

**IBN HALDUN UNIVERSITY  
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
DEPARTMENT OF  
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**MASTER THESIS**

**THE MONARCHY BETWEEN HISTORICAL  
LEGITIMACY AND COMPLEX CHALLENGES:  
HOW DID JORDAN SURVIVE THE ARAB SPRING?**

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**THESIS SUPERVISOR  
ASSIST. PROF. HEBA RAOUF MOHAMED EZZAT**

**ISTANBUL, 2021**

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**by**

**LEEN HOSAM ALI GHARAIBEH**

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fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in  
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APPROVAL PAGE

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts Political Science and International Relations.

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I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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## ÖZ

### TARİHİ MEŞRUTİYET İLE KARMAŞIK ZORLUKLAR ARASINDA MONARŞİ: ÜRDÜN ARAP BAHARI'NI NASIL AŞTI?

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2011 yılında birçok Arap ülkesinde Arap Baharı dalgası olarak bilinen bir dizi gösteri gerçekleşti. Tunus'tan başlayan bu dalga ardından Mısır, Yemen, Suriye, Libya ve Ürdün'e yayıldı. Arap baharı gösterileri daha ilk aylarında Tunus ve Mısır'da demokratik geçişe, Suriye, Yemen ve Libya'da ise bir iç savaşa ve dramatik bir devlet başarısızlığına yol açtı. Ancak, Ürdün'ün baharı daha az dramatik görünüyordu. Ne mutlak bir şiddet, ne de bir rejim değişikliği yaşandı. Ürdün'ün karşı karşıya olduğu şey, onu 1989'da başlayan ve henüz gün yüzüne çıkmayan demokratikleşme projesinin döngüsüne tekrar sokmuştu. Bu tez makalesi Ürdün'de devletin kuruluş aşamasından Arap Baharı'na kadar devlet kuruluşunun köklerini incelemekte, monarşinin meşruiyetini şekillendiren olayları vurgulamakta ve daha sonra monarşinin meşruiyetini sürdürmek ve istikrarını korumak için izlediği araç ve stratejileri analiz etmektedir. Son olarak, bu makale Ürdün'deki monarşinin ne demokratik ne de otoriter olarak düşünülemeyeceğini; bunun yerine bölgede istikrarını ve devlet içinde meşruiyetini devam ettirebilmek için çoklu stratejiler arasında manevra yaptığını ve fırsatlarını değerlendirdiğini savunmaktadır. Bu tezmakalesi, Ürdün'ün iç siyasetini etkileyen uluslararası ve bölgesel düzeylerdeki politikalarının karmaşıklığını ortaya koymaktadır. Makalede tarihsel süreç yönetimi

izlenmekte ve Ürdün örneğinde meşruiyet ve devlet iktidarı kavramlarını uygun bir teorik bağlamda ele almak için Max Weber ve Michael Mann'a atıfta bulunmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Arap baharı, Demokrasi, Gus, Meşruiyet, Monarşi, Otorite



## ABSTRACT

### THE MONARCHY BETWEEN HISTORICAL LEGITIMACY AND COMPLEX CHALLENGES: HOW DID JORDAN SURVIVE THE ARAB SPRING?

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In 2011 a series of demonstrations came across many Arab countries like a snowball in what was known as the wave of the Arab Spring. Starting in Tunisia, then Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Libya, and Jordan followed. This wave has led to democratic transition in Tunisia and Egypt in the very early months of the demonstrations, and a civil war and a dramatic state failure in Syria, Yemen, and Libya. However, Jordan's spring seemed to be less dramatic. No absolute violence happened nor did regime change occur. What Jordan faced was putting it in the loop of the project of democratization that had started in 1989 and yet did not come into the light. In this paper, I show the roots of the state establishment in Jordan and highlight the events that shaped the legitimacy of the monarchy and then analyze the tools and strategies the monarchy followed to sustain its legitimacy and preserve its stability, from the early establishment of the state to the Arab Spring. Finally, this paper argues that the monarchy in Jordan can neither be considered democratic or authoritarian, rather it maneuvers between multiple strategies and seized opportunities to remain stable in the region and legitimate in the state. This paper demonstrates the complexity of Jordanian politics on the international and regional levels that influences its internal politics. This paper takes the historical process method and refers to Max Weber and Mich

00e0a09+1 Mann to address the concepts of legitimacy and state power in the case of Jordan within a proper theoretical context.

**Keywords:** Arab spring, Authority, Democracy, Legitimacy, Monarchy, Power



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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

The interest in taking Jordan as a case study in the discipline of politics has risen after the wave of Arab spring in 2011. In contrast to other Arab regimes, the monarchy in Jordan did not lose its legitimacy and preserved stability and responded to the demonstrations with quick political and economic reforms. The demonstrations in Jordan took a more peaceful shape and did not witness serious violence and oppression. Countries like Egypt and Syria, have experienced different waves of the Arab spring and witnessed an overthrow of the existing political regimes. The demonstrations in Syria were oppressed by military forces and political oppression. More than two hundred thousand civilians were killed according to the Syrian Network of Human Rights, and over six million were displaced by the year 2021. The monarchical regime in Jordan has never used a high level of violence or drove the state into war. The political and social dimensions in Jordan enjoyed a level of stability and legitimacy that regimes like the Ba'th regime in Syria did not enjoy or achieve. Comparing Jordan's situation to a less violent experience, like Egypt, also reveals some major differences in the dynamic of powers in each state. Since its establishment as a republic, presidential elections have been held in Egypt with the participation of all political parties. Surprisingly, the Muslims Brotherhood won the elections and entered power through the ballot boxes in an Arab precedent. This has caused worries for other Arab regimes and political systems, yet it has encouraged the people and given them hope of what can be achieved by democracy. Despite that the Jordanian monarchy had stable relations with the most active political party; the Muslims Brotherhoods, the monarchy still had some concerns regarding where this all was going. With the demonstrations taking place in Jordan in 2011, concerns and worries about the future of the reign of King Abdullah arose. There were some concerns on whether Abdullah II would be the last king to rule Jordan or not. The Arab spring did not seem to be the real threat to the stability of the monarchy. Yet, some sources of the monarch's internal legitimacy were under threat. On one hand, The Transjordanian tribes, who are

considered the backbone of the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan, formed a socio-political movement across the country named 'Al-Hirak' in 2010. This movement created a shock to the regime who expected full and permanent loyalty and obedience from the tribes. As the regime considered tribes as the most stable internal social element in supporting the legitimacy of the monarchy. This socio-political movement (Al-Hirak) has reopened a room for the tribes to be part of the opposition without the need to be part of a political party. In short words, the tribes had a chance to turn from pro-government to an opposition. On the other hand, the economic crisis in Jordan was not going any place better for Jordanians. In the past ten years, Jordan witnessed the birth of new political parties and social movements under a series of political reformations under the reign of Abdullah II. The years 2018 and 2019 witnessed massive and frequent demonstrations in Jordan, and cooperation between many socio-political elements that had never been on the same page for many years. The Islamic Action Front who enjoys a majority of Palestinians origins, Al-Hirak who are mainly Jordanian tribes, the Teachers union in Jordan, new semi-Islamic parties, the leftists, and the liberals, we're all on the same page when it came to demanding political and economic reformations despite their different approaches.

On another level, Jordan's economic crisis weakened its diplomatic relations and placed it in the bandwagon position with the granting countries. In 2018 the unemployment rate reached 18.6% of the population, and the trade deficit of the same year decreased to 3,312.3 Million JOD. With the Trump administration, Jordan's monarchy was under great pressure regarding the peace process. In 2017, the US administration proposed what is so-called the "deal of the century" as a solution for the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. The proposal was mainly to give Palestinians money in exchange for their lands in occupied Palestine 'Israel', and help Jordan financially to welcome more Palestinians in its land. The deal offered Jordan a key solution to its economic crisis. However, accepting this offer for the monarchy means giving up one of the most important pillars of its legitimacy, which is supporting establishing the Palestinian state. Taking into account the huge population of Palestinian origins of Jordanians who see the Hashemite monarchy as legitimate. King Abdullah was not to risk his legitimacy in exchange for a promise of a good solution to the economic crisis. Moreover, Abdullah II was quoted saying that

'Jordan is not Palestine' (Beevor, 2018), And that he will not accept any solution that does not guarantee the Palestinians a full right in establishing their independent state on the borders of 1967. The way the monarchy in Jordan placed the Palestinian issue in its politics had, to some extent, been one of the tools of the monarchy's political legitimacy. Most of the studies that examined the Jordanian case -within and after the wave of the Arab spring -, studied the current politics of Jordan, analyzed the state-society relations, and followed the political and economic reforms done by King Abdullah. In this paper, I examine the tools of legitimacy and argue that the origins of these tools are what preserved the monarchy in Jordan for now. Following the historical events since the establishment of Jordan allows us to understand the origins of the tools and pillars the monarchy in Jordan relied on building its legitimacy.

The Hashemite house in Jordan is not Jordanian, they settled in Jordan after Prince Abdullah bin Al Hussein, the son of Sharif Mecca, came to Transjordan (currently Jordan) under the flag of the Arab revolt against the Ottoman empire. The foundation of what is now Jordan, in its current borders and inhabitants, was first organized, and legitimately established by Prince Abdullah I. This historical dimension explains one of the pillars of legitimacy that the monarchy in Jordan relies on, which is that they were the founders of the state in Jordan in the modern world. In chapter 2; Roots of the state, I draw on the prince's relationship with the British mandate and different social elements that Prince Abdullah I used in sustaining his throne.

Moreover, studying the historical events will allow us to examine the dynamics of power and relations between the monarchy, social elements, regional and international powers that had all shaped the current politics of Jordan, which all will be discussed in chapter two. The political legitimacy in Jordan was established through state institutions and relations between the monarchs and the state institutions and people. The power, as Foucault sees it, is constructed everywhere around us. In this chapter, I answer the question of how the monarchy exercised power to build legitimacy through three main strategies: first building loyal institutions, like the army and the General Intelligence Department. Second, by conducting the social elements in the Jordanian society, and

creating a balance between them. This was remarkably done through crafting the Jordanian identity. And lastly, exercising the power through the constitution.

Religion has played an essential role besides economy and politics all over the world in many countries and monarchies. Looking into the case of Great Britain as an example, the monarch gains their legitimacy by the Church, and monarchs are seen as 'divine'. In contrast, monarchies in the modern Arab world are not 'divine' rather they are seen as the most legitimate power to rule. Because of its wide and important role in building and sustaining the monarchy's legitimacy in Jordan, I examine the religious legitimacy concept in Chapter two and discuss it through two categories. First, the elements of the religious legitimacy in Jordan. Second, institutionalizing religious legitimacy. Analyzing the elements of religious legitimacy guides us to understand how the state benefited from this categorization and built institutions that target these elements to enhance its religious legitimacy.

In the second chapter, I show the origins of the state and use Webers' theory to draw on how each king used different types of authority; traditional, legal, and charismatic. In chapter three, I discuss the political legitimacy of the monarchy of Jordan by analyzing its exercising power. I refer to Foucault's concepts of power and governmentality to examine how the monarchy exercises power through different state institutions (in its attempt to impose an identity, ideology, and uses of religion) to build an integrated vision of its internal political legitimacy. Moreover, in comparison to other countries from the region, I view the relationship between the monarchy in Jordan and different social groups. However, the last chapter argues that the mechanisms and tools of building internal legitimacy do not necessarily secure the Monarchy's legitimacy and stability. In this chapter, I outline the contemporary challenges for Jordan; youth, immigrants, regional role, and importantly the water and gas conflicts. Thereby, I show that there are other challenges at stake that directly threaten the legitimacy and stability of the monarchy in Jordan. The second and the third chapter shows how some tools of legitimacy were transferred into pillars and were used by different monarchs to serve stability.

Nonetheless, other tools faded over time and were replaced by other modern concepts that served the stability of the monarchy.

### **1.1. Jordan in Middle Eastern Studies**

The interest in focusing on the Middle East and the rise of Middle Eastern studies was titled to the interest of the American scholars and institutions in the region after the Second World War. Following the collapse of the Ottoman empire, new nation-states were formed under the mandate powers, and a rise of concepts like liberalism, nationalism, Islamism, communism, and secularism took place until the mid-1900. The Middle East became a region of interest to the U.S foreign policy while it was expanding its power and fields of influence in the world after the Cold War in 1991. Expert scholars in this field, as Timothy Mitchell, couples The United States' high interest in Middle East studies with its interest in practicing power and governmentality over the region, and thus understanding the forces that shape the region alongside foreseeing key events in the region is a priority to achieve this goal. Mitchell tracks the historical log of studies and attempts to study the region, and points out the ineffectiveness of a single discipline amongst social, economical, and political sciences to propose a valid theoretical framework for the region, in addition to the historical inability of interdisciplinary analysis of the region (Mitchell, 2018).

Scholars like Nazih Ayoubi and Edward Said offered the field of Middle Eastern studies a more holistic point of view. Both of them alongside Mitchell challenged the western approach towards the Middle East. While Said's main focus was derived from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and suggested orientalism as the suitable concept to understand the reality of the Middle Eastern politics and field of study, Ayoubi was more interested in examining the contemporary politics of the Middle East through understanding the politics and state formation of the states of the region by analyzing the state-society relations (Ayoubi, 1995). Through Ayoubi's work, it can be comprehended that small states like Jordan and Lebanon matter to understand the contemporary politics of the Middle East. despite the lack of natural resources, relatively small population, and a weak economy,

Jordan has been an essential player in the political scene in the Middle East, especially in the Palestinian cause and Israeli-Arab conflict. Despite that Ayoubi's work looks into Jordan as part of the collective Levant, Jordan still enjoys singularity in its internal and foreign politics that have positioned it in a sensitive place in Middle Eastern politics. The wave of the Arab Spring has shed the light on Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria as states that have witnessed a massive change during and after the wave. Tunisia and Egypt witnessed a change in the political system and steps towards real democracy despite that each has abolished the democratic change in different times. The last was in Tunisia in the summer of 2011 when the elected president Qais ben Saed suspended the work of the parliament and took over the administration after removing the prime minister. Jordan was a case that interested many scholars of Middle Eastern studies because it has enjoyed stability while it was surrounded by countries that have used violence and oppression towards local demonstration, and ousting democratic changes. What would help understand the case of Jordan in the Middle East is to compare it with a more similar political system that lived through similar events; a country like Morocco as some scholars and researchers suggested (Cramer, 2012; Barari, 2015; Biagi, 2015; Clark, J. A., 2018). According to Cramer, Jordan and Morocco enjoy similar political structures and economic policies as both are monarchies and have implemented neo-liberal policies that make them more applicable for comparison. However, and despite these similarities, both countries have taken dissimilar paths in response to public protest during the Arab Spring (Cramer, 2012, pp. 3-6). In contrast to many claims in the case of Jordan that blame the economic crisis for not making it able to provide reforms unlike Morocco, Cramer disapproves and offers alternative explanations. He suggests that Morocco suffered the same economic problems which Jordan had. Therefore, the economic explanation fails to satisfy the question as to why Jordan's Monarchy was unable to strike a deal with the opposition IAF (Islamic Action Front) in contrast to Morocco's Monarchy's formation of a government with the opposition party. He offered the societal divide between East Bank Jordanians and Palestinians in Jordan as a key to understanding the reason behind the difference in the provided reforms between Morocco and Jordan (Cramer, 2012, p. 11). Another reason why Jordan is an interesting case in this field, is the uncertainty in defining the political system in Jordan. Jordan has a monarchical political system, it is considered as

an absolute monarchy by action, and a constitutional monarchy by the constitution. This dilemma goes back to many serious setbacks Jordan faced in different years. It is likely to say that the monarchical memory of democracy and political participation was not positive. In 1957 the first parliamentary government led a coup on king Hussein just a year after it practiced its powers, where the latter oppressed the coup and announced martial laws, and banned the political parties. The era of martial laws weakens democracy and the political parties (M. Lust-Okar, 2001). Jordan did not have multiparty parliamentary elections for more than 30 years when finally in 1989 the martial laws were lifted and the political parties were allowed to pursue their activities. Although the political parties pursued their activities, they were not able to form a government, and the king was able to appoint the prime minister regardless of which party won the parliamentary elections. This shows that the democratic transition in Jordan was not in any progress despite all the “goodwill” the monarchy showed in lifting the martial laws. When comparing Jordan to other countries under the wave of the Arab Spring, Jordan did not witness a change in the political system or order. Jordan was under global pressure to democratize its political sphere, yet, it was under a regional challenge to position itself in the new geopolitical order after the failure of the democratic transition in Egypt in 2013. It is challenging to study Jordan comparatively with precedents in the literature mainly due to the steady transitions Jordan went through compared to drastic events that led to democratization, regime change, or even a civil war. As it will be explained later in chapter 2 in the roots of the state, the monarchy in Jordan followed the suitable strategies for each period and conflict it has faced, whether it was democratic progress or oppression, all was to serve the stability of the state and the political system. This is precisely what makes Jordan’s politics challenging in putting it under a theoretical framework. It is more likely to say that the political system in Jordan was more interested in seizing opportunities than to have a clear agenda on what shape the monarchical system should follow. Therefore, I was keen to understand Jordan’s case within a valid theoretical context. The wave of the Arab Spring showed that the East is experiencing different state formation and state-society relations from the West. Despite some scholars and researchers trying to understand Jordan’s case by Western theories, I argue that these understandings cannot be fully adapted and applied to Middle Eastern countries. Some may argue that Jordan can

be studied under authoritarianism. However, I believe that the history and the current politics of Jordan showed that the political system was not an absolute authoritarian system. Despite the centrality in power and having most of it in the hands of the king (appointing the prime minister, chief of General Intelligence Department, and him being the Commander in Chief of the Armed forces), the parliament could still decrease from the king's powers and the political parties could still be formed and participate in the elections. Also, the state does not own all the media. Therefore, applying authoritarianism to Jordan does not provide a full understanding of the case of Jordan. As it will be examined in the theoretical framework section, I argue that political theories can answer many parts of the politics in Jordan, but none of them can allow the researcher to adapt Jordan as a case study for these theories. Therefore, I believe that the methodology of this research is what makes this research answer the question of legitimacy and power in Jordan.

## **1.2. Methodology**

Since the Arab Spring, many researchers aimed to study the Jordanian case in a comparative context of the Arab Spring. This has enabled the researchers to develop an argument on concepts like legitimacy, democracy, and stability. As the political phenomena of the Arab spring cannot be studied as a whole unit, taking Jordan as a case in the Arab spring enriched the literature on Jordan's internal politics. This method highlighted the similarities and differences between Jordan and other Arab countries like Egypt and Syria and provided a comparison between the political systems and their reactions towards the demonstrations and riots under the wave of the Arab spring. However, I believe that studying the case of Jordan by this method does not give a well-rounded understanding of the nature of the dynamics of power in Jordan that made it different from other Arab countries that witnessed the Arab spring. Adding to that, many of the single case studies are based on the quantitative analysis of survey data, and it is thought that in authoritarian countries this method is less likely to give a reliable outcome. Asking questions on the legitimacy of the political system is not preferred due to security and political concerns.

