 69 The young Japanese lady in question was Tsuda Ume. Sent to the United States at the age of six by her pro-Western father, she lived in Washington, DC, until the age of eighteen. Returning to Japan, she wrote Umeko Tsuda, *The Attic Letters: Ume Tsuda’s Correspondence to Her American Mother*, ed. Yoshiko Furuki (New York: Weatherhill, 1991). Tsuda attended a party at Rokumeikan on March 10, 1883. Quote from p. 185.
- 70 Balme tells the story of King Tupua Tamasese Lealofi and the Marquardt brother in Balme, *Pacific Performances*, 122–23, 129–34.
- 71 Quoted in Nigel Rothfels, *Savages and Beasts: The Birth of the Modern Zoo* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 82–83.
- 72 Hagenbeck tells the story in Carl Hagenbeck, *Beasts and Men: Being Carl Hagenbeck’s Experiences for Half a Century among Wild Animals* (London: Longmans, Green, 1912). “Everything seemed to be set up as though it were the model or the picture of something,” as Mitchell summarizes, “arranged before an observing subject into a system of signification, declaring itself to be a mere object, a mere ‘signifier or’ something further.” Timothy Mitchell, “The World as Exhibition,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31, no. 2 (1989): 222. “The ability to see without being seen confirmed one’s separation from the world, and constituted, at the same time, a position of power.” Ibid., 230.
- 73 Balme, *Pacific Performances*, 127–29; Compare works of “scientific racism,” such as John Lubbock, *The Origin of Civilisation and the Primitive Condition of Man: Mental and Social Condition of Savages* (London: Longmans, Green, 1870); and Ernest Haeckel, *The History of Creation: Or the Development of the Earth and Its Inhabitants by the Action of Natural Causes*, 2 vols. (London: Henry S. King & Co., 1876), vol. 2. “Some of the wildest tribes in southern Asia and eastern Africa ... have barely risen above the lowest stage of transition from man-like apes to ape-like men, a stage which the progenitors of the higher human species had already passed through thousands of years ago” (363–64).
- 74 Hubert Howe Bancroft, *The Book of the Fair: An Historical and Descriptive Presentation of the World’s Science, Art, and Industry, as Viewed through the Columbian Exposition at Chicago in 1893*, vol. 9 (Chicago: Bancroft, 1893), 847, 859, 868, 877; James W. Buel, *Louisiana and the Fair: An Exposition of the World, Its People and Their Achievements*, vol. 5, 9 vols. (St. Louis: World’s Progress Publishing Co., 1906). On Ota Benga, see Mitch Keller, “The Scandal at the Zoo,” *New York Times*, August 6, 2006.

## Chapter 5

- 1 “My father, me thinkes I see my father – Where, my Lord? – In my mindes eye, Horatio.” Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act I, scene 2. In the 1970s and 1980s, the notion of “mental images” was much discussed. A debate is summarized in Michael Tye, *The Imagery Debate* (Cambridge: Bradford Books, 1991).
- 2 On the Turkish fairy tale, see “The Silent Princess,” Andrew Lang, ed., *The Olive Fairy Book* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1907), 318–36. “The wider the range of sensimotor modalities simultaneously active in referential imagery,” Kuzmičová explains, “the more vivid the vicarious experience.” Anežka Kuzmičová, “Mental Imagery in the Experience of Literary Narrative: Views from Embodied Cognition”

- (PhD dissertation, Stockholm University, 2013), 60; Taylor, *The Language Animal*, 38–39.
- 3 “Imagery,” as Kuzmičová puts it, “encompasses any conscious vicarious experience whatsoever of what is most commonly referred to as perception, i.e. the notorious five external senses, but also the internal senses, including, crucially, the sense of bodily movement.” Kuzmičová, “Mental Imagery in the Experience of Literary Narrative,” 59. Jansen invokes Husserl: “Strictly speaking, then, in Husserl’s view, imagining requires the reproduction of an experience. Or rather, it requires the implication of a possible experience: a simulation.” Julia Jansen, “Phenomenology, Imagination, and Interdisciplinary Research,” in *Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science*, ed. Daniel Schmicking and Shaun Gallagher (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 144; Edmund Husserl, *Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898–1925)* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006). Thompson too invokes Husserl. Evan Thompson, “Look Again: Phenomenology and Mental Imagery,” *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 6, nos. 1–2 (March 2, 2007): 137–70.
  - 4 Thomas Nagel, “What Is It like to Be a Bat?,” *The Philosophical Review* 83, no. 4 (October 1974): 438.
  - 5 Tamar Szabó Gendler, “The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 97, no. 2 (2000): 55–81. Children only two years old protest against violations of the norms established in pretense games. Hannes Rakoczy, “Taking Fiction Seriously: Young Children Understand the Normative Structure of Joint Pretence Games,” *Developmental Psychology* 44, no. 4 (2008): 1195–201.
  - 6 “You can feign joy or anger,” Gendlin points out, “but to *have* them, they must come. So also does the muse come, when she is willing and not otherwise. And new ideas, the lines of a new design, and steps of therapy come in this way.” Gendlin, “The Wider Role of Bodily Sense in Thought and Language,” 202. “Your hand rotates in midair your body knows what needs to be said and has never as yet been said in the history of the world (if it is a good poem). Eventually the right phrases *come!*” Eugene T. Gendlin, “The New Phenomenology of Carrying Forward,” *Continental Philosophy Review* 37, no. 1 (2004): 131. Compare Langer, *Mind*, 69.
  - 7 On imagination as pretense, Kendall L. Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 11–69; on children’s games, pp. 21–28, 209–12, 240–44. More generally on the functions of props, see Andrew Sofer, *The Stage Life of Props* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 20–29.
  - 8 Elgenius provides an overview: Gabriella Elgenius, *Symbols of Nations and Nationalism: Celebrating Nationhood* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). On entitativity, see William McDougall, *The Group Mind: A Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology* (London: G. P. Putnam’s, 1920). “In this book,” McDougall explains, “I have sketched the principles of the mental life of groups, and have made a rough attempt to apply these principles to the understanding of the life of nations.” *Ibid.*, ix. Donald T. Campbell, “Common Fate, Similarity, and Other Indices of the Status of Aggregates of Persons as Social Entities,” *Behavioral Science* 3, no. 1 (January 1, 1958): 14–25. “Social groups as entities do not have an epistemological status different from such middle-sized entities as stones and rats, but are apt to be fuzzier, less discrete, less multiply confirmed, and in this sense less real.” *Ibid.*, 14. On the nation as movement, see Henning Eichberg, “The Nation in Movement: Turning the Theory of the People down on the Feet” (Keynote address, International Conference on Social Science in Sport, 8th ISHPES Seminar, Ljubljana, Slovenia, August 24, 2006).

