Debates around the concept of civilization are increasing. It is natural for debates to intensify given that several disciplines such as sociology, political science, and international relations are using civilization as a unit of analysis. As Paul Ricoeur (1965, pp. 271–84) pointed out, we are in a time when a ‘mediocre civilization’ is gradually threatening the whole world. Paul Ricoeur (1965) in his article draws attentions to this threat and states that a standardized ‘mediocre civilization’ came to impose itself over the whole world. Despite his appreciation of the globalization of universal values, Ricoeur regards this ‘mediocre civilization’, which is produced and disseminated by modernity, and which steadily assumes a plastic-artificial character, as one of the greatest threats that humanity faces. Under such circumstances, it is beneficial to question whether the tendency to solve almost every

* I am thankful to Miriam Cooke and Tahsin Görgün who read the manuscript and offered their valuable comments.
issue through a single concept called civilization is the result of reducing thought to a standard mediocre level. Of course, every paradigm is built on ‘root concepts’; however, in order to understand these clearly we must contextualize them in relation to centres of power. As a starting point, then, we can define these centres as centres of the modern Western system of thought. Thus, as modernity becomes global, non-Western societies are forced into a hierarchical relationship with the West and it would not be wrong to say that the present global regime is an outcome of Europe’s re-structuring of the world.

As generally stated in the debates around the concept of civilization, the relation of non-Western societies to the West is often seen as being defensive.\(^1\) A system of thought that places European civilization at the centre renders ‘civilization’ as one of the main concepts of Eurocentric thinking by grounding a hierarchical understanding of cultures and civilizations.\(^2\)

Europe’s civilizational conceptualization attempts to define human communities in terms of fixed binaries such as developed versus underdeveloped, civil versus barbarian (or wild), and modern versus primitive. These have tangible political consequences. According to Norbert Elias (2013), the concept of civilization functions to legitimize European imperialism in large geographical stretches, from Africa to the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia. According to him, civilization expresses Western self-consciousness.

It is expressed with the words that the people belonging to their community ‘civilize’ compared to the past and the people belonging to other communities ‘civilize to less’ and even ‘become barbarous’. (Elias 2013, p. 10)

As Elias stated, we can also call this ‘national consciousness’.

The concept is used to express the things that Western societies have believed to have for two or three centuries unlike earlier societies or ‘more primitive’ contemporary societies or more ‘primitive’ societies. Western societies try to express the things they have and pride on through this concept. For example, \textit{their} levels of technical sophistication, \textit{their} behavior patterns, \textit{their} levels of scientific knowledge or \textit{their} philosophies are some of them. (Elias 2013, pp. 73–4)

If Elias is correct, then the concept of civilization is related to a hierarchical structure, in which civilization becomes a way of favouring
some at the expense of others. Therefore, similar to attitudes that conceive civilization as a picklock-concept explaining everything, attitudes that reduce all explanations to a single alternative concept that rivals civilization must equally be questioned.3

I believe this chapter, which consists of four sections, will contribute to the critique of the modern understanding of civilization by showing the possibility of an alternative non-reductive system of thought. In the first section, I will examine the interest in the *Muqaddimah*, which is both the main source of this study, and has an important place in Turkish intellectual history. In the second section, I will explain the historical, sociological, and intellectual backgrounds against which a foundational text like the *Muqaddimah* was produced. In the third section, I will demonstrate the relationship between Ibn Khaldun’s general understanding of existence and ‘umrân as a concept that explains a social system. In this section, I will also discuss the processes through which ‘umrân emerges and the different historical, sociological, and geographical possibilities in which ‘umrân comes to manifest itself. And finally in the fourth section, I will explain the reasons why we need an independent discipline of *‘ilm al-‘umrân* in order to understand the concept of ‘umrân which defines the social system.

My main goal in this chapter is to demonstrate the possibility of the existence of a social system other than the one that imposes a singular way of life defined by the modern West. By utilizing Ibn Khaldun’s approach in the *Muqaddimah*, I will try to show the pluralist alternative system.

**THE GROWING INTEREST IN IBN KHALDUN**

The interest in Ibn Khaldun in Turkey is an old phenomenon and continues to increase even today. The Turkish secondary literature gives us insight into concepts and methods they believed were central to understanding Ibn Khaldun’s work. These important indicators mediate a long-standing scholarly approach to Ibn Khaldun (more specifically, to the *Muqaddimah*).

In Pirizade Mehmet Sahib Efendi’s (d. 1749) translation of the *Muqaddimah*, he states that the intellectual familiarity with Ibn Khaldun is not new. His translation of the *Muqaddimah* into Ottoman
Turkish at the beginning of the eighteenth century extended a well-established Khaldunian tradition in Ottoman thought (Câbrî 2006, pp. 9–16). He translated five out of six full chapters of the *Muqaddimah* alongside some titles from the beginning of the sixth chapter. Before completing it, he presented it to Sultan Mahmud I (1696–1754) in 1730. About a century and a half after Pirizade, Ahmed Cevdet Pasha (d. 1895) completed the full Turkish translation of the *Muqaddimah* (Hassan 1973, p. 115) by translating the remaining parts of the sixth chapter, which he described as the most difficult part of the book. Pirizade’s translation was first published in AH 1274/AD 1857 in Egypt and a year later in Istanbul. Cevdet Pasha’s translation was published shortly thereafter in AH 1277/AD 1860 in Istanbul (Yıldırım 2001). There are four more Turkish translations of the *Muqaddimah*, which were done during the Republican Period. These were done by Zakir Kadri Ugan (1969), Turan Dursun (1977), Süleyman Uludağ (1991), and Halil Kendir (2004).

**THE *MUQADDIMAH* AS A FOUNDATIONAL TEXT**

The *Muqaddimah* was written as an introduction (hence *Muqaddimah*) to Ibn Khaldun’s book on history. However, like Jean Bodin’s famous *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem* (1566), the book was more than a simple introduction to history. The *Muqaddimah* is laced with a rich variety of concepts and issues unprecedented at the time. The word ‘muqaddimah’ literally means ‘preface’. As such, it can be defined as the thing on which the issues/provisions following it are based. However, the technical translation of the term ‘muqaddimah’ that is closest to its original meaning first used by logicians is ‘a proposition suggesting an argument or a thing on which the accuracy of evidence is based without using any vehicle’ (Şerif 1990, p. 118). As such, it is better understood as a ‘premise’ that must be correct and relevant to the problem at hand. When the premises mentioned in the First Book of the *Muqaddimah* are closely considered, it becomes clear that these propositions are in fact premises upon which the science in question, that is, ‘the science of umrân’, is based.

