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MASTER OF ARTS IN PHILOSOPHY

M.A. THESIS

**A TREATISE CONCERNING THE CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCE
OF HEGEL**




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ABSTRACT

A TREATISE CONCERNING THE CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCE OF HEGEL

Karakaya, Baki

MA in Philosophy

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The concept of experience occupies an important position in Hegel's system of philosophy. It refers to the movement of consciousness throughout the moments which take the consciousness to the absolute knowledge. In this sense, the concept of experience is the main component of Hegel's system which allows it to become capable of integrating the existence into the realm of knowledge. Thus, the foundation of the subject and ego is directly tied to the concept of experience. In our investigation of the concept of experience, we focus on the meaning and the transformation of it as appropriate to the transformation and the meaning of the consciousness. In this context, we claim that the concept of experience has two different meanings; one is denotational, and the other one is connotational meaning of it. The consciousness comes into appearance through the denotational, or the first, meaning, whilst the self-consciousness comes into being through the connotational, or the second, meaning of the concept of experience. What this thesis claims is obviously to manifest the results of distinction of the concept of experience in itself. In addition to this, the impact of the concept of experience on the activity of the consciousness to get to know its existence is another focal point of this thesis. As a consequence, the division of the concept of experience into two meanings has an obvious effect on the manifestation of the differentiation of Hegel's system of philosophy from other approaches, and, of the foundation of the ego and appearance of two types of subject.

Keywords: consciousness; experience; Hegel; Geist; idealism; self-consciousness.

ÖZ

HEGEL'İN DENEYİM KAVRAMINA İLİŞKİN BİR İNCELEME

Karakaya, Baki

Felsefe Yüksek Lisans Programı

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Gör. Muhammet İkbâl Bakır

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Deneyim kavramı Hegel'in felsefi sisteminde önemli bir yer işgal eder. Deneyim kavramı, bilincin, kendisini mutlak bilgiye götüren momentler boyunca hareketine işaret eder. Bu bakımdan, deneyim kavramı, Hegel'in sisteminin varoluşu bilgi alanına ekleme yeterliliğine kavuşmasına imkân veren temel bileşenidir. Böylece özne ve benlik kurulumu doğrudan deneyim kavramına bağlanmış olur. Deneyim kavramı üzerine olan incelememizde, bilincin anlamına ve dönüşümüne paralel olacak şekilde deneyimin anlamına ve dönüşümüne odaklanıyoruz. Bu bakımdan, deneyim kavramının iki ayrı anlamı olduğunu iddia ediyoruz: ilki kavramın düz anlamı, diğeri ise yan anlamı. Özbilinç deneyim kavramının yan anlamı veya ikinci anlamı ile varlığa gelirken, bilinç deneyimin düz anlamı veya ilk anlamı yoluyla tezahür eder. Bu tezin iddiası da deneyim kavramının kendi içindeki farklılaşmasının sonuçlarını göstermektir. Buna ek olarak, deneyim kavramının, bilincin kendi varoluşunu bilmesi edimindeki etkisi de bu tezin diğeri bir odak noktasıdır. Sonuç olarak, deneyim kavramının anlam bakımından iki ayrı kısma bölünmesi Hegel'in felsefi sisteminin diğeri yaklaşımlardan farklılaşmasını ve iki özne türünün açığa çıkmasını ve benlik kurulumunu gösterme konusunda aşikâr bir etkiye sahiptir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: bilinç; deneyim; Hegel; Geist; idealizm; özbilinç.

To my mother and father,
and, for sure,
to the memory of Hölderlin...

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

*“We have no footing anywhere,
No rest, we topple,
Fall and suffer
Blindly from hour
To hour like water
Pitched from fall
To fall, year in,
Year out, headlong,
Ignorant.”*

Friedrich Hölderlin, *Fate. Hyperion’s Song*¹

In philosophy, the question of what the reality is has always been taken as a controversial idea. In this sense, sceptical approaches have mischievously captured the thinking methods of human beings. However, sceptics have almost always been threatened by an assertion which is strictly oriented to their Achilles tendon, an assertion which has unveiled the inquiry of whether those sceptics are able to survive without their experience of the world or not. As a result, what sceptics and other humans have just come to know has obviously been that they are not capable of living without the presence of the experience. In this context, the presence of the experience is to be well-aware, or, better, be conscious of, what the world presents to us. It is neither a perceptible material on which we are able to put, nor is it an untouchably heavenly idea of which we are never aware. Rather than those assumptions, we are consciously familiar with the experience, and also, with the concept of it. Moreover, the concept of experience symbolises an investigation of the life not only in the field of philosophy, but also in other fields, and, of course, in each individual’s living. As a

¹ Translated by David Constantine (Hölderlin, 1996, s. 23).

result, the concept of experience turns out to be an endeavour of human beings to comprehend what the world presents to them. The concept of experience, in this sense, is nothing other than the power of the subject to live. The interaction between human being and the world as being of the other people and the whole existents can easily be called as the experience. Henceforth, the presence of the experience has, of necessity, to mean the presence of both the human being and the world which is external to that human being.

Togetherness of those two, namely the human beings and the world composed of human beings and other existents, does basically make the concept of experience necessary. For sure, the absence of one of those entities directly means the annihilation of the concept of experience, thus, those are the necessary constituent-components of the experience. At the same time, as we have just seen that the concept of experience is the necessary result of presence of those entities, what we, as human beings, need to have for experience is nothing but the consciousness. The experience, from the beginning to the end of life, is an activity of the subject; thus, it should clearly be claimed that the consciousness is necessary for experiencing, since, without consciousness, the subject is not the subject anymore. In this context, the concept of experience consummately refers to the unity between the subject's ability to get to know, and, the existence of the world and subject. Consequently, the concept of experience means the dialectic of the life and the living subject. However, it is quite important to be aware of that this life encompasses not only the finite and biological life of the human being, but also the infinite life of the spirit as the consciousness or the subject of the world. As Hyppolite (1973, p. 9) clearly explains,

Hegel's first treatise of logic is the reply to a question he had posed to himself as a young man: What are the intelligible conditions of human life? However, the dynamism of the relation only possesses its true significance once there appears an active consciousness of life. It is only the spiritual relation that is a dialectic 'for-itself.' That is why Hegel speaks of nature as 'only a concept in-itself,' so that biological life can only end in death or a radical dissolution of the universal and the particular. But in Hegel death is the beginning of the life of the spirit. ... In reflection upon life one can equally well start from the unity of life (*natura naturans*) and proceed to the distinct individual, or one can begin with the separate individual (*natura naturata*) for whom the whole is an external unity, and then discover that unity as the immanent nature of the individual. The two procedures may indeed be complementary in a cyclical fashion exemplary of a dialectical relation.

The dialectical method of Hegel allows the subject to have a beginning point either in the unity of life, and to experience the unity first and then to move to particular, or in the particular, and to experience the individual first and then move to the unity. Thus, the concept of experience is limited neither to finiteness of the human life, nor to

pureness of the infinity of the life of universe; in a similar vein, it is limited neither to the individual as particularity of the being, nor to the unity as universality of the existence. Rather than those, the concept of experience is the consciousness' comprehension of the totality by starting from either the individual or the unity, and, by encompassing both of them at the end of the day. Thus, the concept of experience becomes the main component of thinking and comprehending.

The moments of the consciousness in Hegel's system of philosophy keep going to move through assistance of the experience of consciousness. It can be asked why, in Hegel's system, the concept of experience occupies such an important position. Our answer to this question is nothing other than the dialectical structure of Hegel's system. Hegel's philosophy is based on dialectics, and, it is well-known that dialectics includes four important concepts which are, respectively, unity, difference, negativity, and *Aufhebung*, meaning lifting the moment up to the next level, whose verb form is *aufheben* defined by Pinkard (2002, p. 227) as a term which has triple meanings of 'cancel,' 'preserve,' and 'raise.' Hegel evaluates the determinations in a unity and difference. As Schülein (2016, p. 271) clearly puts it, Hegel, both, thinks of an absolute difference, and, at the same time, criticises the concept of pure difference. By doing so, he obviously intends to make them have interactions between each other, whilst, at the same time, they are not the same thing. If we think of them as they are the same, then, it becomes impossible to recognise what they are; in a similar manner, if we think of them as they are totally different determinations, then, we are not able to make them interact with each other. In both of these states, we encounter with the impossibility to get to know them; since they become closed and confined in a cage. By positing this kind of premise, Hegel strives to restrain them from becoming isolated. At the same time, it should be mentioned that there has to be only one unity; otherwise, we are, again, not able to know what they are in their own unity. When we focus on the negativity, we can easily discern that the negativity is the interaction between those determinations. Each determination has negation in itself, a negation which makes the determination become capable of getting touch with the other. In a state of the absence of negation, determinations have to be maintained what they, at the beginning, are. With the assistance of negation, the determination turns out to be the other, or, unveils its essential relation to the other, then, with the assistance of negation of the present negation, the determination turns out to be presented in itself, and, through this way,

the determinations are exposed to be lifted up to the next level. Thus, what we see by negating the negation is obviously nothing other than *Aufhebung*. This is the absolute way of Hegel's system of philosophy and the consciousness, and, the concept of experience which refers to the actualisation of the consciousness' ability to know follows this dialectical movement, or, it is this movement itself.

Our definition of the concept of experience, thereby, comes to be clear; the experience is the movement of the consciousness to know absolutely. As being appropriate to the differentiation of the concept of consciousness throughout the moments, we divide our concept of experience into two parts; the first one covers the moments of the consciousness, and, the second one encompasses the moments of the self-consciousness, and the Reason as an absolute point of the experience of consciousness. True, it is not the absolute point of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*; however, we have to confine ourselves to investigating the epistemological and ontological implications of the consciousness, as it learns from the concept of experience, rather than focusing on the social and political reflections of it. If we turn back to our subject, as Hegel (2010, p. 127) clearly puts it,

Consciousness is thus *phenomenal*, or it is this dualism: on the one side, it knows an external object which is other than it; on the other side, it is for-itself, has this intended object in it as idealized, abides not only by this other but therein abides also with itself. *Self-consciousness*, on the contrary, is *being-for-itself brought to completion* and *posited*; the side of reference to another, to an external object, is removed.

As a consequence, we construct our investigation of the concept of experience in accordance with this explanation of Hegel. We divide the experience into two meanings; denotational and connotational meanings of the experience. In denotational, or the first, meaning, the consciousness experiences immediate thing which is other than it; whilst, in connotational, or the second, meaning, the consciousness comes to experience itself, to take itself as its own object, and, to turn out to be the self-consciousness. However, it is quite important to bear in mind that we are going to witness that, in the last moment of consciousness, namely in 'Understanding,' both of the two meanings of the concept of experience are apparent to us, since the consciousness, in this moment, starts to turn into the self-consciousness with its exploration of the abstract concepts such as law, force, and infinity as much more important than other two abstractions.

Throughout the flow of our article, we are thematically going to focus respectively on those aspects; investigation of the concept of experience in usual and Hegel's understanding, the results and effects of Hegel's understanding of the concept of experience, and the conclusion as usefulness and effectivity of our classification of the concept of experience in regard to differentiation of Hegel's system of philosophy from other approaches, and impact of his system on the foundation of the ego and subject.

CHAPTER 2

HEGEL'S CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCE

The concept of experience (*Erfahrung*) is, as it should easily be predicted, one of the most critical concepts of Hegel's system of philosophy. However, it seems to be quite beneficial to speak of that, at the outset, Hegel's concept of experience is neither a notion through which he ascribes the possibility knowledge to externality, nor is it used by Hegel, in a negative correlation, as being resembling an empty or unreachable world which is in-itself, and might inevitably evoke us to remember Kant's noumenal world that is perfectly impenetrable and undisclosed to us. Rather than those, of which we have already spoken above briefly, and which will surely be explicated in a detailed way throughout this part, Hegel's concept of experience directly and strictly refers to the process consciousness goes ahead, becomes getting to know itself, turns into the Absolute, and shows itself up in its self-manifestation or its self-appearance. In this sense, it becomes more straightforward, than any other perspective, to claim that Hegel's concept of experience implies nothing but the self-knowing of consciousness, that is, that the concept of experience must firmly be the experience of consciousness.

As it is generally accepted, modern philosophy has, as beginning from its first spark allegedly glowing in the seventeenth century, usually produced in its sphere not only debates on the distinction between reason and extension, namely *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, but also the common understanding according to which the concept of experience has, in its twofold meaning which refers to both the sensual reception of the objects and the competence to grasp their quality by understanding, been extinguished and thrown into the abyss.

If we eminently focus mainly on Descartes' philosophy, it becomes apparent to us that the concept of experience has directly been excluded from the realm of philosophy as a result of its so-called lack of relations with it. Obviously, it is the same bare situation in the empiricist tradition, in which it accurately seems to be repeated again and again, that is, that which is excluded throughout the course of philosophy is, by rejecting

condition and prominence of the consciousness being able to comprehending the world, nothing but the very concept of experience itself.

What does it mean, when we exactly think of the concept of experience, to be excluded from the realm of philosophy? In the system of philosophy of Descartes, it is quite straightforward to see that, from the first, he has strongly excluded the concept of experience by reducing it to an unreliable concept to get to know things. At the beginning of his book *Meditations on First Philosophy*, in the first meditation, Descartes (2008, p. 14) has, without any sort of hesitation to claim so, written that

All the same, I am now perceiving this paper with eyes that are certainly awake; the head I am nodding is not drowsy; I stretch out my hand and feel it knowingly and deliberately; a sleeper would not have these experiences so distinctly. – But have I then forgotten those other occasions on which I have been deceived by similar thoughts in my dreams?

It might deliberately be asked for the state in which Descartes was, while he was writing those sentences; is it possible to count those as arguments through which Descartes has willingly refused the impact of the experience? True, Descartes has deliberately been using those sentences to pave the way through which he has found the ground to built his philosophy, that is to say, he has never focused mainly on the concept of experience itself, and, rather than focusing on the experience itself, has apparently used the experience as a means to negate the possibility of reliable existence of the world, which is based on sensual reception of the objects, to become able to prove the existence of the ‘thinking ego’ as a distinctive feature of the reason and an essence of his philosophical system; however, it is, at the end of the day, nothing but a tragic rejection of the concept of experience without regard to its importance for the consciousness, and to its irrefusable place in the course of getting to know who the human beings are and what it does mean to be in the world as a human being. By doing so, he has definitely not only rejected the concept of experience, but also lapsed into an abeyance in which he has never been competent to realise what is going on in the world, and, he has reduced the existence of human being merely to a solipsistic reason which is permanently to be unable to catch up with the other people, or, better, the other consciousnesses. In this context, it might mildly be claimed that what is to be objected here is not merely Descartes’ declining of the concept of experience, but also his lack of understanding the totality or the unity of knowing and existence. This abeyance in which Descartes has suddenly found his philosophical system, as well as

himself, immediately derives from his weird approach to the common understanding of experience. As Heidegger (1996, p. 43) correctly puts it,

Historiographically, the intention of the existential analytic can be clarified by considering Descartes, to whom one attributes the discovery of the *cogito sum* as the point of departure for all modern philosophical questioning. He investigates the *cogitare* of the *ego* – within certain limits. But the *sum* he leaves completely undiscussed, even though it is just as primordial as the *cogito*.

It might conditionally be claimed that Heidegger is akin to Hegel's positioning in regard to his understanding of the experience. Descartes' approach to the experience, however, inevitably turns into an ignorance oriented to the meaning of the *sum*. Heidegger (1996, p. 43) continuously writes that "Our analytic raises the ontological question of the being of the *sum*. Only when the *sum* is defined does the manner of the *cogitationes* become comprehensible." Especially, this sort of ado to make an attempt to unify two poles, of which modern philosophy is well-aware and has steadily thought, is obviously to mean that the concept of experience is neither a concept which is dispensable, and, that nor might it be apprehended and recaptured through the one-sided approach, namely *res cogitans*, to it. In this sense, the enthusiasm encompassing and thinking of the concept of experience is, of necessity, an indivisible part of any kind of philosophical approach whose aim is inevitably to capture the truth.

Descartes' solipsistic reason has already declaimed that what the concept of experience is has nothing to do with the truth. Though there is no hesitation that Descartes' solipsism has just been begun with his methodological scepticism, the result of the course of his solipsism, which does ultimately focus to a great extent on Cartesian recapturing of the truth of the *ego*, external world and the *God*, and on reproducing what had already been abandoned throughout his scepticism, has finally ended up with the direct exclusion of the concept of experience from his philosophy eternally. What is presented here is quite important in regard to its potentiality to display the position of the experience in the dawn of the modern philosophy. Taking the position of the experience in Cartesian philosophy into consideration does need to be explicated through the comparison between the outset and the final point of Descartes' meditations. Without the concept of experience, Descartes has never found what he has been seeking; and the alleged subject of his philosophy is not a subject in terms of its excessiveness to have itself being dwelled in itself as an undisclosed or veiled impenetrability, and obviously, regarding its lack of competence to find any negation, as what is divergent to this so-called subject is neither itself nor the presence of the

other, because of the difference of their level of value or importance. In other words, it is indispensable to grasp that Cartesian philosophy has a strict dualism in which it is impossible for us to find a place for the concept of experience, except his usage of it as a means to get rid of itself. Moreover, these two sides of Cartesian philosophy, namely *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, have never been equal to each other, that is, the *res cogitans* has always prevailed against the extension. As a result of this unreconciled distinction, these two different parts might never have a connection with each other and have to have, of necessity, an asymmetrical relation, even if we are forced to assume that there is a relation between them. Each part is, thus, enclosed in itself, and the question of being and totality which definitely implies beingness of beings remains concealed regarding parts' incompetence to be connected. As a consequence, Descartes' philosophy is nothing but the perfect presentation of what has to be encountered in the lack of the concept of experience.

It might, at this point, be questioned why Cartesian philosophy is that much important in an inquiry on the concept of experience. There are two answers to this question. The first one is that the structure of Cartesian philosophy has, as it is mentioned above, stably, and strictly, presented to us what takes place in the lack of the concept of experience, that is, that we almost always face two unrelated and unreconciled worlds. However, it is, at this point, very beneficial to remember that this concept of experience we have been tracing by investigating in Cartesian philosophy is not directly and totally correspondent to the very use of it by Hegel. However, the main interest of this thesis is, of course, the concept of experience in Hegel's system of philosophy, that will exactly be discussed elaborately in following subtitles. The second is that, in one way or another, thinking of Cartesian philosophy is to consider the foundation of the modern philosophy and its primary questions which are totally based on the subject and the certainty of that subject's knowledge. When the concept of experience will be discussed under following subtitles, it will be likely to appear that certainty is one of the most prominent intentions in Hegel's system of philosophy, in the sense of absolute knowing.

What about empiricist philosophy in terms of its approach to the concept of experience? Obviously, the question does neither mean that we intend to encompass whole empiricist philosophy, nor should it imply that we are able or prone to do so.

Rather than this, we do merely desire to focus shortly on the concept of experience in Locke's system of philosophy as a representative and primordial instance of empiricist tradition. True, it is quite possible to see a spark of the concept of experience in empiricist tradition, even if it is never similar to Hegel's concept of experience with regard to its position in which the structure of the experience is shaped by the effect of consciousness. In the sense of our distinction between two different experiences, classical view of the concept of experience should, as it is mentioned above, highly come into appearance as it is what we have done with and perceived in our lives. However, our concept of experience is neither a sensual reception of the things, nor a capturing of external world in the sense of its lack of human factor, and, surely, nor is it the rejection of the apparent world. Rather than those either lacking appearances of this world and burying itself in one's own so-called completed reason, or underestimating the importance of reason and the subject, and, thus, lapsing into the deceiving world of mere objects, our concept of experience refers to the relation of the consciousness to the world, and to itself. When we have already spoken of the lacking approach of the Cartesian philosophy, we have especially emphasised its simmering ground which is about to be collapsed, which is in an illusion of self-definition and solipsism that does give to it the chance to humiliate the façade of the world, and that makes the experience rejected. Now, it might be better to focus on the concept of experience in empiricist tradition briefly.

Empiricist tradition has, in any way, taken for granted what external world has presented. Henceforth, it might be understandable to propound that it has already benefited from objects sensed and perceived. However, what is lacking in empiricist tradition, as it might straightforwardly be predicted, is the subject that should obviously be an irreplaceable component in any kind of perceptual action. It is unfortunately deprived of the means that has the competence to mediate the objects and to make them intelligible for us. In this context, what is obvious to us is nothing but the lack of a perceiver, receiver, and classifier faculty coming into being in the subject. In Locke's system of philosophy, there are no innate ideas, in contrast to Descartes' system; however, this hollow understanding of faculties of reason of the subject indispensably leads to a self-contradiction in empiricist tradition. It might, thus, be asserted that empiricist tradition, due to its lack of the concept of experience, in its second meaning which gives to it the possibility to be processes of consciousness,

has already dug its own grave, made the nails put in its coffin and entombed itself. As Locke (1979, p. 103) has himself given it in his *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*,

All that I shall say for the Principles I proceed on, is, that I can only *appeal* to Mens own unprejudiced *Experience*, and Observation, whether they be true, or no; and this is enough for a Man who professes no more, than to lay down candidly and freely his own Conjectures, concerning a Subject lying somewhat in the dark, without any other design, than an unbiass'd enquiry after Truth.

As it might easily be discerned, Locke has completely designed the experience as an 'unprejudiced' action. This suggestion means that the construction of the experience should basically be on a way which should not include the consciousness and the intervention of the subject on any object. In any way, Locke's concept of experience has ended up with the exclusion of the consciousness from its very means, from experience itself. Henceforth, he has merely had two options to get rid of the contradiction in his philosophy. The first is to affirm the presence of innate ideas and categories of the reason to allow the consciousness to endow with the competence to experience the experience itself, that is, to make it have the ability to know itself by taking itself as its object; the second is plausibly to rid of the whole empirical system. However, as it is obvious, in both states, empiricist tradition has to surrender continuing to do so, and has to abandon, at least by converting it into another form, its approach to the concept of experience. Consciousness is, in its first meaning, to have the ability to experience things and to evaluate each of them as being in itself. However, as it is, of necessity, conceived throughout the history of philosophy, empiricist tradition has been unable to provide itself basic conditions to speak of consciousness. In this context, it has always been deprived of the distinctive features of the consciousness, which are basically rooted on both the competence to understand the things in their universality and unity, and to make consciousness its own object. As a consequence, it should be asserted that empiricist approach has inadequately represented the subjectivity in its theory, the subjectivity which is well-aware of the distinction between the naturalness and the naturalness for, or grasped by, consciousness. In this sense, it is plausible and, of course, necessary to set forth that the level of the empiricist tradition is, in terms of philosophical inquiry, exaggerated much more than what it really is. Empiricist tradition has easily gotten rid of the duties of consciousness of human being by partly ignoring the concept of experience, and, reduced it to a pacificated and lifeless component of human being. Consciousness has, in empiricist tradition, turned into a suspended component, and, thus, lapsed from grace into

abeyance in which it has unsatisfactorily been placed in a secondary and accidental position.

As it is readily understood, the position of consciousness and of the concept of experience in any approach is inevitably formed each other's place. In Cartesian philosophy, we directly comprehend that the concept of experience is only used to get rid of the experience itself; and, again, we realise that the structure of Descartes' system of philosophy avowedly excludes the experience, in the form of *res extensa*, by engendering a dualism between reason and extension, and it repulsively suggests that the concept of experience is, of necessity, to be in the realm of secondary and contingent extension. Descartes has destructively ached for the exclusion of the experience to find his philosophy's allegedly real ground; however, then, thanks to his love of life, he has utterly strived to establish the reality of the world again by grounding on an idea of the ungrounded God, which is obviously in an opposition to the absolute and solipsistic position of the reason in his philosophy. As a result, what we have lust to claim at this point is that Cartesian philosophy has, without any hesitation, rejected all the meanings of the concept of experience; and then, it has barrenly thrilled at its meaningless and formal ado to rebuild the realm of experience. On the other hand, as we have already indicated before, empiricist tradition has, to some extent, affirm the importance of the usual meaning of the concept of experience; however, this affirmation has meant nothing but its ignorance of features of the experience, that is, what is ignored is the most important function of the experience, namely its assistance to consciousness to get to know what is meant by the presence of the consciousness is its ability to know itself and to take itself as its object on which it is possible for it to focus broadly. In particular, empiricist tradition highly lacks the enthusiasm to include conscious and unconscious human action, and consciousness itself in its philosophical approach. In other words, the main structure of the empiricist tradition has mainly been built on the assumption that, in any way, it might spot the target with the assistance of daily usage of sensual reception or sense-certainty. It might, to some extent, be asserted that the concept of experience has already been there, in empiricist tradition; however, one of the most crucial points is that it has never surrounded the concept of experience in a totality; what lacks in its surrounding is obviously the second meaning of experience, which implies the ability to overcome the general understanding of experience, namely sensual reception. All those

problematic points about the concept of experience in Cartesian philosophy and empiricist tradition do not allow them to have vivid viewpoints and to afford to proceed their claims.