Therefore, I was interested in understanding why Jordan's monarchy did not fail and lose its legitimacy during the Arab Spring through using another method; history. Scholars and researchers in the political science discipline have always drawn on historical studies to find out what history can tell us about contemporary events or to track political phenomena. It is how researchers in our discipline use the tools that historical approaches offer that can help us to 'place politics in time' (Halperin and Heath, 2017, p:240). Halperin and Heath argued that tools of historical research can also help us to develop a better understanding of many political phenomena, one of them is state formation. Further, these tools help to 'explore how past structures and relations constrain and enable the present' (Halperin and Heath, p:240). By relying on historical research methods, I was able to look more in-depth at the origins of the state in Jordan and draw on how power relations and legitimacy were established. I believe that tracking the story of establishing Jordan, and tackling the significant changes and events helps to understand why the monarchy in Jordan is stable and how it gained its legitimacy. As argued in the book, historical research "enables us to incorporate a stronger temporal dimension into our analyses. The analysis becomes *temporally* situating events in their historical and cultural contexts, taking into account related series of events that unfold over time, and thinking explicitly about timing and sequence." (Halperin and Heath, 2017, p:16). Further, the temporary has formed. What matters to me in this research is to apply Historical Process Research. This method takes one case and many periods, which is what I do here. A historical process is done by examining a series of events that happened over a longer period to understand how processes change over time, and also to order events and practices then use this data as a basis for longitudinal analysis. However, what concerns a researcher in our field is to be stuck in his research process and not be able to convert the historical findings into a political analytical form.

### **1.3. Theoretical Framework**

There are plenty of theories to help study concepts like power and legitimacy in any state. In the case of legitimacy in Jordan and understanding its stability within the Arab spring wave, I was interested in looking for the most used theories on state and power to examine the case in Jordan. I looked into Max Weber's theory of legitimacy, Foucault's concept of

power and legitimacy, and finally Micheal Mann's concept of state. In looking into these theories and concepts I was interested in coming to a conclusion that can explain the case of Jordan in the Arab spring, as a regime that survived the wave and is still legitimate. Each of these theories was able to explain one dimensional or side of the case. However, none of these theories could be fully adopted or applied to Jordan.

Most modern writings on legitimacy and power refer to Foucault's work. He criticized in his work the power of modern capitalist states in all of their forms to understand how power works. Foucault's definition of governmentality looks into the relationship between the ruler and the ruled as the "conduct of the conduct," which may be understood as the "regulation of behaviors," as Bal Sokhi-Bulley prefers to describe it (Shoki-Bulley, 2014). For Foucault, governmentality is a way of thinking about how to govern. And the point of government is to "help things follow their natural course, to be a safeguard and protect the population, and to help advance the people." Moreover, he understands governmentality as a "set of relations of power and techniques that allow the relations of power to be exercised." Power, according to Foucault, is a construct, which means that it exists in all of our relationships. However, and despite Foucault's great work on power, I think it's not relevant in the case of Jordan, yet it can be referred to in some arguments with his concept of governmentality. The main criticism of Foucault's work is that he over-emphasized the technologies of power and that any resistance on the subject's part is ineffective (Borg, 2015). In Jordan's case, power relations and street politics played a huge role in imposing changes on the Monarchy in Jordan regarding authority and power post and pre-Arab spring. Therefore, examining the dynamics of power in Jordan needs to be understood through a more relevant framework. However, I refer to Foucault's main concepts on governmentality and power to highlight some of the power applications in Jordan. A much more relevant theory to examine power and legitimacy in Jordan is Max Weber's famous theory of types of authority and legitimacy and the concept of power. I wanted to examine the pillars of legitimacy in Jordan and set a framework for the case. In addition, Weber's theory on the types of legitimacy allows me to discover the types of legitimacy in Jordan within a valid context. Also, Weber's description of political power sees it as a historical force that has to establish competitive relationships and alliances

with other historical forces (J.Jiménez-Anca, p. 22, 2012). To some extent, this understanding can be applied to the Jordanian monarchy's history in ruling Jordan. While the British mandate imposed the rule of Prince Abdullah on Jordan, not all Jordanian tribes accepted his rule. Which, by consequence, posed a challenge to the prince to stabilize his rule and direct him toward relying on colonial power to secure his reign. Even though the Monarchy established its ruling under a colonial well, the Monarchs used a variety of strategies and mechanisms to build internal legitimacy and secure their reign by forming relationships with various social groups. And, to investigate this further within a theoretical framework, I looked into other modern theories on the state that could aid in framing the power dynamics in society and explaining how the origins of the state can explain political phenomena.

### **1.3.1. Max Weber's Theory of Types of the Authority of Legitimacy in Application**

In highlighting the historical events that shaped political legitimacy in Jordan and exploring how each event influenced the monarchs to use different tools and methods to build and sustain their legitimacy, I rely on the Weberian classification as the basis of legitimacy. The analysis of the origins of the relations between the monarchy and the Jordanians reveals the sources of legitimacy that were built in Jordan even before its declaration as a kingdom in 1946. Though Jordan is neither a western state nor a monarchy, Weber's theory is still valid and applies. The traditional, rational (legal), and charismatic principles of legitimacy will be applied to Jordan as a case study of the monarch's legitimacy. To elaborate more, In Weber's theory, the legitimacy of a leader is paired with the type of authority this entity exercises. He argued that there are three grounds on which the validity of their legitimacy can be based: rational, traditional, and charismatic. Rational legitimacy is also stated as having legal legitimacy and authority. Legal legitimacy is based on the existence of a set of laws that have been established to protect the body's common interest, and the person in authority, along with his staff, works objectively within the boundaries of the law to preserve it in isolation from any personal interest. And thus, obedience to the person holding the position of authority or his staff is merely the obedience of the law and not of his character. This type of authority was exercised by the former monarchs of Jordan. Prince Abdullah first formed a legislative

council and approved what is known as the "basic law." This law was the first legal document between the prince and the Transjordanians in the first years of establishment. The document preserved and legalized the prince's authority. This law was transformed into a constitution with the independence of Transjordan, and later, under the reign of King Talal, the political system in Jordan was constitutionalized to its final shape. Further details will be provided in chapter one to analyze the implications of the legal authority on the legitimacy of the monarchy in Jordan. Furthermore, linked with legal legitimacy, is the establishment of bureaucracy. Which is a hierarchical system of different units, occupied by the most competent and operating in different and limited spheres within the boundaries of the established regulations to collectively satisfy the ultimate goal of maintaining the validity of their rational legitimacy. This concept is drawn from the institutions that the monarchy in Jordan was keen to establish to ensure its loyalty to the crown.

On the contrary to rational legitimacy, traditional legitimacy is the basis of an authority exercised by a person solely by the right of traditions "as they have been handed down from the past and have always existed", and the obedience to this rule is the obedience to the person himself (Weber, 1947). Traditional authority can be exercised either with constraints due to traditional obligations, or without such constraints, and the leader is only limited to what he desires. Meanwhile, the staff within this system are usually either the leader's own family or tribe, or his most loyal retainers, and are not specifically selected for competence. To draw this example from the monarchy in Jordan, the first chapter highlights the events that helped the traditional legitimacy be one of the foundations that the monarchy in Jordan relied on. On one hand, the Arab revolution that ended up having Prince Abdullah I rule over Jordan emphasized the relationship between the prince and the Transjordanian tribes. Though Jordan's monarchs are not "divine," as the western concept of traditional legitimacy sees the monarchs, the fact that the Hashemite monarchs have lineage to Prophet Mohammad played a role in legalizing their authority. In chapter three, I refer to traditional legitimacy as "religious traditional legitimacy," as defined by Micheal C. Hudson. The reason lies in how he describes the legitimacy of Arab monarchies: it is "essentially rooted in kinship, religion, and costume"

(Hudson, 1977, 165). On the other hand, the ties between the Hashemite house and Jerusalem. Custody of the holy sites in Jerusalem was granted to Jordan's monarchy to support their legitimacy and traditional authority. As the Ottoman Sultan was no longer the custodian of the holy places after the Arab revolution took place, a legitimate Islamic symbol and authority had to take the lead. The Hashemite House found a suitable candidate. However, the Hashemite custody of the Holy Places is facing challenges as a result of contemporary Middle Eastern politics and power shifting, which will be discussed further in this paper.

Some critics of Weber's theory on Jordan argue that Weber offers an ideal theory that can't be applied to a state where its political system was founded in non-ideal circumstances. I would agree not to set Weber's theory as a theoretical framework, however, I believe that his classifications of legitimacy and types of authorities can be applied to Jordan and examined as strategies the monarchs' followed to sustain their rule as will be shown in the coming chapter.

### **1.3.2. Michael Mann on The Theory Of State**

Weber's and Foucault's concepts on power look into the state and power dynamics from very different positionalities. While Weber sees that power can be found in competition with other historical forces, Foucault sees that power is autonomous in its operations (J.Jiménez-Anca, 2012). These two perspectives allowed me to examine the case of legitimacy in Jordan from two angles, and both will be applicable on two different aspects: the history of the monarchy in Jordan and the state's institutions and social groups in their relationship with the monarchy.

However, I still had one problem. Foucault and Weber take western societies as examples and fields of observation. This makes it difficult for the researcher to fully adopt these concepts in non-western countries. Both theorists developed their concepts of power and legitimacy from an industrial social background. These industrial societies created technologies of mass production to make huge amounts of goods and products. These societies had their social structures, which led to a division of labor among workers and

factory owners (Crossman, 2019). Therefore, what Weber and Foucault and most other western theorists offer on concepts like legitimacy, power, sovereignty, and governing are very different from what an agrarian society would experience. Jordan is considered a developing country, and its establishment is historically tied to what colonial powers worked on in the region. In other words, creating the state of Jordan was not a natural social development, choice, or war (like European states), rather, it was mainly created by external forces. Moreover, the economy of Jordan was tied from the beginning to the British mandate's financial support, and after independence, it became under the policies and instructions of the World Bank Group and heavily dependent on American and European funding. In terms of ideology, Arab countries, including Jordan, were attempting to shed the terrorist stigma that had followed them since the events of September 11, 2001. Therefore, Jordan, as an agrarian society, was under pressure from the economy, ideology, and politics of the world regarding its international world order. Accordingly, legitimacy, the centrality of power, and its social dynamics will be more accurately examined through theories that take into consideration the differences between industrial and agrarian societies. Why? Because the power in agrarian societies is shaped by their order within world politics. In his work, Michael Mann argued that most theories are "reductionist" theories (Mann, p. 185, 1984), in which each theory looks into one part of the case. However, each case has multiple parts, as is the case for agrarian societies. By understanding Mann's argument, it appears that power in agrarian societies is affected by their regional order, while industrial societies develop power by making relations with different groups of power within civil society.

What drove me to consider Mann's work in my research is that because he looked at the history of humanity and the forming of states. Mann argued, with respect, that none of the theories on the state truly defined what the state is. However, they have discussed what the state is alike through studying pre-existing structures of civil society like in Marxists, liberals, and the functionalist traditions of state theory, which has seen the state as an arena in which the struggles of classes, interest groups, and individuals are expressed and institutionalized, and-in functionalist versions-in which a General Will (or, to use more modern terms, core values, or normative consensus) is expressed and implemented (Mann,

p. 185, 1984). In contrast to this definition, the militarism theory of state formation was offered as an alternative. Mann cites this theory in the works of Germanic authors such as Schmitt, Ratzenhofer, and Gumplocicz (1899) (Mann, 186). Even though this alternative theory was defeated on the battlefield by the combined forces of Russia and Western allies, Mann suggests that it has influenced Weber's work and other Germanic theorists. What matters to me in this debate on state definition is that history has shown that each society and state has its definition of state regarding their social structures and international world order.

Nonetheless, Mann goes further and points to the problem with the Marxist definition of the state that it denies significant autonomous power to the state. And this may be the only thing on which the militarism (physical force) theory of state can be based. Mann proposes that if we accept both theories, we can develop a dual theory that explains the theory of state through two dimensions: the domestic economic and ideological aspects of the state and the military and international aspects of the state (Mann, 186). So, how does Michael Mann define the state? Mann suggests that we can define it in terms of what it looks like, institutionally or functionally (Mann, 187). He followed Weber's suggestion on the state's four elements being

differentiated as set of institutions and personnel embodying a centrality and that it has a territorially-demarcated area over which it exercises a monopoly on authoritative, binding rule-making, backed up by a monopoly on the means of physical violence (Mann, 187).

Mann called this definition "something of a mixed bag" because it contains a predominant institutional element and a functional element (Mann, 1984, p. 188). Importantly, he discusses two parts of this definition: centrality and territoriality, in relation to two types of power, termed here: despotic power and infrastructural power. He mainly focuses on his work on infrastructural power and argues that these kinds of societies commonly exist in bureaucratic and authoritarian states. Mann sees that bureaucracy has a high organizational capacity but cannot set its own goals, which means this kind of state is controlled by others who, once taking a decision, will be enforceable through the state's infrastructure (Mann, 1984, p.191). However, these kinds of states are less believed to enjoy despotic power. As for the authoritarian states, which Jordan is considered one of,

they also enjoy a high level of infrastructural power. As Mann discussed, these kinds of states are intended to suggest a more "institutionalized form of despotism, in which competing power groupings cannot evade the infrastructural reach of the state, nor are they structurally separated from the state" (Mann, 1984, p. 191). Mann finally states that the state is essentially an arena, and this arena is precisely where the origins and mechanisms of autonomous powers are created. Since the state is territorially bounded and centralized, societies need their activities to be regulated over this arena, and the same applies to dominant economic classes and other ideological power movements and military elites (Mann, 1984, p. 210). In light of this understanding, I examine the origins of the state in Jordan to tackle the sources of power of the state and the monarchy, and then examine the mechanisms (tools and strategies) that were used by the monarchy to exercise power over Jordan.

While the work of Foucault is important in analyzing power, the work of Michael Mann is more relevant to this study. I believe that the strength of Mann's theory and discussion on the origins of power and analyzing autonomous power is that he studied the history of mankind in creating states and developing powers within their spheres. This way of thinking allows scholars to study states like Jordan and other Middle Eastern countries based on these states' and societies' unique and different experiences. In this research, I show how Jordan's monarchy did not fail in the Arab spring due to how it formed relations with different power dynamics and also question the legitimacy of the monarchy by examining the challenges the Jordanian state faces. Therefore, Jordan's monarchy's legitimacy is studied in this research through two sections. First, how the monarchy worked on building legitimacy, its mechanisms, and strategies. This is offered in two chapters. Chapter two, on the origins of the state, provides historical background on Jordan's politics and monarchy. Chapter three examines how the monarchy exercises power through different state institutions and social and political groups. In these two chapters, I make frequent reference to Weber's and Foucault's concepts of power, legitimacy, and governmentality, which each would help serve the argument. Second, the legitimacy of the monarchy in Jordan is challenged by making a discussion in the last chapter on the validity of this legitimacy while facing internal and external

challenges, which tightens directly to its limitation in the exercise of power regarding its international order. Currently, Jordan faces an economic crisis with high rates of unemployment, inflation, and poverty. Also, Jordan relies on other countries to provide it with basic needs like water and gas. Jordan is making treaties with its historical enemy, "Israel", to supply it with gas, which leaves Jordan's national security and sovereignty under threat. In this research, I show the uniqueness of the Jordanian case and address the issues related to power applications in a non-democratic state.



## CHAPTER II

### ROOTS OF THE STATE

Jordan is one of three countries in the Arab region that have a monarchical system. Despite the similarity in the political systems between Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco, Jordan enjoys different political and economic experiences. The Jordanian monarchy is tied to the Hashemite House of Mecca, referring in lineage to Prophet Mohammad. This house established what is known today as Jordan and built a monarchical political system while the world was moving forward to demolish monarchies and build republics. The political analyst Mustafa Hamarneh argued in a political discussion forum that there were no reasonable elements to establish a state on what is called Jordan nowadays. He emphasized that there was no ‘economic surplus’ that would serve to fund the bureaucracy and state. Additionally, this geographical spot lacked an elite with a political and social base which allowed the new political regime to have power from top to down (Hassan and Jbour, 2021). In light of this, examining the history of establishing Jordan allows us to understand how power relations were formed between the political system and different social and political groups in Jordan. Therefore, In this chapter, I tackle the historical events that draw contemporary politics in Jordan. To understand the present, an analysis and examination of the past must be done. I examine the origins of the state foundation, and how each monarch of the four followed different strategies to sustain legitimacy. In this chapter I follow the sequence of events that helped to establish the new state, then I explore how King Talal, Hussein, and Abdullah II followed various and different strategies and methods to preserve stability in the political system in Jordan, which has, by consequence, made Jordan experience a different Arab spring. Referring to Max Weber’s theory of types of authority of legitimacy, the legal, charismatic, and traditional types of authorities will be applied to each king. There were times in Jordan’s history when the tradition and religious claim were the best support to the Monarchy in their process of stabilizing their reign.