Modern readers of the *Muqaddimah* are often struck by an embracing vision grounded in a thorough humanistic framework that is more akin to their own sensibilities. This fascination emanates from
the modern assumption that the past has teleologically progressed towards a Eurocentric present that is the only space for any kind of secular humanism. From this standpoint, it is surprising for some that Ibn Khaldun produced a scientifically rigorous explanatory framework suitable ‘even today’ such a long time ago in the ‘East’.

However, if we approach the text from a different perspective and methodology, then we can gain insights into the text that are more helpful. First, we can start by acknowledging that an Islamic vision decisively influenced Ibn Khaldun’s ability to make accurate and comprehensive inferences. The Islamic framework provided him with a general scope and an enhanced ability to comprehend the whole experience of life because it depends on an intellectual accumulation that extends beyond mere subjective ability. For those who were unable to contextualize his thoughts and rather identified him as ‘an ascetic and gorgeous star in the dark night of Middle Ages; no pioneer, no successor’ must have been unfamiliar with his sources. For example, Imam Mawardi’s concept of the relationship between the command (taklif al-amr) and the acquired mind (aql al-muktasab) with the prosperity of the world is directly related to Ibn Khaldun’s concept of acquired asabiyyah that is based on the example of the Israelites. The similarities between the two are more than coincidental. Examples like these enable us to see the intellectual connections between Ibn Khaldun and others, and thus to shed light on each. The acknowledgement of Ibn Khaldun’s indebtedness to previous scholarship, something Ibn Khaldun himself clearly mentions (1969, vol. 1, pp. 94–5), should not in any way take away from his own originality.

Turning to the content of the work, the author mentions that in the work he has explained the changes in the lives of the tribes who lived in past ages and the reasons behind their capturing the country. The state and characteristics of tribes, how they experience nomadic or settled life in cities and countries, their migrations and movements, how they gain power and desire, fall weak, their science and arts, trade, the stories about making profit or loss, the changes they experience in life over time, how they leave nomadic life and settle and the occurring of expected situations and cases, which belong to human communities and world, have also been explained with reasons and evidences. Khaldun also mentions that since his work includes rare sciences and marvelous wisdoms, it has become a

Yet we need not take Ibn Khaldun at his word. This book, like any other, bears the traces of its context. Therefore, the text can be understood better when the context is made more explicit. The spread of Islam after the seventh century provided the foundation of an empire which engulfed the Arabian Peninsula, Mesopotamia, and North Africa, ensuring the stability of trade routes between Europe and Asia. Ibn Khaldun’s lifetime marks the end of this great rise. Intellectuals of his time were interested in assessing what they perceived to be a lack in visionary dynamism plaguing Muslims.

On the other hand, Islam, born in the cradle of civilization, opened new areas of scientific inquiry developed in conversation with many ancient philosophies, religious beliefs and practices. At the risk of oversimplification, one can state that Ibn Khaldun’s *Muqaddimah* shows that Muslims were accustomed to keeping one foot in what they saw as Islam’s original values, while keeping the other in a stream of foreign experiences.9

In the time of Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), Islam geographically extended from the Maghreb to Central Asia, but was simultaneously undergoing a sort of Balkanization (Fakhry 1987, p. 257). While Muslim social organization embraced different tribes and cultures, this resulted in diversifying the sources of sovereignty. Civilizational leadership began shifting from Andalusía and the Maghreb to Anatolia and Iran.

Ibn Khaldun’s life passed partly in exile or in prison, but always in contact with dynasties, and he always found himself at the centre of political struggles. Ibn Khaldun’s own experiences were later embodied in the *Muqaddimah*, as a statesman who conducted negotiations between Timur and the King of Castile, as a tenured jurist who served as a qadi, and as a scholar competent in the intricacies of Arabic language and literature.

Another aspect of the environment contributing to Ibn Khaldun’s intellectual accumulation is the philosophical spirit of his time. He drew his conclusions by reconciling with the common philosophical heritage of the period. Majid Fakhry (1987, p. 257), in his book *Islamic Philosophy*, summarizes Ibn Khaldun’s contribution to Islamic philosophy in two ways: the first entails his far-reaching observations on
and criticism of Greco-Arabic philosophy, and the second is an analysis of his contribution to the Islamic philosophy of history through the creation of original concepts. As Fakhry mentions, Ibn Khaldun’s works can be understood in their entirety when considered together with this in his own life.

Ibn Khaldun’s criticism of the explanations of philosophers about the existence of God, prophecy, the nature of revelation and afterlife were mainly epistemological. He argued that the philosopher’s claims to metaphysical knowledge based on rational thought was insufficient because these issues could not be comprehended with the mind alone, and men could not say anything intellectually provable about these issues (Görgün 2009, p. 553). While Ibn Khaldun did not think philosophical explanations on these issues were epistemologically rigorous, he emphasized many a time in the *Muqaddimah* that a number of other issues should be subject to philosophical investigation. In fact, Ibn Khaldun ‘demonstrated a very positive attitude in the other issues of philosophy and rational sciences. That he considered the science of ‘umrân, which he founded as one branch of philosophy shows that his thinking was philosophical and he gave philosophy a very important place’ (Görgün 2009, p. 553).