For now, it is ample to speak of what is missed in Descartes' system of philosophy and empiricist tradition in terms of their approaches to the concept of experience. The notion of consciousness also deserves and needs to be thought of, especially in terms of its relationship with the concept of experience. We have intentionally separated the concept of experience into two different parts. As it has plausibly been drawn above, the very first meaning of the concept of experience refers to immediate reception of the objects, in which what the experience deprives of itself is the explicit consciousness; this does not mean that consciousness is not there to know the things, rather, it exactly refers to that consciousness has implicitly been there from the very outset of the concept of experience. However, as it has particularly been mentioned above, some approaches, namely empiricist and some vulgar traditions, have never been able to go into details to know the existence of the consciousnesses and faculties having important tasks to understand what has been going on there, in the process of the experience. According to our viewpoint, there are two different meanings of the concept of experience, as it has been mentioned before. One of these two meanings is, for sure, its daily use in which we have an understanding of it through immediate externality, that is, it has never been related to the structure of the self-consciousness and, to a great extent, of the consciousness. Obviously, it is quite vital to make a separation at this point; in the first, or the classical, meaning of the concept of experience, experience is mandatorily related to, and, of necessity, does encompass within itself, an implicit consciousness which might be considered as the necessary component of having the competence to experience the world. This subtle experience has not to be grasped in everydayness of human existence; even if it is and has always to be there. In addition to this, it is, as it has been indicated again and again, a necessary condition to sense and, to a great extent, to perceive. It will, later on, be infused into Hegel's classification of the consciousness in his *Phenomenology of Geist*. In its first meaning, the experience probably seems, in its lack of explicit consciousness, to be merely what the objects present to subject; however, the subjectivity of the subject is not certainly visible to the subject himself. What does it mean that the subjectivity of subject is not visible to subject himself? The subject, who apparently has the ability to

sense and perceive the things, is, to a high degree, not aware of his position to understand the presence and effect of his consciousness to do so. In addition, it is, for subject, also impossible to know the structure and functionality of his consciousness. Nevertheless, what is expected in this stage to come into cognition is basically the presence and accessibility of the consciousness, or, better, is possibility to discover the presence of consciousness. As it is normally expected, it seems that, at the first stage, talking about the form of subjectivity and presence of subject is almost impossible. Nonetheless, we should have a slim chance to discern the presence of the consciousness. What gives us this chance to discern it is apparently nothing other than the everydayness of our individual lives. As a reflection of our objects by which we usually know the particulars in their particularity, we experience our lives in our feelings of dizziness and in our everydayness; what it does mean is that we are ultimately allowed to experience in particularity merely the particular, and that there is no cure for that, except we discover the consciousness which should meaningfully be understood as our openness to the universality. As it may gradually be intuited, everydayness which is a beneficial means to get to know what the things, in their particularity, are must never be our ultimate aim to know absolutely. However, we are not able to reject its importance as a spark at the outset of the action of absolute knowing and of self-discovery of the consciousness.

From now on, it is better for us to focus mainly on the concept of experience itself and its position in Hegel's system of philosophy. In the second meaning of the concept of experience, as a result of our intervention in it for classification to reassemble it and to make it clearer, we utterly realise that the concept of experience includes both the consciousness and self-consciousness. In particular, we explicitly have the intention that, in the second meaning of the concept of experience, there is a distinction between the consciousness and self-consciousness, through which it utterly becomes easier to define and make use of them. This does not mean that the differentiation of the consciousness from self-consciousness does make them totally impenetrable and confined in an undisclosed realm. Rather than this, it might be realised as both of them, the consciousness and self-consciousness, be in a process; moreover, this understanding of process is also valid and useful for the separation of the meanings of the concept of experience. By this way, it apparently becomes possible for us to divide those concepts and meanings into moments throughout which the subject should get

to know himself and the world, by starting from the beginning at which, as we have mentioned, everydayness of his own existence needs to be covered. If we get back to the second meaning of the concept of experience, the subject, first of all, has to know his subjectivity as a primitive differentiation from the objects, or, as an actualisation in the process of reception; this is a process in which getting to know himself might, thus, take place both at the end of the first or at the beginning of the second realm of the experience. Then, in the second phase of the experience, the consciousness proceeds in the faculty of understanding which does completely symbolise and universalise the complexity of particularity. At the same time, it should be also claimed that this universalisation brought into the scene by the understanding allows the subject to have the ability to evaluate the general rules, such as the law and force, which have already been in the whole process of the experience, even if this 'having to be' has to be implicit until the appearance of the knowledge of perception and understanding as a supplement to the former. What does this point mean? This point completely resembles a position through which the consciousness does turn into another form of itself, that is, that we suddenly face with the self-consciousness which is nothing other than a transformed state of the consciousness. Even though we will focus broadly on it in this chapter of the article, let us speculate about the importance and genesis point of the self-consciousness. At this point which refers to the transformation from the primary state, namely the consciousness, to the secondary one, which is, obviously, self-consciousness, what is quite important in terms of our view is metaphysical duties of the 'force' and the 'law' which do directly refer to the 'understanding' by which we might find the answer to the inquiry of what the reason behind this transformation is. As it is appropriately propounded by Orman (2015, p. 125), our understanding's concepts such as the force and the law, which are metaphysical and beyond the senses, and as being determinations which are visible and external merely in the matters, resemble the concept of consciousness; those concepts are quite prominent with regard to their contribution to the consciousness in the course of turning into self-consciousness, a transformation which does require to be a witness to that some universal concepts similar to the consciousness should be taken, by consciousness, as an object of itself. As a result, the consciousness, which is, to some extent, similar to those concepts, might already be able to take itself as its own object and to be inverted by itself. Consequently, the consciousness does utterly turn into self-consciousness, a novel form of consciousness which is competent to think of itself as its own object and

to focus fully on its own self, for sure, without rejecting the realm of the first meaning of the experience; it does, thus, leap to the most superior level of the Hegel's system of philosophy, a level at which it is competent to understand anything in its totality. Thereinafter, we will certainly elaborate all these points needing to be explicated in a detailed way.

Last of all, it should be better to think of what needs to be examined and to organise what this main title will include in accordance with our enthusiasm for what requires to be expounded. Primarily, it needs to be written that all topics, except the positions of Cartesian philosophy and empiricist tradition in terms of their approaches to the concept of experience, will be elaborated within the process. Furthermore, there will be two main subtitles under this main title, those are the definition of the concept of experience, and, the experience in absolute idealism or in Hegel's system of philosophy. Another important point on which we need to focus before we move on to the first subtitle of this chapter is that the heart of this part, and also the centre of the whole article, will predictably be the second subtitle, namely 'the experience in absolute idealism.' However, we also believe and think of that the peak of the article will be the penultimate chapter of the whole article, as being called 'in lieu of conclusion'. Now, we can clearly proceed with doing what we are supposed to do.

2.1. Definition of the Concept of Experience

The definition of the concept of experience consists mainly in, to a broad extent, its historically highlighted usage by philosophers, and, partly, in its position in different languages. The Greek word ἐμπειρία (*empeiria*) basically means experience. The second meaning of the word should be considered as practice without knowledge of principles, and, for sure, craft. Another Greek word related to experience is ἀπειρία (*apeiria*) giving to us the meaning of inexperience or ignorance. Whilst ἀπειροβίως (*apeirobios*) means without experience of life, ἀπειρόκακος (*apeirokakos*) refers to without experience of evil. What all those words do strictly mean is that the concept of experience should correctly be benefited when one desires to imply a separation, or, better, a differentiation between two existents.

What is the clearest implication of this word in philosophy? As we have already mentioned, empiricist tradition has, thanks to bonded languages, taken *empeiria* as its constituent concept. However, what is missed in its interpretation is obviously that empiricist tradition ignores the presence of differentiation, and, at the end, of totality, in the concept of *empeiria*, which does lead us to the foundation of the subject. Both of the meanings of *empeiria* clarify that the construction of any relationship, by using the concept of *empeiria*, directly refers to the presence of a differentiation, namely the object and the subject. In this sense, the differentiation must, at the same time, be comprehended as the inevitable unity of those two realms. Even though empiricist tradition carries in its name the same meaning with the *empeiria*, its approach to *empeiria* only highlights the position of particulars rather than universals. However, it is quite ridiculous to think of that defending an opinion is, without having an idea about it, possible. It seems to be what empiricist tradition has been done throughout its highly effective periods. We have to remember that the crisis of empiricist tradition came into appearance with the assistance of very keen intelligence of Hume, that is, that he understood the impossibility to bind one particular to another one without profit from principles, and that he asserted that what human being had called relationship between things was, in its reality, nothing other than human being's assumption on it. As a result, what empiricist tradition has remarked a long time is, in the fact, not the experience itself, but, instead of it, an impenetrable particularity in which it is impossible to find any relationship between things, object and subject. Henceforth, it is clearer now than it was that there are no safe relationships between the empiricist tradition and the concept of experience. The concept of *empeiria* presupposes the differentiation; however, this differentiation is to serve for the unity; since, only existents in a unity should have the chance to be related to each other.

Experience is mainly established by the structure of a dialectical relationship between the object and the subject. In this sense, the *empeiria* is, rather than its first meaning which refers to its empirical foundation, constructed by its connotation which should strictly be understood in its methodologically dialectical form. We never ignore the importance of the content; however, we are prone to reject any sort of reductionism directly, which can, from time to time, come into appearance in the shape of remarking the form or the content. When we think of the concept of experience, we, at the same time, have to consider a differentiation which presupposes both the difference of a

substance from others and the indifference of matters, or melting down of the difference. As a result, what needs to be considered is, much more than anything else, the dialectical functionality of the process of knowing and the structure of the existence. For what Hegel understands from the concept of experience is nothing but the process of consciousness to get to know itself, from the very beginning of sense-certainty to the end of the absolute knowing. This whole process is called experience, and, as important as this, the enthusiasm to know this process is also the 'science of experience' in regard to its contribution to our knowing, which basically refers to that we are competent to know the whole process of knowing with the guidance and counselling of the 'science of experience.' We need to be permitted, for a while, to leave the approach of Hegel to the concept of experience, under the condition that we will focus more on it in the forthcoming parts.

The concept of experience is quite beneficial for any aspiration through which one can basically attempt to engender a systematic unity of thought concerning the relationships of the objects and subjects. The reason why we have faithfully asserted that is, for sure, the dialectical structure of the concept of experience. To know is to make the thing, of which the knower is aware, turn into an object. Otherwise, it is not possible to know at all. In this sense, we should amply have the claim that experience strictly refers to the necessary and organic relationship between existents. The experience does neither appear merely as the difference between determinations, nor does it pertain only to the unity of indifferent substances. Rather than these, or, better, rather than sublimating each of these, we intend to focus mainly on these together, on the place of each of these, and, of course, on interaction between them. If a philosophical approach portentously aims to remark merely the importance of difference, then, it will possibly lose or ignore the unifying components of those things. In this sense, focusing only on the content of determinations is quite likely to result in the lack of universals which have a binding duty in any scenario. What is lacked at this point, as it might be realised, is the possible aloneness and dividedness of determinations. In this scenario, one who intends to get to know does lapse into an abyss, of which what is a vain endeavour is to believe that it is possible to get rid. In the field of philosophy, the fate of empiricist tradition shows up how this scene should ultimately end up with a crisis. Furthermore, focusing merely on each particular in its oneness probably makes us have lack of interest to the other, attempt to canonise our

limitedness as it is the most important determination in the world, and, absolutise our limited being as it is competent to encompass the whole reality. For another instance of this sort of mere highlight of difference is obviously Fichteian philosophy which presents an absolute, impenetrable and concealed ego that reduces existence to the *absolute ego* and to the identity of subjective and objective determinations in this ego. The second is that, if a philosophical approach exaggeratedly intends to focus on the unity by explicating its importance to the extent that it annihilates everything other than itself, in fact, at the end, it necessarily demolishes itself, then, that approach will absolutely become unable to think of anything other than its self-destroying position. A reflection of this kind of approach is visible in Schelling's system of philosophy. In his system of philosophy, everything, or any determination, is held as it is almost absent in unity, and, melted down in the absoluteness of the unity. What is important is nothing but the unity itself; however, this leads directly to that it becomes totally impossible to know anything. In the middle of nowhere, Schelling strives to intuit the unity through which everything will be open to him, because it is impossible to find any way other than intuition at that point. This deficiency Schelling's system of philosophy has in itself is, of course, discerned by Hegel; as a predictable consequence of this, Hegel (1974, p. 22, 2004, p. 9) criticises Schelling's system in his *Phänomenologie des Geistes* by following sentences,

Dealing with something from the perspective of the Absolute consists merely in declaring that, although one has been speaking of it just now as something definite, yet in the Absolute, the $A=A$, there is nothing of the kind, for there all is one. To pit this single insight, that in the Absolute everything is the same, against the full body of articulated cognition, which at least seeks and demands such fulfilment, to palm off its Absolute as the night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black – this is cognition naively reduced to vacuity.²

As Hegel correctly puts it, Schelling's system of philosophy reminds us the night, the absolute night in which we are not able to perceive anything and to realise the difference in the unity. This philosophy, as it is adequately supposed to do, annihilates the difference; however, no one knows how it is possible to know in an abyss of vacuity in which the presence of difference is not there. The concept of experience, as well as being a means to know the form, assists us to penetrate into the content of determinations. The reason why Hegel does always struggle to criticise both extreme sides, or any excessiveness in the conflict of form and content, is, now, obviously open

² When we quote from Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, we are going to give references both to the German and English versions of the book. There are basically two reasons for this treatment; the first one is to make the meanings of some words clear and unveiled, and the second one is to induce a correlational binding between them. On the other hand, it is quite obvious that we quote from the English version of the book translated by Miller.

to us. In this context, we should utterly assert that, as it is visible in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel certainly objects to formalist views in philosophy, which are quite abstract, unable to come into contact with the reality, and, for sure, deficient to prove necessary relationship between knowing and existence in regard to thinking of to and fro twofold movement of the experience. Therefore, Hegel (1974, p. 21, 2004, pp. 8-9) exactly emphasises that

It thus appears that everything has been subjected to the absolute Idea, which therefore seems to be cognized in everything and to have matured into an expanded science. But a closer inspection shows that this expansion has not come about through one and the same principle having spontaneously assumed different shapes, but rather through the shapeless repetition of one and the same formula, only externally applied to diverse materials, thereby obtaining merely a boring show of diversity. The Idea, which is of course true enough on its own account, remains in effect always in its primitive condition, if its development involves nothing more than this sort of repetition of the same formula. When the knowing subject goes around applying this single inert form to whatever it encounters, and dipping the material into this placid element from outside, this is no more the fulfilment of what is needed, i.e. a self-originating, self-differentiating wealth of shapes, than any arbitrary insights into the content. Rather it is a monochromatic formalism which only arrives at the differentiation of its material since this has been already provided and is by now familiar. Yet this formalism maintains that such monotony and abstract universality are the Absolute, and we are assured that dissatisfaction with it indicates the inability to master the absolute standpoint and to keep hold of it.

It is important to remember that formalist approaches to the determinations cannot discern the content of the determinations. Without taking the content as necessary and important as the form, it seems to be impossible to achieve the aim which is directly the absolute knowing, or, better, the unity of knowing and existence. As a result, Hegel's objections to formalism are shaped by his understanding of the concept of experience without which the philosophy merely turns into an art of rhetoric to deceive ourselves. Particularly, mathematical thinking and, sometimes, ratiocination are associated with formalism. The reason for this is obviously their common assumption of a 'formula' to get to know what goes on. This formula is, of necessity, an external means to apply to determinations, and, without regard to their contents, this 'shapeless repetition of one and the same formula' is repetitively imposed to materials. By doing so, formalist approach, as it is on occasion another name of deficient absolutism and rationalism, should claim that it discerns the diversity and content of determinations; however, what it is able to discover in its self-repetition is immediately nothing other than itself and its previously-designed absolute formula. Moreover, by applying its repetitive formula to materials, it reaches its peak, a peak which is exactly made or built of the bones of presuppositions of this 'monochromatic formalism,' and, which, with the assistance of what is external and contingent, means a discovery of what has already been discovered, even by sensual reception. As a consequence, formalism has

the deficiency to understand the content of the determinations, and, interprets them according to the rules of its hypothetical and monothetic standpoint.

What is needed in furtherance of science of experience is, as it is amply understandable, first of all, to define the experience in a deeper sense and to reveal the differences between two divided meanings of the concept of experience. As we have already showed, the experience should, as what we have to understand by it, be taken as the totality which is, at the same time, a refuge area for both the unity and the difference of determinations. We should neither focus merely on the content, since it might cause us to lose ourselves in particularity as an infinite multiplicity, nor should we solely scrutinise the form by which we directly lapse into the abyss of vacuity as Schelling and some other philosophers has done. Rather than these two excessive approaches, we, with the help of the concept of experience, intend to focus on the second meaning of the experience and to take this second meaning in a perpetual relationship with the first one. Of course, this is what Hegel aims to do.

2.1.1 Usual Explication of the Concept of Experience

The concept of the experience should, as we have already mentioned, be explicated in two meanings: one is its usual meaning in itself, and the other one implies its consistent openness to us for whom the truth has been waiting to unveil itself. The usual meaning of the concept of experience does obviously derive from its denotation. The first meaning of the concept of experience, with which we have already dealt briefly, comes from the Greek word *empeiria*, and, means practice and learning craft by practicing. What does it mean to practice? What are the implications of the word practice? Practice (*Übung*) does mean exercising and, at the same time, routine. The word routine perfectly refers to habits and repetitive actions which take place in daily life and have the deficiency of deceiving one-sidedness, or, of being as being seen. The word practice provides us an externality of the determinations with which we are likely to be in contact in terms of our aspirations to know it as a thing which is in itself. However, externality of the thing does, at the same time, present an impossibility to catch it up as in-itself. In this sense, it should straightforwardly be claimed that the relation, based on the usual meaning of the concept of experience, is established by an

external force, and, that this relation to the externality makes the external contingent and, for sure, derivative, or accidental in its nature. What is this sort of approach, if not a reductionist understanding? Of course, it is nothing but a reductionism, the first meaning of experience assumes that the thing, or the object, in externality is always solid, and, as we put it in Heideggerian terms, *being-at-hand*. This sort of understanding of the concept of experience does inevitably lead to some further questions, such as the problem of the reality of external world as it has directly come into appearance in Descartes' system of philosophy. The word practice literally implies to learn craft, which is neither an art, nor a sort of thinking. In this sense, it is an accidental relationship of the determinations in which we suddenly realise that involvement of a merely deficient position of the object and lack of dialectical processes do, since it is an asymmetrical and one-sided relatedness, entail it to end up with an excessiveness of difference.

Furthermore, the concept of craft, as a product of the concept of experience, should be considered as a lifeless and unvivid positioning of the consciousness. It does, both, annihilate the possibility of becoming which can resurrect the determinations to exist in a dialectical and necessary relationship with each other, and, blunt the consciousness which is the most important component of the process to get to know the self and to reach the absolute knowing.

At this point, we should utterly notice that the main separation between the meanings of experience. The first meaning strictly marks the line between what is external and what is internal. This separation, for sure, functions as a necessary, but, at the same time, as an inadequate way of knowing. We have never rejected this kind of meaning and its functionality. However, what we completely claim is that the position of the second meaning of the concept of experience does abrogate the first meaning, and then, it does, with including the level reached in the first meaning, go beyond the first meaning; this is what Hegel suggested with the word *Aufhebung* which can be translated as both the abolishment and lifting up.

In this context, of course, staying stably in its first meaning is what we do not accept at all. However, if it is required to repeat it again, we, beside admitting the first meaning of experience, desire to lift it up to the level of the second meaning of it by

abolishing the first meaning with the help of negation. This means that, these two meanings, on an ongoing basis, are in the same process, and that to apply the second meaning of the concept of experience to this process is to allow the consciousness to take itself as its object, and, thus, to permit it to know itself and to turn into the absolute knowledge. In Hegel's system of philosophy, this lifting up correctly finds itself and becomes the distinctive feature of his thought. In addition to this, Hegel's system is a system of the process and movement, hence, it can easily be asserted that his system progresses with the concept of becoming and experience. The concept of becoming gives us the possibility to see what we have had so far and what we will be able to have, by the dialectical relations of the determinations. On the other hand, experience is basically the main ground of the dialectical relations, that is, it is the competence to understand dialectical process of the whole system of Hegel. What it means is that main construction of his philosophical system, from the very beginning to the end which is nothing but the beginning itself, is based on the concept of experience, by starting with it on the level of sense-certainty and ending up it on the level of the absolute knowing. As a result, it is exactly impossible to reject that Hegel's system benefits from both levels of the concept of experience. Of course, it is not quite visible in Hegel's books and in his lectures, some of which were published after his death. Why do we need to make a separation between two experiences? The answer to this question will mainly be focused under the next subtitle.

The concept of experience reigns over the whole system of philosophy of Hegel; this appearance of the experience all over the system means that the road to the absolute knowing does start from sensual perception, thus, from the most primitive and basic point, in which the consciousness only realise determinations as thing-in-itself. Then, the consciousness, in process, proceeds to the second meaning of the experience in which it will grasp its own existence and reach, at the end of the way, the Absolute. From now on, we will evaluate Hegel's understanding of the concept of experience and his reasoning on how to make the consciousness inverted and reach the Absolute in this process of self-realisation.

2.1.2. Hegel's Specific Definition of the Concept of Experience

It can be questioned why we have chosen the title as Hegel's 'specific definition' of the experience, if there is no very clear definition of the experience in Hegel's system of philosophy. Our response to this inquiry is that, by this phrasal here, we strive to allude to the second meaning of the concept of experience. True, we have already claimed that Hegel uses both of the meanings to reach the absolute knowing; however, our main point is that Hegel's use of the first meaning is limited to found the ground for the further investigation and to show how the consciousness, in its nature, begins receiving the things one-sidedly and superficially. In this sense, the main contribution of Hegel to the concept of experience is not his intervention to the first meaning of it, except his evaluation which finds it superficial, and also acceptable for starting though, but his understanding constituting, in a process, the second meaning of the concept of experience and taking it as consciousness' experience of arriving to the point at which it becomes able to evaluate itself by seeing itself as its own object.

Another point beneficial for us to know is to seek how Hegel uses the concept of experience. Since we claim that Hegel uses this word differently. First of all, then, we have to focus merely on the literal structure of his use of the concept of experience.