- 9 Marching in sync will make muscles bond: McNeill, *Keeping Together in Time*, 2. Dancing will have the same effect: Ehrenreich, *Dancing in the Streets*. And walking: Margaret Gilbert, “Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon,” *MidWest Studies in Philosophy* 15, no. 1 (1990): 1–14. And participating in pilgrimages: Nick Hopkins et al., “Explaining Effervescence: Investigating the Relationship between Shared Social Identity and Positive Experience in Crowds,” *Cognition and Emotion* 30, no. 1 (2016): 20–32.
- 10 Fred Eugene Leonard, *A Guide to the History of Physical Education* (Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger, 1923), 83–108. See his *Die deutsche Turnkunst*, which he wrote with Ernst Eiselen, one of his students. Friedrich Ludwig Jahn and Ernst Eiselen, *Die deutsche Turnkunst zur Einrichtung der Turnplätze* (Berlin: Der Herausgeber, 1816), translated into English by Charles Beck, another of his students. Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, *A Treatise on Gymnastics*, trans. Charles Beck (Northampton: Samuel Butler, 1828).
- 11 Hans Kohn, *The Mind of Germany: The Education of a Nation* (New York: Scribner, 1960), 69–73; Hans Kohn, “Father Jahn’s Nationalism,” *The Review of Politics* 11, no. 4 (1949): 419–32.
- 12 Jahn and Eiselen, *Die deutsche Turnkunst zur Einrichtung der Turnplätze*, 233. Or, in order to preserve the alliteration, “frank, fresh, fresh, free.” Kohn, “Father Jahn’s Nationalism,” 430–32; Marion Kant, “The Moving Body and the Will to Culture,” *European Review* 19, no. 4 (August 2011): 579–94; Henning Eichberg, “Race-Track and Labyrinth: The Space of Physical Culture in Berlin,” *Journal of Sport History* 17, no. 2 (1990): 245–60.
- 13 Leonard, *A Guide to the History of Physical Education*, 94. On the *Burschenschaften*, see Gustav Philipp Körner, *Memoirs of Gustave Koerner, 1809–1896 : Life-Sketches Written at the Suggestion of His Children*, ed. Thomas J. McCormack (Cedar Rapids, IA: Torch Press, 1909), 81–86.
- 14 Leonard, *A Guide to the History of Physical Education*, 98–99. On Kotzebue’s murder, see George S. Williamson, “What Killed August von Kotzebue? The Temptations of Virtue and the Political Theology of German Nationalism, 1789–1819,” *The Journal of Modern History* 72, no. 4 (December 2000): 890–943.
- 15 Walther Classen, “Nach dem Leipziger Turnfest,” *Kunstwart und Kulturwart* 26, no. 4 (1913): 266.
- 16 *Ibid.*, 266–69; *Leipziger Turner-Führer: Geleitsmann zum Deutschen Turnfeste* (Leipzig: J. J. Weber, 1863), 55–57.
- 17 The numbers on migrations are from Hagen Schulze, *States, Nations and Nationalism: From the Middle Ages to the Present* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1998), 141. On crowds and the origin of sociology, see Christian Borch, *The Politics of Crowds: An Alternative History of Sociology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
- 18 Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (London: Macmillan, 1896), 17.
- 19 Boris Sidis, *The Psychology of Suggestion: A Research into the Subconscious Nature of Man* (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1898), 303; Wilfred Trotter, “Herd Instinct and Its Bearing on the Psychology of Civilised Man,” *Sociological Review* (1908–1952) 1, no. 3 (July 1908): 227–48.
- 20 Borch, *The Politics of Crowds*, 48–78, 128.
- 21 Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976), 292–338; H. Hughes Evans and Crayton A. Fargason, “Pediatric Discourse on Corporal Punishment: A Historical Review,” *Aggression and Violent Behavior* 3, no. 4 (December 1, 1998): 357–68.