**A VISION OF ORDER AND ‘UMRÂN AS AN EXPLANATORY CONCEPT**

Ibn Khaldun argues that there exists an unbreakable bond between man, nature, society, and the Creator (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, p. 3.). This argument is not peculiar to Ibn Khaldun. There are many thinkers—both contemporary to and following Ibn Khaldun—who have focused on this relationship. For instance, according to Ibrahim Kalin, traditional ontologies are predicated on a grand circle of existence. Traditional ontology places man and the universe within this circle. By ‘traditional ontology’, it is suggested that Ibn Khaldun’s understanding of existence is a continuation of a larger tradition and heritage of Islamic thinkers. So the claim here is not that all Islamic thought is exactly on the same side when it comes to their comprehension of existence, but nor can one ignore that there is a shared tradition arising from belief. In addition, Kalin does not put forward a normative judgement as to the accuracy or fallacy of this tradition. On
this account, existence (wujud) exceeds a simple referential relationship to all existing beings in the world (mawjūdat). Because wujud's meaning goes beyond the totality of its reference mawjūdat. Wujud is both constitutive and constitutional of all existing things. According to classical Islamic thought, the reality of wujud is not limited to contingent appearances alone. The wujud of contingent beings in appearance is thus simultaneously both eternal and dynamic as Kalin states; and by participating in wujud contingent beings do not circumscribe the true reality of wujud. The rich etymology of the word 'wujud' in Arabic indicates that it is a dynamic and multi-dimensional reality that is difficult to capture by the ancient Greek word for 'being', ousia. The word 'wujud' etymologically is derived from the root 'to find' and 'to be discovered'. This finding/discovering is always in relation to consciousness. 'To find out' requires intentionality or a 'looking for', and 'to look for' always requires consciousness (Kalin 2010, p. 38).

In this integrated understanding, what constitutes the relationship between the system al-akhlāq (ethics) and al-'umrān is the fact that virtues directing human life and sovereign rules and principles determining the order of the universe are derived from the same source (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, pp. 3–5). This source, together with the aforementioned virtues that direct human life and constitute the order of the universe, is ordained by Allah himself. For that reason, there is harmony and integrity among these virtues. On the other hand, according to Kalin, the description of wujud as haqq in classical philosophy links the ontological and epistemological aspects and levels (marāṭib-al wujūd and marāṭib-al ulūm) to each other. Haqq, if we express it in today's language, would refer to both truth and reality. Both 'haqq' and 'wujud' are attributes of Allah, and he is the authority (marjīa) that defines the principles. Thus, when referring to objective reality and to principles, 'haqq' is used interchangeably with 'wujud'. While 'wujud' constitutes the reality of beings, it also imparts to them truth and meaning. Therefore, distinguishing truth and reality or being and knowledge from each other is not possible either conceptually or methodologically (Kalin 2010, p. 25).

We find a substantial sample of this conceptual framework in Farabi's al-Madinat al-Fādilah. The way in which Farabi begins with the 'first principle' and brings the subject to humans and their social lives after mentioning the ranks of being is the natural outcome of this holistic
The Vision of Order and Al-'Umran as an Explanatory Concept

approach explained earlier. His expression that all existing beings hinge on the cause of first principle and are subject to a definite ranking summarizes the framework that we mentioned here (Fārābī 2001, p. 83). The city life and the political order formulated by Farabi rest upon a comprehensive ontology and cosmology. This holistic and integral ontology is the basic framework of the idea of order and harmony on which the ‘umrān relies (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, pp. 100–4). In a similar way, Ibn Khaldun explains the formation of ‘umrān in a relationship of similar wholeness. Khaldun believes that he Almighty God fashioned man in a way in which his ‘need of food’ would mean that he would not be able to ‘live alone’, nor lacking weapons, would he be able to defend himself. It is only with mutual co-operation that man obtains food for his nourishment and weapons for his defence. This is how God’s wise plan that man(kind) should subsist and the human species be preserved will be fulfilled. Consequently, Khaldun believes that social organization is necessary to human species. Without it, the existence of human beings would not be complete. God’s desire to people the world with human beings and to leave them as His representatives on earth would not materialize. This, he believes, is the meaning of civilization. When mankind has achieved social organization and when civilization in the world has thus become a fact, people would need someone to exercise a restraining influence and keep them apart, because aggressiveness and injustice are in the animal nature of man (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, pp.102–3).

Ibn Khaldun states that sovereignty belongs to mankind by nature and this is realized via ideas and politics. He thinks that the state is a product of this idea and politics (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, p. 104). Ibn Khaldun adopted the postulate that ‘man is civilized by nature’ in his evaluation of the nature of humans. This is also one of the basic premises of his predecessors, and it is a premise that considers ‘being civilized’ as related to the ‘city’ and ‘living a social life’ (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, p. 100). This constitutive order begins with a necessity that human nature has the capacity to recognize. By being conscious of this fact, humans join the cosmic system by choosing to be natural. That is because establishing a state is a requirement of political (social) life and it is a natural need for human beings.

Here we need to emphasize that Ibn Khaldun’s approach regarding man’s tendency towards good rather than evil is also congruent with
his approach to politics and the state. According to him, 'the good suits politics'. That is to say 'good deeds and justice are the branches of state' (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, pp. 362–4). The ruler is the representative of God on earth. If the order is not based and maintained upon good morals and justice, the rulership granted by God will be taken back and God will give that authority to others (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, p. 368). That is because nobility and honour are gained through exerting labour, and these assets can be preserved in a rule based on good morals and justice (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, p. 347).

As it is understood, the 'duty of representing' (the literal meaning of 'caliphate') means the protection of existence. It is maintained when humans strengthen their tendency to do well and avoid heading towards evil falling prey to the seductions of Satan; and this corresponds to the *maqasid al-sharia* (the foundational purposes of sharia). That is to say, being a caliph or representative is an act to preserve the life, property, intellect, lineage, and religion by the will of God. Establishing this on an Islamic framework, Ibn Khaldun has to be understood within the aforementioned paradigmatic ground (maqasid) into which he was born and appropriated in time. According to Görgün, when we consider the purpose of human existence on earth as the act of establishing civilization (‘umrân), it becomes more apparent. This issue is manifested in the Holy Qur’an in the distinction between *salâh* (peace) and *fasâd* (corruption), in which ‘salah’ may be used to define the acts carrying the being towards perfection through preserving it, while ‘fasad’ implies the opposite. This is what Ibn Khaldun means when speaking of the civilization of (civilizing) the earth (Görgün 2009, pp. 200–1). It does not mean treating the other with respect to the values and beliefs of one’s own civilization; rather it corresponds to a wider and deeper foundation of a *hadari* civilization.