## 2.1. Arab Revolution

Transjordan was part of the Ottoman Empire and was divided into three main districts affiliated with other Palestinian and Syrian cities. The historian Sulaiman Mousa argued that the relation between the Ottomans and subjects of Arab districts became very tense after the announcement of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908, as the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) took place in the rule and excluded any engagement or contribution from Arabs (Mousa, 1989. p:14). The rise of the Emirate of Transjordan has a direct relation to the Arab revolution, as the land of Transjordan was a battlefield for 16 months for the war between Ottomans and Arab tribes. In 1908 the CUP led a coup on the absolute governing of Sultan Abdulhamid II and announced the constitution. Accordingly, elections were held in the Ottoman Empire and the Chamber of Deputies gathered in Istanbul. Arabs had seats in the chamber. However, the CUP took discriminatory measures against Arabs. According to Hasan Kayali, these discriminatory practices were seen in the allocation of public offices, such as the army, navy, and also the parliament: “A more compelling argument for discrimination against Arabs is the election of several Turks from the Arab provinces” (Kayali 1997, p:86). After the announcement of the constitution, in 1911, Arabs formed secret and public associations to fight for their muzzled voices. In 1914 the relations between the CUP and Arabs reached their worst phase and the First World War started. In the same year, the CUP called Sharif Hussain to counsel him; he did not encourage separation from the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire entered the war and accordingly the fate and destiny of the Arab region were tied to the Empire. On the day of the war, Britain sent to the Sharif of Mecca a letter by the high commissioner in Egypt stating that the Ottoman Empire entering the war might be a chance for Arabs to claim their independence, and Britain is fully willing to help Arabs achieve this. Sharif Hussain responded that they are not thinking of this right now and they are clinging to their loyalty to the Sultan (Mousa, 1988). However, in 1915, Jamal Pasha (who is known to Arabs by Al-Saffah meaning the butcher) accused several Arab leaders of betrayal and contact with the enemy and executed them in Damascus and Beirut. This flamed the anger of Arabs who considered it an act of ethnic discrimination and violence against them, which made them contact Sharif of Mecca in Hejaz and ask him to support them in their

revolution. Sharif Husain sent his son Faisal, who was convinced of the claims that the people of Syria can gain their independence. In 1916 Sharif Hussain sent a telegraph to the Grand Vizier (al-Sadr al-Azam)<sup>1</sup> in the central government in Istanbul and offered his support to the empire in the war in exchange of the following requirements; first, announcing a pardon for the political artists. Second, granting Syria and Iraq a non-central government. And third, inheriting Mecca *Velayet* to the Hashemites. The government in Istanbul did not respond to the request, and Jamal Pasha remained in his position as governor of Syria. Sharif Hussain was told that he had overstepped and crossed a line. Mousa argues that this was the breaking point for Arabs and CUP, and therefore, they had no way or tool to agree on (Mousa, 1975). This also explains why Arabs did not revolt against the Sultanate administration of Abdulhamid, the reason stands behind the fact that the Ottoman administration would let the *Vilayets* under a federal union which allows them to self-govern<sup>2</sup>. However, as a consequence of the argument between the CUP and Sharif Hussein, the latter sent a letter to the British officer Sir Henry McMahon which turned out to be known as the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. 10 letters were sent between the two men regarding forming the Arab countries under the rule of the Hashemite house. Which finally led to the agreement that Britain will support the Arabs in their revolt against the Ottoman sovereignty over Arab territories, an asset to 'establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories'<sup>3</sup> The Arabs of Transjordan and Greater Syria and the Sharif of Mecca had mutual aspirations, and that was the spark of the Arab revolution in 1916. The revolution started in Mecca and aimed to reach natural Syria and its provinces. Sharif Hussein and his three sons, Faisal, Abdullah, and Ali joined the revolution and played an important role in it. Each of Sharif's sons was a commander and a chief of war. Nonetheless, British officers were among them, to plan, command, and, obviously, fulfill the British will in the region. Accordingly, Faisal reached Syria and won the battle against the Ottoman military.

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<sup>1</sup> The *grand Vizir* or *Al-Sadr Al-Azam* absolute representative of the sultan, whose signet ring he kept as an insignia of office. Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopedia (2014, April 15). Vizier. Encyclopedia Britannica.

<sup>2</sup> Al-Jazeera documentary: interview with dr. Asem Al Dasooqi. اغتيال الملك عبدالله الأول - الجريمة السياسية part1

<sup>3</sup> As came in the 4th letter by Sir Henry McMahon to Sharif of Mecca in what is known as Hussein-McMahon correspondence. The Jewish virtual library, Pre-State Israel: The Hussein-McMahon Correspondence (July 15 - August 1916).

Therefore, by the year 1920 he was able to rule Syria and annex it to his father's kingdom. The Kingdom of Faisal survived four months before the arrival of the French mandate that deported him from Syria.

## **2.2. British Mandate and Formation of Transjordan**

While the Arab revolution in 1916 took its place in Mecca and expanded to Northern Arab territories with the support of the British mandate, Great Britain and France were processing a secret convention which is known as the Sykes-Picot Division Plan. The agreement led to the division of the southern part of Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine into British-French administrative areas. The main purpose of this agreement was to draw the future administrative map of the Arab territories after their disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. This division plan was not welcomed by Arabs especially after the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence and the promises Britain made to Sharif Hussein in supporting creating a united Arab kingdom. However, the plan still appeared to support the Arab ambition of independence and self-administration, as appeared in the British support of Faisal's reign on Syria in 1918. Nevertheless, two years later, the alleged powers came to the final division of the region in what is known as the San Remo Conference, which divided the Arab land to its current shape (Jordan, Iraq, Occupied Palestine 'Israel', Lebanon, and Syria). As a result, Faisal's reign in Syria was overthrown by the French, and the British promise of supporting the Hashemite reign of the Arab territories decreased to a smaller area. Transjordan was part of this division, and the importance of creating a new state in Transjordan emerged by the arrival of Prince Abdullah to support and restore his brother's throne in Syria. In 1920, discussions were made among British officials regarding the local administrations and governments in Transjordan and Palestine. In cities such as Jerusalem and Al-Salt that already had a *Mutasarrif*<sup>4</sup> Since the rule of the Ottoman administration, British officials were appointed to monitor them and reconstruct the new administration under the British mandate. The officers were mainly interested in preserving stability in the region and securing the

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<sup>4</sup> Mutasarrif is the person who represents the administrative authority of an Ottoman Sanjak.  
Source: Cambridge Online Dictionary

French mandate's borders in Syria against the tribal raids on the borders. This expanded the need of creating defensive forces from the tribes themselves to serve the purpose, since Britain was already decreasing its military expenses in its colonies around the globe. Uriel Dann argued that the formation of the first cell of the Jordanian army was bound up with the work of a 'small band of British officers who then constituted the British presence east of the Jordan' (Dann, 2006, 181). The existence of Transjordan as an independent region and administration from Palestine and Syria can emerge from the need to create a stable system within the region.

### **2.3. Prince Abdullah and Formation of Transjordan**

The overthrow of king Faisal's reign abolished the dream of the Arab revolution in having a united Arab kingdom. The battle of Maysalun<sup>5</sup> in 1920 motivated prince Abdullah I to come and help his brother restore the throne. Prince Abdullah arrived in Ma'an in 1920 and was welcomed by the Northern Transjordan tribes. He arrived with a small number of soldiers that would not allow him to go into battle or a war, nor did he have financial or military abilities. Mahafza mentioned that the Prince received invitations from Syrians to support them in their war against the French colonial forces, but the Prince knew the limited abilities he had, and rather he headed south to Amman and declared himself as the Deputy king of Syria<sup>6</sup>. With the local governments and tribal support, and with the British mandate coordination the reign of Prince Abdullah I in Transjordan was established<sup>7</sup>. Prince Abdullah showed high commitment for two things, first, the British-Transjordan treaty, which aided and counseled him. Second, the dream of ruling Natural Syria. By these two factors, Abdullah did not show much interest in developing relations with the local governments, nor in establishing a stable political system. Instead, he focused on developing the army forces to serve his greatest ambitions in ruling Syria. Yoav Alon

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<sup>5</sup> Battle of Maysalun: a battle between French colonial forces and the Arab Kingdom in Syria that happened in 1920, and resulted in the colonization of Syria and Lebanon.

<sup>6</sup> Interview with the historian Ali Mahafza on Ro'ya TV published on July20, 2020.

<sup>7</sup> Prince Abdullah I met the high commissioner Sir Winston Churchill in Jerusalem, and the latter approved the establishment of Transjordan and showed Britain's' full willingness to support the new state on the condition to halt the tribes' attack on Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the support to Syrians against French forces. Nonetheless, the need of Prince Abdullah to rule over Transjordan was because this region had 'fallen into anarchy following the enforced exile of the Prince's brother Faisal by the French in Syria'. (Edwards, Hinchcliffe, 2001, p.19).

argued that prince Abdullah was not interested in the affairs but saw Transjordan as a 'launching pad for expanding his reign into Syria' (Alon, 2005). Therefore, he took little interest in the daily administration of the country and the strengthening of the central government, leaving these matters to the direction of his ministers' (Alon, 2005).

The types of legitimacy on which Prince Abdullah worked to develop to stabilize his reign in that period can be studied and analyzed into three types: religious legitimacy, political legitimacy, and force legitimacy. Religious and historical legitimacy was formed after the arrival of the Prince to Transjordan and the joining of the ranks of the tribes under the Hashemite banner in the war. As for the political legitimacy, it is represented in the political agreement between the local governments in the eastern region of Jordan and the Prince, in which a national conference was held. It was considered a national conference and a legitimate representative of the Jordanian people. An executive committee emerged from this conference and took over the leadership of the Jordanian national movement and issued the "Jordanian National Charter."<sup>8</sup> This was the first national political document with a specific program, and the first political step between the Prince and the locals. Interestingly, the King rarely spoke in his diaries about his meetings or small talks with the people and tribes of Transjordan. Instead, he named the prime ministers and the ministers of his governments, and the military command chiefs and his instructions to them in containing and stopping any violent attacks on the French forces at the northern borders with Syria. Notably, the first twenty years of Transjordan's establishment were very crucial. The Prince's first duty was to preserve peace and contain the tribal attacks on the West Bank and Syria, where new Jewish settlements were migrating to Palestine in large numbers under British protection, and France forced its mandate over Syria. Doing his job correctly, meant to the Prince receiving funds and support from Britain for his new state. Prince Abdullah was loyal to Britain and keen on their approval. Further, he played a big role in prolonging his brother's reign when he proposed to the British High Commissioner, Winston Churchill, to crown Faisal over Iraq after he lost his throne in Syria. Thirdly, the Prince worked on legitimizing his reign through power. As Machiavelli

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<sup>8</sup> In this paper, I look at the Jordanian national charter as the social contract that has shaped the politics and power in Jordan. Therefore, I will be referring to the National Charter with the term "social contract" in the theoretical framework and analysis in this paper.

describes it; “people are compelled to obey purely in deference to the superior power of the state”. Tribes and local governments in Transjordan had no other choice but to obey Prince Abdullah if they wanted to have stability and development. However, many of the chief tribes and sheiks did not feel comfortable toward forming a central government in Amman in 1921, they felt that it might threaten their interests and advantages in ruling their areas (Mahafza, 1973). Therefore, the central government faced a violent rebellion from the tribes. The political situation in Transjordan was very challenging for the new government as well as for the Prince. Yet, it was compulsory for all parties to find a way to stabilize their new state. Nonetheless, the Arab Legion forces were loyal to the Prince as they fought beside him in the Arab revolution. And they were responsible, of course, to suppress any attempt from the tribes to destabilize the state or rebel against the government (Mahafza, 1970). The serious challenges the Prince faced were to preserve and secure Transjordan’s borders, stabilize the political system, and engage the tribes in the new state.

#### **2.4. First Legislative Council and the Constitutional Development: The Law of 1928 and the Constitutions of 1946 and 1952**

In 1928, Transjordan witnessed an improvement on the political and administrative levels. Earlier that year, the British mandate concluded a treaty with Transjordan and recognized an independent constitutional government in Transjordan after five years of delay. The treaty set instructions about the British mandate terms of references in Transjordan, and by that, Prince Abdullah's terms of references were determined. Accordingly, and later on of the same year, Prince Abdullah announced the *Organic Law*<sup>9</sup> to have independent elections and to form the first legislative council in Transjordan. The Basic Law was a royal initiative from the Prince and was not formed due to a contract between the ruler and the ruled.

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<sup>9</sup> Organic law is the literal translation from Arabic of “Al Qanun Al Asasi” of 1928 for Transjordan as shown and used in the library catalog of the Berkley Law of the University of California. However, the author will go with the term Basic Law referring to the first law of legislative council.

Mahafza argues that the legislative council was on the *margin* of the great events in the period of the Transjordan Emirate. He referred to the fact that the *Basic law* gave this council limited powers, and the Prince could form permanent laws without referring to the council (Mahafza, 1973: 73). Moreover, this law was in its best form a grant from the ruling authority - the British mandate government and Prince Abdullah which gave some of its privileges to Transjordanians (Al-Hiyari, 1972). Hence, this constitution was not a natural contract between the Prince and Transjordanians, consequently the people never participated in drafting the constitution (Mousa, 2009). Bani Salameh argues that Jordanians were 'excluded' from participating in drafting the first constitution which made them in the same way also excluded from participating in decision making (Bani Salameh, 2013). The main problem of the formation of this law was that the real will of the people was absent from it in both ways, drafting the constitution and in the limited role of the legislative council which allowed the Prince to make decisions despite the people's wishes. Bani Salameh and Ananzeh argued that Transjordanians rejected this law due to its ties with the British mandate. Further, people did not like the Prince's alliance with the British, and the outcomes of this relation. Therefore, strikes broke out in Transjordan and consequently a conference was held on a national scale to demand independence (Bani Salameh and Ananzeh, 2013, 2). Accordingly, the mandate was abolished, and Jordan was recognized as an independent state under the name 'the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan', which required a new constitutional phase implying the issuance of the new constitution of 1946 (Bani Salameh and Ananzeh, 2013, 2). However, the constitution of 1946 is considered an important achievement on the political and administrative level in Jordan, and was to be 'the basis of the 1952 constitution' (Edwards, Hinchcliffe, 2001, 23). According to Abu Nowar, the constitution, like many other examples, absorbed the 'British concepts of government by qualified and essentially limited constitutional institutions with manageable democratic freedoms' (Abu Nowar, 1989, 207). Transjordan witnessed a formation of different governments and a decent level of political participation in the 30s and 40s of the past decade. From 1921 to 1946 Jordan established health and social services systems and worked on creating the political and parliamentary system. The developed constitution of 1951 made sure in most of its articles regarding the relation between the executive and legislative authorities that the king is the

safety valve to maintain peaceful relations between them and to avoid any conflicts. The king is the head of the executive authority and at the same time he is not accountable to the law nor the parliament of any of the executive authority decisions (The Parliamentary Work: reality and aspirations, 1971. Ch, 5).. This alarms negatively when speaking of democracy and the right to govern. Jordan is a constitutional monarchy by the constitution, yet reality shows an absolute governing by the king.

## **2.5. Arab Legion and Formation of Armed Forces**

The Arab legion forces were established in early 1921, when Prince Abdullah arrived in Transjordan and planned to restore his brother's throne in Syria. The base of these forces were the tribes who had fought alongside with the Prince in the Arab Revolution and stood in loyalty to him. However, the Arab Legion was part of the British mandate forces in the Middle East and 'fought with other allied troops in overthrowing the pro-Nazi Rashid Ali regime in Baghdad'. Nonetheless, they stood in 'hostilities' with Israel in 1948 (Edwards, Hinchcliffe, 2001, 26). Their main duty was to be 'responsible for control of the desert and protection of the borders' (Edwards, Hinchcliffe, 2001, 24). This very conflict for the Arab Legion forces made it challenging for the Prince to swift their duties and responsibilities to maintain peace and safety within the new state. It was important for Transjordan to become a stable state, to have secure borders and internal stability as well. The armed forces of the Jordanian military fought in the war of 1948 in the West Bank and could - despite their limited capabilities - save the West Bank from the Israeli occupation. The formation and expansion of the Arab Legion forces took several steps and levels. In the early years of the establishing the state, Transjordan had enjoyed some gendarmerie left over from the Damascus administration. British officials who oversaw the region, sought to form from these gendarmeries an armed forces for 'restoring a modicum of public security' (Denn, 2006, 184).

## **2.6. The Arab-Israeli War and the Annexation of the West Bank**

In 1946, the British mandate recognized Transjordan as a kingdom, and Prince Abdullah I was crowned as the King of Jordan. This transition can be understood by the fact that

the British mandate fulfilled its promise to Jews and Zionists and helped them establish the State of Israel on the land of Palestine, west to Jordan. And by that, the stability of Transjordan and its independence were not a threat nor an obstacle in the face of fulfilling Balfour's promise of 1916<sup>10</sup>. In 1946, the map of the middle east was almost shaped and settled. The newly formed nation states in Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt were all formed under the British and French mandate. These newly formed separate nation states were keen to preserve their own stability and security, which helped the Zionist movement take control over most of Historical Palestine by the year 1948 and declare Israel as a state in the region. After two years of Jordan's independence and crowning prince Abdullah as king of Jordan, the Arab-Israeli war took place. Israel was founded in 1948 on hundreds of massacres and land thefts in Palestine and wanted more according to Balfour's promise. King Abdullah I tried through his negotiations with the British to annex Palestine under his administration. All the negotiations with the British about Palestine failed according to the King's diaries, nonetheless, he formed relations with officials in Jerusalem and the west bank and preserved his custodianship over holy places.

After the declaration of Israel in 1948, Arab countries formed an "Army of Salvation" to restore Palestine as an Arab territory. Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq joined the war to restore the occupied land. Due to lack of coordination, experience and equipment, Palestine lost 78% of the land to Israel, forcing 700,000 Palestinians to seek refuge in neighboring countries (Palestine Remix, 2014). The war took place after the UN proposed to divide the land into two states, Jewish-Israel and Arab-Palestine while keeping Jerusalem a UN-controlled international zone<sup>11</sup>. On ground, a Jewish state was formed alongside a series of massacres and rise in violence by the Zionist militia groups against Arabs. This plan was not welcomed by the new nation Arab states, which drove them to start a war with Israel. However, weak capabilities, lack of agreement and cooperation between these states prevented them from fulfilling their plan in protecting all historical Palestine. The war ended year later, with total 750,000 Palestinians forcibly displaced to

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<sup>10</sup>The Balfour Declaration was a public statement issued by the British government in 1917 during WWI announcing support for the establishment of a "national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine.

<sup>11</sup> The UN partition plan recommended a partition of Mandatory Palestine into independent Arab and Jewish States. (United Nations, 2021)

neighboring countries and to the West Bank from the occupied Palestinian cities (UNRWA, 2021). Despite the UN's plan, Israeli forces attacked two Arab Palestinian cities and displaced 70,000 Palestinians as refugees to Jordan. The result of the war was annexation of the West Bank to Jordan. Which caused a change in Jordan's politics, society, and demography. Nusiabah describes the war of 1948 between Jordan and Israel as 'not equal and compatible' (Nusaibah, 1992, p14). Accordingly, Jordan had carried the responsibility towards the West Bank after their union. Therefore, Jordan was 'obligated to more lands and people under its authority' (Nusseibeh, 1992. 17).