- 22 Pehr Henrik Ling, *Gymnastikens allmänna grunder* (Upsala: Palmblad & Comp, 1834); C. A. Westerblad, *Ling, hans betydelse och hans verk: En vägledande framställning* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1907), 14–26; Hjalmar Ling, *Rörelselära* (Stockholm: Svenska sjukgymnastiksällskapet, 1949).
- 23 Hugo Rothstein, *Die Gymnastik, nach dem Systeme des schwedischen Gymnasiarchen P. H. Ling* (Schroeder, 1851); Hugo Rothstein, *The Gymnastic Free Exercises of P. H. Ling: A Systemized Course of Gymnastics without Apparatus, for the Developing and Strengthening of the Body and Improvement of the Figure; Adapted to the Use of Medical Men, Teachers, Military Men, and Parents*, trans. Mathias Roth (Boston: Ticknor, Reed and Fields, 1853); Westerblad, *Ling, hans betydelse och hans verk*, 20.
- 24 Leonard discusses Spiess in Fred Eugene Leonard, *Pioneers of Modern Physical Training* (New York: Association Press, 1915), 53–57; Adolf Spiess, *Turnbuch für Schulen als Anleitung für den Turnunterricht durch die Lehrer der Schulen*, vol. 2 (Basel: Schweighauser'sche, 1851), 334–404. For a discussion, see Eugen Weber, “Gymnastics and Sports in Fin-de-Siècle France: Opium of the Classes?,” *American Historical Review* 76, no. 1 (1971): 70–98; Udo Merkel, “The Politics of Physical Culture and German Nationalism: Turnen versus English Sports and French Olympism, 1871–1914,” *German Politics & Society* 21, no. 2 (2003): 69–96.
- 25 Eichberg, “Race-Track and Labyrinth,” 257–59; Leonard, *Pioneers of Modern Physical Training*, 60. On this transformation, see further Lillian Karina and Marion Kant, *Hitler's Dancers: German Modern Dance and the Third Reich* (New York: Berghahn, 2004).
- 26 Jahn, *A Treatise on Gymnastics*, 7.
- 27 *Ibid.*, 8–9.
- 28 Marion Kant, “German Gymnastics, Modern German Dance, and Nazi Aesthetics,” *Dance Research Journal* 48, no. 2 (2016): 10–11; Kant, “The Moving Body and the Will to Culture,” 579–94.
- 29 John A. Williams, “Friends of Nature: The Culture of Working-Class Hiking,” in *Weimar Culture Revisited*, ed. John A. Williams (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 199–225 (135).
- 30 Quoted in *ibid.*, 131.
- 31 Jon Savage, “Wandervogel and Neo-Pagans: Europe's Back-to-Nature Movements,” in *Teenage: The Creation of Youth 1875–1945* (London: Chatto and Windus, 2007); Eichberg, “Race-Track and Labyrinth,” 254–57. On sexuality in the movement, see Elizabeth Heineman, “Gender Identity in the Wandervogel Movement,” *German Studies Review* 12, no. 2 (1989): 249–70; Williams, “Friends of Nature.”
- 32 Quoted in Kant, “The Moving Body and the Will to Culture,” 588.
- 33 Adolf Spiess and Karl Wassmannsdorff, *Reigen und Liederreigen für das Schulturnen* (Frankfurt am Main: Sauerländer, 1869); Kant, “The Moving Body and the Will to Culture,” 587–88.
- 34 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None*, trans. Thomas Common (Edinburgh: T. N. Foulis, 1911), sec. “Reading and Writing,” vii. See, further, Kimerer L. LaMothe, *Nietzsche's Dancers: Isadora Duncan, Martha Graham, and the Revaluation of Christian Values* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
- 35 Marion Kant, “‘Dance Is a Race Question’: The Dance Politics of the Reich Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda,” in *Hitler's Dancers: German Modern Dance and the Third Reich*, ed. Lillian Karina and Marion Kant (New York: Berghahn, 2004), 70–163; Rudolf Laban, *The Laban Sourcebook*, ed. Dick McCaw (London: Routledge, 2011); Mary Wigman, *The Mary Wigman Book* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973).



- 36 Lorenz von Stein, *History of Social Movement in France, 1789–1850*, trans. Kaethe Mengelberg (Totowa, NJ: Bedminster Press, 1964), 88–89; Borch, *The Politics of Crowds*, 259–62.
- 37 Arnd Krüger, Peter Krüger, and Sybille Treptau, “Nudism in Nazi Germany: Indecent Behaviour or Physical Culture for the Well-Being of the Nation,” *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 19, no. 4 (2002): 33–54; John A. Williams, “Friends of Nature: The Culture of Working-Class Hiking,” in Williams, ed., *Weimar Culture Revisited*.
- 38 Carolyn DeSwarte Gifford, “Woman’s Christian Temperance Union,” in *The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest: 1500 to the Present*, ed. Immanuel Ness et al. (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). Largely forgotten today, there was also an active movement of women advocating against women’s right to vote. See, e.g., Mrs. Humphrey Ward, “Women’s Anti-Suffrage Movement,” *The Twentieth Century*, 1908. “The party of sex may be the worst of all parties. And there is too much of it in the Suffrage agitation.” *Ibid.*, 352.
- 39 Elizabeth Cady Stanton, “Era of the Bicycle,” p. 41, quoted in Lisa S. Strange and Robert S. Brown, “The Bicycle, Women’s Rights, and Elizabeth Cady Stanton,” *Women’s Studies* 31, no. 5 (January 1, 2002): 619.
- 40 Frances Elizabeth Willard, *A Wheel within a Wheel: How I Learned to Ride the Bicycle, with Some Reflections by the Way* (New York: F. H. Revell, 1895), 73.
- 41 Mabel Vernon, “Campaigning through Nevada: Adventurous Tour by Congressional Union Organizer. How the May 2nd Rally Woke Up a State,” *The Suffragist* 2, no. 21 (May 23, 1914): 7.
- 42 On Ottomanism, see Doğan Gürpınar, *Ottoman Imperial Diplomacy: A Political, Social and Cultural History* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014), 19–34.
- 43 On Gandhi in London, see Stanley Wolpert, *Gandhi’s Passion: The Life and Legacy of Mahatma Gandhi* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 20–27.
- 44 Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj, or Indian Home Rule* (Madras: G. A. Natesan, 1921), 36.
- 45 Wolpert, *Gandhi’s Passion*, 144–51. “Today the pilgrim marches onward on his long trek,” in Nehru’s words, “but the fire of a great resolve is in him, and surpassing love of his countrymen, and love of truth that scorches, and love of freedom that inspires.” Quoted in B. R. Nanda, “The Dandi March,” in *In Search of Gandhi: Essays and Reflections* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 4.
- 46 Emily Hahn, *The Soong Sisters* (New York: Doubleday, 1941); Benjamin Yang, “The Making of a Pragmatic Communist: The Early Life of Deng Xiaoping, 1904–49,” *The China Quarterly* 135 (September 1993): 444–56; Nora Wang, “Deng Xiaoping: The Years in France,” *The China Quarterly* 92 (December 1982): 698–705.
- 47 “Marking 70th Anniversary of Victory of Red Army’s Long March,” December 12, 2008, [https://web.archive.org/web/20081212212710/http://english.pladaily.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2006-08/14/content\\_554037.htm](https://web.archive.org/web/20081212212710/http://english.pladaily.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2006-08/14/content_554037.htm).
- 48 Chinese universities, to this day, publish articles such as Yang Yang, “On the Inherent Unity of the Spirit of the Long March and the Spirit of Yan’an,” *The Science Education Article Collects*, 2017; Anran Li et al., “Research on the Way of Integrating the Long March Spirit into the Ideological and Political Education of College Students in the New Era,” *International Journal of Social Science and Education Research* 2, no. 5 (2019): 105–9.
- 49 On the American afterlife of the two Carls, see Albert Bernhardt Faust, *The German Element in the United States with Special Reference to Its Political, Moral, Social and*