It is possible to say that Ibn Khaldun’s *Muqaddimah* was written to make his system comprehensible. In fact, the content of the book has been confined to a discussion on the quality of civilization, the nomadism and settled life attached to it, seizure and occupation, earning, livestock, industry, sciences, and so on (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, p. 82). All these elements show us the fields of human activities performed by man that are ‘civil’ by nature. Nonetheless, ‘umrân is the manifestation of these activities. Connoting the concept of human
life with omr and the activity of bringing life suitable for meeting vital/basic needs with imar displays the deep relation between these activities.

All these words etymologically stem from the verb ‘-m-r. In the dictionaries this verb means sitting down (somewhere), living long, visiting (somewhere), building, being settled (somewhere) with people and animals, residing somewhere, keeping well, keeping something or somewhere in good condition. Similarly, ‘umrân means being developed, advancement, and felicity (Mutçali 1995, pp. 657–8; Enis 1998, pp. 597–8). Ibn Khaldun uses the term ‘‘umrân’ to refer to ‘peoples coming together in societies on the lively places of the earth and civilizing the world’ (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, p. 90).

‘Al-‘ilm al-‘umrân’, on the other hand, is a discipline that shows the causes behind historical events and the factors behind social relationships and stages. However, the science of ‘umrân is different from the science of history which means the narration of the past events as they appear. ‘Umran represents the interior dimension of history which contains the knowledge of everything in the past as its subject matter (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, p. 5). As indicated in the Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun is the founder of this discipline (Ibn Khaldun, 1969, vol. 1, p. 91).

According to Ibn Khaldun, the two main states of ‘umrân, hadawiyah and hadarah (sedentary), imply the states of the communities with regard to their lifestyles and manners. He asserts that both situations are natural and necessary for human beings (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, pp. 303–4). Bedouin is the word for nomadic living in the desert. Hadari refers to one living in the village, town, or city, in peace and security. According to him, badawah or nomadism is the basic and first stage of the human communities (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, pp. 307–8). The concept of nomadism defined the communities who adapted to the physical environment, were nomadic, had strong asabiyyah ties, and lacked the development of hierarchy. The concept of asabiyyah is one that is used and developed by Khaldun in order to express a theo-political-psycho-social phenomenon that crystalizes collective action (Ibn Khaldun 1969, pp. 364–5). This concept will be elaborated on in the following discussions, but the point here is that the ruling of these communities rests on chieftain, which is limited only with merits and owes its legitimacy to common values. Besides nomads,
the concept of badawah also refers to settled communities living in the village or rural areas, with a static or technically undeveloped economy.¹²

Hadarah, on the other hand, stands for settled societies in which the level of 'umrân is developed, and which can survive with the instruments of this development. In these societies, asabiyyah ties are replaced with 'worldly and individual desires'. Hadarah also corresponds to societies in which the level of hierarchy has taken root. Reaching the hadari stage is accompanied by the increase of property and progress of sciences and arts. In this society, sovereignty rests upon power and oppression. Even though people are not free, they cannot give up the property and the comfort they have. Also at the roots of hadarah society lies the bedouin society (Ibn Khaldun 1969, p. 309).

In Ibn Khaldun’s account, the antonym of civility is savagery. Human nature does not allow establishing a life that internalizes the state of savagery (waHsh). Ibn Khaldun defines being civil as a ‘natural and necessary’ condition, not ‘a target to be hit’. Thus, he offers a framework that is different from the modern Western understanding, in which civilization is a goal to be reached. He formulates the conditions of mankind as a historical venture under the aforementioned two categories. However, both categories are different versions of being civil. We need to pay attention to the fact that he did not define being nomad as equal to ‘being savage’ or as ‘an uncivil situation’. And he does not consider being hadari or ‘civilized’ as the ultimate end of history. In these general descriptions, there is not a single form of either nomadism or urban life (Ibn Khaldun 1969, pp. 308–9).

While explaining several variables affecting these diverse human situations, Ibn Khaldun puts great emphasis on the relationship between ‘umrân and geographical conditions. In the section dealing with this question, he outlines seven climates and their regional boundaries. These climates are classified according to their respective impact upon the bio-diversification, human activities, progress of sciences, arts, and religions—and the corresponding level of ‘umrân/ civilization in his terms. The fourth climate is the warm climate that provides the most proper conditions for human development. That is ‘because the South and the North are opposite to each other—one being too hot while the other being too cold—and it was necessary for
both to get equilibrium in the middle, this gradually made the fourth climate as the most developed part of the globe (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, p. 193). The third and fifth climes are far from the circle of equilibrium. The second and the sixth climes are also far and the first and the seventh circles are the least suitable places for civilization, because with tough weather conditions—extreme heat in the South and extreme cold in the North—they are ill-suited to human settlement. Iraq and Damascus are the most moderate and suitable regions for the development of civilization. To conclude, the weather of the third, fourth, and fifth climates are moderate. Territories of East Africa, Hijaz, Yemen, Iran, India, China, and Andalusia are the remaining parts of the moderate climate zone. People living in these territories have a modest character because the conditions are optimum for shelter, clothing, tool-making, and finding sources of nutrition. The French, the Galls, and the Greeks are also people of this moderate circle. All these regions are under the third, fourth, and fifth climate regions (Ibn Khaldun, 1969, pp. 193–5). The first and second climate regions are inhabited by people of southern Africa where clothing is not vital and valuable materials such as money are not used and the settlement is undeveloped. The sixth and seventh climates are the very cold regions, such as the northern regions of Asia and Scandinavia (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, p. 199).

Ibn Khaldun does not consider the features that emerge as a result of the geographical factors upon human beings as static or unchangeable.

The nations are distinguished from each other with different features as well. Ascribing the nations living in a certain region to an ancestor due to adherence to the same sect or religion or due to same complexion, because of the features found in the ancestor such as religion etc. have been one of the mistakes of the unawares who do not know about the nature of the universe and the being. Because all these features change in the coming generations after fathers and it is not a lasting feature. This is a rule given by God to his Creatures. And the law of God never changes. (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, p. 202)

His explanation of the diversity of human communities distinguishes his approach from the ones that suppose human nature to be unchangeable and consider civilization as a spiritual whole or race. For him, both civilization and the ethno-cultural diversifications
appear as human differences. Skin colours, characteristics, and habits of human beings emerge and differentiate within time. Eventually, according to him, the diversity and plurality of the tribes and generations stem from the diversity and plurality of their ways and methods of livelihood. This is because the individuals coming together and living in groups is a form of cooperation for the sake of livelihood and for protecting their lives. Maintaining the things necessary for life comes before the things needed to complete the experience of living (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, p. 302).