Hegel does not use a word, which derives from Greek *empeiria*, as a correspondent to the concept of experience. We can, at this point, figure out, by checking out Inwood's *A Hegel Dictionary*, what he has done by rejecting to use German correspondents of the word *empeiria*. Inwood (1999, p. 95) does properly indicate that "Hegel uses the Greek-derived *Empirie* ('experience'), *empirisch* ('empirical(ly)') and *Empirismus* ('empiricism'), but his native German words for 'to experience' and 'experience' are *erfahren* and *Erfahrung*." It is quite clear that Hegel does not prefer using the word *Empirie*, or, in Greek *empeiria*. The reason for doing so is that, as we have accordingly already put it, Hegel does not only think of the concept of experience as an empirical means which allows us to receive sense objects, but also, by taking sense-certainty as the most primitive point of philosophising, because it, to believe that there is nothing beyond sensual reception, is the commonest idea in human beings' mind to reach the truth, consider that the experience is a meaningful action of the human being to arrive at a conclusion to get to know what the universe is and how it turns into what it is. In

other words, we should properly want to state that Hegel aspires to find the consciousness in whole philosophy and to make it the unique unificatory component of the universe. Hence, in addition to use of the concept of experience in common understanding of the word, as we have separated that it is the first meaning of the experience, Hegel's use of the experience in the form of *Erfahrung* implies the twofold structure of Hegel's philosophy. Moreover, we have stated that use of the concept of experience involves both of the meanings of the experience. In this context, according to our vantage point, Hegel's use of the concept of experience in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* progresses in a logic, that is, that he does not decline the first meaning, rather than this, he takes it as an unsuccessful, but a necessary, process to reach the absolute knowing. In this sense, by the word *Erfahrung*, he refers to both of the meanings of the experience; however, as we have already known, the second meaning lifts up the first meaning, and, thus, involves the first one in itself. It can be asked why Hegel does not use *Empirie* instead of *Erfahrung*, when he uses it in the sense of the primary meaning of experience. Our answer will, for sure, be that Hegel's use of *Erfahrung* characterises a conscious way of experiencing, that is, that, even though he affirms the necessity of the first meaning of concept of experience, he has to make the second meaning invaluable regarding both to prevent confusion and to emphasise the superiority of the second one in terms of his system of philosophy's absolute intention. It is, thus, used to imply a departure from the most primitive way of knowing to the absolute knowledge by implicit and explicit consciousness. As Inwood (1999, p. 95) indicates, "*Erfahren* comes from the prefix *er-* and *fahren*, originally 'to fare, go, wander', hence 'to get on fare (e.g. well)', and 'to travel or go on a voyage of journey'. Thus, the root meaning of *erfahren* is 'to set out on a journey to explore of get to know something'. *Erfahrung* refers either to this process or to its result." As we have just covered it, this departure from the very beginning of sense-certainty to the absolute knowledge is the unique way of knowing, and, thus, cannot really be dependent on the first meaning of experience because of the fact that the first meaning does not have a flexibility to allow the consciousness to go out of common use of the experience. What it does mean is that Hegel has not created a new word, but he has still wanted to widen the meaning of experience to pass over the limitations the common meaning has already had. With the same word to which the classical meaning predictably refers, it seems to be impossible to construct a novel meaning which does implicate the widened

sense of understanding the concept of experience as a companion to the consciousness on its running journey to the absolute knowledge.

Again and again, we need to turn back to the same point at which we willingly investigate Hegel's preference to use the concepts *Erfahrung* and *erfahren* rather than using the words *Erlebnis* and *erleben*. According to Inwood (1999, p. 95), "The words *erleben* and *Erlebnis* ('lived experience') became important only in the twentieth century." However, we are prone to think of this preference as a deliberate action, rather than making use of *Erfahrung* reduced to necessity. Even if Inwood asserts that the disuse of *Erlebnis* is about its unimportance in nineteenth century, we are likely to claim that Hegel has not used *Erlebnis* as a decisive concept in his philosophy due to the fact that he has not want to remark a 'lived experience' in his system, a lived experience which is directly condemned to be a part of the first meaning of the concept of experience, or, better, a component of *Empirie* in terms of necessary externality of both of them. In this context, we are well-aware of that Hegel strives to focus on the departure of the consciousness from primitive sense-certainty to the absolute knowledge, and that this sublime way aiming at the Absolute cannot consist in an ominous concept such as *Empirie* or *Erlebnis*. The reason for this is obviously the imprisonment of the common meaning of the concept of experience to empirical processes denying softly the power of the consciousness throughout the whole process of knowing. Hegel does neither desire the use of *Erlebnis* or *Empirie*, nor is he prone to understand the structure of knowing through an external, dualist and contingent relation, unlike the Kantian way of understanding. As a consequence, the concept *Erlebnis* is not ample to pave the way through which, as turning even into the way itself, we strive to understand what knowing does mean. The meaning of the concept *Erlebnis*, namely 'lived experience,' still has a contingency in its construction, and, does not imply any kind of necessary relationship between the consciousness and the world. 'Lived experience' can easily be associated with the construction of a Kantian way of knowing which directly posits an impassable dualism between the phenomenal and noumenal world, and which remarks the departure of the subject from the object. Rather than this, in Hegel's system of philosophy, we utterly notice that the journey of the subject is a departure not from the object, but to, and through, the object. As a result, we come to know that the system of Hegel is not based on the dualism of the object and subject, rather, in contrast to this sort of approach, it is purely rooted in the

‘self-originating and self-differentiating wealth of shapes’ in regard to positioning of the consciousness in this process of struggle to get to know. This does not mean that the positioning of the consciousness is over any determinations, but implies that the consciousness is the subject which is supposed to conduct an investigation throughout the process of knowing.

As we have known, any system of philosophy in German idealism strives to focus mainly on the identity of the object and subject. In Fichtean philosophy the identity come into appearance under the shadow of the ‘absolute ego,’ and, thus, the absolute ego undertakes the task which consists of being the ground for possibility, and for whole process, of knowing. However, the concept of experience seems to be invisible in Fichtean system which, in this process, conceals and impedes the establishment of whole ground for identity of the object and subject, an identity which is the unique way to allow the concept of experience to come into appearance and to become possible. The reason for this concealment or obstructiveness is obviously based on the subject-remarking feature of Fichte’s system. By making the subject the first point of whole philosophy, Fichte, without thinking of this kind of subject’s lack of possibility to involve any determinations other than itself in this state, can, in a sense, be blamed as being on the track of a Kantian system, while protesting to his philosophy. Thus, assuming that there is a subject which can somehow imagine and think of anything it desires is not benefitable for any system to engender a consistent and identical philosophy which does not exclude any kind of existent from its realm of existence, and, for sure, does not make determinations imprisoned in our mind. According to Hegel (1977, p. 155), Fichte’s system has a subjective identity which does not include the inversion of what is present,

In Fichte’s system identity constitutes itself only as subjective Subject-Object. [But] this subjective Subject-Object needs an objective Subject-Object to complete it, so that the Absolute presents itself in each of the two Subject-Objects, and finds itself perfected only in both together as the highest synthesis that nullifies both insofar as they are opposed.

What Hegel says about Fichtean philosophy is that the subjective ground of Fichtean philosophy in construction of identity to make experience possible is not adequate in terms of its one-sided understanding of the experience, namely experience that is confined in the mind of the subject, and that is limited to subject’s finite world.

When we intend to focus elaborately on the philosophical system of Schelling, we probably notice that his system is quite closer to Hegel's one in terms of identity of the object and subject which allow the experience to be possible. As Beiser (2005, p. 63) indicates, "Schelling and Hegel argue that the Kantian-Fichtean reading of the principle of subject-object identity ultimately ends in solipsism, the doctrine that I know only the immediate contents of my own mind. Since the transcendental subject knows only what it creates, it is caught inside the circle of its own consciousness." What makes Hegel's and Schelling's systems close to each other is nothing but their aims to make the experience possible and to impede a solipsistic approach. To some extent, their departure seems to be similar with each other; until Schelling's system of philosophy becomes unable to reward the experience in the Absolute by giving it a place, or, better, until Schelling's system takes the Absolute as a void identity state which is unable to have an effect on posited two differences to be unified; however, those two differences which need to be unified are not only subjective identity of the subject and object, and, objective identity of the subject and object, but also, and to be much more important than the former, identity of the identity and non-identity. Thus, the problematic point in Schelling's system is that he asserts an identity between the subject and object without taking into consideration the state of those two in the Absolute. In this sense, the structure of Schelling's system is based on an indifferent confusion of the things in a unity, and on making identity of the subject and object pure, because, in his system, it is impossible to find an identity in the Absolute which makes it possible to produce identity of identity and non-identity, that is the point which does turn the possibility of knowing into untouched and concealed wilderness. As Hegel (1977, p. 155) intuitively puts it, "The principle of identity is the absolute principle of Schelling's system as a *whole*. Philosophy and system coincide. Identity does not lose itself in the parts, still less in the result." This means that identity loses its effect in the Absolute, and, this leads us to lose our nullifying means in the Absolute. Of course, identity is also there in the Absolute; however, this is not enough to make the experience take place, since this first level identity, which implies the subjective and objective identities of the subject and object, cannot devastate the pure separation made before the Absolute, that is, the pureness of the separation between subjective and objective identity cannot allow them to have interaction in the Absolute. That is how the experience is condemned to suffering in Schelling's system of philosophy.

In Hegel's system of philosophy, we take the difference, or, better, negativity (*Negativität*), as a necessary component of whole system. Moreover, Hegel remarks that the unity is as necessary and important as the difference in his system. In this sense, as Beiser (2005, p. 65) appropriately puts it,

He [Hegel] insists that the difference between the subjective and objective must be not only ideal but also real, i.e. it must be not only one in perspective but also one in the object itself. This means that the subjective and the objective are distinct appearances, embodiments or manifestations of the absolute. On several occasions, he stresses that philosophy needs to explain the distinction between the subjective and the objective of ordinary experience.

To claim this means that Hegel desires to found the Absolute as the point at which both of the identity of identity of subject-object and the identity of non-identity of those two should be able to show themselves and to make the distinction before the Absolute plausible by keeping it away from both of the pure and unsolvable distinction, and, pure and ambiguous unity. Through this kind of approach, philosophy becomes able to encompass the distinction and unity without lapsing into the abyss of vacuity of seeing determinations as one or indifferent matters at all. In this sense, this ultimately turns into the absolute knowing in which the subject and the object, together, construct single universal substance. As Beiser (2005, p. 65) simply emphasises this structure as such, "If philosophy is to explain the opposition between subject and object in ordinary experience, then it must somehow show how the single universal substance, in which the subject and object are the same, divides itself and produces a distinction between subject and object." Hegel's system of philosophy, as we have just mentioned, is established on the lack of Schelling's system, of course by benefiting from it in a positive sense. This means that the structure of Hegel's system is constructed as what is quite proper to allow the concept of experience to be used in the process of long-lasting journey of the consciousness. As a result, Hegel's way of thinking is not only conditioned by the necessity of unity which derives from idealism and from negative impact of dualism of early modern philosophy, but also shaped by negative effects of Fichte's subjective identity of the subject-object and Schelling's annihilating unity. Without existence of differentiation, it is impossible to talk about any kind of experience. In this context, the main premise of the experience is obviously the differentiation, and, of course, the possibility of the unity in which those differentiated determinations are allowed and have competence to make contact. That which is shaped by the differentiation is the only way that the experience can utterly get in any system of philosophy, and that is what Schelling has missed in his system.

From now on it will be more beneficial to focus more on the use of the concept of experience in the first two chapters of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, since it refers to main use of the experience in Hegel's system. Moreover, we surely want to make it clearer by covering it in its order.

2.1.2.1. The Sense-Certainty

In Hegel's system of philosophy, any determination, as Orman (2015, p. 117) correctly puts it, cannot exist without being dependent on the dynamism of surrounding web of other determinations. Thus, both, the object and the subject, should exist in a dynamic, dialectical and, to a great extent, monist system of philosophy of Hegel. As it is expected, for Hegel, the concept of experience should be understood as binding agent, or component, of his philosophy. In this sense, Hegel's system in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* begins with the concept of sense-certainty. The sense-certainty (*sinnliche Gewissheit*) implies an illusion in receiving process of the knowledge. In this sense, it seems that, in the part of sense-certainty, everything is, from the outset, received in their immediateness, and, each determination is known in its particular existence. It normally seems to be the most certain way to get to know things, because we can easily receive with the help of our senses what is there and what is going on around us. However, unlike the state in our first glance at the world, it is not that much straightforward to get to know the reality in a certain way, even if we might believe that everything is clear to us with regard to their existence in the world or around us. At the very beginning of the part 'Sense-Certainty: or the 'This' and 'Meaning'' (*Die sinnliche Gewißheit oder das Diese und das Meinen*), Hegel (1974, p. 82, 2004, p. 58) starts the discussion with a common discourse of those who think of sensual reception as the most certain way to know,

The knowledge or knowing which is at the start or is immediately our object cannot be anything else but immediate knowledge itself, a knowledge of the immediate or of what simply *is*. Our approach to the object must also be *immediate* or *receptive*; we must alter nothing in the object as it presents itself. In apprehending it, we must refrain from trying to comprehend it.

Hegel assumes this sort of approach to be true, he does so for the sake of showing the problematic part of it. In this sense, it can be easily understandable that the structure of Hegel's investigation is shaped as such, by the enthusiasm to prove the opposite of what is said at the beginning. As we will see it, each part of Hegel's *Phenomenology*

of Spirit is formed as a moment which is necessarily a prerequisite for the next moment. This is what generates the concept of becoming in Hegel's system. In our first glance at the first part of the chapter Consciousness, we can utterly claim that the part sense-certainty gives us the determinations which are in-itself and immediate. However, those two attributions of determinations received in sense-certainty cannot be true in the sense that they are deprived of a subject which is supposed to experience their existence. It does not mean that those determinations are concealed as they were in Kant's system; however, the reception of those determinations requires the existence of a subject to experience them. What it means is that any determination is, of course, in-itself; however, it does not have any attribute for being in-itself in a Kantian sense, or, better, it is not thing-in-itself (*Ding-an-sich*) which is the concept referring to things beyond our ability to sense them, in their reality, or their own universe. This is an abstraction, and, more than that, a dualism according to Hegel, and it is impossible to affirm this kind of epistemology in which the knowing and the existence are completely separated and cannot get in contact with each other. As it can easily be predicted, in that kind of approach to the determinations, the concept of experience becomes unimportant individual perceptions of us. For Hegel thinks of sense-certainty as the first moment in the way to know certainly, and, even if this moment shows us quite problematic understanding of knowing, it does not mean that Hegel claims that we live in our small brains which are imprisoned in different vats. As a result, philosophical system of Hegel does not focus mainly on discussions about reality and on desperate or helpless arguments about it such as noumenal world and investigations on the possibility of external world; rather than these, it is obviously about how to complete 'the science of experience' as the most important component of our thinking to reach the absolute knowing. The absolute knowing is neither beyond the invisible walls as what is isolated by our inability to get to know, nor is it limited to our individual minds which is unaware of what is going on outside of our internal world. In this context, it can roughly be claimed that Hegel accepts neither the Kantian concept thing-in-itself, nor the approach which defends that sensual reception is the ultimate point to get to know something.

Hegel asserts that sense-certainty has to be grasped as a beginning point of the way to know. However, it is impossible to think that our sensual reception does not need any further explication, or, better, another investigation to discover the reality in it. When

we claim that it needs further explanation, we particularly mean that we have to have a subject in sense-certainty as a receiver. Moreover, in sense-certainty, what needs to be explained is that it is impossible to think of, and, to understand determinations as they in their particularity are. We cannot have sensual receptions as directly isolated from the externality and unrelated to any kind of other determinations. Thus, we know that we need universals to imagine and imply determinations; otherwise, it seems not to be possible to claim that we can have sensual receptions.

What Hegel utterly claims is that determinations in sense-certainty are supposed to be in-itself and immediate; however, when we receive those tangible things through our senses, they, at the same time, become for-us, thus, turn into mediated in sense-certainty. The most important task to prove that the determinations in sense-certainty are condemned to be mediated, when they become an object of our sense, is the use of extensional, or spatial, and temporal questions, and, of course, demonstrative pronouns such as this or that. 'This' is created by the junction of both 'Now' and 'Here' (Hegel, 1974, p. 84, 2004, pp. 59-60). This means that we are always unable to claim what it really is, when we focus on determination in sense-certainty. When we claim that 'This is that,' or that 'Now is Dawn,' we suddenly become incompetent to assert that it is the dawn we have already talked about, or, that it is that we have just said. In this sense, it can easily be propounded that the structure of sense-certainty is not consistent in itself, and, is not compatible with the immediate determination itself. Thus, in sense-certainty, the object is merely as it is. As Hegel (1974, p. 84, 2004, p. 60) strictly indicates,

The Now that is Night is *preserved (aufbewahrt)*, i.e. it is treated as what it professes to be, as something that is; but it proves itself to be, on the contrary, something that is not. The Now does indeed preserve itself, but as something that is not Night; equally, it preserves itself in the face of the Day that it now is, as something that also is not Day, in other words, as a *negative* in general.³

In this sense, sense-certainty posits what the thing in-itself is, and, any endeavour to take it as an object of the consciousness means an attempt to negate it. When it is said that 'Now is Night,' it turns out to be other than what it is supposed to be. Similar to this, as Hegel (1974, p. 85, 2004, pp. 60-61) exemplifies,

³ The word in parentheses is added by us, by taking from the original text, to make it clear what Hegel says. The verb *aufbewahren* means 'to keep, to save etc.,' and the verb *wahren* means 'to protect;' at the same time, it has to be taken into consideration that the concept *Wahrheit* has the meaning of 'truth.' The reason for Hegel to use this verb is obviously to show the possible relation between the truth and to keep what this truth implies as it in-itself is; that is the point sense-certainty needs to be lifted up, since it is obviously unable to protect what it claims that it is able to do so.

The same will be the case with the other form of the 'This', with 'Here'. 'Here' is, e.g., the tree. If I turn round, this truth has vanished and is converted into its opposite: 'No tree is here, but a house instead'. 'Here' itself does not vanish; on the contrary, it abides constant in the vanishing of the house, the tree, etc., and is indifferently house or tree. Again, therefore, the 'This' shows itself to be a *mediated simplicity*, or a *universality*.

What Hegel strives to show us is obviously that sense-certainty is absolutely the most abstract and on-sided kind of knowledge. Its certainty derives both from being-lapsed-into-itself, and from being devastated when it does become received by a *subject*.

Heidegger (1988, p. 56) writes about sense-certainty as follows,

Sense certainty expresses *itself* by expressing itself regarding its matter, this extant thing. Doing so, sense certainty does not state anything further about itself, a knower and its knowing. For the *truth* of sense certainty is not concerned with the knower, 'consciousness,' or the 'I.' It is in sense certainty's own interest that by always meaning this, which is, sense certainty *does not take* – and also does not need to take – an interest *in itself*. For sense certainty this is *because it is*, and for this knowing there is nowhere an authority which could be asked *why* this being is. Rather, it is only because it is. The being is what is extant and nothing more.

In its *pureness*, sense-certainty includes only itself and it is lapsed into the abyss of itself. What it means is that its presence or being-in-itself is only valid for it while it is disclosed. When we intervene in it, it is directly converted into 'its opposite' regarding its explication through breadth and duration. In this sense, although sense-certainty is a moment in Hegel's system, it is unable to give us what the *truth* is. Rather than this, it keeps its being as a true being in itself, and, loses its pureness in the course of getting in contact with the consciousness as the 'I.' Moreover, there is no further explanation for the investigation of why it is. In this sense, it might easily be asserted that it cannot give us what we seek for, insofar as what we understand from it. However, it has to give us that there is always a negation which makes this, alleged, pureness convert itself into the pavement of our way of understanding. As Hegel (1974, pp. 85-86, 2004, p. 61) clearly asserts,

Pure being remains, therefore, as the essence of this sense-certainty, since sense-certainty has demonstrated in its own self that the truth of its object is the universal. But this pure being is not an immediacy, but something to which negation and mediation are essential; consequently, it is not what we *mean* by 'being', but is 'being' defined as an abstraction, or as the pure universal.

This obviously means that the so-called pureness is destroyed, and, that, with the help of our concept of experience, the way of consciousness, through which we will reach the absolute knowing, is paved.

It can be asked why and how the concept of experience is at work right here. Our answer to this kind of question is that the state of pureness and impenetrability is experienced by subject; even though it is said that the *truth* of sense-certainty has

nothing to do with the knower, we all know that there must be a subject to receive what is present. By the experience of the subject receiving something giving us clue about what there in sense-certainty is, even though we cannot clearly know what it in-itself is, we come to know that there takes place a negation when we strive to use what derives from sense-certainty to us. This negation itself seems to be more certain than something immediate and pure in itself. Of course, in accordance with Hegel's system, something impenetrable and totally closed cannot, to a great extent, be called existent. It can seem to be weird and awkward that the thing in sense-certainty is immediate, and, at the same time, is turned into something mediated and negated, by the experience of the subject receiving it, a subject who cannot be a claimer to perceive it totally though. As Heidegger (1988, pp. 56-57) stoutly puts it,

Sense certainty does *itself* appear when it so appears. But it appears in the light of a gaze which takes sense certainty *only* immediately, *disregarding* all mediating sight, which already belongs to that gaze. Otherwise this gaze could not look on and observe and see only what is immediate in its immediacy. Therefore, our way of looking on up until now was *a looking on which disregards* [*absehendes Zusehen*].

In sense-certainty, if we can take Heidegger as our guide, our gaze on, or, better, our glance at the thing immediate is obviously 'a looking on which disregards,' and, a glance of the competence to receive what there is. It can, at this point, be claimed that Heidegger benefits from his own dictionary to explain what is going on around, that is, that Heidegger probably asserts the openness of the subject as the foreseeing looking on as well as that he speaks of a looking on which disregards. This kind of concealment we believe that Heidegger can easily do with his ability to do so does resemble the twofold, but not contradictory, meaning of sense-certainty. On the one hand, when we see '*absehendes Zusehen*,' we might think of that the subject stays outside of what is going on and watches around, as a kind of *theoria*, and, while so doing, loses its subjectivity's perfection, since it does not intervene in anything, and seems not to be in the second meaning of experience at all; on the other hand, it is still tied to the world as a necessary result of having ability to look on and to disregard what it notices, and, thus, it seems to have a concealed subjectivity put on itself. In this context, the subject which is able to receive what there is in sense-certainty does apparently experience the negation of immediacy's essence, or, of the essentiality of what is immediate. Henceforth, through the first meaning of the concept of experience, as we have asserted above, the subject which is not a completed subject or consciousness, since it is still unable to perceive by assuming itself as a part of receiving, and, is merely competent to receive by experiencing things as they are

excessively external, comes to know that the most didactical side of sense-certainty is to pass over the essence of it and to end up with the essentiality of what is receiving, namely subjectivity of the subject. As Hegel (1974, p. 86, 2004, p. 61) perspicuously points out,

When we compare the relation in which knowing and the object first came on the scene, with the relation in which they now stand in this result, we find that it is reversed. The object, which was supposed to be the essential element in sense-certainty, is now the unessential element; for the universal which the object has come to be is no longer what the object was supposed essentially to be for sense-certainty. On the contrary, the certainty is now to be found in the opposite element, viz. in knowing, which previously was the unessential element. Its truth is in the object as *my* object, or in its being *mine* [*Meinen*]; it is, because *I* know it. Sense-certainty, then, though indeed expelled from the object, is not yet thereby overcome, but only driven back into the 'I'.

In this context, the subject, what Hegel calls the 'I,' become to have the temporary ownership of certainty. This certainty does, if we want to speak of overcoming, shift from the very beginning of the sense-certainty as the certainty of the object to the experiencing subject, and, of course, to the knowing itself. This does not mean that the main reference is always to the subject; rather, it means that what the most important component of this reversal is is obviously the negation of what sense-certainty has indicated.

When we look at the subject which is not a completed subject, as we have just explained that it both has *a looking on which disregards*, and, in spite of that deficient glance at what it focuses on, owns subjective actions such as the ability to focus on something and to disregard some of what it sees, we obviously understand that this subject has, to a great extent, owned the first meaning of the concept of experience. What it means is that our deficient subject has sensual receptions, and, then, notices that those received actually convert into what can be defined through the scale of breadth and duration. However, when those receptions seems to be turned into what the subject owns, we see both, that the main essence, which was ascribed to the object before, become attributed to the negation, and, that the subject already has experienced what there has been, on the level of the first meaning of the concept of experience. Nevertheless, it can again be asked why the subject should merely be able to fit in only with the first meaning of the concept of experience. To have a rough explanation, it can be claimed that the subject does not have any chance at this point to take itself as its object, or, better, to turn into a self-consciousness, and, cannot carry itself even only one step further, since it is exactly not aware of any sort of form; rather than this, it can, we call the subject as it because of the state it is in, only be ill-treated due to that

it is merely engaged in fighting in the battle of particularity to found its own differentiation from other particulars. Even though all those claims are indicated by us, the subject is somehow on its own and necessary way to reach the absolute knowing.

Before we go further in thinking of the concept of experience, we have to declaim that Inwood (1999, p. 96) makes a division between experience (*Erfahrung*) in Hegel as raw sensory materials, sensory materials and experience with the object of consciousness. For us, it is prominent to avow that the first two types of experience have totally to be included our first meaning of the experience. Of course, the third part resembles the structure of our second meaning of experience. In this sense, the third one is conditionally surrounded either by the first meaning or the second. As a result, that classification is not decisive for our categories and intention.