- Educational Influence*, vol. 2 (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1909), 388–95; Jahn, *A Treatise on Gymnastics*.
- 50 Barbara J. Keys, *Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 18–19.
- 51 Quoted in John J. MacAloon, *This Great Symbol: Pierre de Coubertin and the Origins of the Modern Olympic Games* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 125.
- 52 On the ridiculousness of providing sports facilities for members of the working class, see Weber, “Gymnastics and Sports in Fin-de-Siècle France,” 92. Coubertin visited Eton, Harrow, Rugby, and a number of other public schools in the 1880s. Pierre de Coubertin, *L'éducation en Angleterre: Collèges et universités* (Paris: Hachette, 1888).
- 53 Coubertin's notes from his visit to Greece are available in Pierre de Coubertin, *Souvenirs d'Amerique et de Grèce* (Paris: Hachette, 1897), 101–81. On Olympic rituals, see Erika Fischer-Lichte, *Theatre, Sacrifice, Ritual: Exploring Forms of Political Theatre* (London: Routledge, 2005), 69–86.
- 54 See the entries for the respective games in John E. Findling and Kimberly D. Pelle, eds., *Historical Dictionary of the Modern Olympic Movement* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996).
- 55 Agathon, *Les jeunes gens d'aujourd'hui: Le goût de l'action, la foi patriotique, une renaissance catholique, le réalisme politique* (Paris: Plon, 1913), 35.
- 56 “Quatrième lettre: Le Stade Panathénaique,” Charles Maurras, “Lettres des Jeux olympiques,” *La Gazette de France*, 1896, 17, 18, first published in *La Gazette de France*, April 19, 1896; Peter J. Beck, “Confronting George Orwell: Philip Noel-Baker on International Sport, Particularly the Olympic Movement, as Peacemaker,” in *Militarism, Sport, Europe: War without Weapons*, ed. J. A. Mangan (London: Frank Cass, 2003).

## Chapter 6

- 1 Self-help books on the topic have been selling well for over 100 years. An early example is Émile Coué, *Self Mastery through Conscious Autosuggestion* (New York: American Library Service, 1922); a more recent text is Roy F. Baumeister and John Tierney, *Willpower: Rediscovering the Greatest Human Strength* (New York: Penguin Books, 2012).
- 2 Romans 7:15–19, King James version.
- 3 St. Augustine, *The Confessions of Augustine*, trans. William Greenough Thayer Shedd (Boston: Draper & Halliday, 1867), 196, 197.
- 4 Donald Davidson, “How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?,” in *Essays on Actions and Events* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 21–42.
- 5 “Modern neuroscience,” as Haggard puts it, “is shifting towards a view of voluntary action being based on specific brain processes, rather than being a transcendental feature of human nature.” Patrick Haggard, “Human Volition: Towards a Neuroscience of Will,” *Nature Reviews Neuroscience* 9, no. 12 (December 2008): 944. In a famous set of experiments, Benjamin Libet asked subjects to flick a switch but also to tell him, by their reading of a dial, when they first had had a conscious intention to carry out the action in question. This moment in time was then compared with the moment when, according to a scan of the neurological system, the brain first gave an indication that a switch-flicking action was about to take place. For all subjects, the brain got ready before any conscious awareness of a decision to act – the brain reacted on average 535 milliseconds before the muscles moved and