In addition to all these, while explaining the historical developments that are the manifestations of 'umran, Ibn Khaldun brings the concepts of asabiyyah and mulk to the forefront. The word *asabiyyah* means a sense of solidarity or common sense, which holds the community together and makes it move as a single organism. The basic characteristics of this sense may be noted as the sacrifice of the personal for the community (Ibn Khaldun 1969, p. 365). The asabiyyah is strong in the Bedouin society and provides them with military supremacy over more settled communities. Thus, the Bedouin society exercises sovereignty over the mulk, that is, the settled community. However, in time asabiyyah dissolves and empties itself into the state and its bureaucratic apparatus. The concept of mulk is used to connote property, commodity, and all the things under the sovereignty or control of the state. For him, mulk is only possible through coming together around an asabiyah or a thought and by hearts being united in the determination to realize it. Hearts, on the other hand, can only get closer to each other by the cooperation of the people who aim to expand the religion of God and make it sovereign (Ibn Khaldun 1969, p. 402).

The meaning of asabiyyah here extends to all forms of emotions and feelings that stand in for kinship. According to him, tribal organization does not automatically provide the necessary power to seize countries. Even if a lineage-based asabiyyah extends its political power through sovereignty over mulk/territory, this does not lead to the growth of the 'sovereign subject', but rather extends territory and human resources under it. An asabiyyah-based political organization leads to the dilution of lineage-based power over large territories because as it expands it becomes weak.

These conclusions are informed by Ibn Khaldun's larger understanding of the nature of politics. For him, the mulk/state 'can only
be founded with power, authority and victory. Being victorious is only possible through convening around asabiyyah and an ideal and founding proximity among hearts to each other in order to realize that ideal' (Ibn Khaldun 1969, p. 402). Due to the very nature of this attitude, with time the state starts to act against its own existence. In this case, while asabiyyah benefits a particular group, it turns out to be a system of oppression for the ones outside this group. This is quite contrary to the raison d'etre of the state. Hence, every state needs to have peculiar principles of legislation and executive power along the lines of these principles. For this reason, a need arises in every state to posit its own principles of rule and legislation and to execute these rules in accordance with those principles. If these rules or regulations are determined as 'the rules legislated by the reasoning of human beings' (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 2, p. 117), then it is called 'rational politics'. The most that rational politics can achieve are worldly interests for its people. The politics constructed upon 'the principles and verdicts of sharia' on the other hand is called 'shari' or religious politics'. For him, only this kind of politics completely consists of the rules or principles compatible with the raison d'etre of humanity as a whole.

Within the sphere of religious politics Ibn Khaldun discusses the 'question of revelation' under the subject title 'The content of 'umran, the conditions in which it emerges and the causes and reasons behind these conditions'. Khaldun mentions that after illuminating His chosen subjects with Light among whom He created, He embellished them with His irfan and made them 'a tool and vehicle in between'. The chosen subjects tell the created beings of God the maslaha, encourage them to not to go astray and protect the ones on the right way from fire. The wonders explained by them and the unknown knowledge regarding existence can only be known with the knowledge of God; it is not possible to know in another way (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, pp. 216–17).

We may recall that for Ibn Khaldun mulk would be attained with power, and power necessarily with asabiyyah; asabiyyah could lead to oppression and injustice, and that would, in turn, threaten the survival of the state. It was compulsory for the states to set some principles and to legislate certain laws and regulations in order to get rid of this threat. God has revealed His Word and has ensured that mankind is protected from aggression and dispersion by His
messengers. However, the overarching laws and regulations in maintaining this order belong to God in any case. Thus, we can say that for Ibn Khaldun, from the perspective of the science of ‘umrân, religion conveyed to the people through a prophet in the realm of the social is equal to the physical–geographical and social factors (Görgün 1999, p. 552).

According to him, although humans have a disposition to evil (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, p. 354), mankind has the capacity to lean towards good by their disposition, reason and power of speech. Man tends towards evil due to the animal powers that exist within him. ‘Man’s leaning towards good by being human indicates that his disposition is closer to good.’ The fact that Man found state and deal with politics stems from his humanly disposition. From this perspective, then, man’s inclination towards good and decent is pertinent to politics and power (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, pp. 364–5).

As can clearly be seen, the revelatory principles are graces bestowed upon man in determining the content of the principles upon which the state and politics would be established.

According to Ibn Khaldun, the transformation brought with religion elevates the influence and qualities of sovereign power. By means of religion, different asabiyyah are dissolved and they evolve into the higher asabiyyah of belief in a single form:

Belief in and submission to a religion ends the jealousy and competition among the owners of asabiyyah. All come together around the truth; the religion leads them to think for the common good and interests; since their goals are single and equally important for all, no one prevents them from attaining their goals because they embraced attaining their goals to the death. Even if the soldiers and supporters of the state they attacked outnumber them, the ones fighting for the victory of the Truth would defeat them. (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, pp. 402–3)

The theory of asabiyyah is Islamicized by way of the idea of proph­ecy and religion. For instance, the visiting of angels at the time of Prophet Muhammad and keeping Muslims devoted to the cause indicate that religious politics extends beyond simple positivism into an imaginative experience of negotiating the transcendent with the immanent.

Ibn Khaldun’s attitude towards the relationship between mulk and the caliphate is also directly related to this position. According to him,
The concept of authority is the element that distinguishes the caliphate from mulk. Two significant aspects of the caliphate are 'the authority of religion' and the principle that no one has the right to use force on another. In this regard, authority in religion is adopted and embraced as the true religion. The submission of people to religion by free will creates the ground for unification. The power stemming from this unifying submission brings about a very strong relationship that is beyond comparison with any other kind of asabiyyah; this would, in turn, provide the constitution of the most powerful and moral society of the world. However, over time, different types of asabiyyah might emerge and this could lead to conflict. Struggle among different types of asabiyyah pressurizes political powers to force a single form and transform itself from a caliphate to a mulk. With the realization of the (secular) potential that mulk contains in its nature, it retreats from the moral virtues prescribed by religion.