Finally, we see that, at the end of the part sense-certainty, Hegel (1974, p. 92, 2004, p. 66) strictly writes that

By *pointing out* this bit of paper, experience teaches me what the truth of sense-certainty in fact is: I point it out as a 'Here', which is a Here of other Heres, or is in its own self a 'simple togetherness of many Heres'; i.e. it is a universal. I take it up then as it is in truth, and instead of knowing something immediate I take the truth of it, or *perceive* it.

That which can easily be claimed is Hegel's assertion which is that, when we receive the thing in sense-certainty, it seems somehow to be converted into our declaration on it, and to be negated by our declaration which, at the same time, puts immediateness of the thing on itself. This means that, when we orient our attention to what we have so far, we utterly face with the continuation of the road to the absolute knowing, a road which is paved by first negation of the essentiality of sense-certainty in terms of form, and then, by position of the knowing as a truth-bearer in terms of content. In this context, what we can so far propound is that the construction of experience makes the negation possible. From now onward, we will focus on the second subpart of *Phenomenology of Spirit*, namely 'Perception: or the Thing and Deception' (*die Wahrnehmung oder das Ding und die Täuschung*).

2.1.2.2. The Perception

After negation of the essence of immediate thing in sense-certainty, the subject comes to know that the most important progress in the first stage, in sense-certainty, is to discover the competence of the subject for reception which can, hereafter, be called perception because of the fact that it obviously becomes an action the subject has just started to discern.

In sense-certainty, the subject, as we have as far as known, negates the immediateness of object, and, by this negation, the knowing through language, namely 'This' or 'Here,' becomes much more decisive and universal; however, at the end of the day, this universality means an abstract and deficient knowing, since it can easily be reversed by the change of breadth or time. In perception, unlike what we see in sense-certainty, the subject, who has already learnt what it means to receive, does strive to get what is visible as attributions of the object, and, to know particular determinations as bearers of some specific properties. This kind of understanding, as it is naturally be predicted, causes its object to turn into a thing which is there to be known universally. As we have just emphasised, universality of the object in sense-certainty is quite deficient; it can always be rediscovered, since it might be differentiated or uncertain. In sense-certainty, the object is obviously unpredictable, whereas, in perception, it becomes more stable and definable; thus, it turns into a thing.

In sense-certainty, the object has, at the end, reduced to simple words of language such as 'This' and 'Here' which are only able to establish an abstract universality that implies a 'determinate Nothing' causing the consciousness to suspend its function temporarily, a suspension which is not about experiencing as a subject, but about the truth. Hence, in perception, what the consciousness looks for the truth of the thing. As Hegel (1974, p. 94, 2004, p. 68) immediately claims,

Consequently, the sense-element is still present, but not in the way it was supposed to be in [the position of] immediate certainty: not as the singular item that is 'meant', but as a universal, or as that which will be defined as *property*. *Supersession* exhibits its true twofold meaning which we have seen in the negative: it is at once a *negating* and a *preserving*. Our Nothing, as the Nothing of the This, preserves its immediacy and is itself sensuous, but it is a universal immediacy. Being, however, is a universal in virtue of its having mediation or the negative within it; when it *expresses* this in its immediacy it is a *differentiated, determinate* property. As a result *many* such properties are established simultaneously, one being the negative of another.

What we have just noticed is that, even though This or Here presents us the way to know to some extent, their presentation does, at the end of the road, settle down to showing itself as a component of a universal immediacy. As we have just quoted from Hegel above, supersession has twofold meaning which implies both negating and preserving. We have mainly talked about negating; however, preserving is also quite important to serve us for passing over sense-certainty and achieving the perception. In perception, we should discern that the main problem of the subject is nothing more than the contradiction between plurality and oneness. This does not mean that this is not important in terms of the concept of experience of the consciousness. The seeking for truth through the properties of the things is explicitly based on perception which is a novel stage in which the consciousness starts to *take* things as its own. As it has been noticed, in sense-certainty, the consciousness does act to find the object in itself, in its immediacy. Then, form of the object is negated and seems to become enunciable through This or Here. However, these are totally empty indications. What these represent is that this process is only an intention of the consciousness to find the objects in their infinite particularities. This and Here, at the end of the day, refer to ‘the Nothing of a content’ which unstably changes and only implies the limit of the content. What the consciousness experiences in sense-certainty is obviously the form of particularity, since it is impossible to have knowledge of innumerable content. Thus, the consciousness is, in sense-certainty, able to focus merely on form with an initial intention to know all content. The reason why the consciousness strictly desires to unveil the content of the thing by investigating its relations to other things is that it only has knowledge of the negation of immediacy and unpredictably encounters with the problem of preserving. This preserving makes the consciousness does, in perception, focus merely on what is mediated, instead of investigating immediate object. This means that the perception is, of course, not an initial process, and, that investigation in perception always takes place through already-mediated things.

As Heidegger (1988, p. 82) directly propounds,

Hegel discusses the title ‘Sense Certainty’ through ‘the this and intending’ and the title ‘Perception’ through ‘thing and deception.’ The expressions ‘thing and deception’ and ‘this and intending’ look like a mere juxtaposition and enumeration of the two interpenetrating moments of consciousness (the known and the knowing of it).

Heidegger’s understanding of Hegel’s sense-certainty and perception directly refers to ‘intention’ and ‘deception’ respectively. On the other hand, in sense-certainty, the

subject orients itself to knowing what ‘this’ is, and, in perception, ‘this’ is turned into a ‘thing’ or something in ‘thinghood.’ What does this conversion into ‘thing and deception’ mean? This means that the consciousness is well-aware of that its intending to know what ‘this’ is, at the end, destroyed and annihilated by being unrequited. Anything intended in sense-certainty might, to a great extent, cause us not to know what it is, but to notice the process of negation implying both itself and preserving. When the subject comes to focus merely on perception, we utterly discover that the process of perception includes deception as its necessary component in terms of the contradiction between taking the thing through its difference from others and indifference to others. It might seem to be a little awkward and weird, because it should be defended that both the difference and indifference refers to separation from others. However, in difference, we should probably notice that the thing differs itself from others and finds its oneness as it is more exceptional than others. However, what we see in indifference is that the thing is in an insignificant unity, and, in spite of this, it does not have the ability or the lust to differ itself from others and to refuse others – thus, there are two different ways of differentiation: one is exclusive differentiation, and the other is indifferent differentiation. In this sense, what Hegel (1974, pp. 94-95, 2004, pp. 68-69) claims is that

This abstract universal medium, which can be called simply ‘thinghood’ (*die Dingheit*) or ‘pure essence’ (*das reine Wesen*), is nothing else than what Here and Now have proved themselves to be, viz. a *simple togetherness* (*ein einfaches Zusammen*) of a plurality; but the many are, *in their determinateness*, simple universals themselves.

Then, the thing, in perception, becomes more important than it was in sense-certainty. The thinghood is the main result of sense-certainty; on the other hand, it is of necessity the beginning point of the perception. Hegel (1974, pp. 94-95, 2004, pp. 68-69) continues with the instance of the salt; salt is Here, and this means that it has more than simply being here implies. The properties of the salt refer to that “it is white and *also* tart, *also* cubical in shape.” These properties are not able to impact one another; however, they are in an insignificant unity which is tied by the indifferent *also*. Hence, they are themselves indifferent to each other. This what Hegel claims when he speaks of thinghood, universal medium, and pure universal. We can thus claim that what Hegel sees at this point is that, at the end of sense-certainty, the moment of the consciousness is only indifferent differentiation of the things. As a result, in perception, what we have to see is the exclusive difference between the things. In this context, the One becomes one of the most important progressions in perception, since

it refers definitely to the relationship between the thing and the unity of things; namely the ‘*moment of negation*’ determining the thinghood as a Thing. At this point, what Hegel (1974, p. 96, 2004, pp. 69-70) declares is that

In these moments, taken together, the Thing as the truth of perception is completed, so far as it is necessary to develop it here. It is (a) an indifferent, passive universality, the *Also* of the many properties or rather ‘matters’; (b) negation, equally simply; or the *One*, which excludes opposite properties; and (c) the many *properties* themselves, the relation of the first two moments, or negation as it relates to the indifferent element, and therein expands into a host of differences; the point of singular individuality in the medium of subsistence radiating forth into plurality. In so far as these differences belong to the indifferent medium they are themselves universal, they are related only to themselves and do not affect one another. But in so far as they belong to the negative unity they are at the same time exclusive [of other properties]; but they necessarily have this relationship of opposition to properties remote from *their* Also. The sensuous universality, or the *immediate* unity of being and the negative, is thus a *property* only when the One and the pure universality are developed from it and differentiated from each other, and when the sensuous universality unites them; it is this relation of the universality to the pure essential moments which at last completes the Thing.

If we think of what Hegel’s endeavour at this point is, then, we have to focus merely on these moments of perception to mean itself. In so far as our thought penetrates into Hegel’s system, perception has three different sub-moments in itself. What it does mean is obviously that perception is respectively based on a passive or indifferent universality established by the *Also*, on a negation of the others which directly means the One, and on the relationship between the first two moments as the point of ‘singular individuality’ spreading from centre to the plurality of others. As we have already understood, the main tension here in perception is exactly between the passive universal built by *Also*, and, the negation of the others. The structure of perception crystallising under the condition of this tension clearly indicates that this moment is a mediating moment between sense-certainty and understanding. It is founded by movement of the consciousness which has first started to *take* or perceive what there is, and, then, has suddenly withdrawn into its limits. What we know is that thinghood of the Thing is a feature of it deriving from the sense-certainty. Then, it completely turns into the passive universality to make the things articulated with *Also*, and, at the same time, to make them indifferent to one another. However, from this point onward, we directly perceive the oneness of the Thing referring to the One as an element exclusively differentiated from others.

What makes the perception a moment allowing deception to come into appearance in terms of the results of it is that the experience of consciousness makes it lapse into deceptive abyss of the perception. This means that the consciousness experiences both

the unity of the matters, and, also the One differentiated from all other matters. As we see it what Hegel (1974, pp. 97-98, 2004, pp. 70-71) says,

For us, this experience is already contained in the development of the object, and of the attitude of consciousness towards it given just now. It is only a matter of developing the contradictions that are present therein. The object which I apprehend presents itself purely as a One; but I also perceive in it a property which is universal, and which thereby transcends the singularity [of the object]. The first being of the objective essence as a One was therefore not its true being. But since the object is what is true, the untruth falls in me; my apprehension was not correct. On account of the universality of the property, I must rather take the objective essence to be on the whole a community. I now further perceive the property to be determinate, opposed to another and excluding it. Thus I did not in fact apprehend the objective essence correctly when I defined it as a community with others, or as a continuity; on account of the determinateness of the property, I must break up the continuity and posit the objective essence as a One that excludes.

The consciousness perceives the object in a twofold meaning which asserts both the universality of properties of the object transcending its singularity, and, also the oneness of the object. This does not mean that the object has only one of those attributes. The object presents itself as the One which excludes all other forms from itself. At this point, it is only an object which does relate itself only to itself. However, the consciousness seems to notice that the object has to have a unity behind itself which is in a continuity with the object itself. The object in perception is taken as it has to be true; thus, the consciousness has to give up its apprehension which is the inclusion of the object in a unity. Because of that the object presents itself as the true in perception, the consciousness begins to understand the objective essence as the main component of the One which excludes other matters in an exclusionary difference. However, again, the consciousness falls into an abyss excluding the other matters, and, in spite of this action, it is still in a complex state which makes it split up with its first experience in perception. The consciousness which has already withdrawn into itself as a result of its false apprehension of the unity which means a continuity and indifferent differentiation between the matters now starts to remark the distinctiveness of the One excluding the other matters from itself as it assumes itself the Absolute. When the consciousness submerges itself into the One, then, it suddenly realises that this is not the way able to make it reach the absolute knowing. In this sense, it can easily be claimed that the consciousness is again drawn back into its beginning point which is obviously the circularity of the sense-certainty referring to the meaning (*Meinen*) subject has as one of its attributes. However, this does not mean that the consciousness is again forced to follow the same circularity which, in perception, makes it find the One fulfilled with the indifferent differences as a component of an indifferent unity. What it does mean is that, in perception, the consciousness, with its

second disappointment on the way of the *truth*, withdraws into itself, and, finally finds what the truth of perception is. Hegel (1974, pp. 98-99, 2004, pp. 71-72) clearly says that

We have now in the case of perception the same as happened in the case of sense-certainty, the aspect of consciousness being driven back into itself; but not, in the first instance, in the sense in which this happened in sense-certainty, i.e. not as if the *truth* of perception fell in consciousness. On the contrary, consciousness recognises that it is the *untruth* occurring in perception that falls within it.

The consciousness in sense-certainty has rather supposed that it already has the absolute knowing; however, as we have already mentioned about it, this is the most deceptive process, because the consciousness, on that level, has experienced the most abstract process in terms of its closeness and exclusionary features against the consciousness. Apparently, this seems to be an in itself process; nevertheless, the consciousness has leaked into it, and, unfortunately, has built a counter-closeness proposed to be main component of the absolute knowing. However, then, it has become clear that this counter-closeness has been also unable to engender certainty because of the fact that the demonstrative pronouns have produced nothing but the fragmented premises of the object. In perception, we obviously notice its mediating character from the level of pure perception to another level of apprehension. As Hegel (1974, pp. 98-99, 2004, pp. 71-72) swiftly continues to write down what will happen after the citation we have just quoted from him, consciousness

Distinguishes its apprehension of the truth from the untruth of its perception, corrects this untruth, and since it undertakes to make this correction itself, the truth, *qua* truth of *perception*, falls of course *within consciousness*. The behaviour of consciousness which we have now to consider is thus so constituted that consciousness no longer merely perceives, but also conscious of its reflection into itself, and separates this from simple apprehension proper.

This is what the consciousness has utterly experienced in the part of perception. In this sense, what might be claimed is that, by having this experience in perception, the consciousness separates itself from what it was before this experience. This means that the structure of the experience of consciousness reminds us its transition from simply receiving subject to apprehending and noticing conscious-being.

The importance of the concept of experience in perception comes into appearance at the beginning of perception. The oneness of the thing, and, as a result of this, the One are obviously experienced by nothing but the consciousness itself. At this point, the consciousness is neither tied by the alleged passivity of reception which is, to some extent, true in sense-certainty, nor does it have the ability to understand some concepts such as law and force which will be mentioned under what Hegel has called

understanding, and, which refer to progression of the consciousness to think logically and comparatively. In this sense, what consciousness experiences is its competence to apprehend the thing rather than having only basic ability to receive and perceive. What is obvious and deceptive in perception is that

State of opposition does not develop into an actual opposition in the Thing itself, but in so far as the Thing through its *absolute difference* comes into a state of opposition, it is opposed to another Thing outside of it. Of course, the further manifoldness is necessarily present in the Thing too, so that it cannot be left out; but it is the unessential aspect of the Thing. (Hegel, 1974, pp. 102-103, 2004, p. 75)

In perception, we directly discern that the negation which takes place in the unity and relationship of matters refers rather to an initial process which can slightly be considered as a beginning period of reality rather than being main structure of that system, the reality of Hegel's system. Although the negation is the very beginning spark of Hegel's system, and, negation in perception is at last one of the components of this system, this does not mean that it can clearly be founded in perception. In perception, the concept of negation is between the things rather than implying an opposition in the Thing itself. It is important to remember that negation is inevitable in Hegel's system of philosophy.

If we turn back to the experience of the consciousness in perception, we should restart to think of it by its approach to the Thing in perception. At this point, the main structure of the things comes into appearance which can be abbreviated as in-itself, for-another and for-itself. As Hegel (1974, p. 103, 2004, p. 76) indicates, "The thing is posited as being *for itself* [*Fürsichsein*], or as the absolute negation of all otherness, therefore as purely *self*-related negation; but the negation that is self-related is the suspension of *itself*; in other words, the thing has its essential being in another Thing." In perception, the Thing is posited as if it is being for-itself; however, it is in fact nothing but the negation of all other matters, as we have asserted it before. Thus, in perception, what is supposed to be essential is, at the end of the day, inevitably unessential. When we speak of being for-itself of the Thing in perception, it suddenly turns into something being for-another. The Thing asserted as being for-itself is of necessity founded as the negation of others; thus, it posits negation of the others in a 'self-related' way in which we do indisputably face with the construction of that self-relatedness is the 'suspension of itself,' and, that it finds its essence in the others. It refers to both negative and positive sides of the perception, or the experience of perception. On the one hand, it has positively affected the consciousness by showing it how self-related

determinations end up with an essence of the others. On the other hand, we easily notice that negation in perception is not ample to understand what is going on around, and, to find a concrete way to get to know absolutely.

What about the experience the consciousness has in perception? According to Heidegger (1988, p. 89), in perception,

The point is to experience, in and with an actual perception, how things are arranged in it. *We* undergo an experience. Or: We let perception undergo an experience with itself. This is to say that the transposition to an ‘actual perceiving,’ wherein consciousness should undergo its experience, takes place *only now*, after we have constructed the object of perception.

In perception, through its separation into two sides, the consciousness comes to experience the object of perception in its oneness that occurs as consciousness’ perceiving and in its unity as an indifferent difference as apprehension of the consciousness. In this context, what the consciousness needs to get from perception is to undergo an experience. This leads to falling into a fallacy through which the consciousness becomes competent to undergo an experience throughout the perception. When the consciousness becomes aware of that which presents two different poles in perception, namely the One and the universal, it retreats from the object to itself. Briefly, the consciousness starts, from its apprehension, with taking the One as true being, then its perception presents that the object is, at the same time, much more different than being in oneness, that it is obviously in a universality which consists of indifferently different properties standing to be in juxtaposition. When the consciousness thinks of salt, as one of the most famous instances, it grasps it as the One, since, in perception, this is the truth of the object; however, its apprehension claims the object has many properties on itself, and, both of these properties and the matters are bound up with unity by *Also* as an adverb which holds them all together and, at the same time, restrains them from being mixed with each other and intervening. When the consciousness takes the presentation of the object or its perception as true, it suddenly realises that it falls into untruth, or, better, the untruth falls into it due to the fact that it sees the indifferently different matters in a unity. At this point, the Thing becomes the One which excludes otherness. The Thing comes into appearance in a *determinateness* which makes the Thing differentiated from others. In this sense, the consciousness notices the other, and, then, retreats to itself again; but, this time, it does not again go back to *actual perception*. As Heidegger (1988, p. 90) clearly explains,

Thus, in the face of the object of actual perception, we undergo the experience that the apprehending was not correct; taking passes over into an intending. But intending has already crossed over into perceiving. Hence, in this experience perceiving *returns into itself*. Perceiving does not take up the true in a simple apprehending, but it takes the true back into perceiving and thus takes the truth of what is perceived *in and upon itself*.

Thus, the truth, attributed to the Thing in the beginning, returns into knowing as it did in sense-certainty. Through this kind of transition, we provide both, that the truth is placed in knowing again, and, that the perception performs its mediating task for the absolute knowing. At the same time, as Heidegger (1988, p. 90) explicates it, “Consciousness arrives at the point of distinguishing its apprehending of the object *from* the untruth of its perceiving. . . . Thus . . . perceiving as consciousness has emerged as something which does not merely take or limit itself to taking, but as something which is conscious of its own reflection in itself.” When the consciousness takes its apprehension as true in its second return into itself and discerns the untruth of perception by following that it has to be the main component of the process of knowing, thus, that it is more essential than the Thing presenting itself, it turns into a completed subject which is exactly able to be conscious of its ‘own reflection’ into itself. This process is the mediating nature of the perception, namely its deceptive structure moving the consciousness to understanding (*Verstand*).

The experience in perception has to be related to both individuality and universality. In this sense, what the consciousness encounters in perception is obviously nothing but this separation itself. At the same time, this separation is what, as we have just learnt, makes the consciousness cross over into understanding. We can again appeal to Hegel to understand this separation truly; according to him,

Thus the object in its pure determinatenesses, or in the determinatenesses which were supposed to constitute its essential being, is overcome just as surely as it was in its sensuous being. From a sensuous being it turned into a universal; but this universal, since it *originates in the sensuous*, is essentially *conditioned* by it, and hence is not truly a self-identical universality at all, but one *afflicted with an opposition*; for this reason the universality splits into the extremes of singular individuality and universality, into the One of the properties, and the Also of the ‘free matters’. These pure determinatenesses seem to express the essential nature itself, but they are only a ‘being-for-self’ that is burdened with a ‘being-for-another’. Since, however, both are essentially in a *single unity*, what we now have is *unconditioned absolute universality*, and consciousness here for the first time truly enters the realm of the Understanding. (1974, p. 104, 2004, pp. 76-77)

While the consciousness is entering into the realm of understanding, what it has in itself is obviously its experience directly coming from its exposure to sense-certainty and perception, or, better, from it being afflicted with negation in those two moments. The main structure the consciousness encounters in sense-certainty and perception can elaborately be grasped as the togetherness and opposition in single unity. In sense-

certainly, what the consciousness has implicitly seen is closeness of the object and the evanesced truth in itself. On the contrary, what it has experienced in perception is apparently the truth of the object; however, at the same time, the consciousness has had the possibility to be deceived by that truth. Of course, the consciousness' possibility to be deceived has conceptually taken place through the processes of its apprehending and perceiving. These two processes have emerged contradictory results by which the consciousness literally has gotten confused. It has gone out of itself and realised that the perception's truth is 'its dissolution' and that it has essentially constituted perceiving. It has utterly grasped that "it is not a simple pure apprehension, but in its apprehension is at the same time reflected out of the true and into itself." (Hegel, 1974, pp. 98-99, 2004, pp. 71-72). Now, consciousness figures out that its own essentiality to get to know is more superior than perception, since it always discerns an inessential duality in perception.

2.1.2.3. Force and the Understanding

The negation which has apparently taken place in sense-certainty and perception brings the consciousness into the level of understanding. In understanding, the main contradiction comes into being between forces, to which, thereafter, we can of necessity add law. What it does mean is that the consciousness now has the ability to think in more abstract way than it had before. Thus, this part, namely Understanding, is the point at which we become able to see the concept of Notion compatible with Hegel's system of philosophy. Of course, it does not mean that the structure of understanding is similar to that of sense-certainty in which the consciousness has exactly faced with the most ungrounded and abstract position of thinking. Rather than that, in understanding, the consciousness becomes able to prepare to cross over into the self-consciousness, or, better, into the level on which it can elaborately take itself as its object.

We have already mentioned about the unconditioned universal. It is both, the sum of perception and sense-certainty, and, peak of the level of perception in the long-distance run of the consciousness. In this sense, what seems to be obvious is that the beginning point of the consciousness in understanding is quite clear, that it is the unconditioned

universal. It might be asked why it is, of necessity, the beginning point of it in understanding. Our answer to this question is that the consciousness in understanding proceeds and performs its task to be on the right lines to get to know absolutely, and that, by doing so, it utterly undergoes an experience in which we are able to see all processes as moments of the absolute knowing. If we turn back to our main subject-matter, to unconditioned universal, we should start with a quotation from Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*,

This unconditioned universal, which is now the true object of consciousness, is still just an *object* for it; consciousness has not yet grasped the Notion of the unconditioned as *Notion*. It is essential to distinguish the two: for consciousness, the object has returned into itself from its relation to an other and has thus become Notion *in principle*; but consciousness is not yet *for itself* the Notion, and consequently does not recognize itself in that reflected object. *For us*, the object has developed through the movement of consciousness in such a way that consciousness is involved in that development, and the reflection is the same on both sides, or, there is only one reflection. But since in this movement consciousness has for its content merely the objective essence and not consciousness as such, the result must have an objective significance for consciousness; consciousness still shrinks away from what has emerged, and takes it as the essence in the *objective* sense. (1974, pp. 107-108, 2004, pp. 79-80)

The unconditioned universal is the result of perception, or, the peak the consciousness has been able to reach in perception. From now onward, the main intention of the consciousness is to achieve the point at which it can find the Notion of the unconditioned which basically means that, by Notion, it becomes competent to take itself as its object, and to conceptualise itself as for itself. Until this level, the consciousness has not been capable of recognise itself by itself. Of course, this does not mean that it cannot ultimately be changed by the experience of the consciousness. In Hegel's philosophy, what is the transformative component of the system is obviously nothing but the concept of experience. In this sense, we should claim that this part might be one of the most important parts of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Moreover, what we have already claimed for perception as a moment is also suitable to understanding; however, there is only one difference which is that, whereas the consciousness, in perception, experiences the moment as a mediating process from sensual reception to the unconditioned universal, it is, in understanding, developed from the unconditioned universal to the Notion of unconditioned universal as *Notion* which is completed and assures us that the consciousness become competent to be for itself. True, it can be said that there is already a Notion at the beginning of this moment; however, the problematic point is that this Notion is only 'in principle,' and, that the consciousness is unable to see itself in object, or, in unconditioned universal. Nevertheless, it can be claimed that the result of the moment of understanding cannot at all assure us that the consciousness ultimately becomes able to find, or discover, the

Notion explicitly. We are going to leave the result of understanding alone for a while now, and, to turn our attention merely to the unconditioned universal and the process of understanding.