- 345 milliseconds before the action registered in consciousness. From these results, Libet concluded that conscious thought cannot be the cause of what we do but is instead merely registering an action the brain already has started carrying out. Benjamin Libet, “Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action,” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 8 (1985): 529–39.
- 6 James discusses “habit” in James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1:104–27. He borrows the knitting example from Georg Heinrich Schneider, *Der menschliche wille: Vom standpunkte der neueren entwicklungstheorien* (Berlin: Ferdinand Dümmler, 1882), 447, 448. See James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1:119. Compare Dewey: “Choice is the identification with self of a certain desire; when the desire is in accord with the direction in which the self habitually works, this identification takes place almost automatically. For example, a merchant can hardly be said to choose to go to his business in the morning. The desires which conflict with this deed are generally so transient, compared with the fixed routine, that the man instinctively, as we say, goes to his work. In other words, his self has become so organized in one direction through past acts of choice, it has become so stable and set, that it identifies itself with this act at once.” John Dewey, *Psychology* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1890), 365–66.
  - 7 “It dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture and our early choices, and to make the best of a pursuit that disagrees, because there is no other of which we are fitted, and it is too late to begin again.” James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1:121. On habits as the missing link between bodies and minds, see Leandro M. Gaitã and Javier S. Castresana, “On Habit and the Mind-Body Problem: The View of Félix Ravaisson,” *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience* 8, no. 684 (September 9, 2014): 1–3.
  - 8 Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*, 353.
  - 9 Compare Ribot: “If one insists upon making of consciousness a cause, all remains obscure; but if it is considered as simply the accompaniment of a nervous process, which alone is the essential element, all becomes clear and the imaginary difficulties vanish.” Théodule Ribot, *The Diseases of the Will*, trans. Merwin Marie Snell (Chicago: Open Court, 1894), 6. Dewey makes the same point in Dewey, *Psychology*, 368–69. Falk discusses this as a matter of “minding” a reason we have. See W. D. Falk, “Action-Guiding Reasons,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 60, no. 23 (November 7, 1963): 712–13.
  - 10 Dewey: “We realize the self only by satisfying it in the infinite variety of concrete ways. These are means, because they are partial manifestations; the self is the end, because it is the organic unity of these various aspects of self-realization.” Dewey, *Psychology*, 371.
  - 11 Summarized as a children’s tale, with illustrations by John Collier. Vivian Werner, *Petrouchka: The Story of the Ballet* (New York: Viking, 1992).
  - 12 Thomas Henry Huxley, “On the Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata, and Its History,” in *Method and Results: Essays* (New York: D. Appleton, 1899), 244. “Automata ballets” of the period are surveyed in Linda M. Austin, “Elaborations of the Machine: The Automata Ballets,” *Modernism/Modernity* 23, no. 1 (2016): 65–87.
  - 13 On Bergson’s American tour, see Margo Bistis, “Simmel and Bergson: The Theorist and the Exemplar of the ‘Blasé Person,’” *Journal of European Studies* 35, no. 4 (2005): 411–12; as well as the extended exposé in Louis Levine, “The Philosophy of Henry Bergson and Syndicalism,” *New York Times*, January 26, 1913.
  - 14 “The deepest problems of modern life,” as Georg Simmel put it in “Die Großstädte und das Geistesleben” (1903), “flow from the attempt of the individual to maintain

- the independence and individuality of his existence against the sovereign powers of society, against the weight of the historical heritage and the external culture and technique of life.” Georg Simmel, “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” in *Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 324. Compare Willy Hugo Hellpach, *Mensch und Volk der Grosstadt* (Stuttgart: Enke, 1939).
- 15 Thomas Carlyle, “Signs of the Times,” in *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays*, vol. 2 (London: Chapman and Hall, 1872), 233. “We war with rude Nature; and, by our resistless engines, come off always victorious, and loaded with spoils.” Ibid.
  - 16 Andrew Ure, *The Philosophy of Manufactures; or, An Exposition of the Scientific, Moral, and Commercial Economy of the Factory System of Great Britain* (London: Charles Knight, 1835), 15. For more on Ure, see V. W. Farrar, “Andrew Ure, F.R.S. and the Philosophy of Manufactures,” *Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London* 27, no. 2 (February 28, 1973): 299–324.
  - 17 Ure, *The Philosophy of Manufactures*, 20. Compare Simmel: “He becomes a single cog as over against the vast overwhelming organization of things and forces which gradually take out of his hand everything connected with progress, spirituality and value.” Simmel, “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” 337.
  - 18 R. Austin Freeman, *Social Decay and Regeneration* (London: Constable, 1921), 180–81. Freeman was a conservative, an anti-Semite, and a writer of detective stories featuring Dr. Thorndyke. Ure, for his part, had no time for such criticism, pointing to the way the factory system removes the drudgery of labor, “ameliorating the lot of mankind.” Ure, *The Philosophy of Manufactures*, 7, 17–19.
  - 19 Robert Baden-Powell, *Scouting for Boys: A Handbook for Instruction in Good Citizenship* (London: C. Arthur Pearson, 1915), 48. On attention and the creation of a “personality,” see Warren Susman, “‘Personality’ and the Making of Twentieth Century Culture,” in *Culture as History: The Transformation of American Society in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 276–80. On the social economy of attention in the nineteenth century, see Jonathan Crary, *Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).
  - 20 On Taylorism, see Frederick Winslow Taylor, *The Principles of Scientific Management* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1911). On “the scientific principles of shoveling,” see *ibid.*, 64–68. On Fordism, see Henry Ford, *My Life and Work* (London: William Heinemann, 1922). “Along about April 1, 1913, we first tried the experiment of an assembly line.... I believe that this was the first moving line ever installed.” Ibid., 81. Charlie Chaplin, *Modern Times* (United Artists, 1936).
  - 21 First introduced in Albert Abrams, *Nervous Breakdown: Its Concomitant Evils; Its Prevention and Cure, a Correct Technique of Living for Brain Workers* (San Francisco: Hicks-Judd, 1901). Abrams also invented various machines he claimed could cure diseases such as malaria, diabetes, and cancer. For a history of the concept, see Megan Barke, Rebecca Fribush, and Peter N. Stearns, “Nervous Breakdown in 20th-Century American Culture,” *Journal of Social History* 33, no. 3 (2000): 565–84.
  - 22 Emil Kraepelin, *Psychiatrie: Ein kuetzes Lehrbuch für Studierende und Ärzte* (Leipzig: Ambr. Abel, 1893). On the Kraepelinian legacy and on “neo-Kraepelinians,” see Hannah S. Decker, “How Kraepelinian Was Kraepelin? How Kraepelinian Are the Neo-Kraepelinians?: From Emil Kraepelin to DSM-III,” *History of Psychiatry* 18, no. 3 (2007): 337–60. On the sudden appearance, and then disappearance, of catatonia, see David Healy, “Catatonia from Kahlbaum to DSM-5,” *Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry* 47, no. 5 (May 1, 2013): 412–16. On the affinities