## **2.7. King Talal: The Ill King and the Constitution**

In 1951, King Abdullah I was assassinated and killed in Jerusalem while entering the Mosque of Omar. This event has put the new kingdom under multiple challenges, created a huge uncertainty in Jordan and triggered a succession crisis. There were three essential matters on stake after King Abdullah I was assassinated. First, the future of a kingdom's stability that had its first king assassinated. Second, the question of the two banks' unity. While a Palestinian man assassinated the King, gossip on King Abdullah's relations with Britain and giving up Palestine to the Zionist movement arose. Third and most importantly, the succession process; though the constitution of 1946 stated in its first article that it is a monarchical inherited parliamentary government, there were some doubts and concerns regarding the Crown Prince Talal bin Abdullah. Jordanian records and archives mention very little about King Talal (son of King Abdullah I and father of King Hussein). The official Jordanian open sources claim that due to 'health reasons' king Talal could not exercise his powers and fulfill his duties, therefore, he had to abdicate his throne to his eldest son Prince Hussein in 1952. After the death of his father, Talal was brought from Switzerland where he was receiving his 'treatment' and crowned as the King of Jordan. The historian Ali Mahafza said that there was a debate before that whether it should be Nayef, the second son of Abdullah, to be crowned due to Talal's condition. Also, there was pressure from the Hashemites in Iraq to appoint Prince Nayef due to their interest in unifying the two kingdoms<sup>12</sup>. Besides that, Talal was known for his hostility

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<sup>12</sup> Documentary, interview with the historian Ali-Mahafza. (Roya News Youtube Channel, 2019).

towards the British interventions in Jordan, which caused disputes between him and his father Abdullah<sup>13</sup>. However, some historians like Tareq Al-Tall argued that Britain and the Jordanian prime minister back then, Tawfiq Abu Alhuda, opposed the idea, and favored Talal instead. Al-Tall also argued that the British officer Kloub played a key role in the succession process. He and the PM decided to bring Talal to succeed his father, but this was ‘part of a longer-term plan to cultivate young Prince Hussein’<sup>14</sup>. According to the constitution, Hussein could not practice his kingly duties until he was eighteen by the Islamic calendar. Therefore, a Regency Council performed on behalf of him until prince Hussein met the legal age. The abdication of the throne was and still is a sensitive topic to talk about in Jordan. Despite that, the period Talal ruled witnessed a constitutional creation and development. The constitution of 1952 was more democratic than the previous ones and was ‘strongly affected by the constitutions of parliamentary systems in Western democracies’ (Bani Salameh, and Ananzeh, 2015, 3). Bani Salameh and Ananzeh argued that the reason behind the development of this constitution was due to some political, social, and demographical circumstances. The unification of the two banks and democratic tendencies and orientation of king Talal could be seen as the key role to this change (Bani Salameh, and Ananzeh, 2015, 3). However, according to Abu Nowar, the constitution, as many other examples, absorbed the ‘British concepts of government by qualified and essentially limited constitutional institutions with manageable democratic freedoms’ (Abu Nowar, 1989, 207).

## **2.8. King Hussein; New Strategies, New Threats**

King Hussein exercised his power when he reached eighteen after his father King Talal was abdicated. As a young leader to a young country, Hussein showed commitment and intelligence in ruling the state. Hussein's period of reign is the longest so far, it extended from 1951 till 1999. For 47 years, King Hussein changed and maneuvered his tools to legitimize his reign and preserve stability. The first years of his reign, Hussein attempted to gain loyalty and secure himself. He mentioned in his diaries that he felt threatened after

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid; interview with the historian Tareq Al-Tall.

the death of his grandfather King Abdullah when the latter was assassinated in front of him, and that the people who were supposed to be loyal to the king ran away and while the King's body was laying on the ground (Hussein, 1987). Hussein's doubts in the loyalty of his grandfathers' close circle drove him to create a new circle for himself and made him realize the importance of internal legitimacy. Hussein secured himself by appointing trusted people from his family, notably his uncle Sharif Nasser and his cousin Zaid bin Shaker. Further, it can be noticed from Hussein's diaries that he took his uncle Sharif Nasser as a trusted man in many matters.

Hussein's main focus in building Jordan's internal and external politics may be summarized as follows; he sought to build a Jordanian nationalism, improve economics, and control internal politics. This was all in the monarch's legitimacy and stability's interest. King Hussein's interest in creating a Jordanian nationality was derived by the wave of nationalism that invaded the Arab world by Egypt and Syria. However, Hussein inherited a poor state that recently was opted out from the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and still did not have its full sovereignty. So, he started by dismissing the British military from Jordanian Army -which was known for *Arabizing* the command of the Jordanian army- four years after he exercised his powers. As for the economy, it was very challenging and hardly succeeded. For a country like Jordan, which heavily relies on external resources for surviving its economics, it has always been obligated by conditional aid from donors. In Jordan, it was mostly Western aid which required liberal economic policies and 'a minimum political accountability and legitimacy' (Schlumberger and Bank, 2002. p:52). This has supported the regime in Jordan to buy legitimacy and increase stability. However, in times of crisis this strategy did not provide stability. A significant example is what happened in 1996, when the government faced a riot in some southern cities in Jordan who were upset by the liberal policies that would lift subsidies on some basic commodities. These riots were faced by violence and repression. Schlumberger and Bank argued that one of king Hussein's strategies of legitimacy was the socio-economic dimension, as they labeled it as 'allocative' legitimacy. Politically, Jordan developed its relationship with Britain from a colonized position to a good and loyal friend. Further, Jordan was biased to the Western Bloc in the Cold War. Regionally, Hussein formed

alliances with Iraq, and worked on improving relations with Saudi Arabia though it was an old enemy to the Hashemite house. However, Hussein did not enjoy stable and beneficial relations with Syria and Egypt. They were a threat to the stability of the crown. It cannot be denied that the external challenges have played a significant role in choosing the tools of legitimacy. In other words, the monarchy in Jordan was keen on preserving the stability and security of the state. In some way, these attempts were manipulated to turn into an effective tool for King Hussein to legitimize his rule. Some important external factors that also helped King Hussein in sustaining his reign were Arab nationality, Hashemite custody over holy places in Jerusalem, and Jordan's friends and allies. King Hussein sought to build political alliances and unions with his neighbors despite the threats his reign might face. In order to sustain the regimes' stability, he intended to establish an independent Arab defense alliance. A conference was held in Jerusalem in 1955 to discuss this further. The Baghdad-Amman alliance was to provide Jordan with economic and martial assistance in order to reduce foreign aid and get rid of the British command in the Arab Legion forces (Nusaibah, 1992. Ch,3. p,40). Further, the alliance was more of a de facto confederation that came out against the expansion of the United Arab Republic of Syria and Egypt. However, the union between the two kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan soon failed and the Hashemites in Iraq were liquidated by the Iraqi Army and a coup occurred which increased the threat to the monarchy in Jordan. Through that, Hussein was exposed to regional potential threats.

The regime in Jordan has faced internal threats such as assassination attempts to kill the King and several prime ministers. King Hussein has categorized these attempts into two types. First, the greatest strikes which include the Zarqa' political coup. And second, the assassinations attempted to kill the King in person through gunshots, putting a liquid chemical poison in the King's nose drop and so on (Nusaibah, 1992. p:48). The external threat to the Hashemite regime was directly from its neighbor, Syria. In 1958 the Syrian armed forces attacked the Kings' small civil plane while it was flying across Syrian airspace to reach Europe with formal permission. This was three months after the coup in Iraq to overthrow the reign of Faisal (Nusaibah, 1992, ch4). There were Syrian and Egyptian attempts to overthrow the monarchy in Jordan and create political unrest in the

status quo. Nusiyabah argued that despite the peaceful revolution in the Arab League, it has put the Arab countries and the constitutional parliaments in front of a serious risk and, in times where the constitutional democratic morals were not well formulated nor were stable post the independence. (Nusseibeh, 1992, 23). Hussein's strategies in domestic and international politics were on the same page after the political reforms in 1989. In that year, riots raged in southern Jordanian cities, where tribe leaders led demonstrations.

## **2.9. King Abdullah II: Era of Liberalization and Democratization**

King Abdullah II faced very challenging circumstances on three levels in the beginning of his reign in 1999. First, Abdullah was not prepared to be a king, he was 'politically inexperienced' (Schlumberger & Bank, 2001, 50). His father King Hussein put his own brother Prince Hasan in the succession line, and people knew the prince as the next King. However, King Hussein, and before his death, removed his brother from the succession line and crowned his eldest son Abdullah as the crown prince. Therefore, Abdullah was not in the political scene in Jordan, neither he nor the people were prepared to have him as a king. Second, the economic crisis in Jordan. Abdullah inherited a financially weak state that relies on foreign aid most of the time since its establishment. And this by contrast, has caused Jordan a political intervention in policy making. Third, King Abdullah II came to power when the political participation and freedoms in Jordan reached its worst levels (Schlumberger and Bank, 2002, 50). The events of 1996 had shaken the Jordanian society's trust with the democratization process King Hussein announced in the early 1990s.<sup>15</sup> In 1993, Jordan's electoral system was changed from the 'open list to what is known as 'the one voice law'. This change was neither an executive nor a legislative authority's decision, but it was a decision by king Hussein alone. Mudar Badran, an ex-prime minister and a close man to the king, described it as 'it was an American advice'. He said that this law was passed in a crucial period for Jordan to go further in the peace process with Israel. And the king did not want the opposition to win the Parliamentary elections and form a government that would be an obstacle in the way of the peace process with Israel (Al-Rawashdeh, 2015). Abdullah II followed a new

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<sup>15</sup> More elaboration in Chapter 2.

strategy and announced to people in his first speech as a king: “I am not like my father” (Abu Tair, 2009) (Al Athamneh, 2017). He intended to make this declaration to be taken positively, and that a new phase of democracy and liberty is going to see the light. However, the new king praised his fathers’ role and achievements, and said that he now will continue that process. Schumbler and Bank argued that Abdullah II managed to establish a stable system of political rule in his first three years of his reign relying on the inherited instruments of authoritarian control (Schlumberger & Bank, 2001, 50). Abdullah started a campaign or a reshuffling of some important names from the old circle and replacing them with other more ‘liberal’ political elites. He created the Economic Consultative Council (ECC) to become an advisory body on economic policy and strategy formulations. This agent was dominated by fourteen leaders in the private sector which implies the King’s strategy of renewing and liberalizing the economic sector.

King Abdullah has a British mother, he did not speak Arabic well, nor did he know the local accent. His background was liberal and westernized, and further, he was not prepared as a crown prince, yet his father, late King Hussein named him the prince crown before his death. Being a Hashemite in descent was not enough for Jordanians to accept him as the new king, hence, he had to learn the traditions, behave, act and speak like one of the Jordanians. King Abdullah worked on improving his Arabic language, besides learning the traditions, etc. focused on his behavior, more than his descent. Therefore, King Abdullah II's speeches to the parliament and to people had always focused on him as a Hashemite. The reign of King Abdullah II faced many challenges since its first days. As he was not prepared to be king, the political scene in Jordan faced high tensions between his Late father king Hussein and some political and social groups. After the 1996 riot in Ma’an, the political life and freedoms were under threat for many groups in Jordan. However, Abdullah II followed a new strategy and announced to people in his first speech as a king: “I am not like my father”<sup>16</sup>. He intended to make this declaration to be taken positively, and that a new phase of democracy and liberties are going to see the light. However, the new king praised his fathers’ role and achievements, and said that he now

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<sup>16</sup> This sentence was widespread in Jordanian media by journalists and politicians when making reference to King Abdullah’s intention in making political change.

will continue that process. Ten years later, the spark of the Arab spring changed many dynamics and challenged Abdullah's reign for putting more effort in proceeding the political and economic formations. As a new method of speaking to people, he released six 'discussion papers' that indicated his view and intention of proceeding political reformations. These papers were discussed by politicians, press, and even on social media. After Jordan witnessed transformations at the political level after the first wave of the Arab Spring in 2011, King Abdullah II instructed his government to expedite political and economic reforms in Jordan. Through his speeches and royal discussion papers, the king urged the youth to enroll and join political parties, and to participate in the parliamentary elections. In 2013 King Abdullah II gave an opening speech at the first youth conference in Jordan under the name: we are all Jordan, where he addressed the importance of the future of the youth, encouraged them to participate in the elections and enroll in political parties. Three years later, in 2016 he released his first 'discussion paper' in conjunction with the parliamentary elections and emphasized the importance of developing democratic practices. Moreover, he assured the importance of having everyone participating in the democratic transition: "Every actor in our political system – every institution and public figure, but most importantly, each of you, as citizens – has a vital role to play in deepening and strengthening this democratic culture" (Abdullah II, 2016). However, in the same year, King Abdullah II ordered constitutional amendments to grant him the sole power without any countersignature by the prime minister, to appoint the speaker and members of the senate, Chairman and members of the Constitutional court, the Chief of Justice, the commander of the army, and the heads of the Intelligence and the Gendarmerie (Obiedat, 2021). This was very against what people asked for in 2011 to minimize the King's powers and move to the constitutional Monarchy. While people in Jordan did not ask for monarchy overthrow, the monarchy seemed to overthrow their actual demands. In light of the speeches and actions by the king, the lawyer Sufian Obeidat argues that 'the King seems to be the only political player in the country, and the political system appears to operate without politicians' (Obiedat, 2021). Youth and political parties in Jordan are still facing challenges regarding their freedom of speech and political participation. Though the state did not practice violence, it still practices types of pressure on the youth through the state's institutions.

## CHAPTER III

### ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

The monarchy in Jordan had created its political legitimacy through many factors, the social contract was not one of them at the early establishment, nor was it effectively used after signing it. This fact has determined the relation between the people and political participation and undermined the democracy process on ground. In this chapter, I examine the elements of political legitimacy and how it was built, from early establishment to King Abdullah II's reign. I will show how the social factor, identity, power and development were all part of the strategy of building political legitimacy.

#### 3.1. Early Establishment

Two main factors had played a huge role in creating political legitimacy for the Hashemites in the early establishment of Transjordan. First, the British support and will to have a loyal sovereign over Transjordan and Iraq to pursue the plan of Sykes-Picot. After the political British opposition opposed the military occupation of Palestine and Iraq because of the high costs, which were about 20 million pounds, the British Minister of colonies Winston Churchill and the high commissioners in the Middle East held a conference in 1920 in Cairo to discuss the reduction of the military expenses in the Middle East and search for new policies that reconcile Britain's previous commitments and political influence in the region.

For the issue of Transjordan, where Prince Abdullah was gathering forces to reclaim his brother's throne in Syria and threaten the Sykes-Picot Plan of Division, three solutions were offered to solve this obstacle. The first was to force Prince Abdullah to leave Transjordan. Second, come to an agreement with the Prince to rule over Transjordan. Third, to rely on local forces to get rid of the Prince ((Mahafza, 1973. P:22,23), (Young, H: The independent Arab, P:325)). The historian Mahafza stated that Churchill was

inclined more to the second choice to set an agreement with the Prince to rule over Transjordan. The conference committee agreed on the second choice and sent forces to colonize Transjordan to oppress any social movement that could arise and attack the borders with Syria and amend the British Mandate Deed on Palestine to exclude Transjordan from the provisions of the Balfour Declaration (Mahafza, 1973. p:22,23). Finally, Prince Abdullah was invited to meet with the minister of British colonies in Jerusalem to discuss the matter and inform him of their plan for the future of the Hashemite family in the region (Mousa, 1989.p:106,123). The decision was made to crown Faisal bin Al-Hussein king of Iraq, and his brother Abdullah as a prince of Transjordan under the British mandate for a six-month provisional period. Prince Abdullah described this plan as “reasonable” in his letter to his father Sharif Hussein regarding his agreement with Churchill:

As I am aware of the very need to apply the plan regarding the Arab cause, and that we are incapable to have Syria at war because we lack the international support, and by knowing that the Syrian people are not capable to do so, and by knowing that my brother Faisal can't claim his throne again, I have decided to accept the reasonable political plan that England has drawn, and I vowed to rule Transjordan on behalf of your majesty, hoping to achieve our goal in a political form for Britain. (Mousa, 1989. p.130)<sup>17</sup>

The relation between Churchill and Abdullah seemed to enjoy a good level of understanding and cooperation. On the eve of the state establishment, in 1921, the High Commissioner for Britain in Transjordan praised the role of Prince Abdullah in maintaining the peace and creating a better environment for the people of Transjordan by the help and support of the British money and counseling (Al Malik Abdullah bin Al Hussein, p:178). Thus, Abdullah knew that to rule Transjordan he will need more than the tribal and local governments' acceptance, he will need urgent funding and aid to pay the expenses of creating a new military and government. This arrangement, and the bandwagon position Prince Abdullah was in, had cost the new state indirect and direct political and strategic interventions from Britain in exchange for their fund. The Jordanian military command and the close counseling circle around the Prince were completely

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<sup>17</sup> Translated quotation

British, which had hugely upset the Transjordanian tribes who had accepted the Prince's sovereignty to have a chance to be ruled by an Arab<sup>18</sup>.

Second, the Arab revolution that had put Transjordanian tribes under the command of Prince Abdullah I. The early years of Prince Abdullah's rule over Transjordan showed his commitment to the idea of the Arab union project. In his diaries, the prince mentioned a letter he sent to his prime minister Tawfiq Abu Al Huda under the title of "Special Instructions on the Issue of Arab Unity". It contained the Prince's full support of the proposed union between Egypt and Iraq, furthermore, he insisted that the possible union between Egypt and Iraq cannot be solidified until Great Syria is unified and independent from colonial powers. (Al Malik Abdullah bin Al Hussein, p:253) Nonetheless, his fellows in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and in post-Vichy Syria seemed 'inclined against the prince's ambitions and dream of leading a Greater Syria' (Edwards, Hinchcliffe, 2001, p.27). Prince Abdullah and his prime minister shared the same value of the Arab revolution that was heading towards Arab unity. On the same ground, tribes of Transjordan shared the prince's same ambition for the following reasons: first, they headed towards 'being part of the Arab Kingdom that Hashemites promised to create, and second they wanted to put their tribal disagreements behind and move forward to have a state'.<sup>19</sup> This peaceful level of agreement and cooperation between the Prince and the whole Transjordanian tribes took some time before it settled. After many clashes and tensions between the central government in Amman and some tribes in the North and South, a national conference was held in Amman in 1928. The sheikhs of tribes and politicians invited the prince to this conference and announced the 'national charter' which is more likely to be seen as the formal social contract between the Prince and the Transjordanians. The conference came right after the Prince signed a treaty with the British mandate, which has aroused concerns within the tribes regarding the full sovereignty over Transjordan.

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<sup>18</sup> Local governments and tribes in Transjordan opposed the British mandate before the arrival of the Prince. They remained officially under the administration of the Ottoman Empire until 1924 regarding the Lozan Treaty.

<sup>19</sup> Interview with the Military Historian Bakir Al Majali. Ro'ya TV 2019.