If we focus on what Hegel (1974, pp. 108-109, 2004, p. 80) claims, we see that

The result was the unconditioned universal (*das Unbedingt-Allgemeine*), initially, in the negative and abstract sense that consciousness negated its one-sided Notions and abstracted them: in other words, it gave up them. But the result has, implicitly, a positive significance: in it, the unity of 'being-for-self' and 'being-for-another' (*die Einheit des Fürsichseins und des Für-ein-Anderes-Seins*) is posited; in other words, the absolute antithesis is posited as a self-identical essence.

In the beginning, what the consciousness has in understanding is merely the unconditioned universal; however, as we should remember what we in perception have spoken of, the unconditioned universal is constituted by the interaction of being for-itself and being for-another through the way in which we can directly realise that foundation of the being for-itself is based on the negation of others, and, vice versa. In this sense, in the unconditioned universal, the consciousness experiences a unity of this reciprocity of those two different kinds of being. Why are they, namely being for-itself and for-another, that much important to think of? Since, beside seeming to be concerned with the form of the moments, they are also bound up with the content of those moments, and, they cannot be separated from it. Each of them is the negativity of another one which means that, in the end, what is produced, or yielded, has to have the same nature as what they have in their interaction. What Hegel (1974, pp. 109-110, 2004, p. 81) claims is that

One moment, then, appears as the essence that has stepped to one side as a universal medium, or as the subsistence of independent 'matters'. But the independence of these 'matters' is nothing else than this medium; in other words, the [unconditioned] universal is simply and solely the plurality of the diverse universals of this kind. That within itself the universal is in undivided unity with this plurality means, however, that these 'matters' are each where the other is, they mutually interpenetrate, but without coming into contact with one another because, conversely, the many diverse 'matters' are equally independent. This also means that they are absolutely porous, or are sublated. This sublation in this turn, this reduction of the diversity to a pure *being-for-self*, is nothing other than the medium itself, and this is the *independence* of the different 'matters'. In other words, the 'matters' posited as independent directly pass over into their unity, and their unity directly unfolds its diversity, and this once again reduces itself to unity. But this movement is what is called *Force*. One of its moments, the dispersal of the independent 'matters' in their [immediate] being, is the *expression* of Force; but Force, taken as that in which they have disappeared, is Force *proper*, Force which has been *driven back* into itself from its expression. First, however, the Force which is driven back into itself *must* express itself; and, secondly, it is still Force remaining *within itself* in the expression, just as much as it is expression in this self-containedness.

The third part of the title Consciousness is Force and the understanding: Appearance and the Supersensible World (*Kraft und Verstand, Erscheinung und übersinnliche Welt*). What we need to remark in this part is first Force. As we have seen above, Hegel

uses the concept of the unconditioned universal which means the object of the consciousness to grasp the situation both in form and content. At the same time, the unconditioned is nothing other than the essence of the being for-itself and being for-another. In this context, the whole process of understanding occurs in the unconditioned universal. We have to continue by focusing on the quotation we have already given above. As we have so far known, Hegel asserts unity and diversity in the realm of the unconditioned universal. The totality as a concept differentiated from unity encompasses both the diversity and unity.

The diversity of matters makes them lapse into independence. This does not mean that each of them is being for-another; rather than this, it can be propounded that in their dividedness, they are absolutely on the level of being for-self. Of course, they do not get in contact with each other, because each of them is independent; however, what makes any of them become being for-self is nothing else than their inter-penetrability. In this context, the diversity presents us their ability to become being for-self with protecting their inter-penetrability. On the other hand, it can be claimed that the structure of the unity conversely represents undividedness of the matters. What it does mean is that, in unity, each of matters is annihilated and becomes being-for-another. However, it is quite beneficial to set up that being-for-another and being-for-itself cannot be given in a stable way, because of that their positions do, at the end, inevitably refer to each other, and, moreover, they become each other. As we have seen it in perception, being-for-another and being-for-itself should necessarily come into appearance in the same unity; otherwise, it becomes a meaningless endeavour to think of them, and, impossible to make them get in contact with each other.

When it comes to talk about the structure of Force, it can be claimed that Force is all movements and reductions of one side to the other one. Force does both encompass the totality which is the sum of unity and diversity, or, of undividedness and dividedness, and, become the competency of these two sides to move, or shift, to each other. In this sense, Force is the absolute tension in understanding, and also main point of the negation to come into appearance. Thus, that of which we have to think is nothing other than Force's movement and the continuity of its surrounding presence in understanding. The movement from diversity to unity, and, from unity to diversity, of different matters is what we call Force. Force, in this sense, is efficiently built up

by the beingness of those different matters which can be scaled from the total unity of the matters, in which we are not able to notice being-for-self, to the independent diversity, in which we can conditionally be able to discern the being-for-another.

At this point, it might be beneficial for us to focus for a while on the difference between the unity and the diversity in terms of the intelligibility of being-for-self and being-for-another. Being-for-self (*das Fürsichsein*) and being-for-another (*das Für-ein-Anderes-Sein*) can both be visible in the dividedness; whereas, in the undividedness of matters, they seem to be invisible, since there is no difference between them in unity. Thus, it is totally impossible in a state, in which they are stuck on each other, to recognise them. on the other hand, it should be claimed that, in the dividedness of independent matters, it seems to be quite possible to realise the different and common points of those aspects, namely transition of being-for-self and being-for-another to each other. As what we have learnt from the course of history, the consciousness can amply conceive of anything merely through its differentiation from the others. In this sense, what we need to claim is similar to that in which to notice is nothing else than to see the difference between aspects. The reason for why the consciousness is not able to understand what is going on in a closed unity is obviously the lack of difference between its components as a ray from the sun. However, as it can easily be considered, it is also impossible to notice the aspects in the state of absolute difference between the things. Under the absolute sunlight, the consciousness cannot see anything, since everywhere consists of the pure rays from the sun.

What we see in the dividedness of matters is both of being-for-itself and being-for-another. In this sense, their transition to each other is quite possible and understandable. Being-for-itself and being-for-another can only present their presence through the presence of each other. Otherwise, it is not possible for us to think of them. Since, it is totally meaningless to strive to think of being-for-itself of an existent without the presence of the other of it, and vice versa. As we have mentioned above in perception, being-for-itself finds its meaning in being-for-another; the reason for that is basically their dependence to each other in terms of that the foundation of each of these is bound up with the negation of the other one. The negation is the main component of their relation to each other. As a result, what they need is to make the negation undertake the task of having essence; an essence which is stuck neither in

being-for-self, nor in being-for-another. Rather than these two possibilities, because if the essence stays in the realm of one of them, then, it will probably be stuck in the muddle which does not allow it to move to and turn into another, and, which is nothing else than a lifeless formalistic way of living, it should be asserted that the essence is apparently the negation and also negation of this negation. Consequently, these two, being-for-itself and being-for-another, have to be capable of being transformed to another, and, then, to itself again. Henceforth, their difference cannot be understood as an absolute difference which is closed to be known by another. Rather than this kind of understanding, it should exactly be better to grasp them as they absolutely have an openness to become very essential and inevitable part of each other.

Force, in understanding, is the main movement and transition of the dividedness and the undividedness. This means that the components of Force, namely expression and properness of Force, to and fro move and build the ground of understanding. In this sense, it should be declaimed that ‘the dispersal of independent matters’ is the expression of Force, and, that their being ‘driven back’ is, for sure, the Force proper, or, what we call properness of Force. In this sense, in unity, Force comes into being as Force proper, and, in diversity, it turns into expression of Force. As we have seen, the transition of Force is accompanied by the transition of the situation.

Another issue is, in Force, that it directly refers to the knowing of the consciousness in terms of getting to know an *object*. The main intention of the part of the Understanding is to explain how the consciousness is lifted up to the level of self-consciousness, and, thus, how it becomes able to know Notion of the True as an implicit being, rather than being explicit and absolute. At this point, it is possible to claim that, in both the beginning and the end of the understanding, the consciousness does not know what Notion as Notion, or, in its reality, is. What it now knows is, in the beginning of the understanding, is nothing else than the Notion of the unconditioned universal which is obviously an object for it. At the end of the part of Understanding, the consciousness becomes competent to get to know the Notion of the True as an ‘*implicit* being of the True’ which does partially lack the ‘*being-for-self* of consciousness’ which should be defined as the complementation of the consciousness by becoming a self-consciousness.

If we turn back to our main locus in understanding, the medium of the transition from unity to diversity and vice versa is nothing but independent matters themselves. Of course, two sides of Force, the expression and properness of Force, follow each other to establish a valid understanding of understanding for the consciousness. From now onward, the main tension in understanding is transferred to Force through its two sides which are indisputably interpenetrated in the same totality, and in the same unity which will afterwards become a duality. As Hegel (1974, pp. 111-112, 2004, p. 83) clearly avows,

Force, as thus determined, since it is conceived *as* Force or as *reflected into itself*, is one side of its Notion, but posited as a substantial extreme and, moreover, with the express character of a One. The subsistence of the unfolded 'matters' outside of Force is thus precluded and is something other than Force. Since it is necessary that *Force itself* be this *subsistence*, or that it *express* itself, its expression presents itself in this wise, that the said 'other' approaches *it* and solicits it. But, as a matter of fact, since its expression is *necessary*, what is posited as another essence is in Force itself. We must retract the assertion that Force is posited as a *One*, and that its essence is to express itself as an 'other' which approaches it externally. Force is rather itself this universal medium in which the moments subsist as 'matters'; or, in other words, *Force has expressed itself*, and what was supposed to be something else soliciting it is really Force itself. It exists, therefore, now as the medium of the unfolded 'matters'. But equally essentially it has the form of the supersession of the subsisting 'matters', or is essentially a *One*. Consequently, this *oneness*, since *Force* is posited as the medium of the 'matters', is *now* something *other* than Force, which has this its essence outside of it. But, since Force must of necessity be this oneness which it is not yet *posited* as being, this 'other' *approaches it*, soliciting it to reflect itself into itself: in other words, Force supersedes its expression. But in fact Force is *itself* this reflectedness-into-self, or this supersession of the expression. The oneness, in the form in which it appeared, viz. as an 'other', vanishes; Force is this 'other' itself, is Force that is driven back into itself.

Force, if it is taken as being generated by two different forms, namely expression and properness of Force, follows the way in which, first, it will find the duality of itself, and, which, secondly, it will be drawn back to itself as being reflected into itself. When the consciousness experiences Force in its very beginning, it first discerns that Force only means a unity used in the replacement of unconditioned universal, and, that this replacement entails it to be capable of achieving the absolute knowing which is the absolute unity of the existence and knowing. However, then, the consciousness notices that there are two different forms of Force in understanding, one is the expression of it in regard to its spreading to dividedness as being rooted in the subsistence of 'matters'; and, the other one is conspicuously properness of Force as its withdrawal from the level of expression to that of oneness. What is the meaning of this temporary dualisation of Force in understanding, or, what does Hegel mean by claiming this kind of pluralisation of that? With this dualisation, the consciousness notices that, on this level, there is still something deficient to reach the absolute knowing. Of course, it can be claimed that the structure of knowing in understanding is properly constructed in

terms of its similarity to previous moments; however, in understanding, the consciousness has to discern the implicit Notion of the True. Thus, this dualisation needs to be reduced to a unification again. At the same time, it might, pithily and correctly, be defended that this kind of approach in understanding provides us both of that the negativity is still here as an absolute component of the object, and, that the negation does not need an externally impulsive power to come into appearance. When we think of the negativity, we utterly find out that it refers not only to a specific negation in any level, but also to the competence of the substance to negate itself, or, better, to be exposed to the negation for the sake of proving its own existence. As it can easily be expected from now on, when we mention about the negation, it directly refers to the specific negation in each moment to cause the consciousness to realise that it is not yet in the realm of the absolute knowing, and, that the consciousness' process of knowing comes into being through its experience of whole moments. Furthermore, Hegel's use of dualisation again in understanding is of necessity to lead to us to intuit that the consciousness treats its object coming from perception in such a way as if it knows what is going to happen to its level of knowing. However, the consciousness is not aware of where it is now; it only knows what it has already experienced theretofore. The general awareness of the consciousness is tied up with nothing else than its experience which has progressively taken place in the process up to now; the more it become experienced, the more it is going to be aware of the function of moments.

Dualisation is, as we have already claimed, the result of the previous moment, namely perception, and, beneficial for the consciousness to realise that it still focuses mainly on an immediately external object to locate where it really is. Then, again as we have just clarified, this dualisation ends up with the unification of two forms of Force. At this point, it becomes unveiled for us that, in understanding, what should be called peak for the consciousness is nothing other than an implicit Notion of the True due to the fact that it is still not able to grasp things through their Notions, and, that it is still banished from the Absolute and, in understanding, takes what seems to be essence to it in an 'objective' sense. Thus, it is now obvious that the main shift in understanding is from Notion in principle to the implicit Notion of the True. What leads to this end is Force which first produces two poles in the realm of determinations, and, then, attempts to make them surrounded by the oneness. At the end of the day, what remains

in the hands of the consciousness is nothing but remaining concept of Force as universal medium. After that kind of temporary duality, or, better, after lifting duality to the level of universal medium by Force's self-assessment of supersession of its expression, the consciousness utterly encounters with the One, and, directly lapses into the abyss of the One in which it is not capable of finding any kind of subsisting matters. What the consciousness needs at this point is obviously to experience all these inner processes of the third moment of the absolute knowing, namely understanding.

What the consciousness sees at the moment is that, even if it seems to be created by the very attributes of dualisation between expression and properness of Force, the decisive point in understanding is the self-attempt of Force as a universal medium in a unity. In this self-attempt, what we understand is the annihilation and supersession of the expression of Force, that is to say, that oneness razors the subsisting matters and establishes its influence all over the determinations again. However, what the consciousness has constantly been considering as a duality during this whole process is not a real, or Cartesian and impassable, duality; rather than this, it now seems us to be obvious that it is an artificial dualisation of Force, and, that what reduces this dualisation to oneness as the absolute realm of the One is nothing but Force itself. In this context, even though, at the outset, we have seen independent processes, namely unity, duality and unity again, they are much more closely interrelated, and, even expediently emerged by the *telos* of Force in dialectical method of the absolute idealism of Hegel. Moreover, when Hegel uses the term universal medium regarding the process in which he thinks of Force, it means the medium of the 'matters', and, thus, it apparently refers to the dividedness of the matters rather than implying the One. Thus, we utterly realise that, in Hegel's system of philosophy, the main components of Force in terms of their task in understanding are ultimately reduced to each other to explain the way through which the consciousness is supposed to lift itself up to the level of self-consciousness. As Hegel (1974, pp. 113-114, 2004, p. 85) clearly puts it,

To complete our insight into the Notion of this movement it may further be noticed that the differences themselves are exhibited in a twofold difference: once as a difference of *content*, one extreme being the Force reflected into itself, but the other the medium of the 'matters'; and again as a difference of *form*, since one solicits and the other is solicited, the former being active and the other passive. According to the difference of content they are distinguished [merely] in principle, or *for us*; but according to the difference of form they are independent and in their relation keep themselves separate and opposed to one another. The fact that the extremes, from the standpoint of both these sides, are thus nothing *in themselves*, that these sides in which their different essences were supposed to consist are only vanishing moments, are an immediate transition of each into its opposite, this truth becomes apparent to

consciousness in its perception of the movement of Force. But *for us*, as remarked above, something more was apparent, viz. that the differences, *qua differences of content and form*, vanished in themselves; and on the side of form, the essence of the *active, soliciting* or *independent* side, was the same as that which, on the side of content, presented itself as Force driven back into itself; the side which was passive, which was *solicited* or for an *other*, was, from the side of form, the same as that which, from the side of content, presented itself as the universal medium of the many 'matters'.

At the first glance at the flow of our article, it might merely seem to be quoted for providing the readers a good explanation of the relation between universal medium and 'matters;' however, there are more important clues to understand Hegel's system in this quotation than we have just expected at our first sight. First of all, Hegel asserts two different differences, that is, that the first one is the difference of content, and, that the second one is difference of form. It is possible to be anxious about our categorisation made above, namely asserting the difference and then the unity. At the first glance, again, it seems to be quite different from Hegel's point of view in terms of its ending up with the unity. However, after a while later Hegel has asserted this kind of separation between differences of the content and form, he depicts that two poles in each difference are 'nothing in themselves' which means that they are merely 'vanishing moments' which are the ground for Hegel's endeavour to unite them again in the realm of sameness. Hegel's claim, at the end of the day, comes to an expected end by which we notice that Force, in its progression in understanding, absolutely achieves the unity in itself. What is novel for us is obviously the presentation of the passive and active sides of the difference of form. In this sense, it should clearly be claimed that soliciting side in the difference of form represents the One, or, better, Force withdrawn back into itself, or, reflected-into-itself. The other part of the difference of form is passive, or solicited, side, and is associated with the universal medium of the 'matters.' As a result, these two differences, difference of content and form, somehow fall into the sameness, or, into the stalemate. It is quite prominent for us to declaim that this sameness or stalemate is in a visibility only *for us*, whereas, for the consciousness, it is still, as it will for a long time be, concealed. What it does mean is nothing but the twofold structure of the Hegel's system of philosophy as we have already become familiar with.

To sum up briefly the place of the concept of Force in understanding, we should conveniently claim that the structure of Force is constituted as follows, there are two different forces, one is Force immediate which is Understanding's Notion and not for itself, and, which should be taken as the One and as substance; the other Force is Force

negative, which is the object for the sense and for the understanding, and which is Force of the inner being of things and Notion of Force *qua* Notion, and, of course, in itself. As Hegel (1974, pp. 115-116, 2004, p. 86) clearly emphasises,

In so far as we regard the *first* universal as the Understanding's *Notion* in which Force is not yet *for itself*, the second is now Force's *essence* as it exhibits itself in and for itself. Or, conversely, if we regard the first universal as the *Immediate*, which was supposed to be an *actual* object for consciousness, then this second is determined as the *negative* of Force that is objective to sense; it is Force in the form of its true essence in which it exists only as an *object for the Understanding*. The first universal would be driven back into itself, or Force as Substance; the second, however, is the *inner being* of things *qua* inner, which is the same as the Notion of Force *qua* Notion.

As we have already depicted, Hegel divides Force into two sections. However, again, as mentioned above, all these dichotomies conducted in Force are temporary, and has to be annulled at a specific and clear time to lift the process up to another level. In this sense, what is more important than the difference itself is the presence of it because of that we want the consciousness to understand that difference presents both a differentiation and its relapse into the beginning point with this difference.

From now on, it is better for us to focus mainly on law, as the last stage of the consciousness in understanding. As we have just said, the indisputable importance of the difference is the presence of difference. This, at the same time, is nothing but the unique experience of the consciousness throughout understanding. The consciousness first declares that it notices the differences between two separated forces; However, then, it suddenly awakes from its temporary sleep, and discovers that what difference asserts is the difference itself. What does this mean, this premise which merely claims to be itself, and presents itself as it is? What we understand from this premise is that difference occurring in understanding and through Force, or, better, between forces, shows the difference as 'universal difference' which refers to the unique validity of difference in understanding to cause the consciousness to conceive the moment understanding as a moment of law. This is absolutely the moment through which the consciousness starts to learn how to think speculatively. Thus, through the difference presented by Force, the consciousness notices that the difference in objective sense is the difference of it. This does not mean that the approach of the difference lapses into relativism; rather than that, this approach relieves the difference from relativism, and protects it in the realm of speculative and abstract thinking taking place throughout the law. As Heidegger (1988, p. 101) amply approves the way of unification of forces, "Hegel says that for understanding the principle is the 'unity that is in itself universal'

– not the unity that ensues from the connection of two independent extremes, but the unity which itself unfolds into that which unifies the two and, as unifying, is their relation – to such an extent that the unified are themselves the relation.” This means that the structure of difference inevitably leads to unity which manifests itself as law of unconditioned universal. Through this kind of unification of forces, the consciousness reaches the point of understanding of law. However, as Hegel (1974, p. 120, 2004, p. 90) later emphasises,

The absolute flux of appearance becomes a *simple difference* through its relation to the simplicity of the inner world or of the Understanding. The inner being is, to begin with, only implicitly the universal; but this implicit, simple *universal* is essentially no less absolutely *universal difference*, for it is the outcome of the flux itself, or the flux is its essence; but it is a flux that is posited in the *inner* world as it is in truth, and consequently it is received in that inner world as equally an absolute universal difference that is absolutely at rest and remains selfsame. In other words, negation is an essential moment of the universal, and negation, or mediation in the universal, is therefore a *universal difference*. This difference is expressed in the *law*, which is the *stable* image of unstable appearance. Consequently, the *supersensible* world is an inert *realm of laws* which, though beyond the perceived world – for this exhibits law only through incessant change – is equally *present* in it and is its direct tranquil image.

As it is quite straightforward to see, Hegel asserts the realm of laws. This realm of laws is both the ‘initial truth’ of consciousness in understanding, and the truth which has a content in the law. Thus the first task of the consciousness, from now onward, is obviously to put out the plurality of the law, and, of course, to find only one law as the Notion of law; or, better, it should find a unificatory point for all laws, as mere law of laws or the Notion of law. Hegel (1974, pp. 120-122, 2004, p. 91) calls this kind of law, or the expression of this sort of law, ‘mere Notion of law’, and, continues as follows,

Universal attraction merely asserts that *everything has a constant difference in relation to other things*. The Understanding imagines that in this unification it has found a universal law which expresses universal reality *as such*; but in fact it has only found the *Notion of law itself*, although in such a way that what it is saying is that *all reality is in its own self*, conformable to law.

With this quotation, the explanation of law becomes clearer than it was before. What the consciousness finds out is that the law, produced by the consciousness by reducing the plurality of laws to a unique law which posits the difference making each thing become itself. Thus, the law of laws, or, as Hegel’s usage, universal attraction, is the Notion of law. Of course, as a result of this kind of understanding of the consciousness, everything becomes the object of the law, or, better than this, conformable to the law and representable by the law. What we have to understand from this result is that the consciousness is in the stage through which it becomes capable of think of things by their mediated positions, even if this level is unfortunately in the implicit Notion of the

True. Even though it is so, at the end, it is nothing else than the Notion of law. Then, Hegel (1974, pp. 122-123, 2004, pp. 92-93) makes a further separation in law,

The law is thereby present in a twofold manner: once, as law in which the differences are expressed as independent moments; and also in the form of a *simple* withdrawal into itself which again can be called *Force*, but in the sense not of a Force that is driven back into itself, but Force as such, or the Notion of Force, an abstraction which absorbs the differences themselves of what attracts and what is attracted.