- between schizophrenia and modernist art, see Louis A. Sass, *Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modern Art, Literature, and Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). However, Sass does not defend the idea that modern society *causes* schizophrenia. *Ibid.*, 8.
- 23 For Beard's bewildering list of symptoms, see George Miller Beard, *American Nervousness: Its Causes and Consequences, a Supplement to Nervous Exhaustion (Neurasthenia)* (New York: Putnam, 1881), 7–8. On the neurasthenic pandemic more generally, see Tom Lutz, *American Nervousness, 1903: An Anecdotal History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); David G. Schuster, *Neurasthenic Nation: America's Search for Health, Happiness, and Comfort, 1869–1920* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2011).
  - 24 Silas Weir Mitchell, *Fat and Blood and How to Make Them* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1877); Silas Weir Mitchell, *Wear and Tear; or, Hints for the Overworked* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1897). On the perils of masturbation, see Alan Hunt, "The Great Masturbation Panic and the Discourses of Moral Regulation in Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Britain," *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 8, no. 4 (1998): 575–615. "The onslaught on masturbation," Hunt summarizes, "peaked around 1900, remained at a high plateau until 1914, and then gradually, almost reluctantly, receded in the interwar years to lapse into an uneasy silence." *Ibid.*, 576.
  - 25 Silas Weir Mitchell, "Camp Cure," in *Nurse and Patient, and Camp Cure* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1877), 45, 46.
  - 26 John Muir, "The Wild Parks and the Forest Preservation of the West," in *Our National Parks* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1901), 1. On the devastating impact of the rest cure, see Charlotte Perkins Gilman, *The Yellow Wall Paper* (Boston: Small, Maynard, 1901). Gilman, who herself was treated by Mitchell, sent him the short story but received no acknowledgment. "Many years later I was told that the great specialist had admitted to friends of his that he had altered his treatment of neurasthenia since reading *The Yellow Wallpaper*. Charlotte Perkins Gilman, "Why I Wrote 'The Yellow Wallpaper'?", *Advances in Psychiatric Treatment* 17, no. 4 (July 2011): 265. Reprinted from *The Forerunner*, vol. 4, 1913.
  - 27 Joseph Jastrow, "Will (Disorders Of)," in *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, ed. James Mark Baldwin (New York: Macmillan, 1920), 816.
  - 28 Théodule Ribot, *Les maladies de la volonté* (Paris: Germer Baillière et Cie, 1883); Ribot, *The Diseases of the Will*, 29–30.
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  - 30 *Ibid.*, 2:525. For Münsterberg on reflexes and the will, see Hugo Münsterberg, *Psychology: General and Applied* (New York: D. Appleton, 1914), 176–195. For Ribot on the will as gatekeeper, see Ribot, *The Diseases of the Will*, 9–10.
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- 36 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Dawn of Day: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*, trans. J. M. Kennedy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1924), para. 206.
- 37 “Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius! Send your ships into unexplored seas! Live in war with your equals and with yourselves! Be robbers and spoilers, ye knowing ones, as long as ye cannot be rulers and possessors!” Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Joyful Wisdom* (“*La Gaya Scienza*”), trans. Thomas Common (New York: Macmillan, 1924), sec. 283. See also Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce homo* (Portland: Smith & Sale Printers, 1911), 33, 55–56.
- 38 Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, 363; Keith Ansell-Pearson, “Nietzsche and the Problem of the Will in Modernity,” in *Nietzsche and Modern German Thought*, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson (London: Routledge, 2012), 165–91; Kimerer L. LaMothe, “‘A God Dances through Me’: Isadora Duncan on Friedrich Nietzsche’s Revaluation of Values,” *The Journal of Religion* 85, no. 2 (2005): 241–66; Steven E. Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, 1890–1990* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
- 39 Nietzsche, *The Dawn of Day*, para. 206. In this way, he added, they would avoid “the alternatives that now threaten them either of becoming slaves of the State or slaves of some revolutionary party.” Ibid.
- 40 On the crucial role of Jules Ferry, and his economic arguments, see Stephen H. Roberts, *The History of French Colonial Policy, 1870–1925*, vol. 1 (London: P. S. King & Son, 1923), 13–18. But economic and political arguments often blended together. “Colonization is for France a matter of life or death,” wrote Leroy-Beaulieu, an economist. “Either France becomes a great African Power, or in a century or two, she will be a secondary European Power, and will count in the world little more than Greece or Rumania counts in Europe.” Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes* (Paris, 1882); quoted in Roberts, *The History of French Colonial Policy, 1870–1925*, 1:18. On the German colonial policy, see Hartmut Pogge van Strandmann, “The Purpose of German Colonialism, or the Long Shadow of Bismarck’s Colonial Policy,” in *German Colonialism: Race, the Holocaust, and Postwar Germany*, ed. Volker Langbehn and Mohammad Salama (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 193–214.
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- 45 Quoted in W. B. Cohen, "The Lure of Empire: Why Frenchmen Entered the Colonial Service," *Journal of Contemporary History* 4, no. 1 (January 1, 1969): 110–11. See Ernest Psichari, *Terres de soleil et de sommeil* (Paris: Louis Conard, 1917). Compare: "It is a delicious experience to feel that you are the absolute master of your actions, totally responsible for their results, and invested with a well-defined mission that is beautiful because it has a lofty goal and is ripe with benefits for progress if it succeeds." Camille Coquilhat, *Sur le Haut-Congo* (Paris: J. Lebegue, 1888), 139.
- 46 Quoted in Agathon, *Les jeunes gens d'aujourd'hui*, 34; Compare Jérôme Becker, *La vie en Afrique, ou Trois ans dans l'Afrique centrale* (Paris: J. Lebegue, 1887), 2:350.
- 47 Paul Rohrbach, *German World Policies: Der Deutsche Gedanke in Der Welt* (New York: Macmillan, 1915), 138–40.
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- 52 "If war had ever stopped, we should have to re-invent it, on this view, to redeem life from flat degeneration." *Ibid.*, 403.
- 53 H. G. Wells, *Experiment in Autobiography*, vol. 1 (London: Faber & Faber, 1934), 102.
- 54 *Ibid.*; The rules of these games are explained in H. G. Wells, *Little Wars: A Game for Boys from Twelve Years of Age to One Hundred and Fifty and for That More Intelligent Sort of Girls Who Like Boys' Games and Books; with an Appendix on Kriegspiel* (London: Palmer, 1913).
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- 56 Theodore Roosevelt, "The Strenuous Life," in *The Strenuous Life: Essays and Addresses* (New York: Century, 1902), 1. These experiences were the topics of his