John Locke argues that ‘no one can be put out of his estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent’ (Locke 1980: 52). However, the functionality of the new political system had to prove its validity and ability in developing and formulating implement policies in an effective manner, and to survive periods of crisis whenever they came. With the British mandate supporting Abdullah’ reign internationally, he focused on sustaining his legitimacy internally. The first challenge for the new sovereign of Jordan, Prince Abdullah, was to come to an agreement with the local governments and tribes to accept the central government of Transjordan. Despite their acceptance of the Prince to rule Transjordan, *sheikhs* of tribes did not completely acknowledge the authority of the central government in Amman. As Youm describes it ‘when Abdullah I came to Jordan, he found that in the absence of the Ottoman authorities, powerful tribes had become the effective masters of the country, a situation that posed a formidable challenge to the establishment of a centralized state’ (Alon, 2005). Historical archives show that the sheikhs of tribes in Transjordan had the tendency of acting like kings when the Ottoman administration became weaker (Abujaber, 1989), (Abu Dayeh, Naganuma, 2009. Vol. 37. No.4. 18). And that itself created a challenge to the Prince to empower his central government in Amman and not let the sheikhs of tribes run the scene. The first central government in Amman faced multiple challenges with the Transjordanian tribes to accept its sovereignty and governing. There were two valid reasons in the tribal argument regarding opposing the central government's sovereignty. First, the non-Transjordanian element running the government. According to Tayel Slaiby, the Transjordanian national patriotic identity arose in 1921 and did not welcome the Syrian elements the prince had appointed to run the government (Slaiby, 2015. p:256). Despite the good relations between Transjordanian tribes and Syrian politicians of the independent party, leaders and sheikhs of some Transjordanian tribes headed toward meeting the Prince and inform them of their objection in not appointing Transjordanians to run the central government (Slaiby, 2015. p:256). Second, as mentioned previously, the tribes - Southern tribes precisely- were powerful and had become the effective masters of the country before the arrival of the Prince (Youm, 2005). Despite the Prince’s ambition of creating one united Arab country, by applying this on the new state he established, he faced opposition from the locals and Transjordanian tribes who felt out of place with this

plan. It seemed like the Prince favored his ambition over the feelings and ambitions of locals who headed towards a nation state for them like their neighbors in Syria, Iraq and Egypt. The Arab revolution legitimacy element of the rule of Prince Abdullah was threatened by the upset tribes who argued their right of governing their own state. It was clear that Prince Abdullah chose to remain the Transjordanian's engagement in the state confined in the military (force institution), and engage other Arabs in shaping the policies and politics of Transjordan. The Prince's reliance on other Arab elements in building the politics in the new state of Transjordan fulfilled his cause of having a great Arab kingdom. Yet, weakened his government's political legitimacy for the local tribes who 'challenged the central government in Amman with violence actions and rebellions' (Mahafzah, 1973. p:44).

In the first years of the state establishment, Prince Abdullah showed high commitment for two things, first, the British-Transjordan treaty, which aided and counseled him. Second, the dream of ruling Natural Syria. By these two factors, Abdullah did not show much interest in developing relations with the local governments, nor in forming a stable political system. He focused on developing the army forces to serve his greatest ambitions in ruling Syria. This, of course, had come to change after the declaration of the national charter in 1928 which established a new era of relations and priorities for the Prince.

### **3.2. Social Factor in Political Legitimacy**

While the political legitimacy in the early establishment era under the rule of King Abdullah I was made by two main factors, the successor kings had to develop other alternative strategies to sustain their political legitimacy. The regime in Jordan faced multiple challenges on the local and regional levels. Most importantly, dynamic changes in the population and demography in Jordan after the Palestinian flux in 1948, economic challenges after terminating the British-Jordanian treaty, military coups in neighboring monarchies and transforming into authoritarian republics, and the War of 1967.

The state-society relations went through periods of transformations, tensions, and instability throughout the years. King Abdullah I mostly favored power and support from the British. King Hussein favored power in times of crisis and combined it with coalitions and political reformations that mostly pleased different social groups. Russel Lucas argues that the mobilization of political pluralism and civil society during periods of political liberalization ‘aided the regime in balancing the regime coalition giants and the opposition forces in the country...which allows the regime to pick and choose its partners from the diverse social field’ (Lucas, 2004, 112). King Abdullah II headed towards liberalization and economic reformations. However, it did not serve the social, political and economic demands of the people. To understand the reasons behind the different strategies of the monarchs in Jordan, the author offers an analysis of the nature of relations monarchy had with different social groups. The society in Jordan may be divided into three social groups based on origins. Each of them enjoys a different relation with the crown in a way that seems to put the monarchy in a position of absolute power and be the key balance to political and social stability in Jordan; tribes, Palestinian element, and minorities. In this section the author tries to examine two of the three elements in their relationship with the monarchy in Jordan, and how they enrolled as a part of the monarchy’s political legitimacy strategies. The minorities are divided into ethnic and religious groups; Circassians, Christians, Druze, and Armenians. However, they have not been a challenge in terms of legitimacy, rather, they enjoyed peaceful relations with the crown.

### **3.2.1. Tribes in Political Legitimacy**

From the early establishment to the present, Southern tribes played the biggest role in forming the Jordanian military. Tribes in Transjordan were the core of the Arab Legion armed forces in the Arab revolution, and the Prince understood that in the early days of the establishment of the state of Jordan (Alon, 2005). The tribes enjoyed a high level of independence and self-control even before the arrival of the Prince. The small communities in Transjordan were basically tribal communities. So, the tribes were the core of the community in most of the Transjordanian cities. The prince knew that the tribal

system was strong and solid, and that the modern state would not be a replacement for it. Nonetheless, he will have to compromise with the existing system. The tribal norms, traditions, clothes and looks had been placed to be the real face of Jordan's identity, as if it is the origin, and any other is the outlander. The South had lacked real institutional development in all sectors, urban planning, agriculture, education, health and investments. It is to be believed that the state intended to do so, to keep their loyalty and need to the monarch directly. In exchange, they enjoyed *makarem* (royal gifts) from the monarchs regarding their health insurances, education and jobs in the public sector. As for King Hussein, his vision was clear that he needed to raise a patriotic and national feeling and awareness in Jordan. The two banks' unification, creation of a Jordanian identity, and internal stability were the most challenging matters for King Hussein besides economic development.

Abudayeh and Naganuma argue that 1970 was the peak of the period which witnessed *decisive* relations between tribes and the administration. The departure of Gamal Abdel Nasser had weakened the Palestinian position in Jordan. That year, Jordan witnessed what is known as Black September, a bloody violence between the Jordanian army and the Palestinian guerillas who had violated the rules and formed a state within a state and put Jordan's national security under the threat of an Israeli backfire (Abu Dayeh, Naganuma, 2009. Vol. 37. No.4. 33). However, the relation of the tribes and monarchy is not derived and based on how the monarchy had formed relations with other elements and groups in the society. The Palestinian guerrillas were not Jordanian citizens but were welcome until 1970 to stay in Jordan under a condition of not attacking Israel from Jordan. Nonetheless, Black September shook the trust and loyalty for the Palestinian origins in Jordan, and made the King turn to Transjordanian tribes to form the Tribal Council (Majlis El-Asha'er) and appointed his brother, Prince Mohammad, as its head. The Council had operated for two years and was basically responsible for promoting tribal standards and for suggesting the most suitable methods of administration to be implemented among Bedouins (Official Gazette, 1976). This Council was cancelled six years later under several administrative changes and developments that aimed to escalate the negative effect of the conflict in 1970 between Palestinian origins and Transjordanians (Abu Dayeh,

Naganuma, 2009. Vol. 37. No.4. 33,34). However, the relationship was not always peaceful between monarchs and tribes. Though this relation has enjoyed a level of stability under the reign of King Hussein, two major riots and protests challenged the stability of the monarchy's relation with tribes. In 1989 a rebellion in Ma'an - a southern city in Jordan - aroused against the government's new economic reformation actions by the state. The tribes were very angry at the announcement of the reduction of subsidies on some basic items in accordance with the debt rescheduling agreement with the International Monetary Fund (Brand. A, 1995). King Hussein did not wish to use violence and favored a political solution. Though the protests wished for economic reformations, the monarchy offered a "democratic bargain" in return for unpopular policies' (Lucas, 2004, 114). Political reformations were offered, and a new era of democratization took place. It was an act of delusion and distraction of people's demand, yet it has preserved stability to some extent. When the state was not able to provide good economic conditions for people, it turned to the political solution. Many were optimistic about the new democratization policies, but maybe not the tribes. In 1996, another rebellion arose in Ma'an. The rebels called their rebellion "*Thawrat Al-Khoubz*" which literally means the "Bread Revolution", as a symbol of the poverty and lack of development their district suffered from. Ironically, King Hussein threatened to use power and force to set the order. Recruiting people from southern and northern tribes in the public sector did not drive real development for their regions, which has caused real differences between Amman and other cities and enlarged the gap between social classes.

For King Abdullah, he has inherited, to some extent, stable relations with most of the groups in Jordan, but favored the economic elites and different circles of relations. His vision was to empower Jordan economically and make it the Singapore of the Middle East. There were times when the relation between King Abdullah and tribes witnessed periods of tensions. In 2011, the *Hirak* which is the political tribal gathering, marched to Amman and protested in front of the interior ministry and addressed King Abdullah in person in their opponent's chants requesting the King move from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. In most of the tribal chants and political and social activities, they address the King directly instead of addressing the current government and prime

minister. Distinctly, the protests in Amman in 2018 gathered tribes, “*Hirak*”, political parties and individuals who protested the new tax law. Only tribes and people who are thought to belong to the *Hirak* addressed the King directly, unlike other groups who claimed for specific political and economic reformations and avoided addressing or insulting the King himself. These scenes and events demonstrate the kind of relation and position from the crown’s legitimacy the tribes believe they enjoy. Tribes in Jordan, precisely the Southern tribes, come to believe that they are the backbone of the Hashemite crown and the true safeguards for it.

Though when we talk about the tribes in Jordan, we do not differentiate between them. The author comes to highlight the most significant differences between tribes of the North and tribes of the South to help get a better understanding regarding the relations and kind of balance the monarchy in Jordan built with tribes. As there are no historical books or narratives addressing the tribal system in Jordan in this regard or from this point of view, this section will offer an additional explanation of the monarchy’s relations with the tribes in Jordan. The nature of the tribes of the North and Middle is different from the South in Jordan. In the North people are simple peasants and traders who had relations with neighboring cities from Syria and Palestine. However, Northern tribes enjoyed political awareness and more social interactions with neighboring communities<sup>20</sup>. There are not many records about the tribes and their relations with prince Abdullah when he arrived in Jordan. The historical books of that era speak about ‘disagreements and opposing riots against the sovereignty of the prince regarding his relationship with the British mandate’ (Mahafzah, 1973). No final judgment can be made upon the monarchy’s relation with Northern tribes regarding the latter's first positions. However, it is noted that Prince Abdullah did not appoint any Transjordanian character as a prime minister in the first years of establishment. Rather, he favored Syrian politicians regarding their expertise. This aroused tensions between the Prince and tribes who felt excluded from the process of policy making. However, a visible name of an opposer of the prince’s sovereignty back then was Kloub Shraideh, who engaged later in the former government, and by that a new

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<sup>20</sup> An interview by the author with Tayel Al-Saliby, History and Sociology Supervisor at the Northeastern Badia Education Directorate. 20.06.2021. Amman.

series of the relations between the tribes and the prince started. It is concluded that in the early years of the state establishment, most of the Bedouins were not politicized to influence the political scene, nor had the ability to legitimize or delegitimize a political system. Rather, they were put under the new situation and wanted to find room for themselves. However, the tribes were the essence of the Jordanian army formation and were the main social organizers in Transjordan.

### **3.2.2. Palestinian Element in Political Legitimacy**

The Palestinian flux from West Bank to Jordan in 1948 occurred change on the targeted groups regarding the loyalty to the monarchy in Jordan. The Jordanian army fought against the Israeli militias in Jerusalem and the West bank for two months. As a result, the West Bank was annexed under the Jordanian administration, and Palestinians in the West Bank were granted the Jordanian citizenship. This annexation had - in a way or another - implied an acceptance of the Hashemite monarchy's sovereignty over the West Bank and the Eastern part of Jerusalem. As Aragon identifies political legitimacy: 'it is the people's acknowledgment and acceptance of an entire political system and the validity of its decisions and policies' (Aragon, 2021) However, in countries like Jordan, it is hard to measure people's true opinion towards the legitimacy of the monarchy. Therefore, this section examines how the Palestinians in Jordan became an essential element of the monarch's legitimacy. The Palestinians came to Jordan on four levels and historical events. Starting, the Palestinian existence in the East Bank (Jordan now) has been there under the Ottoman empire. Al-Salt city witnessed a natural migration from Nablus (a Palestinian city) in the early 20th century. Therefore, Al-Salt enjoys a similar architecture to that which exists in Nablus. The second coming was in 1948 after the Arab-Israeli war, which resulted in the largest number of Palestinians who came to Jordan as refugees. The third coming was in the following Arab-Israeli war in 1967, which forced many Palestinians to flee from the West Bank. The fourth, and last, was due the Gulf war in 1990. Palestinians who took Kuwait as their first destination after the war of 1976 were forced again to come to Jordan in large numbers. As a result, between natural migration, forced migration and displacement, Palestinians formed a high percentage from the

Jordanian population, and most of them were given citizenship. However, The Palestinians who fled from the West Bank to the Eastern one -Jordan- were titled as refugees according to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Though Palestinians in Jordan who had fled in 1948 were granted the Jordanian citizenship, many of them live in the UNRWA camps of refugees.

There are two matters to consider while talking about the Palestinian element in the political legitimacy. One, the Palestinian asylum after the Arab-Israeli wars in 1948 and 1967. Two, the political and economic influence of the Palestinian origins on Jordan. More than 700,000 Palestinian fled from the West Bank to Jordan, Lebanon and Syria to seek refugee after the Arab-Israeli war in 1948 [UNRWA], 2021). According to the UNRWA, by 2015 there were 2 million Palestinians that are registered as refugees in Jordan. Though most of the Palestinians who sought refuge to Jordan have the Jordanian citizenship following the unification between the two Banks in 1950, many remain living in the UNWA camps of refugees. In the context of political legitimacy and governmentality, which are the lines of my argument in this paper, the Palestinian refugee issue in Jordan is not isolated from global and international politics. Palestinian refugees in the world were governed by UNRWA and some NGOs (non-governmental organizations). As most of the Palestinians in the camps of refugees in Jordan, not all of them, have the Jordanian citizenship. However, many of them left the camps and moved to the cities and engaged with social, political, and economic life there. In countries like Syria and Lebanon, the Palestinian refugees did not get citizenship, and in Lebanon precisely, the Palestinian refugees do not enjoy any kind of privileges or rights to access the public services, in other words they don't have any social, political, or economic liberties (UNRWA, 2021). However, the case in Jordan is different. The Palestinian refugees in Jordan have access to public services and healthcare, and those with the Jordanian nationality fully exercise their political rights. Christie Valentine argued that the annexation of the two Banks and giving citizenship to Palestinians refugees had aided the monarchy in Jordan in gaining legitimacy in increasing both territories and population (Valentine, 2011, 21). The administration of these camps is run by the UNRWA's office in Amman, thereby, the Jordanian state has no interference in the camp. Secondly, how does Jordan use the card

of the Palestinian refugees to serve its political legitimacy? The status-quo of the Palestinians in the camps of refugees serves Jordan in supporting the two-state solution. Having Palestinians who are still registered as refugees in Jordan, whether they have the citizenship or not, supports the claim of the 'right to return' and thereby passing Jordan's agenda that 'Jordan is not Palestine' (Beevor, 2018). The more Palestinians registered as refugees in the UNRWA, the more Jordan will be able to push toward supporting the right of return for the Palestinians. And as a result, Jordan will be able to reserve the political legitimacy of the existing political system.

For someone who lives in Jordan, they can tell who is Palestinian origin or Transjordanian by the name of the family. This does not apply to people and researchers who come to Jordan to analyze the Palestinian refugee issue in Jordan. Thereby, there are no published statistics on the numbers of Palestinians origins in Jordan other than what the UNRWA provides on the refugees in their camps in Jordan. And from this point precisely, the second matter of the Palestinian element is discussed. The political participation for Palestinian origins was heavily seen after the creation of the Political wing of the Muslims Brotherhood Organization; Islamic Action Front In 1993. Most of the Muslim Brotherhood members soon became members of the party. The Muslims Brotherhood organization was founded in Jordan in the mid 40s. And due to many factors, like the lack of organizations of the camps and the need for having an active body to call for the right of return, the Palestinian refugees headed toward joining this organization. The Islamic Action Front (IAF) was the most active party since its establishment as well as the Muslims Brotherhood organization. The organization soon became the most popular political and social body that revives the Palestinian cause. Their approach, ties to Hamas (the Muslims Brotherhood branch in occupied Palestine) and the international organization of Muslims Brotherhood, their charity works, schools and institutions, all made the members of this organization have the sense of belonging to a more narrowed society, that has to some extent been equal to the tribal system in Jordan. As a result, the monarchy in Jordan had to form relations with these two social elements that have an influence on two different social groups.

### **3.3. Identity in Political Legitimacy**

There was a need to create a shared identity between the Hashemite family and the Transjordanians. Laurie A. Brand suggested that there are four basic elements of the Jordanian identity. First, the association with the monarchy. Second, commitment to and expression of Arabism. Third, commitment to Palestine. Fourth and finally, the unity of the two People (Brand. A. L, 1995. 46-61). These elements shaped for great extent the unspoken identity conflict in Jordan. Nonetheless, they were merely clearly shaped after the unification of the two banks. The Hashemites focused on Arab identity to support their legitimacy. This has been translated as the ambition of creating one united Arab kingdom, as the creation of national identity in Transjordan was not in Prince Abdullah's plan or interest. This can be understood within the political and social conditions in the first years of establishment.