As we have already seen, this twofold meaning of the law is again presented as if the consciousness is still in the process of Force. However, this difference is also a resemblance of the indifference, or, better than this, a proof by which the consciousness discerns that the structure of difference, at the same time, presents the recital of selfsameness. Thus, again, difference is nothing else than the assistant of the consciousness to make it understand what is going on better. At the same time, this is the last process before self-consciousness. When we think of this difference as a movement between the law and the Force, it brings into us more and more clear. What makes it that much clear is to think of this difference as a difference in play of forces. As we have already known, even if we have not needed to name it while mentioning, play of forces refers to interaction of two forces, expression and properness of Force. In this interaction, the structure of the difference between those forces plays an essential role in regard to their transition to each other. Of course, their interaction presents a transition of any of them to each other; however, what is more important than this is obviously, at the end, their convergence to a unity as a common point surrounding both of them. Thus, what their difference represents is that the difference can cancel itself and show that there is no difference. Nevertheless, this is not a contingency we rarely face with and find ourselves desperate. Rather than this kind of occurrence, it is the general rules of the difference between forces, as it is the decisive law of that between Force and law. Furthermore, beside its twofold meaning, or, ambivalence in it, the latter, the difference between Force and law involves of necessity the movement [*Bewegung*] through which we both see a separation of them and, realise, again, cancellation of their separation. As Hegel (1974, pp. 126-127, 2004, pp. 95-96) clearly enunciates,

In the play of Forces this law showed itself to be precisely this absolute transition and pure change; the selfsame, viz. Force, *splits* into an antithesis which at first appears to be an independent difference, but which in fact proves *to be none*; for it is the *selfsame* which repels itself from itself, and therefore what is repelled is essentially self-attractive, for it is the *same*; the difference created, since it is no difference, therefore cancels itself again. Consequently, the difference exhibits itself as difference of the *thing* is thus nothing else but the selfsame that has repelled itself from itself, and therefore merely posits an antithesis which is none.

Thus, process of the differentiation and the cancellation of difference is essential for consciousness in understanding to lift itself up to the level of self-consciousness, since, through this movement, the consciousness completes the internalisation of the external law, or, better, constitutes the law as it in reality is. By this very movement and interaction of self-repulsive selfsame and self-attractive unlike, the consciousness becomes capable of experience the infinity which absolutely refers to the gates of the self-consciousness. As Heidegger (1988, p. 124) clearly puts it,

This unity, which differentiates itself and in the difference is itself the un-differentiated, is the difference in itself, the inner difference – infinity. ‘The simple character of law,’ the truth of the object of understanding, ‘is infinity.’ This infinity is the *unconditioned universal*. But for ordinary representation the universal is already the concept. The named infinity is the *absolute concept*; it is that universal which is no longer relative to the extant particular which is subsumed by it; it is that universal which *is* the differentiated in its difference and *is* simultaneously unity.

Thus, infinity is the absolute experience of the consciousness, and, of course, the acquisition of infinity by it presents it the possibility to think of itself as its object. Obviously, with the consciousness’ acquisition of infinity, it is quite easy to claim that it has rather become able to convert itself from being-in-itself to being-for-itself. As it is firmly indicated, it is now competent to be both itself and, at the same time, its opposite; it can now gather these attributes in one unity, and, it has ‘difference in its own self’ [*Unterschied an sich selbst*] and is “difference as inner difference, or difference as an infinity [*Unendlichkeit*]” (Hegel, 1974, pp. 130-131, 2004, pp. 98-99). Hence, infinity is given both as a starting point of the spark of reason which is the motor activity of Hegel’s system of philosophy, and as a direct experience of the consciousness both to reach self-consciousness and its self-difference. Hegel (1974, pp. 130-131, 2004, pp. 98-99) continues to explain the results of the consciousness’ experience of infinity as follows,

We see that through infinity, law completes itself into an immanent necessity, and all the moments of [the world of] appearance are taken up into the inner world. That the simple character of law is infinity means, according to what we have found, (a) that it is self-*identical*, but is also in itself *different*; or it is the selfsame which repels itself from itself or sunders itself into two. What was called *simple Force* duplicates itself and through its infinity is law. (b) What is thus dirempted, which constitutes the parts thought of as in the *law*, exhibits itself as a stable existence; and if the parts are considered without the Notion of the inner difference, then space and time, or distance and velocity, which appear as moments of gravity, are just as indifferent and without a necessary relation to one another as to gravity itself, or, as this simple gravity is different to them, or, again, as simple electricity is indifferent to positive and negative electricity. But (c) through the Notion of inner difference, these unlike and indifferent moments, space and time, etc. are a *difference* which is no *difference*, or only a difference of what is *selfsame*, and its essence is unity. As positive and negative they stimulate each other into activity, and their being is rather to posit themselves as not-being and suspend themselves in the unity. The two distinguished moments both subsist; they are *implicit* and are *opposites in themselves*, i.e. each is the opposite of itself; each has its ‘other’ within it and they are only one unity.

What do we need to understand from this paragraph of Hegel? First of all, we see that the law of which the consciousness becomes well-aware completes itself through the assistance of infinity. Infinity is not only an assistant of the law to complete itself, but, at the same time, the most essential milestone of the consciousness to experience its inner world as a reflection of the external, and, to discern the difference as both of the difference and no difference to take itself as its own object through which it becomes capable of investigating itself and the world. Thus, the meaning of completion of the law imply of necessity the internalisation of appearance. Through this kind of understanding, the consciousness begins to grasp the structure of knowing. In this context, knowing is neither to think of the world through concepts or symbols in a formalistic way, nor is it the act of thinking in a way compatible with the common sense assuming the immediate thing as the unique reality of life without giving any question to the problem of reception of this sundered reality. Rather than those, knowing has always to be accompanied by a negation, an other, and, of course, a mediation through which the substance becomes able to make the thing get inside its world of meaning, or, merge with its inner world. After the completion of the law with the assistance of infinity, what the consciousness notices is that there are three prominent implications it gets to know throughout the appearance of infinity in understanding. The first one of those implications, which are the results of the premise of that which ‘the simple character of the law is infinity’, is that that premise does directly carry and include both identical and different attributions in itself. This means that both of them, the law and infinity, have a functional system which resembles the that of Force, namely expression and properness of Force. It is quite similar to play of Force; nevertheless, this totally implies the achievement of the consciousness to the self-consciousness through the concept of infinity. As it is again similar to the understanding of play of Force, we see that, in the second implication, Hegel particularly emphasises that each part of the first implication has to be stand together with the other; otherwise, it is impossible to think of an interaction between them to unite and then again to differ from each other, and, as a result of that state, the possibility to know and to exist ends up with a totally failed differentiation. At the same time, this absolute dividedness, in which things are not related to each other in any way, does not subsist in the process of knowing and does assure of the indifference of the things unrelated to each other. With the third implication, as it might easily be reckoned, we see that Hegel desires to complete the second one with a positive instance

of what he has planned to see as a result of the total experience of the consciousness in understanding. According to this, ‘through the Notion of inner difference’, unlike, divided and indifferent moments, such as velocity and distance, begin to stand together and to get in contact each other, since each of them has in itself its own differentiation from itself as well as from others. Through this kind of difference, their being-for-itself means nothing else than being-for-another; since to posit itself refers for each of them to acceptance of the presence of the others, and to breaking the chains surrounding them and keeping them in their isolated and impossible presence. In this sense, what Hegel means by claiming that they be stimulated into an activity which is nothing other than recognition of each other is that the essence of knowing is to experience it in the unity, and, that difference of dividedness is, at the same time, to assert that there is no difference. Hence, both of them, to claim that moments are differed from each other and selfsame or buried in nothing other than themselves, and, to posit that they are indifferent to each other in an undividedness, and, thus, annihilated by a unity, have to be porous to each other, and, in order to entail themselves to get in contact with each other, have to establish a difference which is not difference, a difference referring to both dividedness and undividedness through exclusive difference and indifferent difference respectively. In this sense, it is quite possible to think of three important components of Hegel’s system of philosophy, which are unveiled through the experience of the consciousness, and, which are respectively; (a) moments are implicit as the result of the experience of the consciousness in understanding, (b) they are ‘opposites in themselves’, and, each one has its opposition at the same time in itself, and (c) they are in one unity. These are the main requirements for the establishment of a dialectical system of philosophy.

Before we completely move to brief touching to the subject of self-consciousness in regard to its relation to the concept of experience, we have to see what Hegel thinks about infinity. Hegel (1974, pp. 132-133, 2004, pp. 100-101) proposes that infinity is nothing but the essence of life, as follows,

This simple infinity (*die einfache Unendlichkeit*), or the absolute Notion (*der absolute Begriff*), may be called the simple essence of life, the soul of the world, the universal blood, whose omnipresence is neither disturbed nor interrupted by any difference, but rather is itself every difference, as also their supersession; it pulsates within itself but does not move, inwardly vibrates, yet is at rest. It is self-identical, for the differences are tautological; they are differences that are none. This self-identical essence is therefore related only to itself; ‘to itself’ implies relationship to an ‘other’, and the *relation-to-self* is rather a *self-sundering*; or, in other words, that very self-identicalness is an inner difference. These *sundered moments* are thus *in*

and for themselves each an opposite – *of an other*; thus in each moment the ‘other’ is at the same time expressed; or each is not the opposite of an ‘other’ but only a *pure opposite*; and so each is therefore in its own self the opposite of itself. In other words, it is not an opposite at all, but is purely for itself, a pure, self-identical essence that has no difference in it.

Hegel puts infinity in a way through which we can elaborately think of the unity, a unity which consists of self-identical and self-sundering attributes in itself. What it does mean is that the structure of infinity is built up by very dialectical relationship between selfsameness and difference; however, when we gaze at the unity of infinity, we cannot, of course, notice and see anything other than a totality. Hegel draws a unity in which both self-identicalness and self-differentiation are possible in terms of being an object for the consciousness to get to know. In this sense, whereas, in this very position, common understanding discerns merely an absolute difference or an absolute identity in which the consciousness becomes unable to get to know anything due to absoluteness of the remoteness of other, or, in the latter, of the absence of other, Hegel establishes them in the same unity to make the knowing possible. To know absolutely requires both of difference, since only an other to the substance is able to be known, and of identicalness, since an absolute otherness with which it is impossible go get in contact cannot be the object of knowing. In this context, Hegel’s system of philosophy can be considered as a unity in which difference is always created, shattered, and created again.

Experience of the consciousness in understanding results in its implicit understanding of the True and of possibility of the objectification of itself. For sure, there can be questions about how to make it possible in understanding. Our answer to that kind of question is basically rooted in the internalisation of the mediated object, or, better, outer world of perception. As we have already known so far, the consciousness seeks for the True in perception; however, perception seems to come into appearance as a deceptive process in the face of the consciousness. Then, the consciousness discerns that the relation of perception to it is to notice the deceptiveness of the absolute difference. The consciousness, then, sees the importance of negativity in the way of knowing the things. In understanding, it has unconditioned universal as the possibility to be freed from being reduced to the relationship between sameness and difference. Rather than this, it notices that there is the truth of infinity as a unity of the difference and, of course, selfsameness. The structure of this kind of understanding leads the consciousness to get rid of the absoluteness of the dividedness and undividedness. This

does not mean that there is no dividedness and undividedness; rather than this, it absolutely means that the dividedness and undividedness have to exist together, and, even to include the other one and to be included by each other. By doing so, Hegel banishes the sceptical approach to knowing from the certain land, from the homeland (*Heimatland*) of the philosophy. In this context, by obtaining this kind of experience, the consciousness does absolutely bring itself into the dawn of the self-knowing, or, the self-consciousness. The common approach to the knowing can claim that the consciousness should merely know itself before it gets dilated towards the world, and, in this context, it seems that Hegel's way of understanding of the consciousness seems to be in opposite of this view. However, what that view proposes is nothing but only to assume a completed and in itself consciousness which does not have any kind of relation to the world it intends to realise, and, which is obviously and absolutely closed and concealed in its own presence; thus, it is not the consciousness anymore, rather than this, it absolutely becomes a blinded and self-indulgent being. Thus, Hegel's meaning of the consciousness sounds quite inclusionary concept rather than being merely a closed structure. The experience obtained by the consciousness in understanding does, thus, mean for the consciousness to discover itself as its own object. In addition to this, discovery of the consciousness by itself is nothing other than the experience which falls into the second meaning of its concept, as we have classified it above. We have to think of that understanding, as a part of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, has its position both in the first and second meaning of the concept of experience. However, its outcome is merely positioned in the second meaning of the experience due to that, in the second meaning, what is remarked is merely ability of the consciousness to think of itself, as it is now capable of interpreting a quite abstract and challenging concept such as infinity.

2.1.2.4. The Self-Consciousness

The last subject of the subtitle is, as it can easily be predicted, the self-consciousness. What self-consciousness means is the departure of the consciousness from itself to the world, by taking itself as its object, and, again, that of the consciousness from the object to the itself. This is the objectification of the consciousness. However, objectification does not only mean becoming an object of the consciousness, at the

same time, it obviously refers to that the consciousness falls into an objective realm. In so far as we have mentioned about it, the consciousness has been in the position of receiving the things in any way; from now onward, as it has started from the point of understanding's unconditioned universal, our subject is the consciousness' experience of itself both in partly subjective and mostly objective realm. It is subjective, because what the consciousness presents is a desire to know itself through the mediation of the other; it is also objective, since the way the consciousness takes includes both the consciousness itself and the social realm of others. In this sense, self-consciousness refers to both the consciousness itself and the social realm of the other in terms of being an open process of mediation. However, when we claim that it spreads to both subjective and objective realm, it does not basically mean society; rather than this, we think that it refers to sociality, or, better, socialisation process, since when we directly propose society as a realm of the consciousness' spreading, it is impossible to find there a process, and, even there is no difference in any word like that, a difference which is able to show that there is no difference, thus, which is both a difference and no difference. We will focus on this issue later.

As we all have hitherto learnt, the consciousness notices the law and Force in understanding, and these have shown the power of the consciousness to be able to interpret the things in regard to their necessity in their becoming. Thus, Force and the law have caused the consciousness to turn into self-consciousness. When we thoughtfully look at them, we see that those concepts are quite similar to the consciousness in terms of coming into appearance through the things, i.e. coming into being through a specific rule, or, as a force of an existence, or, better as a consciousness of a substance or subject. In this sense, what we should claim is that the law and Force have a tremendous effect on the consciousness to come to take itself as its own object and to become self-consciousness itself (Orman, 2015, s. 125). In this context, what the consciousness has in itself as a potentiality is obviously nothing other than to become self-consciousness. At the same time, it is plausible to think of this potentiality as the Notion of the consciousness. Furthermore, the consciousness has, in understanding, already seen that the form and the content have been overlapped. By this kind of awareness of the consciousness, we see that it turns into self-consciousness (*Selbstbewußtsein* or *Selbstbewusstsein*) by which it should be able to find the way to the absolute knowing. This means that, by becoming self-consciousness, the

consciousness both stays in itself as being-in-itself, and, again, becomes able to be the other of itself as being-for-itself. For sure, it has learnt being-for-itself and being-for-an other in understanding. Thus, by turning into self-consciousness, the consciousness has the experience of otherness whose concept and form, in terms of being-for-other and for-itself, has already been discovered by it. This preparation for the subject is enough to move to the moments of self-consciousness.

The first moment of self-consciousness is what Hegel calls desire (*Begierde*). At this point, it is obvious that the self-consciousness notices its substantial being and the positions of the other determinations; that is, it is in the realm of truth. According to Hegel (1974, pp. 138-139, 2004, pp. 104-105),

With self-consciousness, then, we have therefore entered the native realm of truth. ... The [mere] *being* of what is merely 'meant', the *singleness* and the *universality* opposed to it of perception, as also the *empty inner being* of the Understanding, these are no longer essences, but are moments of self-consciousness, i.e. abstractions of distinctions which at the same time have no reality *for* consciousness itself, and are purely vanishing essences. ... With that first moment, self-consciousness is in the form of *consciousness*, and the whole expanse of the sensuous world is preserved for it, but at the same time only as connected with the second moment, the unity of self-consciousness with itself; and hence the sensuous world is for it an enduring existence which, however, is only *appearance*, or a difference which, *in itself*, is no difference. This antithesis (*Gegensatz*) of its appearance and its truth has, however, for its essence only the truth, viz. the unity of self-consciousness with itself; this unity must become essential to self-consciousness, i.e. self-consciousness is *Desire* in general. Consciousness, as self-consciousness, henceforth has a double object: one is the immediate object, that of sense-certainty and perception, which however *for self-consciousness* has the character of a *negative*; and the second, viz. *itself*, which is the true *essence*, and is present in the first instance only as opposed to the first object. In this sphere, self-consciousness exhibits itself as the movement in which this antithesis is removed, and the identity of itself with itself becomes explicit for it.

How is it possible to claim that self-consciousness first comes into appearance as 'desire in general' sense? When the consciousness turns into self-consciousness, or, unites with it, we directly notice that the structure of self-consciousness is rooted not in essences the consciousness has witnessed in previous stages, but in the very moments in those stages. Thus, when we think of self-consciousness, we have to think of nothing but the moments of self-consciousness. At the same time, it can also be claimed that self-consciousness has two different moments in itself which are respectively called by Hegel distinct moment and second distinct moment. In the first moment, self-consciousness establishes its otherness as a different moment to itself. As we have already known, the self-consciousness is a tautology; thus, we should again claim that its difference is inside of it as well as its selfsameness. However, since it has to create its own otherness, the otherness for it is the 'form of a being' which means that the distinctiveness between the self-consciousness and the object of

abstract thinking comes into appearance. What it means is that the structure of the unity of self-consciousness has, in first moment, to divide itself into two different parts; since it needs to know what it orients to in a mediated way. Then, what it needs is to be drawn back to itself, to turn into the self of its own unity. As it can easily be grasped, the general structure of the dialectical way of Hegel's system of philosophy is quite reasonable and understandable in regard to its approach to the tension between difference and selfsameness. This point is explicitly proposed by Robert Stern (2002, p. 75) as follows, "Thus, we once again have a tension between universality (the 'wholly universal' I belonging to both self-consciousnesses) and individuality (the sense that each self-consciousness has of itself as an individual fundamentally distinct from the other self-consciousness)." In this context, it does almost always present a dividedness, and, then, the unification of the poles of that division. This means that, the position of Hegel's system of philosophy is, particularly after the consciousness' discovery of self-consciousness, rooted in self-alienation and self-unification.

These two moments in self-consciousness come into appearance as a temporality rather than the change or transition of essences. In this sense, what we see at this point is obviously nothing other than the implementation of the moments in desire as the essential part of the self-consciousness. Thus, in desire, it is very possible for us to propose that the moments of the distinction and of negation of the distinction is applied respectively. First of all, distinction of the self-consciousness from itself takes place, and, then, what we witness is the unification of the self-consciousness with itself. This process, as we have quoted from Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* above, of necessity leads to very construction of the self-consciousness in the face of itself. What it does mean is that the structure of self-consciousness is demonstrated by this distinction and unification to the self-consciousness. In this sense, desire is, as the first of all implications, nothing else than to claim that the self-consciousness becomes exhibited for it, and, applies exhibition to itself. Throughout these two moments of self-consciousness, self-providence, or self-intuition of the self-consciousness is quite usable to think of that which infinity directly results in the unfolding, or disenchantment, of the self-consciousness. How does desire come into appearance then? Desire is nothing but the lust of self-consciousness to find itself again. Its basis is the distinction of the pure movement of the self-consciousness. The desire of the

self-consciousness is to unite in any way, since it has just learnt that its object is nothing else than something limited by it to the strict frame of being known by it.

As we have already claimed before, self-consciousness basically has a positive attitude towards its object in desire in respect of its unity. Nevertheless, this positive attitude coming into appearance in desire is to focus merely on the object of self-consciousness. This is what makes the object an object of self-consciousness. As Hegel (1974, pp. 138-139, 2004, pp. 104-105) clearly confesses, the otherness, in any way, seems to be a being for the self-consciousness. Any kind of being means a differentiation from the self-consciousness, a difference which self-consciousness believes and desires to melt down in itself. Thus, desire is, as we have just now claimed, nothing but the positive approach by self-consciousness to the object of the self-consciousness. As Copleston (2003, p. 183) properly puts it, “The self is still concerned with the external object, but it is characteristic of the attitude of desire that the self subordinates the object to itself, seeking to make it minister to its satisfaction, to appropriate it, even to consume it. And this attitude can be shown, of course, in regard to living and non-living things.” As a result, the self-consciousness develops its desire to have a unity in itself by encompassing and invading the realm of the difference. It means that the structure of desire is strictly based on the occupation of the thing, or, better than that, of the differentiated being’s realm. In this context, what we should pose is that the self-consciousness annihilates what seems to be negative to it, and, invades it to amend the negativity; that is to say briefly, it consumes what it encounters. As it is quoted from Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* above, the consciousness has a ‘double object.’ One of them is obviously nothing but the self-consciousness itself. When we think of the second one, even if Hegel calls it the first one, we directly come to understand the reason of the invasion of the self-consciousness; as Hegel proposes, second one is the immediate object of sense-certainty and perception, and, has a negative character for the self-consciousness. As a result, desire of the self-consciousness unveils itself as a lust of that to become integrated with disturbing negativity of the immediate object, or that of being differentiated from the self-consciousness.

At this point, it is important to deal with the approach in which we witness it to be proposed that the self-consciousness consists in being a part of the society. Interpreters of Hegel almost always see him as a part of some perspectives such as Kantianism,

social philosophy, Spinozism and so on. Robert B. Pippin interprets Hegel and his concept of self-consciousness as respectively a social philosopher and a concept to open the gates to the society in his philosophy. According to Pippin (2011, pp. 15-20), Hegel proposes the concept of self-consciousness as a ‘practical achievement’ of the mind to the society, and,

Hegel sees such an achievement as necessarily involving a relation to other people, as inherently social. This last issue about the role of actualization begins to introduce such a dependence, but it is hard to see at outset why other people need to be involved in the intimacy and privacy that seems to characterize my relation to myself. (Pippin, 2011, p. 19)

The problematic point for us is neither the extrovert functionality of the self-consciousness, nor is it the practicality of the self-consciousness. What needs to be explained for us is the direct orientation of the self-consciousness to the society. We have to think of this issue at this point due to the fact that Pippin (2011, p. 13), by departing from McDowell, builds his claim on the ground of desire. Of course, the self-consciousness thinks of otherness at this point as something negative; however, what is more important than this is the unity of the self-consciousness in itself. At the point Pippin sees a negativity, we are very likely to see the unity of the self-consciousness, a unity which is based firmly on its claim to involve even negativity in itself. As a consequence, we of necessity find Pippin’s claim reductionist in regard to his approach to the self-consciousness, as if it is only made up of social reason. In this context, ‘practical achievement’ should not to be understood as a totally wrong claim. Rather than this, there is, of course, a practical achievement of the self-consciousness by desiring; however, it can neither be seen as the ultimate desire of the self-consciousness, nor can the emphasis of Hegel on the unity of the self-consciousness be reduced to it. Thus, according to our vantage point, there are two main problematic points in Pippin’s approach to desire and the self-consciousness; one is that ‘practical achievement’ is made up of an overreading, and thus, a reduction, of desire in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. This claim about ‘practical achievement’ reflects an overreading of self-consciousness because of that, in any way, in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, desire is only one of the moments of the self-consciousness, that the self-consciousness does not have any clear externality similar to itself regarding being conscious, and, moreover, does not take the otherness as an acceptable division. Furthermore, this claim reflects a reductionism in which we see that the realm of unity of the self-consciousness is utterly rejected, and that, instead of that kind of unity, this approach puts only the negativity of otherness in the realm of desire of the self-

consciousness. What it does mean is nothing else than reducing the whole realm of desire of the self-consciousness to the very simple structure and one-sidedness of externality. As we have consciously repeated again and again, the use of desire by the self-consciousness comes into being after the self-presentation, or, better, self-releasing of the self-consciousness in the form of an other, thus, after appearance of difference in infinity as a part of it, or, in the form of self-differentiation. According to our view, the second problematic point in this kind of approach to desire and the self-consciousness is obviously the alleged objective of the self-consciousness. The point at which Pippin's reading of Hegel clearly turns into a declaim of alienation of Hegel from metaphysics and that of fixation of Hegel in social philosophy is obviously fortified by the understanding of act of the self-consciousness through which Pippin sees nothing else than the society as the ultimate target of the whole process of absolute idealism. In our opinion, society cannot be taken as a part of desire of the self-consciousness because of the fact that it is not possible to think of such a concept in the moment of desire due to lack of specific determinations belonging to the externality, and, that, in the moment of desire, the self-consciousness is not totally open to the impact of otherness, rather than this, its openness is, to a great extent, an openness to become closed in its unity by melting down the otherness in itself with the assistance of desire. Rather than defending the presence of an objective such as the society, we claim that, in the openness of the self-consciousness, we are able to see that there is a possibility for the self-consciousness to socialise in regard to that its competence is limited to experience that it can do so. At the very beginning of its experience of self-differentiation and that of being as a distinct moment in which desire comes into appearance to bring it into where it comes from, namely into its unity, the self-consciousness notices the possibility of externality and otherness. However, it never refers, at this point, to a specific concept of otherness such as society; rather than that kind of assumption, if it is better for us to refrain from fictitious preaching, and to confine ourselves modestly to depicting what we see in the moment of desire of the self-consciousness, then, it is plausible to propose that the structure of desire consists of the possibility of the self-consciousness to discern the socialising process, and that, in spite of noticing that possibility, it does, at the end of the day, take itself back to its unity. It can be asked why it withdraws itself into unity rather than preferring exploring the externality. The answer is not far away from the question; it does so because of that it lacks any apparent and specific reciprocity with regard to finding other self-

consciousnesses. When it finds other self-consciousnesses, then, it is not in the moment of desire anymore; nevertheless, what it has at the moment is merely being as an object in externality to it and its negative relation to that object.