Related to mulk, state, and power, another significant issue to consider is Ibn Khaldun's refusal to consider or evaluate the question of power beyond ideals, human action, and geography. As it can be better understood in this evaluation of the era of caliphs, he seemed to adopt a consensual formula between the requirements of power relations and the ideals. His interpretation of the conflict (the first civil war among Muslims) between two close friends of the Prophet, Ali and Muaviyah, provides strong evidence for this claim. He states that both Ali and Muaviyah tried to unite the Muslims under their leadership. According to Ibn Khaldun, they wanted this for the sake of Islam and both of them were right. Ibn Khaldun wrote:

When the second caliph Umar visited Damascus and saw the governor Muaviyah in unaccustomed clothes to the Muslims and asked 'O Muaviyah! Do you follow the Iranian rulers?' and Muaviyah responded to him 'O the leader of the believers! We are in the border area next to the enemies and have to take pride in our war customs and accessories', Umar remained silent and did not refuse his argument based on righteous and religious concerns. (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, pp. 512–13)

It is clearly stated in the introduction and definition of the concept of 'umran that it is a comprehensive concept that regulates and organizes both systems of thought and ways of life. Thus, another point emphasized by Ibn Khaldun is the correlation between the development and diversification of the arts and sciences and the progress of
‘umrân. Khaldun believes that the people living in the cities in the progress towards sedentary life are concerned about the basic needs of life and these are wheat and other foods to eat. After cities develop and production increases, the income of the people exceeds their basic needs. People start spending this extra income to procure objects of luxury. Besides, industry and science is the product of reason and reflection, which differentiate humans from animals. Since humans are a kind of animal, they need food and nutrition. Yet the necessities of life come before industry and sciences. Science and industry is something needed after the basic needs of living have been met. Industries and the development of cities ensure that progress is in accordance with its need for luxury. The building of cities necessitates the progress of art and industry (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 2, p. 369).

According to Ibn Khaldun, when the needs of the people are met, new opportunities for human beings emerge. Prosperity is directly related to mobilizing resources and opportunities, and creating new ones. Thus, he says that God makes the earth prosperous via the hand of humankind.

Ibn Khaldun confined the sixth book of *Muqaddimah* to the issue of sciences. In the introduction of this chapter, he emphasizes the naturalness in the development of knowledge and sciences and points to the necessary conditions for the development of the sciences within the theory of ‘umrân. According to him, the preconditions for the progress of sciences are absent in villages or rural nomadic settlements, since these communities cannot sustain production beyond vital needs (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 2, p. 453). Methodologically, Ibn Khaldun uses a descriptive approach and reflects on the phenomena as they are, but, when needed, he also uses a normative approach and makes judgements upon his phenomenology of the political. While talking about the sciences, he acts as an observer on the one hand, and as a critic on the other, and sometimes even as a scholar contributing to the production of knowledge (Bedir 2006, p. 18).

Ibn Khaldun’s classification of the sciences begins with two branches. The first is the category of wisdom-related philosophical sciences (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 2, p. 455). These sciences are natural sciences for the people, and they learn these by themselves with their own reason and capacity. The second is the category of revelational-constructive sciences, and people can learn these from a teacher or
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instructor (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 2, p. 455). For Ibn Khaldun, these sciences are peculiar to the Islamic community. Ibn Khaldun notes that every nation has such sciences peculiar to them, but he argues that the Islamic community has two advantages in this regard. In the Islamic community, these sciences progressed to a level that had not been seen in any other nation (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 2, p. 458).

Ibn Khaldun discusses the methods of philosophical and constructive sciences in several places within the text. One of the contexts he discusses is how the natural process of thinking in humans turns into a rigorous science. According to Ibn Khaldun, because they have the ability to think, human beings achieve two things:

1. They can build a worldly life via cooperation, solidarity, and living together, and
2. they can comprehend the message of Prophets in order to prepare for the life hereafter.

Therefore, Ibn Khaldun takes two socially significant phenomena into consideration while classifying the sciences: designing the world and understanding the message of the Prophets. According to Görgün (1999, pp. 538–55), while in the first phenomena humans play a founding role, in the second role humans limit comprehension. In his emphasis on deductive reasoning, humans point to the role of comprehension. One of the sciences he includes in this classification is the science of 'umrân that was first developed by him. The basic feature of the science of 'umrân, which is a metaphysics of society, is that it considers the subject matter as a social existence which went unnoticed by the metaphysicians. Ibn Khaldun's true success is not his emphasis on treating historical events with a methodology based on causality, but to invent the field of social existence. There, he considers the science of 'umrân as a part of philosophy as well as history. In this regard, 'umrân can be considered as a philosophy of history on the one hand, and, through the study of history, a philosophy of social science on the other. However, it is possible to say that beyond these two disciplines, 'umrân is essentially a social metaphysics expressed in the tradition of classical philosophy (Görgün 1999, pp. 538–55).

According to Ibn Khaldun, to raise professionals specialized in science, regular education is required. This is only possible if society has developed to a certain level in demography, prosperity, and econom-
ics. The society that promotes the progress of sciences, by transferring funds and resources to the study of the sciences, is the most powerful and thereby exercises dynastic control over the mulk. The establishment of foundations and the rise of the arts and sciences in the East and the West formed the apogee of state power (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 2, pp. 441–52). According to his theory of 'umrān, as the rise and fall of the civilizations necessarily follow each other, the arts and sciences also follow this cycle, and with the decay of the civilization, the sciences also fall (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 2, p. 452).

Ibn Khaldun considers the arts resulting from this process and classifies them according to their different aspects. The first classification is based on meeting the needs. The art that exists for meeting basic needs are 'simple arts', while the ones for meeting luxurious needs are 'complicated arts'. In another classification, the arts are distinguished as ones peculiar to sustenance, politics, and reflection. Arts and crafts like textile weaving, sericulture, carpentry, and ironworking are peculiar to sustenance. Military service and its equivalents are peculiar to politics. The sciences and arts peculiar to reflection are classified as music, poetry, and teaching.