Although Prince Abdullah agreed with the British on ruling Jordan under their mandate, he did not hide his dream and goal of having a united Arab kingdom. The kind of identity he needed back then was a united Arab identity precisely. It is noted that in his first speech in the eve of the state establishment, prince Abdullah addressed the people of Transjordan as "Arabs" and mentioned the aspirations and achievements the Arab revolution achieved with British support (Al Malik Abdullah bin Al Hussein, 2012). This gives an indication of how the Prince saw Transjordan and what the establishment of this new state meant to him. The society of Transjordan in 1921 contained Transjordanian tribes, Circassians, Syrians and Palestinian origins. All of these groups were subjects of the Ottoman Empire and lived peacefully in their regions and lands. By addressing everyone as "Arabs," the Prince aimed to make Transjordan the start point of the Arab kingdom dream. If Transjordan can be a diverse community of Arabs under the command of a Hashemite ruler, then uniting the Arab territories could be achieved. Laura suggests three forms of Arabism the monarchy in Jordan emphasized. First, the monarchs' frequent references to the importance of the Arab revolt and its principles. Second, the periodic appeal to Arab Bedouin values. Third, Jordan's policy aimed at greater integration in Arab politics

(Brand. A. L, 1995, 50). An example can be provided by the recent speech of King Abdullah II in Tunis, on March 31, 2019:

We have unfortunately been preoccupied by internal national challenges and therefore unable to focus on the shared concerns of our Arab Ummah. This calls for moving from facing challenges separately into the actual implementation of joint Arab action. It is time we regained our compass to lead our societies toward security and prosperity” (King Abdullah Official Website, 2019)

Identity was an essential focus for the monarchy to achieve stability and legitimacy in the new state. The social and political demography of the map of Transjordan gave the impression that a shared identity can be easily formed due to the status-quo and may serve the ambition of the Prince to rule Syria. The military historian Majali mentions that Prince Abdullah was a fanatic against regionalism, and he considers Arabism his identity. The sense of Arabism was carried with the successive kings and crown princes. To give Jordan and the Transjordanian a sense of belonging to the regime was important. The sense of Arabism was derived from the Arab revolution. And that Jordan is part of the Arab Ummah who shall one day be united.

The Hashemites themselves were not Transjordanians, the Palestinian flux and the demographic distribution made socio-political differences between the cities in Jordan, and the Arab revolution ties were not enough anymore. Unlike his grandfather, King Hussein sought to build a unified identity in Jordan between Palestinians and Transjordanians. He focused on the idea that the “Jordanian” identity contains people from different origins “*shatta al osul wa Al manabit*”. He addressed people in Jordan in his speeches with this sentence and created a legitimate identity for the royal family aside from their origins. The Arabism identity and approach was for King Abdullah I, and his grandson King Hussein the most important element for their legitimate rule over Jordan. Prince Abdullah (later King Abdullah I) focused on integrating the Transjordanian tribes in his vision of Arabism. The tribes did not mind, according to the historian Majali, they shared the same feeling of Arabism with the Prince because they wanted to be part of this Arab kingdom, and because they wanted to put their tribal disagreements behind and move forward to have a state.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Interview with the Military Historian Bakir Al Majali. Ro'ya TV 2019.

King Hussein showed his commitment to the Arabism vision and identity in two important events: first, in 1956 he released the British commanders of the Arab Legion forces and ended the British era of commanding the Jordanian army. This action was welcomed by the Jordanian army and people and strengthened the legitimacy Hussein needed in his first years as a monarch. The Arabization of the Jordanian army also served the legitimacy of the monarchy in the region. Four years previously, in 1952, the Arab region witnessed patriotic national movements led by military soldiers in Egypt to overthrow King Farouk and free Egypt from the imperial powers and foreign interventions<sup>22</sup>. This movement had an echo within the Jordanian military, who wanted to sever their relations with the British, and take the lead in their own military institution. King Hussein shared the same feelings with the soldiers, yet he was not sure of the capabilities and abilities of the Jordanian soldiers to replace the British commanders instantly. He mentioned in his Book *My Job as a King*<sup>23</sup> that he had personal disagreements with Kloub Pasha on two essential matters. First, the role of the Arab officers in the Jordanian army. And second, Jordan's defensive strategies. He mentioned that he wanted to promote the Jordanian officers to senior positions in the army so they can lead the army:

This choice upset the authoritarian policy that was persuaded by Britain...The Anglo-Jordanian treaty stipulated the right of Jordan to receive financial assistance amounting to 12 million pounds annually, and the obligation of Great Britain to provide the officers necessary to organize the Jordanian army. But the English were practically leading the army.<sup>24</sup>

However, the decision of Arabizing the army was finally made despite the British plan of giving up the military command to Jordanians after 30 years. King Hussein did not wait for the British plan, he favored winning loyalty from the army, as quoted in his diary: “the army in Jordan is not only an instrument of defense against foreign raids, but is also, and especially an integral part of the entire nation”.<sup>25</sup> Also, the Arabizing of the Army served the sovereignty of the monarchy over Jordan. Second, he tried to create a shared identity

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<sup>22</sup> In 1952, a group of the Egyptian military forces called itself the “Free soldiers movement” and sought to overthrow King Farouk to free Egypt from the Imperial forces.

<sup>23</sup> Diaries of King Hussein in an interview by a French journalist with King Hussein about his life and his job as a king. This interview was gathered in a book and was published as the official book of King Hussein's diaries and was put as an Open source.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. p86

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. p87

between the Palestinians who sought refuge in Jordan in 1948 and Transjordanians by creating a unified identity. Two years following the announcement of unification of the two banks and granting Palestinians of the West Bank a Jordanian citizenship in 1949, King Abdullah I was assassinated in Jerusalem by a Palestinian man. When King Hussein exercised his powers 3 years later, he sought to secure his legitimacy and throne. And this could not be done without the Palestinian element in Jordan. Laura argues that the Jordanian monarchy's goal was less to impose Transjordanian identity on Palestinians than to create a hybrid Transjordanian identity on both communities. Nonetheless, making the King the symbol of Jordan has been 'central to the states' efforts to create a hybrid identity and to promote that unquantifiable commodity known as 'legitimacy' (Brand. A. L, 1995, 50). Palestinian origins in the West Bank and Jordan were all Jordanian citizens by law since 1948 when King Abdullah I granted them citizenship. Yet, both of Transjordanian and Palestinian communities lived through social and economic differences. The West Bank was wealthier and more developed due to the development and attention it enjoyed by the Ottomans and later the British mandate.

In contrast, Jordan did not enjoy such development nor attention. Due to lack of resources and social studies in that phase, there is no accurate quantitative data to measure how the people of both communities felt regarding the identity. Yet, analyzing the monarch's strategy in imposing the Transjordanian identity and Arabism on both communities can provide us an explanation of how the monarchy legitimized its rule by this factor. Additionally, the conflict of Black September in 1970 added a new identity challenge for the regime. Instead of proving to the people that the monarchy does not prefer one group over another, King Hussein created the tribal council right after the events of 1970 and assigned them in promoting tribal standards. For a Hashemite monarchy, the Transjordanian-Palestinian identity in Jordan is a matter of stability. Favoring one group over another in different times and events translates the regime's strategy in legitimizing itself upon the instability of the sub identities to seek the one absolute identity of the Hashemites; Jordan is a Hashemite country. However, it should be noted that King Hussein had never addressed in his diaries nor in his speeches any citizen in Jordan with

his origin. He would only focus in his speeches on the idea that Jordan is a home for all Jordanians despite their origins.

A relevant reference to the Hashemite identity is seen in the national anthem. The national anthem in Jordan was written and sung in 1946 by the announcement of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It starts with 'Long live the King' and then describes the king as 'king of Arabs' who has the 'glory of Arabs under his flag'. Another factor can be discussed regarding crafting identity in Jordan in serving the political legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy. Choosing a capital of a new state that was intended to be a start point for the Hashemite prince to create the united Arab kingdom was important and challenging. The Prince moved from Ma'an to Amman after he was welcomed by the tribes of Ma'an. There, in Ma'an, it was the Prince's starting point to move forward to Syria. However, when he arrived in Amman, the British officers in Jerusalem had already decided the future plan of division of the region. An agreement was made by the British officers and Prince Abdullah to allow the latter to rule Transjordan and give up Syria. There was a debate between the British officials of the colonies regarding choosing a local administration for Transjordan in 1920, before Prince Abdullah's arrival to Amman. 'Al-Salt' made a suitable choice for them because it was the largest town of the region and had been 'endowed with extensive administrative facilities by the Ottomans over the previous half century' (Rogan, L. 1996, 3). However, Prince Abdullah was not welcomed to rule over Al-Salt due to its previously existing system. Ma'an was neither developed nor prepared to be a capital for the prince. The decision was made on Amman to make it the capital. Amman was historically the capital of Transjordan named "Rabbat Ammoun" for the Romans and had refugee societies of Circassians and Syrians who settled there under the Ottoman Empire. Despite these circumstances, the Prince succeeded in creating the capital and formed a political union. Though Prince Abdullah did not choose Amman in the first place, yet Amman had served the symbolic meaning of creating a new identity for Jordan, unlike Al-Salt which had ties with the Ottoman Empire regarding its urban planning and administration system.

### **3.4. Power in Political Legitimacy**

Power has many forms and applications. Michel Foucault suggests that power determines the individual's behaviors by controlling the individual's decisions to have (Crowley, 5). Therefore, it is important to understand how power works, determines tools of power, and how the authority exercises power. The strategies of the monarchs in exercising power under the political legitimacy process may be categorized through the following: first, the constitution. Between absolute monarchy and constitutional monarchy, practicing politics was done with many limitations of peoples' engagement in the process of decision making. The issue appears in the electoral system and the King's wide constitutional powers. The electoral system in Jordan has been changed and drafted. Second, the institutions. The monarchs had exercised powers through institutions whether it was constructed by laws in the constitution, or it was through forming relations with the institutions. Most of the time, these institutions were in favor of the monarchy and were loyal. Yet, some might have formed a threat at some point to the power of the monarchs. The institutions I tackle in this section, and believe are the key institutions of the monarch's legitimacy are: the general intelligence department, the army, the royal Hashemite court, and finally the executive and legislative authorities.

This section examines the tools of exercising power in Jordan, and suggests that it was through two main panels, the institutions and the constitution. In institutional form, the monarchy has tied the military directly to the monarch and determined the civil-military relations. Moreover, the monarchy in Jordan created the Royal Hashemite Court (RHC) which has replaced the governmental services in many sectors and applied a new equation on the political scene. As for exercising power through the constitution, the king is the absolute power and authority in the state, he rules through his ministers and is not accountable to the Parliament. Between the institutions and constitution, the space of exercising power maximized and threatened the democracy and liberalization process in Jordan throughout the years.

Since the establishment of the Emirate of Transjordan, the Jordanian forces remained under the British command until King Hussein Arabized the army and placed Jordanian commanders over it and placed himself as the higher commander of the military forces. Power in its direct meaning was exercised by the monarchs in Jordan through the military institution to end an instinct threat to the crown and preserve security. The years 1970 and 1996 witnessed a 'heavy use' and 'threat of use' of force to set order. As mentioned previously, the year 1970 was named Black September due to the bloody violence happened between the Palestinian guerillas in Jordan and the Jordanian army. Though King Hussein did not wish to risk Jordan's relations with the PLO and their leader Yasser Arafat, violence had taken place in Amman and other Jordanian cities to protect the sovereignty of Jordan against the violations. In that time, Jordan had lost lands of the West Bank in the borders of 1948 to the Israeli forces during the Six-Days War in 1967, which made it more challenging for Jordan to have administrative control over an occupied land with a great chance to lose it too.

In 1996, the Jordanian army was called for the first time to the streets to set the order facing civilian riots. As there are not many records on that riot, the author relied on popular resources. The riot in 1996 broke out in Al-Karak (southern city in Jordan) against the Al-Kabariti government who 'pushed forward the IMF economic reform program despite the opposition by the parliament' (Andoni and Schwedler, 1996, 41). There are some published recorded videos by the people from Al-Karak showing the damage done by the riots to express their anger on what they called 'starving policies: economic policies that would necessarily make people starve'. Moreover, some witnesses on the events talked about different groups from the army who entered Al-Karak, such as the *Bedouin forces*<sup>26</sup>. Ironically, these riots called for the end of Al-Kabariti government and chanted 'long live the King'. However, two dozen armored military vehicles, several helicopters and dozens of troop transporters entered Karak to set order again. And King Hussein went out for a speech that was broadcast on state television and promised to 'strike with an iron arm'

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<sup>26</sup> Bedouin forces emerged in the beginning of the establishment of Transjordan as a part of the Jordanian forces league. Their main duty was to protect the southern borders of Transjordan. Later on, their responsibilities developed to contain the spread of narcotics and are called to oppress massive demonstrations in times of need.

those who he called 'undutiful' people. Andoni and Schwedler pointed to how the King dressed in that speech and his tone; "when the streets were clear, the King visited the several hundred soldiers in Karak and gave a short speech that was broadcast on state television. Wearing a military uniform (the King is the supreme commander of the army), he said he was "pained and saddened" by the violence, but equally determined to crush the protest" (Andoni and Schwedler, 1996, 41). These two events caused a fundamental change in the military-civil relations. While the high commander in the military is the King himself, a question of the military institutional objectivity rises. Another institutional element in exercising power is the RHC<sup>27</sup>. The RHC replaced itself as the problem solver institution when the executive authorities and governmental services failed to meet people's needs and aspirations. The conflictual status the RHC did was challenged by King Abdullah II, who sought to liberalize the institutions to move forward into a democratic state.

As for the Constitution, the issue arises in the fact that the constitution of 1951, states that the regime in Jordan is parliamentary, monarchical, and inherited. But on the ground, the power is absolute by the hand of the king. And the parliament's role has been decreased and undermined. By law, the king rules through his ministers, yet he is not responsible for their actions. Another dimension the power legitimacy may be analyzed from, is the challenges that face the legitimacy. The General Intelligence Department has been a key to understanding the dynamics of powers in Jordan's internal politics. The creation of an intelligence department is one of the key points to preserve the national security in the state. The role of the intelligence departments in the Arab countries had been always tied to the stability and security of the political system. The rulers would heavily rely on this institution to ensure the legitimacy of their reigns. By taking Jordan as a case study in this research, the monarchs faced some oversteps on their terms of references by the department of general intelligence. Jordan's intelligence service is considered one of the most developed and active institutions of its kind in the Middle East. It was established by the British officials at the mandatory period and then was led by Jordanians after the Arabization of the Army in 1957.

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<sup>27</sup> For more details See chapter 3: Religious legitimacy

### 3.5. Religion in Political Legitimacy

The religious approach has always been a beneficial tool to legitimize authority. History gives us many examples of religions that played a huge role in sustaining political systems around the world. Max Weber's theory of types of authority contains an indication of religious legitimacy in the traditional authority type he proposes. Traditional authority rises when the people are willingly obeying someone because they believe in the holiness of the ancient traditions and the legitimacy of those to rule. Like royal families in kingdoms, they are "ordained by God to rule over people". This type of authority still exists even in democratic spheres. In Europe, we could still see queens and kings, yet the parliament is to rule. This kind of authority loses its power over time. And what keeps the rulers in their "traditional authority" status is the history, culture, and identity of that place. An interpretation made by Hossein Razi on the relation between religion and legitimacy in the Middle East offers that Islam has influenced political attitudes on some social and political aspects within Middle Eastern societies. Notably the *nature* of the legitimate political system (Razi, 1990, 75). The religious symbolism for people of the Middle East is part of their identity and existence. There is this need to see religion represented and respected as a part of the formation of their political system and constitution. The case of religious and traditional legitimacy in Jordan is no different by the concept. However, the religious and traditional tool for the monarchy in Jordan has been transformed as a pillar for the political system's legitimacy through historical legacy and institutions that preserved this legacy.

One may ask if Jordan is considered a religious or secular country in terms of democratization and liberalization reformations. Hani Shboul explains the relationship between religion and state in Jordan in the historical perspective. He argued that the state of Jordan was not characterized as a religious state since its establishment nor as a secular one, nonetheless, Jordan has maintained what he called a balance between civil and religious requirements. He argued that this balance between these two pillars were preserved through generations of successive kings, and the country did not come out from this public line at any stage (Shboul, 2018). In this section, I examine the religious

legitimacy within the epistemological understanding of civil-state relations in the case of Jordan, including the tribal and Palestinian elements in accepting this kind of religious legitimacy. Second, I illustrate how religious legitimacy was institutionalized by the political system to ensure its sustainability. Furthermore, I argue that religious legitimacy is under the threat of losing its influence and status due to the change in Jordan's domestic and international politics and relations throughout the years. Religious legitimacy was and still is an essential part of the legitimacy of the monarchy in Jordan.

### **3.5.1. Elements of Religious Legitimacy**

The monarchy in Jordan built its religious legitimacy through two significant elements. First, the Hashemites legacy of Prophet Mohammad. The Hashemite's historical kinship tie to Prophet Muhammed was presented by some scholars as one of the key reasons for the Jordanian monarchy's resilience and its perceived legitimacy to rule (Yom, 2009). As mentioned in chapter 2, the new state of Jordan was founded in 1921 by Prince Abdullah I. even though the colonial powers agreed with the Prince to rule Transjordan and offered him support and help to establish a state, the acceptance of the people of Transjordan was a vital element to put this establishment into success (Mahafzah, 1973). Tribes that fought alongside the Prince in the 1916 Arab Revolution against the Ottoman Empire, saw that the Prince was more legitimate than the Ottomans to rule them. For them, he is an Arab and his father is the Sharif of Mecca and Hashemites are the descendants of Prophet Mohammad. For tribes of Transjordan, these were better qualities than what the late rulers of the Ottoman Empire would offer them, especially after the disagreements and injustice they experienced from the late Ottoman rulers in their districts. Also, this descent to the Prophet makes the Hashemite kings less vulnerable to criticism and delegitimization on religious grounds. As the legitimacy was to the Caliphate under the Ottoman Empire, Arabs accepted it as part of the Islamic heritage and transition of Muslim Caliphates. However, this element of legitimacy was demolished when the CUP changed the essence of the Ottoman Empire and transferred the legitimacy of the state from the Caliphate to Turkish nationalism. Therefore, this kind of tie is important because it cannot be contested by the regime's opponents. And it can be considered as a backbone for the regime in times

of crisis, as when King Hussein in 1990-1991 told all relevant social forces to sign a document stating that “Jordan's system of political rule is Hashemite and dynastic” (Bank and Schlumberger, 2002). In the same year, the King asked members of the Parliament not to address him as Your Majesty, but simply as Al-Sharif. By this word he invoked his lineage to Prophet Mohammad in a legislative institution. Though Jordan is not considered as religious state, the second article of the constitution states that the religion of this country is Islam, and no prince can be crowned a king unless he was born from a Muslim mother. Practicing religion by the kings and crown princes may not seem important as much as their religious background and ties to Prophet Mohammad to gain respect and acceptance from the people.