Hegel (1974, pp. 143-144, 2004, pp. 109-110) claims the self-consciousness in desire as follows,

Desire and the self-certainty obtained in its gratification, are conditioned by the object, for self-certainty come from superseding this other: in order that this supersession can take place, there must be this other. Thus self-consciousness, by its negative relation to the object, is unable to supersede it; it is really because of that relation that it produces the object again, and the desire as well. It is in fact something other than self-consciousness that is the essence of Desire; and through this experience self-consciousness has itself realized this truth. But at the same time it is no less absolutely *for itself*, and it is so only by superseding the object; and it must experience its satisfaction, for it is the truth. On account of the independence of the object, therefore, it can achieve satisfaction only when the object itself effects the negation within itself; and it must carry out this negation of itself in itself, for it is *in itself* the negative, and must be *for* the other what it *is*. Since the object is in its own self negation, and in being so is at the same time independent, it is consciousness. In the sphere of Life, which is the object of Desire, *negation* is present either *in an other*, viz in desire, or as a *determinateness* opposed to another indifferent form, or as the inorganic universal nature of Life. But this universal independent nature in which negation is present as absolute negation, is the genus as such, or the genus as *self-consciousness*. *Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.*

What we now need to think of is obviously nothing else than the other and its foundation as an independent object in its nature. The self-consciousness is in an ambivalent situation shaped by a double aporia: at the one pole of this aporia, we directly discern that the self-consciousness comes into appearance through the concept of infinity, and, assures us to believe that it has its difference which is no difference in itself; at the other pole what we see is nothing else than the other as an independent object which posits its presence through immediate objectness deriving from the sense-certainty and perception, and, which does not directly allow the self-consciousness to reduce its presence to infinity. In this context, supersession of the object by the self-consciousness does neither mean that it ultimately can be reduced to the self-consciousness' unity, nor can it be understood as the realisation of the object by the self-consciousness as an object of it. In this sense, this distinction, as the first moment the self-consciousness experiences, posits that desire and self-consciousness is about to be differentiated from each other. Thus, as we have already proposed, the self-consciousness can merely experience a socialisation with the reunification rather than getting the object as fully as possible. The distinction between the self-consciousness and the object directly brings the desire into open. Desire is, at this point, nothing other than a novel mediatory between the object and the self-consciousness which definitely comes from the very essence of the self-consciousness. In this context, self-certainty

of the self-consciousness derives from the supersession of the object; however, what the self-consciousness produces by doing so is nothing but the object itself again. The reason why the self-consciousness produces the object again and again is apparently the structure of its ambivalent state in which it encounters with both the negativity of the other and desire to supersede what is negative in the face of it. In this context, what is the main component allowing the supersession of the object is desire of the self-consciousness, and, what leads to reproduction of the object is again nothing other than the desire itself. As similar to the ambivalent state of the self-consciousness, desire is both the care and the trouble of the self-consciousness. However, in the face of the self-consciousness, what is negative becomes the very essence of the object in itself and for the other, namely for the self-consciousness. This kind of reflection of the negativity on the object is nothing other than the foundation of the absolute otherness in Hegel's system of philosophy, or, in self-consciousness. What it means is that the structure of othering is accurately based on negativity of the object in the face of the self-consciousness. Thus, the self-consciousness is finally at the point of the satisfaction supposed to come from an absolute otherness, or, to come into appearance in another self-consciousness. With the negativity, the object is founded as a consciousness, and, for self-consciousness, it is nothing else than the absolute negation. In this sense, the self-consciousness finally finds its negative alliance to keep going on in its way.

As Hegel (1974, p. 144, 2004, p. 110) clearly puts it, there are three moments in which the self-consciousness becomes consummated;

The notion of self-consciousness is only completed in these three moments: (a) the pure undifferentiated 'I' is its first immediate object. (b) But this immediacy is itself an absolute mediation, it *is* only as a supersession of the independent object, in other words, it is Desire. The satisfaction of the Desire is, it is true, the reflection of self-consciousness into itself, or the certainty that has become truth. (c) But the truth of this certainty is really a double reflection, the duplication of self-consciousness. Consciousness has for its object one which, of its own self, posits its otherness or difference as a nothingness, and in so doing is independent. The differentiated, merely *living*, shape does indeed also supersede its independence in the process of Life, but it ceases with its distinctive difference to be what it is. The object of self-consciousness, however, is equally independent in this negativity of itself; and thus it is *for itself* a genus, a universal fluid element in the plurality of its own separate being; it is a living self-consciousness.

This consummation of the self-consciousness in fact starts with the triple relationship between the object, desire and the self-consciousness. The 'undifferentiated I' has a relation to desire. The independent object leads to the 'I' whose immediacy is nothing else than absolute mediation of its objectness. This means that the independent object,

as we have had it as a remnant from the very processes of sense-certainty and perception, indeed turns into an immediate 'I,' and vice versa. However, the independent object is, at the same time, assists the self-consciousness to find desire, since its reason to become differentiated from itself is nothing else than the immediate 'I'. As a result, what we need to understand from the beginning of this paragraph of Hegel is that the being considered as an independent object is in relation to the undifferentiated 'I' and desire. Desire emerges as the result of this mediation of the 'I' and directly finds its satisfaction in the reflection of the self-consciousness on itself. As we have constantly claimed, desire emerges as the result of the differentiation between the self-consciousness and the independent object, and, its main intention is to reunification of those two realms. Again, as we indicated above, the object seems to the self-consciousness to be present in a negation; however, the negation of the independent object is not only a negation visible to the self-consciousness, but also a negation of its own self, because, it is immediate in itself. The 'I' is mediated due to the fact that it is indeed the distorted version of the independent object, it is exposed to distortion through the supersession of the independent object by desire and, of course, the self-consciousness. Henceforth, what the self-consciousness encounters with is, thus, nothing else than construction of the other self-consciousness. The reason for this construction of the other self-consciousness is obviously the experience of the self-consciousness coming from the very beginning of the distinction of it. Moreover, the other self-consciousness is generated by nothing else than the duplication of the self-consciousness. the self-consciousness assumes that the otherness is nothingness; however, at the same time, it has desire to absorb this otherness as nothingness. However, this kind of desire is nothing but to give the object's independence to this nothingness which is obviously a result of a differentiation from the self-consciousness, and, has its self-differentiation in itself. Through this kind of understanding, the self-consciousness sees, in the face of itself, a genus for itself; since, it is, to some extent, an independent object, and, with the desire of the self-consciousness to unite with it, the genus for itself of the independent object is strictly consolidated and fortified. By becoming a genus for itself, we see that the other consciousness, or the independent object, turns into a 'living self-consciousness.' From now on, it is possible to propound that what the self-consciousness will experience is nothing else than the presence of other self-consciousnesses.

What we are going to focus on is the subtitle of the part ‘Self-Consciousness,’ namely ‘Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage’ (*Selbständigkeit und Unselbständigkeit des Selbstbewusstseins; Herrschaft und Knechtschaft*). The self-consciousness has, through the negativity of the independent object, witnessed that there are other self-consciousnesses. What the self-consciousness experiences here is nothing else than what we have already witnessed before; as Hegel (1974, p. 146, 2004, p. 112) cool-bloodedly indicates,

In this movement we see repeated the process which presented itself as the play of Forces, but repeated now in consciousness. What in that process was *for us*, is true here of the extremes themselves. The middle term is self-consciousness which splits into the extremes; and each extreme is this exchanging of its own determinateness and an absolute transition into the opposite.

The transition to the opposite is the main experience the self-consciousness can have throughout this process. The self-consciousness is divided into two different forms, and, these forms are called lordship and bondage. Of course, there is no need for us to depict that these denotations do not directly refer to class consciousness etcetera; rather than that kind of understanding, it is enough for us to stay in the limits of self-consciousness and the experience of it, and, to indicate that this process is a reflection for us on being the subject or the object in a relatedness. The lordship as the Notion of the self-consciousness is the immediateness of the being-for-self and the mediated relation, since it is in itself *qua* itself, and, is at the point to encounter with the other referring to the mediation of the self-consciousness through an other. The lord and the bondsman are related to each other. The lord somehow relates himself to the bondsman, and, this means that there is a mediation in the relation of the lord, a mediatory tool which is nothing other than the thing or independent being that somehow makes these two forms of self-consciousness stuck in the state they are indeed in. Hartmann (1960, pp. 332-333), as one of the most known interpreters of Hegel, proposes that this differentiation is based mainly on the self which encounters with the foreign self as an object, that is, that the self seems, at the same time, to be its reflection on the other as an object of the other, and, that this relation which establishes, on the one hand, the object of the consciousness as a reflection on the other, and on the other hand, the subjectivity of the consciousness as being conscious of its ability to see itself as it truly is, ends up with the ‘self-consciousness for self-consciousness’ which is shaped by the presence of the infinity and the very reality of the death. In this context, two extremes of the self-consciousness, namely the lord and the bondsman, are classified as follows, the lord is the active force of the self-consciousness, and, the

bondsman is in the position of passivity. The power of the lord over the independent thing is mediately the power of him over the bondsman. As a result of this state, the battle for the recognition is started by two extremes of the self-consciousness. The independent object is neither in the possession of the lord, nor is it in that of the bondsman. However, both of them are related to each other through this independent being, and, as it is sheerly expected, neither the lord's desire nor the bondsman's annihilating impact is adequate to abolish the independence of the being, or, of the thing. At the end of the day, we easily notice that each of them is deprived of the completed unity in itself; and that is the reason why they both need to be recognised by each other. As Hegel (1974, pp. 151-152, 2004, p. 116) plainly clarifies,

In both of these moments the lord achieves his recognition through another self-consciousness; for in them, that other consciousness is expressly something unessential, both by its working on the thing, and by its dependence on a specific existence. In neither case can it be the lord over the being of the thing and achieve absolute negation of it. Here, therefore, is present this moment of recognition, viz. that the other consciousness sets aside its own being-for-self, and in so doing itself does what the first does to it. Similarly, the other moment too is present, that this action of the second is the first's own action; for what the bondsman does is really the action of the lord. The latter's essential nature is to exist only for himself; he is the sheer negative power for whom the thing is nothing. Thus he is the pure, essential action in his relationship, while the action of the bondsman is impure and unessential. But for recognition proper the moment is lacking, that what the lord does to the other he also does to himself, and what the bondsman does to himself he should also do to the other. the outcome is a recognition that one-sided and unequal.

What we are clearly told by this paragraph of Hegel is that both of these two self-consciousnesses need to be recognised by each other, and, that this recognition, of necessity, takes place through the independent object. As it becomes clearer than it was, the independent object which has, shortly before the appearance of self-presentation of desire, come into appearance in the first distinction of the self-consciousness becomes able to find its essential position only now and at this point. Even though its first duty might be considered as an endeavour to form an alternative to self-consciousness' uniqueness, it seems now to be turned into a mediation of the whole life, into a tool through which those two self-consciousnesses encounter with each other, and lapse into the necessity in which both are supposed to be recognised by, and to recognise, each other. Each of those self-consciousnesses, thereby, becomes capable of being mediately recognised through another self-consciousness. However, in this asymmetrical relationship, the bondsman's self-consciousness becomes unessential in its nature as well as his action strictly based on 'working on the thing' and 'dependence on a specific existence.' However, this does not mean that the self-consciousness of the lord does not need the recognition coming from that of the

bondsman; rather than this, what we have to propose is that the lord needs of necessity to be recognised by the bondsman. However, the problematic point is that, on the one hand, they have to treat each other, as if they do not need the other, as a constitutive rule of the self-consciousness' uniqueness, on the other hand, they are absolutely in the need of each other. Nevertheless, as we have seen it through the quotation from Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* above, according to the lord, self-consciousness of the bondsman is nothing other than an unessential consciousness; thus, it can merely become a dissipated consciousness in the face of that of the lord. However, this does not mean that it is not prone to be altered in the process. As Hegel (1974, p. 152, 2004, pp. 116-117) thoughtfully depicts,

In this recognition the unessential consciousness is for the lord the object, which constitutes the *truth* of his certainty of himself. But it is clear that this object does not correspond to its Notion, but rather that the object in which the lord has achieved his lordship has in reality turned out to be something quite different from an independent consciousness. What now really confronts him is not an independent consciousness, but a dependent one. He is, therefore, not certain of *being-for-self* as the truth of himself. On the contrary, his truth is in reality the unessential consciousness and its unessential action.

The lord's self-consciousness notices that the bondsman's consciousness is nothing else than an object assisting him to find the truth of his certainty. However, the lord's understanding of the bondsman's self-consciousness as an object is totally reversed by the action through which the lord finds his essential consciousness, that is to say, the essentiality of the lord's consciousness is apparently the result of the bondsman's recognition of it. In other words, the lord's consciousness is lifted up to the level of essentiality, if and only if he is able to get recognised by the consciousness of the bondsman. The process is, thus, reversed; the essentiality of the consciousness of the lord is not certain in itself, or, better, he is not 'certain of being-for-self' as having truth of himself. As Hegel (1974, p. 152, 2004, p. 117) predictably continues to write his implications or speculations on this issue,

The *truth* of the independent consciousness is accordingly the servile consciousness of the bondsman. This, it is true, appears at first *outside* of itself and not as the truth of self-consciousness. But just as lordship showed that its essential nature is the reverse of what it wants to be, so too servitude in its consummation will really turn into the opposite of what it immediately is; as a consciousness forced back into itself, it will withdraw into itself and be transformed into a truly independent consciousness.

Thus, the consciousness of the bondsman comes into appearance as the independent consciousness which has nothing but the relation to the independent object and the consciousness of the lord. When it should be considered that, at the outset, the consciousness of the bondsman is of necessity tied to the consciousness of the lord, and thus, seems to be unessential; however, this necessary relation between two

different self-consciousness, at the end of the day, ends up with the necessary bond with each other, and, moreover, the unessential nature of the lord's consciousness is unveiled. At the beginning, the bondsman has its high degree of self-consciousness in so far as it finds a necessary relationship with the lord. However, we clearly see that the lord uses the bondsman's consciousness as a means to affect the independent object, and, at the same time, the consciousness of bondsman is obviously related to the object much more than that of the lord is. Thus, as a result of this power of the consciousness of the bondsman, we finally realise that the alleged essentiality of the lord's consciousness is moved away from himself. What the self-consciousness experiences here is both the absoluteness of the other self-consciousness and transition from an essential power to an unessential level.

Nevertheless, the point at which we are suddenly arises the question what the servitude is in itself. The consciousness of the bondsman does implicitly has the 'truth of pure negativity' and being-for-self, even if it is not aware of this implicit possession of it (Hegel, 1974, pp. 152-153, 2004, p. 117; Orman, 2015, p. 129). Thus, what we need to focus mainly on in the consciousness of the bondsman is obviously nothing other than its exploration of its implicit possession of what it is. As Hegel (1974, pp. 152-153, 2004, p. 117) clearly explains it, the consciousness of the bondsman experiences the most dreadful fear, the fear of the death, and, he continues to speak of it,

In that experience, it has been quite unmanned, has trembled in every fibre of its being, and everything solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations. But this pure universal movement, the absolute melting-away of everything stable, is the simple, essential nature of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, *pure being-for-self*, which consequently is *implicit* in this consciousness.

Thus, we see that the structure of self-consciousness of the bondsman presents both an implicit being-for-self and an ability to discover the essential nature of itself which is nothing else than the pure universal movement unfolding itself through the melting away of everything in its world. As a result, the bondsman has the absolute negativity to explore what his consciousness in itself has. In this sense, this pure being-for-self is merely explicit for it in the lord. The bondsman can, thus, understandably experience pure being-for-self through his relation to the lord. At the same time, the bondsman's consciousness works on the independent object and sees the results of its effect on nature of the thing. What the self-consciousness of the bondsman has now is the absolute power of the absolute negativity; however, it remains to be mystery for the lord. As Hegel (1974, p. 153, 2004, p. 118) clarifies,

Through work, however, the bondman becomes conscious of what he truly is. In the moment which corresponds to desire in the lord's consciousness, it did seem that the aspect of unessential to the thing fell to the lot of the bondsman, since in that relation the thing retained its independence. Desire has reserved to itself the pure negating of the object and thereby its unalloyed feeling of self.

What it means is that the bondsman gets to know who he in reality is. It is indispensable to claim that the independence of the bondsman to get to know who he truly is is directly based on the fleetingness of the independence of the object by the working of the bondsman. In this sense, what we have to claim is that the bondsman's consciousness knows itself through the mediation of the world. What the lord has in his self-consciousness is uniqueness of the self-consciousness, and, he does, thus, impose what he has upon the bondsman's self-consciousness. However, at the other hand, the bondsman now knows how to achieve his being-for-self, and, is well-aware of that the pavement of his way to get to know his consciousness' implicit truth explicitly is rooted merely in the working on the independent being or object. Thus, pure negativity of the bondsman turns out to be the constructive power of the self-consciousness and the world, since self-consciousness shows itself on the earth. This does not mean that the self-consciousness of the bondsman might plainly come into appearance without the presence of that of the lord. Rather than this kind of understanding, it is quite important to discern that positions of the lord and the bondsman are inverted throughout the process of their recognition of each other. As a result, that which the position of the lord's consciousness turns out to be an unessential consciousness, and, which that of bondsman's consciousness becomes conscious of its implicit being-for-self with the help of pure negativity rooted in its relation to the independent object should be understood as the absolute experience of the consciousness in Hegel's system of philosophy.

Hegel (1974, pp. 154-155, 2004, pp. 118-119) clearly explains the last positions of the self-consciousnesses of the lord and the bondsman as follows,

The formative activity has not only this positive significance that in it the pure being-for-self of the servile consciousness acquires an existence; it also has, in contrast with its first moment, the negative significance of *fear*. For, in fashioning the thing, the bondsman's own negativity, his being-for-self, becomes an object for him only through his setting at nought the existing *shape* confronting him. But this objective *negative* moment is none other than the alien being before which it has trembled. Now, however, he destroys this alien negative moment, posits *himself* as a negative in the permanent order of things, and thereby becomes *for himself*, someone existing on his own account. In the lord, the being-for-self is an 'other' for the bondsman, or is only *for* him [i.e. is not his own]; in fear, the being-for-self is present in the bondsman himself; in fashioning the thing, he becomes aware that being-for-self belongs to *him*, that he himself exists essentially and actually in his own right. The shape does not become something other than himself through being made external to him; for it is precisely this shape

that is pure being-for-self, which in this externality is seen by him to be the truth. Through this rediscovery of himself by himself, the bondsman realizes that it is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he acquires a mind of his own.

What Hegel says at this point is the basic implications of what he claimed before.

According to these implications, the negativity of the bondsman turns out to be the explicit being-for-self of the consciousness of the bondsman though his relation to the independent object on which he has to work; however, at the same time, it is plausible to propose that, even though his consciousness acquires an existence through that process, it has fear in itself as primary as the negativity of it. When the bondsman destructs the primary negativity deriving from his relation to the object, his being-for-self becomes explicit in regard to turning the Notion into an actuality and essentiality in the world. However, the fear which comes into appearance with the externalisation of the being-for-self is none other than his shape to exist. In the end, we are not able to see this fear or second cycle negation of the relation to the thing which is not independent anymore. Thus, what the bondsman sees in his shape of existing is absolutely nothing else than his exploration of his being-for-self by his working on the thing; however, he, at the same time, shows us that acquiring 'a mind of his own' does of necessity take place through the alienated existence of the self-consciousness of the bondsman. The self-consciousness of the bondsman seems to turn out to be itself as being-for-self with the assistance of alienation, or, better, by digressing the existence of being-in-itself. As a result, what we notice in so far as is the mediation of the nature by the very cultural improvement of the human being. In this sense, as far as we have thought of this issue mainly based on an alienation from its pure existence, we reach the result that that which consciousness becomes free from the first meaning of the concept of experience is nothing but owning of consciousness a cultural reason working on the independent object which is not independent anymore. What is mediated here is the nature as well as the self-consciousness; thus, the experience of the self-consciousness is, at this point, obviously rooted in the relation of the self-consciousness to both itself, or another self-consciousness, and the object. This relation consists in what we call the second meaning, or connotational meaning, of the concept of experience. Both of the self-consciousness and the existence of human being, as togetherness of epistemological and ontological attributions of human, are the objects of second cycle of the experience. In this context, what we need to know is that the structure of this second cycle experience is the absolute arrival point of the self-consciousness.

Of course, this is not the final, or absolute knowing, in Hegel's system of philosophy. The relationship between two self-consciousness is unfolded at this point; thus, we become capable of seeing positions of consciousnesses and their experience of each other. However, there are three different approaches Hegel declaims at this point; which are, respectively, stoicism, scepticism and unhappy consciousness. Each of these approaches is a misrepresentation of the experience of the self-consciousness. Stoicism refers to the undisclosed consciousness which is not able to experience the presence of other consciousnesses. In this approach, the self-consciousness cannot have any effect on the nature as the independent object, and, on the self-consciousness of the other. This approach immediately implies the fall of the self-consciousness into itself, and, thus, delineates a sceptical consciousness which understand the world as founded by its own tautology. At the same time, this kind of understanding is totally contradicted with the consciousness of Hegel's system of philosophy which strives to bring itself into being by working on the object of the world. Thus, this sort of approach directly describes the lack of its endeavour to work on the world, and, that of experience of the self-consciousness in regard to its realising glance at the presence of the other self-consciousnesses and, of course, that of the independent object. Thus, this is not appreciated by Hegel's understanding at all. Of course, stoicism can turn into an understanding in which we see that the relation of the self-consciousness to the world is totally negated by the subject. At this point, the self-consciousness is again drawn back into itself, and, merely lapsed into the abyss of scepticism. However, as being compatible with the structure of the stoicism, scepticism encompasses more radical understanding of the world, an understanding in which the self-consciousness rejects the presence of the breadth as space and velocity a time, thus, in which it refuses the physical world on which, as Hegel's system of philosophy proposes, the self-consciousness is supposed to work. In this context, as it can easily be predicted, Hegel's system of philosophy does never become related to stoicism and scepticism in the sense of their negative approach to the external world. Furthermore, it is obvious that the sceptical approach contradicts with itself because of the fact that it kindly refuses the presence of the external world while it is still indisputably, and of necessity, tied to the external world. thus, it is unacceptable that this approach is suitable to Hegel's system of philosophy in terms of latter's understanding of the consciousness. The last alternative approach to the self-consciousness is the understanding held by

unhappy consciousness. The unhappy consciousness can naturally be the result of both of the scepticism's dichotomy between internal and external, and, the dualisation of the understanding of the world regarding rewarding and punishing of human beings because of their actions by a dualist approach to the world, a dualism which can be shaped by distinction between individual and universal as isolated and differentiated unities in themselves. Actually, what Hegel delineates is nothing other than the desperate situation of the Medieval Christianity in which the results of the actions of the human being seemed to be on shaky ground. Moreover, it can straightforwardly be evaluated as the Hegel's objection to the Medieval Christianity from the vantage point of Protestant ideology (Orman, 2015, pp. 132-133). At the end of the day, what we see is Hegel's absolute criticism to all of those three understandings in which the self-consciousness is of necessity divided into two veiled or closed unities. However, in Hegel's system of philosophy, those divisions are, at the end, gathered in a unity in which the self-consciousness can also think of the negativity. Hegel does absolutely make an attempt to lift down the God of Christianity to the world of human beings. What this attempt of him clearly depicts is that there is something earthly which allows us to unite all of our actions, knowing, and existence; this is the reason (*Vernunft*) through which the consciousness combines and reconciles internal and external, phenomenal and noumenal world, and the absolute knowing and the existence. The reason is absolutely the combination of the consciousness and self-consciousness, that is, it is the direct result of experiences of the consciousness and self-consciousness. The reason is the immanent unity of the existence and the knowing. In this sense, the reason is the absolute point of arrival as being caused by the very essence of the experience of the consciousness and self-consciousness. As a result, what we are capable of proposing is that the reason is the absolute point at which the reality and Notion get reconciled with each other. As Hegel (1974, pp. 178-179, 2004, pp. 139-140) clearly defines it,

Now that the self-consciousness is Reason, its hitherto negative relation to otherness turns round into a positive relation. Up till now it has been concerned only with its independence and freedom, concerned to save and maintain itself for itself at the expense of the *world*, or of its own actuality, both of which appeared to it as the negative of its essence. But as Reason, assured of itself, it is at peace with them, and can endure them; for it is certain that it is itself reality, or that everything actual is none other than itself; its thinking is itself directly actuality, and thus its relationship to the latter is that of idealism. Apprehending itself in this way, it is as if the world had for it only now come into being; previously it did not understand the world; it desired it and worked on it, withdrew from it into itself and abolished it as an existence on its own account, and its own self *qua* consciousness – both as consciousness of the world as essence and as consciousness of its nothingness. In thus apprehending itself, after losing the grave of its truth, after the abolition of its actuality is itself abolished, and after the singleness

of consciousness is for it in itself Absolute Essence, it discovers the world as *its* new real world, which in its permanence holds an interest for it which previously lay only in its transiency; for the *existence* of the world becomes for self-consciousness its own *truth* and *presence*; it is certain of experiencing only itself therein.