The relationships of the arts with bedouin, hadari/sedentary, and civilization/'umrān, are also treated in the sixth chapter. The classification of basic arts with respect to their contents is as 'essential' and 'honorable and significant by subject'. The essential arts are farming, architecture, tailoring, carpentry, and weaving. The arts that are honorary and significant by subject are midwifery, authorship, book selling, music, and medicine (Ibn Khaldun, 1969, vol. 2, p. 368).

THE NEED FOR THE SCIENCE OF 'UMRĀN

While forming the science of 'umrān, Ibn Khaldun distinguishes two realms of existence. The first of these, the 'realm of elements', constitutes the subject matter of the metaphysical, and as its extension, of the physical or the natural sciences (tabiyyat). The second realm, the 'realm of occurrences/events' constitutes the subject matter of the science of 'umrān. The realm of events is the realm of being/existence and annihilation. It is directly related and dependent on humans and can exist solely alongside humans; likewise humans cannot exist without the realm of events. The essential difference between these
two realms of existence is that humans belong to the first realm with their physical entity and individuality, yet the second realm of existence exists necessarily as a result of the human existence, that is to say, it belongs to humans. As the realm of events arises from within the society, it is social; as it exists and ceases to exist within time, it is inside the society, and, therefore, the realm of the events is a social realm of existence. Things like asabiyyah, mulk, and state, which do not exist in the physical world, arise out of people living together. Therefore, by acting and interfering in the physical world, humans reconstruct it in accordance with their means and purposes. ‘Umran arises as a result of this reconstruction (Görgün 1999, p. 544).

As also understood from the lines just quoted, according to Ibn Khaldun (1969, vol. 1, pp. 66–7), as every entity undergoes change in the realm of events ‘umran also goes through changes. Khaldun mentions that one should know that the duty of man is to talk about the reconstruction of (imar/ ‘umran) the habitable places of the world by living in communities, and the savageness which occurs in the native state of this reconstruction and gaining familiarity (habituation) within the community, and the asabiyyah in which humans protect themselves and the families and populaces they belong to. It is one’s duty to inform about every kind of aggression and invasion of people against each other, and the founding of the states as a result of these invasions, and the degree of the power and glory of these states, and humans earning and making a living through labour, the sciences, the skills, and the arts, typically the industry, and naturally the civilized productions coming into existence as a result of this prosperity and to narrate and relate any knowledge regarding these subjects (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, p. 82).

It can be inferred from this quotation that narration and rumour, due to various reasons, are methods that could lead to delusions. Especially in the calculation of goods, money, and armies, historians have narrated so many rumours that did not make sense that these narrations have to be analysed in accordance with rules and principles of reason and laws (Ibn Khaldun 1969, vol. 1, pp. 19, 88–9). Ibn Khaldun (1969, vol. 1. pp. 91–2) expressed that since these rules and principles could not be studied by existing sciences, a new science was needed. He recites the characteristics of this new science and accentuates its peculiarities, differentiating it from other sciences.
The science of ‘umrān is the reconstitution of events and the social existence of humans within this multilayer conception.

In this chapter, the concept of ‘umrān and its significance in understanding the term ‘civilization’ from the point of view of Ibn Khaldun is explained. ‘Umran is a sophisticated concept and it has a certain relation to religion, nature, arts, science, and state politics. It is, thus, a regulatory concept that conforms above all to God’s rules and then to the order that humans have founded on earth in accordance with those rules. In light of this, it is possible to evaluate what we have written so far in four points:

1. Ibn Khaldun thinks that everything happens in accordance with destiny and the situation we are now facing is the realization of this destiny. As there is an order in the sphere of physical existence, the sphere in which mankind lives has a similar order. And Khaldun’s term the ‘nature of ‘umrān’ indicates that the rules of ‘umrān can be explored (similar to rules of the physical world). The subjects of the science of ‘umrān are the analysis of this nature, the accidents that befall this nature, and the relations between these accidents. The core principle of the explanation for how ‘umrān came into existence can be stated as ‘needs properly met produce new potentials’. So, throughout the *Muqaddimah*, Ibn Khaldun set forth that Allah constructs the earth via the hands of man and prosperity is realized by mobilizing existing potential and producing new potential. Among the wisdoms of *i'mar* (reconstruction and prosperity) are the different dispositions: the need for nutrition and the sheltering of humans. These necessities help humans to voluntarily realize the maqasid al-shari'a. This is both a state of necessity and a realization of the freedom of man’s actions that are shaped by his preferences.

2. The basic feature of the science of ‘umrān, which is a kind of ‘metaphysics of society’, founded by Ibn Khaldun, is that it takes as its subject matter the historical–social existence which had not been noticed until then by the metaphysicians. The actual success of the science of ‘umrān comes from this genuineness. Ibn Khaldun’s metaphysics of society enables a two-layered and two-phased thought. The first of these is that with reference to the unity of humans, it identifies that the realm of historical–social
existence consists of human actions and in this context it states that the realization of social order needs no other reason than that of one being human. Second, it states that as humans gravitate towards perfection, they necessarily need religion, and the ethical perfection in human actions adds a different dimension to the cooperation among people.

3. According to him, humans are civilized by nature, but here ‘civil’ means humans living in society with other people. Thus, the word here has a meaning quite close to that of being cultivated. However, every group of people does not have to necessarily establish the same social order, because establishing a social order runs in a ‘voluntary’ way based on ‘free will’ (Şentürk 2006). Ibn Khaldun mentions the stages experienced by humanity in its historical journey: badawiyyah and hadarah. However, he regards these two situations as manifestations of being cultivated under different conditions. It has to be pointed out that he does not define badawiyyah as being savage or as an uncultivated state. In this case, the ultimate goal of the human history is not evaluated as ‘being cultivated’ or ‘being hadari’. According to his explanation, the opposite of being cultivated is ‘being savage’, yet mankind has not constituted a lifestyle which leaves a possibility to internalize this situation. With this approach, Ibn Khaldun has presented a framework that is explicitly different to the modern Western system of thought.