- first books. See Theodore Roosevelt, “*Hunting Trips of a Ranchman*,” and “*Hunting Trips on the Prairie and in the Mountains*” (New York: Review of Reviews, 1904); Theodore Roosevelt, *Ranch Life and the Hunting-Trail* (New York: Century, 1899).
- 57 Roosevelt, “The Strenuous Life,” 7.
- 58 Ibid.
- 59 The Rough Riders, Roosevelt explained, provided the Ivy League graduates’ best chance of “seeing hard and dangerous service.” Theodore Roosevelt, *The Rough Riders* (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1900), 20. On the role of the frontier in American life, see Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” in *Frontier and Section: Selected Essays of Frederick Jackson Turner* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1961), originally published in 1893. On the connection between Roosevelt and Buffalo Bill, see Christine Bold, “The Rough Riders at Home and Abroad: Cody, Roosevelt, Remington and the Imperialist Hero,” *Canadian Review of American Studies* 18, no. 3 (1987): 321–50.
- 60 Among many articles on the same theme, see “Paraders Cheer Times War News; Britons, Frenchmen, and Belgians March up Broadway Singing National Anthems,” *New York Times*, August 6, 1914; “War Spirit Stirs Berlin to Frenzy; Singing Patriotic Songs, Crowds Throng the Streets Awaiting the Kaiser,” *New York Times*, July 27, 1914.
- 61 “10,000 Sing War Songs.; Brooklyn Germans Congratulate the Kaiser on His Attitude in Crisis,” *New York Times*, July 27, 1914.
- 62 Robert Speaight, *The Life of Hillaire Belloc* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957), 41.
- 63 “Je désire presque une guerre monstrueuse où fuir parmi le choc d’une Europe folle et rouge, où perdre le souvenir et le respect de toute écriture et de tout rêve dans des visions réelles, trépignements funèbres de sabots clapotants et déchirements de fusillades, et n’en revenir!” Letter from Valéry to Gide, May 8, 1891. André Gide, *André Gide – Paul Valéry: Correspondance, 1890–1942* (Paris: Gallimard, 1955), 83.
- 64 Quoted in Hew Strachan, *The First World War, vol. 1: To Arms* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 138.
- 65 Quoted in Modris Eksteins, *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age* (New York: Mariner Books, 1989), 94.
- 66 F. T. Marinetti, “The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism,” in *Futurism: An Anthology*, ed. Lawrence Rainey, Christine Poggi, and Laura Wittman (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 51. Mechanical society, Bergson pointed out, has vastly extended our powers, creating new artificial organs. Our bodies have “suddenly and prodigiously increased in size.” But will this new body be purely mechanical, as the Germans suggest, or must it, like the French insist, be filled with a living spirit? Henri Bergson, *The Meaning of the War* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1915), 35. Professors of Germany, “To the Civilized World,” *The North American Review*, 1919, 284–87. For a survey of war enthusiasm among intellectuals, see Roland N. Stromberg, “The Intellectuals and the Coming of War in 1914,” *Journal of European Studies* 3, no. 2 (June 1, 1973): 109–22.
- 67 Ernst Jünger, *The Storm of Steel* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1929), 312.
- 68 On torture in the Philippines, see “The Water Cure Described; Discharged Soldier Tells Senate Committee How and Why the Torture Was Inflicted,” *New York Times*, May 4, 1902. On the heroism of dogfights in the air: Samuel Hynes, *The Soldiers’ Tale: Bearing Witness to a Modern War* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1998), 81–87.
- 69 The notion of general enthusiasm for war was first questioned, in the case of France, by Jean-Jacques Becker, 1914: *Comment les Français sont entrés dans la guerre; contribution à l’étude de l’opinion publique printemps-été 1914* (Paris: Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1977). For Germany, the same case has