Hegel, at this point, strives to tell us that the self-consciousness turns into the reason, and, of course, its negative relation to the world and the independent object is also converted to a positive relation in which we see that the actuality and the truth come into appearance as nothing other than the rationality itself. Thus, we directly come to understand that this is what Hegel calls the absolute idealism. The state of the self-consciousness in desire, and also in independence and dependence of self-consciousness, or in lordship and bondage, is obviously a result of the understanding the world as a negation of the self-consciousness through both of the independent object and the other self-consciousness. However, with the reason, the self-consciousness seems to turn out to be a positive combination of the object and the consciousness. The self-consciousness as reason now experiences nothing other than itself as reality and actuality of the unitedness of the world and its own self. According to Heidegger (1970, pp. 38-39),

Knowledge detaches itself from the relation to the objects. Mental representation, knowing itself as its own provider, detaches itself (*absolvere*) from its need to find sufficient certainty for itself in the one-sided representation of the object. ... This self-detachment of self-certainty from its relation to the object is its absolutum.

The reason why we stop our investigation of the experience of self-consciousness is obviously nothing else than its unification with actuality, or, better, its becoming the reality itself. As Hegel clearly and succinctly declaims above, what the self-consciousness as the reason experience is nothing else than itself. That is the absolute point of the concept of experience in terms of the consciousness and self-consciousness. We notice that the experience of consciousness has begun as the experience of totally different presentation of immediate object, then, it has turned into a negative relation to the object and self-consciousness itself, and, at the end of the day, it finally has come into appearance as a merely related experience of itself to itself. In this sense, we have to move to the results of that kind of understanding of the concept of experience in Hegel's system of philosophy.

2.2. Experience in Absolute Idealism

Under this title, we are going to examine the results of the concept of experience and the junction points between experience and some other concepts in Hegel's system of philosophy. By doing so, what we plan is nothing but the improvement of our understanding to find an inclusionary way to discover the concept of experience in its philosophical sense. At the same time, by doing so, we aim to become capable of covering the subject in conceptual sense as well as that we have done in chronological or systematic way. Before this part, we have, to a great extent, focused mainly on the experience through an examination proper to Hegel's way of proceeding the subject matters. From now onward, we are going to discuss subject matters which are, respectively, negation, temporality, condition of the subject, internality, organicism, dialectics, substance, teleology, and mediation.

2.2.1. Negation as the Experience

As we have already seen, in each moment, the experience of the consciousness comes into appearance as a negation of what is present. In this sense, the negation is both the reason and the result of the experience. Through use of negation, the consciousness come to know what is deficient in each moment; at the same time, it means nothing other than an experience in Hegel's system of philosophy. At the end of the moment, the consciousness, again, discerns that the result of that experience is for it, of necessity, the reoccurrence of the moment in which a new negation process has to be taken as its main executive action. On the other hand, what we should claim is that this relationship between the negation and the experience depicts nothing but their absolute and inevitable importance in Hegel's system. In this sense, the experience has to be included in each moment as well as the negation. Thus, the negativity in Hegel's system becomes the consciousness' experience of negation. Without thinking of the negation as an experience, it is impossible to think of lifting the consciousness up to the next moment. In this sense, the result of the experience is another negation and vice versa. As a result, the negation leads to an experience of the consciousness through differentiation and rejection of that differentiation made before. It can be also proposed that the relation of experience to the negation is the relation of consciousness

to its moments. Rather than claiming a superiority of any of these two concepts over the other one, it should definitely be better to declaim that they are overlapped and competent to exist with each other.

2.2.2. The Experience as Temporality or Being against Lifeless Formalism

Another issue is that the experience absolutely presents, with the assistance of the negation, a temporality in Hegel's system of philosophy. As it can be expected, Hegel's system resembles the philosophical system of Spinoza. However, the most important difference between these two systems is obviously the aspect of temporality. As Bumín (2013, pp. 15-17) clearly depicts, in Spinozian system, we are not able to find a spark of the time or velocity; on the contrary, in Hegel's system, temporality makes an appearance and presents itself as the milestone of the latter to turn out to be a system in which human being's living and history become a decisive part of philosophy. The problematic point of Spinozian philosophy is its geometrical approach to the existence, an approach which is able to think of the existence in a unity; however, it lacks the most important component of any kind of thinking, or, of philosophy, that is, what is the missing point in his philosophy is temporality which directly refers to the finiteness of the human being. In this sense, unlike Hegel, Spinoza excludes the finiteness, and also infinity as a result of the former, by banishing temporality from philosophy. At the same time, Hegel's intervention in this issue takes place through his benefit from nothing other than the experience. The concept of experience is obviously the main theme of temporality. As we have already given the clues of that issue implicitly, for instance, in the end of understanding, consciousness notices, through its experience, that the structure of infinity becomes the main decisive point of the self-consciousness' understanding of itself. In addition to this, the temporality is, even if it is not in Heidegger's understanding of this concept but in the sense of velocity, directly the result of the experience. Without experience which might have either denotational or connotational meaning, it is impossible to think of temporality in regard to human's activity, and, to depict the moments of knowing in terms of absolute negation and activity of the consciousness. Thus, by doing so, we should easily come to claim that the experience is the first and necessary condition of temporality and the subject.

2.2.3. The Experience as a Necessary Condition of the Subject

The experience absolutely results in understanding the construction of the subject in Hegel's system. As it is known, the main subject in Hegel's system is obviously the Geist. When we think of the previous moments of the Geist, we utterly arrive at the conclusion in which the main predominant concept of the Reason as the content and form of the Geist is nothing else than the experience. The Reason cannot be separated from the consciousness; that is, the constructive and basic unit of the consciousness is, at the same time, that of the Reason. Thus, what we, at this point, notice is that the experience is the absolute constituent of the Geist as the absolute knowing, or the unitedness of the knowing and existence.

Beside this, without the concept of experience, it is impossible to think of a subject. The subject is not merely a knower in regard to the result of experience, rather than this, the subject is obviously an experiencer by following its own desire, or, better, its intention. Hence, all of what the consciousness intends, and separates from others, is nothing else than an implicit desire to experience. Again, it is both the reason and result of the experience. The consciousness intends what it intends as a result of its experience, since its frame to choose is limited to what it confronts with; on the other hand, it is also obvious that the intention of the consciousness can give novel experience to it because of the fact that the consciousness can provide itself its improvement merely by doing so. Hence, both of them, namely the reason for and result of the intention of the consciousness, are ultimately shaped by the very effectuation of the experience. At this point, it might be beneficial for us to remind ourselves the position of the experience in sense-certainty as a reason for and result of intention. It should be asked how, in the very first moment of the sense-certainty, the consciousness has an experience as a reason to intend. The answer is as basic as the presence of the consciousness: at the very beginning, the consciousness both intends and experiences, that is, they cannot be separated; however, the experience is necessary for the consciousness to be present, otherwise, we could have thought of a blind consciousness which had been able to stay closed and not to think of anything. Thus, the experience is the presence of the consciousness. Where does this experience happen?

2.2.4. Internality of the Experience or Involvement of the Experience in This-World

The experience, as necessary as the consciousness, makes an appearance in this-world which means that the consciousness and the experience, of necessity, unfold themselves in the unity of idea and the material. In this sense, it is impossible to think of that, without the experience, the consciousness can exist, and vice versa. Of course, as a result of this kind of understanding, both of them unite our internal and external world. There is no asymmetrical relationship between their presentations of themselves. In this sense, Hegel's vantage point is quite differentiated from the idealism of Plato in terms of their approaches to dualism (Orman, 2015, p. 123). In this context, what we should claim is that being-in-the-world of both the consciousness and experience is obviously very beneficial for human beings to allow the possibility of knowing to come into appearance. Otherwise, when we think of two absolutely different worlds for our knowing and our existence, then, it becomes impossible to get to know anything, and, the connection between the particular and the universal becomes destroyed by the very essence of this kind of thinking. In this sense, the discourse upon this-world does not mean that we are prone to conceive the experience in a materialist way of understanding as opposed to the rationalist way of thinking. Rather than this, we are likely to lift this reactionist understanding up to the level of idealism, since, in both of them, namely in materialist and rationalist views, it is impossible to think of knowing and the existence connected to each other, and, to establish a ground for the relation of the particular to the universal, and vice versa. In this sense, the experience is nothing other than the dissolvent of these polarised approaches, and, it has to come into appearance in a unity, or, in this-world, of which we have to be aware. What should be the next is obviously nothing other than the connection as a result of the experience in this-world.

2.2.5. Organicism as Supplement of the Experience

The experience in this-world directly leads to a unificatory understanding of the organicism. Organicism is obviously the result of the experience in regard to its unificatory nature by which the consciousness becomes well-aware of the reality of

itself as a part of this-world, and, becomes, for sure, certain of the reliability of its reality. In organic understanding of the world, when the consciousness glances at anything, what it discerns is the reflection of the universe on that particular thing. In this sense, as we have already seen this in actions of the Reason, what it sees is nothing other than itself, since it is one of the reflections of the world as being-for-other. The experience is, as we have now come to know, the basic reason for this kind of reflection. At the very beginning of the consciousness' sensual reception, it has not been aware of that reflection; however, at the end of the day, it has come to know that that is none other than itself and the reflection of the universe on itself, and on the thing. If it had been different from that kind of occurrence, then, it would have been quite fragmented in terms of annihilation of the experience and, thus, knowing. As a result, what we see is that the presence of the organicism makes knowing possible, and, that the concept of experience is the unique way to notice this organicism. At the same time, this understanding of the organicism which comes into appearance with the consciousness' unfolding action as experience is an attempt to turn the connection between determinations into necessary and dialectical one.

2.2.6. The Experience as a Means that Makes Dialectics Possible

As we have already seen, the experience presents itself as it is the constituent of knowing in this-world through an organic understanding of the structure of determinations. This experience, again, necessarily causes the dialectical relations between things and the consciousness to be possible. Without the concept of experience which allows the consciousness to know both the object and itself, it seems to be impossible to get to know determinations, and, thus, the Notion as an absolute knowing. In this context, when we think of the concept of experience as the constituent part of knowing, dialectics is utterly caused by the competence of the consciousness which sees the determinations in relation to each other. The experience as an action of the consciousness in this-world completely refers to unfolding of the teleological and meaningful unity of world. Thus, it does mean that the relationships between determinations have to be present in regard to making the life meaningful, and, the experience is the necessary condition to know this dialectical and necessary connections of the determinations. At the same time, dialectical relations of

determinations consist in moments which imply each level of lifting up, and, negation as both the cause and result of the experience allows the consciousness to undergo all of those moments to arrive at absolute knowing. In addition to this, we should exactly declaim that the progression of consciousness is also included in dialectical system of Hegel's philosophy. Thus, what we witness is directly the rise of the consciousness from the very beginning to the last level, from the consciousness in sense-certainty to the Reason as a unity of what is either internal or external. At the same time, in this-world, the experience seems to cause the consciousness to turn out to be a Reason which is the absolute substance of the world.

2.2.7. Substance as both the Absolute and Absolute Holding of the Experience

Substance is nothing other than the Being which is able to be without coming from any cause, thus, by itself. Where the experience brings the consciousness is the Reason which seems to be the Absolute in the universe. In this context, the Reason becomes both the Absolute itself and the experience-holder. As we have already seen it above, the Reason experiences nothing but itself, since it in itself is everything, and, it is apparently the unity in which we both know and exist as well. What it does mean is that the Reason comes into appearance as the truth and the convergence of knowing and existence. In this sense, what we should claim is that substance is obviously nothing else than the Reason itself. At the same time, what makes the consciousness turn out to be the Reason is nothing but its ability to experience. Of course, this does not merely mean that the substance allows the experience to come into appearance; as well as this, the experience is absolutely one of the necessary components of substance. Without the concept of experience, substance is not able to be itself. In this sense, the experience is the key figure, when we desire to focus narrowly on substance and the Reason as the Absolute. Appearance of the experience is obviously the main point at which we become capable of discerning the process through which the consciousness turns into the Reason, and, turns out to be tied to the unity of the particular with the universal. The experience is what makes substance be itself, and, comes into appearance within the action of substance. Thus, at the same time, the experience provides substance the possibility to be enriched by progressing on the road to absolute knowing, a road apparently paved by *telos*.

2.2.8. Contribution of the Experience to the Teleological System of the Absolute Idealism

When we think of teleological system of the absolute idealism, we utterly come to know that competence of the consciousness to have experience does, in fact, bring it into the realm of absolute knowing. This kind of improvement of the consciousness which directly leads to the Geist as the Reason of the world derives from nothing but the experience. The experience, thus, turns out to be a contributor to the very essence of the Hegel's absolute idealism, namely to the teleological foundation of his system. In this context, we immediately discern that the experience makes the consciousness get to know what the Notion of any determination presents. Knowing the Notion is, at the same time, to know absolutely. In this sense, the experience is able both to provide the consciousness some clues about how to know, and to get to know the *telos* veiled within the Notion. As a result, the experience causes the consciousness to get to know the Notion; by doing so, the consciousness, which, when it becomes able to know the Notion, turns into the Reason, at the end of the day, comes to know the teleological construction of any determinations. Thus, the experience does immediately affect the unfolding of the Notion by giving the consciousness chance to have actions to know, and, does mediately assist the unfolding of teleological system in Hegel's philosophy by giving the consciousness the unveiled Notion. When we think of whole moments of the consciousness, then, we might easily call its development by this word group 'from puddle to the ocean.'

2.2.9. From Puddle to the Ocean or from Immediacy to Mediation

The whole moments of the consciousness to reach the absolute knowing might easily be understood as the processes of it from puddle to the ocean. What do we mean by claiming so? First of all, it should strictly be considered that the structure of the classification in Hegel's system of philosophy is obviously based on proving the lack of certainty, and on fixing the concept of certainty. In this sense, the whole process starts with so-called 'the most certain way' of knowing. Of course, Hegel never defends this kind of approach to the method of knowing; however, he probably desires to show to what extent this kind of understanding is deficient in the way of absolute

knowing. At this point, what we see is that the most popular way of knowing of which empiricists think as the most certain one is, in fact, is the most deceptive way of knowing. It apparently resembles a puddle, that is, it seems to present an easier way to conceive what the consciousness encounters with; however, the reality is much more different than this, that is to say, for consciousness, it seems to be impossible to grasp what it encounters with truly. Thus, what the consciousness face with is totally opposed to what it has expected in its first glance at a specific puddle or the sense-certainty. On the contrary, for consciousness, the ocean is clear and full of reality, since there is nothing other than the ocean itself in ocean, even if it might sometimes be risky and dangerous. The ocean totally resembles the life itself and the level on which the consciousness becomes aware of itself and its necessary relation to the universal. The second reason for us to use this kind of argument in resemblance is obviously depicted in the title. Hegel's system of philosophy, with the invaluable contribution of the concept of experience to it, is nothing else than a prolonged process from the state of immediateness to that of mediated thinking. In the state of immediateness, there is no certain view about the object, even if it seems to be the most certain way to know; on the contrary, in the state of mediation, we see that the certainty of the object and the consciousness' understanding of itself are lifted up to the level of knowing. The reason why we call this widening of power of the consciousness as 'from puddle to the ocean' is obviously nothing other than following the purpose of Hegel's system of philosophy, namely absolute knowing or *Weltgeist*. In other words, puddle unclearly refers to what it means in terms of plurality of it; whilst the ocean has to be quite specific in regard to its totality and comprehensiveness.

CHAPTER 3

IN LIEU OF CONCLUSION

As far as we have gone deep into the concept of experience in Hegel's system of philosophy, we utterly realise that the concept of experience is what makes Hegel's philosophy quite different from preceding systems of philosophy, that the structure of Hegel's philosophy is, in the narrowest sense, based strictly on the twofold meaning of the concept of experience, and, that the experience is obviously one of the essential components of being a subject, or, better, of ego of any subject.

By proposing the concept of experience as a main component of his system, Hegel completely differs his system from the preceding systems in both ontological and epistemological senses. The objections of Hegel and the other German idealists to Kant's philosophy were mainly based on Kant's thing-in-itself, or *Ding-an-sich*, and with the assistance of the concept of experience, Hegel became able to overcome this difficulty in which we directly witness the distinction between both of epistemology and ontology, and, of the subject and the external world. Despite the fact that we might overemphasise the differentiation of Hegel's philosophy from preceding systems, we have to say over and over again that the concept of experience should be understood as the most important and effective meaning in differentiation of Hegel's system from others in regard to taking the human activity into consideration, and, to thinking of the consciousness and its object as they encounter with each other in a totality. In this context, the inclusion of the concept of experience in the consciousness directly causes a totality through which we become capable of understanding the reality and idea together. What it does mean is the destruction of both Cartesian and empiricist systems of philosophy as well as the annihilation of the alleged unification of the externality and internality in Kantian philosophy; however, we know that the destruction is, at the end of the day, a reestablishment of thinking in a Hegelian sense, like that each beginning is an end, and, vice versa as *finis ab origine pendet* meaning that the end hangs down from the start. As Kılıçaslan (2015, p. 155) puts it, the Geist should be understood in Hegel's system as a particular way of the concept of experience, thus,

they are inseparable from one another. Thus, what Hegel's understanding of the concept of experience presents us is the totality of knowing and the existence, the subject and object, the internal and external world.

Among our claims given along this article, the most important one is obviously that the concept of experience in Hegel's system of philosophy should be divided into two parts which are the denotational meaning and connotational meaning of the experience. The former involves the consciousness' immediate reception and perception of the externality, whilst the latter refers to the consciousness' abstract and complex thinking process and its thinking of itself as its object as well as its comprehension of the itself reflected upon the other and vice versa. The twofold meaning of the experience consummately seems to unveil the distinction between the self-consciousness and consciousness, thus, results in the differentiation of the subject, as an existent which is able to live among other people in accordance with a constitution (*Grundgesetz*) as an ethical way to live together, from the subject which is not subject yet because of the fact that the latter is both over-aware and unaware of itself. In this sense, the second subject resembles a child in its early times in the world, that is, it presumes that the world boils down to it. This kind of infantile understanding shows us that the child, as well as our second-type subject, highlights both the animality of it as its divineness in the eyes of it, and, inability of it to do what it desires. These two poles of our second-type subject should be the result of the lack of the second meaning of the concept of experience in that subject. Otherwise, it is supposed to have an experience of socialisation, and, the idealisation of the life through the recognition of the otherness and getting recognised by other self-consciousnesses. In fact, the second-type subject of us merely focuses on its closedness in itself. Thus, this subject, so to speak, has self-indulgence, and, reduces itself to the animality as an immediate state of closedness. Consequently, beside its epistemological implications, our distinction between the meanings of the concept of experience assists us to unveil the difference of 'openness' of the subject from closedness, or animality, of the second-type, or unimproved, subject. At the same time, it might be claimed that this distinction between two meanings of the concept of experience does extraordinarily serve for our intention to unveil the implicit distinction between the nature and culture. In this sense, what we should strictly claim is that the nature is gradually purified by the improvement of the culture taking place through the walking of the consciousness towards the Reason as

the unity of the authenticity of the reality with the competence of the consciousness to have an effect on it.

At the same time, our proposition to take the concept of experience as it has twofold meaning in itself inevitably results in a differentiation between epistemological positioning of the egos, which means the competence to differ itself from the others, in the systems of Hegel and other philosophers, especially German idealists. Thus, it becomes a litmus paper showing us which one of the famous thinkers cares about experiencing the world, and, how we can be able to make a separation between the closed and open philosophical systems. As it is expected, the ego in Hegel's system of philosophy comes into appearance in the second meaning of the experience. True, it is possible to see sparks of the ego in the first meaning; however, as we mentioned above, during the first meaning, the consciousness does not have any desire and distinction between the other and itself theoretically. In this context, Hegel's system particularly differs itself from Fichte's system based on absoluteness of the ego. In this sense, Fichte's 'absolute ego' posits itself before the beginning of the experience, even though it cannot be understood as the conscious activity of it. Thus, the appearance of the consciousness needs an opposition between the ego and non-ego, an opposition which is created by the absolute ego (Copleston, 2003, pp. 45-47). Moreover, the distinction between both the ego and non-ego, and, internality and externality is directly put on the stage by the absolute ego (Albayrak, 2018, p. 50). However, as we have already seen, without presence of the consciousness, it is impossible to think of the ego as ego. According to Fichte (2005, p. 198),

Consequently – a very important conclusion, and the only possible one if appearance itself to be traced back to reason – appearance itself is inaccessible only to me, to the 'I' projected absolutely through appearance; it itself is a self-making of reason, of reason's primordial effect, and indeed as an *I*. (The imprint of reason's effect rests solely in the *I*, as such).

The ego is, in Fichte's system, confined to itself as a null circle, and, lapses into the abyss of vicious circle. Even if we might approve it as the null position, or the origin, of the ego, then, we directly encounter with the problem of experience of consciousness of the ego. In this sense, the ego which is posited by the absolute ego merely stares at the otherness as immediate contents of the consciousness, that is, it has to be stuck in the middle of the first meaning of experience. In this context, it is not open to turning out to be another, to having the ability to see itself as its object, to being integrated into the world; thus, as we have already mentioned above, it turns out

to be the second-type subject having no competence to be among, and together with, others. In this sense, there is an irreducible difference between the egos in Hegel's system and Fichte's philosophy. However, this should be treated as it is the subject of another inquiry. Thus, at this point, we necessarily confine ourselves to manifesting this spark of the difference between foundations of the ego in Fichte's and Hegel's systems as an important subject in regard to conceiving the totality of internality and externality.

Ultimately, while we put an end to our article, we need to recap briefly what we have reached throughout our article. With our distinction between the meanings of the concept of experience, we come to know that Hegel's system of philosophy differs itself from the Cartesian and empiricist approaches through the first meaning of the experience, or, namely the experience of the pre-self-consciousness, and, from philosophical systems of German idealists, especially from Fichte's system, by placing the ego on the top of the concept of experience. Furthermore, Hegel's use of the concept of experience as being proper to our distinction directly leads to the possibility to think of two different levels of subjectivity, as we have already covered them with the terms second-type and first-type subjects. Of course, these are the results of twofold structure of meaning of the experience as the motor power of dialectics in Hegel's thought. As Gadamer (1976, p. 74) clearly depicts, "Hegel's dialectic of master and servant seems to delineate a valid truth: if there is to be freedom, then first of all the chain attaching us to things must be broken. The path of mankind to universal prosperity is not as such the path to the freedom of all. Just as easily, it could be a path to the unfreedom of all." The end is the beginning, and vice versa.

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