4. For Ibn Khaldun, mulk signifies a second level of existence. As he considers humans as a part of existence, Ibn Khaldun evaluates humans’ ‘inshâ’î (constructive/constitutive) activities not as a matter of domination over nature but as a matter of rights and responsibilities of a representative in his capacity of being God’s caliph (representative) on earth. According to him, mulk cannot be the ultimate goal of history. The ultimate goal of history can be understood by the expression ‘God, completes/perfects his command (‘amr) through the caliphate.’ This becomes more evident especially if we think that the purpose of the existence of mankind in the world is to bring about ‘umrân, that is to say, make the earth prosperous. This question/subject shows up in the differentiation of ‘salah’ and ‘fasad’ which are used in the Qur’an in a widespread manner. While salah is subject to and the proper
way for divine guidance, the quality of the actions that preserves the existing and carries them to perfection, fasad means the exact opposite. By the construction (i’mâr) of the world, Ibn Khaldun exactly means this (Görgün 2009, p. 200).

All of these points suggest why ‘umrân appears as a unique concept in Ibn Khaldun’s thought and why this chapter hesitated to translate ‘umrân simply as ‘civilization’. Unlike ‘umrân, the concept of civilization has been immersed in discussions of progress and modernization—something that still continues. Ibn Khaldun, however, one should re-emphasize, developed the concept of ‘umrân with the purpose of understanding the cycle of civilizations in their natural context, far from responding to the modern crisis of Muslim societies.

In a nutshell, what I have summarized in four points leads us to the conclusion that social life is a phenomenon which is constructed through free human agency and which can manifest itself in different forms under different circumstances. Therefore, it is necessary to see different social manifestations and ways of life as totally natural. And the concept of ‘umrân constantly promotes this understanding.

Along with this, another conclusion might be that just as the current social system is constructed by human agency, other forms of social life can be constructed in a similar manner. Detailed examples given in the Muqaddimah clearly demonstrate this point. Therefore, contemporary social, economic, and political forms are not ultimate and eternal. In any case, everything has an end; eternity and constancy/stability are qualities that befit no form or mode of existence less than it does God himself.

NOTES

1. Ottoman-Turkish modernization is a remarkable experience that can be examined from this perspective. Moreover, as the modernization in Ottoman as a general frame was a Europeanization-Westernization disseminating from the political centre towards the periphery, the concepts of being civilized and civilization were used in a Eurocentric context in nineteenth-century Ottoman thought, and the measure of civilization was generally defined as ‘vulgar Westernization’ (Kalin 2010, pp. 13-14).
2. For an attractive evaluation about ‘Letaifu’l-efkar ve kâşifu’l-ersâr’ by Semerkandi as an example of different ways of understanding the history of humanity and its condition, see Kavak 2012, p. 467.
3. As an example to facilitate the understanding of the mental clutter, the main function of Halil Halid’s ‘civilization’ expression is to adopt and understand civilization as the common heritage of humanity instead of rejecting it in spite of the awareness of the fact that it justifies European colonialism: ‘Let Europeans not forget that Easterners are fond of their independence and freedom just like themselves and hate a foreign country to boss them with the claim of “good will” or “civilizing mission” with all their hearts’ (Halid, 2008, p. 211).

4. Latinized copy of this work was also published by Klasik Yayınları. See Ibn Khaldun and Pirizade (2008).

5. Although I have utilized Pirizade’s, Kendir’s and Dursun’s translations for this chapter, I prefer to quote from Ugan’s translation alongside the Arabic text (Ibn Khaldun 1981). There are various questions concerning all of these translations. For example, the concepts of civilization and state which have different connotations today were frequently used in the translations interchangeably. On the other hand, some parts of the text were translated incompetently without mentioning the fact that some parts had been skipped during the translation. For an assessment of this translation, see Kirbaşoğlu (1985, pp. 363–98).

6. Cemil Meriç evaluated Ibn Khaldun in his book Umrandan Uygarlığı:

Darkness falls on Maghreb.... A man in Ibn Selame castle.... Sounds of hooves and screams in his ears and bitter taste of defeats in his lips. He has been fighting with history for more than 20 years. He has been a player in or a spectator for very major disaster of his era. Palaces, wars, dungeons.... And the destiny, which razes the most proud towns to ground, wakes up before consciousness cliffs. Thought, son of crises. The man’s gazes pierce the mists. The man places law in the place of destiny, the law in other words, manifestation. He understands that there is no place for giants in this war where dwarves have the victory. He conquers with his pen the countries which he cannot conquer with his sword, the countries and eternity. Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), an ascetic and gorgeous star in the dark night of Middle Ages; no pioneer, no successor. Muqaddimah, a dawn enlightening ages, whirlpools, caves, summits. (Meriç 1996, p. 139)

Although this evaluation of Cemil Meric is popular and attractive, it is not accurate. Indeed, it is known today that different names especially Fahreddin Razi and Al-Ghazali are his sources (see Fakhry 1987, pp. 256–64; Görgün 1999, pp. 533–44).


8. For a vision which uses his classical metaphysical language but is not a repetition of his classical metaphysics, see Görgün, 2009, pp. 354–6.

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10. Imam Mawardi also implied that all blessings are from Allah and the more men do favour, the more result they get. According to him, the improvement of world and afterlife occurs this way (Maverdi 1969, p. 5).

11. Likewise, it should be expressed that the circle of adalah, commonly known in the way Kinalizade formed and one of the most comprehensive and concise expression of Ottoman social order as well as Classical Islamic political thought, has also been used by Ibn Khaldun (Mukaddime, v. 1, p. 94). In Kinalizade’s expressions the circle of justice (‘adalah) is expressed in the following way (emphasis are our own):

\[\text{adlııır mucıb-i salāh-i cihān/cihān bir bağdır divārdevlet/devletin nāzımı serı’ıttır/serı’ate olamaz hiç hāris illā mūlāk/mūlāk zaft eyelemez illā leşker/leşkeri cem edemez illā māl/māl kesb eyleyen ra’ıyettir/ ra’ıyyeti kul eder pādışah-ı āleme adlı.} \ (\text{Ahlāk-ı Alāı p. 539})

12. As happened in Ugan’s translation of Muqaddimah, the term ‘badawi’ being translated as ‘nomad’ leads to semantic restrictions.


14. For the details of these reasons, see Ibn Khaldun (1969, vol. 1, pp. 18–19, 82–90).


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