The second element is the custody of the Hashemites over the holy places in Jerusalem. Alongside with the Hashemites’ historical and religious heritage and ties with Prophet Mohammad, and before they lost their custody over Mecca and Medina by the rise of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Sharif Hussain showed commitment and awareness towards the holy places in Jerusalem since 1917, as the British mandate records show (Kilani, 2019). According to the British mandate archives,<sup>28</sup> The first Friday prayer of the year 1917 marked a historic transition of the 400 years of responsibility from Ottoman Sultans towards holy places in Jerusalem. In that year, the Friday prayers by the Imam of Al-Aqsa were for Hussein bin Ali, not the Sultan. This prayer is symbolically, religiously and legally very important (Kilani, 2019). In a paper presented to the United Nations in 2019 by the director of the Royal Hashemite Fund for the Restoration of Al-Aqsa, Kilani highlighted the legal significance of this transition as follow; ‘first, the Al-Aqsa Mosque was not left without royal custodianship representing the Muslim *ummah*, especially after the Sultan Abdelhamid was overthrown. Second, Sharif Hussain was very keen to show responsibility towards Muslim and Christian communities in Jerusalem during the transition period 1916-1924. Third, there was the religious *bay’ah*<sup>29</sup>. In 1924 for Sharif Hussein to take custody over the holy places. And finally, the united Arab kingdom dream

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<sup>28</sup> The British mandate records published as reports and are available online as open source.

<sup>29</sup> *Al Bay’a* is an Arabic verb which means the approval of someone's right to rule by the people. It is a tradition where people come to see the person who is going to rule and verbally give him their approval. It can be seen as the old version of social contract in the Islamic world.

would be paved by the religious legitimacy of ruling over the holy places in Jerusalem (Kilani, 2019).

In 1924, Sharif Hussein was visited by Haj Amin Al Husseini, the leader of the Islamic Higher Council in Jerusalem<sup>30</sup>, who informed Sharif of the threats to the Mosque and need of funds to restore the heritage of the holy place. Sharif contributed around 50,000 golden lire to restore Al-Aqsa Mosque and other mosques in Palestine. His timely response to the call of the people of Jerusalem made them honor him and request that Sharif Hussein be buried in the western corner of Al Haram Al Sharif in June 1931, affirming his stature, and recognizing his efforts in safeguarding Islamic institutions in Jerusalem.

Accordingly, the Hashemites of Jordan became legitimate safeguards of the holy places in Jerusalem. A series of restorations and developments were made in Jerusalem<sup>31</sup>. Moreover, this has found a positive echo in the hearts of the people of Jordan, and especially after the commitment of Prince Abdullah to his father's legacy and then his successions. The Palestinian flux to the East Bank gave this kind of legitimacy another dimension. While there is no accurate data that can tell us the percentage of the Palestinian-origin Jordanians, it can be said that a huge number of the population are originally from West Bank and Jerusalem. The Jordanian government throughout the years had vital involvement in the renovations of the holy sites, both Christian and Islamic. Jordan's intention in seeking legitimacy over holy was different to that of the British and French. Legitimizing the authority over the holy city of Jerusalem ensured the new King of Jordan; Abdullah the First, his right of ruling Jordan, as Kartz argues (Kartz, 2003). To gain an internal acceptance and support, the regime had to turn its interest toward the Palestinian element in society, not just the tribal one. Jerusalem and the West Bank were under the Jordanian government control until 1988, when the FLO claimed that the West Bank and Jerusalem should be under a Palestinian government. Despite the

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<sup>30</sup> An Islamic non-governmental institution to safeguard Jerusalem's heritage.

<sup>31</sup> Wasfi Al Kelani; the director of the RH fund for the restoration of Al-Aqsa submitted a paper to the International Conference of the Question of Jerusalem and listed four commitments by the Hashemites towards the holy places throughout the years. Furthermore, he listed more restorations made by Hashemites from 1922 till 2019.

administrational detachment from Jordan, the holy sites remained under the Hashemites custodianship till today. The question remains; how can the custodianship of Hashemites over holy places be considered as a pillar of legitimacy for the Hashemites in Jordan? It is very important for regime stability to share values and norms with the people. This case arises in Jordan due to the demographic and social political environment Jordan has.

The connection between the Hashemite custodianship over holy places and their legitimacy in Jordan should be demonstrated in each period of the Hashemite reign. For Prince Abdullah I, Jerusalem was part of his dream of a united Arab kingdom. It was also the legacy he inherited from his father. He had to secure this legacy and ensure that the colonial powers in the region confirmed his custodianship. For King Hussain the custodianship took another dimension. Despite its importance as an inherited legacy, it was a pillar of the regime's stability on the regional level. Jordan presented itself as the only left safeguard to the holy places in Jerusalem. In addition, the unification between the West Bank and Jordan in 1950, was more of an administrative unification. The two Banks shared the Parliament, Palestinian refugees gained the Jordanian citizenship, and the education was unified. Nonetheless, since frequent reference is made to the Hashemite role in defending Jerusalem. The royal family continued their support to the Islamic holy places and continued paying the salaries of government employees on the West Bank even after Israel seized it in 1967. Up until the peace treaty, it also invoked its continued military preparedness to confront the enemy (Brand, 1995, 51). The international and national speeches made by the former kings and the current Abdullah II never ignored the Hashemites' legitimate custody over the holy places in Jerusalem. The latest was an international speech that King Abdullah II made at the Plenary Session of the 75th United Nations General Assembly, he said:

And we cannot resolve this conflict without working to preserve Jerusalem for all humanity, as a unifying city of peace. As Hashemite Custodian, I am bound by a special duty to safeguard Jerusalem's Islamic and Christian holy sites, but the responsibility for the Holy City falls on us all.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Part of King Abdullah II speech at the plenary session of the 75th United Nations General Assembly: written word on the official website of King Abdullah II.

Furthermore, the Jordanian regime was keen to show its supportive political position to the two-state solution and peace building for Palestinians in their homelands. Hence, Jordan has faced economic and political challenges regarding this position.

### **3.5.2. Institutionalizing Religious Legitimacy**

Religious legitimacy was built through institutions and political ties and trust. The regime has imposed control over most of the media and newspapers editors, gained the Islamic political movements and parties' loyalty to the Hashemite regime and established religious institutions that lifted the Hashemites. Building the religious legitimacy on what already existed may even be more challenging. The Hashemites had to maximize their religious legitimacy to sustain this pillar safely and guard over time (they guaranteed the people's acknowledgement of this pillar). There has been work on institutionalizing the religious elements of legitimacy, engaging these institutions with the everyday life activities of the citizens, and giving them the "Hashemi" title to ensure direct engagement to the house of Hashemites. In this part, I will mention the most significant institutions that I believe had a huge influence on the Jordanian identity ties to the Hashemites. Starting from the Royal Hashemite Court, which historically was named "*Al Maqar*"<sup>33</sup>. Since its foundation, its main job was to link and connect between the king, the state's institutions, and citizens. As it is also responsible to follow up on political, economic, and developmental royal initiatives. Furthermore, the court takes responsibility in covering expenses of medical treatment for citizens who do not have health insurance. These kinds of services the royal court offers to citizens can be very conflictual with the government responsibilities. For example, the health insurance coverage should be the Ministry of Health's responsibility. The failure of the state's institutions in providing services to citizens is commonly covered by the Royal Court, which enhances the feeling that the king can solve whatever the problem is for citizens. And by that, a sense of loyalty to the person of the king arises against the state institutions. In contrast, when the court fails in meeting people's aspirations and needs, it loses loyalty and trust from people.

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<sup>33</sup> Al Maqar: Arabic word means the headquarters.

In 2018, around 350 people marched from Aqaba (the southern port of Jordan) to Amman the capital and protested in front of the Royal Court demanding for jobs. The people did not trust the institutions, nor the Ministry of Labor to protest in front of, in contrast, they directly headed to the Royal Court in the Capital to seek a solution. Ironically, on the second day of the protests the government announced 3,300 jobs in tourism, industry, construction, health, and agriculture will be made available, and urged the protesters to register (Abu Sneineh, 2019). The Royal Hashemite Court placed itself as the problem solver to the people. And the people will always link the “Hashemite” phrase with “solution”. Whether the regime initially wanted to take this position or not, this made people throughout the years appeal to the person of the king in many matters. In 2016 King Abdullah II instructed some minor adjustments on the role of the royal Hashemite court regarding medical exemptions. Instead of handling the matter to the RHC alone, he instructed them to arrange the medical exemptions and health coverage insurance with the Ministry of Health. However, the regime sounds to be stuck in a circle of empowering the person of the king and depowering the government institutions.

On another level, there were investments in educational, research, cultural and force institutions regarding enhancing religious legitimacy by name. The University of Al Albayt for an example, in which the phrase of “Al Al-bayt” means Islamically the family or house of the Prophet Mohammad, was established under the chairmanship of Prince Hasan bin Talal in 1995. It was the first university to have a royal member in its administration. Further, there are other *Hashemite* organizations like, the Hashemite Organization for the Injured Soldiers, and the Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization. However, there are many institutions titled with *royal* status, even though they refer to the royal family, the house of Hashemites, and mostly are run by royals. However, some of them are privatized and do not necessarily represent the monarchy, yet it could provide the same assumption of institutions with the title ‘Hashemite’.

What makes the difference between a *Royal* and a *Hashemite* institution, is that the Hashemite institutions offer themselves as alternatives for the state institutions and as a pure gesture and intuition from the Hashemite royals to be generous with the people and

try their best to meet their needs regardless of what the government does. A status of separation between the king and the state was made by the regime. To some extent it succeeded, but many times, people announced that the failure of any government is because they are not engaged in the process of choosing the prime minister, however, the king must take the blame. King Abdullah II's reign witnessed a lot of these expressions, despite the democratization and liberalization process he announced.

Within the institutionalization of religious legitimacy, I followed what the national education school textbook teaches the Jordanian students. The seventh-grade textbook explains to the reader that the legitimacy of the Hashemites in Jordan comes from the fact that they were the *leaders of the modern Arab awakening project*. Notably, the textbook includes the legitimacy of accomplishments made by the former kings as one of the tools and pillars that legitimized the ruling of the Hashemites.<sup>34</sup> Moving from the element of kinship to the Prophet Mohammad to the second element of the custody over the holy places in Jerusalem, Prince Abdullah (later King Abdullah I) took his father's lead in contributing to the holy places and transferred this to his heirs. Another institution that was politicized in Jordan is the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Friday prayers, which is a unified speech written by a formal committee by the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic affairs has become more like the voice of the state through the speakers of the Mosques.

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<sup>34</sup>7th grade national education textbook (first edition of the year 2016).

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **LEGITIMACY CHALLENGES AND SECOND ARAB SPRING**

In 2021, the state celebrated 100 years of stability, development, political and economic achievements. However, the most recent events, since the wave of the Arab spring, made people on ground and on different social media platforms criticize what the state has called ‘achievements’ on the political and economic level. In this chapter I draw on the contemporary politics of Jordan and events that have created challenges to the legitimacy of the monarchy in Jordan. As argued in the previous chapter, the Monarchy in Jordan built its internal legitimacy by presenting themselves as loyal to the new state of Jordan, accommodating different social groups of Jordanian tribes and Palestinian origins, showing hostility towards Israel and supporting the Palestinian cause as part of Jordan’s regional role. The validity of the monarchy’s legitimacy while it is facing internal and external challenges, is tightened directly to its limitation in exercising power regarding its international order. Currently, Jordan faces an economic crisis with high rates of unemployment, inflation, and poverty. Also, Jordan relies on other countries like ‘Israel’ to provide it with basic needs like water and gas which leaves Jordan’s national security and sovereignty under threat.

Three main issues have shaped the new challenges to the political legitimacy of the Monarchy in Jordan. Within the contemporary issues of economic crisis, instability in neighboring countries, and changes in the political order in the region, Jordan has been trying to preserve its stability and empower the political system. The Arab spring posed a new phase on the region as well as it did on Jordan. And as a result, the demographic composition in Jordan is now part of the challenges, as it has high rates of youth, immigrants and refugees. Additionally, Jordan’s natural resources are under mounting threat due to the inefficient administration which is driving Jordan to rely on other

countries to provide these resources. These issues are an added burden to the legitimacy challenge to the monarchy.

However, Jordan is considered a key player in regional conflicts due to its proximity to war zones like Iraq and Syria, its ability to host refugees, and its willingness to host military bases. Also, the diplomatic capabilities of Jordan to be a part of the international attempts to find solutions to the Syrian instability is because Jordan is one of the countries that hosted refugees in large numbers at the beginning of the war in Syria. In this chapter I show how the new demographic composition in Jordan is a challenge in stabilizing the monarchy; by drawing on Youth and refugees and migrants from political and economic aspects. Also, I address the issue of water and gas in Jordan as they are the future keys to save Jordan's economy and preserve the monarchy's stability. Finally, I show the ebb and flow of Jordan's regional order under king Abdullah I, Hussein and Abdullah II.

#### **4.1. Youth and Demographic Challenge During and After Arab Spring**

Arab countries have relatively young populations. Young people represent 20 percent of the population in Egypt and Syria, compared with 15 percent in Bahrain, 21 percent in Algeria, and 22 percent in Iran and Jordan, all of which have faced their protests (Mirkin,2013 p.13). According to UNICEF<sup>35</sup>Jordan has one of the youngest populations in the world among 63% of them are under the age of 30 (UNICEF, 2021). Consequently, on one hand, measuring the size of the political participation and interaction in the Jordanian society is related to the numbers of youth who participate and interact in the political life in Jordan. On the other hand, the economic crisis and high rates of unemployment in the Arab region are mainly threatening the youth. In other words, the youth as a demographic factor are one of the basic factors that drives change in politics in the Arab region. And in the context of the Arab Spring, youth imposes the demographic challenge for the states as they have represented the highest participation in protests and demonstrations compared to low participation in the elections. In the case of Jordan,

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<sup>35</sup> UNICEF: the official organization of the United Nations Children's Fund. was found in 1946 and placed in NewYork.

youth's political activity is mainly concentrated among university students during and after the Arab spring. While most students are not members of political parties, those who belong to political parties are about 16% with the majority of 52% belonging to the Islamic Action Front party. Taking into consideration that the Muslim Brotherhood and its political front the IAF party, is the most well-organized political force in the country, it is worth remembering that Islamists are closest to the common people and this is reflected in the fact that the political attitude of the majority of respondents is Islamic (al-Azzam, 2014, p. 289). Notably, the Arab spring was not the first time in Jordan when students of the Jordanian universities engage in demonstrations and be part of the political change in Jordan. Youth as a challenging demographic factor to legitimacy did not form a threat to political regimes in the Arab region. However, this has changed when youth movements formed active social movements and allied with political parties and civil society organizations intending to occur a change in contemporary politics. But what has driven youth to engage in the Arab Spring? Two elements might be directly behind the youth's massive participation in the Arab spring, first the lack of opportunities under the rapid growth in population and the state's failure in providing them proper life. Second, the youth's inability to be part of the decision-making in their countries, which by contrast led to corruption and have the power and decision-making in the Arab countries monopolized by certain people. In the same context, Mulderig argues that "the contagion of the Arab Spring revolutions was largely caused by the realization of youth in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and elsewhere that their generation was living in an undignified liminal state of pre-adulthood, and that the possibility of demanding access to education, jobs, and marriage was open to all Arab youth" (Mulderig, 2013, p. 4). This kind of realization was seen in Jordan within the youth who cooperated with other political groups and parties in the country who agreed on boycotting the elections of 2011 and demand collectively political and economic reforms (Yitzhak, 2018, p. 30).

There is another dimension when speaking of youth in the Arab spring. The first wave in 2011 was accompanied by the internet and social media's easy access and spread all over the world. The narrative of any political event was no longer monopolized by the state alone. The spread of information and access to it has changed the power dynamics on the

ground, not just for Jordan, but for all other countries that witnessed demonstrations and reformation demands. This has challenged the despotic and authoritarian regimes' ability to impose control over information and calls for demonstrations. Online activism, social media websites, and the emergence of alternative news platforms all played important coordinating and mobilizing roles in protest movements (Harris, 2015). In Jordan, the state had to deal with people without a structured body. Alongside the political parties and worker unions, a new form of political opposition by youth was demonstrating, and the only way to contain their anger and pause their activities was by responding to their demands or oppressing them to the maximum level. The state in Jordan was not in favor of using violence or spitting blood. The examples of Syria, Yemen, and Libya were not appealing to both the state and the people in Jordan. People's main demand was to decrease the power of the king and move toward a constitutional monarchy. With the king having power over the executive authority, part of Parliament (senators), and the army, moving toward this demand was not easy to achieve at once. The king declared in one of his visits to the European Union that Jordan has "embraced the Arab spring as an opportunity" and that Jordan "aims to be a haven in a turbulent region" (EU affairs, 2012). The youth formed a challenge to the state on two levels derived from the fact that they represent more than half of the population in Jordan. First, the continuous mounting numbers of unemployment and poverty, second the modern tools of internet and social media the youth have that are hard to be controlled. In 2015 a cybercrime law draft legislation was issued under a popular rejection for what people argued that this law will be a tool to violate their rights and freedoms. Despite these concerns and calls for rephrasing the law and making it more narrowed, in 2019 the parliament discusses the cybercrime bill and voted in favor of this law.

As Jordan is a youth country, its future depends on them. That's why king Abdullah turned to them mainly post-Arab Spring. If he wants to legitimize his reign and ensure what comes in the constitution; that the political system is parliamentary inherited monarchy, then he has to encourage the youth to be part of it. Especially that his successor the crown prince Hussein belongs to this group. It is important for the current king to ensure his son's throne and leave him a legacy of stable internal politics. However, he did not change

the electoral system when everyone believed that this ‘one vote system’ should be changed. Simply because it doesn’t reflect real representation of people.

#### **4.2. Refugees and Migrant Workers In Jordan**

Jordan has been a destination for migrants from neighboring countries before and during the Arab Spring. Palestinians, Iraqis, Syrians, and Egyptians were the main nationalities to take Jordan as a destination all for different reasons. These new communities that have interred Jordan posed on the government and the political system some changes according to what each represented. For Palestinians, which are the largest population among all refugees in Jordan, more than half of the population now in Jordan (HRW, 2010). As discussed in chapter two, Palestinians have come to Jordan after three major wars in the region, the Arab-Israeli wars in 1948 and 1967, and the Gulf war in 1991 which forces Palestinians in Kuwait to seek refuge in Jordan. Currently, Palestinians in Jordan are divided into two categories. First, those who gained Jordanian citizenship and enjoy all their political and civil rights. And those are divided into two parts according to their residency. The first part lives outside the camps of refugees, and the second part still lives inside the camps of refugees. Those who still live inside the camps are under the administration of the UNRWA. The second category is the Palestinians who hold an additional identification card beside their Jordanian citizenship to identify their Palestinian identity, which allows them as Palestinians origins to visit the West Bank through Jordan. These cardholders also enjoy political and civil rights in the West Bank. In this context, the challenge of the Palestinian refugees is titled to how the monarchy in Jordan sees these camps and how they will be part of Jordan’s claim in supporting the Palestinian refugees’ right of return. Moreover, the demographic shift that has been caused by the Palestinian existence in Jordan is perceived as a perpetuation of converting Jordan into an alternative homeland for the Palestinians.