- been made by Jeffrey Verhey, *The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth and Mobilization in Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). And Britain: Catriona Pennell, *A Kingdom United: Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
- 70 “What calamity that the phrase was ever uttered! What misery it will cause!” Robert Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative* (London: Constable, 1921), 87. He develops his views on pp. 83–93. The conceptual confusion is summarized in Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2003), 11–13.
- 71 On self-determination understood as “the right of determining to what Power their tutelage should be assigned,” see Sydney Olivier, “Mandates under the League of Nations,” in *Western Races and the World*, ed. Francis S. Marvin (London: Humphrey Milford, 1922), 249–64. “Even the uncivilized peoples of Africa,” as Lloyd George, the British prime minister, argued, “were quite capable, through their native organs of government, of expressing a popular choice and decision on such a question.” *Ibid.*, 252. In practice, however, only people in the former Ottoman Empire were thought of as capable of expressing a view on such a topic, and even here their views were ignored. *Ibid.*, 253.
- 72 “To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.” League of Nations, *The Covenant of the League of Nations, with a Commentary Thereon* (Ottawa: J. de Labroquerie Tache, 1919), para. 22. See further Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 115–95.
- 73 Lugard discusses “Methods of Ruling Native Races” in Frederick John Dealtry Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1922), 193–229. Quote from p. 194.
- 74 To quote Benjamin Kidd, a British sociologist and Social Darwinian. Benjamin Kidd, *The Control of the Tropics* (New York: Macmillan, 1898), 51.
- 75 Lugard, *The Dual Mandate*, 215.
- 76 *Ibid.*, 217.
- 77 Percy Girouard, High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria and the East Africa Protectorate, quoted in *ibid.*, 216.
- 78 In 1919, some 60 percent of the Syrian population was opposed to the idea of a French mandate. Representatives met in a parliament and elected their own ruler. Damascus was subsequently occupied by the French, and in October, 1925, the “insurrectionists” were bombed by French airplanes. Quincy Wright, “The Bombardment of Damascus,” *The American Journal of International Law* 20, no. 2 (April 1926): 263. See also Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 142–68. In 1922, the Bondelswart people in the South African mandate of South West Africa rebelled against taxes and other impositions. The administrator of the mandate sent planes to bomb villages, killing women and children. See *ibid.*, 112–41.
- 79 Roberts, *The History of French Colonial Policy, 1870–1925*; Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).
- 80 Lugard, *The Dual Mandate*, 215.
- 81 *Ibid.*, 201–27.

## Chapter 7

- 1 Ferdinand Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft: Abhandlung des Communismus und des ...* (Leipzig: Fues's Verlag, 1887). Henry Sumner Maine, chapter 5, "Primitive Society and Ancient Law," in *Ancient Law* (London: John Murray, 1908), 100–151; Georg Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money*, trans. David Frisby (London: Routledge, 2004). On "Merrie old England," see Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), 168; Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).
- 2 Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), 10. For Marx on alienation, see "Estranged Labour," in Karl Marx, *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, trans. Gregor Benton (Marx/Engels Internet Archive, 1844), 38–45, <http://archive.org/details/economicphilosophookmar>. A very similar critique often came from conservative critics of capitalism and modern society. See, e.g., Freeman, *Social Decay and Regeneration*.
- 3 Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France: And on the Proceedings in Certain Societies in London Relative to That Event* (London: J. Dodsley, 1790), 114.
- 4 On the death of God, see Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, para. 125; Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, 6. On disenchantment, see Weber, *Protestant Ethic*. Everything has become gestellt, "enframed," in Martin Heidegger's terminology, and put before us as a resource to be used for some purpose. "The forester who, in the wood, measures the felled timber and to all appearances walks the same forest path in the same way as did his grandfather is today commanded by profit-making in the lumber industry, whether he knows it or not." Martin Heidegger, "Meßkirch's Seventh Centennial," trans. Thomas J. Sheehan, *Listening* 8 (1973): 45.
- 5 Heidegger, "Meßkirch's Seventh Centennial," 45.
- 6 Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj*, 12–25. See also G. K. Chesterton, "Matthew Arnold, among Much That Was Arid and Arbitrary . . .," *Illustrated London News*, September 18, 1909.
- 7 "Man has to undo the wrappings and the mummydom of centuries, by which he has shut himself from the light of the sun and lain in seeming death, preparing silently his glorious resurrection." Edward Carpenter, *Civilisation: Its Cause and Cure, and Other Essays* (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1889), 59; Karina and Kant, *Hitler's Dancers*; Mark Letteri, "The Theme of Health in Nietzsche's Thought," *Man and World* 23, no. 4 (October 1, 1990): 405–17; LaMothe, *Nietzsche's Dancers*.
- 8 Bernd Jäger, "Theorizing, Journeying, Dwelling," *Duquesne Studies in Phenomenological Psychology* 2 (1975): 235–60.
- 9 Heidegger, "Meßkirch's Seventh Centennial," 43.
- 10 Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj*, 38.
- 11 Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj*; Carpenter, *Civilisation*, 71–72; Karina and Kant, *Hitler's Dancers*; Fischer-Lichte, *Theatre, Sacrifice, Ritual*.
- 12 G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* [1820] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
- 13 David Kolb, *The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger and After* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).





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