The second refugee group that came to Jordan were the Iraqis, who referred to Jordan after the American war on Iraq. The Iraqis were concentrated in Amman, specifically the West of Amman where social and economic changes occurred. Many were to blame the Iraqis

for the soaring prices and deteriorating public services (De Bel-Air, 2009, p. 10 cited in Lacroix & Alqdah, 2012,). Moreover, Jordan tool some security restrictions after the November 2005 incidents in which ‘thirteen Iraqi terrorists associated with Al Qaeda threw bombs into three luxury hotels, and among those killed were several guests at a Jordanian wedding’ (Weiss-Fagen, 2007, p. 8 cited in Lacroix & Alqdah, 2012, p. 5). From 2007 onwards, visa restrictions, restrictions on employment, exclusions from accessing education were implemented by the Jordanian government on Iraqis (Lacroix & Alqdah, 2012, p. 7-10). However, a study in 2012 surveyed 372 Iraqi refugees in Amman, Jordan, the following were the leading difficulties Iraqi refugees were facing: 90% unemployed, 72.6% relied on relatives for income, 43% mentioned receiving aid from other organizations, 73% spent most of their day watching tv or sleeping, 94% wished to be resettled in Western countries, 44% lack access to education, other social issues raised were domestic violence, barriers to integration due to economic and educational restrictions, impact on mental health, and most were suffering from several non-communicable diseases such having heart disorder, diabetes, etc. (Lacroix & Alqdah, 2012, pp. 7-9).

The last and largest refugee group that has entered Jordan in the past 10 years was the Syrians. In 2007, estimates range from 1.2 to 1.4 million Syrians who sought refuge in Jordan (UNHCR, 2007 cited in Lacroix & Alqdah, 2012, p. 4). In no doubt, the large numbers of Syrian refugees created a conflict within the Jordanian society. The Jordanian society expressed its dissatisfaction with the Syrian wave of asylum that affected its life and had negative repercussions on all political, economic, social, security, demographic, and health levels. The Jordanian citizen felt injustice, exclusion, and marginalization (Bani Salameh et al., 2020, p. 100). Jordan faced an increase in the pressures it had originally, due to the scarcity of resources, which, in turn, has created many economic problems, such as poverty, unemployment, a deficit in the state’s budget, and additional pressure on the health and education infrastructure (Bani Salameh et al., 2020, p. 89). However, The Syrian and Iraqi refugees in Jordan solidify Jordan’s position in the International community. As Jordan hosts as of 2021 about 66,760 Iraqis and 663,210 Syrians, Jordan is seen as part of the political solution in Syria and Iraq (UNHCR, 2021).

Aside from the refugee issue in Jordan, the Egyptian labor in Jordan strikes as an economic problem for the Jordanian society from one side, and as a preferred choice for certain jobs such as in Agriculture and Construction sectors (Razzaz, 2017, p. 21). In 2010, Egyptians comprised almost 85% of the total migrant workers in Jordan. In 2015, Egyptians comprised almost 65% of the total migrant workers in Jordan. However, the supply of Egyptian labor has decreased over the past year as the Government of Jordan has increased efforts to restrict the inflow of labor and to catch and deport Egyptians with work permit violations (Razzaz, 2017, p. 51, 27). The Egyptian existence in Jordan is seen by the Jordanian society as a competitor in terms of job opportunities, in contrast to what the Syrian or the Iraqi refugees represent.

#### **4.3. Controversy Over National Resources: Water And Gas**

Although Jordan is located in the Mediterranean region and hosts segments of the Jordan River, it's facing a water crisis and is holding the second position as the world's most water scarce country (UNICEF, 2021). Current studies show that this crisis is only getting worse as the current per capita water supply will be halved by the end of the 21st century (Ghaith, 2021). Jordan mainly relies on two sources of water, depleting freshwater aquifers and from a disputed Jordan valley, since Jordan doesn't receive its share of water and is polluted by Israeli waste (Climate Diplomacy, n.d.; Haddadin, 2000).

A number of factors contribute to the severity of this crisis. Jordan throughout multiple conflicts in the region has hosted refugees and most recently refugees from Syria in addition to its own rapid growth in population, as the population increased by four million from 2010 to 2020 (Jordan Department of Statistics, n.d.), which implies additional personal and industrial need of water. Additionally, the ecosystem in Jordan is expected to gradually suffer from the consequences of the current climate change crisis, with expected decrease in rainfall, higher temperatures and flash floods. Nevertheless, the most contributing factor is poor management of water resources and distribution due to poor infrastructure and (Alqadi & Kumar, 2014). This leaves Jordan with few options to avoid future deterioration, most notably the Red Dead Canal (Ababsa, 2013), which poses two major challenges of cooperating with Israel that is interested in a mirror project of

transporting water from the Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea that grants them more control over the project (Weinthal & Zawahri, 2020), and financing its planned projects to meet its current and future needs (Alqadi & Kumar, 2014). A novel declaration of intent between Jordan and Israel with mediation of both the United Arab Emirates and the United States of America, proposes a project where Jordan will supply Israel with solar power in exchange for freshwater (Al-Junaidi, 2021) can temporarily recuperate its immediate need.

Another controversial resource is natural gas as an initial component of power generation in Jordan (“93 percent of Jordan’s Electricity Generated by Natural Gas,” 2018). Until recently Jordan mainly relied on Egypt as the primary source of natural gas (U.S Energy Information Administration, 2014) until Jordan decided to sign a deal to import gas from Israel (Al-Khalidi, 2020).

Regardless of Jordan’s urgent need to sustain both of these resources, the state’s approach was met with a great deal of opposition from both Jordanians protesting in the streets, even describing the deal as a betrayal to the people (Al-Khalidi, 2020; Joneidi, 2020). Also, some voices in the parliament voted to withdraw from the deal (Elliott, 2020). This response was the same as the similar most recent deal to generate solar power in exchange for freshwater (Al-Khalidi & Freij, 2021). This national stand implies both discontent regarding the regime’s normalization of its relationship with Israel and criticism of the state’s mishandling of resources. Nonetheless this raises concern of Jordan abdicating his sovereignty by tying its national security to another state that will provide him with very crucial resources.

#### **4.4. Changing In the Regional Order**

Despite that Jordan is a small country with scarce resources, it plays an important role in both the regional and international sphere. The geographical location of Jordan is a key to its role in the region, first it shares the longest border with Israel and acts as a barrier to Israel’s expansion in the region. Second, it’s stability in the middle of continuous conflicts and war zones makes Jordan an essential gate of global governmentality to host refugees,

act as a mediator in the region and as an active member in the war against terrorism, all which are very important roles in international and regional politics. Since Jordan's stability is crucial for the international community, King Abdullah II maintained his father's King Hussein strategy in solidifying Jordan's position within the international community by distancing himself from taking sides in regional conflicts and embracing the policy of 'friends of everyone'. The interest of the Palestinians alongside its own interests have always been the motive behind their policies, which also explains the thought process of King Hussein in his decision to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. Unfortunately, Jordan didn't achieve what it was hoping for after signing the treaty, since Israel increased its occupational activities, mutual economic projects never materialized, and through the terms regarding the Jordan River, the Jordanians have become dependent on Israel for water supply. While more countries in the GCC are joining to normalize their relations with Israel, the Jordanians keep stressing the influence of the continuous Israeli colonization on the demographic structure in Jordan, since more refugees arriving in Jordan is increasing the social and economic pressure on their side. However, and since the Covid pandemic, Jordan has further exacerbated economic problems. It has imposed more restraints on their response to these normalization ties between gulf states and Israel mainly because the Jordanian economy is dependent on financial aid from them and their allies.

Unlike other monarchies in the region historically, Jordan was one the few to survive with its initial political system. Many analyses tie this stability to Jordan's relations with the U.S and joining the west camp in the cold war. However, examining Jordan from a regional and international events' scope is insufficient to draw conclusions on how the regime maintained its legitimacy and stability internally. Therefore, the historical analysis of events since the establishment of the state alongside the tools and strategies that different kings relied on to handle internal and external challenges provide a better understanding of the dynamics of powers and relations between the political stakeholders in Jordan, and how they collectively enhanced political legitimacy.

In the first years of the state establishment King Abdullah's strategy in building legitimacy was to focus on getting support from Britain, on par with his vision of a united Arab state to rally support from the entire region. But as Jordan was declared an independent state by the end of his reign, the priority shifted to constituting the relationship between the king and Trans Jordanians to preserve his legitimacy. Despite his very short reign, King Talal progressed the constitution enabling Jordanians of political participation by stating the political system as a parliamentary monarchy. King Hussein can be seen as the highlight in Jordan's history as he efficiently utilized various tools of legitimacy. Internally by forming a unified national identity and externally by solidifying Jordan's role both regionally and internationally as key to his political legitimacy. As well as contributing to the religious legitimacy of the royal family by exercising Jordan's custody over the holy places in Jerusalem, and his announced ambition of reunifying the two banks. As for King Abdullah II, his priorities were shifted to the economy, liberties, civil rights and other important aspects of the population in terms of his internal political legitimacy mainly through the formation of different governmental specialized organizations. In addition to the same strategy his father adopted regarding diplomatic affairs.

In 2021, King Abdullah was the first Arab leader to head forward visiting the U.S president Joe Biden after he exercised his authority. The King's visit to Biden would open new horizons for Jordan - according to some Jordanian politicians - in addition to its being a savior for the monarchy in Jordan in the Western media after the 'sedition' incident in Jordan<sup>36</sup>. The visit seemed like an excellent exit for Jordan, which experienced economic and political pressures under the administration of former US President Trump and changing politics and allies in the Middle East. Under the Trump administration, a new wave of Arab peace operations began with Israel, which posed a great threat and challenge to Jordan, both politically and economically. From a political point of view, Jordan, which has the longest border with Israel, was supported and viewed as the key to stability and as a barrier to Israel's expansion in the region. However, with the change in the Arab attitude

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<sup>36</sup> In April 2021 a royal crisis occurred between Prince Hamza and King Abdullah II where allegedly the prince tried to take over the throne.

towards normalizing relations with Israel, Jordan's political role in the region diminished and marginalized. As a result, the Jordanian monarchy was threatened to lose privilege in its claim of supporting Palestinians to establish their independent state, and its importance as the only custodianship of the Holy Places in Jerusalem when Arabs from gulf will be able to visit the holy places under an Israeli permission. Moreover, things were not also in favor of the monarchy domestically. After the wave of Arab spring, and continued demonstrations in Jordan, the monarchy in Jordan witnessed a royal 'feud' as described in the western media. However, the details of the events needed to be understood by its historical depth.



## **CHAPTER V**

### **CONCLUSION**

The Middle East has always been a point of interest for researchers as it's crucial to analyze the wider sphere of international politics. The variety of the demographic distribution and the acceleration of the events make this spot take much of the searcher's attention. For Jordan, its geopolitics imposes on it to deal with various events that influence the street. and this makes the state in Jordan in continuous interaction with the Jordanian society as much as it is needed to interact with the changes in the region. Jordan's greatest concern now is its economic crisis, which is the most common reason behind the Jordanian's street frustration. Analyzing the monarchy's tools and strategies to maintain legitimacy give a further and wider understanding of the events that shape legitimacy and power in Jordan. Examining the political events from outside does not necessarily enable us to analyze the dynamics of power internally. Therefore, the historical analysis of the origins draws the picture more accurately. The monarchy in Jordan has been in continuous work to enhance its political legitimacy since the Arab Spring took place in 2011. The tools, strategies and approach by king Abdullah had varied regarding some internal and external factors. For the most part, the Jordanian monarchy was affected by the externals more than the internals due to its international order. Therefore, concepts like governmentality and power may be more applicable to modern bureaucratic states in terms of stability and legitimacy, but in Jordan it seems that the political system and the state do not follow a certain type.

It is important to emphasize Jordan's geopolitics as part of answering the question of power and legitimacy in Jordan. Jordan's geopolitics had put it under challenges and imposed changes on its internal politics as it did on its regional and international ones'. Starting from the fall of the Berlin wall and the change in the world's great powers, to globalization and war on terrorism, the Arab spring and recently the global pandemic.

These events had formed challenges to Jordan as a small country with scarce resources. According to the Academic Amer Sabaileh, the geopolitical effects on Jordan may be examined through three-time events that Jordan played a major role in. First, the Iraqi-Iranian war. Second, the civil war in Lebanon, and finally the Gulf war and changing situations in the West Bank (The Jordanian Youth and the State Centennial, 2021, 108). Sabaileh emphasizes Jordan's politics in these time events, and argues that after the Iraqi-Iranian war Jordan turned to its internal politics and started a phase of political and economic developments. After Saddam Hussein's overthrow, Jordan began its geopolitical role precisely on what is called 'war on terrorism' until the wave of Arab spring. The current geopolitics of Jordan is a result of all of these events and wars. Jordan throughout the years tried to strengthen its relations with Iraq as it is part of Jordan's international and regional relations. Despite the Hashemite union between Iraq and Jordan failing in 1968, both countries still enjoy stable relations. However, the Iranian interference in Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and the insatiable power dynamic inside Iraq between the tribes and current political system, have narrowed the relationship between the two countries. As for Jordan's relation with Syria, the relations since the Arab spring and the war in Syria has formed a political and economic burden on Jordan. However, the emergence of ISIS and the need of forming an international alliance to stop the spread of its acts, had put Jordan again in the political scene where King Abdullah stated multiple times that he supports the political solution in Syria. After ten years of the Arab spring in Syria, and the floating numbers of refugees to Jordan, Jordan has reopened its borders with Syria. In King Abdullah's II recent visit to the US, he lobbied for exceptions for Syrian sanctions, which all be in favor of Jordan's economy (Mathews, 2021). Saudi Arabia is also sharing borders with Jordan. After the Arab spring, the relations between Jordan and Saudi Arabia took a strategic depth. Where Jordan seemed more close to the gulf by receiving funds. However, as long as the relations do not transcode a relation based on funds to a strategic alliance, Jordan will remain under pressure regarding its regional relations. A good example is the last Qatar-Gulf crisis when Jordan was forced to freeze relations with Qatar under pressure from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. On the domestic level, Jordan's relations with the gulf regimes formed concerns to some political parties and social movements. While Saudi Arabia and

UAE listed the Muslim Brotherhood organizations as a terrorist organization, Jordan simply did not. However, Jordanian authorities maneuvered with some new rising Islamic political parties and closed their offices in multiple events. Lastly, and most critical relation for Jordan is its relations with Israel. Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994, yet Israel is still considered the first enemy for the Jordanian society. Israel is a historical enemy which threatens the stability and natural resources of Jordan. However, Jordan formed security cooperation regarding refugees and sharing borders and water. The new wave of normalizing relations with Israel arose the question of whether Jordan was a functional entity that was found to serve the establishment of Israel in the region or it is what Hashemites could save from the Sykes-Picot plan of division of the Middle East. Jordan's role in the peace process between the Palestinians and Israel seemed to be limited as the recent events revealed. With the Israeli violations of Al-Aqsa Mosque, Judaization of the Old City and the implementation of ethnic cleansing policies against the Palestinians, Jordan could not but condemn and denounce without being able to achieve any direct political pressure on Israel. The case applies to the last war on Gaza too. Jordan did not have any card to pressure Israel to stop its war on Gaza strip. In both cases, Jordan went to the US to find a solution and lobby toward stopping the Israeli violations.

Despite Jordan's weak diplomatic cards and faint political influence on Israel, it still can be part of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict solution. Having the biggest population of Palestinian refugees among the region enables Jordan to be part of the solution as this large population is still considered a threat to the Jordanian identity. Therefore, this is one of the reasons behind Jordan's support of the two-state solution and establishing an independent Palestinian state.<sup>37</sup>

The recent Corona virus has put an external pressure on Jordan in facing its economic crisis and exacerbated the weakness in Jordan's administration and autonomous power. In light of Mann's discussion on autonomous power, the weakness of the Jordanian authorities can be translated to its lack of autonomous power and knowledge over its own citizens. During the late pandemic (Covid-19) the Jordanian authorities issued defense

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<sup>37</sup> See chapter 3; Palestinian element in political legitimacy.

orders and set a complete lockdown. Many people were negatively affected because they don't have social security registrations, and therefore there was no one to help them cover their daily expenses. In other words, the infrastructure of the state was not strong enough. Because the state in Jordan is infrastructurally weak, the relationship with the individuals is weak too. Immigrants for example suffered during the late pandemic from the lack of services. Moreover, the day laborers who are not under any umbrella, were not reached by the state to get help during the pandemic, but the state was able to punish them according to the defense orders whenever they broke it to work and support themselves. The state was able to use high despotic power over society, but was unable to help them overcome the economic consequences to its weak infrastructural reach. Jordan used the defense order in a despotic way, but because of the weakness of the infrastructural reach it couldn't impose it on all regions. For example, when the state imposed the lockdown, it could apply it on the capital, but not on other cities, districts, villages and rural areas. Practically the state used the physical power to oppress political and labor demonstrations, which confirmed the people's concerns on their freedoms regarding the state enforcements of defense law. It is supposed that the despotic state is a tyrant. And has the knowledge of every citizen in the modern world, and therefore its infrastructural reach is strong. However, the state in Jordan was able to be despotic on individuals but infrastructural when it comes to individuals needs and rights. The same applies to how the state deals with democracy. In terms of freedom of speech, people enjoy a level of freedom and to some extent are able to express their political opinions. However, they are not truly engaged in policy making, neither the political parties and politicians experience a peaceful transition of power within the state. As Mann describes this type of state:

Despotic achievements have usually been precarious in historic states because they have lacked effective logistical infrastructures for penetrating and coordinating social life", however, "thus the development role of the powerful state has essentially fluctuate sometime promising it, sometimes regarding it (Mann, 1984, p:211).

To finally conclude, it seems that Jordan as a state does not fall under a certain type of modern state. It fluctuates between using despotic power and encouraging democracy. The monarchy in Jordan can be either the obstacle or the guarantee of democracy in Jordan. The monarchy in Jordan can preserve legitimacy in two dimensions.

First, sovereignty over its resources, reinforce democracy and reposition the constitutional monarchy. Second, strengthening Jordan's relations with neighboring countries and the international community.



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January - June 2016, Erasmus+ student, Hacettepe University, Turkey

2019-2021 MA in Political Science and International Relations, Ibn Haldun University, Turkey

## Experiences:

August 2015 - August 2019 Radio talk show host and News Anchor, Husna fm, Jordan

June - August, 2018 Arabic Teacher for Non-native Speakers, Ewan institute, Jordan

May - August, 2019 Research Assistant, Center of Strategic Studies, Jordan

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